STUDIA CROATICA
Year XV – January – June 1974 – Vol. 52-53
The Great Paradox of Our Time
The Crisis of the Yugoslav Economy and the Policy
of "Stabilization"
Banks in Yugoslavia
"The Democratic Spirit" of the Republic
of Poljica
Documents
"The Reader's Digest": Incomprehensible
Hesitations Before the Truth
The Death of General Perón
Eudocio Ravines and Serbian Hegemony
How Were the Votes Cast in Croatia?
News and Commentary
Micro-News Report
Book Reviews
Dr. Ivo Omrcanin: Economic Wealth of Croatia
George J. Prpic, Ph.D.: "Tragedies and
Migrations in Croatian History"
Nicolás Matijevic and Olga H. de Matijevic, Patagonian Bibliography
F. W. Deakin, The
Embattled Mountain
Croatian Poetry from its Origins to the Present Day
The great paradox of our time
Franjo Nevistic
On "Socialist" Freedom and Justice
"What, then, are kingdoms without law but
great bandits, and what else are bandits but small kingdoms?" Saint
Augustine.
This is an ancient truth of Saint Augustine, but it
seems eternal and therefore highly relevant in our present historical moment.
The absence of law gives rise to violence.
Indeed, violence in today's world does not cease.
Rather, we could say that it increases daily, becomes universal, and conquers
global citizenship. The use of violence characterizes gangs, large or small, in
the same way.
Everything related to this reality, on this side of
the Iron Curtain, is all too familiar to us. The mass media provide us with
information on the matter, like a daily ration of intellectual and moral
nourishment, comparable to what the milkman and the baker deliver to us every
morning for our physical sustenance. When we open the newspapers we read daily,
we are informed about armed robberies, kidnappings, and fatalities, which are
not limited to any particular sector of society. No one is safe anymore, from
the highest-ranking politicians, military officers, union leaders, and
industrialists to, lately, even priests, considered since time immemorial as
the ideal of the virtuous man, especially in Christian society.
Regarding what is happening in this respect on the
other side of the Iron Curtain, in the so-called "socialist"
countries, information is scarce. Due to ironclad censorship and discipline, it
is impossible for information from that "forbidden" area to reach our
ears. The information concerning the repeated waves of "purges" and
"cultural movements" is supplied to us wrapped in ideological
packaging and presented on such gigantic scales that we hardly grasp their
tragic nature of violence.[1]
Indeed, the reciprocal violence between rulers and
the ruled, or between different strata of the same society—to avoid the term
"class," so dear to Marxist "scientists"—ignores what, for
example, R. Aron considers one of the greatest achievements of civilization in
general: the monopoly of force, the authorized use of weapons by a single body
within society. The polycentric use of force, at this historical moment, acts
to destroy this monopoly, this invaluable achievement of civilization, exhibiting
the characteristics of a true social schizophrenia, analogous to the
physiological and psychological schizophrenia of ill individuals. Just as in
the latter it often leads to the destruction of their immediate social
environment and, sometimes, to self-destruction, so this social schizophrenia
threatens to destroy society itself. The opposing "kingdoms" try to
destroy each other to impose their order, their own law, their legality, each
denying the legitimacy and legality of the other's actions.
Examining the roots of this evil in depth,
especially from the perspective suggested by Saint Augustine—the lack of
law—would take us very far afield; it would require a voluminous study,
consulting hundreds of authors and thousands more carefully selected, serious,
and profound works, since we would have to address the problems of the ontology
and deontology of law, which constitutes the fundamental and central theme of
the philosophy of law and of all human political and social life.[2]
Even without considering our own capacity to
dedicate ourselves to such a difficult task with any probability of success,
our purpose on this occasion is different, although we cannot entirely avoid
the first issue. Since our aim is to shed some light on one of the greatest paradoxes
of our time, intimately linked to the universalization of violence and the lack
of respect for the law, it is essential to address, albeit briefly, the issue
mentioned first.
What is this paradox, and what does it consist of?
The rebellious youth—to limit ourselves to just one aspect of this sad
phenomenon—those who perpetrate acts of violence today, invoke socialist
freedom and justice. But this socialist freedom and justice
that these 20- to 25-year-olds attempt to achieve through violence and the sacrifice
of often innocent lives are quite foreign concepts. What kind of freedom
and justice can those who categorically deny the Decalogue as an indispensable
foundation of civilization in general, and of Greco-Judaic-Christian
civilization in particular, bring us? What kind of justice and freedom is it
where the immolation of lives, pansexualism, and public bullfights of naked
university students characterize the heralds and bearers of a better, more
just, and freer society? [3]
If this is the case, then the most decisive
repression of the violent and the violence on the part of the constituted
authorities of society and the State would be normal and logical. If "they
have nothing to bear witness to, if they are not prophets but only gravediggers"—both
of men and of society—then the destruction of what exists must be prevented,
and the destroyers must be destroyed.
Despite all this, we cannot simply be supporters of
this kind of politics. We cannot be for two reasons. One group assists—at least
some of the rebels—and another, partially, is directed against the established
authorities.
Dienailou himself, after noting the maladjustment
of today's university youth to the conditions of modern life, adds: "But
there is also something else: the dissatisfaction of young people with a
technocratic society that uses them for its own ends but does not address their
fundamental problems. On this point, Marcuse's analysis is accurate. It is not primarily an economic crisis, but a psychological
one" [4].
Another scholar, who addressed the problem with
singular boldness and depth, reasons: "...behind the Marxist
slogan—freedom—there must be a true ethos and a true pathos, because otherwise
it would be impossible to understand the attractive power (of Marxist freedom—observation
note) if we are not to despair of human nature" [5].
This same author then reproduces the opinion on the
matter of the most authoritative contemporary theorist of Austrian communism.
Indeed, Ernst Fischer says: "The new left, which formed in the twilight of
the capitalist world, is not a passing phenomenon, nor a fad as some think, but
the expression of a profound social, political, and spiritual crisis." (In "Die Zeit," No. 29, July 1969, a time when the youth
rebellion in Europe reached its zenith.) R. Marcic then adds his
comment: "It is precisely a dialectical materialist, a convinced
communist, who presents the Western world with the certificate that, while the
Western world is capable of solving its material problems, it is not capable
when it comes to solving its spiritual problems, whose existence is, in
principle, denied by dialectical materialism. This is an
unprecedented challenge for us, one that we cannot ignore" [6].
To better round out these opinions and, according
to our own view of the problem, to get to its heart, it is almost impossible
not to recall here the Basque thinker, Miguel de Unamuno. According to him,
atheists and violent people are the most enamored of God.[7]
They would be a kind of "bogoiskateli" (seekers of God), a Russian
term coined in pre-revolutionary times in Tsarist Russia.[8]
They would therefore be spirits with a very special
sensitivity to justice, freedom, and politics in general. Discontent with the
environment and the era in which they live, because it is, in every way,
contrary to the image of their god, they try to change it, to accelerate its
evolution and progress with impatience, with the mad love of those who believe
in a divine freedom and justice, perfect, but obstructed by usurpers against
the "divine" will. In the case of these young rebels, we would be
dealing with a wellspring of human idealism, the true force and irreplaceable
factor for the progress of universal history. We would be witnessing a
pronounced interest in politics. Indeed, we are facing the phenomenon of the
total politicization of life, which is also evident in our Argentine
environment. (Especially in the speeches of President Perón.)
Leaving aside other components that could motivate or are actually inspiring
the violence we are witnessing—Sallust's "libido dominandi," for
example, or Nietzsche's "Der Wille zur Macht," or moral corruption
and the actions of mercenaries—let us focus, first and foremost, on those who,
within the general movement of rebellion, could effectively act as "bogoiskateli,"
as seekers of God, as those madly in love with Him, to see whether or not we
should "despair of human nature."
If these were seekers of God, one might ask: how
could their activity have led to such horrendous crimes, to the sacrifice of
the freedom, property, and lives of others? How is it that these young
people—barely at the beginning of their intellectual and moral lives—oppose the
whole of society, threatening its total destruction—political, economic, and
cultural—in the name of socialist justice and freedom? What gives them courage,
audacity, and resolve where more mature minds, after prolonged experience and
profound study, do not dare to make categorical judgments, preferring to take a
hypothetical position and proceed with caution and moderation?[9]
To avoid "despairing of human nature"
(Marcic) and having to confront only the "gravediggers" of men and
society (Danielou), we must examine what truly lies behind the socialist
freedom and justice invoked by the rebels of our day. We have said that for
them, freedom and justice constitute a kind of divinity, a mad love for God.
"Youth thirsts for the absolute. And the dimension of those who have the
duty to answer that thirst would constitute a true tragedy," says Danielou
in the passage already mentioned twice.
The answer, it seems, that is most appropriate for
many is given by F. Engels, one of the principal "evangelists" of
socialism. His ideas, formulated well in advance, find precisely today the
fertile ground for realization, in accordance with the law of the
"interference" of centuries and eras.[10]
How, finally, does Engels save us from the despair
of human nature, if indeed he saves us at all? Indeed, its starting point is a
strict materialist monism as a conception of life and the universe. The
concepts of freedom and justice are entirely confined to and exhausted within
the material world, precisely within historical-dialectical materialism. The
problem of freedom, within this conception, is the problem of dominion over the
laws that govern the material world.
The beginning of human freedom originates in the
penetration of human reason into the mystery of natural laws. Engels says:
"Freedom is not found in the dreamed-of independence from natural laws,
but in the knowledge of them and in the possibility that arises from this
knowledge to allow them to act in accordance with a predetermined end."
But this applies equally to external nature and to the physical and spiritual
life of humankind. "Freedom of the will is nothing other than the capacity
to make a decision in accordance with the knowledge of things... Freedom
consists in the knowledge of the dominion of natural necessities over ourselves and over external nature; therefore, freedom is
necessarily a product of the development of history."
Thus, by freeing himself from nature and subjecting
its laws to his own purposes, man fell into another, even worse, form of
slavery. "The forces at work in society behave just like the forces of
nature: blindly and necessarily, until we understand them and take them into
account." Since the mode of production is the most decisive factor for the
structure of society, its legal and political organization, and man's legal and
moral consciousness, it is of paramount importance to understand the laws of
production. "While we stubbornly resist understanding their nature and
character—the resistance coming especially from the defenders of capitalist
production—they act within us, against us, subjecting us to their
dominion..."
With the socialization of the means of production,
commodity production is eliminated, and with it, the domination of the product
over the producers. Anarchy within social production is replaced by a planned
and conscious organization. The struggle for individual existence ends. Only
then does humanity, in a certain sense, definitively separate itself from the
animal kingdom, leaving behind the conditions of animal existence and entering
into truly human ones... "Humanity's own socialization, which until now
had been seen as a necessity imposed by nature and history, is now its own,
personal, and free act"... "The objective, external powers that
previously dominated history now come under the control of humanity itself.
Only from this point forward will people make their
history with full awareness; only from this point forward will the social
causes set in motion by people themselves prevail and, to an increasing degree,
have the effects they themselves desire." This is
humanity's leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom" [11].
Here, therefore, is the basis for the dreams of the
"bogoiskateli" concerning earthly paradise, the "perfect
society," a future of justice and freedom where "each will work
according to their abilities and receive according to their needs." The seekers
of God, the advocates of a better future for society, have thus
"discovered" the secret of human liberation and the true concept of
freedom and justice, which are precisely socialist ideas and realities.
In the process of societal development, the mode of
production and distribution of goods is of paramount importance. Once the means
of production are socialized, essential conditions for social freedom and
justice are created. Therefore, action is necessary. Philosophies and
philosophers have hitherto only interpreted history, but from now on they
themselves must change it. The proletarian revolution destroys the existing
society that enslaves humanity, seizes power, socializes the means of
production, and definitively liberates humankind. Justice.
Seen in this light, there would be no reason to
despair of human nature. Today's rebels would be acting from the depths of
humanity's purest idealism. Logically, we should then reject any policy of
repression by the established authorities.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. The laws of
society are not identical to the laws of nature. Knowledge of the latter is
expanding by leaps and bounds, but it nevertheless escapes the total and
absolute control of human reason. But knowledge of the laws of society, which
are, first and foremost, laws of freedom, seems unattainable for freedom
itself. Hence, the new revolutionaries, the new philosophers—seekers of
God—begin to compensate for the lack of knowledge with the will to possess it
and with belief in a new utopia. "The decline of specifically religious
faith is being exploited with remarkable skill by communism, which in this
sphere aspires to act as a kind of vicar."
How can such a thing happen? “For the simple reason
that communism possesses the ferment or corpuscles that I would call
'religioid,' which in many souls provoke satisfactions analogous to those of a
religious belief,” Raúl O. Abdala said not long ago in “La Prensa.” Indeed,
today’s rioters despise all other religions and the entire society, organized
on pre-socialist and non-socialist principles. The fanaticism of the new
religion turns its adherents into fanatical revolutionaries who spread death
everywhere without scruple, or into governors who, with the greatest
fanaticism, persecute those who do not accept their religion. The free nature
of man leaves great opportunities for his persecutors.
For socialist society demands ethically perfect or
automatically obedient human beings, which is clearly
impossible. Violence should accomplish this impossibility. Analyzing the
self-managed society of Yugoslavia in this way—and it would be a more liberal
communist society—a philosopher, almost inseparable from it, He concludes:
"It is thus proven that, to eliminate exploitation, it is not enough to abolish
private ownership of the means of production." Due to the scarcity of the
means of production and the instinct for possession, in this new society there
will be a group that "will appropriate a portion of the surplus value for
its own needs, taking it away from society..."
This analysis demonstrates that in post-capitalist
society moving towards socialism, drastic forms of political alienation are
quite possible: when the revolutionary elite becomes the bureaucracy and the
differentiation of citizens into subjects and objects of politics takes hold.
Indeed, this philosopher reasons: "...the tendency towards the extreme
concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a narrow group of
leaders becomes more evident (after the destruction of bourgeois society)...
Man loses control of the political institutions, the State and the Party he
himself created... (Didn't Engels say the same thing about bourgeois society? - Author's note). Political affairs, even those requiring
initiative, such as elections, no longer have any meaning, because a genuine
choice is no longer possible, and therefore one's vote is meaningless.
Politics, consequently, ceases to offer the
slightest intellectual or emotional satisfaction: one renounces this and takes
refuge in apathy... moreover, one reaches moral degradation... in those who
consider it advantageous to engage in politics. Now fear, worries, and the
aspiration for success become the primary motives for political activity... the
involution and depersonalization of the individual are accentuated. Instead of
developing his personality, the individual He forgets himself, freeing himself
from personal responsibility and becoming a mass element, placed without
discrimination and irrationally at the disposal of the leader" [12]. But
what about those who consider it neither appropriate nor possible to dedicate
themselves to politics or who take refuge in apathy? Where do socialist freedom
and justice stand?
How can such a thing happen? “For the simple reason
that communism possesses the ferment or corpuscles that I would call
'religioid,' which in many souls provoke satisfactions analogous to those of a
religious belief,” Raúl O. Abdala said not long ago in “La Prensa.” Indeed,
today’s rioters despise all other religions and the entire society, organized
on pre-socialist and non-socialist principles. The fanaticism of the new
religion turns its adherents into fanatical revolutionaries who spread death
everywhere without scruple, or into governors who, with the greatest
fanaticism, persecute those who do not accept their religion.
The free nature of man leaves great opportunities
for his persecutors. For socialist society demands ethically perfect or
automatically obedient human beings, which is clearly
impossible. Violence should accomplish this impossibility. Analyzing the
self-managed society of Yugoslavia in this way—and it would be a more liberal
communist society—a philosopher, almost inseparable from it, He concludes:
"It is thus proven that, to eliminate exploitation, it is not enough to
abolish private ownership of the means of production." Due to the scarcity
of the means of production and the instinct for possession, in this new society
there will be a group that "will appropriate a portion of the surplus value
for its own needs, taking it away from society..."
This analysis demonstrates that in post-capitalist
society moving towards socialism, drastic forms of political alienation are
quite possible: when the revolutionary elite becomes the bureaucracy and the
differentiation of citizens into subjects and objects of politics takes hold.
Indeed, this philosopher reasons: "...the tendency towards the extreme
concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a narrow group of
leaders becomes more evident (after the destruction of bourgeois society)...
Man loses control of the political institutions, the State and the Party he
himself created... (Didn't Engels say the same thing about bourgeois society? - Author's note). Political affairs, even those requiring
initiative, such as elections, no longer have any meaning, because a genuine
choice is no longer possible, and therefore one's vote is meaningless.
Politics, consequently, ceases to offer the slightest intellectual or emotional
satisfaction: one renounces this and takes refuge in apathy... moreover, one
reaches moral degradation... in those who consider it advantageous to engage in
politics. Now fear, worries, and the aspiration for success become the primary
motives for political activity... the involution and depersonalization of the
individual are accentuated. Instead of developing his personality, the
individual He forgets himself, freeing himself from personal responsibility and
becoming a mass element, placed without discrimination and irrationally at the
disposal of the leader" [12]. But what about those who consider it neither
appropriate nor possible to dedicate themselves to politics or who take refuge
in apathy? Where do socialist freedom and justice stand?
To this impossible knowledge is added the ethical
perfection of humankind, which remains unattainable, especially in a society
that obliterates human personality through terror and violence. For, as Pascal said, "Man is neither beast nor angel, and the
problem is that whoever wants to make him an angel makes him a brute."
This is precisely what, tragically, results from the deplorable acts of
violence that overflow before our eyes. The rebellious "bogoiskateli"
in free societies, and their counterparts in power in "socialist"
countries, are, or should be, openly displaying their true colors. The utopian
faith in social and socialist freedom and justice is a mere pretext in the
struggle for power. Their confrontation with the powers of free societies or
with the subjugated subjects within their own sphere of influence is "a
confrontation of pure revolt with pure power, which has no way out," as
Daniélou said. The desire to create a perfect society at a time of total
destruction of man's moral personality constitutes the great paradox of our
era.
What, then, is the possible way out? The reason
that seemed to support the rebels is gradually evaporating. The convergence of
a whole range of "revolutionaries" is extinguishing the light of the
"bogoiskateli," extolling the banner of power and domination as the
only one. Is repression by the political authorities of the free world then
justified? What reason limits or conditions similar actions?
E. Fischer and H. Marcuse[17]
acknowledge the economic capacity of the free world, yet they justify, support,
and propagate rebellion against it. R. Marcic points out a significant parallel
between this phenomenon of rebellion against the free world at its zenith of
economic prosperity and that which occurred in classical Athens, also at the
height of its flourishing. It was the Sophists who rebelled against the system
in force in Athens almost two thousand five hundred years ago. Hippias
reproached his fellow citizens in power: “You speak of truth, of love, of
beauty, you argue about order, you speak of justice, and what do you do?
Proudly, you despise the barbarians; not even the Greeks themselves are your
equals, you do not treat the Greeks of other cities as your brothers, not to
mention other men. And yet, we are all brothers and belong to the same human
race. Hypocrites! What kind of order is it that speaks of freedom and lives by
slaves?”[18] Is Marcuse’s assertion accurate, and to what extent, that
rebellious opposition, especially from the youth, is “an opposition that
condemns the system and its way of life en bloc, condemning its constant and
omnipresent pressure, when, through the game of its increasingly repressive and
destructive productivity, it degrades everything to commodities; opposition to
a system in which buying and selling constitute the substance and the entire
horizon of life?” Can the same questions that Hippias once posed to opulent
Athens be directed to the free world?
If these accusations prove justified, then we can
indeed speak of the current confrontation between the rebellious and violent
forces on one side and the established authorities of the free world on the
other, as a confrontation between "pure revolt" and "pure
power," where there is neither dialogue nor any possible solutions,
according to Daniélou. Free society would increasingly become a closed society,
defending its political and economic power to repress those who challenge it,
especially against a society closed in principle and practice that sought to
replace it.
Thus, pure revolt and pure power would lead us to
chaos and atomic annihilation, without any possibility of dialogue or
reconciliation. "Technical civilization," says Daniélou,
"demands its temples and its festivals. It has technicians and asks for
priests. It is a spectacle both lamentable and ludicrous that this occurs
precisely when priests want to become technicians and when there is an attempt
to transform churches into places of political assembly."
Here, he refers to the fundamental problem of the
crisis within the Church itself. Priests who want to become technocrats, and
churches that participate in political meetings, justify themselves by claiming
that practical love for our neighbor is God's greatest commandment and that this
is where we must begin. The Vatican's "Ostpolitik" also arose from
this same idea. In dialogue, everything is possible, everything can be
resolved. But it is no less evident that there are errors in both currents and
widespread discontent.
Among the former are deserters who cause scandal,
while others, for a supposedly higher interest, overlook the concrete
misfortunes of many peoples and shake hands with those who oppress them. But
let us set aside for the moment this specifically ecclesiastical problem,
which, once crystallized, could have a general influence on Western, perhaps
even universal, society, and let us consider another proposed solution in this
chaotic state of confrontation where respect for the law is lacking and the
opposing sides, in their struggle, become lawless bandit kingdoms, as Saint
Augustine aptly said.
To the sophists
of that distant time in history. When the rebellion broke out in Athens, Plato and
Aristotle opposed it. Democritus and Antiphon, proponents of sophistry and the
first materialists in history, fought against all positive order, arguing that
at the beginning of the world there was chaos, matter without form, order, or
any constitution. Everything that was subsequently imposed is artificial,
contrary to nature; it is slavery. Aristotle defended the idea that from the
beginning of the world there was order, rhythmos, natural
law. Man fulfills his destiny in political society, but is not exhausted by it.
He does not accept the conclusion that Hegel and dialectical materialism drew
much later, which plunges man into collectivism.
The end and objective of the community is not
itself—the polis—but rather humankind, a being with inherent dignity who lives
for itself. Human nature—physis—delimits the power of the community, of
society, of the State. Therefore, law is not merely positive law, the
collective will, or the will of the strongest. Today, the question arises once
again with intensity and urgency: is the meaning of history humankind or the
human species, the totality or free humankind?
Communist dialectical materialism opts for the
species, for the totality, negating humankind as a free being with prepositive,
superpositive, and natural rights. The current conflict, expressed in violence,
is the conflict between the Western tradition, which gradually and
progressively forged the concept of human personality, and all forms of
despotic collectivist-socialist voluntarism that repeat ancient Eastern
despotisms.
The philosophical essence of this conflict lies in
the ontological problem: What is truth? Ontological
materialism or ontological formalism? Marcic, along with many prominent
thinkers today, especially in Europe, accepts the Aristotelian viewpoint.
Ontological formalism, as an expression of the universal order, inspires Law,
which is the most important form for the life and development of both humanity
and society, as well as for history. To deny it in the name of a supposed
natural chaos or a utopian society on the one hand, or in the name of the
strongest and their will on the other, means creating a socio-political vacuum
that is catastrophically being filled by violence. Because law is not merely
human will, however powerful those who formulate it may be. There is a natural
law of humankind, superior to all claims, whether chaotic-anarchist or
oligarchic-voluntarist.
Human beings must live in an open society in order
to reconcile their interests and rights with the interests and rights of others
in freedom and justice. The collectivist-totalitarian state excludes this
possibility by imposing a monopoly on power in all its facets and
manifestations: political, cultural, and economic, depriving man of his dignity
and reducing him to a mere object of the power of a class group. The pluralist
state, if it is truly liberal, if it does not close itself off to plutocratic
privileges, is an open state where all opinions, respecting human dignity, have
the possibility of coexisting within a measured rule of law that has its
ontological foundation both in the physical world and in the national and
ethical nature of man.[19]
Pure power, without the ontological backing of this
rule of law, and pure rebellion in the name of nihilism, of ontological chaos,
or of a utopia—especially a Marxist-socialist one—lead to senseless conflict, to
the tremendous confrontation of large and small bandits without rights.
The great problems
of history are not solved through crimes. For this purpose, the utmost exertion
of humanity's moral and intellectual virtues is needed. Those who daily bear
witness to the contempt for the Decalogue are utterly unfit for tasks of this
kind. If, nevertheless, they demand socialist freedom and justice, forging
their path through violence, they do so from a position of weakness, in
accordance with the idea of Louis Veuillot, when he said:
"When I am weakest, I demand freedom because that is your principle. But
when I am strongest, I deny it to you, because that is mine."
Is there a
communist-socialist regime that would proceed differently? Rebels within the
free world either have the same intention or they don't know what they are
doing. In both cases, it is the great paradox of our time. The most imperfect
man tries to achieve the most perfect society.
The crisis of the Yugoslav economy and the policy
of "stabilization"
Joining the Soviet Bloc
Jure Petricevic
I. Introduction
The economic crisis in Yugoslavia became the main
topic of study in 1972 and 1973, along with the reform of the Communist League
and the Constitution. Economic stabilization is the basic program of the party
and the government, and the duty of all those involved in the production
process. The economic crisis severely affected the working masses and consumers
and manifested itself, first and foremost, in rampant inflation and the
illiquidity of businesses. The high inflation rate led to a sharp rise in
prices and a decrease in the people's purchasing power, which in turn resulted
in a decline in the standard of living. The illiquidity of businesses led to
mass layoffs, wage reductions and non-payment, and increased unemployment.
Economic stabilization was supposed to reduce the
inflation rate, eliminate illiquidity, and increase employment by absorbing the
unemployed workforce and halting the exodus of workers abroad. At the same
time, it was intended to facilitate the return of some of those working abroad
by guaranteeing them employment in Yugoslavia.
The economic crisis is also reflected in foreign
relations. It manifests itself in the growing external deficit and the
increasing external debt. These two negative indicators are increasing to such
an extent that the growing inflow of foreign currency from tourism and workers'
remittances cannot offset the increase in debt. Thus, Yugoslavia's balance of
payments has recently suffered a large deficit, despite some incomplete
official reports attempting to portray a positive trend.
Economic stabilization is a key point in all the
conclusions and party statements of the last two years. This is the main theme
of the letter from Tito and S. Dolanc, dated September 18, 1972. In it,
following the model of Rankovic and the Soviets, they announce the
implementation of extremely rigorous centralism, including in the economy.
The only thing achieved so far is a slight decrease
in the illiquidity of businesses. Meanwhile, the inflation rate continues to
rise, unemployment is increasing, and the balance of payments deficit, instead
of showing any improvement, is worsening.
The stabilization policy, therefore, did not
achieve its intended objectives. Since this failure is an integral part of
Yugoslavia's socio-economic and political system and is related to the
Sovietization of Yugoslavia and its entry into the Soviet bloc, it is necessary
to analyze the causes of the new and profound economic crisis affecting the
poorest segments of the population and, above all, the Croatian economy.
II. Causes of the Economic Crisis and the
Stabilization Policy
On December 4, 1972, Dr. Jakov Sirotkovic, Deputy
Prime Minister of the Belgrade government, addressed the Federal Assembly in
Belgrade regarding the economic crisis and the stabilization measures. Prime Minister
Dzemal Bijedic presented further details to the same body on December 28, while
considering new draft laws aimed at addressing illiquidity and stabilizing the
economy in 1973. (Vjesnik, December 5 and 29, 1972.)
According to official figures published at the
time, losses in the economy amounted to 4 billion dinars, while overdrafts
reached 10 billion dinars. The cost of living increased by 16% in 1972 compared
to the previous year (later revised to 17%). According to official data, it was
estimated that 300 companies were on the verge of bankruptcy and 200,000 people
had been laid off. Later estimates yielded even higher figures. The number of
companies that had gone bankrupt reached several thousand. Companies were
unable to meet their obligations, became illiquid, and the main victims of this
crisis were the workers and employees. Non-economic investments, the production
of unsellable goods, private interests, the considerable power of banks and the
central government as creditors, and above all, the bureaucratic and
centralized economic system, were the causes of this major crisis.
As a recovery measure, general savings were
implemented, loans were reduced or suspended, mandatory bonds were imposed, and
wages and salaries were cut. According to some estimates, the salaries of one
million people were reduced by 10%, and the salaries of another 1.2 million
were frozen by the same percentage for a period of six months starting in early
1973. This economic "stabilization" thus impacted the vast majority
of workers and employees, whose incomes were reduced or could not be increased
in line with the rising cost of living.
At the same time, the central government
anticipated an increase in its expenditures for 1973. Prime Minister D.
Bijedic, in his aforementioned address to the Federal Assembly, declared that
the total budget for 1973 would be increased by 12.5% compared to
1972, reaching approximately 30 billion dinars. This budget was later revised
to 35 billion dinars, or 31% more than the previous
year. Bijedic emphasized the increase in the armed forces budget and in
veterans' salaries.
Due to the substantial increase in the official
budget, other stabilization measures appear illusory. However, in all
government and party conclusions, documents, and stances, the responsibility
for economic stabilization is placed on the personnel and managers of
self-managed enterprises, as if the success of the new policy depended on them
and not on the measures adopted by the government—that is, its credit and monetary
policy and its socio-economic system. This shifting of responsibility onto
enterprises is the guiding principle of the new phase of Yugoslav economic
policy.
According to official Yugoslav ideology, workers'
self-management was in effect, responsible for the development of enterprises
and all economic policy. On December 4, 1972, before the Federal Assembly,
Jakov Sirotkovic emphasized in his presentation on socio-economic policy for
1973 that the basic objectives and tasks of economic policy for the following
year were "to strengthen the social role of stabilization policy at all
stages of the reinvestment process and in the implementation of the production
and investment policy, and the accelerated development of the backward
republics and regions. Economic policy for 1973 should represent an important
stage in resolving the fundamental contradictions of society in order to
subordinate the system and the pre-investment process to the interests and
control of the working class."
The stabilization policy, therefore, did not
achieve the desired result. It merely accentuated the priority of the federal
bodies and strengthened their position. This policy, according to basic
indicators, generally failed. Based on the evolution of prices for essential
goods and services, it is estimated that the price index for these goods and
services will rise by 20% in 1973 compared to the previous year. The inflation
rate remains at its previous level, also defined by Sirotkovic as galloping
inflation. According to the Labor Statistics Bulletin, third quarter of 1973,
published by the International Labour Office in Geneva, the number of
registered unemployed during the first five months of 1973 ranged between
367,204 and 402,736, or 8% to 8.7% of the employed population. These figures,
of course, refer to the unemployed in the socialist sector. The majority of the active population is not included in these
statistics, nor are the unemployed in the private agricultural sector,
whose numbers are high.
The economy of the Socialist Republic of Croatia is
making significant sacrifices to this stabilization policy. According to Dr.
