STUDIA CROATICA

Year V, Buenos Aires, 1964, No. 14-15

CONTENTS

• Ivo Lendic - Ivo Bogdan: Relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See

• Angel Belić: Dr. Vladko Macek

• Bogdan Radica: John F. Kennedy

• Willelmus Meinzl: O tempora..., o mores

• Marko Japundzic: The Croatian Glagolitza

• Stjepan Ratkovic: The Beijing-Moscow Dispute: Is it purely ideological?

• Pedro Vukota: Albania in the Communist Controversies

• Jure Petricevic: Croatia and the Total Crisis of Yugoslavia

• Anton Knezevic: Messianism and the Russian-Soviet Mission in the World

• Gojko Boric: The Bridled Pegasus

Documents

• A Note from the Yugoslav Communist Government to the Catholic Episcopate Regarding Exiled Priests

Book Reviews

• Ministry for Expelled, Refugees, and War Victims: The Refugee State of Germans in Yugoslavia

• Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945

• J. B. Hoptner: Yugoslavia in Crisis - 1934–1941

• Dr. Milan Stojadinovic: Neither War nor Pact

• Ludvig Vrtacic: Introduction to Yugoslavian Marxism-Leninism

• Croatian Academy of America: Journal of Croatian Studies, vol. II

Ivo Lendic - Ivo Bogdan: Relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See

"The Body of Christ is still being crucified morally and oppressively in many parts of the world. The Church of silence is also the suffering Church, the patient Church, and, in some places, the gagged Church... This situation is unjust and shameful, both for those who suffer and for those who cause it, even when framed in terms of legal hypocrisy."

Pope Paul VI

(Way of the Cross, Good Friday, 1964, at the Roman Colosseum)

NEWS ABOUT THE IMMINENT CONCLUSION OF A "MODUS VIVENDI"

Using necessity as a virtue, both the Soviet Union and the communist governments of Central and Eastern European countries are striving to convince the opinion of the free world, and to some extent their own subjects, that they have softened their combative stance toward religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular. In other words, they are pursuing effects in their foreign policy, and at the local level they are trying to achieve through a compromise with the Church what they failed to achieve through brutal persecution: the weakening of the faithful's opposition to the communist regimes.

The communist authorities in Yugoslavia are now acting in the same way, where religious persecution was primarily directed against Croatian and Slovenian Catholics. For several years, Belgrade has been announcing a change in its official policy regarding the Catholic Church, which until then had been fiercely persecuted. Furthermore, news is circulating through unofficial channels about the imminent conclusion of a modus vivendi between Yugoslavia and the Vatican and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.[1] Similar reports also appeared during this year, even confirmed last March by the Catholic news agency Kipa.

It seems that this time there is a more solid foundation, since—according to a contributor to the Parisian newspaper La Croix—Belgrade warned that it will not be able to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican unless the conditions for the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia improve beforehand.[2] The same commentary states that the Yugoslav government reacted favorably for the first time to one of the memoranda from the Catholic episcopate.

This refers to the memorial, dated October 9, 1960, in which the bishops stated, as in several previous documents, their willingness to accept the existing legal order on the condition that the laws concerning the freedom of the faithful and of the Church are respected and faithfully applied. In this document, they cited a whole series of violations of existing regulations and fundamental human freedoms by the communist regime.[3]

The aforementioned contributor to La Croix harbors no illusions regarding the situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. "It is a fact," he states in another article, "that everything we in the West understand as Catholic Action is impossible, that atheism permeates all compulsory school and educational activities for all young people, and that it is difficult for a believer to declare themselves as such as soon as they occupy a position in the country's political and social organization" [4].

However, based on concrete facts, one could deduce that the heroic resistance of the Catholics was not in vain, since the Yugoslav communist government became convinced, in view of the failure of its persecutory measures against the faithful, that it was necessary to reach a kind of peaceful coexistence with the Catholic Church. Indeed, the communists try to present their defeat as a merit, as a kind of liberalization.

However, today in Yugoslavia physical attacks, arrests, imprisonments and mistreatment of bishops have ceased (before, the Bishop of Mostar had his legs broken, the Ordinary of Ljubljana was doused with naphtha and set on fire), and virulent campaigns against the Holy See have ceased[5].

Vacant sees are being filled without major difficulties. After many years, bishops were able to travel to Rome ad limina. All bishops obtained permission to participate in the Second Vatican Council, which contrasts with the prohibition against the late Cardinal Louis Stepinac taking part in the conclave after the death of Pius XII. Although with great obstacles, several seminaries are functioning.[6] Moreover, two seminaries that years ago were closed with "legal hypocrisy"—that is, by fabricating trials and issuing severe sentences against their directors—were able to reopen without the restitution of their property and buildings.

Priestly vocations exceed those of the pre-war period, although attempts are being made with treachery to dissuade seminarians from their decision, especially during the military service they must complete before ordination. Those aspiring to the priesthood or religious orders must participate in "voluntary" youth work under conditions of promiscuity.[7]

Although the conditions for an ecclesiastical apostolate are not present, nor is there likely the goodwill on the part of the authorities to guarantee the Church even the bare minimum of freedom, L'Osservatore Romano noted in an article that bishops and clergy could undertake various initiatives in relation to the Second Vatican Council [8].

Thus, in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, the interdiocesan liturgical-pastoral congress was held from February 17 to 20, attended by several bishops and hundreds of clergy members from all over the country. The Croatian metropolitan, Archbishop Franjo Seper, president of the Episcopal Conferences of Yugoslavia, launched the bi-weekly Glas Koncila (The Voice of the Council), which quickly reached a circulation of 50,000 copies. The aforementioned correspondent emphasizes that this newspaper found a favorable reception, due to its ecumenical spirit, even among the Orthodox.

The press of the free world reported with interest the news that the Yugoslav ambassador to Italy, Ivo Vejvoda, had been decorated by the Vatican. Mr. Vejvoda had personally met Pope John XXIII when he received the Bazan Prize for his contributions to world peace. Vejvoda was also present as a representative of the Belgrade government at the funeral of John XXIII and at the coronation of Pope Paul VI.

In connection with these events, news circulated from Belgrade that Ambassador Vejvoda, on orders from his government, was negotiating a modus vivendi with the Holy See and that the negotiations were taking place in a friendly atmosphere.[9] The same sources reported that diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Yugoslavia, severed by Belgrade in 1952, might soon be normalized, but the Vatican declined to comment on these rumors.[10]

However, the Catholic press maintains "that it can already be said that new relations have been established, allowing us to expect further progress, even though for the moment these relations have not taken on a diplomatic and legal form" [11].

Experiences, both with monarchical Yugoslavia between the two world wars in the area of relations between Belgrade and the Vatican, and with the communist regime, which, without justification and of its own initiative, severed all ties with the Holy See following the elevation of Archbishop Stepinac to the cardinalate, do not, despite everything, justify the optimism that an agreement between the Yugoslav communist government and the Holy See, aimed at ensuring the freedom of the Catholic Church, would be stipulated "in the near future."

However, considering the agreement between the Holy See and the Hungarian communist government of September 15 of this year—the first document of its kind—and the Vatican's practice of not placing insurmountable obstacles in the way of diplomatic relations with an internationally recognized government, the possibility of similar arrangements with communist Yugoslavia should not be ruled out. Furthermore, bearing in mind the well-known position of John XXIII, followed by Paul VI, that the Church must accept dialogue even with communist governments as long as there is the slightest hope of upholding the fundamental rights of man and of the believer, Belgrade's insistence on reaching some kind of understanding with the Vatican should not be rejected outright. Paul VI, in his first encyclical Ecclesiam Suam, maintained the need for dialogue, although he condemned "systems frequently identified with economic, social, and political regimes, and among them, especially atheistic communism"...

"The hypothesis of dialogue becomes extremely difficult under such conditions, if not impossible, even though we do not yet harbor any preconceived exclusion of those who profess such systems and adhere to these regimes. For those who love the truth, discussion is always possible."

Of course, religious persecution in communist countries was always accompanied by false accusations and serious breaches of the truth. Furthermore, attempts were made to cover up acts of violence that amounted to a complete denial of justice and legality, even those perpetrated by the communist regime. Deplorable trials against bishops, priests, and the faithful were orchestrated in such a way that the charges and sentences always contained, to a greater or lesser degree, "legal hypocrisy."

Therefore, Paul VI, while emphasizing that the Church, in principle, desires dialogue, also stresses: "But obstacles of a moral nature greatly increase the difficulties due to the lack of sufficient freedom of judgment and action and the dialectical abuse of language, not precisely directed toward the search for and expression of objective truth, but rather placed at the service of preconceived utilitarian ends.

This is why dialogue remains silent. The Church of silence, for example, remains silent, speaking only through its suffering of an oppressed and debased society, where the rights of the spirit are trampled upon by those who determine its fate. And even if our discourse were to begin in such a state of affairs, how could it offer dialogue while being reduced to a voice crying in the wilderness? Silence, the cry (of the victims of persecution), patience, and always love are, in such a case, the testimony that the Church can still give today and that not even death can stifle."

The Catholic Church, taking into account the evolution of the world, declared itself in favor of dialogue and, for its part, seeks to create a favorable climate, maintaining that the Church is not and cannot be an exponent of certain economic and political interests—that is, the opposite of what communists insist on attributing to the Church, accusing it, and especially the Holy See, of being an instrument and even an instigator of supposed "capitalist and imperialist aggression."

It is obvious that the Holy See will do everything possible to fulfill its apostolic mission in communist countries. Furthermore, when it comes to political relations, that is, ties at the international level, this does not mean that the situation of the Catholic Church is satisfactory in the respective country.

After the last world war, the Vatican immediately established diplomatic relations with several communist governments, and also with Yugoslavia. In each case, the initiative came from the governments concerned. The Vatican Secretariat of State, wishing to avoid reproach and interference in the internal affairs of other states, is not averse to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with internationally recognized governments if they insistently request it.

Likewise, it does not take the initiative to break off established relations, even under penalty of "enormous humiliation and suffering." The Church does not wish to abandon the field of the apostolate while there are important religious and human reasons that must be protected and safeguarded.[12]

COINCIDENT DIVISIONS IN RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL-NATIONAL AREAS

In the specific case of Church-State relations in Yugoslavia, the subject of this work, the past open persecution, and the current veiled persecution, of the Church, perhaps more than in any other country, was characterized by legal hypocrisy and a lack of goodwill in establishing and respecting objective truth.

Bishops, priests, the faithful, and the Holy See itself were targets of these treacherous accusations, which sometimes created unpleasant confusion in the free world. Even now, certain progressive circles suffer the impact of a whole series of misunderstandings and confusions, deliberately created and maintained by the Yugoslav communist regime.

This premeditated distortion and misrepresentation of the truth culminated in the "most sorrowful trial" (in the words of Pius XII) against Archbishop Stepinac and resonated to some extent due to a lack of understanding of the complex religious, cultural, and national issues in a multinational state like Yugoslavia, a country heterogeneous in its national, religious, and cultural dimensions.

Plinio Correa de Oliveira, in his aforementioned and much-debated study on the Freedom of the Church in the communist state, rightly points out that the problem arises differently in three typical cases: the Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia, and he presents—perhaps for the sake of brevity—only part of the truth. "In Russia," he says, "as is well known, the religion with the largest number of adherents is the schismatic Greek Orthodox faith. In Poland, it is the Catholic religion (most of whom belong to the Latin rite). And in Yugoslavia, both are numerous" [13].

However, Yugoslavia is not only heterogeneous in religious terms (in addition to Catholics and Orthodox Christians, there is a Muslim population of about 10%), but also nationally and culturally.

The religious divide in the turbulent Balkans, where the distinction between nationality and religion is sometimes impossible, is of paramount importance. It implies significant cultural and political differences. Indeed, in our case, the crucial confessional division coincides with the geographical, cultural, and national divisions, further exacerbating political relations.

This is all the more true given that in Yugoslavia—a typical example of a multinational state, whether monarchical or communist—Serbia, comprising barely a quarter of the territory and population, holds sway. Since Serbia is exclusively Orthodox, its national tradition can be defined as a Church-Nation, and as such, it is ill-suited to play a leading role in a state divided between national and religious considerations. Therefore, in both Yugoslavias, before and after the last world war, national and religious discrimination was practiced to the detriment of Catholics, that is, Croats and Slovenes.

Foreign observers, with little familiarity with the cultural and political reality of Yugoslavia, created after the First World War following the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, cannot fully understand or appreciate the meaning of the discrimination against the Catholic Church, nor the deeper reasons for certain coincidences between national and religious conflicts.

To better understand the topic at hand, we will briefly digress, outlining the complex problems of a country that, due to its internal contradictions, collapsed like a house of cards in April 1941 and was restored in 1945 in the interest of the communist invaders, who sought to expand the Soviet empire of European satellites to the Adriatic and the borders of Italy.

Without delving too far back in history, we need only emphasize that in 1929 a royal dictatorship was established, supported by Serbian militarism, under the pretext of safeguarding state unity. Until then, Yugoslavia was called the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," its name signifying that it was a complex state in both national and political terms.

The dictatorship of King Alexander decreed the dogma of unity, not only as a state but also as a nation. According to this theory, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were not peoples in the ethnic and political sense, but merely "tribes" of a single people, unified over centuries under Serbian rule, much like Italy under Piedmont and Germany under Prussian influence.

By decree, the state's name was changed to Yugoslavia, meaning the country of the peoples of Southern Europe belonging to the Slavic linguistic group. A Yugoslav nationality in the ethnic sense does not exist, for the simple reason that there is no single Yugoslav national culture, but rather Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian national cultures. Therefore, comparisons with Italy and Germany, nationally homogeneous countries, are not valid.

The communist regime maintained the decreed name Yugoslavia, but formally recognized five nationalities—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia—and numerous minorities, primarily Albanian and Hungarian. (The ethnic German minority of 500,000 members, mostly Catholic, was completely liquidated, perishing in massacres and concentration camps, or being expelled and deported) [14].

The communists claim to have solved the national problem in a federal form by dividing the country according to national criteria into six "people's" republics, called "socialist" republics since 1963. However, it is evident that they did not solve it, given that federalism in a communist state, where the Central Committee of the party governs, structured in a centralist manner and controlled almost exclusively by Serbs and Montenegrins, is a dead letter [15].

Moreover; It can be said that the communists in the last war organized the guerrilla warfare, which took on the character of a national war between Serbia and Croatia,[16] perpetrating massacres of Croats and Slovenes at the end of the last war. With the supposed aim of pacification and the subsequent economic exploitation of Croatia and Slovenia, the communists irreparably exacerbated the national conflicts. If some foreign commentators do not see this weakness in Yugoslavia, within a totalitarian regime, it does not mean that it does not exist.[17]

The national division of Yugoslavia coincided with its geographical and religious divisions. The western part, bordering Austria and Italy, comprised Croatia and Slovenia, predominantly Catholic countries. In the Middle Ages, Croatia was established as an independent kingdom, and in 1102, with the extinction of the national dynasty, it entered into a union with Hungary.

From the mid-14th century until 1918, it became an integral part of the Habsburg Empire, though always as an autonomous kingdom. The religious culture of the Western Church, as in all Western peoples, constitutes the fundamental element of Croatian and Slovenian culture. On the other hand, the Serbs are exclusively Orthodox, and the institution of the national church, which, following Byzantine and Russian tradition, was placed at the service of the state and later of national ideology, is highly characteristic of the development of their medieval and modern state.

The original sin of Yugoslavia, created in 1918 and restored in 1945, is that Croatia, which enjoyed sovereign attributes under the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, was unable to exercise its right to self-determination. In the imposed union with Serbia, Croatia was degraded to the status of an annexed province, while Serbia exercised hegemony to such an extent that Yugoslavia, in effect, was an enlarged Serbia, instead of becoming a free and egalitarian community of various peoples belonging to the same linguistic group.

It is obvious that in such a conglomerate, created against the will of its constituent peoples, democratic freedoms cannot prevail and that the dominant group seeks to impose its cultural and political forms and conceptions. This means that Serbia attempts to impose autocracy, rooted in its cultural and political tradition, on Croatia and Slovenia, countries with a Western cultural and political tradition. These contrasts are also reflected in their respective alphabets: the Latin alphabet used by Croats and Slovenes, and the Cyrillic alphabet used by Serbs, as well as Russians.