Velimir Rajkovic, the Croatian government's representative on the Parliamentary
Committee for Social Planning and Finance (July 10, 1973), "the growth of
industrial production in Croatia, which had long been at the forefront in this
area, has slowed." He also indicated that personal incomes fell by 10% in
the first half of 1973 compared to the previous year due to restricted
consumption (VUS, No. 1117, October 3, 1973). The weekly publication reports
that in the first seven months of 1973 in Croatia, due to a 20% reduction in
investment, chemical industry production fell by 2.2% and leather and footwear
production by 10%, while similar declines occurred in the textile, metal, and
other industries.
According to the same source, "as a
consequence of stagnant production and rising costs, Croatia's economic losses
in the first half of the year amounted to 1.025 billion dinars, 85% more than
in the same period of the previous year. Overall industrial losses increased by
147%, with particularly sharp increases in key sectors such as metallurgy
(173%), construction materials (238%), and shipbuilding (529%) (this large increase was influenced by the
devaluation)."
Despite the decrease in illiquidity in the economy,
according to the same source, in June in Croatia "only" 166 workers'
organizations were blocked "with a total amount of blockages of 780
million dinars," a figure that would be 12 times lower than that of the
same period in 1972. Self-management would only be effective in companies and
in the economy if democratic institutions and producers decided, through
democratic methods, on the use of credit and monetary resources, on production,
on development policy, and, in general, on the course of the economy. But such
a thing does not exist in Yugoslavia, since the entire state and socio-economic
system is based on the principle of extreme centralism and Serbian hegemony,
which are contrary to any form of self-management, democratization, and
decentralization. The events following the anti-Croatian coup staged by Tito
and the Serbian generals in Karadjordjevo in December 1971 confirm this once
again.
The composition of Yugoslavia's net and gross
social product according to the socialist or private sector reveals the power
wielded by federal bodies through investment, credit, foreign exchange,
production, and economic development policies, as well as through foreign
policy. Yugoslavia's social product in 1971 is shown in the following table
(Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 1973, pp. 110 and 123).
|
Producto neto social |
Gastos materiales |
Producto bruto social |
||||
|
En miles mill. de din. |
% |
En miles mill. de din. |
% |
En miles mill. de din. |
% |
|
|
Sector social |
168,9 |
82,6 |
182,4 |
87,2 |
351,3 |
84,9 |
|
Sector privado |
36,6 |
17,4 |
26,7 |
12,8 |
62.3 |
15,1 |
|
Total |
204,5 |
100 |
209,1 |
100 |
413,6 |
100 |
A country's gross domestic product (GDP) represents
the total value of goods and services produced in a year. Yugoslavia's GDP
reached 414 billion dinars in 1971, of which 352 billion corresponded to the
socialist sector and 62 billion to the private sector. The state, that is, the
central organs of the Yugoslav federation, exerts a decisive influence over the
socialist sector, which accounts for 85% of the GDP. The economic and,
consequently, political power of this predominant influence of the socialist
sector is enormous, and the central authorities use it for their own benefit
and for the benefit of the ruling people, the Serbs.
Of the GDP, slightly more than half, or 209 billion
dinars, corresponds to material expenditures necessary to achieve the net
product of 205 billion dinars. These material expenditures
are primarily related to the socialist sector, at 87.2%, thus again
demonstrating the powerful influence of the central state organs on the
economy. These are current material expenditures, through which the
State can, at its whim, promote, postpone, or even ruin certain businesses,
sectors, or economic regions.
Purchases and orders for various materials, the
prices of those materials, imports, and domestic production provide the State
with a powerful instrument at the service of its economic policy and its
relations with the peoples and republics that make up Yugoslavia. Finally, of
the total gross domestic product, more than four-fifths, or more precisely 83%,
correspond to the socialist sector. Of this, about half corresponds to the
wages of workers and employees.
The great victim of Belgrade's centralism and
dirigisme is the peasantry and agriculture. Yugoslavia carried out many of its
costly economic experiments in the postwar period at the expense of the
peasantry. First, forced collectivization, then onerous taxes and
discrimination against peasants and the private sector of the economy caused
most producers to abandon the countryside, thus losing enormous productive
capacity. The result is the proletarianization and impoverishment of the
countryside, coupled with insufficient agricultural production.
The weakening of the countryside and agriculture is
also evident in its share of the net product. While, according to the 1971
population census, the agricultural workforce comprised 41.7% of the total
workforce, agriculture's share of the net product reached only 19.7% that same
year. Although the statistical data concerning the workforce are preliminary,
they offer a fairly accurate picture of the situation in the countryside and
among peasants. Even in Western countries, agriculture's share of the net
product is lower than its percentage of the workforce; this disproportion is
even greater and is indicative of the difficult situation of the peasantry and
the backwardness of agriculture due to the poor economic policies of the
Yugoslav government.
Even in the allocation of the net product, the
state exerts enormous influence. In 1971, 110.5 billion dinars, or 54.1%, were
allocated to personal consumption, meaning food, housing, clothing, and other
expenses related to the population's personal needs. Since most consumer goods
and services are provided by the socialist sector, the influence of the state
and federal bodies is very significant in how social production is used for
personal consumption, as they control production, distribution, and prices.
The central organs of Yugoslavia directly manage
most of the social product through what is called general consumption, which is
the consumption of institutions and communities outside the sphere of personal
consumption, and through investments in basic funds, which are managed by the
federal organs. Thus, in 1971, according to official data, "general
consumption" reached 17.5 billion dinars, or 8.6% of the net social
product. Investments in basic funds accounted for 64.7 billion dinars, or 31.7%
(Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, 1973, p. 126).
General consumption and investments in basic funds
together represented 40.3% of the social product in 1971, the portion available
to the organs of the federation. However, these figures do not yet provide a
true picture of the share of the "non-economy" in the social product.
This is also evident from the total budget of the socio-political communities
(federation, republics, cities, communes), which
reached 37.3 billion yen in 1971 (see the 1973 Statistical Yearbook of
Yugoslavia, p. 253). This figure is also incomplete, as noted in the Editor's
Note.
From public discussions and various publications,
it can be concluded that the "non-economy" consumes approximately 40%
of the social product and that this percentage is increasing. The increase in
the federal budget by 12.5% and then by 31% in 1973, with the
parallel decrease in workers' income and losses for businesses, confirms the
growing share of the "non-economy" in the consumption of business
output. During the "economic reform" of 1966-1971, delegates from the
Socialist Republic of Croatia argued that a 40% share of the
"non-economy" in the social product was excessively high and
detrimental. What are the prospects for the future development of workers'
self-management in the economy?
The answer lies in the draft of the new Yugoslav
constitution, which first verbally extols the worker, elevating him to the
status of sovereign, only to then reduce him to the level of a mere instrument
in the hands of the party and the centralist, bureaucratic state. The guiding
principles of the new Yugoslav constitution promise workers that they will
decide "directly and equally, with other people, in cooperative work, on
all matters of social reinvestment" and that they will realize "their
material and moral right and interest in benefiting from the results of their
present and past labor."
According to the Constitution, workers even
distribute income (Art. 19), leading one to conclude that the worker in their
company is the owner and that the income of all employees and workers depends
on them. However, in the same article of the Constitution, these rights are
limited, and the workers' income in the "Yugoslav self-managed
society" is not guaranteed, since the company must first fulfill its
predetermined obligations to the State, and whatever remains, eventually, of
the company's total income is distributed among the workers. This system was
already being applied in Yugoslavia, as confirmed by the recent policy of
"economic stabilization" in 1973. With the new Constitution, this
system is strengthened. First, the political monopoly of the Communist Party is
ensured, and in politics and economics, priority is given to the army over the
workers and genuine economic interests. While workers are not guaranteed
payment for their labor in advance, the new Yugoslav Constitution ensures, in
the federal budget, that resources for financing "the Yugoslav armed
forces and other national defense expenditures" are allocated first among
the expenditures (Art. 250). The National Bank of Yugoslavia is committed
"to carrying out all banking operations for the needs of the armed forces
and other national defense needs, as established by federal law" (Art. 238
of the draft Constitution).
In this way, the armed forces become the leading
and supreme masters of the economy. With this new constitution, Yugoslavia
becomes a military state, not a workers' state.
III. The Balance Sheet of Yugoslavia's Economic
Relations with Foreign Countries
The balance sheet of Yugoslavia's economic exchange
with foreign countries over many years, together with the internal state of the
economy, is the most important criterion for judging the development and
strength of that economy. However, it is difficult to construct an accurate
picture of foreign relations, since the Yugoslav government does not publish
all the data, and some figures are falsified and manipulated.
Based on official Yugoslav statistics, statements
by government representatives, and data published in the domestic and foreign
press, it is possible to reconstruct an approximate picture. The following
table reflects the balance of Yugoslavia's trade with the rest of the world for
the years 1971 and 1972.
Balance of Yugoslavia's Trade with the Rest of the
World in 1971 and 1972
(in millions of US$)
|
1972 |
||
|
Ingresos |
||
|
Servicios |
||
|
Comunicaciones y seguro |
377 |
400 (nota 4) |
|
Turismo |
360 |
460 (nota 5) |
|
Demás servicios |
153 |
170 (nota 4) |
|
Ingresos por transferencia |
||
|
Remesas obreras |
652 |
870 (nota 5) |
|
Otras transferencias |
145 |
190 (nota 4) |
|
Ingresos de transferencias de actividades improductivas |
||
|
Intereses |
17 |
20 (nota 4) |
|
Demás ingresos |
11 |
15 (nota 4) |
|
Exportación de mercaderías |
1.815 |
2.240 (1,2) |
|
"Endeudamiento neto en el exterior" [23] |
373 |
- |
|
Total |
3.903 |
4.365 |
|
Egresos |
||
|
Servicios |
||
|
Comunicaciones y seguro |
13 |
15 |
|
Turismo |
218 |
220 |
|
Demás servicios |
224 |
250 |
|
Egresos por transferencias |
33 |
40 |
|
Egresos por transferencia de actividades improductivas |
||
|
Intereses |
147 |
170 |
|
Demás egresos |
14 |
20 |
|
Importación de mercaderías |
3.254 |
3.235 (1,2) |
|
Superávit neto en el intercambio con el exterior |
--- |
415 |
|
Total |
3.903 |
4.365 |
(Note 4) Author's estimates.
(Note 5) Based on journalistic
data.
Before analyzing these figures, it is important to
emphasize that the "balance of foreign trade" in the 1973 Statistical
Yearbook of Yugoslavia does not include figures for the payment of Yugoslavia's
foreign debts, which is its shortcoming. This is the sole reason why the trade
balance for 1972 is positive at 400 million dollars, a figure (the initial
provisional figure was 350 million dollars) that was tendentiously released to
the world press to convince foreign public opinion that the Yugoslav economy
was clearly improving and showing positive results.
Moreover, if this balance sheet had included the
payment of the external debt, which in 1972, with interest, reached $1.3
billion, then the "official surplus" of $400 million would have
become a deficit of approximately $900 million. This false figure was released
to create a favorable climate abroad that would facilitate the approval of new
loans and the "cooperation" of Western companies (with the guarantee
of their respective governments) with the Yugoslav economy, which was being
"liberalized" and "evolving favorably."
Until 1971, the Yugoslav authorities withheld data
in the statistical yearbooks regarding the current flows and ebbs of external
loans and the payment of debts and interest. But the difference between the
flow and ebb for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971 (Statistical Yearbook of
Yugoslavia 1972, p. 113) is presented in a positive light, since the income
from foreign loans exceeded the repayment of these debts. This maneuver
optically enabled a positive result for external debt, which does not
correspond to reality and constitutes serious accounting manipulation.
A consolidated table reflecting the real state of
external debt, both principal and interest, over several years would be correct
and necessary. Therefore, the public could not have an accurate picture of
external debts and obligations. The Statistical Yearbook for 1973 only includes
interest payments abroad, omitting principal payments.
To this deficit must be added another, even more
important factor: the exchange rate of the dollar to the dinar in the
calculation of the balance of payments. For 1970 and previous years, the
Statistical Yearbook used an exchange rate of US$1 = 12.50 dinars, for 1971
15.00 dinars, and for 1972 17.00 dinars. It is well known that Yugoslavia used
different exchange rates simultaneously with the rest of the world, and an
outside observer can hardly discern whether the exchange rate chosen for the
balance of payments corresponds to the actual average. It is noteworthy that
the applied exchange rate of 17 dinars to one dollar in foreign trade in 1972
is higher than the official rate. Perhaps this exchange rate is justified,
perhaps not.
To assess Yugoslavia's economic situation in the
world based on the balance of payments, the following values are
of primary importance:
1. Yugoslavia's trade, that is, the exchange of
goods, has been in deficit for years. This is a persistent phenomenon. The annual
deficit is very high: in 1971 it reached $1.439 billion; in 1972 it decreased,
but still reached $1 billion, or $995 million. A further increase in the
deficit is expected for 1973, potentially reaching $2 billion.
2. Another fundamental characteristic of
Yugoslavia's external trade is its high level of indebtedness and the
substantial annual payments in installments and interest. This liability
amounted to approximately $1.3 billion in 1972, and, more than the trade
deficit itself, it constitutes a heavy burden on the balance of payments. It is
important to emphasize that official data regarding external debt are
incomplete or often entirely lacking. It is reasonable to assume that external
debt is higher than the published figures. Thus, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister
Sirotkovic stated that Yugoslavia's debts in 1972 amounted to $3 billion (see
NZZ, January 9, 1973), while Vjesnik, on July 10,
1973, reported that the external debt for the same year was around $4 billion.
Since this figure was published later, it should be considered more reliable.
3. Non-trade with the rest of the world, that is,
tourism, workers' remittances, other services, and transfers, reflect a
relatively high surplus. In this sector, the surplus reached $1.066 billion in
1971 and, according to provisional data, $1.410 billion in 1972. With this
surplus, Yugoslavia should, in the long term, offset the deficit in foreign
trade and the payment of the external debt with its rising interest.
4. The two main negative figures in the balance of
payments—trade and debt service payments—exceed the surplus in the long run,
resulting in a negative balance. The balance of payments is largely passive.
This is illustrated by the example of 1972, when the trade deficit was
relatively moderate at $995 million, and debt service payments, including
interest, amounted to $1.3 billion. These two figures combined totaled a
negative $2.295 billion, compared to a non-trade surplus of $1.41 billion.
Therefore, the overall balance of payments deficit in 1972 reached $885
million. Based on Yugoslavia's economic development, it is expected that the
external deficit will increase.
Taking all these factors into account, the balance
of Yugoslavia's overall economic relations with the rest of the world yields
the following approximate results for 1971-1973: Balance of payments balance
1971-1973 in millions of US$
|
Saldo comercio exterior |
Anualidades deudas externas |
Saldo giro deudas externas |
Saldo balanza pagos |
|
|
1971 |
-1.439 |
-1.200 |
+1.066 |
- 1.573 |
|
1972 |
- 995 |
-1.300 |
+1.410 |
- 885 |
|
1973(estimativo) |
-1.660 |
-1.400 |
+2.100 |
- 60 |
5. These basic data indicate that Yugoslavia is a
permanent debtor to the rest of the world. The essential condition for
addressing the deficit and creating a surplus in the balance of payments would
be the internal stabilization of the economy. In the previous chapter, we saw
that the situation, instead of improving, is worsening: the external deficit is
increasing.
6. Yugoslavia's passivity in trade is a persistent
phenomenon after the war. Since 1948, Yugoslavia had been temporarily
mitigating and resolving its large external deficits with political loans
granted by Western countries. The United States, in particular, provided
Yugoslavia with substantial aid in money and goods as a reward for its
"independence" from the Soviet Union. However, as
Yugoslavia has increasingly leaned towards Moscow, becoming politically and
economically integrated into the Soviet bloc, Western loans and direct aid to
Yugoslavia have decreased, while its passivity in foreign trade has grown
alarmingly. It is true that Washington provides aid, and with its
guarantee, so do American companies, through loans, "cooperation,"
foreign trade, and other resources.
Yugoslav economic aid is highly significant, given
that the crisis has deep political and economic roots. It is characteristic
that within the country, the main burden of the abnormal, centralized, and
bureaucratic state and economic system is borne by the masses of workers,
employees, and consumers, and above all, by the Croatian economy, while in
international relations, the West foots the bill for the failure of
Yugoslavia's political and economic system. Now, the political and economic
crisis in Yugoslavia has culminated, and it faces a crossroads. Therefore, the
Serbian generals, the true masters of Yugoslavia, are seeking a long-term
solution within a new framework: they are seeking the political, military, and
economic protection of the Soviet Union and the incorporation of Yugoslavia
into the Soviet bloc. In this way, the current masters of Yugoslavia hope to
"consolidate" their state and their power, "erase" the
Croatian question from the agenda, and "cleanse" the ailing economy.
IV. The Integration of the Yugoslav Economy into
the Soviet Bloc
After the Brezhnev-Tito agreement, concluded in
September 1971, Yugoslav-Soviet economic cooperation encompassed all major
economic sectors. It consisted of Soviet loans, cooperation between companies
of both countries, intensified foreign trade, growing Yugoslav cooperation with
Comecon, and the long-term, overall coordination of the Yugoslav economic
system with developments in the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc.
Yugoslavia's economic cooperation with Moscow was
more overt than its political cooperation. In this new era of cooperation
between Moscow, Washington, and Bonn, the Soviet Union had to proceed
cautiously regarding Yugoslavia's integration into the Eastern Bloc so as not
to formally undermine Yugoslavia's neutrality and non-alignment, even though
the postwar Soviet-American status quo regarding Yugoslavia was gradually
weakening without yet collapsing. Therefore, political and military cooperation
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was developed discreetly. For public
opinion, Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971 and his agreement
with Tito, followed by Tito's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1972 and
Kosygin's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1973, were spectacular.
In the period from 1971 to the autumn of 1973,
Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation progressed to such an extent that Moscow
already exerted a decisive influence on the Yugoslav economy. This cooperation
was particularly linked to strategic sectors and enterprises. The focus of
Soviet interest was on areas that would enable and secure access to the
Adriatic coast. This largely encompassed the Croatian coast and its rear.
That Soviet-Yugoslav political cooperation was
intimately connected to economic cooperation was demonstrated by the
Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. At that time, the Soviet Union used not only
Yugoslavian airspace but also its airports and ports to transport military
equipment to the Arabs. The port of Rijeka was made available for the transport
of Soviet war materiel. Given that the "Viktor Lenac" shipyards,
located near the port of Rijeka, serve as a supply and repair base for Soviet
warships, it is clear that the Yugoslav government made the port of Rijeka
available to the Soviet Union as a support base. The Boka Kotorska also serves
the Soviet fleet. During the last Arab-Israeli war, the foreign press wrote
extensively about Soviet transports through Yugoslavia. Regarding air
transports, the Titograd airfield was mentioned in particular, but Mostar and
Dubrovnik were also mentioned. It appears that the port of Dubrovnik, along
with Rijeka, played a significant role in the transshipment of Soviet military
transports.
Before world public opinion, Yugoslavia's so-called
non-alignment was revealed in its true light. From a political and economic
standpoint, Yugoslavia is subordinate to the Soviet Union: today against
Israel, tomorrow against Western Europe and China. But the most important thing
is that Belgrade and its Serbian regime are placing the Croatian regions at the
disposal of the Soviet Union for its political and military purposes. Belgrade
is turning Croatia into a Soviet colony and an occupied territory.
Difficulties are also arising in Soviet-Yugoslav
economic cooperation, since many companies would prefer to collaborate with the
West rather than with the Soviet Union. This cooperation with the Soviet
authorities is based on colonial principles, pressure, and inequality, so
resistance to such collaboration is understandable among companies that had
previously cooperated with Western establishments. Furthermore, economic
cooperation is imposed for political reasons, and since the final decision
regarding Yugoslavia's relationship with the Soviet Union will be made during
the Tenth Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia in 1974, several
companies and institutions are trying to avoid this collaboration until the
Congress takes place. But this resistance has been largely overcome, and
Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation has reached enormous proportions with
unforeseen consequences in the last two years.
The Soviet loan of $540 million, to which Kosygin
added another $45 million during his visit to Yugoslavia in 1973, represents
only a portion of Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation. Furthermore, agreements
were reached regarding new loans, the purchase of goods, and cooperation, far
exceeding the amount of the aforementioned loan. Moreover, various projects are
underway, without the Soviet cooperation agreements being made public, but
these projects are driven by the strategic and political interests of the
Soviet Union, such as the Belgrade-Bar railway line to the port of Bar, and the
Omisalj-Bakar-Sisak-Bratislava oil pipeline.
Soviet military transports in October 1973
demonstrated that the Soviet presence in Yugoslavia is permanent and that it seeks
to transform the Adriatic coast and its rear into an area of
Soviet military operations. I will now outline some of the most
important projects and agreements that illustrate the purposes of this
cooperation between the Serbian generals and Moscow.
1. Although strategically important and
economically unjustified, the Belgrade-Bar railway line is being laid without
interruption. This is important for Moscow, which, together with the Yugoslav
army, is accelerating its construction, as well as the construction of the port
of Bar, even though no official information has yet been published regarding
Soviet involvement. It appears that the construction of this line was arranged
through secret agreements between Moscow and Belgrade immediately after the end
of World War II, within the framework of Soviet policy based on the Yalta
agreement of a 50:50 split of influence in Yugoslavia.
According to the subsequent US-Soviet agreement,
this split was to be implemented according to the territorial division of Yugoslavia
into its western and eastern (Soviet) halves. According to Soviet-Serbian
plans, the Belgrade-Bar railway line was to be located in Yugoslavia. From 1966
to 1971, very little was heard of Soviet loans in the eastern half of the
country, and it would have guaranteed the Soviets (and Serbia) access to the
Adriatic Sea.
Today, for the Soviets (in fact, for the Russians,
since non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union do not determine either foreign
or domestic policy), this solution seems more realistic, as they are already
consolidating their power in the upper Adriatic and are trying to encompass all
of Yugoslav territory within their bloc and subordinate it exclusively to their
interests.
The construction of the Belgrade-Bar railway line
and the port of Bar is a burden on the Yugoslav economy, and especially on the
Croatian economy, which bears the brunt of this burden.
2. The Titograd aluminum complex, with its bauxite
mines, power plants, and all the necessary
infrastructure, is being built continuously. The Soviet-Yugoslav agreement
concerning the construction of this industrial complex was made public at the
beginning of the last decade. At that time, the press reported that its cost
exceeded $200 million. The Soviet Union was listed as the sole creditor. During
the partial liberalization of Yugoslavia, its projects were suspended. After
the upheaval in Yugoslavia in December 1971, the Soviets became active again
and forced the construction of this aluminum complex. With the completion of
this project, the Belgrade-Bar railway line would, in part, find its economic
justification, although it is, first and foremost, a strategic line.
Part of the $540 million Soviet loan, agreed upon
in the Moscow-Belgrade agreement of October 1972, is earmarked for the Titograd
aluminum complex. However, other Soviet funds are undoubtedly being allocated
to this project, based on previous agreements regarding the construction of
this complex.
The Soviet Union is participating in the design and
construction of various parts of this complex, utilizing its technical
expertise and institutions, and according to data published to date, will
supply the majority of its products.
3. An oil pipeline is being built from Bakar Bay
(Omisalj-Bakar), through Sisak and Hungary to Bratislava, connecting to the
Soviet "Friendship" pipeline, under Moscow's auspices. The eastern
section, from Sisak, through Bosanski Brod to Pancevo with access to Romania,
is considered a secondary priority, as, for political reasons, this section is
neither secure nor advantageous for the Soviet Union.
The construction of the western section, towards
Bratislava, was agreed upon in May 1973 by the Yugoslav and Hungarian
delegations, based on the agreement reached between Tito and Kádár in Briones
in July 1973. Shortly thereafter, the following companies signed contracts for
the pipeline's construction: INA (Zagreb), Energoinvest (Sarajevo), and
Naftagas (Novi Sad). After lengthy negotiations, the republics of Croatia,
Bosnia, and Serbia finally reached an agreement. Previous disagreements and
misunderstandings were overcome. Since the primary purpose of this pipeline is
to connect to the Soviet "Friendship" pipeline in Bratislava—that is,
to extend the Soviet pipeline to the Adriatic coast—it is highly likely that
Moscow demanded its rapid construction.
According to preliminary estimates by the companies
INA, Energoinvest, and Naftagas, the cost of constructing the oil pipeline in
Yugoslavia would amount to approximately $200 million. The work would be
financed by domestic and foreign sources (the press did not specify the foreign
sources). The pipeline was expected to be completed by 1976.
Bakar is becoming a major oil port, which will give
it significant international importance. The Soviet Union, by using the commercial
ports of Rijeka and Martinscica for its warships, and with the port of Bakar
and the oil pipeline, would obtain, for its expansionist military objectives, a
base in the upper Adriatic, ensuring a permanent presence and political,
economic, and military supremacy in this part of Europe and the Mediterranean.
4. The Sarajevo-based company
"Energoinvest" enjoys special Soviet favors in the form of large
loans and orders and constitutes the Soviet base in Bosnia. This company and
its director, Blum, largely concluded, outside the officially agreed-upon loan
of 540 million dinars, separate agreements for Soviet credits, the purchase of
raw materials and industrial products for a total of one billion dollars.
Thus, Emerik Blum, CEO of Energoinvest, signed an
agreement on July 19, 1973, in Moscow, with the Soviet company Raznoimport,
regarding orders and credits worth $500 million (Vjesnik, July 20, 1973:
"Energoinvest's Big Deal").
This agreement primarily concerns six million tons
of products, which Energoinvest's aluminum complex in Zvornik will deliver to
the Soviet Union between 1976 and 1985.
According to this agreement, the construction of
the "East Bosnia" aluminum complex will continue. The Soviet Union
will participate in the construction of what is presumed to be the largest
aluminum plant in Europe, providing credits and facilities. The majority of the
investment, valued at approximately $160 million, is provided by the Soviet
Union.
Aside from this major deal with the Soviet Union,
Blum had already arranged, two weeks earlier, an agreement with the Soviet
company "Masinoimport" for the sale of armor worth $250 million over
the next 10 years.
Blum estimated that "Energoinvest,"
starting in 1976, would export $100 million worth of goods to the Soviet Union
annually. "Energoinvest" was currently exporting $12 million worth of
goods, while total Yugoslavian exports to the Soviet Union in 1972 reached
approximately $300 million.
During his visit to Sarajevo in late September
1973, Kosygin inspected the "Energoinvest" electrical appliance
factory in Lukavica and emphasized the cooperation with this company, which he
described as having a primarily political character and transforming Bosnia
into a Soviet industrial and military base.
To complete the picture, it is important to note
here that the expansion of the aluminum plant in Šibenik was financed with
loans from East Germany, indirectly strengthening Soviet influence, since East
Germany's economy is subordinated to Soviet interests. These German loans are
linked to obligations for the delivery of raw materials and products from
Yugoslavia.
The Soviet Union controlled virtually the entire
aluminum industry in Yugoslavia. This large and important sector of the economy
was integrated into the Soviet monopoly and included in Moscow's
economic-military strategy. It is now clear why, some years ago, Herzegovina
and Dalmatia lost the battle over the location of the aluminum industry center
to Montenegro, even though objective criteria argued against building the
complex in Titograd. The Belgrade-Bar railway line should have had a stronger
economic foundation. Through subsequent Soviet loans and orders, via
Energoinvest, a significant industrial sector in Bosnia was incorporated into
the framework of Soviet investments in the Titograd aluminum complex.
5. The Soviet Union strengthened its influence in
Bosnia by collaborating on the installation of a steel plant in Zenica, with
parallel cooperation from the United States (Vjesnik, July 29, 1973, "The
Peoples United on the Bosna River"). Both teams began work in early 1973.
Soviet loans, agreed upon between the Soviet and Yugoslav governments in
November 1972, were likely used for the expansion of this plant. At the same
time, American loans or aid were probably also being used, as evidenced by the
presence of American engineers.
The report in Vjesnik is written in an idyllic and
naive tone about the peaceful and friendly life of six American families and
five Russian engineers, living under one roof and working harmoniously. This
was intended to calm public opinion, fearful of a possible Russian invasion.
6. Another area of collaboration is
emerging in Soviet-Yugoslav relations: the employment of Yugoslav workers in
the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc. It is well known that
Yugoslav authorities tend to convince workers employed in Western countries to
return to the country with the promise of finding employment, but their true
intention is to send a portion of these workers to the Soviet Union. During the
"economic reform" and, to some extent, during liberalization between
1966 and 1971, Belgrade, through its policy of neglecting and exploiting the
Croatian economy, motivated the mass emigration of Croats to Western countries
in search of work and better wages.
This mass exodus was politically advantageous for
the Serbian leadership, as a large number of their opponents left the country
and, at the same time, sent remittances in foreign currency to their
families—currency needed by the Yugoslav government. However, in the current
political situation, the Yugoslav leaders see these hundreds of thousands of
workers as potential Croatian soldiers fighting against Yugoslavia, given that
their average age is between 25 and 35.
This is the main reason why Belgrade is striving to
bring these workers back. Furthermore, another possibility for Croatian
emigration now exists, based on the Russian-Yugoslav agreements concerning
worker employment. These workers would be worse off in Russia than in Western countries,
where they earn more and have greater control over their wages. In the Soviet
Union, their employment status would be regulated by agreements between the two
states and their companies, and the workers would live as if in a colonial
country.
Until now, only Bulgaria had sent workers to the
Soviet Union. Outside of Comecon, only Finland, with its workers, carried out
certain projects in the Soviet Union.
Kosygin's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1973
publicly reaffirmed the great political and strategic importance of economic
cooperation between Moscow and Belgrade. In his statements and speeches,
Kosygin emphasized that the Tito-Brezhnev talks were "very important"
for strengthening trust, understanding, and cooperation between the two
countries and the two parties, and that economic collaboration was developing
steadily and dynamically, with the results achieved providing a good foundation
for further development.
During his visit to Zagreb, at a dinner given in
his honor by the Prime Minister of the "Croatian government," Dr. I.
Persin, Kosygin, during the toast, challenged the Croats and praised Tito and
the Yugoslav state. He said (according to Vjesnik, September 28, 1973):
"We see that Yugoslavia's greatest strength lies in the unity of the Yugoslav
peoples... We greatly esteem Tito, founder of the Yugoslav federation and
unifier of the Yugoslavs." In the same speech, Kosygin stated "that
the Union equally respects all the Yugoslav republics."