Since cultural differences give rise to political and national differences, it is understandable that in Serbia, from the very beginning of the union with the Croats, strong anti-Catholic tendencies took hold. The universal Catholic Church was labeled as alien and hostile to the Slavic world. The ideologues of Pan-Slavism and Yugoslavism, inspired by the Russo-Byzantine tradition, attributed all their failures in promoting Yugoslav national and political unity to the Catholic Church, the supposed agent of enemy politics.

Furthermore, in communist Yugoslavia, the Catholic Church was accused of being a supposed exponent of Western capitalist imperialism. The supposed Yugoslav scientists seem indifferent to the historical fact that the Church did not divide the peoples of Western and Eastern Europe into two distinct, often antagonistic, communities. On the contrary, it was the cultural and political differences between Byzantium and Rome that motivated the schism in the hitherto united Christian Church.

Likewise, it is easy to see that the Serbian-Croatian national conflict is not attributable to the Church. Rather, the Catholic Church, in its ecumenical endeavors, encountered significant obstacles precisely because of these national conflicts and contrasts. Had the conditions been conducive to the cultural and political integration of Croatia and Serbia, religious division alone would not have been enough to prevent the formation of a shared national culture.

In Europe, there are several examples of the development of robust national cultures despite religious divisions (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Hungary). The opposite is also true. Croats and Slovenes are Catholic, and the Slovene language is very similar to the dialect spoken in Croatia's capital and surrounding regions; there is a cultural affinity between Croats and Slovenes, even to the point of racial similarity. Nevertheless, Croats and Slovenes are two distinct national entities.

The geographical location of Serbia and Croatia, two neighboring countries belonging to the same Slavic linguistic group, was decisive in the formation of their distinct national cultures. The dividing line between the two countries was once the border between the Western and Eastern Roman Empires, between the Greek and Latin spheres of influence, and, after the migrations of peoples, between the empires of Charlemagne and Byzantium, and later between the Western and Eastern Churches. This border has determined the historical, cultural, and religious process of Croatia's integration into the West and Serbia's integration into Eastern European culture.

Consequently, the divergences and tensions between Croatia and Serbia, which until 1918 were never under a common government, are much deeper than the differences and contrasts between two peoples within the same cultural sphere, such as Croatia and Slovenia, or Italy and France. All these tensions and incompatibilities existing between the worlds of Western and Eastern European culture, the origin of the ecclesiastical schism, appear and act violently as opposing forces in Croatia and Serbia.

This is all the more true given that this is a zone of encounters and clashes of civilizations to such an extent that both peoples maintain a highly developed sense of their shared border mission in defense of their respective cultures. This explains the spontaneous adherence of the Croats to the joint historical endeavors of their Western-cultural neighbors, especially in the defense against various invasions by the Mongols, Ottomans, and Soviets, and, on the other hand, Serbia's defection from the Western Church (the first Serbian king, Stephen, received the scepterfrom Pope Honorius III), the accommodation of Eastern Christians to the Ottoman Empire, and later, Serbia's role as a Russian representative in the Balkans.

Communist Yugoslavia was created in 1945 in response to the Soviet expansionist plan in Central and Eastern Europe. The main executors of this plan in the Balkans were the Serbian communists, with substantial support from the Serbian masses. Their mission, in accordance with Moscow's intentions, was to establish the communist regime not only in Serbia, but also in Croatia and Slovenia, and even beyond the borders of Yugoslavia, in Albania. The Red Army conquered Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, at the end of 1944 and installed the Yugoslav communist government there.

However, according to the agreement with the Western Allies, they were not permitted to occupy the Adriatic-Mediterranean region of Croatia, Slovenia, and Albania. The expansion of the empire of Stalin's European satellites into the heart of the West, in the central Mediterranean, was largely accomplished by Serbian forces under communist command. It is neither the fault nor the merit of the Serbian communists that the first crack in the monolithic communist bloc appeared precisely in that region in 1948. Tito was only able to oppose Stalin because the Western Allies had not previously approved the Soviet occupation of typically Western regions such as Croatia and Slovenia.

The fact that Croatia opposed the communist invasion until the very end of the last war, rejecting all compromise, was tendentiously interpreted as a supposed adherence to the ideology and policies of the Rome-Berlin Axis. The just Croatian struggle for the realization of national self-determination was identified with the totalitarian nationalist movements that emerged between the two world wars. The truth is that the Croatian people during that period had voted in a plebiscite for the democratic, even pacifist, national movement led first by Esteban Radic and then by Vladko Macek. It proved disastrous for both Croats and Serbs that the forced Serbian-Croatian unity could not be dissolved peacefully, due to the Serbian ruling circles who saw Serbia as an aggrandized entity within Yugoslavia.

Legal hypocrisy culminated when the communists inserted into the 1946 Yugoslav constitution the principle that all peoples of Yugoslavia have the right to self-determination, including the right to secede. However, the communists, following the example of the actual dictatorship, maintain the theory that the Croats exercised this right once and for all during the last war when they supposedly declared themselves in favor of communist Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the Croats offered fierce resistance to the communist invasion, knowing that they were defending their political and national rights and freedoms.

Western democracies, which, in the power politics of the last two world wars, disregarded the Croatian people's right to self-determination, can now, without resorting to force, help Croatia, left to its cruel fate, aggravated by the insistence on justifying its past conduct, even though the constitution of Yugoslavia was a "bold experiment in political chemistry" due to the forced fusion of different peoples, "nurtured until now by two distinct civilizations" [18]. Due to inertia, this trend has gone so far that communist interpretations of the Croatian struggle for national freedom are accepted without prior examination.

Thus, because a small group, finding no other response to the violence, terror, and trampling of national rights by monarchical and then communist Yugoslavia, also resorted to force and violent methods, every step taken in support of the Croatian national cause is labeled nationalist extremism and anti-democratic action. Almost every European country has had extremist groups of the right and left, yet no one would declare any national claim of the respective country illegitimate. In the case of Croatia, the opposite is true, even though it was the only country in southeastern Europe where, between the two world wars, massive national resistance, as we have said, manifested itself through a party with a distinctly democratic and even pacifist orientation.

Even the Catholic press found itself in an embarrassing situation when the communists, during the infamous trial of Archbishop Stepinac, labeled all manifestations of Croatian patriotism, and especially their struggle for national independence, as collaboration with Nazi-fascism. The truth only emerged in the second phase of that trial, primarily thanks to L'Osservatore Romano, which for months, day after day, published and commented on news related to the proceedings on its front page.

It is worth emphasizing here that the communists in the interwar period held diametrically opposed views regarding the national question of Yugoslavia. While monarchical Yugoslavia acted within the French security system as a cornerstone of the Cordon Sanitaire against Soviet expansion, the Comintern, at Stalin's own initiative, advocated the liquidation of Yugoslavia in accordance with national principles and the right to self-determination.

Among other things, the independent state of Croatia should be established. Later, with the rise to power of the National Socialist regime in Germany, Moscow sought the friendship of France, joined the League of Nations, and advocated for the system of collective security. At that point, the communists began to modify their attitude toward Yugoslavia as a multinational state and a "prison of peoples." They effected this shift despite the continued existence of the royal dictatorship, which was fiercely attacked by the communists domestically.

This position was partly modified to the detriment of the Yugoslav monarchy following the unexpected Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on the eve of the Second World War. As is well known, Hitler invaded the Balkans in the spring of 1941, that is, while this pact was in effect. Although the blitzkrieg in the Balkans was the prelude to the campaign against Russia, which began a few months later, the Croatian and Macedonian communists witnessed with a certain satisfaction the disintegration of Yugoslavia along national lines. The constitution of the Independent State of Croatia and the incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgaria, even for the communists of Croatia and Macedonia, was a just solution to the national problem[19].

Pero cuando pocos meses después el Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Yugoslavia, encabezado por Tito (que Stalin mismo designó para ese cargo), empezó a organizar la guerrilla contra las tropas del Eje, de acuerdo a la técnica stalinista de explotar el descontento y los conflictos nacionales, los comunistas, con el propósito de asegurarse el apoyo masivo de los serbios, se habían declarado partidarios de la restauración de Yugoslavia, que los comunistas antes denominaron "cárcel de pueblos". Por supuesto que tal Yugoslavia debería ser comunista y en su organización copia fiel del modelo soviético, que es también un Estado plurinacional, con el predominio de un pueblo sobre los demás. Se sobreentiende que la "cárcel de los pueblos" que hasta entonces fue Yugoslavia, se convirtió por arte de magia dialéctica en el paraíso terrenal y que todos los croatas, los eslovenos y los macedonios, al seguir luchando por la libertad nacional y contra la supremacía serbia, serían proclamados enemigos de su propio pueblo, renegados, traidores a la solidaridad eslava, destructores de la "fraternidad y unidad" de los pueblos sureslavos, "resabios de nazifascismo", "bestias salvajes" (término de Milovan Djilas) que deben ser exterminados implacablemente.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CROATIAN PATRIOTISM

Of course, not even the Catholic Church could escape such a denigrating campaign, for the simple reason that three-quarters of the Catholics in Yugoslavia were Croatian and a portion were Slovenian. In the postwar period, when Croatian patriotism was outlawed and the Holy See accused of inspiring and promoting Western capitalism and imperialism, being openly Croatian and Catholic meant being deprived of all rights.

The communist authorities ruthlessly attacked all their real and potential opponents, especially since they monopolized power in violation of the Yalta agreements regarding the right of the peoples of Yugoslavia to decide in elections on the form of government. Therefore, the communists feared a possible intervention by the Western Allies, as Churchill's government had done in Greece.

It is important to emphasize here that the Catholic movement in Croatia between the two world wars had a vigorous press and numerous Catholic Action organizations, but lacked its own political organization. It is true that at the end of the First World War there was an attempt to organize the Christian Democratic Party, but with the establishment of King Alexander's dictatorship in 1929, Croats of all political ideologies acted together under the leadership of Dr. Vladko Macek, successor to Esteban Radic, who had been assassinated in the Belgrade parliament in 1928. During the Second World War, the only political organization permitted in Croatia was the Ustaše, the National Liberation Movement of Dr. Ante Pavelić.

It is well known that the Croatian Catholic bishops, and particularly Archbishop Stepinac, strove to prevent, or at least mitigate, the wartime excesses of the nationalist regime and forbade the clergy from participating in political activities.[20] However, they clearly distinguished between the circumstantial political situation and the just struggle of the Croatian people for their national independence and against the communist invasion.

The Catholic episcopate made significant pronouncements in favor of Croatian independence, statements that are silenced in Yugoslavia, and if they are mentioned, it is to falsify them and label them as high treason.

Below, we will cite only two key documents.

The first is the Pastoral Letter of the Croatian Catholic episcopate on the occasion of Easter 1945, that is, when the communist invasion of Croatia was underway.

In this Pastoral Letter, the Catholic bishops, aware of the danger they would face the next day,[21] protested against the persecution of the faithful in the areas occupied by the communists and against "a sea of falsehoods, lies, and slander, which are being launched against our people from all sides and with well-defined purposes." Referring to the atrocities and cruelties committed by the communists, and censuring the excesses of the Catholics themselves in the struggles between the Serbs and the communists on one side and the Croats on the other, the bishops continued:

"The Croatian priests and faithful learned from the Church to give to God what is God's and to the Croatian people what belongs to them. History bears witness that for more than a millennium the Croatian people never ceased to proclaim, through a plebiscite, that they did not wish to renounce their right to freedom and independence, which they wholeheartedly desire for other peoples.

Thus, when in this second world war the Croatian people were able to realize their desire and their right by establishing the Independent State of Croatia, the Croatian Catholic bishops, naturally, respected the will of the Croatian people. Consequently, no one has the right to accuse a citizen of the State of Croatia or the bishops of having respected this unwavering decision of the Croatian people." founded, moreover, on divine and human laws"[22].}

A year later, Monsignor Stepinac was accused before the communist tribunal for his defense of the Croatian people's right to independence. This accusation, like so many others, was based on the deliberate confusion of each people's right to freedom and the specific wartime circumstances under which the Croatian state was restored. But Stepinac, during the trial, stood firm against the communist identification of the struggle for Croatian independence with any political ideology whatsoever.

"Everything I have said (during the war) about the Croatian people's right to freedom and independence is in complete accordance with the basic principles set forth by the Allies at Yalta and in the Atlantic Charter. If, according to these principles, every nation has the right to independence, then why is it denied to the Croatian nation?

The Holy See has repeatedly emphasized that both small nations and minorities have the right to freedom. Can a Catholic metropolitan archbishop not even mention this principle? If we are to fall, let us fall having fulfilled our duty. If you believe this trial pleases the Croatian people, give them the opportunity to express their opinion. For my part, I will accept the verdict. I have respected and will always respect the will of my people."

When the prosecutor tried to conflate his defense of Croatia's rights with collaboration, Archbishop Stepinac retorted that he was not persona grata to the Germans, nor did he participate in political activities.

"However, the entire Croatian nation had declared itself in favor of the Croatian State through a plebiscite, and I would have been infamous if I had not felt the pulse of the Croatian people, who were slaves in the former Yugoslavia."

Regarding the subject of this study, even in the dock, Monsignor Stepinac was not exempt from the duty to respect established authority, as he was portrayed as the epitome of nationalist intransigence and as an organizer of rebellion.

"You accuse me of being an enemy of the State and of state authorities. Today I recognize your authority, but who held that authority before? I repeat, for me you have only represented authority since May 8, 1945, and not before."

Stepinac enumerates all the acts of the new power by which the Church was deprived of its rights, even though they present them as liberation. "We consider such freedom illusory and we do not want to be slaves without any rights: we will fight with all lawful means for our rights in this State." He then explained the reasons why the Church must oppose violent atheistic materialism, and continued:

“Let no one think that I want war. Let the current authorities enter into talks with the Holy See. The Church does not recognize dictatorships, but it is not opposed to an honorable understanding with whomever. But let the communist leaders understand that if there is to be freedom for the spread of materialism, then we also have the right to respond and propagate our principle.

Many Catholics have died and will die to defend that right. I conclude: If there is goodwill, an understanding can be reached, and the initiative belongs to the current authorities. Neither I nor the other members of the episcopate are the ones who should enter into these fundamental negotiations. This is a matter between the State and the Holy See.”[23]

The Catholic episcopate continues to maintain the same position, namely, that relations between the Church and the Yugoslav State must be settled through an agreement between Belgrade and the Vatican. He expressly reiterates this in his memorandum of September 1960, addressed to the Yugoslav government, when he says that "the Catholic episcopate is not competent to enter into decisive negotiations... and even less to finalize a definitive agreement concerning this problem. By the divine constitution of the Church, this belongs exclusively to the Holy Apostolic See, that is, to the Holy Father as the supreme visible head of the Catholic Church in its entirety" [24].

COMMUNISTS AGAINST THE HOLY SEE AND IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL CHURCH

This insistence on the Holy See's exclusive right to negotiate is explained by the Church's precarious situation in a communist state. The bishops are, in effect, prisoners and cannot negotiate on equal footing with their captors. The Holy See, on the other hand, is in a different situation, although it must bear in mind the fact that the bishops are practically hostages and at the mercy of the totalitarian communist dictatorship.

Furthermore, when the episcopate insists on the need to negotiate with the Holy See, it surely has in mind the grave situation of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church. Abandoned to its fate and without international support, it had to make compromises with the regime that provoked exasperated reactions from its adherents. As a result of this pressure, a major schism arose among the Serbian Orthodox Church's émigré faithful.

The communist rulers, for their part, maintained that relations between Catholic faithful and the authorities should be settled "without the interference of third parties." Belgrade, in this regard, waged a systematic campaign against the Vatican, particularly in early 1953, following the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Holy See. In this campaign, both the press and official documents, such as ministerial reports to the Assembly (parliament), emphasized that relations with the Orthodox Church in communist Yugoslavia were normalized, while Catholics were creating obstacles for political reasons, because the Vatican, and consequently the Catholic episcopate, were serving foreign interests and international reaction. Hence the discrimination against Catholics, just as in monarchical Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt that both the Russian and Serbian Churches suffered greatly under the communist regime. Nor could it be otherwise, as long as communists acted on principle as enemies of all religion. Nevertheless, over time, peculiar forms of coexistence between Orthodoxy and Communism developed in Russia. Especially during the war, ecclesiastical circles vehemently opposed the invasion of the Third Reich, and after the war, they participated in the noisy Soviet campaigns for peace, frequently accusing the Holy See of allegedly serving Western imperialism and capitalism. This curious symbiosis, based on the centuries-old Caesaropapist tradition, found its fullest expression in the liquidation of the Uniates in the part of Ukraine that formerly belonged to Poland, in Transylvania and Ruthenia. Catholics were persecuted not only for ideological reasons but also because they were considered dangerous to national interests in predominantly Orthodox countries. The national Church was favored over Catholic universalism.