In the toast at the dinner that Tito organized in his
honor in Briones, he reaffirmed his opposition to the Croatian people's
aspirations for freedom and national independence: "My comrades and I were
very pleased to have seen Yugoslavia. Certainly, Yugoslavia's great achievement
is that all the republics agree on the problems that arise today, united around
President Tito, in the preparation of the new Constitution and new documents
for the Congress of the Communist League."
Kosygin then stated that upon returning to the
Soviet Union with his delegation, he would say "that they had seen a
united, vigorous, and creative Yugoslavia, fighting for the interests of
socialism, together with all the socialist countries." Referring to
bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Kosygin stated:
"We perceive no dark stain on these relations. We are convinced that our
friendship is growing stronger every day; and this is what I will convey to my
comrades when I return to Moscow. Our mutual understanding and trust exist, and
nothing limits them" (Vjesnik, September 29, 1973). These concepts were
emphasized in the joint Yugoslav-Soviet communiqué: "To strengthen mutual
trust and understanding between both countries and both parties, the talks
between President Tito and General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
Brezhnev in Belgrade and Moscow in 1971 and 1972, respectively, were of vital
importance" (Vjesnik, October 2, 1973).
The words of the Soviet premier and the joint
communiqué leave no room for doubt. Moscow supports Serbia's policy of oppression,
persecution, and exploitation of Croats, Albanians, and other non-Serbian
peoples. The Soviet Union adopts a hostile stance toward the Croats' struggle
for national liberation and actively collaborates in suppressing Croatian
national aspirations. Only with the Soviet Union's support were the Serbian
generals able to establish and consolidate a new military-police dictatorship.
For this Soviet service, the Yugoslav leaders paid a very high price,
surrendering significant economic advantages and military bases. Kosygin, as
the supreme technocrat and manager, conducted an inspection tour of Yugoslavia
in the autumn of 1973, overseeing key centers of Soviet colonial interests.
The October Arab-Israeli War demonstrated where
Soviet-Yugoslav collaboration leads. By ceding its airports and Adriatic ports
to the Soviets, Yugoslavia entered the Soviet bloc and, without being a formal
member of the Warsaw Pact, participated in military operations on behalf of the
Soviet Union. Belgrade and Moscow were dragging Croatian territory into armed
conflict and pushing the Croats toward direct danger of war. This policy was an
integral part of the preparations to settle accounts with the West and China.
Worse Economic Situation in 1973 and Prospects for
1974
Since I finished this study in early November 1973,
various data on economic developments in 1973 and the outlook for 1974 were
published. The Yugoslav government's budget for 1974 was released, a severe
electricity crisis emerged in Croatia, and unemployment and the cost of living
increased. Below, we will review the important data, highlighting their impact
on the Croatian economy.
The federal budget for 1974, approved by resolution
of the Federal Assembly on December 27, 1973, increased considerably, reaching
41.513 billion dinars. According to official figures, the 1974 budget, compared
to that of 1973, increased by 6 million dinars, or 19%. However, this figure is
inaccurate. The original budget for 1973, approved by the Federal Assembly at
the end of 1972, was 30 billion dinars. Therefore, the total increase for 1974
amounts to 11.5 billion dinars, or 38%, not 6 billion dinars, or 19%.
This increase in the budget is the primary source
of inflation. All other stabilization measures become ineffective if the budget
increases so significantly. Stabilizing the state budget should be the first
condition for economic stability. But the Yugoslav government proceeds in
the opposite way.
The armed forces account for almost half of all
budget expenditures, 19.559 billion dinars (41.1%). Expenditures for the armed
forces constitute the largest item in the official Yugoslav budget. While it is
possible and probable that other expenditures for the armed forces are covertly
allocated, the published figure demonstrates the role and priority the army
holds in the political and economic life of Yugoslavia. (The
budget data was published in Vjesnik on December 27 and 28, 1973.)
Figures regarding the inflow of foreign currency
for the first 11 months of 1973 were also published (Vjesnik, January 12,
1974). This inflow, compared to the same period in 1972, increased by 3%,
reaching $2.038 billion. This sum comprises remittances from workers amounting
to $1.209 billion, tourism revenue of $595 million, and $234 million from other
sources.
Remittances from workers and tourism saw
particularly significant increases.
However, as we have seen previously, this picture
is incomplete, as it does not provide all the important data concerning the
balance of payments, that is, the balance of trade with the rest of the world.
First, these foreign exchange inflows are gross income, from which the
corresponding expenditures must be deducted.
Furthermore, to obtain a complete balance of
payments with the rest of the world, it is necessary to consider the external
trade in goods, which in 1973 resulted in a negative balance and deficit. This
deficit amounts to $1.660 billion. Then there are the payments of installments
and interest on the debts incurred, and this item for 1973 will likely amount to
around $1.400 billion. Therefore, the actual balance of Yugoslavia's economic
exchange with the rest of the world, based on a provisional and summary
estimate for 1973, would be presented in the following form (in millions of
dollars):
|
Ingresos |
Egresos |
|
|
Ingresos netos de divisas |
2.100 |
--- |
|
Déficit en el comercio con mercadería |
--- |
1.660 |
|
Pago de las deudas externas con intereses |
--- |
1.400 |
|
Déficit en el intercambio económico con el exterior |
960 |
--- |
|
Total |
3.060 |
3.060 |
The total trade deficit in 1973 hovered around $960
million, compared to $885 million in 1972. This deficit was partly covered by
the German loan (actually war reparations) and American investments in the
Yugoslav economy. However, this cover is an optical illusion. The
deficit-ridden nature of Yugoslavia's overall economic relations persisted.
This deficit was addressed through a combination of
measures:
1. employing unskilled
workers abroad, primarily those not essential to the military;
2. new Western economic
aid;
3. tourism revenue;
4. the accelerated
integration of the Yugoslav economy into the Soviet bloc;
5. reducing foreign
currency expenditures (tourism spending amounted to almost $220 million in
1972). A lasting improvement in economic relations with the outside world is
possible only with a fundamental change to the entire economic system. The
recent combination of partial economic liberalism with a centralist, statist,
and bureaucratic economy was an improvisation without a solid foundation,
sustained by political favors and Western economic aid. Development after 1971
followed the path of Stalinist statism and centralism, culminating in
integration into the Soviet bloc. The "liberal" element in the
economy still serves as a vestige of the era of partial economic reform.
In the spirit of the new cooperation, Yugoslavia
intensified its trade with the Soviet Union. This is evidenced by the plan to
increase trade by one billion dollars by 1974, compared to 850 million dollars
in 1973 (Vjesnik, January 12, 1974). The Soviet Union became Yugoslavia's most
important trading partner. Simultaneously, despite all the difficulties,
Yugoslavian workers were being forced to work in the Soviet Union. It is a
modest start, but a long-term plan remains. "Last summer, some 200
Yugoslav construction workers began the final work on the enormous hotel
complex in Yalta," reports Vjesnik's Moscow correspondent, and according
to new plans, "a thousand Yugoslav workers will soon be employed in
tourist construction in Sochi" (Vjesnik, 6/7-1-74). The Yugoslav
government periodically announces news about the probable and imminent
convertibility of the dinar. We have seen that Yugoslavia's external balance
does not allow for this convertibility due to the large deficit, while
internally there is economic instability, resulting in high inflation and high
unemployment. Convertibility of the dinar can be artificially imposed if
certain Western states, such as the US and West Germany, continue to mask
Yugoslavia's large external deficits with loans and "economic"
cooperation.
Convertibility can be confined to a controlled area
of economic relations with the outside world, mimicking the
current "free market for foreign exchange," which in reality
represents trade and state control of a portion of foreign currencies. The
basic long-term conditions for the dinar's robust convertibility are lacking.
The news about the "soon convertibility of the dinar," likely
released deliberately, serves primarily to create a favorable atmosphere for
new loans and economic cooperation.
The notable increase in workers' remittances in
1973 indicates that more workers left Yugoslavia that year in search of work
than in 1972. According to data from S. Tadic, a member of the Board of
Directors of the Croatian Federation of Trade Unions, the number of workers
leaving Yugoslavia for Western Europe increased by 25% in the first nine months
of 1973 compared to the previous year. According to Tadic, one out of every two
workers in Yugoslavia was employed in West Germany, and in the Socialist
Republic of Croatia, the percentage reached 70%. "If that country were to
dismiss foreign workers in 1974, it would seriously affect us..." (Vjesnik, December 25, 1973).
According to Yugoslav sources, 700,000 Yugoslav
citizens were working abroad in the summer of 1973. Tito also mentioned this
figure in his speeches. However, experts pointed to higher numbers. Thus,
Engineer Santner, in the Swiss weekly Die Weltwoche of January 16, 1974,
refutes Tito's statements and writes: "Tito only told two-thirds of the
truth. According to reliable estimates, in the summer and autumn of 1973, there
were not 700,000 but nearly 1.1 million Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, and
Macedonians outside the borders of Yugoslavia; that is, 700,000 in West Germany
(more precisely: 500,000 registered workers and 250,000 members of their
families and those employed 'illegally'), 190,000 in Austria, 70,000 in France,
25,000 in Sweden, 13,000 in the Netherlands, and the rest in 65 other European
or overseas states.
In other words, that amounts to 20% of the workers
and employees in Yugoslavia—logically not "The most incapable—who live and
work abroad." This 20% figure does not refer to the entire working
population, but rather to the socialist sector and to workers and employees registered
in the private sector. The number of registered employed people in Yugoslavia
in 1972 amounted to 4.2 million. According to the 1971 population census, the
total working population, including those working abroad, reached 8.9 million.
This figure also includes peasants. It is understandable that the return of a
smaller portion of the workers would increase the already high number of
unemployed and create new political problems. It is feared that at least
200,000 workers will lose their jobs abroad and return home. This would
increase the already 400,000 unemployed in Yugoslavia, creating an
uncomfortable situation for the authorities. Instead of the 300,000 Tito's
soldiers stationed abroad whom Yugoslavia is trying to attract, several hundred
thousand unemployed and desperate people, whom the Yugoslav government fears,
could return. This problem is
particularly acute in Croatia.
This pressure from the newly unemployed coincided
with the energy crisis, due to the lack of electricity that seriously affected
Croatia's economy. Therefore, promises to create new jobs in that republic are
unfounded. The energy crisis does not affect Serbia, because during its
"economic reforms" that republic made significant investments in
power plants and now has a surplus of electricity. Thus, VUS of January 2,
1974, acknowledges that people in Croatia are asking: "Why does Serbia
have enough electricity and why aren't there any
disconnected consumers?" and there are significant observations such as,
"They have it and we don't," "Lucky them that they have
Djerdap" (Ruzica Vuger: "Why does Serbia have electricity?"). In
this article we read: "With last year's production of 14 billion kWh,
Serbia accounted for 42.8% of total energy production. However, in 1964, when
each republic was responsible for its own electricity generation, Serbia's
share was 24.3%, and it generated only 3 billion kWh."
Despite this transfer from the Federation to the
republic, Serbia received enormous resources from federal funds for its power
plants: "Since, like the others, they addressed this issue, Serbia
invested 4.7 billion dinars in its development over a period of five years. Of
this, 44% came from federal resources (mostly for Djerdap), 35% from legal
contributions in that republic and Serbia's loan, 5% from energy resources and
coal mines, 2% from consumers, and 14% from other arrangements (bank loans,
contractors, etc.). With this, by 1970, production was sufficient to cover
consumption. Including the following two years, 8.2 billion dinars were invested
in power plants, creating a 'current surplus.' Today, ZEP is not only the
largest electricity association but also ranks first in Yugoslavia in terms of
the concentration of economic resources for the production."
This concentration of resources would be increased
until 1980 through new investments of approximately 21.8 billion dinars.
A table of electricity production for 1972 was
published for each republic. At that time, Serbia produced 42.5% of
Yugoslavia's total production. This table shows that energy production in
Croatia and Slovenia was almost equal and slightly higher in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Serbia's percentage, due to accelerated construction, increased,
and the lag of the three western provinces became more pronounced. The production structure by republic in 1972 was:
Electricity Production
|
millones kWh |
% |
|
|
Servia |
13.006 |
42,5 |
|
Bosnia-Herzegovina |
5.852 |
19,2 |
|
Croacia |
5.152 |
16,9 |
|
Eslovenia |
5.030 |
16,5 |
|
Montenegro |
775 |
2,5 |
|
Macedonia |
741 |
2,4 |
|
Total: |
30.556 |
100 |
Serbia, along with Macedonia and Montenegro, forms
a single unit in the production and consumption of electricity. It appears that
Serbia exports electricity, but no data has been published on this matter.
Despite Serbia's electricity surplus, the three
western republics—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia—cannot receive
the necessary electricity from Serbia due to a lack of infrastructure.
Regarding this "interrepublican solidarity," Vjesnik wrote the
following on December 16-17, 1973: "At the recent electricity conference
in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, the Director General of the Yugoslav
Energy Community, Engineer Lazar Ljubisa, admitted that Slovenia, Croatia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina are isolated from Serbia and Macedonia. Only the
high-voltage transmission line (Bajina Basta-Titograd, totaling 200 MW)
connects the two subsystems... This line, for technical reasons, was
disconnected no fewer than 142 times in the first nine months." In the
same article, Vjesnik describes Croatia's situation and the "federation's"
energy policy in the following terms: "This is the most severe and serious
energy crisis to date, although in recent years we have already experienced
reductions several times... Croatia is still short almost 10 million kWh per
day, which represents the majority of Yugoslavia's electricity deficit."
The cause is attributed to a lack of rainfall, meaning a lack of water in the
hydroelectric plants. However, the primary cause lies in the lack of essential
investments. Vjesnik's forecast for the future is very bleak. "Now they
tell us that in the coming years there won't be enough electricity. Yugoslavia
can produce 35 to 40 billion kWh per year (depending on rainfall), but next
year we'll need 41.5 billion, and more each year after that. We also learn that
Croatia will be short two billion kWh of electricity next year. Who was setting
energy policy to reach this impasse, at the very foundation of economic life,
since we all indirectly depend on electricity...?" The same article
explains the investment policy set by the central government bodies. "It's
difficult to explain how three enormous aluminum complexes, three major
consumers of electricity, are being built, and two of them are progressing
faster than the hydroelectric plants that are supposed to 'feed' them. It's
also hard to explain why the necessary resources for building the power plants
and the high-speed pipelines can't be obtained."
" We have seen that enormous sums of federal funds,
drawn primarily from the Croatian economy, are being invested in the development
of electricity in Serbia. These same resources are lacking for promoting the
energy sector in Croatia. This example demonstrates that Yugoslavia serves
Serbia's interests through the exploitation and plunder of Croatia.
Brugg, Switzerland, January 30, 1974
(Spanish
version by B. K.)
Banks in Yugoslavia
Contradictions and Difficulties of a Communist
Regime
In Yugoslavia, the political struggle surrounding
banks is a constant topic of discussion. Despite the new Constitution, which
was supposed to have come into effect at the end of 1973 (it was actually
proclaimed in February 1974 – SC editor's note), and which was intended to
definitively reduce the power of finance capital and the forces that exploit
it, the role and activities of banks continue to be the subject of debate among
specialists and politicians. These discussions are dominated by discontent with
the pace at which the measures foreseen in the 1971 constitutional reforms are
being implemented, on the one hand, and by resistance to these reforms, on the
other. Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, in his recent review of "the weaknesses of
the Yugoslav economy," mentioned banks and the banking system first and
foremost, since there "worker control would still be only formal"
(Borba, November 21, 1973).
But it wasn't only the Croatian communists, who
were the first to propose reforming the banking system and calling for its
implementation to be accelerated, but also Kiro Gligorov, a member of the
Executive Bureau of the Presidency of the Communist League of Yugoslavia and
one of Yugoslavia's leading economic experts, who strongly criticized, at the
beginning of November, at the forty-fourth meeting of said Presidency, the
application of procedural principles in the banking system, "which are
still very strong and upheld by those forces that maintain a position of
privilege and monopoly" (Nedjeljne Informativne Novine - NIN, 18-IX-73).
Milan Dragovic, director of the Belgrade bearing
factory and chairman of the Commission for Socio-Economic Affairs and Relations
in the Committee of the Communist League of Serbia, is dissatisfied with the
pace, firmness, and consequences regarding the realization of the fundamental
objective of the labor amendments, namely, the material control of banks and
social investments by "united labor" (the workers). (Komunist, November 19, 1973.)
The political struggle surrounding the banks, or
rather, concerning the power to dispose of the capital accumulated in them, is
in full swing and will probably continue into the coming year, despite the fact
that this problem was theoretically and in principle resolved in the articles
of the 1963 constitutional reform, formulated in 1971, as well as through
decisions of the highest Party organs. The delayed implementation
of banking reform, as well as the harshness of the controversy it provoked, are
logical and understandable. The banks, their function in Yugoslav society and
economy were not the cause of discontent only within the leadership of the
Communist Party of Croatia in the years 1970-1971, they are also intimately
connected with the changes in the leadership of the Communist Party of Serbia
in the years 1972-1973. The implementation of the latest banking reform is
undoubtedly "the most penetrating economic and socio-political
intervention, since it has to eliminate the unsustainable differences in the
way income is obtained, the differences between the privileged and
non-privileged in the economy that have led to this situation that has been
called the 'capital relationship'" (NIN, 18-XI-1973).
In other words: the banks that developed from the
1965 economic reforms into powerful centers of financial and, consequently,
political power, becoming the main cause of political and social conflicts,
must be subjected, through reform, to the absolute control of society, and
their current monopoly position eliminated by establishing a "financial
and business service" model.
Banks in Yugoslav society and the economy had
achieved their privileged position over several years. This position developed
with the decoupling of the economy from the state apparatus and the
strengthening of market economy elements, which began in the mid-1950s and
received a significant boost from the banking reforms of 1961-1963, as well as
the economic reforms undertaken in 1965.
The First Post-War Period
In the first period after the war—perhaps until
1953—the system known as non-reimbursable investment financing was in effect.
In 1953, credit was introduced as the new method of financing investments. This
innovation was directly linked to the new economic system, which was based on
worker self-management and greater autonomy for businesses. From then on,
investment funds came from the commune, district, republic, or even the
Federation itself. These funds were collected through taxes. Alongside the
Industrial Investment Fund established in 1955, funds were also organized for
housing construction, agriculture, forestry, and hydroelectric power, as well
as for road construction.
During this period, separate investment funds were
created, independent of those established within individual companies. This, to
some extent, created the conditions for the functioning of the new credit-based
financing system, as companies reached a position where they could repay the
loans obtained from public funds. The percentage of the economy in total
investment funds was only 2% in 1953, but gradually rose to 30% by 1956. The
formation of funds and the introduction of investment loans led to a more
rational use of resources, economic criteria gained greater respect, and
investment efficiency increased.
In the early postwar period, banks depended
entirely on social funds and their budgets. They possessed little to no
resources of their own. Until the promulgation in March 1961 of the law on
banks, loans, and other banking activities (Sluzbeni List, No. 10 of March 15,
1961), the only social banks were the Yugoslav Investment Bank, the
Agricultural Bank, the Foreign Trade Bank, the municipal banks, and the savings
banks. They primarily focused on arranging long-term investment loans, while
short-term loans were the sole responsibility of the National Bank. At that
time, banks were really just a service, the financial service of the
political-social community (regional corporations) of the communes, the
republics, and the Federation.
At that time, one could not speak of banking
activity in the field of investments as being guided by economic principles.
Furthermore, its activity was "territorialized," that is, limited to
the territory in which the banks were founded. Moreover, the political and
social communities exerted a decisive influence over the administration of the
banks, as they appointed both the board of directors and the director.
A decisive innovation came with the process of
"denationalization" of the investment system with the "Law on
the Use of the Economic Investment Resources of the Federation" at the end
of 1963 (Sluzbeni List. No. 52 of December 31, 1963). Through this law, the
"General Investment Fund" was dissolved, and its resources were
transferred to the credit funds of specialized banks. At the same time, the
republics, districts, and communes were authorized to proceed in the same
manner with their funds. The next stage began on January 19, 1964, with the
elimination of contributions to social investment funds for the regional
communities. These contributions were later transferred to the banks. The
complete reform of the banking system was finally carried out in March 1965
through the Laws "On Banks and Credit" and "On the National Bank
of Yugoslavia" (Sluzbeni List, No. 12, March 24, 1965).
Conditions of Economic Reform
The economic reform of 1965 was inconceivable
without prior reforms of the banking and credit system. With this new role,
banks became the most important factor in the country's new economic policy.
The starting point for the reform of the banking and credit system, and the
conditions indispensable for its efficient operation, was increasing the share
of economic enterprises in capital accumulation. This entailed limiting the
decision-making power of the regional communities regarding their reserve
funds. The availability of larger sums of money gave workers' organizations
(the enterprises) the ability to take more independent measures regarding the
expansion of their production base and—through self-management
decisions—deposit a portion of their accumulated capital in banks. Thanks to
these deposits, they could participate both in the administration of the banks
and in banking decisions regarding the use of common investment funds.
The need to collect investment funds through taxes
was eliminated. Since socio-political communities still collected investment
funds through taxes, they were obligated to allocate these funds to credit
funds designated for investment where they had free rein, meaning they were now
obligated to do so with the banks in their territory. These funds could only be
used for direct investment in exceptional circumstances. However,
socio-political communities did not entirely lose their influence over the
allocation of investments. For certain projects, they could negotiate interest
rates or other terms with the banks. Longer-term investment loans were also
financed through common credit funds accumulated in the banks.
The changes in the banking system encompassed the
establishment of the necessary resources for independent banking activity, the
form of their founding, their status, administration, customer relations, and
profit distribution. The Law "On Banks and Credit
Operations" of March 1965 defined them as economic organizations "of
special social interest." "They manage common investment
resources on behalf of the social community, proceeding in accordance with the
principles applicable to credit and similar operations, taking into account the
main directives of the social plan and credit policy." The new law also
granted them the ability to operate throughout the territory of Yugoslavia,
thereby giving economic enterprises and territorial communities the freedom to
choose banks and simultaneously facilitating a wider circulation of investment
resources and their rational use.
Unlike in previous periods, economic enterprises
and other institutions were authorized, under the same conditions, to
participate in the founding of banks alongside regional societies. The only
conditions for establishing a bank are: first, securing sufficient initial capital, and second, the participation of a number of
companies and regional communities in the bank's formation, which would
guarantee the necessary resources for its operation.
The bank's management is carried out by the
founding members and in accordance with their contributions. Contributors pay
interest, which in turn depends on the bank's performance. Contributors also
bear the risk of losses. Contributors' voting rights at bank meetings must not
exceed 10%, regardless of the amount of their contribution. This prevents the
bank's management from becoming the monopoly of a relatively small circle. The
bank's governing bodies are the assembly, the executive committee, and the
director. Those involved in management have the right to organize themselves in
a form of self-management, similar to other organizations of this type, and
which is implemented through working councils.
Under these conditions, created by economic reform,
the growing independent activity of businesses, the progressive liberalization
of prices and foreign trade, the further privatization of investment assets,
and the development of elements of a market economy, the role of banks as
instruments of capital accumulation and credit and investment policy clearly
increased. The table below illustrates the growing share of banking assets in
total investment: Share of banking assets in total investment
|
1963 |
1966 |
1970 |
||||
|
Total |
15,848 |
50,0 |
25,220 |
50,0 |
44,577 |
50,0 |
|
Medios propios del inversor |
4,096 |
25,5 |
8,338 |
33,5 |
11,259 |
25,3 |
|
Medios bancarios |
1,236 |
8,3 |
8.731 |
24,9 |
19,659 |
44,1 |
|
Presupuesto u otros medios de la sociedad |
8,254 |
51,6 |
2,742 |
11,0 |
5,972 |
13,4 |
|
Medios del productor privado |
1,320 |
8,3 |
4,357 |
17,4 |
7,687 |
17,2 |
|
Otros medios |
5,3 |
3,2 |
0,0 |
|||
("Statisticki godisnjak" SFRJ 1962, p.
112)
The rapid expansion of banks as a means of
investment was not without consequences, which manifested itself
in economic, social, and political relations. While banks were organized more
or less according to classical principles, they were, in the early years,
undoubtedly a positive driving force for development, but their subsequent
rapid growth led to serious conflicts between social and political groups.
Thus, banks became completely detached from
socio-political and economic communities, and only in this way did they achieve
a near-monopoly position in the financial market. The 1965 Banking Act
conceived of banks solely as instruments of the financing and investment
policies of economic enterprises and socio-political communities, with the aim
of ensuring an ever-increasing influence of the economy and an ever-decreasing
influence of regional communities. This is also evident from the proportion of
their shares when the initial capital of the bank funds was formed, where the
companies' share corresponded to one-third, while the socio-political
communities participated with two-thirds. By the end of the 1960s, this
relationship had completely changed. Financially weak or illiquid Yugoslav
companies fell into ever-increasing dependence on banks.
On the other hand, the banking law did prohibit the
influence of economic enterprises or socio-political communities and at the
same time promoted, through self-management, the strengthening and independence
of the banks with respect to the two "partners". If we add to this
the fact that the banks, thanks to their vast financial resources, were
continually growing as the accumulation point for the best specialists in the
field, then it is no wonder that the large banks, in the short term, not only
became independent but also created what is known as "anonymous
capital".
The share of this anonymous capital—the banks' own
capital in their credit funds—reached more than a third in 1972, while that of
socio-political communities fell below half and that of economic enterprises
dropped to a fifth (Komunist, November 19, 1973). This "decoupling of the
centers of financial power" also created the material basis for the
political influence of the "technocrats."
"Rich" Banks - "Poor" Economy
The expansion of banks and the growth of their
power were tolerated, while the entire economy developed in parallel. With the
emergence of economic difficulties, internal and external imbalances, and the
rise in unemployment and insolvency, the antagonism between economic
enterprises and banks also intensified. Not only the weakest companies, but
also the most advanced ones, fell into permanent dependence on the large banks,
which, taking advantage of market conditions, imposed interest rates of 10% on
long-term loans and 20% on short-term loans, while simultaneously seizing
almost all the foreign currency earned by these companies. This demonstrates
that the Yugoslav socialist market economy lacked both the necessary tools and
legislation capable of preventing uneven growth, with banks dominating the
economy.
While the economy was deteriorating, even in
healthy businesses, due to a lack of money and such severe illiquidity that workers sometimes had to wait a month or more for their
wages, the financial power of the banks was constantly growing. It was quite
normal for a secretary or doorman at a large bank to be better paid than an
engineer at an insolvent factory. The political and party bureaucracy within
the country, whose reputation and even existence sometimes depended on the
success of the local economy, demonstrated its capacity and indispensability in
lending, often leading itself, the entire party organization, and businesses to
a direct dependence on the large banks. All of this together forms the basis of
what is called the "bureaucratic-technical structure" against which
the League of Yugoslav Communists (the Party) is currently launching its
offensive. These relationships also form the basis of the major national
political conflicts that characterized the Yugoslav political scene in 1971-72.
If Yugoslavia were not a multinational state, but
rather a nationally homogeneous one, the expansion of banks at the expense of
economic enterprises would have been reduced to social conflicts and limited to
internal party and factional struggles and a possible shift in economic policy.
However, due to its multinational structure, the conflict between banks and the
economy, and between banks and the party bureaucracy, primarily took on the
characteristics of a national political conflict. This was exacerbated by the
excessive concentration of banks in Belgrade and, simultaneously, by the
expansion of the Croatian economy, which consisted mainly of foreign trade, the
oil industry, and shipbuilding.
Political and National Aspects
When the Federation's investment funds were
gradually transferred to banks in 1953, the largest beneficiaries were the
Federation's major banks: the Yugoslav Investment Bank, the Agricultural Bank,
and the Foreign Trade Bank, the latter known as Jugobanco; all three were
headquartered in Belgrade. Initially, this did not cause any major disruption
because, until the 1965 Banking Act, the banks had their own capital and were
under the control of the socio-political communities. However, when the banks
became independent in 1965 and began to raise their own capital, these three
banks, along with the newly founded Bank of Belgrade, came to dominate
virtually the entire financial market. The table below illustrates this:
Amount of capital placement and headquarters of the
banking institution
|
Nombre del Banco |
Sede |
Monto de colocación en millones de dinares nuevos 1971 |
|
|
1. |
Banco Yugoslavo de Inversiones |
Belgrado |
43,760 |
|
2. |
Banco de Belgrado |
Belgrado |
36,737 |
|
3. |
Banco de Comercio Exterior |
Belgrado |
21,522 |
|
4. |
Banco de Ljubljana (esloveno) |
Ljubljana |
20,003 |
|
5. |
Banco Económico |
Sarajevo |
19,625 |
|
6. |
Banco Agrario |
Belgrado |
14,973 |
|
7. |
Banco Económico |
Zagreb |
11,014 |
|
8. |
Banco Económico |
Skopje |
10,682 |
|
9. |
Banco de Crédito |
Zagreb |
10,181 |
|
10. |
Banco Comercial y de Inversiones |
Skopje |
9,195 |
("Ekonomska Politika," Belgrade,
September 4, 1972)
It is clear from this table that the placement of
Croatian banks reaches only one-fifth that of Belgrade banks and is barely as
high as that of Macedonian banks, which are listed among the country's
underdeveloped republics. The paradox of the situation becomes even clearer
when one considers that the Republic of Croatia has become, in the last twenty
years, the largest producer of industrial goods in Yugoslavia. With a 22% share
of Yugoslavia's total population, Croatia contributes 27% to the national income,
accounts for 30% of industrial production, 30% of foreign trade, and
contributes roughly 36% to foreign exchange earnings. (NIN,
February 13, 1972). The industrial "giant," Croatia, thus
becomes the financial "dwarf."
The Financial Center – Belgrade
Croatian banks account for 17% of total Yugoslav
bank lending, while Serbian banks hold a 60% share. Comparing Zagreb, the
largest industrial center in Croatia and Yugoslavia, with Belgrade reveals an
even more stark contrast. The two Zagreb banks control 9% of the credit
extended in the Yugoslav economy, while Belgrade banks control 49% (Ekonomska
Politika, September 4, 1973). Furthermore, of the ten largest foreign trade
companies, four are headquartered in Belgrade and have an annual turnover of
23.5 billion dinars (16.4 billion German marks), while the only Zagreb-based
foreign trade company, Ferimport, has a turnover of only 2 billion dinars. This
meant that 75% of total Yugoslav foreign trade was conducted through
Belgrade-based companies, while Zagreb accounted for only 10%.
It was logical and natural that such a distribution
of financial capital would awaken and deepen old antagonisms between Zagreb and
Belgrade, and ultimately spread to the leading unions of the League of
Communists of Croatia and Serbia, and subsequently to the press, intellectuals,
and broad swathes of the masses. Given the enviable position of Croatian banks
in the pre-war years, the situation, as it unfolded in the late 1960s, was
untenable for Croatia's economic and political leadership.
This unfavorable financial situation in Croatia,
coupled with significant difficulties in economic development, led Croatian
political leaders in 1970 to frame the problems of banking, foreign trade, and
the currency system as a top-priority national and political issue. The
argument of the "exploitation of the Croatian economy" was put
forward, and a rapid overhaul of the existing financial and economic system was
demanded. To achieve this, the Croatian leadership called for the
decentralization of the political and economic system.
Serbia's political leadership and a significant
portion of the federal administration, closely tied to Belgrade banks, were
unwilling to embrace radical change. Belgrade banks successfully mobilized
underdeveloped republics such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia,
and Kosovo-Metoji Province—whose economies heavily depended on loans—against
the Croatian Communist League. Slovenia remained neutral, leaving Croatia alone
with its demands in the discussions regarding the constitutional revision,
which was intended to reform the economic and financial system. "Croatia found itself alone among the other five
republics" (V. Bakaric in "Vjesnik u Srijedu" of July 21, 1971).
Croatia sought to overcome this
"isolation" at the Yugoslav level with its own internal mobilization.
The press became a platform for propaganda against Belgrade's banks,
businesses, and export companies. The well-known journalist Neda Krmpotic,
writing from the IX Congress and also a member of the Conference of the
Communist League of Yugoslavia, stated that Croatia was in reality a "free
hunting ground for the big businessmen of Yugoslavia" (Vjesnik u Srijedu
of September 16, 1971). Similarly, the Croatian politician and professor Marcos Veselica declared at a student assembly at
the University of Zagreb that "the centralists, together with the Croatian
bureaucrats, are selling the Croatian (Adriatic) coast to Belgrade
bankers."
Objectives of the new banking reform
The Croatian leader, the most influential in At that time, Miko Tripalo declared unequivocally in an
interview that large businesses and banks should be renationalized (Vjesnik u
Srijedu, October 14, 1971). The student strike in November brought this action
to its peak but also to its end, because at the 21st session of the Presidency
of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, held on December 1 and 2 in
Karadjordjevo, Tito, supported by the majority of the members of the
Presidency, condemned the "counter-revolutionary and separatist policy"
of the Croatian leadership and dissolved it shortly thereafter.
Exactly one year later, in October 1972, after
virulent discussions within the Party and after repeated criticisms from Tito,
the top of the pyramid of leadership of the League of Communists of Serbia and
Belgrade was also changed, and with this, a large part of that circle of people
who most vehemently opposed the reforms of the banking and large-scale trade
system: undoubtedly in the conviction that banks are an irreplaceable element
in the market economy, but also knowing that because of the reforms Belgrade
and Serbia were going to lose both their economic power and political
influence.
As the growing power of banks intensified the
antagonism between national and social groups in Yugoslavia, its solution had
to be approached either from a class or a national perspective. The Croatian
party leadership, by then dissolved, evidently wanted to resolve it from a
national perspective. In an interview with "Komunist," Dr. V. Bakaric
stated: "The managerial layer of society, which has privatized the
extraordinary means of society, of banks and similar institutions, came to
dominate Yugoslavia, and the center of financial power, alienating the working
class, began to become the center of political power as well." Tito sought
to prevent this development through democratic means, and that is why "the
center that lay on the other side" was protected. However, from 1968
onward, criticism took forms that could no longer be accepted, as it condemned
"not a real change in relations, but a redistribution of financial and
political power from which the working class would continue to be
deprived." The criticism had escalated to nationalism and, by
circumventing the Party, sought support from the streets. This led to the
"outburst" at the 21st session of the Presidency of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (Komunist, November 26, 1973).
Tito and the majority of the Presidency opted for a
class-based solution. This meant stripping power from bank capital and transferring
it to the economy, to self-managed guilds, to the workers, without any regard
for republics or national borders. Accordingly, Articles 40, 41, and 42 of the
new Constitution stipulated that bank foundations could be established through
"unionized worker organizations, self-managed communities of interest, and
other legal entities of society." In other words, banks could be founded
by economic enterprises and institutions that provide social services,
including social and cultural institutions.
The Constitution guarantees the economy control
over banking institutions and provides that united workers' organizations,
self-managed interest communities, and other legally entitled social entities
may conduct banking operations in accordance with the Law, the Self-Management
Convention on Banks, and the provisions of that Convention (Draft Constitution,
"Vjesnik" of June 9, 1973). It specifically states that
"socio-political communities," meaning communes, republics, and the
Federation, "are not founders of banks and cannot engage in banking
activities." This is clearly intended to prohibit any direct interference
by the administrative apparatus in banking matters.
Furthermore, the new articles of the Constitution
prohibit the subsequent formation of banks as "independent centers of
financial power" with the accumulation of their own capital. The bank in
the future must distribute "the means created by its activity, after
covering the costs of its business and the separation of means that correspond
to the work community in accordance with the agreement between the work
community and the bank's administration body to those legal entities, who have
deposited their means in the bank."
The objectives of the current banking reform
provided for in the new Constitution are, according to "Komunist
(19-XI-1973): "First, the real domination of the banks and of social
production in its entirety by united labor; second, the prohibition of drainage
of surplus value from production to non-productive regions through banks;
third, the dissolution of the bureaucratic-technical structure of the banking
administration through united work." By "united work" we must
understand production facilities.
The Yugoslav theorists and those who devised this
reform are completely aware of the difficulties in carrying it out, and it is
also a completely new model. In his already mentioned interview, given to the
"Komunist", Bakaric said regarding the concerns that the reform
brings: "This is a complex of problems, for which the solution cannot be
found overnight. There will be storms and great oppositions. The technical
managers are actually defeated, but now we have to go one step further. "One should not stop halfway" (Komunist
of 11/26/1973).
(Translated by
FN from "Wissenschaflicher Dienst Sudosteuropa", Munich, volume 11/12
1973, pp. 179-184.)
"The democratic spirit" of the Republic
of Poljica
Ante Kadic
I never thought I would write about socio-legal
relations in Old Poljica. I am doing so at the urging of several friends and
organizers of the international symposium discussing the family community
(zadruga) among South Slavs and Balkan peoples. They asked me to tell them
something about the peasant republic of Poljica, as they knew (from what I had
told them) that I was born in the southern foothills of the Mosor Mountains, in
coastal Poljica (Jesenice parish). Although I was taken from my peaceful and
quiet native village of Krug when I was ten years old to be sent to the high
school in Split, where my restless path unwittingly began, to this day I feel
deeply connected to my family home and my fellow villagers.
I will divide this work into two parts: In the
first part, I will address the opinions expressed by certain specialists,
primarily Russian, regarding the social order of the Republic of Poljica,
emphasizing that it was not a utopian region—although Poljica was a rather
ideal refuge from the Balkan war and the prevailing tyranny—since its
inhabitants were men of their time, when social inequality reigned. In the
second part, I will describe my family's life before moving to the Adriatic
coast (Mali Rat), while we still lived quite peacefully in the land of our
ancestors. Upon moving to the coast in the 1920s, our
communal life, already disrupted by the commercial activities of my father and
uncles, though not profoundly disrupted, completely ceased.
I. The two most important legal and social
documents in the medieval history of Croatia are the Vinodol Code and the
Statute of Poljica. The Code of Vinodol (1288-) was
imposed by the feudal prince on his subjects, while the Statute of Poljica
(1440) contains a set of customs and practices in force in the early village
communities, as well as new provisions generally agreed upon by the lords and
the people. The Statute of Poljica, written in Bosnian script (Bosniak
characters), which prevailed for a long time in Poljica and other parts of
Dalmatia, and drafted in the Cakavian-Stokavian dialect, has been published several
times: first by Matija Mesic, then by Vatroslav Jagic, Mate Tentor, Stipe
Kastelan, and finally by Zvonimir Junkovic, who also translated it into modern
Croatian.[24] The Statute has also been translated into German and Russian.[25]
There is abundant literature on the Statute.[26] I will refer specifically to
the studies of specialists. Russians, insofar as they, more than others,
analyze the internal order of Poljica, although sometimes they strive to adjust
certain articles of the Statute to their a priori theories.
As soon as the Statute of Poljica (Mesic 1859)[27] was published, scholars were surprised by the
similarities between the terms used by the Dalmatian Croats and those of
"Ruska pravda"; they were particularly interested in the word
"vrv" (in Russian, "verv"), and F. Leontovic was the first
to try to explain it (1867) as a family community, identifying it with the
cooperative (zadruga)[28]. The following year (1868) he published a book in
Odessa[29] attempting to reconstruct a general picture of the social structure
of the ancient Slavs, paying special attention to communal land ownership,
assemblies, and the eligibility of the prince (chief). He stated that of
Poljica it could be said "that they, like the Slavs of Procopius's time,
were not subject to a ruler but from the beginning lived under popular
government."
He further maintained that in Poljica, "until
then, governance was based on the ancient principles of Slavic cooperatives
(Zadruga) without the slightest sign of division between communal authority and
the prince. In Poljica, the commune, with its assembly and its leaders (among
whom was also the grand prince), was the principal social factor."
Leontovic further embellished this idyllic picture, distancing it from reality
when he concluded that "the people of Poljica, over the course of many
centuries, had become so intertwined with their community, its interests and
needs, their lives having become so intertwined with those customs, and so
meager were outside contributions, that the centuries following the time of the
Statute registered almost no movement in the social life of Poljica" [30].
Against such an interpretation by Leontovic, who,
inspired by the prevailing Slavophile views of the time, saw in the Statute the
embodiment of justice and democratic order among the ancient Slavs, the Russian
academic B. Grekov reacted vigorously in his extensive book on Poljica (1951).
Grekov correctly argued that an ideal community did not reign in Poljica, but
he exaggerated, seeking in the Statute evidence that even then in Poljica (as
in Vinodol) only the feudal relationship between lord and people existed.
Attacking Leontovic, Grekov pointed out that the
latter misinterpreted the very first article of the Statute ("The first
Law of Poljica is to accept the prince appointed by the lords, loyal to them
and pleasing to the people of Poljica"). Leontovic read: "to accept
the prince appointed by the lords," that is, the Venetian nobles of Split,
as if it meant "to accept the lord prince," and believed that the
second part, "loyal to the lord," that is, to the Duke of Venice,
meant "loyal to God," concluding that "the function of the grand
prince had long had in Poljica the character of an elective office" [31].
Grekov especially criticized Leontovic for seeing communal life there, where it
no longer existed: "In Poljica of the 15th-16th centuries, undoubtedly,
there was a feudal society, and no longer in its
initial phase... In the feudal system, there is no room for
equality" [32].
Grekov's entire book contradicts Leontovic's views,
and consequently his opinion about the Poljica community differs from
Leontovic's: "The Poljica village-commune is a rather complex, or more
accurately, motley organization; there are remnants of the past that live only
in memories, some on the verge of extinction, others already dead, mixed with
glimpses of the new system with prospects for the future... Without
a doubt, we are in the presence of the evolution, already very advanced, of the
genealogical system" [33].
Both of Grekov's books, which deal with the
socio-legal organization of maritime Croatia in the Middle Ages, one concerning
the Vinodol Code (1948) and the other concerning Poljica, were harshly
criticized by Croatian scholars and others. Marko Kostrencic and Miho Barada
proved that Grekov was ignorant of "the most elementary features of the
evolution of Croatian history" [34], so that his work on the Vinodol Code
is a mistake, while Zvonimir Junkovic and Juraj Marusic pointed out his
ignorance and misunderstanding of the specific situation of Poljica [35].
Junkovic maintained that Grekov "was not interested in providing a
faithful translation, but rather a free commentary, the aim of which was to
serve as an illustration of conclusions the author had reached in his study.
Unfortunately, very often, this commentary did not agree with what the
legislator of Poljica had intended to express."[36]
Although other Russian historians, jurists,
treatise writers, and ethnologists wrote about the social system in medieval
Croatia, always mentioning Poljica, the greatest attention should be paid to
the prestigious scholar M. Alekseev, who, in his study on "The Slavic
Sources of Thomas More's Utopia"[37], held the opinion that Poljica, with
its Statute, would have been one of the models from which More constructed his
scheme of the utopian country.
It should be emphasized here that Alekseev, who
accepts Grekov's criticisms of Leontovic, is closer to the latter than to
Grekov in his interpretation of the customs and laws of Poljica. Alekseev
believes that the spirit of the The social democratic
system, as practiced by the ancient Slavs, was preserved in Poljica "until
recent times," a fact particularly evident in the election of the grand
prince, the army commander, the procurator, and the municipal prosecutor. All
these functions could have served as inspiration for More, as he wrote about
the election "of phylarks, syphogrants, or tranibors" and about the
holding of popular assemblies.[38]
Alekseev, who not only saw the similarity between
More's work and the institutions of Poljica, but also put forward the
hypothesis that More, who neither traveled to Poljica nor immersed himself in
its patriarchal environment through reading, could have learned something about
the inhabitants of those inaccessible mountains who defended their possessions
without seeking to aggrandize them.
A friend of More was Sebastian Giustiniani,
Venetian ambassador in London (January 1515 to October 1519); More, in his
letter to Erasmus (September 1519), In 1516, he expressed that he liked
Giustiniani for being an honest and well-mannered man,[39] while the ambassador
informed the Venetian government (in February 1518) that More was an
intelligent and virtuous man, and closer to him than any other Englishman.[40]
Since they could have met a year before the publication of Utopia (1516), it is
not improbable (Alekseev thinks) that Giustiniani told More where he had been
before arriving in England.
Giustiniani was appointed (1512) the principal
Venetian regent in Dalmatia; these were turbulent times when the islanders of
Hvar, led by Matija Ivanic, rose up against the nobles, so the regent also
compelled those of Poljica to assist him in suppressing the uprising. Perhaps
Ivanic's demand for the same authority as the Prince of Poljica led Giustiniani
to take an interest in the customs of their wartime allies from Poljica.
Alekseev also reproduces the alphabet of More's
Utopians and compares it to the Glagolitic script used by the priests of
Poljica in religious services. While it is difficult to assert that these two
scripts have nothing in common, at first glance, the Utopian alphabet appears
to differ from Glagolitic.
Alekseev observes that it is not necessary for all
his arguments to be equally convincing, nor for every
detail of the Poljican customary code to correspond to the Utopian system. The
essential point is this: More's friend Giustiniani may have told him something
about the patriarchal organization of Poljica that sparked his imagination
regarding the construction of the Utopian framework. He does not deny that
other sources, such as Tacitus's description of the ancient Germans or Amerigo
Vespucci's reports on the Brazilian aborigines, may have influenced the curious
creator, but he believes, nevertheless, that More found in the South Slavs of
his time one of the most appropriate examples for his Utopia.[41]
Above all, this link between More
and Poljica, through Giustiniani, does not seem convincing to us. Giustiniani
spent only a few months in Dalmatia on a punitive expedition, where he acted in
an undiplomatic and very cruel manner. He is primarily responsible for the
failure to reach the promised agreement between the nobles and the people of
Hvar. The people wrote to Venice in unfavorable terms regarding the cruel
governor, and for a time he fell out of favor.[42]
Unexpectedly, he was appointed ambassador to England when F. Donato, previously
designated, suddenly fell ill.[43]
Giustiniani had no special connection with Poljica.
According to the 1444 agreement, Poljica was to fight for Venice without pay in
the area between the Cetina River, the Krka, and Livno. Outside this territory,
if recruited, the soldiers were entitled to pay and plunder.[44]
When they were ready to attack Vrboska on Hvar from Bol on Brac, under
Giustiniani's command, disagreements arose between the governor and the
soldiers of Poljica, who were subsequently sent home.[45]
The Venetian governor favored the privileged class
and failed to inspire enthusiasm in the commune of Poljica. Had Giustiniani
shown even the slightest inclination toward social justice, his mission would
have succeeded, but after his departure, the situation on Hvar worsened.
On the other hand, and this is a very important
point, More wrote the second part of his Utopia before 1515 or that same year,
while, as part of a delegation, he was living in Flanders from May until the
end of the year. It is highly improbable that what Giustiniani (who arrived in
January) might have told him could have had such a decisive influence on More.[46] The opinion of More's informed biographers, according
to whom the second book of Utopia was written after long periods of reading and
reflection, is more likely.
It is now up to us to delve into the essence of
Utopia and see if we find anything in the Statute of Poljica that compels us to
recognize a particular analogy between Poljica's system and that of the
Utopians.
Although it is evident how the Utopians differed
from English society at that time, there are many contradictory interpretations
regarding what More intended to achieve in writing his
Utopia. While certain Marxist authors, from K. Kautsky to V. Volgin (whom
Alekseev quotes frequently), see More as a critic of early capitalism and a
prophet of modern socialism and communism, others (for example, R. O. Sullivan
and E. Surtz) believe that Utopia is primarily a religious and philosophical
work, while still others (R. Chambers and D. Bevington) appreciate above all
its literary and satirical value. There are also those who claim (e.g., R.
Ames) that More attacked only decadent feudalism and not capitalism, which was
in its initial phase.[47]
There is no doubt that More had firsthand knowledge
of the remnants of English feudal society, but he also foresaw the consequences
of capitalism, which, although in its nascent stage, was driving peasants from
their lands, forcing them into war, and, when they became disabled and
impoverished—sometimes completely destitute, vagrants, and bandits—was treated
without any consideration and subjected to punitive measures. In addition to
his knowledge of English reality, More was familiar
with ancient writers such as Plato, Aristotle, Saint Augustine, and others who
addressed state and social order. More than anyone else, he was influenced by
his teacher and friend Erasmus, who dedicated his *In Praise of Folly* to him,
sharply satirizing the powerful secular and ecclesiastical authorities.
At the end of the first part of the book, painting
a picture of the grim living conditions of the poor, More
strongly condemns private property. Although at this point he is influenced by
the Bible, Aristotle, and Erasmus, he is clearer, more systematic, and more
categorical than all his predecessors. More agrees with Plato, who refused to
enact laws for those who denied the equal participation of all citizens in all
goods.
He observes that "where private property
exists, where everything is measured in money, there is no justice and no
progress" [48]. He then emphasizes that the rich are usually dishonest and
useless, and the poor modest and useful to society. He emphasizes that
"the abolition of private property is the only means to the just
distribution of goods."[49] Although he admits that legal provisions could
be enacted to limit the power of the ruler and the size of his estate, he
concludes that these would only be provisional measures since "there is no
hope that society will return to a healthy state while private property
prevails."[50]
Among the Utopians there is no private property,
and that is why communal life is possible.
In brief, I will refer to Moro's utopian community,
which is more akin to a bureaucratic communist "kolkhoz" than a
patriarchal Slavic cooperative.
Each city, Moro writes, has its designated
countryside; the citizens do not wish to expand their houses because they
consider themselves farmers rather than landowners. In the countryside, in
suitable locations, there are houses equipped with agricultural tools and
implements. These are inhabited by those who take turns working the land. Each
rural family has at least forty members, men and women. At the head are the
chief and the mistress of the house, serious and experienced individuals. There
is one phylarch for thirty communities in total. After spending two years in
the countryside, twenty men from each community return to the city. They are
replaced by an equal number from the city. These are taught by members who have
already spent at least a year in the countryside and are familiar with
agricultural tasks... [51]
While there are certain apparent similarities
between Utopia and the social order of Poljica, Moro's
"communities," in their essence, differ from the reality of
Poljica.
In Poljica, prior to Austrian rule (1815), the
population was divided into nobles and commoners. The prestige of class
affiliation was so great that some went to great lengths to prove their descent
from Bosnian or Hungarian lords. [52] Although all the inhabitants of Poljica
participated in assemblies on certain important issues, many ordinances were
nevertheless voted on only by the nobles. All important public offices, from
the Grand Prince and the head of the army down to the public prosecutor, were
usually held by nobles. Only in some villages (Srinjine, Podstrana, Jesenice,
Duce) did the village chiefs, independently of the nobles, manage the village's
day-to-day affairs and participate with the nobles in the election of Poljica's
supreme bodies.[53]
In Poljica, justice (according to the Statute) was
not equal for all. Different penalties were prescribed for the same offenses,
for nobles and for commoners. If a subordinate insulted his master, his tongue
was cut out, and if he raised a hand against him, his
right hand was cut off. Marusic rightly concludes: "Such a state is far
from being an idyll."[54]
Since Poljica, at the time of the Statute's
promulgation, was neither a purely feudal society nor entirely free from the
influences of the feudal order,[55] we find dual
ownership: communal and private. Although at first communal property was more
extensive, encompassing the entire tribe and extended family, later (if it
still existed) it was limited to a few closer families.[56]
This is clear from the articles of the Statute that
address "inheritance" and its distribution. In article 49a, we read
that "whoever possesses the old inheritance, bequeathed by their
ancestors, must cultivate it, enjoy it, and live off it. It is not honorable to
squander it and consume it without great need; rather, one must leave it as one
inherited it."
Therefore, one could not spend the inheritance
bequeathed by one's ancestors unless in dire need. Furthermore, this ancient
inheritance could be divided not only among distant relatives but also among
siblings, for at the end of the characteristic Article 33 we read:
"Until the siblings and other co-owners divide
the inheritance, everything is held in common, both good and bad, debts and
credits: everything is held in common until it is divided. When it is divided,
then each one receives their share."
This article on division indirectly defines the
community of Poljica: while living together, the members of the community hold
everything in common; no one owns their own property. This article also
expresses the difference between this community and Utopia, for it allows those
who are united by blood or who have shared both good and bad up to that point
to divide the common goods and begin to work their land.[57]
In Poljica, therefore, private property existed
(often small "fields," hence the name Poljica) which gradually
replaced communal property (in later centuries, communal property was mainly
limited to grazing land and forests). It is understandable, then, that some had
more land than others; most serfs, for economic reasons, were obliged to work
the land of privileged nobles and non-nobles, having to pay the owners a
certain tribute. The "Vlasici" were hired shepherds on the upper
slopes of Mosor.[58]
Therefore, one cannot speak of a community in
Poljica like that of the Acts of the Apostles or Utopia, where everything was
held in common. The inhabitants of Poljica were neither religious fanatics nor
utopian thinkers like More, but flesh-and-blood men
who worked hard so that they could say: this is mine, and I leave it to my
children as an "inheritance." The concept of private property was so
developed that neighbors had to be very careful to ensure that their chickens,
pigs, or other animals did not stray over a neighbor's fence and cause even the
slightest damage to their vegetable garden or vineyard.
Many provisions of the Statute relate to these
property issues. For example, Articles 53-54 state that
"a chicken caught in the vineyard pays with its head; it must be killed
and eaten. When it pecks around a neighbor's house, one may kill it...
When a chicken causes damage in a vegetable garden or vineyard, the owner, upon
reporting it, may kill and eat one, even if there were several. If there is a
rooster among them, then another chicken must be killed, leaving the
rooster."
While I have thus far listed the reasons why
Poljica could not be the model for Utopia, it is obvious from what has been
said that there was more freedom and democracy in Poljica than in other
Dalmatian communes. Whereas elsewhere the Venetians truly held power, here they
were content with political dependence and tribute, leaving untouched the
long-standing privileges of the inhabitants of Poljica. According to the first
article of the Statute, the Duke of Venice could approve or reject the election
of the Grand Prince, but the inhabitants of Poljica tried, whenever possible,
to diminish or completely eliminate Venetian interference in the election of
their supreme authorities. Although at first they "elected" their
Prince from among the nobles of Split, later they elected him solely from among
their own nobles,[59] and the chiefs of each village,
chosen by the people on St. George's Day, also participated in his election.
The entire population participated in the
assemblies where decisions were made regarding war or peace, relations with
other countries, and, in general, all matters of importance. Thus, in Articles
23-25, almost the same formula is repeated several times: "All the
inhabitants of Poljica unanimously decided and ordered all the nobles, serfs,
and shepherds... The inhabitants of Poljica, assembled, all the nobles, and the
entire commune of Poljica decided...".
It is worth noting that there were no class
conflicts in Poljica. This was partly due to the fact that Poljica was always
surrounded by powerful enemies, whether Turks or
Venetians, so that only through harmony could they maintain a degree of
independence. Furthermore, although at first the "didici" emphasized
their Bosnian nobility and later the "vlastela" their Hungarian
nobility, they gradually became equals with the common people. It should not be
forgotten that the inhabitants of Poljica, as a whole, lacked much formal
education, and there were no differences between the supposed upper and lower
classes, neither in the construction of the houses, nor in their conduct,
bearing, nor mentality. I still remember a saying I heard in my childhood, when
a neighbor asked about the village chief and was told, "He's in the
cellar, mending slippers."
In Poljica, a serf could free himself from his
master's control. This was provided for in Article 89, which begins with these
words: "When the serf thinks of leaving the master..." and ends with
this statement: "A man may flee from evil if it is possible" [60].
It was also provided for that a freed serf could
expand his holdings at the expense of part of the common forest and grazing
land. That important anti-feudal Article 59 begins by stating: "When a
village wishes to divide a forest or grazing land among its members, that is,
when they no longer wish to or cannot maintain it in common or graze their
flocks there..."; if a serf's field bordered the communal land to be
distributed, then he would participate in the division with the others. This
provision is characteristic, as it highlights two attitudes typical of
Poljica's "democratic spirit," namely, "that everyone should be
able to live, since nothing that exists today has always existed." This
means that the Statute recognized that the justice of life is stronger than
written laws, which must adapt to the times.[61]
In the peasant community of Poljica, where there
were no slaves, the poor had organized themselves into the Council of the Poor,
which acted in conjunction with and as a counterweight to the more powerful in
the assemblies.[62]
Consequently, although Poljica was not a utopian
country, and although the feudal system with private property gradually took
hold there as well, the mountainous terrain of this region made Poljica a kind
of fortress. The peasants were aware that their republic (principality,
commune, parish) along with the Statute was their best
protector. In those feudal times, they were justifiably proud of their
privileges.
II
Marshal Marmont, who abolished the independence of
Poljica (1807), says in his Memoirs about the mountains of Poljica and the
indomitable character of its inhabitants: "The principality of Poljica,
situated in beautiful, high valleys, lacks passable roads and is easy to
defend. The isolation of this region, combined with the desire of its
inhabitants not to submit to anyone, is undoubtedly the reason why the
Venetians granted them several privileges: they paid no taxes, they were their
own masters, they appointed their leaders, and there were neither soldiers nor
sailors among them. We wanted to take away these privileges, and they rebelled.
Looking at this corner of the world, we concluded that their government was
good: there is nothing more carefully tended than their crops, nor anything more beautiful than their villages" [63].
Although the French abolished the Republic of
Poljica and the Austrian government changed many aspects of its way of life,
Poljica remained quite isolated in the foothills of the Mosor Mountains. These
high plateaus, which had fostered the creation of its independent republic and,
over the centuries, provided natural protection against the Turkish conqueror,
also helped preserve (until the end of the First World War) the sense of
kinship among its inhabitants and, to some extent, the village community.
Incidentally, the coastal road was built in 1856,
and a little later a boat began transporting passengers from Split to Omis.
However, few villagers from Jesenice and Duce went to Split or down to the
coast to bathe or row boats. When the factory was established in Dugi Rat
(1911), the poorest peasants sought work there, not to become professional
laborers, but to earn some money to buy a new field, repair their homes, and
pay off debts. You should have seen them hurrying home at night, as if
something were driving them, as if they felt unsafe outside their parents'
house.
I recently perused, with great care, two studies on
the inhabitants of two parishes in Poljica. They contain surnames from the
early 18th and late 19th centuries, and in both cases, I was able to verify
that most of them correspond to families I knew in my childhood.[64]
Like more or less all of Poljica, and like my
hometown, it was a closed society. Everyone was native, Croat, and Catholic;
there was no one of any other religion or nationality. However, it was said
(more accurately, rumored) that some in the "old days" had come from
Bosnia as Muslims, but they had also long since integrated with the others, so
that they too visited the altars and lit candles before the saints[65].
The villagers used to choose their future wives
from among the young women of their own parish. If one of them married a native
woman from one of the villages on the other side of the mountain, more than an
hour's walk away, the whole village talked about her.
The women had to know the grooms' family
backgrounds: their economic, moral, and even health, which was difficult to
ascertain unless they met with other women in the church who reviewed the lives
of the living and the dead. Great care was taken to prevent marriages between
close or distant relatives. In these cases, the priest requested special
permission from the Pope.
However, we were all connected by some blood tie,
and when I traveled through neighboring villages, someone would always call me
"cousin" or "relative," and I would have to visit their
house for a drink. At those times, they would coax out of me who my aunts'
fiancés were, and the women were surprised that my relatives could be happy if
my aunts could find better matches than a Zemunik or a Brnicevic. Then he
continued his comment: “Until now, they served you, and from now on, they will
serve you; that, my son, is like getting off a horse to ride a donkey.”
As in other
villages, so too in ours, there was a great difference between rich and poor
peasants. Some lived in
rough stone huts, where the wind howled, while others lived in beautiful houses
with tiled roofs and slept in soft beds. There were “houses” where people lived
in abundance, while in others, even by autumn, they lacked food and drink.[66] Those who owned extensive vineyards, olive groves, and
plum orchards were considered true potentates. Some villagers (like my father
and my uncles) traded in wine and cherries, opening taverns in Rijeka and
Trieste, while others sold meat, flour, cloth, salt, coffee, and other goods.
There were peasants who didn't own land and worked
the land of the wealthier landowners, bringing them a fifth or sixth of the
harvest in the autumn. Others worked as laborers in the vineyards, and the
landowner fed them and, if they came from a distant village, provided them with
lodging. At the end of the workday, they were paid. Sometimes, these were
well-off peasants who urgently needed cash to buy a cow or a horse, or to
expand their land.
In the wealthier households, there were male and
female servants. Sometimes, young women were employed to earn some money before
marriage, and young men from the upper Poljica region were employed to learn
how to manage a farm. Some stayed with their master for the rest of their
lives; they were usually bachelors and were respected and treated as members of
the family. If the father died and only young men or women remained, the
servant would manage the house and the farm for a time.