The rulers of both monarchical and communist Yugoslavia considered, and continue to consider, the Catholic Church, due to its universal character, as an institution that acts as a factor of disintegration in this multinational and culturally heterogeneous state, and even as an inspiration for Croatian nationalism and separatism. In contrast, Orthodoxy is seen as a factor of state cohesion. Indeed, given Serbia's hegemonic position in both monarchical and communist Yugoslavia, Serbs constitute the ethnic element upon which the politics of Yugoslav union are founded, but in their capacity as an aggrandized Serbia.

As previously stated, even the communists between the two world wars maintained that this hegemony was Yugoslavia's original sin and the main cause of its swift defeat and disintegration, according to national criteria, in April 1941.

While the Macedonians, after the war, were able to count on Bulgarian protection and Moscow's benevolence, even obtaining the Macedonian Orthodox Metropolis, the Croatian Catholics were cruelly persecuted, not only as opponents of communist expansionism, but also of the Yugoslav union, that is, as fighters for Croatian national independence.

Coinciding with the appalling reprisals against the Croats, including massacres,[25] the persecution of the Catholic Church was unleashed, for having allegedly served anti-democratic and anti-Allied actions. In reality, the Church only sympathized with the Croats' struggle for national independence and, in truth, for democracy and the West. It is a proven fact that in a multinational state like Yugoslavia, maintained by force, there can be no national or democratic freedoms.

It is painful that the Orthodox Serbs—who are mostly not communists—supported the communists. As is well known, the first guerrilla movement in Yugoslavia was purely Serbian nationalist, led by General Mihailovic. Because it was directed against the Croats and other opponents of Serbian hegemony, these guerrillas clashed not only with the majority of the population of present-day Yugoslavia but also with the interests of the Western Allies, who demanded they fight against the invaders and not against the non-Serbian population.[26]

It so happened that the Serbian masses, abandoned by the Allies after Mihailovic and the exiled government of King Peter, accepted the communist leadership without much hesitation. Of course, the Serbian peasants accepted it reluctantly, in contrast to the young Serbian intellectuals, who were captivated by communist agitation.

They accepted the communists not only because they were Russia's favorites, Russia being the traditional protector of the Orthodox Slavic peoples in the Balkans, but primarily because they understood that only the communists, with Soviet support, could restore Yugoslavia. It is true that the Western Allies, for understandable reasons, did not declare themselves against the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia either, but it was known that, in accordance with democratic principles, they would not oppose, after the war, the demands of the Croats and other oppressed peoples who invoked the right to self-determination, including the right to secession. Gradually, the Serbian Orthodox Church also accepted this way of thinking. Between the two world wars, it had been closely linked to the Serbian dynasty and openly supported the dictatorship of King Alexander. In this respect, his attitude was in accordance with the Byzantine tradition, which, through Russia, was reinforced and updated. This opinion is also shared by Svetozar Pribicevic, a prominent Serbian politician, when he asserts:

"Tsarism was transferred from the banks of the Neva (Saint Petersburg) to Belgrade, where it found a favorable climate...; tsarism became the form of government in Yugoslavia. Following the example of the Russian tsars and imitating them, King Alexander went so far as to consider himself supreme head of the Serbian Orthodox Church...

Patriarch Varnava fully supports the king's unlimited power and considers anyone who rises up against the royal autocracy a heretic... The Synod of the Orthodox Church, headed by the patriarch, has now become the combative organ of the dictatorial regime. This stems from the fact that the church has become a constituent part of the state administrative apparatus."[27]

It is obvious that the Serbian patriarch and his bishops were supporters of the monarchy during the war. Patriarch Gavrilo, successor to the aforementioned Varnava, remained in exile for some time along with the Serbian monarchist politicians. But in 1946 he returned to Yugoslavia, and his first public appearance was at the Pan-Slavic Congress held in Belgrade, under the auspices of the Soviet Union, which, for reasons of political propaganda, sought to portray the recent war as a conflict between Germans and Slavs. With this public act, the Serbian patriarch acknowledged the patriotic merits of Stalin and Tito.

His main achievement in the eyes of the Serbs is the restoration of Yugoslavia, virtually under Serbian hegemony. This is the starting point of the political coexistence between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the communist regime. Marxism, as a system of government, was imported to Yugoslavia in its Russian version. As such, and like Orthodoxy, it finds itself firmly within the Byzantine-Russian cultural and political tradition. In contrast, the restoration of Yugoslavia under Bolshevik rule meant national catastrophe for adherents of the Western Church and the danger of having foreign cultural and political forms imposed upon them.

In this great national misfortune, when all traditional political and social structures were eliminated, only the Catholic Church, with its deeply rooted traditions and international connections, constituted a visible force of resistance to communism, alongside the profoundly democratic peasantry, who still oppose collectivization and denationalization. State oppression and propaganda were unleashed against the Catholic Church in Croatia, with the primary objective of severing ties with the Holy See.

Milovan Djilas, then Tito's presumed successor, admitted unequivocally in a conversation with Mestrovic about Cardinal Stepinac that the communist regime's first and immediate objective was to separate Catholic Croats from the Holy See.

"We would not have minded," Djilas said of Stepinac, "his Croatian nationalism, and had he proclaimed the Croatian Church, we would have exalted him to heaven" [28].

As we have already mentioned, in Serbia there were political and psychological factors favorable to communism. Serbs felt the re-establishment of Yugoslavia as their national conquest. Therefore, in Orthodox Serbia, the conditions for coexistence between the State and the Church under the communist regime proved more tolerable than in Catholic Croatia, which is not considered "liberated" without having suffered from foreign invasion as well as a cruel dictatorship. In Serbia, moreover, the forms of collaboration experienced with the Russian Orthodox Church, especially during the "patriotic war" against the Third Reich, could be applied. Although the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy is fundamentally conservative, nationalist, and monarchist, there was communist infiltration among the younger clergy even before the war.

Thus, during the dictatorship of King Alexander, an entire class of Orthodox seminarians was expelled from Sarajevo for adhering to communist doctrine. It is no coincidence that the Minister of the Interior in Tito's first government was Vladimir Zecevic, an Orthodox priest. Prominent Orthodox clergymen, affiliated with "priestly associations," advocated for the inclusion of the clergy as soon as the war ended. in the People's Liberation Front (today the Socialist People's League of Yugoslavia), a mass organization controlled by the Communist Party.

Although the Orthodox bishops strongly opposed these priestly unions from the outset, the majority of the Orthodox clergy soon joined them. The communist regime favored them, and some priests had their sentences commuted or reduced from the period of relentless persecution. All members, without exception, received financial benefits (pensions, insurance, etc.).

Those who opposed such cooperation with the communists were harassed. Members of the priestly unions received monthly stipends, but in return, this "people's clergy" was expected to extol the merits of the communist party in the "liberation," contribute to the country's "socialist development," and adopt all measures leading to the so-called "separation of church and state," including the suppression of religious education. In schools, the prohibition of religious schools, religious youth, cultural and educational organizations, etc. On the other hand, they must interpret and explain the cases of persecution of the clergy and the faithful as legitimate repression of the reactionary influences still existing within the Church.

As we noted, the first Catholic clergy associations were founded in Slovenia. Although Slovenia, with a population of around 1,500,000, is a predominantly Catholic country with a strong religious culture, and before the communist invasion had vigorous religious organizations and even a majority political party with Catholic leanings, due to its unique political process, a segment of the population welcomed the communists as "liberators."

This is a consequence of Slovenia's geographical location, bordering Italy and Austria—after the Anschluss, Austria became part of the Third Reich—and was exposed to such severe pressures that many Slovenians saw their salvation in Slavic solidarity, specifically within the Yugoslav state. Indeed, the Slovenians' hopes of being able to defend themselves against their western neighbors with the help of Serbia in the event of an international crisis proved illusory during the last world war.

The army of monarchical Yugoslavia, led exclusively by Serbs, didn't even attempt to defend Slovenia's borders. It capitulated without a fight; Yugoslavia was dismembered, and Italy and the Third Reich divided Slovenia between them, refusing to recognize its political and national identity. Furthermore, the Nazi and Fascist reprisals against the Slovenes were so cruel that many liberal-leaning Slovenes, as well as a group of progressive Catholics, welcomed the communists as "liberators" at the end of the war.

While the Bishop of Ljubljana, along with prominent clergy and most of the ruling class, sought salvation in exile, the progressive Catholic group found a way out through collaboration with the communists who, for tactical reasons, had solemnly promised during the war to respect the will of the majority and not impose the communist regime by force.

For all these reasons, the organized collaboration of small groups of Catholic clergy with the communist regime began first in Slovenia. The movement began with scathing attacks in the group's "Bulletin" against the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the Holy See itself. By decree of April 12, 1949, the Sacred Congregation of the Council condemned and banned the Bulletin. Very soon, another publication,

Nova Pot (The New Way), was founded, which was more cautious. Nevertheless, the bishops, at their conference held on April 26, 1950, had to declare non expedit. A segment of the clergy interpreted this prohibition in their own way, and the organization was able to continue its work despite the episcopate's opposition. When Belgrade broke off diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1952, the aforementioned magazine of the priests' trade unions transcribed the communist argument, according to which relations between the State and the Church could only be normalized without the interference of foreigners, namely the Apostolic Nuncio and the Holy See.

At the end of 1949, the same Yugoslav dictator, Tito, expressed himself in similar terms on the occasion of receiving a group of the "national clergy," telling them verbatim:

"Since we have separated from Moscow, why can't you separate from Rome?" [29].

The communist pressure aimed at separating Croatian Catholics from the Holy See failed to achieve its intended results due to the close ties between national and religious tradition. Such a relationship is undesirable in certain circumstances and from an ecclesiastical perspective; however, in this specific case, this close relationship led the communists to achieve the opposite of what they had sought and expected, based on their experience with the Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia, where, in accordance with Byzantine tradition, the church acts in part as an instrument of secular power.

The result in Catholic Croatia was that national and ecclesiastical opposition complemented each other, which made it easier for communist propagandists to argue that the measures against bishops, clergy, and the faithful were political in nature, not anti-religious; that communism was fighting reaction, the "remnants of fascism," and not the social influence of religion; and that it was pursuing the punishment of collaborators and preventing the intrigues of "Western imperialism," etc. By resorting to legal hypocrisy in the trial of Stepinac, a staunch defender of the Church's rights and a symbol of loyalty to the Holy See, his unjust conviction was politically motivated. In the dense and confusing atmosphere of the postwar period, when many sincere democrats saw the communists as "liberators" of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe from Nazism, this tactic undoubtedly had some impact.

However, in Croatia—as we have said—the persecution of the Church with politically motivated accusations and incriminations only strengthened the Catholic flock's bond with its pastors. No apostasies or movements in favor of a national church were recorded in Croatia. Only several years later would attempts be made to weaken ecclesiastical discipline through "professional associations of priests," founded, promoted, and sponsored by the communist regime.

CLERGY PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

This form of clergy collaboration with the communist regime, outside of and against the ecclesiastical hierarchy, began first in Serbia among the Orthodox clergy, later in Slovenia, and much later in Croatia, where it has yet to gain traction.

In the People's Republic of Croatia, the first clergy trade union was founded only on November 12, 1953. Despite all kinds of pressure, this movement proved very weak. In some dioceses, such associations do not have a single member. The only exception was among the Croatian Catholic clergy in the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and only in areas where Catholics live in the diaspora among the Orthodox and Muslim majority.

While in homogeneous Catholic regions the social climate favors the Church and the people despise the collaborationist priests, the situation in the diaspora is different. Therefore, some priests, otherwise highly respectable, especially the Franciscans, believe it is appropriate to reach a kind of compromise with the communist regime. While this provokes outrage in the other, predominantly Catholic regions of Croatia, it is viewed differently in the diaspora.

Upon closer examination, it is perhaps possible that the vast majority of the faithful, where Catholics are a minority, understand the Franciscans' tactics. There are precedents from the Ottoman era when the Franciscans, for centuries, were the only clergy in Bosnia and, thanks to their conciliatory approach, managed to salvage at least some Catholic positions in a non-Christian state, the Ottoman Empire. Under favorable circumstances, following the Austrian occupation of Bosnia in 1878, Catholicism experienced rapid growth.

Neither the Catholic Episcopate nor the Holy See approved the work of the priests' trade unions. On the contrary, in accordance with instructions received from Rome, the Catholic Bishops, at their conference of September 23-26, 1952, communicated this resolution to the clergy:

"It is not permitted to create professional associations of the clergy or to participate in them."

This prohibition was harshly criticized in the Yugoslav press. The Apostolic Nunciature in Belgrade, which communicated the Vatican's position against priestly professional associations to the bishops, was accused of interfering in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. On November 1 of the same year, the Belgrade government sent a note of protest to the Holy See (No. 414385/52). When the Vatican Secretariat of State attempted to deliver its reply, contrary to diplomatic protocol, the Yugoslav government refused to receive it. The note was subsequently published in full in L'Osservatore Romano on January 14, 1953.

Meanwhile, the smear campaign against the Holy See continued, culminating in the severing of diplomatic relations by the Belgrade government, under the pretext that the elevation of Archbishop Stepinac to the cardinalate was an insult and a challenge to Yugoslavia, given that he had been sentenced by the communist regime to 16 years in prison.

The statement from the Secretariat of State deplores the violent persecution of the Church in Yugoslavia. Regarding priests' associations, it emphasizes that these are founded by the communist authorities, who exert pressure on the one hand and offer privileges on the other, so that they frequently include members who violate ecclesiastical discipline and are liable to canonical penalties. State authorities openly interfere in the activities of these associations, where the work of bishops and the Church itself is publicly and notoriously criticized. Through the "Liberation Front," these societies are, even formally, linked to the Communist Party. This state of affairs is rightly a cause for concern for the bishops and the Holy See, as it contradicts the inescapable duties that bind the clergy to their bishops on the one hand and to the Holy See on the other, by virtue of the prescriptions of the Code of Canon Law.

Currently, while the Belgrade government announces the imminent negotiation of a modus vivendi with the Holy See, the final paragraph of the aforementioned note, which categorically enumerates "the fundamental rights of the Catholic Church, which the Holy See cannot renounce and whose disregard would render any potential talks with the Yugoslav government fruitless," takes on a new relevance.

For its part, the Presidency of the Episcopal Conferences sent a lengthy memorandum to the Yugoslav government on October 1, 1953, citing compelling facts and figures regarding the persecution unleashed against the clergy and bishops by the Yugoslav authorities, who were thereby violating their own laws and even the constitution. Regarding the much-criticized prohibition of priests' professional associations, the memorandum emphasized that it had been unanimously approved in the plenary session of the Catholic Episcopate for reasons of moral order and ecclesiastical discipline, and that the bishops could not revoke it.[30]

In the oft-cited memorial of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of September 1960, which addresses the possibility of normalizing relations between the State and the Church and lists the difficulties hindering this process, point 17 states that one of these difficulties is precisely the professional associations of priests. We quote its full text:

"In particular, all pressure from state or local bodies regarding the so-called 'professional associations of priests' must be stopped. This, with regard to priestly discipline, is the exclusive responsibility of the Church, and with regard to priests, as citizens, it is a matter of their personal and free conviction" [31].

It must be admitted that the "people's priests" movement in Croatia never took the form of ideological collaboration like its counterpart, Pax in Poland. Such priests in Croatia, especially in Bosnia, always emphasize that they wish to adhere to Church doctrine in everything, that they do not interfere in matters of ecclesiastical administration, which are the responsibility of the bishops, and that they concern themselves only with professional matters of a welfare nature. They are interested in good relations between the State and the Church.