Although we had several houses and each family
lived in their own, we all ate in the same kitchen and cellar where the wine,
brandy, and oil that we shared were kept. Except for the sick, no one ate
separately. My mother, being the wife of my eldest brother, was the homemaker;
she had acquired such prestige that my grandfather Stipe respected her more
than his own children. She was the pillar of the household. All the most
important decisions were made around the hearth. At that time, the children
were sent to bed, and the adults sat on the benches, while the women watched
from their corner to see if the wine jugs were running low or if the fire was
going out in the hearth.
My grandfather's house, which we considered
communal and where we gathered for all the holidays (Christmas, Easter, when we
had guests, weddings, baptisms, house blessings, or wakes), was built of solid
stone, had a heavy door reinforced with iron, and next to it was a loophole for
mounting weapons. This was our "mother" house, a remnant of Turkish times.
In the middle of our courtyard stood a multi-story "tower," by then
completely abandoned, since there were no more Turks and it was no longer
necessary to keep watch from the top floor in case they were about to break in.
All the villagers with our surname lived near our
houses. There wasn't a single family with this surname in any other village. We
were all gathered together like chicks around a hen. When the people of Poljica
mentioned our surname, they knew it referred to an old family living in Krug, a
little way up from the church.
The sense of community was so deeply ingrained that
when the people of Krug began to move to the coast, they settled where there
were already some who shared their surname and built houses side by side.
Sometimes, they could have built them in a more suitable location, but they
didn't want to move far from their relatives. Although they lacked the
traditional home, they retained a longing for the old ways or a fear of not
venturing too far from their nest, for woe to the solitary man when he finds
himself in need or old.
From the large families, around the 1980s, the men
began to emigrate to the American continent, always
hoping to return someday. They called their fellow villagers "from
America." At celebrations, they gathered around roasted lambs and
reminisced about their old homeland; they lived abroad, but their spirits
remained with their distant villages. They were proud of their native villages,
and thus they embellished the past and the present of Poljica.
Poljica was not an earthly paradise; there were many barren regions, and
in summer rain was awaited like manna from heaven. Lower and middle Poljica had
more fertile fields than upper Poljica.[67] In upper
Poljica, livestock farming was somewhat more prevalent, although on the slopes
of lower Poljica, sheep and goats grazed in a communal forest. The peasants
worked the land primarily. The fields were like their homes to them; they spent
all day there. It was a great shame if someone was forced to sell a portion of
their vineyard. Before dying, some would say, "If I haven't acquired
anything, at least I haven't squandered my inheritance."
They cared for the fields like the apple of their eye, watching over
them, and observing the grapes like a mother watches her baby. In the gardens,
there were delicious vegetables, greens, and fruits; on the terraces and
windows, the women placed pots and large planters with flowers. Although water
sources were not frequent, great care was taken to keep them clean. The
peasants were healthy and well-built. To say "inhabitant of Poljica"
was a source of pride, indicating that the man was slender and hardworking, a
descendant of an old family, closely connected to his
relatives and his village.
In my youth, Lower Poljica was in the transitional phase from a
patriarchal society to the tourist-based, working-class one that now fully
prevails. Whereas before, in Mali Rat, everything smelled of wine, barrels, and
vats, since the wine was transported to Trieste, now there is an overcrowded
neighborhood with many reinforced concrete houses. Further up, abandoned
vineyards stretch out, and Krug is a ruin. People only go to Krug on Sundays,
on excursions, and under leafy beech trees, they reminisce about the good old
days, when everything was predetermined, down to the last detail, by the
"respectable" Statute, which everyone obeyed equally.
Bloomington,
Indiana, USA
(Translated into Spanish: B. K.)
Documents
"The Reader's Digest": Incomprehensible
hesitations in the face of truth
American historian C. Michael McAdams responds to
the aforementioned publication in his country
"The Reader's Digest," in its English
edition, published in December 1973, an article entitled "The Most Illegal
of Illegals," containing serious errors, inaccuracies, and even slander
that are detrimental to the Croatian people in general and some of their
political figures. The American historian, McAdams, warned the author of the
aforementioned article of the impossibility of maintaining such errors, both
from the point of view of historical truth and from that of the professional
ethics of journalism.
Mr. McAdams presented concrete facts that refute
the errors and false assertions of the journalist Nathan Adams, author of the
denigrating article, and requested that his counterarguments be published in
"The Reader's Digest." Despite this, in a private letter to McAdams,
the editor of "The Reader's Digest" expressed his refusal, justifying
it with vague statements and invoking alleged findings from the magazine's
legal and research department that confirmed the article's defamatory stance.
Disagreeing with this refusal, the American
historian sent a letter, originally prepared for "The Reader's
Digest," to all Croatian newspapers and prominent figures in exile, urging
them to be aware of and publicize this rejection, which he considered strange
and contrary to the spirit and tradition of free journalism, especially in the
United States.
Because "Studia Croatica" and the
Croatian Latin American Institute of Culture (Buenos Aires) have received the
same "justifications" from the Editor of "The Reader's
Digest" for refusing to publish Mr. McAdams's statements, taking into
consideration that the two Croatian organizations have contributed, especially
on some points of the McAdams-"The Reader's Digest" controversy, by
providing the former with irrefutable arguments -see notes 20 and 21 of the
letter- and given that these are distorted historical truths that unfairly
harm, with unconfessed purposes, the national, political, and moral integrity of
the Croatian people, we are publishing below the Spanish version of Mr.
McAdams's unanswered letter, so that our readers can form their own opinion on
the matter. (Editor's Note)
Here is the text:
Dear Sirs: In the December issue of Reader's
Digest, an article by Mr. Nathan M. Adams was published under the title
"Our Growing Wave of Illegal Immigrants." Due to my limited knowledge
of the subject, the article seemed accurate and well-researched. However, on
page 116, there was a smaller, boxed section entitled "The Most Illegal of
the Illegals," which contained numerous errors and, above all, was based
very little on facts.
On December 3, 1973, I wrote to you, specifically
to Ms. Julia Jeffrey. I attempted to highlight some of the more obvious
deficiencies in the aforementioned article and, where possible, provide
accurate information. I also enclosed the complete list of Americans held
prisoner of war in Croatia at the end of World War II. I hoped that the editors
would use this information to correct the article and thus restore its
validity. But perhaps I was somewhat naive in my understanding of Reader's
Digest's editorial policy. I received only one reply from your editorial staff
in the form of a private note. It stated:
"We regret your criticism of the edited
material. However, prior to publication of 'Our Growing Wave of Illegal
Immigrants' and the cited sidebar, both were carefully reviewed by our legal
and research departments, which, we believe, found adequate grounds for all
factual assertions."
I found it rather amusing that "adequate
grounds" had been found for the "fact-based assertions," whereas
I had difficulty finding any such assertions in the article. It was evident
that your magazine's editorial staff had no interest in correcting the article,
nor that prior to its publication, no research had been conducted by Mr. N.
Adams or by any group that would dare call itself a "research
department." Therefore, I am addressing this letter to various sections of
your organization, as well as to interested parties outside of Reader's Digest
staff.
As is obvious from my name, I am neither Croatian
nor affiliated with any Croatian organization. I have never seen the gentleman
(Dr. Artukovic - translator's note) mentioned in your article. My interest in the
matter stems purely from a desire for historical accuracy, in the interest of
truth.
In preparing my forthcoming book on the Croatian
Armed Forces during World War II, I have spent two years studying modern
Croatian history, although I am aware that many historians have dedicated their
entire lives to the study of the Croatian people. Indeed, Professor John Prcela
of Cleveland has spent most of the last thirty years investigating a single
event in the history of the Croatian people: the 1945 Bleiburg massacres.
No matter how fruitful these historians may be,
many of their works will be read only by other historians or scholars. It is
therefore very disheartening to see a publication that claims a monthly
circulation of thirty million copies adopt such a negligent attitude toward
historical truth. The reputation, importance, and large print run of your
publication place a considerable responsibility on you, and especially on your
research staff, to ensure that everything published is as accurate and truthful
as possible. Therefore, I will attempt, once again, to highlight some of the
many inaccuracies and falsehoods contained in Mr. Adams' article.
Paragraph II, first sentence reads:
"At the INS (Immigration and Naturalization
Service) headquarters in Los Angeles, the file of Andrija Artukovic, a
74-year-old Yugoslavian now living in Surfside, California, is locked and
labeled 'Secret.'"
The conclusion that the files are locked is
logical, as many things are nowadays. Mr. Adams perhaps considered that by adding
the "secret" label to the case, it would place it in the same
category as the famous Daniel Ellsberg case. Whatever his reason for making
such an assertion, the truth is that Dr. Artukovic's case is public knowledge,
and many Americans are familiar with all its aspects. But if Mr. Adams
sincerely believed the case was secret, this could explain why he didn't bother
to conduct even the most basic investigation.
Although we have only one doctor in the U.S.
government, almost every member of every Croatian government in recent times
has held a doctorate, and therefore I see no reason why Dr. Artukovic should be
deprived of this title.
The letters "C," "Ć," and
"Č" are distinct letters, that is, not interchangeable in the
Croatian alphabet. Therefore, writing "Artukovic" is incorrect.
Although some magazines may not be able to reproduce these letters, evidence
that you have this capability is provided on page 35 of the December issue.
Finally, there is no such thing as
"Yugoslav" nationality. "Yugoslav" denotes a type of
citizenship, just like "Soviet." In the 1971 census of Yugoslavia,
1.3% of the population registered as "Yugoslav." These are, in
principle, people of mixed or uncertain nationality. The remaining 98.7% belong
to one of the 25 nations or minorities of Yugoslavia.[68]
If you are referring to Dr. Artukovic's citizenship, you would still be
mistaken, as he is not a Yugoslav citizen. Apart from these points, your first
sentence appears to be based on facts (i.e., age and place of residence).[69]
Paragraph II, second sentence continues:
"During World War II, he was Minister of
Justice in the Nazi-controlled puppet state of Croatia."
Although the term "occupied by the Nazis"
would have been more accurate than "controlled," and the expression
"puppet state" is somewhat dubious, given that Croatia declared its
independence by taking Germany by surprise, and also represented the least
compliant government in the Balkans, what interests me most is the title
"Minister of Justice." Indeed, Dr. Artukovic was Minister of Justice
and Religious Affairs, but only during the latter part of the war. From April
16, 1941, to October 10, 1942, he was Minister of the Interior. It was during
this period that Tito's government accused him of having committed several crimes,
and not during his tenure as Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs.[70] Perhaps this is merely an oversight, or perhaps the
title of Minister of the Interior doesn't sound sinister enough to warrant
publication.
Paragraph II, sentence three states:
"Witnesses and war crimes investigators
maintain that he contributed to the systematic massacre of nearly one million
Jews and Serbs."
This assertion is a vestige of the postwar era,
when such ludicrous figures could be manipulated with some success. The total
population of Croatia, according to the 1931 census (the last before the war),
was slightly over three million. At that time, there were 353 Serbs for every
thousand Croats (this figure corresponds to Croatia and Slavonia). If Bosnia
and Herzegovina were included, it would be possible to reach one million Serbs.
However, two facts must be considered:
1) The Croatian state claimed, but never fully
consolidated, its control over Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the first months
of the war, much of this territory was in the hands of the partisans or
Četniks (see note 3).
2) Census data shows an increase of more than
39,000 Serbs between 1931 and 1948 [71]. This does not mean that there was no
persecution of Jews and Serbs in Croatia during the war, but rather that your
figures have the obvious purpose of distorting rather than informing. In fact,
even Tito's government, known for its tendency to exaggerate, never attempted
to produce such figures.
As in all German-occupied areas, the Gestapo and
the SD (Security Service) were active in Croatia; Thus,
the victims among Jews and Croats (Catholics and Muslims) were numerous.
Although the Croats had enacted racist laws, at the insistence of the Germans,
they did little to enforce them. This is how, on several occasions, the
Croatian people and their laws came to the aid of the Jews. One of these laws
defined "Aryan" and "Jewish" in such a way as to enable
hundreds of Jews and children of mixed marriages to escape the Nazis. Another
law granted citizenship to those who had distinguished themselves through their
service to the Croatian state.[72] The reason for such
measures becomes obvious when one considers the number of Jews among Croatia's
leaders and that the wife of Marshal Kvaternik, head of the Armed Forces and
second-in-command of the state, was Jewish. Incidentally, Kvaternik was forced
to resign by the Germans because of this and his outspoken criticism of the
Nazis. After the war, for his anti-Nazi stance, he was rewarded by Marshal Tito
with hanging.
Perhaps the most outspoken critic of Nazi racial
policies was Archbishop (later Cardinal) Aloisius Stepinac of Zagreb. The great
Croatian leader Vladko Macek, so anti-Nazi and anti-Ustaša that he spent many
war years in prison, referred to the archbishop's stance with these words:
"His sermons against racial discrimination and Nazism, delivered in the
Zagreb Cathedral during the occupation by Hitler's troops, have been
famous" [73]. The Nazis threatened to imprison him, but fear of an open
revolt by the Croatian people made them change their minds. What the Germans
could not achieve in four years—to silence Stepinac—Tito accomplished
immediately. The cardinal spent his last days in a communist prison or under
house arrest.
How many Jews were deported from Croatia and
exterminated? The number will perhaps never be known. The Nuremberg Tribunal's
indictment puts the figure for all of Yugoslavia at 70,000.[74]
With Jews comprising around 30% of the population, as the Croatian government
maintained (though it never completely dominated), it is possible that 20,000
Croatian Jews perished during the war. It is conceivable that some of these
deaths were caused by Croats, either in the service of the Croatian state or
acting in their personal capacity. However, it is interesting to note that the
Nuremberg Tribunal blames the German government, specifically the SS, SD, and
Gestapo organizations.[75]
The issue of the persecution of Serbs is a
completely different matter. In order to understand these events, one must
first examine the situation in which the Croats found themselves. Croatia
(which should be Yugoslavia, translator's note) was immediately occupied by
German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces.
In the following years, these forces were joined by
those of Tito's Partisans, Mihajlovic's Cetniks (Royalist Serbs), Nedic's
Cetniks and the National Guard, Pavelic's Ustaše, the Croatian Regular Army
(Domobrani), the Montenegrin Federalists, the Slovenian White and Blue Guard,
and even a group of Cossacks (the anti-Soviet XV Cossack Cavalry Corps). This
was, of course, before the introduction of the Allied Regular Forces of the
British and American advisors and the Red Army. During the war, each of these
forces sometimes had to fight against several, if not all, of the forces
involved here. The total loss of life during the Second World War was set by
Tito's government at 1,700,000 souls of all nationalities from all Yugoslav
states.[76] A large number of them were Serbs; An even
larger number were non-Serbs, especially Croats.
Immediately after the invasion, Cetnik gangs began
attacking Croatian towns. These groups consisted of troops from the Yugoslav
Royalist Army who had been stationed in Croatia after that army collapsed in
the face of the Axis forces. On April 13, 14, and 15, 1941, the villages of
Struge and Illici were attacked by Cetniks. Almost immediately, Croatian
peasants retaliated against the local Serbian population, an attitude that
continued throughout the war. This situation was perhaps most clearly summarized
by Commissioner Hocke in his ruling in favor of Dr. Artukovic:
"Evidence has shown that some villages, where
the new government was unable to provide protection, organized their own
militia for self-defense. Units of the new government would enter and seize
power, only to be subsequently driven out by units of their adversaries.
Some villages changed hands several times a day.
These groups were not always organized armed forces but—in many cases—ordinary
civilians. Many lives were lost" [77].
Thousands of
Serbs, led by the Partisans and the Cetniks, invaded Croatia during the war. Both groups fought with utter disregard for life
and property. In contrast, Croatian forces never entered Serbia. In fact, with
the exception of those Croats used as cannon fodder for the German army on the
Russian front, Croats fought only on their own land and in its defense.
During the Second World War, many Serbs were
deported from Croatia; many were sent to Serbia; Others
went to German labor camps. It was the duty of the Croatian government to
ensure that these deportations were carried out. I have no doubt that Dr.
Artukovic, as minister, was involved in these events. Although the Croatian
government knew that the Serbian population represented a threat to the nation's
internal security, it is interesting to note that the order to deport the Serbs
did not originate within the Croatian government. According to the Nuremberg
Tribunal, a conference was held at the German embassy, chaired by
the German minister in Zagreb, Siegfried Kasche,
"...at which it was decided to evacuate the
Slovenes to Croatia and Serbia and the Serbs from Croatia to Serbia. This
decision resulted from telegram No. 389 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
dated May 31, 1941" [78].
"... This assertion demonstrates two things:
1) The colonization of Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs was ordered by the German
Foreign Ministry, and 2) that the Croatian government had little say in these
events. The only power in the Balkans capable of carrying out such measures was
Germany. Only Germany could issue such sweeping orders. Von Ribbentrop
acknowledged in the instruction that such orders originated in his office.[79] These orders often had more of an effect on the
Croatian population than on the Serbian population. During the war, 300,000
Croats were deported to Germany as slave labor, and thousands more were
incorporated into the German armed forces to fuel the German war machine. I
have never seen figures approaching 100,000 Serbs deported or imprisoned.
On January 29, 1942, the United States Department
of Defense ordered the first relocation of American citizens of Japanese
descent. Executive Order (American term for "Decree") No. 9066
followed on February 19,[80] and America's first internment camps were established
by Executive Order 9102.[81] In some areas, such as Terminal Island near my
home, American citizens had been given twenty-four hours to sell or dispose of
all their belongings, pack up, and leave their homes.[82]
In total 106,925 Japanese Americans were dispatched
to camps in places such as Topaz, Utah and Rivers, Arizona.[83] Perhaps the
most fanatical advocate for the imprisonment of American citizens, due to their
race, was California State Attorney Earl Warren[84]. Mr. Warren then pursued his
career to be appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and was serving in
that capacity when that court dealt with the Dr. Artukovic matter.[85] To my knowledge, Reader's Digest had never called for
a trial against Mr. Warren for war crimes.
Finally, before leaving paragraph II, third
sentence, I would like to ask Mr. N. Adams and Reader's Digest to name the
aforementioned "witnesses and investigators of war crimes." That
would be interesting, since in eight years of trying to obtain Dr. Artukovic's
extradition, the Yugoslav government has not been able to present a single
living witness to the court. In fact the lack of substantiality of the Yugoslav
testimony has been one of the several reasons why the courts ruled in favor of
Dr. Artukovic. The Judicial Commissioner stated:
"All the evidence presented by the complainant
is in narrative form. The affidavits were signed by the deponents, but, very
obviously, they do not contain their own words. They are someone's conclusions,
referring to what the testimony covered." "The same language is
repeated in the sworn statements... I have very serious doubts that this could
be a coincidence" "... I do not even have the words of the witnesses
to judge their meaning, or whether the answers had been influenced by the
questions. I have been presented with someone's conclusions about what the
testimonies were. This is very uncertain evidence to which little credit can be
attributed."
"The defendant presented living witnesses who
were subjected to rigorous cross-examination. In certain cases, the living
witnesses testified that the complainant's witnesses were not telling the
truth. No attempt had been made to reject these testimonies. The complainant
did not propose rejecting witnesses and nor did he ask for time to secure
exculpatory evidence. The living witnesses were in the United States and
without fear, without insinuation and without compulsion to testify falsely. History indicates that this could not have been the case in
Yugoslavia, at the time when they were taken statements" [86].
As for the "war crimes investigators", I
doubt that you could name one who was not a member of the UDBA (People's
Political Police). Despite this, I hope to see those names that, I am sure, you
will present, since this information has been "carefully verified by our
investigation department and legal department."
Let's turn to paragraph II, sentence 4:
"And, according to the testimony of an
American intelligence chief in the Balkans during World War II, he (referring
to Dr. Artukovic) also approved the orders that sent dozens of captured
American airmen to the firing squad."
Although there are several disputed assertions,
this is perhaps the most absurd and ridiculous in the entire article.
First, naturally, I would like to know the name and
position of the aforementioned Intelligence Chief. From this point, it becomes
clear that the only reason these so-called events are attributed to others is
to protect Mr. Adams and Reader's Digest. It is, undoubtedly, "the
work" of his "legal department," mentioned in his first letter.
"Dozens" would indicate, I believe, at
least 24 airmen. While there were probably fewer than 100 American airmen taken
prisoner in all of Croatia during the war, this number would represent a
quarter of the total. Please name them. If you cannot name
them all, perhaps half; a third if possible. I am sure you can provide
the names of these men and the source of your information. Your first letter
convinced me of this. To assist you, I have added the names and addresses of
each of the American airmen detained in Zagreb at the end of the war. I am
certain they will remember some of their comrades who were taken to the firing
squad. With the list is a copy of Colonel Paul E. Harden's letter—his name is
also on the list of prisoners of war. Unfortunately, it appears that Colonel
Harden is "misinformed" about the treatment he and his fellow
officers received from the Croatians. Perhaps you should read his publication
to learn more.”
The photograph mentioned by Colonel Harden depicts
a dozen American airmen. With them are Father Benkovic, an American by birth
but of Croatian descent who was studying in Croatia when the war broke out;
Baroness Nikolic; and her niece. The reason the airmen are with the Baroness is
that they were living in her mansion.[87] Although the
place had been guarded by veteran members of the National Guard, the Baroness
considered the airmen her guests and treated them as such. The American airmen
received the best food and medicine available. Those who were sick were treated
in the best hospitals in Zagreb.
At the same time, the Croatian soldier could only
expect meager supplies at the field first-aid stations. About three months
before the end of the war, Air Force General Rubcic arranged for twelve American
airmen to receive training on Croatian aircraft. After this familiarization, 14
Americans and a liaison officer flew via Zadar. This action was undertaken as
an attempt to convince the Allied forces to land on the Dalmatian coast and
save Croatia from the Red Army.[88] However, the
Croatians did not know that Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had
already divided up Europe to the great benefit of the Soviet Union.
Many Americans offered their services to the
Croatians in an attempt to save their troops from the Russian Army. American
Lieutenant Edward J. Benkoski, along with British officers Rodney Woods and
John Gray, tried to negotiate on behalf of the Croatians. An American officer
accompanied Croatian officers to the Bleiburg negotiations to prevent their
compatriots from being returned to Yugoslavia and certain death at the hands of
the partisans. It goes without saying that each of these men could have
returned home the moment they crossed Allied lines. Instead, they chose to help
their captors. Such friendships are not forged by firing squads.
One of the reasons for the good treatment given to
the Americans is that the Croatian people felt, and still feel, a strong
connection to the people of the United States. At that time, America had a
Croatian population of over 600,000. Today, this number is approaching 900,000.
[89] Given Croatia's population density, this meant that virtually every
Croatian had a friend or relative in America. Secondly, the Croatian government
never doubted who would win the war. This is why they requested and prepared
for an American invasion of Dalmatia. In 1943, Croatian Colonel Ivan Babic flew
to American-occupied Italy to persuade them that such an invasion would
encounter no resistance from Croatian forces and that they would establish a
bridgehead for them.[90] It was hoped that with the
American landing, Croatia would be saved from both the Germans and the
Russians.
Father Benkovic was appointed chaplain to the
captured airmen, whose treatment he described:
"Despite the constant American bombing raids,
the Croatians felt no hatred toward them, for, in a fatalistic way, they
considered them necessary... I saw how well the people treated my fellow
countrymen being held captive in Mostar; they even offered the American airmen
the few cigarettes they possessed. They also asked me, as an
American, to convey to my compatriots the hope of liberation they placed in
them" [91].
In the last two weeks, I spoke personally and by
telephone with several Americans who were captured in Croatia, as well as with
their captors. All of them corroborated the information reproduced above. No
one recalls any instance of mistreatment of American prisoners. Needless to
say, there was also no mention of Americans being shot.
I must assume that these fictitious assertions
appeared in the article for one of the following reasons. The first alternative
would be to accept that Mr. Adams included this false information for the sole
purpose of deceiving his readers and continuing to slander Dr. Artukovic. The
other possible conclusion is that Mr. Adams genuinely received such information
and was naive enough to believe it. Since I consider Mr. N. Adams an honest
person, I have investigated this latter possibility. An American who was a
bomber co-pilot, and who now lives in San Diego, confirmed that before being
shot down over Croatia, he had been informed that airmen captured by non-German
forces could be shot, since there were often no regular prisons available to
hold prisoners of war.
This information, naturally, was provided by the
partisans. Incidentally, they often exchanged American prisoners of war for
partisans. Such circumstances could have been the source of Mr. Adams's
misinformation. However, it is inconceivable that any writer would use intelligence
reports from 1943-1945 to gather information on such a matter. Thirty years
passed, during which knowledge could have been gathered about what actually
happened versus what might have happened.
Paragraph III, sentence 1:
"To escape the Nuremberg war crimes
trials..."
In this case, I don't see the second alternative.
This assertion is a blatant lie. In all likelihood, the author intended to add
a bit of drama to the article, as did the use of the word "secret" in
the second paragraph. And in all likelihood, this was done knowing it was a
complete fabrication.
The Nuremberg trials lasted almost a year (November
14, 1945, to October 1, 1946). During the trial, thousands of documents were
presented and hundreds of witnesses testified. The trial proceedings and
documents comprise 43 volumes, averaging 700 pages each. In all these thousands
of pages and months of testimony, the name of Artukovic does not appear even
once. Dr. Artukovic was not sought, mentioned, or alluded to in any way before
or during the trials.
Since many of those mentioned were merely soldiers
in the German army, it is unusual that they omitted such a "criminal"
as the one you described in your article. The only mention of Croatian
participation in war crimes is attributed to members of the 7th SS Division,
"Prinz Eugen" [92]. This division was composed of ethnic Germans, or
"Volksdeutsche," who were recruited in Croatia. Dr. Artukovic, like
thousands of other Croatian officials and officers, from the local postman to
the anti-communist priest, has been accused of war crimes solely by Tito's
communist government.
The rest of his article deals, generally in a
distorted and perverse manner, with the attempted extradition of Dr. Artukovic.
To explore these inaccuracies in detail would require including the transcripts
of the court proceedings from 1951 to 1959. Nevertheless, I will highlight some
of the main points of interest.
Reader's Digest wants its readers to believe that
Dr. Artukovic remained in the country from 1951 to 1959 using some legislative
loophole. I am unaware of what Representative Utt did or did not do regarding
Dr. Artukovic. The reason, however, that the process took so long is that the
Yugoslav government took the case to the Supreme Court. In July 1952, it was
ruled that no extradition treaty existed between the United States and
Yugoslavia.
After almost two years, the Yugoslav government
produced an obscure 1902 treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of
Serbia (then known as Serbia) to justify its actions. In April 1956, the
District Court ruled that the accused could not be extradited because he was
wanted for political reasons (a specific exclusion in the treaty). Finally, on
March 10, 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the District Court's decision and
ordered a hearing before the U.S. Commissioner in Los Angeles.[93]
The Yugoslav government took six years to search for or create sufficient
documentation to submit to the court. Commissioner Hocke stated:
"I cannot condone the plaintiff's action in
delaying the delivery of these additional documents until June 1958. The
documents themselves indicate that they had been obtained in early
1952."[94]
Your article implies that the only reason Dr.
Artukovic had not been extradited was that his crimes were "political."
That is a complete misinterpretation of the court's ruling. The Court, in fact,
ruled in Article IV as follows:
"That the crimes in the amended extradition
request are political in nature and that under Article VI of the treaty,
extradition is not applicable" [95].
It is unfortunate that Mr. Adams did not consider
it worthwhile to include the aforementioned decision in Article III:
"That the complainant did not prove with
sufficient and competent evidence that there is reasonable and probable cause
to consider the accused guilty of any of the crimes charged in the amended
extradition request" [96].
Such a selective and biased interpretation of the
facts cannot be attributed to error or oversight. Mr. Adams altered and
distorted the meaning of the U.S. District Court's decisions to suit his own
purposes. Such an attitude is, in my opinion, both inexplicable and
unjustifiable. Commissioner Hocke summarized his feelings regarding this case
with these words:
"I hope I do not live to see the day when a
person has to answer for a crime, whether in the courts of California or the
United States, based on evidence such as that presented in this case by the
complainant" [97].
It is regrettable that we all witnessed a day when
a man, after being exonerated in court, could nevertheless be accused again,
prosecuted, and convicted by a writer who, without a doubt, is completely
ignorant of each and every relevant fact of the case.
With the publication of the article "The Most
Illegal of the Illegals," Reader's Digest incurred considerable harm that
it must remedy. In my opinion, you owe Dr. Artukovic an apology for the
injustice committed against his dignity; a retraction to each of the 950,000
Croatians living in the United States and Canada; and the truth to your 30
million readers. I sincerely hope that Reader's Digest will decide to fulfill
these obligations.
Sincerely,
C. Michael McAdams, historian;
Enclosed: Reduced photocopy of Colonel Paul E.
Harden's letter. USAF and from the list of names and
addresses of prisoners of war in Zagreb, Croatia, in March 1945.
April 10, 1967
Dr. Milan Blazekovic, President
Croatian Latin American Institute of Culture
Carlos Pellegrini 743 P.3 of. l8
Buenos Aires,
Rep.of Argentina
Dear Dr. Blazekovic:
I apologize for the extended time period which has
elapsed since your letter was written. Your letter finally reached me
approximately a month ago. However, it was mislaid and I was able to locate it
only this past week.
Although I was not present at the time your
enclosed picture was taken, I recognized the majority of those individuals
reflected thereon.
It is a fact that in my association with the
Croatian people and authorities, their actions were exemplary and adhered to
International Law. Within their resources and facilities, the Croatian people
provided timely and competent assistance to United States Armed Forces
personnel during the period of World War II.
If I can be of further assistance, please advise.
Sincerely,
Paul E. Harden, Lt. Colonel, USAF
6 Marian Drive, Newburgh, New York 12550
We reproduce the Spanish version of this letter:
Dear Dr. Blazekovic:
I apologize for the long time that has passed since
your letter was written. It arrived approximately a month ago. However, it had
been misplaced, and I was only able to locate it last week.
Although I was not present when the photograph you
sent me was taken, I recognize most of the people in it.
It is a fact that, in my interactions with the
Croatian people and authorities, their conduct was exemplary and in accordance
with international law. Within their means and capabilities, the Croatian
people provided timely and appropriate assistance to American military
personnel during World War II.
If I can be of service to you in the future, please
let me know. Sincerely,
Paul E. Harden,
Lt. Col.,
USA (Air Force)
6 Marion Drive, Newburgh, New York 12550
The death of General Perón
The aforementioned Institute has sent Her Excellency President María
Estela Martínez de Perón a telegram of condolence, expressing its best wishes
for her complete success in the important mission constitutionally entrusted to
her during this period of transition of power, following the passing of such a
great political figure as President Perón.