A CRUCIAL PROBLEM IN THE CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES

However, the problem of loyalty to the established authorities, not so serious in a nation-state, is extremely delicate in Yugoslavia. Not only are Christian social doctrine and the ideology of the communist regime incompatible, but in Croatia, the painful problem of patriotic loyalty arises. Since Yugoslavia is a state that practices national discrimination, the vast majority of Catholics—that is, Croats and Slovenes—feel that their national rights are being trampled upon. Among other things, Croatia is deprived of the national right to self-determination, a right now universally recognized. Hence the conflict between loyalty to one's nationality and to the State.

The official doctrine of the Communist Party is that Yugoslavia is a multinational state, formed in 1918 by coercive means and without the consent of the people, especially the Croatians. Between the two world wars, the communists considered the Croatians' demand for the establishment of their independent national state justified. They then changed their stance for reasons of political opportunism, that is, when it suited the Soviet expansionist designs of extending the Soviet empire of satellites to the shores of the Adriatic.

To this end, it was necessary to conquer Croatia through Serbia, which was only possible with the restoration of Yugoslavia, which had disintegrated in 1941. Thus, a conflict arose among the Croatian communists between their loyalty to their own people and their loyalty to the Soviet Union, to the working class, represented, in their view, by the Communist Party, when the latter opted, for the reasons mentioned, for the restoration of Yugoslavia, which until then, as is well known, they had described as the "prison of peoples."

Indeed, communist documents reveal that the Party had to combat the discontent of Croatian communists, officially labeled chauvinists, attacked and sidelined, and some liquidated. Andrija Hebrang, the most prominent communist after Tito, was arrested and murdered without trial in a communist prison, and this fact received far less attention abroad than the later case of Milovan Djilas.

The fact that even Croatian communists did not approve of the stripping away of national rights proves that in Croatia, a clash inevitably arose between loyalty to the people on the one hand and to the established authorities on the other.

This issue is of paramount importance when considering the relations between the Catholic Church and communist Yugoslavia, since four out of every five Catholics were Croatian. They longed for Croatia to separate from the Yugoslav state and, as an independent state, to join the community of European nations. Of course, the Church does not deny that Catholics have an obligation to obey the established authorities.

Archbishop Stepinac himself admitted this before the communist tribunal. The Catholic episcopate, in all its pastoral letters to the faithful, in its notes and protests sent to the state authorities, never fails to emphasize that it did not fail in its duty of loyalty to the state authorities. On the other hand, they do not forget that the Croatian people's aspiration to freedom and national independence is in accordance with natural law, and that the Church, in this sense, cannot oppose the evident rights of its faithful, as members of their people. They emphasized Croatia's right to independence shortly before the establishment of the communist government. They did so in an important document, although they knew they were running serious risks, in a pastoral letter to the faithful dated March 24, 1941 [32].

Aloysius Stepinac, accused before the communist tribunal of this and other statements made prior to the re-establishment of communist Yugoslavia, maintained from the dock that "the right of the Croatian people to their freedom and independence is in complete accordance with the basic principles set forth by the Allies at Yalta and in the Atlantic Charter and the pronouncements of the Holy See" [33].

By accusing the bishops and faithful of Croatia of wanting to achieve national freedom, the communists are committing an act of legal hypocrisy, since they themselves officially maintain that in the so-called Yugoslav federation, Croatia achieved not only the "achievements of socialism" but also national freedoms, including the right to secession.

In their falsehood, they further insist on their unacceptable and specific interpretation of the patriotic aspirations of the Croatian people, so that the situation of Catholics is particularly aggravated by the fact that the communists identify their regime with the Nation and with society—in a word, with the homeland—and consequently claim that their peculiar conception of patriotism in general, and of Croatia's rights in particular, is obligatory. For Croatian Catholics, acquiescence to communist demands would mean a break with political tradition and with the struggle for democracy and national independence.

Croatian patriots cannot accept in any way how their national history is officially interpreted in the name of a fictitious "brotherhood and unity" of the peoples of Yugoslavia. The regime, through its constant propaganda and school textbooks, particularly censors all of Croatia's historical and cultural ties with the Western world, of which it has been a part for over a millennium. Any Western influence, even religious, is deemed unpatriotic. Conversely, influences from Eastern Orthodoxy are highly valued.

As a curious interpretation of the social and political process, the attempt—during the Stalin-Tito conflict—to develop a concept of a peculiar Balkan variant of civilization, equally distanced from Western and Byzantine-Russian cultural influences, deserves special mention. This attempt was based on the gratuitous glorification of the Bosnian Bogomils (Patarenes), who had separated from the Catholic Church.

THE MEANING OF COLLABORATION WITH THE CHURCH PROPAGATED BY COMMUNISTS

Therefore, the communist attempts to condition their relations with the Church on such collaboration by the clergy—according to which the Church would become an instrument for imposing ideas and cultural forms foreign to and contrary to Croatian and Western tradition, a kind of spiritual genocide—are completely unacceptable to Croatian Catholics.

For this reason, such attempts, even those made through "professional priestly associations," must fail, and, as we have seen, the people have scornfully rejected "popular priests." They tolerate them in exceptional circumstances, in the diaspora, always with reservations, judging this kind of collaboration as a lesser evil, a condition for surviving while awaiting better times.

This constrained collaboration of the small segment of the clergy with the regime would not merit special attention were it not to serve as an illustration of the methods and true meaning of the "coexistence" between ecclesiastical and state authorities that the communists wished to invigorate through a modus vivendi with the Holy See. For purely documentary purposes, we will summarize below the proceedings of an annual assembly of the "Association of Catholic Priests of Bosnia and Herzegovina," as reported by its mouthpiece, Dobri Pastir.[34]

The assembly was held in the Yugoslav communist "Army Home" in Sarajevo, although suitable church premises were available. The hall was decorated with state flags, a large portrait of Marshal Tito, and a sign that read: "Everything for Religion and Fatherland." The president of the assembly first thanked the Army for its attention and ended with the exclamation, "Long live the Yugoslav People's Army!

Long live its supreme commander, Marshal Tito!" A telegram of obligatory greeting was sent to the Yugoslav dictator, "recognizing and thanking him for his tireless work for peace... for his efforts for the well-being of our State, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. In both endeavors, we will always be his devoted and loyal collaborators."

The Franciscan priest Ostojic, president of the assembly, emphasized that the most important issue was "collaboration with the national authorities."

"In resolving this issue, many priests are bothered by the fact that our authorities are building the country and social order on the principles of socialism. But we must remember that this authority is precisely ours, the legitimate one." The duty of the subjects, particularly the clergy, is "to promote and defend the prestige of our State." This is especially expected of us today, when our country is criticized in the most insolent and hurtful way. We are attacked by exiles, we are attacked by other states because of our "socialist" structure. There is no doubt that our duty, as sincere patriots, is to always behave constructively toward our authorities and to safeguard the prestige of our leaders..."

Representatives of the government and the Socialist League of Working People, which also includes priestly associations, attended this assembly.

In his lengthy speech, the government representative emphasized the need for collaboration between the clergy and the authorities, noting that, thanks to the association, "there are fewer and fewer cases of priests using their vocation for political ends in a negative way," since "most priests, as reasonable men, understood and realized the changes that had taken place in the country..." He then repeated his attack on the non-affiliated clergy and the Croatian exiles, the only opposition that could freely express itself against the communist regime.

"Likewise," the government delegate said in his speech, "we must acknowledge that some priests still do not understand our efforts and do not accept this policy." They cannot reconcile themselves with the current state of affairs in our society. Driven by their political concepts, which clash with the interests of the people and the entire country, they imbue religious matters with political meaning and attempt to portray the situation as if the Church were suffering persecution and religious life were impossible, intending to exploit the faithful's adherence to their Church for their political ends.

Through their actions and behaviour, they seek to fuel an unscrupulous campaign, and it is understandable and normal that our State neither wants nor can tolerate any outside interference in our internal affairs. Our wish is that all priests, sensing the historical magnitude of the efforts undertaken by our working people to achieve a better life, may find their proper place in our society.”

The government representative did not attempt to conceal the fact that the majority of the clergy did not wish to join and that many priests were then imprisoned. The assembly was also attended by the delegate of the Federation of Priestly Associations of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In accordance with the Serbian conception of Yugoslav unity, he emphasized the “fraternal bonds between Serbia and Bosnia,” “the vigilant guardianship of the fraternity and unity of our peoples,” and the need for “the clergy, through their constructive work and loyalty, to reaffirm that our socialist Yugoslavia is truly the mother of all our peoples and that we unanimously support our state leaders and the President of the Republic, Comrade Tito.” He added that he was speaking on behalf of 1,700 priests. Orthodox, members of the federation.

The secretary's report highlights that the priestly association in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 233 members.[35] During the year, five members resigned. The same report emphasizes the economic advantages of maintaining contacts with state authorities. There was no shortage of praise for the regime or attacks on the refugees, who "are divided, although their methods of struggle against our country are identical to their future desires." The communists, therefore, interpret the exiles' partisan and ideological differences as proof of their own decadence, since they sacrifice everything to the party's famous "monolithic unity."

These attacks by the Franciscans against the exiles, obtained through extortion, are very convenient for the communists, who particularly target the Franciscan exiles from Herzegovina to the United States. These Franciscans are well-organized and excellent pastors of the Catholic parishes of Croatian immigrants, and they also have newspapers in which they systematically and objectively criticize the communist regime. In response to this activity, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in the US imposed as editor-in-chief of the organ of the powerful mutual aid society Hrvatska Bratska Zajednica (The Croatian Fraternal Community) an affiliate of the "professional priestly associations" that supports the collaborationist line with the communist regime.

The communists know that the people do not believe the official propaganda against the exiles, and therefore pressure the secretary of the priestly association, also a Franciscan, to censor the activities of his Franciscan brothers in exile, identifying, as the communists do, the struggle of the exiles against the totalitarian and anti-Croatian regime with the "struggle against our country." Which is "our country"? Croatia or the multinational conglomerate of Yugoslavia? Of course, this point cannot be touched upon.

That the activities of the exiles have a positive impact on the country is deduced from this paragraph of the aforementioned report presented by the secretary. "We're not stating it as fact, but it's possible that (the exiles' activities) might confuse and disconcert some of our members, leading them to misinterpret and misunderstand certain things. Of course, they then adopt the wrong attitude in their actions."

If the officials of the professional priestly association imposed and fostered by the regime must admit that "confusion and bewilderment"—that is, opposition to the regime and to the false fraternity and unity—are rampant among its members, what should we say about the vast majority of Croatian Catholic priests who are not affiliated, despite so much pressure? We've already mentioned that there are dioceses in Croatia without a single member of this association.

A reflection of these confusions and bewilderments, and of the desire to remain loyal to the Church and the people, can be found in the statements of Franciscan friars during the same discussion. Dobri Pastir notes that the Franciscan Domagoj Simic, a professor of theology, attempted to define the concept of "goodwill" in relation to "the relationship between religious and non-religious forces in our society."

From his reference, published in part, it can be inferred that coexistence must be based on freedom and the recognition of the human and civil rights of the ideological adversary.

"That is what we consider coexistence, and we are prepared to recognize it for everyone. Of course, we want it recognized for us as well. With a full and concrete recognition of rights, real coexistence would be assured. But we are far from thinking that this would end the clash of opinions, or, if you prefer, the ideological struggle.

We are far from that spiritual unity in which there would be no conflict of opinions; such unity is difficult to imagine among humankind. Whenever we speak of collaboration, it must be understood that we are talking about the needs and problems of practical life, never about ideology, because in that arena neither of us intends to collaborate, nor does anyone expect it from us."

A reaction to such clear reservations regarding ideological collaboration was inevitable. One of the association's officials, in view of the presence of numerous communist representatives, felt it appropriate to emphasize "the members' loyalty to the national authorities," adding:

"We could discuss ideological differences at length, but that is not the association's primary objective. Greater impetus for work and more vigorous activism will come from emphasizing the practical results of collaboration rather than from a detailed analysis of ideological differences, especially in meetings like this one, where a practical approach should prevail over dissecting ideological divergences."

How difficult the life of the clergy in Bosnia is can be inferred from the words of Joseph Markusic, one of the oldest and most prestigious Franciscans, among the first to collaborate with the communist authorities. As such, he was able to speak more freely in the aforementioned discussion:

"I will cite," he said, "some more serious examples of our difficulties in practical life that are striking and greatly hinder the dynamic development of our tasks." First he referred to the difficulties relating to "the situation of our clergy before the law and human justice." Then, noting the general rise in the standard of living, he emphasized that this rise "does not benefit the clergy"... "I venture to say that our monasteries and parishes are poor, and moreover, that they cannot be otherwise, given the current regulations regarding collections (referring to controls and taxes)"...

"It cannot be said that priests have descended to the level of beggars, which is not true, but it is true that they have nothing to distribute and cannot attend to their guests and visitors. They practically have to beg. The main thing is not food, but they cannot renovate their buildings, pay their assistants, secure means of transport, or acquire books essential for their specific studies and instruction. I am referring to this state of affairs when I say that the clergy are poor, just like the convents, parishes, and parish priests. If that is just and decent, let it continue, but I do not believe it is beneficial to anyone in any way. Priests are advised to be patient, and that is something of their own." "Vocation, and indeed they have much patience."

The elderly Franciscan, "speaking concretely"—the report states—describes "the grave fate and difficult situation of the Franciscan convent in Guca Gora near Travnik... and then listed the convents and parish houses, partially occupied by outsiders and institutions." The difficult life of the clergy presents great obstacles. "Without tranquility and a positive attitude, there is no normal work... and that must generate a painful disposition, whether justified or not, since it is difficult to justify so many anxieties and sorrows in one's heart."

He also pointed out that valuable cultural and historical documents, preserved by the Franciscans over the centuries, were taken from them and transferred to state museums. Tourist brochures omit any mention of important Franciscan convents, in contrast to the extensive coverage of Orthodox and Muslim monuments. He complained that while he was Franciscan provincial, the authorities suspended the province's bulletin, which, in his opinion, was illegal. Then—as he put it—"out of sentimentality," he felt compelled to mention the priests who were still imprisoned.

"If it weren't considered presumptuous," he declared, "I would like to go there today and free them. That might seem like a weakness of mine: even if it were, it is justified, understandable, and pursues a good purpose. I know very well, and I acknowledge, that nothing much will come of it; but the truth is, you can see how deeply my idealism troubles me in this and many other respects."

The report on the participation of Franciscan novices in "voluntary" public works on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway was then read. "This type of work establishes friendly ties between our peoples" and "concretizes the solidarity of the youth of the Yugoslav Republic and representatives of other peoples through the international brigades." The final resolution emphasizes "the need to spread fraternity and unity among our peoples" and that the participants of this meeting are "unwaveringly united in safeguarding the integrity of our country," that is, against the national independence of Croatia.

The government of the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina organized a formal reception in honor of the participants in the assembly of priestly associations.

How Yugoslav communists conceive of collaboration between ecclesiastical and state authorities is revealed in the monthly publication Nova Danica, published by the professional priestly association of the Socialist Republic of Croatia for the past four years. This newspaper is aimed at the masses, just like the popular almanac Danica.[36]

These publications have funds and modern printing facilities and are distributed free of charge throughout the country and among the numerous immigrants on every continent. They should prove that there is freedom of the Catholic press and loyalty from ecclesiastical circles to the communist oppressors. Their religious character is ostentatiously emphasized, but all reference to Christian social doctrine, which opposes communism, is omitted, and information and articles concerning the activities of the communist government are highlighted, all, of course, in a panegyric tone. Thus, on the same page, photos of the Holy Father and communist leaders are published.

The faithful, however, are not deceived, for they know that these are disguised communist publications. For their part, the ecclesiastical authorities do not hide the fact that this is not the Catholic press. Thus, the fortnightly Glas Koncila (The Voice of the Council), published by the Archbishop of Zagreb, in its February 9, 1964 issue, published an excerpt from a letter by the Vicar General of the Archdiocese of Zadar, calling it "our only religious newspaper," which in other words means that Nova Danica is not the religious newspaper, despite being published by the Association of Catholic Priests of the Socialist Republic of Croatia.

According to the magazine Novi Zivot,[37] some bishops "deemed it necessary to prohibit their parishioners from reading such things." The communists, the same magazine reports, seized and burned Catholic publications, as happened with the book by the learned Franciscan O. J. Bakotin, which deals with the position of women in Christian society. At that time, the modest religious weekly Sursum corda was published in Zagreb. It was banned for publishing without comment an excerpt from Minister Krstulovic's speech, which contained anti-religious content. Its editor, Dr. Francisco Grundler, was sentenced to six months in prison and fined 90,000 dinars.

A DOCUMENT ON COMMUNIST ARROGANCE

In the Documents section of this volume, we publish the letter addressed last year by Moma Markovic, a member of the Yugoslav government, to the Presidency of the Episcopal Conferences. Invoking efforts to normalize relations between Church and State, the communist minister demands that Catholic bishops prevent the anti-communist activity of the Croatian clergy in exile.

These are more than 200 priests who, following the massacres that included several hundred of their brethren, were saved by going into exile along with tens of thousands of their faithful. In exile, the Croatian priests carried out pastoral work in accordance with the Apostolic Constitution Exul Familia. Most of them, especially in various American countries, joined their respective dioceses. They are active as pastors and educators.

The Croatian Franciscans in Argentina and the United States have their own "commissaries." Among them are notable writers who contribute to both foreign and Croatian publications. Furthermore, even before the war, a significant number of Croatian clergy resided in various countries for pastoral purposes, caring for numerous Croatians who had emigrated for economic reasons. They maintain several convents, schools, and parishes abroad, and in addition to charitable organizations for their compatriots, they publish widely acclaimed Croatian publications.

It goes without saying that the Croatian clergy in a free world cannot glorify the communist regime, which oppresses their homeland and persecutes the Church. Nor do the exiled Croatian clergy engage in partisan politics, but they stand in solidarity with political immigrants in their struggle for the liberation of Croatia from Serbian and Soviet influence and for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Croatian state.

However, the communist dictatorship disregards the criteria prevailing in the free world regarding what is lawful and unlawful, patriotic and unpatriotic. Thus, the Belgrade government, as stated in the letter, considers it "contrary to the most fundamental ethical principles" for exiled priests to sympathize with efforts to achieve Croatia's national and democratic freedom. For the communists, this is anti-democratic activity, dangerous extremism, and treason. Therefore, the letter labels the most prominent exiled priests, including the editors of purely religious publications, as criminals.

M. Markovic, a minister in Tito's dictatorship and head of the "Religious Commission," is well aware that the exiled clergy are outside the jurisdiction of the bishops, a fact he mentions in his letter. However, he demands that they try to get ecclesiastical authorities in other countries to retaliate against Croatian priests in exile, simply for opposing communism and national oppression and supporting democracy and Croatia's right to national self-determination.

Furthermore, this spokesperson for the communist dictatorship calls for praise for the "Yugoslav champions of peace"—a peace, of course, without justice and freedom—appealing to progressive democratic circles and even to the calls for peace made by Pope John XXIII. The Belgrade government ignores the Pope's own appeal on behalf of refugees, who, in his encyclical Pacem in Terris, states, among other things:

"...we regard with profound sorrow the cases of political refugees, whose countless numbers demonstrate that the rulers of some nations excessively restrict the limits of just freedom, within which it is possible for citizens to live a life worthy of human beings... For this reason, we take this opportunity to publicly approve and commend all initiatives of human solidarity or Christian charity aimed at alleviating the suffering of those forced to emigrate from their countries."

Regarding the alleged criminal activities that the communists attribute to the most prominent and meritorious exiled Croatian priests—some of whom are named in Markovic's note—it would be fitting to reiterate the protest of the Catholic episcopate sent to Tito on September 25, 1952, following the imprisonment, persecution, and convictions of bishops and priests accused of alleged crimes.

The episcopate, meeting in Episcopal Conference in Zagreb, then discovered that three bishops and more than 200 priests were imprisoned. "Is it not surprising, indeed, that the clergy, who in all civilized countries do not come into contact with the penal code, should become so incorrigibly criminal in our country?" [38].

The letter from the Yugoslav government regarding the clergy in exile sufficiently illustrates how Belgrade conceives of cooperation between ecclesiastical and state authorities. In its view, the Catholic Church should be placed at the political service of the regime, against its faithful. Through the regime's small concessions—a regime that openly proclaims its ultimate goal as the liquidation of religion and directs its efforts toward this end—the Catholic Church should become complicit in the political and national oppression of its faithful. In this way, the communists would like the bishops to become foreigners in their own country, enemies of their people and their flock.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Another highly illustrative document of the Yugoslav communist dictatorship's views on Church-State relations is R. Vidic's controversial book, *The Situation of the Church in Yugoslavia*. It was published in Belgrade as an unofficial publication (without the year indicated in the original) for propaganda purposes, in several languages, including Spanish.[39] Yugoslav diplomatic missions, even in South American republics, distribute and enforce this book, probably to mitigate the negative impact of Catholic demonstrations during dictator Tito's visit last year.

The book warrants a brief commentary from us and perhaps more from ecclesiastical authorities in Latin America, due to its false, insulting, and insolent assertions regarding the Catholic Church and its slander against the Holy See.

Here we will only point out, in order to better understand the relationship between communist Yugoslavia and the Catholic Church, that the book casts a favorable light on and praises the opposition of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the ratification of the 1937 concordat. This resistance, expressed in the form of a slanderous and fanatical campaign, had become an international scandal. It culminated in street demonstrations in Belgrade, led by Orthodox archpriests, and in the excommunication of the Orthodox members of parliament who voted for the concordat.

The government of Milan Stojadinovic had to revoke it and solemnly promise that the concordat would not be ratified. The result was that the concordat, signed in Rome on July 25, 1935, which guaranteed, at least formally, the equality of Orthodox and Catholics, never came into effect.[40] Now the communists wield the arguments and criteria of Serbian chauvinists, according to whom Yugoslavia is, in fact, an enlarged Serbia and the Orthodox Church should enjoy a privileged position.

The Catholic Church's efforts to achieve religious equality are also labeled, in this communist publication, as Roman clericalism, which threatens Serbian interests in a country where everything was Serbian: the dynasty, the military leadership, the diplomacy, the capital, and the highest officials of the state administration during the autocratic monarchical government that the communists themselves described as a "fascist military dictatorship."

Modifying, as is their custom, historical facts to suit their current agenda, the communists now try to argue that Catholic aspirations were excessive and that the opposition of Catholic Croats to the false and forced Yugoslav national unity is nothing more than the result of the intrigues of shadowy foreign forces, and first and foremost, the Vatican in the service of Yugoslavia's enemies.

How fallacious such an interpretation is becomes clear from the numerous documents concerning the so-called Concordat crisis.

First, it is appropriate to describe the attitude of the Serbian Orthodox Church, expressed in a memorandum from the Episcopal Synod: "The Serbian Orthodox Church," it states, "must maintain its position as a state church, as is the case in other neighboring Orthodox states, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania."[41]

During the Concordat crisis, the unofficial newspaper Le Temps (Paris, July 25, 1937) aptly summarized the situation in these terms: "This Concordat must change many things in Yugoslavia that placed the Catholic Church in a position of inferiority compared to other religions."

The Prague-based anti-clerical newspaper Narodna Politika, which had always advocated for friendship with the Serbs, wrote, during the concordat crisis, about the behaviour of the Serbian Orthodox Church: "This Church forgets that the concordat with Rome is a state necessity. If the high hierarchy of the Serbian Church cannot understand this, then it is clear that it desires neither the unity of Yugoslavia nor reconciliation with the Croatian Catholics."

The communist aversion to the concordat, which was meant to guarantee the rights of the Catholic Church, is understandable, but it is telling that at the same time, it is considered normal for the Serbian Orthodox Church, while rejecting the concordat, to enjoy the privileges of a state church. This proves that in communist Yugoslavia there was no change in the religious and national discrimination against Catholics and Croats.

We emphasize that we do not deny the suffering of the Orthodox Church under the communist regime, but nevertheless, in communist Yugoslavia, to preserve the image of an aggrandized Serbia, matters of Church-State relations are judged by a double standard.

This occurs for national reasons (Serbia's privileged position at the expense of Croatia) and because of the traditional Serbian conception of the right of political power to interfere in the life of the Church, which should be a political instrument of the nation. The Serbian Orthodox Church accepts this concept. That is why the communist totalitarians, mostly Serbs, despise the Catholic hierarchy more than the Orthodox one.

They are deeply bothered, just like the rulers of monarchical Yugoslavia, by the fact that the supreme head of the Catholic Church resides abroad and that Croatian Catholics, through the Holy See, are linked to the entire West and can count on the solidarity of the universal Church.

The Yugoslav communist leaders, like their monarchical predecessors, interpret the Catholic Church's aspiration to govern itself freely and sovereignly without state interference as something hidden and sinister.

Previously, in Belgrade, it was said that the Vatican served Italian fascism (in the book cited above, Pope Pius XI is presented as an exponent of fascism), and after the war, under the communist regime, it is claimed that the Vatican is an exponent of Western imperialism and of the indeterminate "international reaction," which supposedly conspires against the great pacifist, Marshal Tito, who is sustained by aid in dollars and who, as is well known, came to power by spilling rivers of blood and carrying out massacres.

Returning to the demand by the Yugoslav communist government that the Catholic episcopate act as an instrument of the regime in the countries of the free world against exiled Croatian Catholics, we will understand it better if we bear in mind that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia obtained certain favors from the representatives of their respective Orthodox Churches in the area of international propaganda and regarding the control of Orthodox emigrants and exiles residing in free countries.

The Russian case is well known and beyond the scope of our study. Therefore, we will briefly address the evolution of relations within the Serbian National Church in the United States. Until recently, the North American-Canadian eparchy operated there, headed by Bishop Dionizije. He increasingly cooperated with Serbian political exiles, criticizing the communist regime. Lately, the Belgrade Church Synod investigated his case, suspended him, and finally removed him from office. His eparchy, which encompassed the US and Canada, was divided into three parts, and the three newly appointed bishops are well-liked by the Yugoslav state authorities.

CONCLUSION: A DIFFICULT ROAD TOWARD AN EVENTUAL "MODUS VIVENDI"

In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that everything said is a pale and incomplete reflection of the sad reality that afflicts the Yugoslav conglomerate, where not only Christianity and atheistic communism clash, but also different concepts regarding Church-State relations. The Yugoslav leaders oppose the Catholic Church not only as adversaries of all religions that must disappear, but also because in Croatia it is the symbol of the free and Western world, alien and antagonistic to the world in which communism, the totalitarian, Russian variant of Marxism, was conceived and adopted.

The Yugoslav communists first attempted to break the Church's opposition with terrorist methods. When they realized that this path would not lead them to their proposed goal, and when Western economic aid, especially from the US, became essential during the Moscow-Belgrade conflict, they adopted the new tactic of legal hypocrisy, invoking the principles of peaceful coexistence.

For years, Belgrade has been announcing the possibility of a modus vivendi, albeit a restricted one, with the Holy See. However, what the government of János Kádár, complicit in the ruthless Soviet repression of the heroic Hungarian revolution, achieved, the dictator Tito could not.

It turns out that the internal structure of the Yugoslav state, multinational and heterogeneous in cultural and religious terms, is an insurmountable obstacle to any normalization of relations between Church and State, despite all the grandiloquent pronouncements that present Tito's regime as the champion of peaceful coexistence.

Because of the internal structure of the Yugoslav conglomerate, the attempt to reach an agreement with the Vatican under the much more favorable pre-war circumstances had failed. The Vatican knows this very well and will never allow the Catholic clergy to become instruments of communist politics, which run counter to the Christian and patriotic sentiments of the majority of its faithful. The recently deceased Archbishop of Ljubljana, Vovk—whom the communists doused with gasoline and set on fire—said of these shifting communist aspirations and tactics:

"Before, they followed the principle: 'Strike the shepherd and the sheep will scatter,' and now they adhere to the motto: 'Embrace the shepherd and the sheep will flee from him.'"

What the Yugoslav communist regime, in its arrogance and hypocrisy, truly demands of the Catholic Church is not its strict political neutrality, but quite the opposite. It seeks to politicize it by reducing it to just another element of its totalitarian propaganda, discrediting it and morally isolating it. It is not difficult to imagine the extent of the scandal and bitterness throughout Croatia in cases such as that of the Catholic priest's cheer for the Yugoslav army and its commander, who imposed a reign of terror and unleashed massacres of many thousands of patriots after the armistice, as well as in the aforementioned case of the same priest's partisan pronouncements against exiles in the free world.

The sense of outrage could only be mitigated by the human understanding of the faithful, who, knowing the sad truth, understood that the priest's attitude was not sincere, but rather morally coerced.

Appreciating with serenity and profound gratitude for the immense moral support that the Holy See has given to the martyred Church of Croatia and, at the same time, to the just cause of the Croatian nation by honoring, in the saddest circumstances of its thousand-year history, the then imprisoned and slandered saint and worthy pastor, Bishop Stepinac, with the sacred purple, all Croatians—with rare exceptions due to misinterpretations—are convinced that the Vatican understands the true meaning of our struggle for the freedom of the Church and the Fatherland; two converging struggles.

Therefore, Croatian Catholics categorically reject the notion that the Holy See, so perceptive and far-sighted in its actions, could compromise with the open enemies of God to the detriment of the resistance of an oppressed nation in a grave emergency, one that will not be forgotten for centuries. And even less so at a time when the Yugoslav communist regime is begging for agreements, which it once arrogantly rejected despite Archbishop Stepinac repeatedly pointing the way for the communist persecutors of the Church to negotiate with the Holy See.

The conclusion of a modus vivendi, as the Catholic hierarchy conceives it, would signify a great moral victory for the persecuted Church, the victory of the spirit over force. A truce, however brief, would allow for the healing of deep wounds and the partial recovery of losses suffered during the undisguised persecution of the Church. Instead, the communists want to achieve political gains without making concessions.

They wish to reach some agreement with the Holy See so they can demonstrate to the free world that their regime respects fundamental human rights and, domestically, convince their victims that the regime is so strong that even the powerful worldwide organization of the Catholic Church bowed before it. Furthermore, they would like to make the Church and the clergy in the free world the instrument of their politics, or at least obstruct their opposition.

The Yugoslav communists will not succeed, because the Catholic hierarchy is well aware of their intentions and methods. Herein lies the crux of the problem and the reason for the successive postponements of the agreement announced as early as 1960. A modus vivendi, if it is ever agreed upon, will never be an instrument of communist oppression.

We believe it would be appropriate for Catholic newspapers in the free world, at least, to refrain from disseminating optimistic news about the supposed freedom of the Church in communist Yugoslavia, which would allow for hope of a swift agreement between the Holy See and the communist regime.[42] Such an assessment of the situation is untrue, confuses and bewilders persecuted Catholics, and already facilitates certain propaganda gains for the communist regime, regardless of the final outcome of the negotiations and the implementation of any eventual stipulations.

Buenos Aires.

Angel Belic: Dr. Vladko Macek

On May 15, 1964, Dr. Vladko Macek, 85, passed away in Washington, D.C. He was the president of the Croatian Peasant Party, honorary president of the International Union of Peasant Parties, and former vice president of the Yugoslav government at the time of the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

It is difficult to be a committed democrat and a true pacifist, and as such, Macek tried to put his democratic principles into practice in an autocratic and anti-democratic environment. From his youth until his exile in old age, Macek always acted within a context where, against the oppressors, he had to fight for his democratic convictions and for the right to freedom of the Croatian people. As a student, he experienced the dictatorship of Ban (Viceroy) Count Khuen-Hedervary, and as a mature man, he lived through the dictatorship of King Alexander in Yugoslavia.

Macek could have collaborated with all the authoritarian regimes in Yugoslavia, had he so desired, for his cooperation would have been welcome, but he categorically refused. This principle brought him grave consequences, for he was almost constantly persecuted and imprisoned, yet he endured all these hardships with Gandhian resignation, convinced that in the end his just cause would prevail. National and political freedom, social justice, and democratic order are such lofty and noble ideals that only through their ethical values will totalitarian ideologies triumph.

The struggle to achieve these goals is characterized in the history of almost all peoples by revolutions and protracted, bloody conflicts. The champions of such ideas believed that no sacrifice should be spared, even if it required human lives, to achieve the intended ends. Dr. Macek held a different view.