Eudocio Ravines and Serbian Hegemony
In the May 29th edition of "La Prensa" in
Buenos Aires, Mr. E. Ravines, an internationally renowned journalist, published
the article "The Political Crisis in the Yugoslav Regime," subjecting
the current situation in that country to a multifaceted analysis. He focuses
primarily on the succession of the dictator who turned 82 last May. Among the
theses and hypotheses of this prominent journalist, with his neoliberal
leanings, which accurately, distort, or misrepresent the reality of Yugoslavia,
the following is the most misguided: "The absence of Serbs, the
traditionally dominant country, even holding hegemony within the Federation,
constitutes a very serious weakness in the succession, one that will be
insurmountable. Neither Croats nor Slovenes have the capacity to govern the
country peacefully, where Serbian influence is paramount and decisive."
It is surprising, first of all, that Mr. Ravines grants credit to a nation, Serbia, which, according
to him, is a "dominant" nation "even hegemonic within the
Federation..." How is it possible that a liberal, an irreconcilable
opponent of political dictatorships elsewhere, in the case of Yugoslavia
expresses his complacency with Serbian hegemony? Is the Peruvian journalist's
liberalism a deeply held and ingrained ideological conviction, or merely a
circumstantial accident?
Furthermore, Mr. Ravines' lament about "the
absence of Serbs" in the combinations of elements for Tito's succession is
inaccurate. According to "Die Furche," an Austrian weekly, Serbs hold
a dominant position in the newly formed Presidency of the State of Yugoslavia.
"As can be seen," says Stepan Tomancic, correspondent for the
aforementioned Austrian newspaper in Belgrade, "the Serbs dominate the
collective leadership with three notable men." They are: Petar Stambolic
(Serbia); Cvijetin Mijatovic (Bosnia); and Stevan Doronjski (Vojvodina). At the
same time, the Slovenes and Croats have only Kardelj and Bakaric, respectively.
Furthermore, "Die Furche" states that "the only Montenegrin
(Vidoje Zarkovic) should be considered as supporting the Serbs." Three Serbs,
then, and a Montenegrin who would support them, against a Croat and a Slovene,
in no way confirm Mr. E. Ravines's claim of "a Serbian absence." It
would take us too far afield to attempt to refute the renowned journalist's
arguments with further evidence. We would need much more space to point out not
the absence, but the predominantly Serbian presence in all the most vital
sectors of that country, such as the army, the police, diplomacy, and the
economy. This last factor, dependent on financial capital unjustly concentrated
in Belgrade banks and in Serbian hands, is of particular importance. Mr.
Ravines overlooks this series of factors as if they were insignificant, when in
fact they constitute a firm foundation for the continuation of Serbian hegemony,
thus paradoxically promoted in the eyes of the world by a neoliberal
journalist.
But Mr. Ravines goes even further. Not content with
sanctioning Serbian hegemony, clearly contrary to liberal political philosophy,
he also made an offensive judgment against the Slovenes and Croats. He denies
them the capacity to govern the country "peacefully." Hegemony and peaceful governance, for him, mean terror; again,
incompatible with Mr. Ravines' liberalism. The Slovenes and Croats would
not accept such a lofty political mission, worthy of the South American
journalist's praise.
Furthermore, the Croats do not desire to govern a
country with so many contradictions. Nor even to live in it. We Croats fight
for self-determination, for a sovereign Croatian nation-state. In more
favorable circumstances, by transferring the political initiative to the Croats
and Slovenes, they could govern that country according to democratic principles
and not a hegemonic peace. Under the same conditions granted to the Serbs,
thanks to the idealism of some Croatian and Slovene politicians in 1918, the
latter two peoples could also govern hegemonically, if Mr. Ravines so desires.
The traditional sympathies of the Macedonians and Albanians of Yugoslavia with
the Croats and Slovenes are well known. The same is true of the Hungarian,
Slovak, and other minorities. With a majority of this kind—60% over the 40%
Serbs—hegemonical rule could also be achieved, "pacifying" any
potentially reluctant Serbs. But, as we have said, peoples
with a Western and democratic education renounce the politics of hegemony
because it breeds misfortune for all. We, we repeat, will not waver in
our struggle for the self-determination of our peoples, this being the only
principle suitable for freedom, justice, and peace in that region of the world
as well.
Mr. Ravines can only be understood if his judgments
are of a "historical"—circumstantial—nature. If, on the contrary, he
formulates them as axiological assessments, he proceeds to dismantle his own
supposedly liberal and democratic political creed.
Who dominates in Croatia?
The latest statistics regarding the Communist
League of Croatia indicate that in 1973 the League had 209,376 members. Of
these, 134,961 or 64.9% were Croats, 51,350 or 24.5% were Serbs, 2,073 or 0.9%
were Slovenes, and 1,664 or 0.7% were Montenegrins. As is common knowledge,
Croats constitute 79.4%, Serbs 14.2%, and Slovenes 0.8% of the total population
of Croatia.
Consequently, in the Croatian Party, the Serbian
percentage is much higher than its population number (24.5% versus 14.2%),
while in the Croatian case the situation is the reverse (64.2% versus 79.4%).
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is
similar. Of the 143,577 members of the Party, 75,515 are Serbs, or 52.6%; the
number of Muslims is 43,709 (30.4%); while Croats comprise only 15,716, or
10.9%, and so on. However, of the total population of that socialist republic
of Yugoslavia, Serbs make up 37.2%, Muslim Croats 39.6%, and Catholic Croats
20.6%. Consequently, the Communist League of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
dominated by an absolute Serbian majority, even though Serbs barely exceed a
third of the total population. The difference in these percentages clearly
demonstrates the disproportionate Serbian influence in Croatian lands. (The news item is from "Nova Hrvatska," London, No. 7/74,
p. 5).
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that
Muslims declare themselves Croats, as long as they are free (S.C. Network).
How were the votes cast in Croatia?
At the end of March, "elections" were
held in Croatia for delegates and municipal representatives under the new
"electoral" system. Our informants on the ground later provided us
with some very interesting information about these "elections."
In a suburban neighborhood of Zagreb—the Botinac
neighborhood—where, according to the employer census, there are 1,110 families,
the vast majority are Croats (1,030 families) and a small number are Serbs (80
families). However, as "delegates of the local communities," 18 Serbs
and only 6 Croats were elected... A member of the Electoral Commission of
Zagreb's most important municipality informed us of the following: "At
dusk, while tallying the votes cast, we were able to ascertain that of 6,000, only about 500 were declared valid, while all the
others were invalidated. This is how the popular majority voted: the official
lists, in most cases, were simply crossed out or marked with two zeros, along
with various comments such as: 'Zivjela Savka!' 'Zivio Mika - nasa dika' (which
means: Long live Savka, long live Mika (Tripalo), two Croatian communist
leaders, deposed by Tito in 1971) or 'I will vote when Croatia is free.' All
the official data subsequently published are the product of the electoral
commissions, after consultations with the political officials of the
commune..." ("Nova Hrvatska", London, No. 7/74.)
News and commentary
Significant Toast: Tito-Sadat
On March 28, 1974, Tito received the President of
Egypt, Anwar Sadat, on Brioni Island. During dinner together with their
respective delegations, the two statesmen delivered speeches, which we
partially reproduce below: "...It is understood," Tito said,
"that we will pay close attention to what happens in the Near East. There,
in recent months, there have been developments that could decisively influence
the further development not only of that region, but also of a larger area of
the world. The October War, which claimed many innocent victims
and caused enormous material damage, was a new and serious experience, but also
a great lesson for all of us. Due to Israel's stubborn and aggressive policy,
the aforementioned war unfortunately had to occur.
However, it could have been avoided—as is now
clear—if those who could influence Israel had striven to ensure that it
respected the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and
that..." Instead of aggression and occupation of foreign lands, it should
follow the path of cooperation and friendship with its neighbors. This is and
remains a vital interest of all the peoples of that region, including Israel.”
After highlighting his sympathy for the Arab cause,
Tito continued: “Within its means, Yugoslavia also gave all the support and
assistance it could to its friendly Arab countries. It could not be otherwise,
because we have viewed your struggle, as we do today, as an inseparable part of
the general struggle against imperialism and also as a reaction for freedom,
independence, and progressive development.” In presenting his suggestions for a
just and peaceful solution to the problem in the Near East, the Yugoslav
Marshal continued. "We must, unfortunately, acknowledge that even after
last year's experience, phenomena that deeply concern us remain present in
Israeli politics and behavior. The most representative leaders of that country
have still not freed themselves from the well-known aspirations and objectives
of aggression toward neighboring Arab countries. This is evident in the
statements recently made by these same Israeli leaders, as well as in the
pressure and provocations that Israel is exerting against Syria."
(What would Tito answer, we ask, if someone or some
powerful people were to demand that he, too, uphold the Charter of the United
Nations, which guarantees the freedom, independence, and progressive
development of "his" peoples, especially the Croatian people?)
Sadat, for his part, said to Tito, among other
things: "Allow me, dear brother, to express to you and to the friendly
Yugoslav people the immense gratitude of the Egyptian people for the honorable
stance you took when our Arab nation assumed the responsibility of fulfilling
its sacred duty to repel aggression and secure respect for its right to live in
peace and dignity with the peoples of the world. Let me remind you once again,
dear friend, that every soldier in Egypt, every peasant, every worker, and
everyone in general, will never forget that this victory was achieved thanks to
the help of loyal friends and, first and foremost, the Yugoslav people and
their leaders."
(It's a very interesting reciprocal recognition. We
are certain that there are archives that preserve the texts of both speeches
very well. However, we are not so sure whether the rights to national
independence, freedom, and progress have the same meaning in Tito's dictionary
as in that of the Egyptian president.)
Bernard Feron on the crisis in Yugoslavia
"Le Monde" of Paris published in its May
24, 25, and 26 editions a lengthy article entitled "Yugoslavia Between Zigzags," authored by Feron. Mysteriously, the
author considerably "corrects" his opinions regarding the Yugoslav
crisis that erupted in 1970/71. On that occasion, Féron wrote in "Le Monde
Diplomatique": "But one thing is certain: Yugoslavia's trade balance
is still heavily in deficit. In 1970, this deficit reached $460 million, while
Croatia had a surplus of $160 million that same year. Naturally, Croatia wants
to take advantage of this wealth. However, all the foreign currency was sent to
the Central Bank (Belgrade), which distributed it without considering the
contribution of each of the republics... Thus, for example, the Croatian
economy, which earns between 30 and 40% of the total foreign currency, receives
only 10%." Thus, it is "forced to buy it from the Central Bank at
high prices..." Now, Bernard Féron himself says: "In short, many (of
the Croatians - SC Editorial Note) feel they are still being exploited."
Mr. B. Féron's change of opinion is strange.
Everyone in the know understands that the situation changed from that moment
on, with the economic and political state of Tito's fiefdom deteriorating.
According to him, the Macedonians and lbanians of that country also ask
Belgrade for protection through "democratic centralism" against
aggression from Bulgaria and Albania, respectively. It's as if we were to say:
the Hungarians ask Stalin to protect them against the national will emanating
from Budapest, a will that tends toward sovereignty and national integration in
freedom. Indeed, "dialectics" in our time can paint realities that
seem miraculous, even though they are not and cannot be.
Zdravko Ducmelic
The magazine "Programa de Radio
Nacional," Buenos Aires, in its March 1974 edition, reproduced on its
cover "Two Figures with a Musical Tone" by Z. Ducmelic, a work from
1961, and on the inside of the same cover, the following opinion about the
painter: "The Croatian artist, Zdravko Ducmelic, has lived in our country
since 1944. He studied painting in Zagreb and at the Academies of Fine Arts in
Rome and San Fernando in Madrid; in addition, he carries out important artistic
and teaching work at the University of Cuyo. But, as always happens with
artists at heart, he followed within himself the promptings, the dictates of an
invisible master, that invisible master who makes us visionaries.
This adaptation to those compelling calls brought
forth, with the force of a spell, a world of strange creatures, visualized
through a firm and concise calligraphy; lines that, due to their special
character, They attain the virtue of the sign, and these images appear—so to
speak—clothed in sober colors, especially ochres or vague old golds or
indefinable grays; as if these forms, while still belonging to this reality,
also belonged to an enchanting antiquity. Exemplary are these two figures with
a musical tone reproduced here, dating from 1961; they demonstrate that spirit
inclined toward the symbolism of distant harmonies, but their fullness is also
manifested in the clear presentation of something much more complex: the
meaning of a plastic expression.
Through various periods up to the present day,
Zdravko Ducmelic (this excellent painter was one of the guests at last year's
Palanza Prize) has been manifesting, with a more corporeal vision, that initial
fantastic world that inspired him. His current figures, without losing that
almost immaterial lightness that characterizes them, manage to create an
atmosphere; that is, Ducmelic breathes life into them, opens invisible pores in
his paintings; so that we not only see his sorceress characters, but also,
apart from The visual impression is that we breathe something of the air where
those human and superhuman figures live, dream, and sing, at the same time as
they seem to belong to the same realm as those irresistible sirens who tempted
Ulysses when he sought to return to his beloved Ithaca. These powers are
visible in this artist's paintings, though they can only be seen beyond the
physical eye, that is, through spiritual vision.
In Zdravko Ducmelic's latest paintings, we could
simultaneously observe and feel how this painter of strange worlds has managed
to harmonize matter and color with the spirit that animates him, the spirit
that leads him through inner labyrinths where vague faces from remote legends
of a mystical past linger. He thus achieves a surprising transmutation; that is
to say, he creates a kind of melody that, without ceasing to be a melody,
transforms into a silence of forms and colors. To hear it, one needs, without contradiction, the special eyes we have
mentioned here; only they make it possible to enter the evocative suggestions
of his imagery. But to achieve that, the viewer must not only contemplate but
also know how to recreate those visions as an active observer.”
Success of a Croatian artist in Switzerland
Virgilio Nevjestic, a young Croatian painter living
in Paris, inaugurated an exhibition of his work in the second half of February
of this year (1974) at the “Klub 44” gallery in Neuchâtel, Switzerland. The
artist, who has won several awards in his native Croatia and abroad, according
to opinions of the Swiss art press, also achieved great success in that Swiss
city. “Fan-Express” of February 18 wrote: “There is no doubt that Virgil
Nevjestic—called Virgil—is one of the most brilliant personalities of the young
Yugoslav generation (!?).
Likewise, there is no doubt that this artist is
among the most outstanding representatives of graphic and pictorial art in
general. As a guest of “Klub 44,” he presented his first independent exhibition
in Switzerland. His engravings possess the captivating power of ancient
manuscripts, the tenderness of icons, the wrinkled faces of allegorical
figures, and, at times, the strident poetry of actors. Virtuosity and elegance
are present in all his works. Sparse and extremely precise, Virgil combines
graphic and pictorial warmth with a technical mastery whose dimension is convincing.
Another newspaper commented: "Exceptional
graphic and pictorial mastery, coupled with an uncommon historical richness,
presents Virgil Nevjestic as a worthy successor to the greatest classical
engravers and draftsmen. At a time when the need for a return to figurative
representations is increasingly emphasized, as a counterpoint to vagrancy and
fleeting fashions, Virgil's works restore our confidence. And not, of course,
as if they themselves possessed the character of confidence, but simply because
they allow us to breathe with the artist and observe that nothing
in them is without reason." Along with the exceptional technical mastery,
which we emphasize once again, the intensity of his message unfolds graphically
through signs from which the symbolism of figuration emerges.”
“Die Welt,” H. Böll and the Imprisoned Croatian
Writers
The aforementioned German newspaper, in its May
22nd edition, published the article entitled: The Names of the Imprisoned
Croatian Writers Are Now Known, which we reproduce in English: “The names of
the fourteen Croatian writers, condemned by the Yugoslav authorities for having
expressed their disagreement with their policies, are now known. It is believed
that H. Böll, the outgoing president of PEN, also had the fate of these writers
in mind when he criticized the political and cultural situation in Yugoslavia
at the recent Congress of the aforementioned Club in the city of Ohrid. Böll,
who is scheduled to meet with President Tito next Thursday, was attacked for
his intervention on behalf of the Croatian authors.
Among those convicted are the editor in charge of
the weekly "Hrvatski Tjednik", Vlado Gotovac (4 years); from Zlatko
Tomicic, editor of "Hrvatski Knjizevni List" (5 years); of the French
citizen, Mirko Vidovic (6 and a half years old); from Zvonimir Komarica, member
of the Board of Directors of "Matica Hrvatska"; by Mato Marcinko;
from the pedagogy teacher, Ante Sekulic (3 years) ; by Zeljko Sabol; the head
of the editorial office of the newspaper "Our Homes", Kazimir Vucemil;
by Vlatko Pavletic, editor-in-chief of the magazine "Kritika"; José
Ivicevic, editor-in-chief of "Hrvatski Tjednik" (5 years); from the
editor-in-chief of "Odjek Mosora", Ivica Bekavac; by Tomislav
Bilosnic and Mate Talijancic (5 years). The writer Matija Poljakovic has
already died in Subotica prison."
The same newspaper of May 25 published under the
title The delegation of the PEN-Club, received by
Tito, the following news: "Marshal Tito has received at his residence in
Karadjordjevo a delegation of the international PEN-Club, which held its
presidential meeting in Ohrid (Macedonia). According to information from the
Tanjug agency, the head of the Yugoslav state held a long conversation with the
members of the PEN-Club, led by the new president W. S. Pritchett and the
outgoing H. Böll. The latter had previously declared that he would speak with
the head of the Yugoslav State about some imprisoned Yugoslav intellectuals, as
well as about the withdrawal of passports from the philosophers of the circle,
grouped around the magazine "Praxis".
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, meanwhile, has
telegraphically expressed to the writer H. Böll the gratitude of the federal
government for his performance as president of the PEN-Club."
British-Croatian society
On January 8 of the current year, the British-Croat
Society was founded with headquarters in London. Its objective is purely
cultural in nature. Through its activity, the British people will be provided
with elements so that they can better understand Croatia and its people. The
new entity is under the patronage of the Earl of Birkenhead. To serve as the
society's first president, the writer Auberon Waugh was elected, Eng. Edo
Pivcevic vice president, Eng. Paul Trvtkovic treasurer and Nancy Zigrovic
secretary.
At the inauguration Mr Waugh gave a short speech,
stating that the aim of society was "enterly cultural" - only the
cultural.
Below, we reproduce the speech, partially
abbreviated, by Mr. Pivcevic, which better clarifies the motives, purposes and
work modalities of the new society, taking into consideration the political
environment of the British capital:
"Years ago, when I first came to London, my
employer at Palmer's Green, a retired captain in the Anglo-Indian Army, asked
me where I was from. When I told him Croatia, he looked at me calmly, his mouth
slightly open as if he wanted to ask, 'Is that ours?' but preferred to just
think it. Then I said, 'It's part of Yugoslavia.' His eyes lit up. 'Ah,' he
said, 'that must be somewhere in Turkey.' From that moment, it was clear to me
that one day I would have to organize a British-Croatian society. But Croatia
is part of Yugoslavia, and someone might ask, 'Why British-Croatian and not a
British-Yugoslavian society?' The answer is that Yugoslavia is a multinational
country with different languages, encompassing several different cultures and
traditions. Its history as an independent state only goes back half a century.
In fact, it was created in 1918, after the collapse of the old Austro-Hungarian
Empire. Initially, it was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,
but this name was changed in 1929 to "Yugoslavia."
Yugoslavia - a Croatian idea
It is interesting to note something easily
forgotten: a few Croatian politicians were largely responsible for contributing
to the creation of that state. In their long and desperate struggle for
survival, invaded, mistreated, and persecuted by their stronger and more
"civilized" neighbors, the Croats continually dreamed of a political
organization where they could, together with other South Slavs, as partners and
equals, live in better conditions and resist foreign pressures, thus ensuring
their survival as a nation.
It was originally thought that Bulgaria, along with
the nationalities that today make up Yugoslavia, would also join this
community. With this idea, some prominent figures in Croatian public life began
contacting influential people in the neighboring Slavic regions. Thus, in 1867,
the Academy was founded in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. The Yugoslav Academy
of Arts and Sciences was established to foster greater cooperation among the
South Slavs. It was the first institution of its kind in the Balkans and
remains to this day the only "Yugoslav" academy in Yugoslavia. All
the other nationalities in that country have since founded their own national
academies.
It is important to emphasize these facts because
Croats are often accused of narrow nationalism and separatism. The truth,
however, is quite different. The Croats initiated the movement for political
integration in the Balkans, but many of them later realized that the final
outcome was detrimental to themselves.
However, I don't want to discuss political matters.
This is not a political society." After noting the significance of
political development in today's world, Mr. Pivcevic added:
"But precisely because this is my view, I
believe it is essential to safeguard the differences that exist in traditions
and cultures among different ethnic groups. Modern industrial civilization,
with all its undeniable material advantages, has brought an ever-increasing
degree of uniformity to the world. Uniformity costs less than variety, but that
doesn't necessarily make it better. Americans have benefited from
standardization and mass production more than other nations, yet they continue
to go to Europe in search of their ancestral origins and differences.
Nevertheless, the pattern of development seems to
be the same in all parts of the world." Not long ago, I went to Yalta and
I can report that the new supermarket, recently built there and shown to me
with tears of joy by two proud locals, is a sad replica of its Western
counterpart, except for the lack of elevators, which I understand is due to a
temporary lack of funds. I have also observed that the teenagers of Yalta increasingly
feel the need—long recognized as basic by their more educated peers elsewhere
in the world—to have transistor radios at their disposal to better pass the
time. While traveling along the road between Simpheropol and Yalta, I saw
enormous plastic tulips, carefully placed by the authorities in well-chosen
locations to add a touch of splendor to the landscape year-round.
ut woe to that world where people, though inundated
with transistors and plastic tulips, cannot read the books they wish or
maintain and develop their distinct identities solely for reasons of political
expediency or a certain ideological dogma. What makes the world an interesting
place are its differences, not its similarities. In the case of nations,
differences in tradition and culture are the result of the collective
accumulation of experiences, what we usually call history."La lucha de
Croacia por sobrevivir
"From the 7th century onwards, when they
arrived in the Balkans and settled in its western part, the Croats had to fight
desperately for their survival. They found themselves, for the most part, in a
hostile region, without much hope of being able to get enough food from the
small portions of arable land between steep and rocky
mountains. Furthermore, this region was the border between the East and
the West and, consequently, of strategic importance for both. Both the East and
the West wanted to gain control over this region and their important trade
routes. For this purpose they carried out large and long battles, with the
Croatians being the ones who had to bear the main brunt of these conflicts.
"However, and by a miracle, this small but
vigorous town fought to survive and persevere in its own identity. And more
than this: for more than three centuries the Croats enjoyed a significant
degree of political independence under their native kings until, finally, in
1102, they officially entered into personal union with Hungary. The Hungarians
claimed the right to the Croatian throne because the Croatian king, Zvonimir,
had married a Hungarian princess and died without descendants.
"This marks a strong change in the destinies
of Croatia. In the centuries that followed, the will of this people to preserve
their ethnic identity has been exposed to the most severe tests. The Croats saw
their lands invaded and occupied by a succession of invaders. They suffered
torture, persecution and hunger. Like any people that has
suffered extreme poverty, they were easy prey for foreign agents looking for
soldiers. There are, therefore, few battlefields in Europe where the Croats did
not fight, again and again, for a plate of lentils.
"Nevertheless, Croatians continued to be a very
culturally active nation. The oldest book, printed in the national language,
appeared in 1483, a few decades after the invention of the printing press. It
is of special significance that this was a translation - until then accessible
only in manuscripts - of the Latin-Roman Missal into the national language.
Secular literature flourished in the cities of Dalmatia in the 15th and 16th
centuries. The two most prominent figures of that period - the poet and
philosopher Marulic and the comedian Drzic - raised the power of expression of
the Croatian national language to very remarkable levels. The first novel in
the Croatian language was written by the poet Zoranic and published in 1538 by
the same author.
"If we remember that today there are only four
and a half million Croats in Yugoslavia and if we admit the rapid increase in
population in the last 150 years, then their number in the 16th century could
not have been much greater than a third of the current one. The fact of
remaining culturally active even in a very difficult political situation,
tenaciously refusing to be assimilated by their neighbors and teachers, when it
would have been much more comfortable to submit, offers us testimony of their
tenacity and their will to safeguard their own identity. ethnic.
(The speaker, evidently, does not take into account Muslims as Croats. - Obs. from SC.)
"But it is not truly common for a people, when
their identity is threatened, to make exceptional efforts. The Christian world
has done everything in its power to erase the identity of the Jews, but all it
has achieved is to strengthen their resolve to resist and further assert their
distinctive character. People do not want to be forced into a mold. Nor is
there any need for this. There are many things we can learn from our
differences, and very little is gained by trying to eliminate them.
The British Example
"Here we have the British practice of
tolerance and fair play, an example the rest of the world could advantageously
emulate. It has always been in the best British tradition to view all forms of
regulation in human affairs with suspicion. This suspicion was extended to the
parliamentary form of government, which has been and remains the foundation of
Britain's liberties. We ourselves—and we must not forget this—are among the
beneficiaries of these liberties." "I wanted to end this speech by
paying tribute to a great Croatian who, throughout his life, was a scholar of
Brittany and British affairs—Dr. Vinko Kriskovic—(*) who did more than anyone
else to awaken interest in Brittany among his fellow countrymen. In his
brilliant essay on the British Constitution, published in the book Anglia Docet
in 1922, Kriskovic offered a profound analysis of the British system of
government. This book holds special significance for me, for after my father's
death, I found a nearly illegible copy of it among his books; and, drawn by the
mysterious nature of its title—it sounded like a treatise on magic—I read it at
the age of thirteen, without understanding it. Years later, I read it again and
can say that I experienced pleasure in being able to understand it.
"With your permission, I would like to
dedicate this, our inaugural meeting, to the memory of Dr. Kriskovic."
(*) Professor Vinko Kriskovic was one of the most
prominent Croatian intellectuals of the first half of this century He was a
professor of Public and State Law at the University of Zagreb and the author of
numerous political and general culture essays, particularly on literature,
characterized by his profound understanding of the most pressing issues of his
time. Due to his democratic convictions and his particular affinity for
England, Kriskovic could never reconcile himself with the fascist regimes of
Europe, nor with the semi-fascist and hegemonic
Serbian dictatorship in Croatia between the two world wars.
He died in exile at the age of 92 on November 6,
1952. The Swiss land (Zurich), the ideal of his political dreams, holds the
remains of this Croatian scholar who for many years astonished his university
students with his vast erudition and culture, as well as with his
liberal-democratic orientation and Croatian patriotism.
Micro-news
On the occasion of the recent visit of Tito of
Yugoslavia to Bonn, the editor of the Croatian fortnightly "Nova
Hrvatska", London, June 10, 1974, addressed an open letter to President
Heinemann of the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr. Jaksa Kusan said, among other
things, the following: "If we consider that the whole question concerning
the internal conditions of Yugoslavia means interference in its internal
affairs, and then, accordingly, if it is considered unlawful to raise the
issue, for example, of political prisoners in Yugoslavia, then many Germans
will recall the similar situation in East Germany, and each will wonder what
use the current policy of 'détente' is... In Yugoslavia, there will be even
greater disillusionment with the attitude of the West. When it wishes, it is
capable of exploiting trade relations or other means to pressure even the
Soviet Union, for example, in the case of Jewish emigrants, but when it comes
to small nations without an interested protector, it turns a blind eye even to
the most blatant persecution of people and ideas. The West thus loses allies
precisely where, according to its democratic principles, it should be seeking
them." Recalling the imprisoned writers, students, journalists, and others
in Tito's Yugoslavia, Kusan emphatically asks: "Is it forbidden to request
an impartial international commission to investigate the treatment of these
prisoners because some of them, despite their serious illness, are forced to
perform the heaviest physical labor, are denied necessary medical attention,
live on a diet of insufficient food, etc...." Nor are hundreds of
thousands of those working in Germany free from the presence and control of the
most varied spies and agents of the Yugoslav secret police...
"There is no doubt that Tito's regime depends
far more on the credit, trade, and economy of the Federal Republic than the
German government in Bonn depends on the goodwill and sympathy of the Party
leaders in Belgrade." Therefore, Mr. President, it will be very difficult
to understand all this if the issues of real interest to the peoples of
Yugoslavia are not also raised in the talks with the Yugoslav delegation,”
concludes journalist Kusan in his letter. It is regrettable that this and many
other voices remained “a voice crying in the wilderness” in the face of
Realpolitik. (SC Editorial Staff)
-
Cardinal Jan Daniélou died suddenly on May 19,
1974, in Paris at the age of 69. He is considered one of the most prominent
Catholic theologians of our time. His extensive work as a theological and
philosophical writer, his long tenure as a professor at the Faculty of Theology
in Paris, and his keen and effective interest in the problems of civilization
led to his appointment as cardinal by Pope Paul VI in 1962. At the Second
Vatican Council, he distinguished himself by demonstrating profound erudition
and a deep understanding of the most pressing issues of the day, whether from a
Christian, Marxist, or general civilizational perspective.
In 1972, he visited the Argentine capital, where he
delivered a series of highly relevant lectures. Despite his keen interest in
contemporary youth, seeking to understand them, explain the reasons for their
rebellion, and guide them toward a more rational path of reconciliation with
society, we personally observed that the youth of Buenos Aires showed little
interest in the opinions of the late French academic and cardinal of the Church—a
very significant symptom indeed!
The Argentine historian, Father Guillermo Furlong,
a Jesuit like Daniélou, died in Buenos Aires at the age of 85. He dedicated his
talent as a historical researcher especially to the study of colonial culture
and the activities of his own Jesuit Order in Argentina. For his valuable
contribution to Argentine historical scholarship, he was honored by several
Argentine institutions and academies.
Miguel Ángel Asturias died on June 9 of this year,
at the age of 74, in Madrid. He served as Guatemala's ambassador from 1966 to
1970. In 1967, he received the Nobel Prize in Literature for his works that
reflect the specificities of the Latin American world with its indigenous
roots. His works are considered "a kind of appeals court, a refuge for the
humble with their anonymous sorrows, a temple of justice where the
dispossessed, the marginalized, the indigenous people who inhabit his land and
neighboring ones cry out," as stated in "La Prensa" on June
10th. His major works include: "El Señor Presidente," "Men of
Maize," "Strong Wind," "The Green Pope," "The
Eyes of the Buried," and many more, several of which have been translated
into foreign languages.