He, too, was a fighter who sought to realize his ideals, and to this end, he worked and organized his party throughout his life. But he was a pacifist who abhorred revolutions and bloodshed, striving to achieve his goals through peaceful means. Therefore, it is essential to judge all his decisions, even political stances that at first glance elicit spontaneous criticism, through this pacifist lens.

Vladko Macek was born in 1879 in Jastrebarsko, Croatia. He studied law in Zagreb and later practiced as a judge and lawyer. From a young age, he was interested in the problems of the peasants who, barely thirty years earlier, had emancipated themselves from feudal rule and at that time lived in dire economic circumstances. As a student, he wholeheartedly embraced the peasant movement being organized by Esteban Radic, which would eventually become the most powerful political party in Croatia.

The party's program aimed for the economic and cultural advancement of the peasantry. Politically, it had two objectives: one in the realm of domestic policy, meaning that the peasants, who at that time represented 80% of the Croatian population, would have a proportional number of representatives in parliament (Sabor), which was not the case then, as universal suffrage was not in effect; and the other, in the realm of foreign policy, meaning that in Croatia's relations with Austria-Hungary, the age-old constitutional rights of the Croatian kingdom would be fully respected.

In Radic's view, this meant that the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary should be restructured into a confederation. Such a confederation of the Danubian peoples could not be realized due to Serbian bullets in the Sarajevo assassination, the immediate cause of the First World War, which ended with the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into its constituent parts.

In 1918, new states were formed in Southeast Europe. Among them, for the first time in their respective histories, the Croats and Serbs, two neighboring peoples with antagonistic spiritual traditions, were united. The Croatian Republican Peasant Party, aware that it represented the overwhelming majority of the Croatian people and interpreting their will, opposed union with the Kingdom of Serbia. It understood that such a union would not be a community of two equal partners, but rather Serbian domination over the other peoples comprising the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Consequently, in 1919, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, exercising its democratic mandate received from the people, informed the Paris Peace Conference that the Croatian people, through a written referendum, had declared themselves opposed to the creation of a common state with the Serbs and invoked the right to self-determination, which would be embodied in the constitution of a neutral, peasant, Croatian republic.

The peace treaties had not yet been concluded, the new states did not formally exist, and the Paris Peace Conference could readily take into account the wishes of the Croatian people. The main burden of organizing the plebiscite fell on Dr. Macek, as the Serbian police had arrested Radic, the Party president.

Thus, Macek was the first to sign the memorandum addressed to the Paris Peace Conference. A few days later, he too was arrested, and so his political career in Yugoslavia began as a political prisoner. Macek never escaped persecution and imprisonment, a characteristic of all Croatian politicians in Yugoslavia: every declaration or act in favor of fundamental democratic freedoms always ended in prison, if not violent death.

From the creation of Yugoslavia until 1928, for a decade, Macek participated as vice-president in the organization of the party, which had been led until then by Radic, until Radic was gunned down in the Belgrade parliament. The Serbian national deputy who carried out the assassination of Esteban Radic was not solely responsible for the murder, but for all Serbian nationalists, represented by King Alexander and his closest collaborators. As the Serbian politician Gavrilovic wrote at the time in Belgrade's main newspaper, the assassination of Esteban Radic was meant to demonstrate that the Yugoslav state was stronger than Radic.

After Radic's death, the Croatian Peasant Party's parliamentary bloc elected Dr. Macek as president. From then until his recent death, Macek was the leader of Croatian democracy.

The situation in Yugoslavia after Radic's death was extremely tense. On the one hand, the Serbian ruling circles felt embarrassed, aware of the magnitude of the crime committed, for which they were responsible; Aware that the assassination of the Croatian leader had the opposite effect, they thought that with the shepherd killed, the flock would scatter. Instead, the Croatian people erased all partisan differences and closed ranks within the party of the assassinated president.

It seemed impossible that a Croatian-Serbian war would not occur. And now there is the psychological paradox that persists from August 1928, that is, from the death of Stefan Radić, until January 1929, when King Alexander established his dictatorship. This five-month period is decisive for the subsequent existence of Yugoslavia, that is, for the catastrophic situation of the Croatian people in the following decade.

The Serbian government fears it will not be able to control the situation, as it perceives the popular fury against the terrorism practiced in the non-Serbian parts of Yugoslavia. The Serbs constantly expect an uprising of the Croats and other oppressed peoples and minorities. Indeed, such was the mood in all sectors of the Croatian people. It only took a spark for the revolution to ignite.

Of course, the outcome of a revolution can never be predicted. Dr. Macek, who had assumed leadership of the party and, consequently, of the entire Croatian people, also did not know whether the Croatian revolution would be successful or end in a pointless bloodbath for which he would be responsible. Macek was torn by a profound moral conflict. On the one hand, he felt the pulse of the people, who imperatively demanded freedom and the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, their national prison; on the other, he was overwhelmed by the immense responsibility of a leader who had to make a decision of such magnitude.

The tradition of his mentor, Esteban Radic, prevailed: that the struggle should never be abandoned, but that only peaceful means should be employed. Macek chose against revolution. Let us quote his words: "I did everything in my power to prevent the revolution that was about to erupt not only in Zagreb, but throughout Croatia. I did so not only to respect Radic's wishes and my own pacifist ideals, but also because it would have been utter folly to allow the political struggle to be transferred to a terrain where we would necessarily be weaker." Just as the Serbs feared a Croat revolution, Macek feared Serbian militarism and its armed forces.

The Serbs took full advantage of the situation. Seeing that the Croatian struggle was not escalating into armed rebellion—a five-month period was enough to convince them of this—King Alexander established his personal dictatorship on January 6, 1929. He suppressed not only all freedoms, political parties, and organizations, but also prohibited the use of the Croatian flag and the Croatian name.

The opposite of what Macek and other opposition politicians had hoped for occurred. Instead of Serbian hegemony ending and the terror subsiding, it reached indescribable proportions. According to statistics, an average of one political assassination was committed per week in Croatia, intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of state power, as wielded by the Serbs.

But Macek was not easily broken. At the head of the Croatian nation, he defied the dictator and clandestinely organized resistance to Serbian tyranny. He was repeatedly arrested, convicted, and then released. At that moment, Thomas Mann and Albert Einstein raised their voices in defense of the Croatian people's freedom. Alexander's dictatorship lasted until his violent death in Marseille at the hands of Macedonian and Croatian nationalists, while Macek was imprisoned.

But the dictatorship did not end; it passed from Alexander's hands to those of his political successors. In order to give the impression abroad that Yugoslavia was evolving toward a democratic system, the new government, headed by Jeftic, the deceased king's closest collaborator, announced elections for May 1935. Democracy and freedom of expression were out of the question. Voting was public, and the elections were held according to the traditions of Alexander's dictatorship, so that anyone who voted against the government risked persecution, which particularly affected public employees.

Despite the ruling party's formal victory thanks to Serbian votes, the vast majority in Croatia voted against the dictatorship. On a moral level, the elections represented a victory for Macek. Nevertheless, the dictatorship does not relent in its oppression. Nor does Macek, convinced now more than ever that his tenacious and peaceful struggle will bear fruit.

We live in the years of the rise of the Axis powers. Yugoslavia, until then an ally of France and a member of the Little Entente, realizes that the balance of power in Europe is changing rapidly and, without any moral qualms, adapts to the new situation.

The new man is Milan Stojadinovic who, although a member of the social group of Serbian politicians closely linked to France when it was all-powerful, easily crosses over to the Axis. He forms a close friendship with Count Ciano and tries to organize a fascist movement. But Stojadinovic also wanted to give the impression that he was not acting as a dictator, as a usurper, but rather that he was exercising power by the will of the people. Therefore, he announces parliamentary elections for December 1938. The entire Croatian people firmly support Dr. Macek, believing he will lead them to freedom.

The electoral contest bears the hallmark of the struggle between the new Serbian fascist leader, Stojadinovic, and the veteran Croatian democratic leader, Vladko Macek. The vote is public, and the atmosphere of the official dictatorship still prevails. The government wins, but its victory is narrow, and no one doubts that the real victory belonged to the opposition, which triumphed in Croatia with 80% of the vote.

At that time, ominous clouds gathered over Europe, and few believed that a new conflagration could be avoided. The Serbs, as the dominant people in Yugoslavia, knew full well that the state would automatically disintegrate in the event of an external attack; they knew that the other peoples and national minorities would not defend Yugoslavia, which they did not consider their homeland, but rather their concentration camp. Prince Paul, regent and cousin of the assassinated King Alexander, personally assumed leadership of the efforts to reach an agreement and satisfy at least some of the Croatian political demands.

Dr. Macek negotiated on behalf of Croatia. After several months of arduous negotiations, in August 1939, just days before the outbreak of the Second World War, Croatia achieved restricted autonomy in a fragmented territory. Regardless of the reasons that led the Serbs to concede, for Dr. Macek, the fact that the Croatian question had moved from a stalemate was of paramount importance.

He was pleased, for he saw in this act the success of his democratic, humanitarian, and pacifist philosophy. Of course, this philosophy contrasted sharply with the violent changes taking place in Europe at that time, to the point that many of his supporters were calling for greater activism. But Macek was inflexible. Anything would do, as long as bloodshed was avoided.

Bearing in mind the pacifism that always characterized Dr. Macek, one can understand his subsequent consent to Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact. During his public life, he proved on countless occasions to be a true democrat and, in foreign policy, a supporter of Western democracies.

However, geographical and political situations cannot be changed arbitrarily, and the relationship with Germany at that time could only manifest itself in two ways: maintaining the status of a neutral country, or becoming hostile, ending up like Poland or France. Let us not forget that at that time, March 1941, Germany was at the height of its power; All of continental Europe is under siege; a non-aggression pact is in place with the Soviet Union, and the United States is still outside the conflict.

And now, when it comes to bloodshed, Dr. Macek believes it is better to make compromises than to assume responsibility for events whose outcome is uncertain. He ardently hoped that in this way his people would be spared the war. But a group of Serbian officers stages a coup d'état just two days after Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, overthrowing the government and the regency of Prince Paul.

To this day, in the abundant and varied political literature, the true purpose of this "putsch" remains unclear. Each interpretation reflects the conceptions and interests of its authors. Based on established facts, which Macek also acknowledges, two theories can be drawn: first, the coup leaders belonged to the group of Serbian nationalists who believed that the government and Prince Paul had gone too far in granting the Croats limited autonomy, which the Croats, in turn, considered insufficient, and therefore demanded their removal. Another interpretation is that, in the realm of foreign policy, the coup leaders opposed collaboration with the Axis powers. Perhaps they thought this way while in opposition, but from the moment they came to power, they clearly saw that wanting something was one thing, and being able to do it was another.

They observed the Yugoslav army's utter lack of preparedness and its inevitable and swift destruction in the event of war with Germany. At the same time, they realized that the Croatian people could no longer be dealt with using brute force, as dictator Alexander had done. Now, then, they did the same thing for which they overthrew the previous government: Nincic, the brand-new foreign minister, informs Berlin that his government recognizes the Tripartite Pact without any reservations, and the coup leaders inform Macek that they recognize Croatian autonomy.

They asked for Macek's cooperation and begged him to resume the vice-presidency of the government. Macek, although deeply displeased with the "putsch," agreed to join the coup government with the aim of saving peace and his people from the calamities of war. But it was already too late. From the German Chancellery documents, published by the State Department in Washington in 1962, it can be concluded that Hitler took the Belgrade coup as a personal affront and wanted revenge.

For years, Hitler had advocated for German-Yugoslav cooperation and was satisfied with the Yugoslav governments, which, it is true, were part of the victorious bloc at Versailles, but in fact, cooperated extensively in trade with the Third Reich. It is no secret that the Luftwaffe (the German air force) was built with Yugoslav aluminum. That is why Hitler did not seek to destroy Yugoslavia, since he obtained what he wanted from it.

On April 6, 1941, the Germans bombed Belgrade. There was no organized resistance. The king, the government, and the generals fled south, hoping to reach Greece and from there England. Macek did not flee and returned from bombed Belgrade to Zagreb. Given this opportune moment, the Croatian people rose up, disarming the Serbian military garrisons stationed throughout Croatia, and on April 10, the Croatian revolutionaries proclaimed Croatia's independence.

Macek, firmly convinced that the Western democracies would win, considered this tactic, which could be interpreted as an alliance with the Axis powers, to be a mistake and refused to collaborate with the newly formed Croatian government. He remained in Croatia until the end of the war, always in opposition to the government headed by Dr. Ante Pavelić. A few days before the end of the war, when communist troops occupied Zagreb and once again imposed the Yugoslav union on the Croatian people under Serbian supremacy within the communist regime, Macek, who had been interned, left his homeland and sought asylum in the United States.

In 1957, Macek published his autobiography, *In the Struggle for Freedom*, in New York. This book is of paramount importance for those who wish to understand the Croatian-Serbian conflict, because its author personally experienced all the hardships of the tragic Yugoslav coexistence.[43]

Macek's character can be summarized as follows: Morally, he was a man of absolute integrity, incorruptible and willing to defend his principles with his own life. His many years spent in prison attest to this.

In social and economic terms, he dedicated his entire life to improving the conditions of the Croatian peasantry. This should not be interpreted as a class struggle, since, according to the ideology of the Croatian Peasant Party, peasants in Croatia are not a social class but rather such a large majority that they can be identified with the people. Therefore, working for the benefit of the peasants is equivalent to working for the entire nation. The Croatian peasant is both owner and worker of the land on which he lives with his family.

In religious matters, Macek was a Christian who publicly professed his faith and religious convictions.

Culturally, Macek was an enthusiastic promoter of the study and development of indigenous Croatian culture, which boasts wonderful works in folk literature, folk music, and the decorative arts.

Politically, Macek was first and foremost a democrat who deeply believed in the principle that only the popular will is decisive for the correct approach to fundamental political guidelines. For this reason, Macek deserves credit for having signed and sent to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 the memorandum stating that the Croatian Republican Peasant Party had conducted the plebiscite in which the Croatian people overwhelmingly declared themselves against union with the Kingdom of Serbia and demanded their own independent and neutral peasant republic. Nevertheless, by decision of the victorious powers, the Yugoslav state was created, and this undemocratic manner of its creation is its original sin, never redeemed.

The will of the Croatian people, expressed in the wake of Yugoslavia's creation, never wavered. In all subsequent elections, held under various Serbian governments, the Croatian people remained united and unanimous in their demand for the application of the principle of self-determination.

Macek, as a politician who had earned the people's trust to lead their policies, knew exactly what his people wanted. At the same time, he knew that Yugoslav state power existed, that within the country it controlled the police and military apparatus, and abroad it enjoyed the support and diplomatic recognition of the great powers. Directing politics is an art of achieving the intended goal with the available means.

Macek believed that the means at his disposal were perseverance and tenacious resistance, even if the struggle lasted many years. He agreed to sign the accord with Regent Prince Paul regarding partial autonomy for Croatia. But these were not his final positions, rather actions dictated by the needs of the time. He was criticized for a lack of activism and dynamism. But Macek did not believe that the problems could be solved through the use of force. The choice between revolutionary activism and humanitarian pacifism is a matter of conscience, of moral and political judgment.

Buenos Aires

Bogdan Radica: John F. Kennedy

First, the news of the assassination shook the entire nation to its core. Everywhere, in every corner of this vast country (the United States of America), men, women, and children were paralyzed, shedding tears like never before; believers in God gathered in the nearest churches, others wept in every corner of cities large and small; in classrooms, students and teachers fell into profound silence, workers ceased their labor; cars came to a standstill along the wide highways. Whites and blacks alike were overcome with grief upon learning of the assassination of one of their own.

Then news arrived from all parts of the world reporting similar sentiments. Not only did his nation come to a standstill, but the entire world did; there was no country, region, or village, however remote, where people were not as deeply moved as their fellow citizens. It seemed to everyone that the very earth had stopped. In the lamentations coming from distant areas, there was perhaps a deeper sorrow than those from closer by. Suddenly, representatives from all over the world gathered in Washington: they were of every stripe and every political persuasion.

Dallas vanished from the scene like an ugly, sinister image; and Washington, all at once, acquired an unusual brilliance and splendor. But the world remained stunned, surprised, and petrified. The immense sadness of that solitude also gripped his wife, the mother of his children. It was heartbreaking to see her, proud and punished by implacable fate, leading her two children by the hand behind the coffin of their husband and father.

For the first time since I've lived in this country, where a strange destiny brought me, as it has so many others, I experienced that even Americans can feel the tragic sense of life. Americans don't believe in death; they reject it, preferring to conceal it with the veil of swift oblivion. In their constant effort to rationalize everything, they also rationalized death, so quickly and lightly, as if they didn't want to see it so that life would always seem beautiful and interesting. This time, in the sudden, thoughtless, and unexpected death of this young man, and moreover, their president, they could neither evade it nor escape the tragic feeling of life. Although that feeling was short-lived, it was so sincere and vivid that it instilled in us new hope for the progress of this ever-young and restless nation.

President Kennedy was relatively young, certainly young as president of the country, where that seat is usually occupied by men of advanced age. This fact is explained by the fact that the time of generational change had arrived in the Union. Kennedy was aware of this when he once emphasized that a new generation was in charge of leading the country and giving it a new direction. Indeed, he had given a new direction to his policies.

Surrounded by young and new people, Kennedy introduced not only a new language, a new rhythm, a new style, but a revolutionary approach to considering his nation's internal and external problems. What made him stand out in Europe, Latin America, and throughout the world, more than in his own country, was precisely this new language and his peculiar, one might say, intellectual style. He was not an average American politician, resorting to the hackneyed, cheap, and trivial phrases of frankly antiquated parliamentary rhetoric. Although he did not come from the American upper class, and although the son of an ambassador and educated at Harvard, socially he did not belong to the Boston elite, for he was a descendant of poor Irish immigrants, touched by good fortune in this land of happiness and prosperity.

He was a gentleman in his conduct and actions. His family did not escape the harsh blows of fate: a whole series of tragedies and misfortunes, including the loss of his older brother and a sister. All of this, like his personal tragedy in his brush with death, left deep marks on him. Yet, all these misfortunes strengthened his inclination toward courage. His confrontation with life was the aspect that most interested him in the lives of some celebrated Americans. When he appeared without a coat or hat, in the rain or snow, it was delightful to see him as if he had no fear of the weather. His encounters with journalists at press conferences were always a political and intellectual event, as were his solemn speeches, which he delivered with such conviction and such a distinctive accent that they seemed so spontaneous, as if no one but himself had written them.

Unlike the average American, Kennedy possessed a greater sense of history than any other president, with the exception of Roosevelt. It is a common occurrence in American politics that a man, however ordinary, upon entering the White House, gradually and rapidly rises to the challenge and importance of the presidency. It could be said of Kennedy that, given his profound understanding of the meaning of history and the role America should play at this historical moment, he knew what awaited him, how he should act, and how to conduct himself in his inaugural address. And so it happened that in that address, the entire country, the entire world, felt that after two decades, a new man had arrived at the White House.

His approach to global and American problems was revolutionary. Domestically, he first addressed the racial question, thus initiating one of the most profound revolutions since the Civil War. While previous administrations confronted this problem with bombastic pronouncements, Kennedy tackled it comprehensively, striving to resolve it. Confronting prejudice is the most difficult thing, especially in democratic regimes where laws are not always easy to interpret.

Trying to resolve problems where state sovereignty clashes with that of the federal government is no easy task, particularly when the world is ablaze with bloody revolution. That young man showed great wisdom in a situation capable of plunging the country, as in Lincoln's time, into civil war, the worst of all wars. It must be acknowledged that he had the support of Black leaders, who, through him, regained faith in the law of the evolution of American democracy.

That is why that little Black woman in the South was right when she exclaimed: "They say he was a friend of us Black people; he was a friend of all men!" However, many did not forgive him for that, especially the Southerners. Was the fatal shot a consequence of this? It is difficult to say. In this free country, where every detail is known, it is still impossible to say why the alleged assassin killed John F. Kennedy. An American writer aptly said, "These are days when being American is hardly something to be proud of."

He clashed with the world of high finance ("big business"), which would never forgive him for accusing it of lacking compassion for the poor. The Kennedys' wealth is incomparable, both in quantity and quality, to that of the Rockefellers. When young Kennedy, during those turbulent and fascinating years in the United States, noticed one day that this world of high business was ruthless with his father, who had built a great fortune through his own merits, that big business took offense.

But Kennedy had a sense of history; It belonged to a new North America that finally began to understand that money and wealth should not be the ultimate goal, but merely a means to achieve a more sublime and noble end on earth: fraternity and equality among men, the suppression of racial and class differences, especially the gap between wealth and poverty, with the purpose of establishing the justice that the United States imposed upon itself, from its origins, as its main mission in history.

All of this involved bold attempts, thwarted even in countries bleeding from revolutions. Neither European socialists nor communists achieved them, nor is there any serious prospect that they would. The path chosen by Kennedy to achieve them within the framework of freedom was, of course, the most arduous.

To reach the proposed goal, peace was necessary. Kennedy suffered several setbacks in this regard. The first was his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, from which he did not emerge victorious, but which served to introduce him to his principal rival. Then came the failed attempt to liberate Cuba with the Cuban exiles. There he displayed much indecisiveness, hesitation, and a Hamlet-like "to be or not to be" dilemma, failing to see things through to the end. Between the opinions of realists and abstract political thinkers, he opted for the latter.

Later, he perfectly corrected both errors: first, he showed Khrushchev how to behave in situations where there was no compromise. Thus, he forced Khrushchev to withdraw from Cuba, causing him a resounding fiasco, without dragging his country or the world into war. The question remains: Why didn't he go all the way? Some say he intended to resolve the problem gradually, later, on the eve of the elections or afterward.

Be that as it may, this also opened a new chapter which, although only partially completed, demonstrates that Kennedy had inaugurated a new foreign policy that, ultimately, would have given the world a clearer direction and perhaps even ushered in an era of freedom worldwide. The disintegration of internal life in Russia and in all the communist countries of southeastern Europe foreshadowed such an evolution. Kennedy's strategy, which prioritized ideas and spiritual values over force in the face of communism, began to prove more effective than that practiced by the West until then. It seems that Kennedy managed to warn and even teach the Russians how they should proceed in their relations with North America—that is, to what extent America could make concessions and capitulations to the global communist strategy.

On the issue of Cuba and Soviet interference in Latin American affairs, he showed himself willing to go to war, and in doing so, he forced the Soviet Union to withdraw. This attitude and maneuvering earned him the esteem of both friends and enemies. Moscow realized that in him it had a serious rival who knew how to rationalize the situation and make pertinent decisions. The communists felt for the first time that they now had to deal not with just any bourgeois politician, but with a man who understood the significance of the contemporary revolution in the world.

Kennedy possessed not only a keen sense of history but also of ideology: two very rare qualities in Anglo-Saxon, and particularly American, politicians. The strength of the United States lies in its firm economic stability, in the organic material power that created it. Their strength lay, to a certain extent, in their ignorance and complete disinterest in ideology, which in turn was their weakness. Kennedy and his collaborators recognized the value of ideology and made great efforts to understand it and arm themselves against it. In this respect, they encountered incomprehension from their own supporters and allies, but in the end, they would have won.

This was all the more true given the deep internal crisis in the Soviet Union and the communist countries, and the fact that Moscow no longer controlled the communist world. It is difficult to say to what extent they were convinced of the need to liberate southeastern Europe from communism. The Kennedy administration stopped talking about liberation from communism, but if it had used the language of previous administrations, it would have amounted to the same thing. In a sense, it was better not to have used that language when it knew it had no other option but to act in stages. In any case, Kennedy's merit lay in having acted in such a way as to force Russia to withdraw from Europe.

In that arena, the most serious issue was Kennedy's conflict with De Gaulle, a conflict so unnecessary for Washington and Western Europe that it will continue to deepen at a time when European unity is essential for all oppressed peoples, and when the communist world is grappling with its worst crisis. One can only speculate that Kennedy might have avoided such a deviation and such disagreements in the West and among Westerners.

All these events that define Kennedy's personality and make him so remarkable in contemporary world history characterized only the beginning of his administration. They could not have been fully developed or completed in three years, as it took eight years for his power to fully manifest and for the United States to be placed on new foundations. Thus, they remain fragmented, and it is difficult to predict whether anyone will be capable of successfully completing what Kennedy began.

It is necessary to hope that the new president, L. B. Johnson, will try to complete many of Kennedy's revolutionary innovations, although it is obvious that he will not proceed in the same way as Kennedy.

What characterized this young man was his profound and refined sense of culture and intellectual pursuits. Many even claim that in certain institutions and administrative bodies, intellectuals proved more effective than so-called businessmen. Kennedy elevated intellectuals, painters, actors, writers—in short, artists—to their rightful place, artists who had previously been not only relegated but despised.

Under Eisenhower, the businessman reigned supreme; the more aggressive and vulgar he was, the more popular he became. In the Kennedy era, it was considered a mark of distinction to have professors at one's table, not only in the White House but throughout Washington society. North America was freeing itself from provincial bourgeois affectation, and esteem for intellectual pursuits and culture surpassed the mediocrity of petty-bourgeois life. This is why Europe understood this style better, as it was the most highly valued mode and style in Europe. Finally, the conviction was strengthened that, even in democratic countries, intellectual elites had to guide policy.

In all of this, Kennedy evoked the memory of Lorenzo the Magnificent, of whom Guicciardini said that he tried with all his might to ensure peace for Florence, teaching its enemies how they should behave in order to guarantee its spiritual, cultural, and economic progress. Kennedy felt precisely that the United States was at the beginning of its material and spiritual renaissance and that peace was necessary to gradually transform its enormous quantitative potential into qualitative. Kennedy understood that the strength of a civilization lies in its quality, not its quantity; he was well on his way to achieving this synthesis.

That is why his absence is so painful today and leaves us with a sense of emptiness. Kennedy understood that an industrial civilization cannot live and develop without simultaneously forging its humanism. Industrial society without democracy gradually becomes an oppressive totalitarianism. Democracy without humanism strips industrial civilization of its very essence. American democracy, which developed through the industrial revolution, was, under Kennedy, on the path to realizing its humanism, capable of offering new possibilities to the West.

The mercantile and technocratic world cannot guide humanity in its pursuit of happiness solely through industry and democracy. It must do so through humanism, a renewal both within and without. Kennedy was on the verge not only of intuiting all of this, but also of showing his compatriots how to rise to the level of a nation that leads the world. The question remains whether there will be those who follow this path and who will, in fact, open "the new frontier" that Kennedy announced to his country and to humanity.

If this path is not followed, then Kennedy's legacy will resemble a star that shines only once in the sky before vanishing back into darkness. That is why it is so important that his nation understands this, so that it can continue and successfully complete the policies he initiated, thereby opening the "new frontier" that oppressed humanity has awaited and longed for for years.

Nothing is ever truly lost in the world's process, and it is reasonable to believe that Kennedy's legacy will also be realized. This should be the responsibility of the new generation that he introduced onto the historical stage and for whom he paved such a profound path. All indications suggest that this generation has grasped his legacy and is prepared to continue John F. Kennedy's work—that is, to finish it.

Farleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey.

O tempora, o mores

In memoriam J. F. Kennedy

Willelmus Meinzl, Academiae Willelmi Raymond

Ac velut in somnis, oculos ubi languida pressit,

Nocte quies, nequiquam avidos extendere cursus,

Velle videmur et in mediis conatibus aegri,

Succidimus no lingua valet, no corpora notae,

Sufficiunt vires, nec vox aut verba sequuntur.

/Vergilius, Aen. XII/

Infelicem et miserum me esse teneo, occasione mortis, viri sapientissimi atque, exoptatissimi, ducis excellentissimi et doctissimi, praesidis prudentissimi Joannis Kennedy, magnum dolorem nostrum ac maximam maestitiam in hac die exprimere.

"Crudelis ubique luctus, ubique pavor,

et plurima mortis imago"

/Vergilius, Aen./

Quae est caqusa tristitiae nostrae?

"Unde iste fletus? Unde in has lacrimae genas?

Invictus olim voltus et numquam malis lacrimas

Suis praebere consuetus, iam flere didicit".

/Seneca, Hercules/

Gravissimae interim res acciderunt. Dux amantissimus, praeses Civitatum Feoderalium Americae Septemtrionalis, vir summo ingenio, imperatoriaque forma, civis vero optimus, qui prudentiam et audatiam, cum fide, integritate, temperantia et honestate iunxit, a. d. X. Kalen, Decembrr. a. D. 1963, in Dallas - Texas, interfectus est.

"O miserum et infelicem illum diem, quam cito ella omnia ex laetitia

et voluptate ad luctum et lacrimas reciderunt"

/Cicero, Pro Sula, 31/

Patria nostra pulcherima, fiorentissima, potentissima, optimun virum perdidit. Erat eloquentia copiosus et exuberans, poteratque quidquid vellet apertissime et lucidissime exprimere. Quadraquinta sex natus in optimo robore aetatis obiit. Clarissimo genere ortus, semper divitiis abundavit. Adulescens militari fortitudine atque audacia in bello multos superavit. In rebus gerendis proptissimus de futuris callidissime conjiciebat, de instantibus verissime iudicabat. Eum nemo anteiret virtutibus. Humanitate et doctrina praestaret omnes. Certam pacem magis quam speratam victoriam seu bellum malebat.

Neminem huic praefero magnitudine animi et in amore erga patriam. Omnia ad maius auxilium pauperorum, ad opem impotentium, ad salutem mercenariorum fecit. Utinam tales viri semper rei publicae praeficierentur.

Et quis interfector incliti praesidis fuit?

"Sed quo nefandum facinus admissum loco est,

Memorate: Aperto Marte an insidiis iacet".

/Seneca, Oedipus/

Insidiis. Praedomum manus necavit eum. "Torpor insedit per artus,

frigidus sanquis coit".

/Seneca, Oedipus/

Lee Oswald, homo violentus, insanus, demens, atrox, cujus corde fides cesserit, ore pudor, occidit eum. Oswald, homo obscuro loco natus, flagitiis atque facinoribus coopertus, moribus coruptus interfector fuit.

"Nec tibi longa manent sceleratae gaudia caedis...

Caedem expiari regiam exilio deus,

Non ante caelo lucidus curret dies,

Haustusque tutos aetheris puri dabit".

/Seneca, Oedipus/

O Dii immortales... O tempora... O mores; Ubinam gentium sumus? In qua urbe vivimus? Quam rem publicam habemus?

/Cicero, Orat. in Catal./

Quam securitatis urbanae curam habemus? Quenam ista regio est?

"Cui dabit partis scelus expiandi,

Jupiter? Tandem venias, praecamur,

nube candentis umeros amictus,

Augur Apollo.

/Horatius, Carm. Od. 2./

Quidnam loquar? Responsa dubia iacent. Quid vobis Ciceronis?

"Hic, hic sunt nostro in numero... qui de meo, nostrumque omnium

interitu, qui de huius urbis, antque adeo orbis terrarum exitio

cogitent" ... "Nos autem viri fortes, satisfacere rei publicae

videmur, si istorum furorem ac tela vitemus".

/Cicero, In Cat. I./

Deus per quem proficiunt universa, per quem cuncta firmantur - in hac chaotica historiae hora sit adiumentum nostrum.

Cum magna pompa, commitantibus omnibus optimis ex toto orbe terrarum in coementerio Arlington sepultus est.

"O triste plane, acerbumque funus".

/Plinius, Epist./

"... silet arduus aether, tum zephyri posuere. Premit placida aequora

pontus, accipite ergo animis atque haec mea figite dicta".

/Virgilius, Aen. X./

Quamobrem et gratiam tibi habemus et habituri sumus, quoad vivemus, maximam:

"Lucida dum current amnosi sidera mundi,

Oceanus clausum dum fluctibus ambient orbem,

Lunaque dimissos dum plena recolliget ignes,

Dum matutinos praedicet Lucifer ortus,

Altaque caeruleum dum Nerea nesciet Arctos..."

/Seneca, Oedipus/

"Quidquid ex eo amavimus, quidquid mirati sumus, manet mansurumque

est in animis hominum, in aeternitate temporum, fama rerum. Nam

multos velut inglorios et ignobilis oblivio obruet; ille posteritati

narratus et traditus superstes erit".

/Tacit. Annal. De v. Jul. Agr./

Sit tibi terra levis. Oremus, ut aeterna pace fruatur.

Vallis de Portola, California, a.d. V. Kalend. Decembr. a.D. 1963.