- The Barcelona newspaper "Tele Express"
published a news item on June 12th regarding the Spanish prosecutor's support
for the extradition of the Croatians who hijacked an SAS plane in 1972. Defense
attorney Roberto Reyes Morales, opposing the prosecutor, listed a series of
reasons against extradition. The newspaper stated: "The defense attorney
added that the Croatian state declared its independence on April 10, 1941, that
Spain recognized it, and that this recognition has not yet been revoked, as Croatia
has not established relations with the Yugoslav government."
-
On June 16th, according to the Parisian news
program "Telerama," a film by Father Turcinkovic, one of the editors
of "Glas Koncila" (Zagreb), was screened. The film concerned the life
of the Catholic Church in Croatia. It was shown in the Notre-Dame
Reconciliatrice chapel. The "Telerama" report stated: "What do
we know about the long and glorious past of the Catholic Church in Croatia? A
film by Father Turcinkovic evokes the rich and painful history of this
community, located in Yugoslavia, on the fringes of the Slavic world and near
the Islamic world. The present, with the serious problem of emigration (one in
four Croatians lives and works outside the country) and the situation of the
Church within a socialist society, was then discussed with Father Erceg, a
professor, Father Calic, a missionary in Lyon, and Father Turcinkovic, who came
from Zagreb for the occasion..."
The same French newspaper published an article on
the date indicated, dedicated to the "naïve" painters of Yugoslavia,
paying special attention to those from Croatia. The Generalic family of Hlebine
is like an artistic dynasty: Ivan, 57 years old, has been painting since 1930;
his brother Ivo is a wood sculptor; Josip, his son, paints rural scenes and
depictions of the horrors of war. Mijo Kovacic, Matija Skurjeni, and Ivan
Rabuzin are also mentioned. Of the latter, the author of the article, Jean
D'Yvoire, says that he is a "quiet and visionary 52-year-old carpenter who
reads Meister Eckhardt, the mystics, and Spinoza, and 'cleanses nature,'
transforming the world into a luminous earthly paradise, fresh and transparent.
In his work, the reconciliation between man, the natural world, and the inner
world is perfected." Along with the news, the aforementioned French
newspaper reproduces a work by Ivan Vecenay, depicting a peasant procession
heading towards the local church.
The Chicago Tribune and The New World, both in
their June issues, published articles dedicated to the Croatian Franciscan
friar Silvio Grubisic and his work translating the Bible directly from Hebrew
into Croatian. Both newspapers also reproduce a photograph of Father Grubisic,
highlighting his pastoral activity, his dedication to his work, and his
excellent command of Hebrew. His initial hobby—translating the Bible—has become
the principal work of his religious and cultural life.
Professor Mirko Eterovic, Chair of Literature and
Classical Latin and Greek at the University of Córdoba, and also a professor at
the National University of Córdoba, Argentina, published a very interesting
article, "Humanist Education," in the Notarial Journal, No. 25,
1/1973. On the occasion of the 400th anniversary of said city, suggesting and
placing its faith in the renewal of humanist education, an essential
prerequisite for a comprehensive education of Argentine youth and in general.
-
Croatian Philatelic Association
Mr. Ekrem Spahic, a combatant in Vietnam,
distinguished for merit with the Bronze Cross, founded the Croatian Philatelic
Association in the United States. In philatelic circles he is known by the
nickname "Eck." He was a Member of the famous 173rd Airborne Brigade,
as a war correspondent.
Currently, as an active and distinguished columnist
for the News Herald newspaper in Borger (Texas), he has found the time
necessary to realize his long-awaited idea and organize The Croatian Philatelic
Association. In a short time, orders and requests came from all over the world
and especially when the idea of the organization was realized in
the philatelic press.
The position of first president of the Association
is held by Mr. Thomas E. Gaughan, a well-known philatelic journalist in New
York and a member of the most important philatelic institutions, as well as
journalistic circles. The vice president is the well-known philatelic and
numismatic expert Mr. Jerome Colich (Rego Park, N.Y.). The Secretary General of
the Association is Mr. Ekrem Spahic.
The Croatian Philatelic Association publishes
quarterly and in English, the magazine "The Trompheter" (The
Trumpeter) "The Herald". For information about the activities of the
Association, as well as instructions for membership, contact: The Croatian
Philatelic Society, 1408 Hazelwod, Suite C - Borger, Texas 79007, USA.
Dr Ivo Omrcanin: Economic Wealth of Croatia
Economic Wealth of Croatia, Dorrance & Company,
Philadelphia 1973, p. 165.
Dr. Ivo Omrcanin, currently a professor of modern
languages at Indiana University, USA, is one of the most prolific
Croatian writers in exile. He has dedicated a series of books in Latin,
Italian, German, English, and Croatian to issues intimately linked to the
history, politics, culture, and social, religious, and economic life of his
people. Omrcanin has not become "Americanized" or "bourgeois,"
for he could not reconcile himself with the idea of ubi bene, ibi
patria (where there is well, there is the homeland). This dynamic and restless
spirit of his knows well that intellectuals have inescapable obligations to
their people. Even more so when their people suffer from a
lack of freedom, when they are unjustly deprived of their own material goods, a
natural prerequisite for both material and spiritual development.
The book under review is dedicated precisely to the
economy of Croatia. Its author, drawing on authentic sources, demonstrates
objectively and scientifically Croatia's economic potential and shows that its
people, if free, could transform it into a country of enviable progress.
However, this prospect is tragically postponed due to exploitation by foreign
political powers.
The work, *Economic Wealth of Croatia*, covers the
period from 1868 (the date of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise; see SC, Nos.
32-35, pp. 98-157, 1969) to 1918 (the year Yugoslavia was formed), and then
from that date to the present (1973). Of course, the book lacks the elements of
a meticulously comprehensive work due to the almost insurmountable difficulty
of obtaining all the necessary data for the author's purposes while in exile.
For example, dissecting the necessary elements pertaining to Croatia within the
Yugoslav complex is a considerable undertaking. The author
points out these difficulties in the notes that refer both to the separate
regions of Croatia and to the production of the various sectors of the Yugoslav
economy as a whole.
In the introduction (pp. 1-9), the author converts
North American measurements to the European metric system to facilitate the
understanding of the data he presents, primarily for the English-speaking
American reader. According to statistics from the 1965 Atlas of the Cereal-Growing
Areas in Europe, Croatian lands comprise a total of 11,842,000 hectares. Of
this total, 5,653,800 hectares were in the Republic of Croatia, 5,112,900
hectares in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 1,075,300 hectares in Vojvodina. During
that period, 6,937,484 hectares were designated for agriculture, specifically
3,407,848 hectares in the Republic of Croatia, 2,620,000 hectares in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and 910,000 hectares in Vojvodina. The total area suitable for
cultivation was 3,565,541 hectares, with 1,590,541 hectares in the Republic of
Croatia and 1,590,541 hectares in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1,190,000
ha and 785,000 ha in Vojvodina. (The author notes that he uses the name
Croatia for all Croatian provinces: Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria,
Bosnia-Herzegovina with Sandzak and the Croatian part of Backa and
Baranja-Vojvodina.)
"The total area designated for cereals in
Croatia was 2,370,263 hectares, of which 1,027,263 hectares corresponded to the
Socialist Republic of Croatia, 778,000 hectares to the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 565,000 hectares to Vojvodina."
The population, according to the 1971 census, in
the three Croatian parts of Yugoslavia—the Socialist Republics of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the autonomous region of Vojvodina—was "7 million Croats," the author states, adding
that among them were "just over one million non-Croats."
According to Table 4 of the book, corresponding to
the year 1948, the Croatian lands in Yugoslavia, now arbitrarily dismembered,
had 7,222,060 inhabitants and an area of 119,923 km², with a
population density of 83.8 inhabitants per km². The first part of the book
reports on the natural resources and economic wealth of Croatia in general. The
author begins by providing data on cereal production in Croatia before the
establishment of the communist government of Yugoslavia. To this end, he
reproduces tables (5-11) for the years 1910-1915 and 1919-1923, specifying the
production of wheat, rye, barley, corn, and oats, indicating the total quantity
per row and per hectare.
In 1928, wheat production doubled compared to 1923,
reaching 15,844,899 quintals, or 14.84 quintals per hectare. From that year
until 1945, production stagnated. Comparing these data with
those of international production, shown in Tables 12-17, the author comments:
"These data indicate that, with respect to cereal production, Croatia,
considering its population size, occupies an excellent position among the
leading countries of Europe." Indeed, in Table 17 for 1925, Croatia
ranked eleventh out of 18 European countries, headed by Denmark and with Soviet
Russia at the bottom. Denmark then obtained 31.1 quintals per hectare, Croatia
14.84, and Russia 8.2. Immediately below Croatia were
Austria with 14.8, Italy 13.9, Hungary 13.7, Bulgaria 13.2, Spain 10.2, Romania
8.6, and Russia with 8.2 quintals per hectare.
In 1921, Croatia exported 329,919,013 kg of corn,
valued at 325,923,782 Yugoslav dinars. That same year, 47,072,906 kg of wheat
were exported, worth 151,177,264 dinars. Additionally, 31,568,090 kg of wheat
flour were exported, valued at 126,603,536 dinars.
Barley exports for the same year totaled 24,452,403 kg, worth 40,558,041
dinars. In 1924, Croatia's total grain exports reached 166,000 tons, valued at
478,000,000 dinars.
According to the 1965 Atlas of the Cereal-Growing
Area in Europe, there was a notable increase in yield per hectare for each
cereal species, which the author reproduces in detail.
Dalmatia is the center of Croatian viticulture,
even though there are good vineyards in Herzegovina, Srijem, and Slavonia. The
author apparently could not obtain data on current Croatian wine production,
providing only statistics from 1926, when 23,510,000 hectoliters were exported,
valued at 13,100,000 dinars.
The cultivation of various fruit species is another
important aspect of Croatia's wealth. There are 612 fruit trees per 100
inhabitants. Plums are the most common, with an average yield of 14-16 kg per
tree. Bosnia is the center of plum production, and as a result, Croatia ranks
first in the world in this sector. The latest data the author cites dates from
1923, when there were 12,300,000 plum trees and a production of 1,500,000
quintals of fresh plums. In addition to large quantities of fresh and dried plums,
Croatia exports considerable amounts of sljivovica (brandy), which is
well-known abroad.
For example, in 1921, 38,376,730 kg of plums were exported for a value of 144,284,621 dinars.
Furthermore, apples, pears, walnuts, and other fruits are abundant in the
northern parts of Croatia. Along the Adriatic coast, there is a greater variety
of fruit in abundant quantities: figs, almonds, oranges, lemons, olives,
cherries, etc. Dalmatian maraschino, made with sour cherries, is well-known. At
one time, up to 2,000 hectoliters of this product were exported annually. Olive
groves produced approximately 60,000 quintals of olives per year. Olive oil
holds a privileged position. Pure alcohol is also produced in 14 distilleries
with a capacity of 25,000,000 liters. In 1924, 12,330 hectoliters were
exported.
Among industrial crops, tobacco ranks first. The
production center is Herzegovina. The quality of this product is among the best
in the world. In 1911, production reached 11,282 quintals and was valued at
2,587,244 Austrian gold crowns. In 1941-42, production was 6,000,000 kg.
Regarding hemp, it is interesting to note that Croatia, with its production,
ranks immediately after the USA, Russia, Italy, and the Philippines.
In 1921-22, 10,861,161 kg were
exported for a value of 46,691,161 dinars. In 1925, the harvest doubled,
reaching 221,000 quintals; the export value was 243,000,000 dinars. Hemp flax
is of lesser importance, with 90% of its production consumed domestically.
Cotton cultivation only began after World War II in the Neretva River basin
(Narenta).
The experiment exceeded all expectations in terms
of quality. Hops are also very important and are grown especially in Srijem.
There are many breweries producing up to 1,500,000 hectoliters of beer per
year. The value obtained from beer exports reached 206,000,000 dinars in 1921.
Sugar beets are abundant, covering domestic needs, with a considerable surplus
for export. Data for 1940 show a production of 8,000,000 quintals with a yield
of 181 quintals per hectare. The author also provides some data regarding
chicory, turnips, paprika, etc., noting that the annual chicory production
reaches 120,000-130,000 quintals, and turnip and paprika production reaches
70,000 quintals each. Sunflowers, along with sugar beets, occupy the most
important place in this sector of the Croatian economy. Aromatic and medicinal
plants are also of great importance. Chrysanthemums, especially the Herzegovina
variety, are the most prominent. They are of excellent quality, and their
export to London, Paris, and New York reached 50,000,000 dinars annually
between the two world wars. Rosemary cultivation ranks second in this category
and is grown on the Dalmatian islands.
A wide variety of legumes and other vegetables are
mentioned. The data is from 1925-26. Beans and potatoes hold a privileged
position in terms of production, consumption, and export. Potato production in
1910 was 10,000,000 quintals, and bean production was 36,763,026 quintals, with
19,416,053 kg exported. Exports of surplus production yielded 41,656,694 dinars
in 1926. Honey production also ensured an export surplus of 101,368 kg, valued
at 1,500,000 dinars.
The export of hides, meat, live animals, cheese,
butter, milk, etc., was of great importance, as Croatia earned 339 million
dinars from meat exports alone in 1926. In 1921, it exported 108,214 head of
cattle worth 235,478,158 dinars. In 1927, it exported meat and livestock valued
at 269,195,465 dinars.
Fish: The Adriatic coast boasts over 350 species of
fish, 40 of which are of superior quality. It has a thriving fishing industry
and exports internationally renowned sardines. Croatian rivers such as the Sava,
Danube, Bosna, Vrbas, and Kupa are rich in fish, with salmon, trout, and eel
being among the most well-known species.
Forests occupy a place of paramount importance in
Croatia's wealth. There are 4,556,800 hectares covered by forests. Slavonia,
Bosnia, and Gorski Kotar are the richest regions in terms of forest cover.
Croatian oak is internationally renowned. The author had access to timber
production data only up to 1927, when there were 1,511,315 cubic meters of
softwood and 767,573 cubic meters of hardwood, 70% of which was exported.
Charcoal and pulp are also important sectors. During the period between the two
World Wars, there were 15 companies that produced approximately 45,000 tons of
tannin annually. In the city of Drvar, in 1940, there was an annual production
of 18,000 tons of pulp, with surpluses for export.
Among the minerals, coal stands out, with its
production center in Bosnia. This is also the center of iron production.
Ljubljana, Vares, and Zenica are key centers in steel production. In 1958,
Zenica accounted for 50% of crude and ingot steel production and, in turn, 70%
of the total produced in Yugoslavia. It is truly one of the largest
metallurgical centers in Europe. Sisak is another similar metallurgical center.
The U.S. Development Loan Fund provided an $8.5 million loan for the
manufacture of various types of pipes. In addition, there are copper,
magnesium, phosphates, graphite, lead, zinc, and alloys. Cement, bauxite,
gypsum, asphalt, and bituminous substances are abundant. In 1921, for example,
180,953,021 kg of cement were exported, valued at 49,429,109 dinars.
Bauxite is found along the Adriatic coast.
According to a 1965 estimate, Croatia ranks third in the world in terms of
bauxite reserves, accounting for 23.9% of European reserves and 5.5% of global
reserves. It is estimated that Dalmatia alone contains 20,000,000 tons of
bauxite. It is of the highest quality, containing 60-70% aluminum oxide. Oil
deposits, exploration, and production in Yugoslavia are now located in Croatia.
It is regrettable that the author could not provide further details here.
Stones used in architecture and decoration, such as marble and granite, as well
as Croatia's hydroelectric potential, are of ever-increasing importance. Its
possibilities are enormous.
In the third part of his book—national sovereignty
and freedom—the author focuses on the economic exploitation of Croatia from
1868 to 1918 due to its lack of national sovereignty. To avoid lengthy
arguments, the author reproduces, partially and in summary form, the report
obtained in 1883 by Crown Prince Rudolf of Habsburg. These reports were
compiled by Moritz Szeps and Dr. Berthold Frischauer, two leading journalists
in Vienna at the time, as individuals he personally trusted. These reports were
largely published in the Neues Wiener Tageblatt on August 31, 1883 and 1884.
The exploitation of Croatia by Hungary was of such magnitude that it gave the
Imperial Curia in Vienna sufficient grounds to intervene in Translatania, as
the Hungarian-Croatian part of the dual monarchy was known.
Dr. F. Folnegovic, one of the leading opposition
politicians and a member of Starcevic's party, and Dr. H. Hinkovic, also from
Starcevic, provided Frischauer with the economic and political data that were
causing widespread discontent in Croatia. "If things continue this
way," they openly stated, "Russian protection will be sought. Croatia
will continue to exercise its rights without any regard for religion, even
while respecting Catholicism and the religious beliefs of the Croatian people,
in order to guarantee Croatia's sovereignty." At the same time, some
Hungarian politicians, in their correspondence with an English noblewoman—Mrs.
Hughes-Hughes—denied Croatian claims. One of them, Apponoyi, asserted,
"...constitutionally, one could say that the banus (administrative head,
viceroy of Croatia—SC's note) could remain in his post if a Hungarian
administration came to power and the new government did not have confidence in
him; but practically, such a thing is impossible." Regarding the
participation of Croats in state politics, Apponoyi wrote: “In fact, an
invitation to Croats is a weapon eliminated from party life through a kind of
consensus among all parties and public opinion. I hope this spirit will remain
until we, the current politicians, are in our graves; this is, therefore, a
deeply rooted tradition of Hungarian politicians and also their greatest
honor.”
Chapter Four of this book is devoted to the “sad
history” of the Croatian economy between 1918 and 1939. Preferring to focus his
attention more closely on the exploitation of Croatia under the current
communist regime, the author reproduces only the opinion of the Yugoslav
communists themselves when they officially addressed the matter. The 1962
Yugoslav Encyclopedia states, among other things: "In 1931, Croatia's
financial resources suffered their first collapse after some 80 years of
growth. After this, the disorganized private capital market
in Croatia became dependent on the Central Bank and the privileged financial
institutions in Belgrade" (p. 89). We believe the author should
have used R. Bicinic's book, *The Economic Basis of the Croatian Question*,
here. This would have contributed more to the specific purpose of his work and,
politically, made Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in 1941 more
understandable.
In Chapter Three, the author, to better highlight
the exploitation of Croatia by the communist regime in Belgrade and the
regime's overall economic failure, provides extensive data on the economic aid
received, primarily from the United States, and subsequently from other Western
countries such as England, France, Germany, etc. He also mentions the aid
received from communist countries, led by Soviet Russia. The section on
technical assistance provided to communist Yugoslavia by the United States is
particularly interesting. Forty-three projects encompassed fisheries, crops,
food, agricultural mechanization, fruits and vegetables, soil fertilization and
water reserves, veterinary services, forestry, plant protection, the leather
and shoe industries, business management, housing construction, public health,
bridge and highway construction, cement, industrial cotton, paper, and more.
In almost all of these projects, which were
completed, the United States contributed between 70% and 100% of the funding.
In one way or another, communist Yugoslavia received $2.89 billion from the
United States between 1946 and 1969. Yugoslavia also received aid from the
United Nations and a large amount of remittances from Croatian immigrants in
the United States. However, despite all this, Yugoslavia's annual balance sheet
consistently showed large deficits, which were constantly covered by the United
States. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
initiated and justified this. According to Dulles, Yugoslavia was the first
country to gain independence from Soviet Russia. While not condoning everything
that was happening there, Dulles stated: "We would all lose—not just
Yugoslavia—if it were reduced again to complete dependence on Moscow. This
would be a serious blow to the aspirations of other countries in that area to
achieve their independence."
To refute the official statistics of a dictatorial
and communist regime, the author analyzes only the production of wheat, corn,
and sugar beets from 1957-64 in state-owned enterprises and cooperatives.
Yields reached 38.9 quintals per hectare of wheat, 49.9 quintals of corn, and
365 quintals of sugar beets per hectare in 1964. Any superiority shown by these
collective enterprises is due to favoritism on the part of the communist
regime, while private farmers are unable to obtain tractors, fertilizers, or
other resources necessary for progress.
But if Croatia could export grain when its
production was below 20 quintals per hectare, we can imagine the prosperity
that would result if it truly achieved the overall production of 38.9 quintals
per hectare. And we know that there is hunger in Croatia and that communist
Yugoslavia as a whole would face exceptionally difficult times without economic
and military aid from Western countries. If Croatia had received the same
technical and economic assistance as communist Yugoslavia, and if it had been
able to implement it freely and within the framework of its democratic state,
it could have achieved a standard of living equal to that of the most developed
countries in Europe. On the contrary, the author reproduces statistical data
from Professor Joseph T. Bombelles, concerning the actual state of the
communist Yugoslav economy, which provides irrefutable proof of the misery
endured by the people of that communist state. Finally, a secret agent, who for
many years operated within the Croatian diaspora as an extremely hostile
element to the Tito regime, acknowledged that this regime could not have
survived without the aid of the Western world.
Miroslav Varos, as this agent is called, abruptly
left Rome two years ago and currently continues working in Yugoslavia. He wrote
the following: "Communist Yugoslavia has been entirely dependent on the
West for its survival from the very beginning. It ostensibly acted on behalf of
the Western political world in order to strengthen its own regime. As long as
the West supports Tito, he will dominate Croatia and other subjugated nations,
purchasing weapons for his military in the US and England and using them
against the people, while the soldiers who use them wear the five-pointed red
star with the hammer and sickle on their caps."
To conclude his valuable book, the author
reproduces reports by B. Ferron, published in Le Monde Diplomatique in January
1971, where this renowned specialist in Yugoslav affairs noted, among other
things, that the Yugoslav deficit grew that year by $460 million, while
Croatia, on its own, had a surplus of $160 million. It is understandable that
Croatia would want to use these resources.
But all this foreign exchange is deposited, not
without resistance, in the Central Bank of Yugoslavia and then distributed,
without considering how much each of the republics has contributed to the
common treasury. Thus, for example, the Croatian economy, which contributes 30
to 40% of the foreign exchange entering the country, receives only 10%. If it
cannot afford the purchases necessary for its industry, Croatia is forced to
turn to the Central Bank, paying very high prices for them..." Comparing the
agricultural progress of free countries after the last world war, especially
France, the author says that Croatia has the potential for large-scale
production of high-quality grain.
But to achieve this, it must be free and develop
its economy through free enterprise. "As in all things," he says,
"so too in agriculture, freedom is the supreme factor for such an
achievement." But instead of progressing, Croatia is regressing
economically, culturally, and biologically. Hundreds of thousands of Croatians
are leaving their homeland without prospects, seeking to build their lives on
the other side of the ocean. The famine, political persecution, and massacres
during and at the end of the last world war, which cost Croatia two million
lives, including those killed and emigrated, illustrate the dire situation in
Croatia today." Under normal conditions, Croatia is capable of
establishing a high standard of living because it produces almost all the
important raw materials. But the current communist regime has ruined its national
economy by stifling all private initiative. To the question of whether
Croatia's economy is currently capable of establishing an independent state,
the answer is yes. Croatia is capable of living as an independent state, even
as an autarkic one. But that would be an extreme situation, because its
political and economic objective is to forge close ties with all the free
peoples of the world, and especially with the free community of Europe, states
Dr. Omrcanin.
His book, despite being written hastily, provides
us with valuable data and logical conclusions. A more comprehensive compilation
of data, its partial updating, and a methodical systematization would require
much more time and a whole army of specialists. One man, in a short time, has
accomplished more than could have been expected.
All those interested in that increasingly important
part of the world should read it.
Tito's death, which is not far off, will unleash a
crisis whose future is difficult to foresee. The author puts his finger on the
wound and points the way out: the self-determination of the peoples of
Yugoslavia, first and foremost the Croatian people, who have every right to
live freely in a sovereign national state.
It is a matter of conscience and responsibility for
the Croatian diaspora to effectively support the author in his noble endeavors.
*Economic Wealth of Croatia* should be in the homes of many who influence, or
could influence, the fate of the world in which Croatia awaits justice and
freedom.
Franjo Nevistic
George J.
Prpic, Ph. D.: "Tragedies and Migrations in Croatian History"
(Tragedies and Migrations in Croatian History),
Toronto 1973 (published by "Hrvatski Put" P.O. Box 78, Station
"M" Toronto, Ont., Canada, p. 24).
The Croats are perhaps the nation with the highest
emigration rate in the world, with the obvious exception of the Jews, who until
about 25 years ago did not possess an indisputably defined national territory.
The case of the Croats is, therefore, comparable to that of the Irish and the
Armenians, with the difference that the former (the Irish) have already managed
to live in their lands freed from foreign rule. The Croats cannot be called
free even after the calamitous loss of their population in 1945. Their exodus
continues. At least 25% of all Croats live abroad.
The author of this booklet, a history professor at
John Carroll University in Cleveland, USA, attempts to elucidate the
relationship between national tragedies and the resulting migrations of the
Croatian people, setting aside other causes of Croatian migration, such as
Croatia's geographical location, the maritime character of the Croatians, and
various economic factors.
Even the first contacts of the Croatians with Islam
as merchants, sailors, administrators, and rulers—representing a phase of
Croatian history neglected by pro-Western Croatian historians—caused migrations
even without the presence of national tragedies. Croatia's tragedies began with
invasions from the East and West, from the North and South, introducing three
civilizations into its territory: Western, Byzantine, and Islamic, with their
respective religions: Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam.
However, the greatest tragedies, with their
migratory consequences, began with the Turkish invasions,
and especially after the disastrous Battle of Krbava Field in Lika on September
9, 1493, in which three generations of the oldest Croatian noble families
perished. This deprived Croatia of its political identity and ushered in an era
of endless wars, with the resulting migrations of southern Croats northward to
Slovenia, Austria, and Hungary. Thus, Croatia began to lose its ethnic unity,
with disastrous consequences for the future. The tragic formula (father!) has
been repeated throughout the centuries until 1945: lost battles, new waves of
migration!
It is estimated (Prof. Dr. D. Mandic) that by 1699,
approximately one and a half million Croats had been deported by the Turks as
slaves. It is important to note that slavery in Turkey during that period is
not comparable to the modern concept of slavery. The author also estimates that
Croatia had lost approximately two million inhabitants by 1800.
After briefly mentioning the most important wars
and battles in which Croatians participated as soldiers for other nations, the
author cites several names of illustrious Croatians who died abroad due to
voluntary or involuntary migrations.
In his final chapter, "Conclusions," the
author argues that if Croatia had not been a permanent battleground, it would
have 40 million inhabitants today, and even then, had it not been for so much
emigration, it should have at least 10 million instead of the current 6
million. The author states, "Of all the tragedies,
Bleiburg was the greatest in Croatian history," referring to the
massacre of 300,000 Croatian soldiers and civilians after World War II.
"Thousands of Croatian intellectuals living in English-speaking countries
are pressing for an investigation into all the crimes committed against their
people after 1945. It is time to address the question of the responsibility and
guilt of those involved in these crimes, that is, to question both those who
made the massacre possible by extraditing Croatians seeking asylum, and those
who perpetrated the massacre," the author says.
This small work, furnished with historical
engravings and maps, and containing a somber text, is nevertheless concluded by
its author with a glimmer of hope. His final thought reads: "Since Croatia
has no friends in the free world, its only hope lies in the large number of
Croatian emigrants. They are aware of their potential and the historical
mission they wish to fulfill. Like the Irish and other peoples in diaspora who
helped restore freedom to their homelands, the Croatians also believe that with
will, determination, and a long struggle they will achieve their ultimate
goal."
Milan Blazekovic
Nicolás Matijevic and Olga H. de Matijevic,
Patagonian Bibliography
p. 266,
National University of the South.
The Patagonian Documentation Center of the National
University of the South, based in Bahía Blanca, has published a work that will
eventually comprise six volumes. Its purpose is to contribute to a better
understanding of Argentine Patagonia and the southern lands under Argentine
sovereignty, distinguished by its comprehensiveness, selective approach, and
up-to-date technical resources. Its authors, widely recognized in library
circles, have undertaken a monumental task that, to date,
has resulted in nearly fifteen thousand references. Of this vast collection,
this first volume presents those related to the following subjects:
Archaeology, Rock Art, Chroniclers and Travelers, Mythology and Legends,
History, and Argentine-Chilean Border Issues. The other five volumes will be
dedicated, respectively, to Geography, Indigenous Peoples, Botany and Zoology,
Geology and Paleontology, and Natural Resources and Development.
The book, neatly and meticulously printed, honors
Nicolás Matijevic and Olga H. de Matijevic, who, with its creation, pay a
well-deserved tribute to this land they came to from their native Croatia (266
pages).
(La Nación, Buenos Aires, February 24, 1974)
F. W.
Deakin, The Embattled Mountain
(The Disputed
Mountain), London 1971, Oxford University Press, pp. XIX-284.
From the beginning of the Second World War, or
rather, from the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the date
on which the resistance began in the dismembered Yugoslavia under communist
leadership, until mid-1943, the Allies—especially the British—were interested
in knowing who represented the true resistance to the Axis powers and their
allies in the Balkans: the Serbian Chetniks, under Draza Mihajlovic, or the
Partisans, under communist leadership. In order to obtain an unequivocal answer
to this question, upon which military and political decisions depended, the
British SOE (Special Operations Executive) in Cairo sent several missions to
Yugoslavia.
The numerous missions, initially only British, to
Draza Mihajlovic's headquarters in Serbia, Tito's mobile headquarters, and the
Croatian partisan headquarters in northern Croatia, left the impression that an
Allied invasion of the Balkans via the Dalmatian coast was imminent, or at
least in preparation. This impression, which became a firm conviction,
determined the strategy and policy not only of the Germans and Italians, but
also of the Chetniks and the partisans, who fought and exterminated each other
trying to secure the hinterland of the landing zone. A large-scale military
operation was anticipated: the Allied landing and invasion via Dalmatia.
According to Professor Deakin's account, this operation had apparently never
been seriously considered.
This is the most important and most interesting
conclusion, from a political point of view, to be drawn from the work of
Professor F. W. D. Deakin, literary assistant to Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and leader of the mission to Tito's headquarters launched on May 27,
1943, by air, codenamed "Typical," which paved the way for the
arrival at that headquarters of Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean as the British Prime
Minister's personal representative.
Now, twenty-five years after his thrilling
adventure, when almost all the survivors of those missions have published their
respective memoirs or accounts (for example: Jasper Rootham,
"Miss-Fire," 1964; Christie Lawrence, "Irregular
Adventure," 1947; Fitzroy Maclean, "Eastern Approaches," 1949
(1956) and "Tito: The Man Who Defied Hitler and Stalin (The
Heretic)," 1957), Professor Deakin publishes his book as a prelude to a
larger work on the Battle of the Sutjeska River, around Mount Durmitor in
Montenegro, as part of the Mediterranean theater of World War II, revealing
both the goals and attitudes of all the belligerent parties.
F. W. D. Deakin's work differs in more than one
aspect from the descriptions of events or experiences of other authors, but the
most outstanding characteristic of his work is that, as a historian, he
attempts to distinguish between his recollections and his subsequent knowledge
of the political and military situation. For this reason, the author presents
the episodes in three stages: a prologue, the first and second parts, and an
epilogue.
Within this framework, Deakin recounts episodes,
conversations, and references regarding the potential Allied landing, which
provoked a wave of mixed feelings, ranging from hope to open suspicion and
distrust regarding the Allies' subsequent political intentions in the Balkans.
As an example, the author cites Tito's letter to
the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Croatia, dated April 8, 1942,
in which he states: "We have evidence that British policy tends to
sabotage and compromise the struggle for national liberation, so that when the
situation is favorable and Italy abandons Hitler and submits to the reach of
the British, they will land troops in Dalmatia, or elsewhere, appearing as
'liberators' to save the country from chaos. To this end, some ten so-called
'military missions' have already arrived and are doing their dirty work in
different parts of Yugoslavia. One of these missions has reached our
headquarters (Tito is referring to the mission of Major Terence Atherton!),
another has landed in Dalmatia, and others in different places, exactly where
we do not know" (p. 170).
Tito's suspicions, as he strove for communist
domination over all of "liberated" Yugoslavia, were not unfounded:
they were fueled by the slow pace of preparations for opening the second front,
the continued support for the Yugoslav government in London and for General
Mihajlovic in the country, despite his open collaboration with the Italians and
Germans, and, finally, the repeated delays in recognizing the National
Liberation Movement as a military and political organization in the country.
Indeed, all the conversations the author held
during those days with various Yugoslav communist leaders were based on the
latent and unexpressed conviction that the British and Americans would land in
the Balkans, beginning on the Adriatic coast, before formally recognizing the
partisans as allies and before completely severing relations with Mihajlovic
and his Chetniks due to their proven collaboration with the Axis powers (pp. 62
and 63). Tito turned his doubts into reality by shifting the focus of the fight
inland to the Dalmatian coast with the aim of eliminating the Chetniks there,
who had entrenched themselves in the same area with identical objectives (pp.
66-68).
Professor Deakin does not explicitly state anywhere
in his work that the Allies intended to land and that, therefore, those who
expected such an operation were mistaken. However, it is clear from his entire
account that this was indeed the case. The author makes an exception only on
page 180, when discussing the plans of Captain D. T. Hudson, leader of the
first mission on September 20, 1941, codenamed "Bulleye," and those
of Colonel S. W. Bailey, who landed at Mihajlovic's barracks on Christmas Day
1942.
Both concluded that peace between Tito and
Mihajlovic was impossible and that the solution therefore had to be sought in a
territorial demarcation. Bailey proposed that Tito be induced to withdraw west
of Zagreb, thus forming two independent republics: Tito's in western Croatia
and Mihajlovic's in Serbia. The advantage of this proposition would have been
"that the British would have maintained direct control over the future
development of events in Croatia" (p. 180). To get a sense of the British
dilemma at this time, it is helpful to transcribe what the author reports
verbatim: "Sir George Rendel, the ambassador assigned to the Yugoslav
royal government in London, was, however, against Tito's transfer to Croatia.
This would not only exacerbate the national rivalries between Serbs and Croats,
but would also pave the way for the introduction of a communist regime in
Croatia, which, due to its geographical proximity to Hungary and Austria, could
form the nucleus of a Central European communist bloc.
"The Foreign Office, where a special meeting
was held on January 18, 1943, feared future difficulties for the British if
they were to come face to face with hostile partisans after a landing operation
in Dalmatia or on the Croatian coast. But Bailey's plan had enormous drawbacks
for other reasons." Serbian-Croatian rivalries would intensify, facilitating
the spread of communism and potentially leading to clashes between Tito and
Macek's Croatian Peasant Party, rather than between Tito and Mihajlovic.
Slovenia would be sacrificed to communism. A complete break with King Peter was
implicit. The effect on Greece and other allies would be
disturbing” (pp. 190-181). We consider it interesting to note here a
denial by the Yugoslav government, which was forced to be published in the
Swedish newspaper Wagens Nyheter (July 2, 1955), that there was no secret agreement
between Tito and Hitler to jointly prevent the Allied landing on the Croatian
coast, although there are many indications that such an agreement would have
existed had the operation taken place. These indications corroborate not only
the information provided by Walter Hagen (Wilhelm Höttl) in his work “Die
Geheime Front” (The Secret Front), but also Tito’s own biography, written by
his biographer Vladimir Dedier (V. Dedier, “Tito Speaks,” Hachette Bookstore,
Buenos Aires, 1953, p. 225).
It is also worth mentioning that several reports
contradict the view that the Allies had no intention of landing in the Balkans,
which is the implicit thesis of Professor Deakin's book. Perhaps we should
distinguish between the British position, which we have already highlighted
above, and the American one. It suffices to refer to the difference of opinion
between Churchill and Dwight Eisenhower regarding the landing site, in the book
"The Alexander Memoirs 1940-1945" (The Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc.
New York, Toronto, London, 1962), where Field Marshal Alexander recounts that
for the Americans, military, not political, motives were decisive: "If the
Prime Minister was of the opinion that the Allies should establish themselves
in the Balkans with considerable forces to prevent a Russian occupation and to
create a more stable world after the war, then he should immediately see the
President (American - our observation) and put the facts as well as his own
conclusions on the table" (p. 42). Despite the author's personal and emotional
attachment to the main Yugoslav communist leaders, forged during the harsh
struggle for survival over three months, he cannot be simply accused of bias in
favor of the partisans or against their adversaries: Serbian Chetniks and
Croatian Ustaše. However, this, along with his subsequent contacts with the
same figures in the task of reconstructing the fates of the other British
missions, led him to sometimes adopt the language and the way of appreciating
and judging adversaries used by the Yugoslav communists, most of whom were
Serbian.
This circumstance is most eloquently evidenced by
the author himself when, emphasizing that the overwhelming majority of the
units around Tito were Serbian, he states: "This assessment includes the
Muslim units of Bosnia and Herzegovina, historically of Serbian
descent..." (p. 106). This is indeed a huge error, difficult to explain in
a book like Professor Deakin's, since it is well known that the Muslims of
Bosnia and Herzegovina are descendants of Catholic Croats who converted to
Bogomilism, who, in turn, embraced Islam after the Turkish occupation of 1463.
Endowed with photographic material, rather limited
literary references, and a meticulous index, this work, at times resembling a
captivating novel, effectively rescues from oblivion the frustrated attempts of
British policy in Yugoslavia, due to the inexplicable destruction of a portion
of the official British archives after the war.
Milan Blazekovic
Croatian poetry from origins to our days
Editiones Seghers, Paris, 1972. Pages
310.
Two years ago, Pierre Seghers, French poet and
editor, published in his beautiful "Autour du Monde" collection an
extensive anthology of Croatian poetry from its origins to the present day. The
arduous task of selection, classification, and relevant commentary was
undertaken by the Croatian writers and anthologists Slavko Mihalic and Ivan
Kusan. Among the translators were Janine Matillon and Marc Alyn, and the final
revision was carried out by P. Seghers. The introductory explanation of
Croatian literature, which could have been more extensive and generous, was
written by Slavko Mihalic.
Poetry, the most delicate fragrance of the spirit
and the heart, is the deep, authentic, and living voice that springs from the
earth and from the blood. It reflects, especially in the Croatian case, not
only subjective nuances but also the almost constant historical vicissitudes of
the Croatian people, who never cease fighting for national freedom and
individual rights. It is characterized by a dramatic tone and an unyielding
faith in a bright future.
In this anthology, which spans six long centuries,
from the 14th to the present day, the attentive reader will perceive the moving
song "of men confronted with the often tragic destiny of their country.
They also speak to us of their nostalgic roots, of their land and their sea, of
their myths and their disillusionments, their tribulations and their courage.
They are Croatians, undoubtedly, but poets of the entire world, certainly"
(Pierres Seghers).
Located on the volatile and dangerous border
between Western Europe and Eastern Eurasia, with a Christian and partly Muslim
spiritual orientation, the Croats participated in all European literary
movements and currents, contributing their considerable share to the universal
cultural heritage. Croatian literature, abundantly nourished by folk poetry—an
inexhaustible source of authentic language and poetic inspiration—was born and
flourished in Dubrovnik and the Dalmatian cities during the 15th and 16th
centuries. Given the adverse political circumstances, literature assumed the
task of national unification. The poets, bards, and poets of their time fully
reflect the grandeur and tragedies of Croatia. Thus, the long and arduous
course of Croatian history resonates and is reflected in the works and verses
of its poets.
This anthology offers a broad overview of Croatian
poetic creation, running parallel to the literary production of Western
countries. It also includes translatable examples of the rich folk poetry, both
heroic and lyric, while proverbs and popular sayings are transcribed in the
final pages.
In their effort to present a coherent and complete
succession of Croatian poetry, the anthologists sometimes sacrificed its
intrinsic value and included second-rate authors and poems, instead of
selecting the representative poets of each period and literary or philosophical
school.
The book begins with the unknown poets of the 14th
century and the funerary inscriptions carved on the tombstones of the Bosnian
Bogomils (Patarenes).
Marko Marulic (1450-1524), the renowned Latinist
and father of Croatian literature, describes in his "Prayer Against the Turks" the atrocities suffered by the
Croats as a result of the Ottoman invasion and conquest.
Ivan Gundulic, considered the greatest epic poet in
Croatian literature, wrote the pastoral play Dubravka (The Forest), in which he
sings the hymn to freedom, a fragment of which is reproduced here in French by
Janine Matillon:
O aimable, ô spléndide, ô liberté chérie!
Don où le
Tout-puissant a mis tous les trésors,
de notre gloire seule et véritable source,
et plus riche ornement de notre fameux Bois,
tout l'or du monde, tout l'argent et tout le sang
ne sauraient s'échanger contre ta beauté pure.
Silvije Strahimir Kranjcevic (1865-1908) is
undoubtedly the most representative poet of Croatia in the last century. His
poetry ranges from patriotic romanticism to a vision of Golgotha
where man occupies the place of Prometheus in the universe. We
transcribe below the first stanzas of his superb poem: Eli, Eli, Lama Sabachtani!
Le Crucifié du Golgotha, pour qui a-t-il rendu esprit?
Est-elle tombée, cette victime, trop tard, trot
tôt, tombée pour qui?
Le Crucifié du Golgotha, la terre entière le
saisit,
Mais de ce sacrifice ancien on n'a pas recueilli le
fruit.
Son sang s'est échappé à flot, son coeur s'est
arrêté ici,
Et plus jamais il n'a battu comme il battait aux
temps jadis.
Et puis les siècles ont passé, les longs siècles
d'une horreur noire,
Son sang séché s'est écaillé, on en a profané
l'histoire!
Vladimir Vidric es el representante más genuino del
movimiento llamado la Moderna croata. Su virtuosismo, unido a la maestría del
lenguaje y de la música, hacen que este
Verlaine croata sea casi inaccesible a la traducción. Transcribimos su breve
poema "Adiós" en versión francesa de Janine Matillon y Pierre
Seghers:
Dans mon dos doucement
La mandoline frappe
Et s'ouvre mon manteau
L'obscurité pourprée
A couvert mes paupières
De soleil et de vin.
Et ma main qui compose
Des chansons, elle efface
Une larme qui nait
Et tombe de mes yeux.
C'est comme ça, Ma Dame
Que je descends, hélas,
L'escalier du
château.
Tin Ujevic (1891-1955), the last of the true
bohemians, dominates Croatian poetry of our century. A magician of language, he
achieved a synthesis between the classical and the modern. A universal and
cosmic poet, with soaring imagination, he is profoundly human and
compassionate, as reflected in his "Daily Lament":
Qu'il est dur
d'être faible
qu'il est dur d'être seul
d'être vieux, jeune encore!
Et faible et chancelant,
et sans personne au monde
ayant perdu la paix
et n'ayant plus d'espoir.
Dans la boue des chemins
de piétiner sa route
et d'être piétiné
sans une étoile au ciel.
L'étoile du destin
s'est éteinte ou perdue
qui brillait au berceau
arc-en ciel, illusion,
Dieu, Dieu, rappelle-toi
les feux de tes promesses,
Dieu, Dieu, rappelle-toi
l'amour et les victoires,
les lauriers, les présents,
Et sache que ton fils
traverse la vallée
des larmes de ce monde
épines et cailloux.
Among the postwar generation, Vesna Parun stands
out for her poetic, amorous, and tragic experiences, which can be appreciated
in her poem "The Mother of Man." "A woman-poet of the highest
rank, Vesna Parun offers Croatian and universal poetry works of pathetic
grandeur, a flow of life and truth" (Pierre Seghers).
Il eût mieux valu pour toi accoucher d'un hiver noir, o ma mère, plutôt
que de moi.
Il eût mieux valu pour toi accoucher d'un ours
dans sa caverne, d'un serpent dans son trou.
Il eût mieux valu embrasser la pierre plutôt que
mon visage,
Et pour moi, plutôt que le lait d'un femme, téter
celui d'une bête
Si tuavais accouché d'un oiseau, o ma mère, tu
serais mère.
Tu serais heureuse, tu réchaufferais l'oiseau sous
ton aile.
Si tu avais accouché d'un arbre, l'arbre renaîtrait
au printemps.
Ta chanson ferait fleurir le tilleul, verdir le
jonc.
A tes pieds viendrait se coucher l'agneau, si tu
étais mère d'un agneau.
Tes balbutiements, tes larmes, la douce bête les
comprendrait.
Mais te voilà debout,
seule et partageant le silence des tombes;
Il est aimer d'être homme quand l'homme et le
couteau sont frères.
Among the young poets, Vlado Gotovac (b. 1930)
stands out, currently "atoning" for his ideals of individual and
national freedom in Tito's dungeons. We reproduce an excerpt from his
"Poem of the Adolescent Who Does Not Love This World":
Je vous présente un jeune homme
Qui n'aime pas ce monde,
Et qui nous dit:
Chanter, et suivre la chanson!
Ce monde se
dissout dès qu'il se réveille!
Ce monde ensommeillé est en train de mourir!
Nous chantons de plus en plus fort,
Nous voix se tissent dans sa trame:
Dès qu'il comprend ces mots, il meurt!
Une dolente sérénade d'amour perdu
Déchire ses tendres chanteurs
Entortillés de plantes vénéneuses
Et, en accompagnant le monde vers les étoiles
mortes
Tous ceux qui vont mourir aujourd'hui rêvent d'eux!
The anthology at hand also includes poetic
compositions by the distinguished Croatian Latinists of the 15th and 16th
centuries, whose message does not differ from the content of the verses written
in Croatian. Here the Latin language also served as a vehicle to point out the
tragic destiny of the Croatian people and their long aspiration to overcome it.
This book is further proof of the creative capacity
of the Croatian people and the merit of the writer Pierre Seghers is great for
having made a selection of Croatian poetry accessible to those who know the
French language.
Likewise, the work of Janine Matillon, a French
writer and great friend of Croatian literature, main translator of this
anthology, who has put so much effort into ensuring that Croatian poetic
expression found its equivalent in French, is commendable.
Branko Kadic
[2] Rene Marcic: Vom Gesetzesstaat zum
Richterstaat, Vienna, 1957, pp. 37, 55, etc., or by the same author: Jugend in
den politischen Umbruechen, Separ., pp. 60, 61.
[3] G. Martínez Márquez: New method of
"liberation" in the U.S.: running naked, in "La Prensa" on
March 11, 1974. One of those strange "liberators" declared to
reporters, when a similar girls' school refused to join their runs:
"What's wrong with these girls from Bernard that they don't want to be
'liberated'?" See also: Jean Daniélou: Dissatisfaction of young people
with a technocratic society, in "Le Monde" - "Clarín" on
February 24, 1969: "It is evident that a confrontation between pure revolt
and pure power is pointless. Dialogue is not possible. Because it could only
take place to the extent that the revolt were man's protest in the name of a
reality that objectively signified the human destiny in relation to which the
protest against an inhuman society would be made. But to speak of human
society, one would have to know what man is." And at this point, the
leaders of the revolt have nothing to say. They stop at the level of rejection;
they have nothing more to bear witness to. They are not prophets. They are
undertakers,” says the recently deceased ecclesiastical dignitary.
[4] J. Danielou, Op. cit. in “Clarín,” Buenos
Aires.
[5] R. Marcic, Vom Gesetzesstaat zum Richterstaat,
p. 95.
[6] R. Marcic, Jugend in den Politischen
Umbruechen, p. 57.
[7] Miguel de Unamuno, La agonía del
cristianismo, Buenos Aires, 1966, pp. 51–52: “And it is that hatred, and above
all, envy, are forms of love.” True atheists are madly in love with God.
[8] G. A. Wetter, Soviet Dialectical Materialism,
Buenos Aires, 1950, p. 90.
[9] "The revolutionary is already a condemned
man; he has no personal interests, no business, no feelings, no ties...
Everything in his person is dominated by a single, exclusive interest, a single
thought, a single passion: the revolution... The only science he knows is
destruction. He despises and hates current social morality, in all its motives,
in all its manifestations. In his eyes, only that which contributes to the
triumph of the revolution is moral; that which prevents this "Triumph is immoral." Quoted
by Wetter, op. cit., p. 66.
[10] W. Roepke, La crisi sociale del
nostro tempo, Rome, 1946, p. 15, explains what he means by the term
"interference" of the centuries. Children, the only
privileged ones, as was said in his time, act today in accordance with this
"interference" of eras.
[11] F. Engels, Herrn Eugen Duehrings Umwaelzung
der Wissenschaft, quoted by R. Marcic in his book Vom Gesetzesstaat zum
Richterstaat, pp. 96, 97, note 38.
[12] M. Markovic, Il socialismo e l'autogestione in La rivolta di
"Praxis", Longanesi y Cia., Milan, 1970, pp. 30, 31, 33.
[13] Nikita Khrushchev characterized that situation
in a classic manner, worthy of his improvisational genius. The Daily Mail of
May 22, 1956, published the following report after Nikita's famous speech on
Stalin and Stalinism: "...Khrushchev received a piece of paper (in the
Supreme Soviet meeting room - note) on which was written: 'What were you doing
while Stalin was committing such crimes?' Khrushchev read these words and said:
'I ask whoever is asking to stand up.' But no one moved. 'That is precisely
it,' Khrushchev then added, 'what I was doing while Stalin was in power.'"
According to another report, Khrushchev replied: "What could we do? There
was a reign of terror." "It was enough to just glance at him for
someone to lose their life the next day." See: R. Marcic, Vom
Gesetzesstaat zum Richterstaat, p. 94, note 34.
[14] "V. I. Lenin, at the end of 1917, in
order to establish 'a rigorous revolutionary order,' demanded 'the ruthless
crushing of outbreaks of anarchy among drunkards, hooligans,
counter-revolutionaries, and other individuals'..." Furthermore: "In
what neighborhood of the big city, in what factory, in what village... are
there no saboteurs who call themselves intellectuals?" Solzhenitsyn quotes
Lenin from official documents of the Leninist era. "V. I. Lenin proclaimed
as his sole objective to cleanse the Russian land of all harmful growth." (The Gulag Archipelago, Plaza y Janés edition, Barcelona,
1973, p. 33.)
[15] R. Michels, Political Parties, Amorrortua Publishers,
Buenos Aires. See especially the Introduction, written by Seymour Martin
Lipset.
[17] H. Marcuse, The End
of Utopia, Delachhaus and Niestlé, Neuchâtel, 1966, pp. 44, 45.
[18] R. Marcic, Jugend in den politischen
Umbruechen - Youth in Political Upheavals, pp. 58, 59.
[19] J. Bryce, Les Démocraties Modernnes, Vol. II, p. 589,
states that Anglo-Saxon peoples do not understand revolution in terms of the
establishment of democratic regimes, of democracy itself, because democracy is
intended to ensure the validity of the people's will through free elections.
Can we apply this political wisdom—foreign in its experience, but universal in
its content—to the lives of other peoples and to our Argentine community? It is
to be hoped that we can. A great French jurist (J. Barthélemy) said in a work
(The Value of Liberty): "...those peoples who knew how and were able to
remain faithful to liberty have nothing to envy in those who abandoned the path
of it," when it comes to justifications of any kind.
[20] See: R. Marcic, op. cit., pp. 60, 61; and A.
Verdross-Drossberg, Grundlinien dell'Antiken Rechts und Staatsphilosophie,
Vienna, 1946, p. 17.
[21] Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 1973, pp.
114 and 126.
[22] All figures for 1971 and foreign trade for
1972 are published in dinars in the Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 1973.
The exchange rate given for the dollar, according to which the amounts in
dinars in the "balance of trade" are calculated, is based on this
Yearbook and the 1972 edition. For this purpose, the following dollar exchange
rate was used: 15.00 for 1971 and 17.00 for 1972. According to this exchange
rate, we have calculated the amounts in dollars in the present work.
[24] Poljicki
Zbornik, vol. I, edited by F. Brnicevic and D.
Ivanisevic, Jure Kastelan, Zagreb, 1968, pp. 32–103.
[25] B. D. Grekov, Polica- opit izucenia
obstestennih otnosenii v- Police XV–XVIl vv., Moscow, 1951, pp. 211–307; the
same author, Die Altkroatische Republik Poljica, edited by E. Donnert, Berlin,
1961, pp. 183–279; Tomo Matic Statut der Poljica, in Wiss. Mitt.
aus Bosnien und der Herzegovinia (Vienna), December
1912, pp. 329–96.
[26] F. Brnicevic, "Gradja za bibliografiju
Poljica", Poljicki Zbornik. I, pp. 267-286.
[27] Mesic, Poljicki Statut, Arhiv za povjestnicu
jugslavensku (Zagreb), volume V, 1859, 225-318.
[28] F.
Leontovic, "0 znacenii vervi po Russkoi pravde i poklickom statutu." Zurnal Min.
Nar. Prosv., 1867; cf. Ivan Bozic, "Vrv u
Poljickom statutu." Zbornik Filozofskog Fakulteta u
Beogradu, vol. IV-1, 1956. 89-112.
[29] F. Leontovic, Drevnee horvato-dalmatskoe
zakonodatel'stvo. Odessa. 1868.
[30] Idem, op. cit. 75-76; cf. M. P. Alekseev,
"Slavianskie istocniki Utopii Tomasa Mora", Iz istorii angliskoi
literaturi, Moscow-Leningrad, 1960, 112-114.
[31] Grekov, Polica, p. 126.
[32] Idem, 181.
[33] Idem, 87.
[34] M. Barada, Hrvatski vlasteoski feudalizam,
Zagreb 1952, p. 10; M. Kostrencic, "Vinodolski zakon", Historijski
Zbornik, II - 1949, 151.
[35] J.
Marusic, "O agrarno-pravnim pitanjima i drustvenom uredjenju
Poljica", Poljicki Zborník, 1, 181-182.
[36] Z. Junkovic, "Biljeske uz tekst i
prijevod Poljickog statuta". Poljicki Zbornik, I, 106.
[37] M. P.
Aleksev, Iz istorii angliskoi literaturi, págs. 40-134.
[38] Idem, o.
c., 113.
[39] "Plane
delectat me; videtur enim honestissimus et rerum
humanarum peritissimus ac iam divinarum cognitioni deditissimus" (P. S.
Allen. Opus
epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami, vol. II, Londres, 1910, 339); cfr. R. W. Chambers, Thomas More, Londres, 1935,
pág. 171.
[40] Sebastian
Giustiniani, Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII. R. Brown, Londres, 1854,
II, 162.
[41] M. P.
Alekseev, Iz istorii angliskoi literaturi, págs. 115-116.
[42] Cfr. J.
Sidak, Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, tomo IV, Zagreb 1960. 402-403;
[43] R. Brown, "The Giustinian Family",
Prólogo al Seb. Giustinian,
Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII, I. 25-26.
[44] M. Sunjic, Dalmacija
u XV Stoljecu, Sarajevo, 1967, págs. 67-68.
[45] R. Brown, Prologue to Giustiniani Four Years,
I, 24.
[46] “Sebastian Giustiniani… was known to More by
the time that the manuscript of Utopia was dispatched to Erasmus” (St. Thomas
More, Complete Works, vol. IV: Utopia, edited by E. Surtz and J. Hexter, New
Haven, 1965. Introduction, CLXXII). F. M. Nichols, explaining More’s letter of September 3, 1516, says that Giustiniani
had recently met him (The Epistles of Erasmus, vol. II, London, 1904, 391). The
manuscript of Utopia was sent to Erasmus along with that letter.
[47] Cf. Ligeia Galagher, More’s Utopia and its
Critics. Chicago, 1964.
[48] St. Thomas More, Utopia, in
charge of E. Surtz, New Haven. 1964, pp. 52-53; Complete Works, IV, 103-105.
[49] Idem, Utopia, p. 53; Complete Works, IV,
104-105
[50] Idem, Utopia, p. 54; Complete Works, IV,
113-115.
[51] Idem, Utopia, pp. 61-62; Complete Works, IV,
113-115.
[52] S.
Kastelan, Povjesni ulomci iz bivse slobodne opcine-republike Poljica, Split, p.
47; F. Culinovic, Drzavnopravna historijajugoslavenskih zemalja, Zagreb, 1961,
p. 182.
[53] F. Culinovic, o. cit., 182.
[54] J.
Marusic, "O agrarno-pravnim pitanjima i drustvenom uredjenju
Poljica." Poljicki Zbornik, I, 183.
[55] F. Culinovic. Drzavnopravna
historija jugslavenskih zemalja, p. 192.
[56] Idem, 181.
[57] M. Kostrencic, "Poljica" Enciklopedija Jugoslavije,
volume VI, Zagreb, 1965, p. 534.
[58] In later documents "Vlasi" is no
longer mentioned (cf. Culinovic, o. cit., 184).
[59] M. Kostrencic, "Poljica", Enciklopedija Jugoslavije,
volume IV, 533.
[60] J. Marusic, "O agrarno-pravnim pitanjima i druztvenom
uredjenju Poljica", Politicki Zbornik, I, 183-184.
[61] Idem, 186.
[62] Idem, Op. cit., p. 193.
[63] "Rien de plus soigné que leur culture, rien de plus joli que
leur villages" (A. F. Marmont, Mémoires, volume III, Paris. 1857, 49).
[64] F. Ivanisevic, Poljica, Zbornik za narodni zivot i obicaje juznih
Slavena, tome IX-2, Zagreb. 1904, 224-226; B. Zelic-Bucan, "Obiteljska
prezimena u Poljicima 1725. godine" Poljicki
Zbornik, I, 231-236.
[65] F. Ivanisevic, Poljica, Zbornik za narodni zivot..., IX-2, 285-288.
[66] Idem, IX-2, 263-278.
[67] I. Rubic, "Poljica- geografska
studija", Poljicki Zbornik, I, 25-26.
[68] Ekonomska Politika (Belgrade) May 22, 1972.
[69] United States of America, ex rel. Branko
Karadzole. Consul General of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,
complainant vs. Andrija Artukovic, defense attorney, Docket No. 9 - Case No.
283, (Los Angeles, United States District Court, Southern District of
California, Central Division) January 15, 1959. (hereafter
Karazdole v. Artukovic), "Memorandum of Opinion," Paragraph 4.
[70] Jugoslavija u drugom svetskom ratu, (Belgrade:
Interpress, 1967), p. 65. ("Yugoslavia During
World War II," an official history authorized by the Federal People's
Republic).
[71] Rev. Krunoslav Draganovic, "Croatian
Countries in Light of Statistics," in The Croatian Nation, A. F. Bonifacic
& C. S. Mihanovich, eds., (Chicago: Cultural Publishing Center, 1955), p.
369.
[72] The full text of all Croatian laws appears in
the official publication of the Croatian government, Narodne Novine, 1941–1945,
series held in the UCLA and UCB libraries (fJ337 A149 Doc.).
[73] Vladko Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom
(Univ. Park, Pa.: Pa. State Univ. Press: 1957), p. 233.
[74] Registry of the Tribunal, Trial of the Major
War Criminals (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal: 1947), Vol. I, p.
67.
[75] Ibid., p. 27.
[76] Jugoslavija u drugom svetskom ratu, op. cit.,
p. 212.
[77] Karadzole vs. Artukovic, op. cit.,
"Affirmative Defense" para 7.
[78] Secretariat of the Court, op. cit., Vol. 433.
[79] Ibid., p. 434.
[80] Cary McWilliams, Prejudice, (Boston: Little,
Brown: 1944), pig. 108.
[81] Ibid., p. 154.
[82] Ibid., p. 129.
[83] L. Bloom & R. Reimer, Removal and Return,
(Berkeley: UC Press: 1949), p. 38
[84] Cary McWilliams, op. cit., p. 118.
[85] Karadzole vs. Artukovic, op. cit., paragraph
21.
[86] Ibid., "Probable cause...", paragraphs 15 through 21.
[87] The photograph and extensive information
regarding the American prisoners of war were provided by the Croatian-Latin
American Institute of Culture, Carlos Pellegrini 743, 3rd floor, office 1, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
[88] An event first reported to me by Dr. Milan Blazekovic on August 20,
1973, and confirmed by former prisoner of war R. H. Jahries of San Diego,
California, on January 9, 1974.
[89] G. J. Prpic, Ph.D., Croatian Immigrants in America (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1971), p. 451.
[90] Ivan Babic, "Military History" in Croatia, Country,
People, Culture, F. H. Eterovich & C. Spalatin, ed. (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1964), Vol. I, p. 157.
[91] T. Benkovic, O.F.M., The Tragedy of a
Nation, p. 31. (Father Benkovic currently lives in Chicago.)
[92] Clerk of the Court, op. cit., Vol. XX, p. 400.
[93] Karadzole v. Artukovic, op. cit., paragraph 21.
[94] Ibid., "Motions," paragraph 10.
[95] Ibid., "The Facts," paragraph (Article) IV.
[96] Ibid., "The Facts," paragraph (Article) III. (Emphasis
added.)
[97] Ibid., "Probable Cause..." paragraph 30.