The Croatian Glagolitza: On the Occasion of the 1100th Anniversary of the Actions of Saints Cyril and Methodius (863-1963)

Marko Japundzic, Rome, Italy

On May 11, 1963, the feast day of Saints Cyril and Methodius (according to the Eastern rite), Pope John XXIII solemnly signed, in the presence of representatives of all Slavic peoples, his apostolic letter Magnificus Eventus, thus inaugurating the commemorative celebrations for the 1100th anniversary of the actions of Saints Cyril and Methodius.

This papal message brings to mind the encyclical Grande Munus (Great Work) of the great Pope Leo XIII, published a century earlier, which marked the beginning of a new era in the field of Slavic studies.

When Leo XIII published his encyclical, it did not find a warm reception in the Latin and Germanic nations, and even the separated Slavs considered it mere propaganda from Rome.

Pope John XXIII's message, on the other hand, had a great impact among the Germans, who, between June 12 and 16, 1963, organized a large congress of Slavicists in Salzburg. This congress, in addition to discussing scientific problems, constituted a significant religious event. It was a kind of compensation for the lack of such demonstrations, precisely in the countries where Saints Cyril and Methodius lived and worked, and where today they can only be considered philosophers and educators.

Saints Cyril and Methodius, of Greek origin, were born in Thessaloniki, Macedonia, where many Slavs lived alongside Greeks. First they were high-ranking state officials, then monks, missionaries among the Casaros on the Sea of Azov, and finally, in 863, the Byzantine Emperor Michael III sent them to Moravia at the request of the Moravian prince Rastislav. In Moravia, they introduced the Slavic liturgy and founded the Slavic ecclesiastical hierarchy. Saint Cyril died in Rome in 869 and Saint Methodius in Moravia in 885. After Saint Methodius's death, the disciples of the two brothers were expelled from Moravia, and their work was destroyed.

In the last hundred years, much has been written about their work. Based on legends and the biographies of Saints Cyril and Methodius, which in many respects were indeed legendary, it was thought, among other things, that Saint Cyril had "invented" the Glagolitic script and introduced the Eastern liturgy to Moravia. The Glagolitic script remains the most debated issue. Recent studies, especially those conducted after the Second World War, have brought new perspectives to the problem of Glagolitic script and liturgy.

It appears that most of the Croatian provinces were incorporated into the greater metropolis of Methodius, and thus it is easy to understand why almost all Glagolitic missals and breviaries mention the feast of the Holy Brothers, while some also contain their office.

I dedicate this work, which deals with recent studies on problems that have remained unclear until now, to the memory of Saints Cyril and Methodius, who spread the truth, and therefore, a sincere effort in the search for highest historical truth is the honor we can pay them.

The term "Glagolites" currently encompasses three things: Glagolitic script, the Old Slavic Croatian liturgy, and Glagolitic bibliography—that is, all writings in Glagolitic script.

The original term "Glagolitza" refers only to the script that took its name from the fourth letter of the Old Slavic alphabet, "Glagolju" (the earliest form being "Glagoljo"), meaning "I speak." We have known "Glagolitza" in this sense since the 14th century. Later, especially in popular usage, "Glagolitza" became the term for religious services of the same name, eventually encompassing everything written in Glagolitic script.

Here, we propose to provide a brief overview of the origin of Glagolitic script, Glagolitic religious services, and finally, a summary of Glagolitic literature.

I. The Croatian Glagolitic Script

Besides the Etruscan script, the Latin alphabet, the Greek alphabet, and Gothic runes, we find two more scripts used by Slavic peoples in Europe: Cyrillic, which in its modern form is the national script of Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins—that is, of the East and South Slavs who use the Byzantine rite in their liturgy—and Glagolitic, which, with few exceptions, belonged and still belongs exclusively to the Croatian people.

Where did the Croatians get the Glagolitic script? This is a question that has interested, and continues to interest, Slavic scholars. Various theories have been put forward about the origin of the Glagolitic script, and new ones continue to emerge. We will cite the most important ones:

1. The theory of St. Jerome, in the strict sense of the term, attributes the origin of the Glagolitic script to the Doctor of the Church, St. Jerome (d. c. 420), born in the Dalmatian city of Stridone, that is to say, in the territory populated by Croats from the 6th and 7th centuries. We find this theory, expressed with complete clarity, in the rescript of Pope Innocent IV to the Bishop of Senj, Philip, in 1248. In the opinion of Professor J. Hamm,[44] this theory is no earlier than the 11th century and was invented by Glagolitic priests to protect themselves from the attacks of the Latin priests in Dalmatia who, especially during the time of the Cluniac reforms,[45] viewed the Glagolitic liturgy with suspicion.

The renowned Czech Slavist J. Dobrovsky[46] went even further, arguing that Glagolitic script dates from the 14th century as a counterweight to the Orthodox Cyrillic script. G. Dobner[47], a respected Czech historian and Slavist, refuted Dobrovsky's thesis, demonstrating that Glagolitic codices are much older than the 14th century. We now know that some date from the 10th century. We even find in Maurus Hrabanus, from the 8th century, the assertion that Saint Jerome composed a script[48]. It is true that he does not say what Glagolitic is, and the form of the script that is known there is completely distorted, so it tells us nothing. But his assertion takes us back to the 8th century, and consequently, this theory, rightly or wrongly, was based on a claim thousands of years old.

Today, this theory has been discarded, at least in the form described, and exists in a broader sense, meaning that the origin of Glagolitzian script must be sought before the 9th century, therefore before the missionary work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.

2. The Theory of Saints Cyril and Methodius. When Slavic studies began to develop at the end of the 18th century, the new theory, still in force today, took shape and gained a large number of adherents. The Slavists, rejecting Saint Jerome's theory as impossible, proclaimed that Saint Cyril was the inventor of the Slavic script and that he used Greek minuscule as its basis. As proof, they cite four documents: a) The Life of Saint Cyril, b) The Croatian Chronicle, now known as "Ljetopis popa Dukljanina", c) The treatise on the origin of the Slavic script by the monk Hrabar, d) The letter of Pope John VIII of 880 [49]. The first three documents survive in 14th- and 15th-century transcriptions, and the first two, in particular, relate, in legendary form, how Saint Cyril, after a very long period of fasting and prayer, was enlightened and invented the Slavic script. Although some have sought to dismiss the first three documents as lacking historical value, either because of their legendary content or because only 14th- and 15th-century transcriptions are available, the letter of Pope John VIII remains, which undoubtedly confirms: "Litteras denique Slavinicas a Constantino quondam philosoph reppertas, quibus Deo laudes debite, iure laudamus..." [50].

Since no document explicitly states which of the two Slavic scripts it was, Glagolitic or Cyrillic, the problem was resolved by the Croatian Slavist V. Jagic, more through his prestige than through the arguments he presented.[51] He noted that, based on its paleographic appearance, Glagolitic script predates Cyrillic, concluding: the script invented by Saint Cyril is Glagolitic and not the Cyrillic script that bears his name. But the great Slavist did not consider the possibility that if Glagolitic letters are older than Cyrillic, they might be older than Saint Cyril himself.As we have said, this theory was long considered the only valid and scientific one.

3. The Gothic Theory. Ignoring the other theories that left no noteworthy traces, we will mention the Gothic theory, which, without having much impact, has been persistently maintained. Among the Croatians, Professor K. Segvic[52] supported this theory, basing it primarily on historical facts. In his opinion, the Croats immigrated to their present-day homeland as Christians, supporters of Arianism, and consequently, the Bible was translated from Ulfila's Bible[53], and the basis of Glagolitic script was Gothic runes. Professor Hamm also supported this theory[54], but from a different perspective.

Hamm demonstrated, from a paleographic, or rather graphic, point of view, the similarity between Glagolitic and Gothic runes. His second proof was philological. He attempted to demonstrate the morphological, syntactic, and lexicographical similarity between Ulfila's translation and the Slavic translation of the Holy Scriptures. Professor Hamm then termed his theory the "migration hypothesis," linking it to the fact that the territory of present-day Croatia was once inhabited by the Goths, who left behind certain documents.

Therefore, it would be necessary to prove that links existed, or could have existed, between the Croats and the Goths. This theory was also abandoned. The Arian sect was local in nature and could have reached Croatia through various routes, not directly through the Goths. We find philological similarities in all the ancient translations of the Holy Scriptures: Latin, Armenian, Gothic, Coptic, Syriac, etc., since they all used the original Greek (except for the Gospel of Matthew, written in Aramaic). However, what is important are the real differences, so pronounced that the Slavic Holy Scriptures could not have been translated from Gothic.

4. More recent opinions revert to the older thesis: Glagolitic script predates Saint Cyril. Although this opinion was never entirely abandoned, it is now embraced with new arguments, especially by foreign experts, and specifically by I. Ohienko, E. Georgiev, and particularly M. Hocij, who in 1940 wrote an extensive work on the origin of Glagolitic script. This study went unnoticed due to the vicissitudes of the last war, only to be discussed at length in 1953 by W. Lettenbauer.[55]

Hocij deduces Glagolitic script from the pre-Carolingian cursive of the 7th and 8th centuries, particularly from Merovingian and Lombardic Italian cursive. Only in a few cases are Glagolitic letters derived from other scripts. This script developed because scribes sought to simplify the stroke of each letter, slanting it to the right without returning to the left and right, as was the case with Latin letters.

In this way, the scribes facilitated their work. It is evident that writing was not invented by a single man but developed gradually. Hocij places its origin in the 8th century, in the area of Venice and Istria. This timeframe coincides with the activities of Benedictine missionaries in Croatia, and the region of its origin does indeed correspond with the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Aquileia. Hocij also offers further arguments to support the Latin origin of Glagolitzia[56].

Petar Skok, based on a philological study of Church Slavonic terminology, reaches a similar conclusion. He states: "I believe that this analysis as a whole justifies the conclusion that missionary activity in the Croatian regions during the 8th and 9th centuries originated in Aquileia. The historical study of documents can only corroborate the linguistic conclusion. Therefore, our Glagolitzia developed in the territory evangelized from Aquileia"[57].

According to the Russian archimandrite Antonin Kapustin, who traveled to Mount Athos and the Holy Land in the last century, to Mount Sinai and Saint Catherine's Monastery, Glagolitic missals were kept in chests alongside Latin manuscripts, not Eastern ones, while Cyrillic manuscripts were kept with Eastern ones. It is obvious, then, that they were considered Western manuscripts. The oldest Glagolitic texts contain many passages from the Vulgate and many Germanic elements that could have appeared there simply because they were transferred from Western, not Eastern, texts.

The aforementioned monk Hrabar states in his treatise that before embracing Christianity, the Slavs wrote with Greek and Latin letters, but without "deformations."

Here, we should add the theory of Saint Jerome, which would be linked to the cosmography of Ethicus, written in Greek and later abridged in Latin by Saint Jerome. According to K. Pertz's research, St. Jerome's "Breviarium" was written between 396 and 400.

This assertion is opposed by H. Löwe, who places the work after 768. According to him, Ethicus is a pseudonym, and his Latin reveals signs of Irish orthography. Therefore, Löwe concludes that the author was, in fact, the Irishman Virgil, Bishop of Salzburg from 743, relying on the authority of St. Jerome. In any case, he was familiar with Glagolitic script, which means that it already existed, if not in St. Jerome's time, at least during his lifetime, that is, in the 8th century [58].

Thus, the most recent research also proves the veracity of the older thesis that Glagolitic is the Croatian script, both in its origin and its origin. It originated on Croatian soil and for over a millennium remained the Croatian script, used in public, ecclesiastical, and private life.

More than a century ago, parish registers were written in Glagolitza in the Croatian Littoral and Dalmatia; Croatian Franciscans of the Third Order use it for their conventual records, homilies, and reflections; and in municipalities, public notaries draw up wills and sales contracts.

Currently, for practical reasons, Glagolitza has disappeared from public and private life, though it is still used in the Church (in fact, due to its uninterrupted ecclesiastical use, Glagolitza has become, in a way, the "sacred script," similar to Egyptian hieroglyphs).

II. The Croatian Glagolitic Liturgy

During the first part of the Second Vatican Council, many learned about the Croatian Glagolitic liturgy. The Croatians are the only people in the Western Church who, for more than a millennium, have celebrated the liturgy in their national language.

Where does this privilege come from? Here, too, the same theories that arose regarding the origin of Glagolitic script resurfaced, since writing and liturgy go hand in hand. The liturgy in the national language necessarily required a corresponding script, since neither Latin nor Greek, with only 22 characters, could satisfy the phonetic needs of the ancient Slavic language, which had many more phonemes.

Alongside the theory of Cyril and Methodius on the origin of writing runs a parallel theory on the origin of the Slavic liturgy. This theory is quite simple. In 863, Saints Cyril and Methodius arrived in Moravia, sent by Emperor Michael and invited by Prince Rastislav, where they ministered among the Slavs, introducing the Slavic liturgy and establishing their own hierarchy.

After Methodius' death (in 885) and the deaths of Prince Rastislav and his successor Svetopuk, the German bishops expelled Methodius' disciples, usurping the ecclesiastical hierarchy. These expelled disciples went to other Slavic regions, introducing the Slavic liturgy there.

What was this liturgy, introduced by the holy brothers? It is difficult to say today. If we rely on the biography of Saint Cyril, it seems to have been the Byzantine liturgy. His "legend" states that Cyril began the translation of Holy Scripture with the Gospels: "Iskoni be slovo i slovo be u Boga. In principio erat Verbum et Verbum erat apud Deum." This Gospel is read in the Byzantine liturgy on Easter Sunday, which inaugurates the annual liturgical cycle in the Byzantine rite, while in the Roman liturgy, this cycle begins with Advent. Most Slavic scholars of the Byzantine rite believe that Saints Cyril and Methodius introduced the Byzantine rite, since they themselves belonged to it.

If we rely on the apocryphal epistle of Adrian II (867-872) and the epistle of John VIII (872-882), then it could only have been the Roman liturgy, since these epistles explicitly mention it. It is difficult to imagine that during the reign of Photius (827-898) and his schism, the introduction of the Byzantine rite into a vast territory was simply permitted, which at that time amounted to placing it under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Recently, J. Vasica conjectured that the liturgy introduced by Saints Cyril and Methodius was the so-called Liturgy of Saint Peter.[59] In his philological research, Vasica observed that many terms in the "kyiv Leaves"[60], as well as in the oldest surviving Croatian Glagolitic missal[61], have similar or identical meanings to the Greek text of the Liturgy of Saint Peter. From this, it was deduced that the first liturgy introduced by the Slavic apostles was precisely the Liturgy of Saint Peter.

The Liturgy of Saint Peter originated in Macedonia, probably between the 8th and 9th centuries. Macedonia lay on the border between the Eastern and Western Roman Empires and, in a political and administrative sense, belonged to the Eastern Empire and, consequently, to the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Byzantine Rite (at least during the period in question). But, as is often the case in border regions, peoples, languages, cultures, and religions mingled here as well. The Western Rite extended locally as far as Constantinople, while the Byzantine Rite spread sporadically to the Pannonian Plain. In this area, where both rites exerted considerable influence, a new liturgy was created, known as the Liturgy of Saint Peter, since its proponents attributed it to Saint Peter, who supposedly introduced it first in Rome, thus making it the original Roman liturgy. That liturgy in its first part (the mass of the catechumens) contained all the characteristics of the Byzantine liturgy, while in the second part (the mass of the believers) it resembled the Roman liturgy more in form than in text[62].

Such a liturgy could indeed have been suitable for Saints Cyril and Methodius to introduce, at least provisionally, into the territory that already belonged to the Roman rite. It is undeniable that it could not be sustained for long in that area, as evidenced by the attacks of the Latin German bishops against the Slavic liturgy.

Be that as it may, we are not concerned here with which rite was introduced into Moravia, since we are not addressing the topic of the Slavic liturgy in Moravia, but rather in Croatia.

Therefore, the question arises: did the disciples of the holy brothers truly introduce the Slavic liturgy into Croatia, or did it pre-exist, as the Croatian clergy previously believed? The proponents of the Cyril and Methodius theory lack direct documents and evidence, relying instead on suppositions and legendary accounts from the "Chronicle of the Priest Dukljanin." Historical facts and liturgical texts contradict this opinion.

The Croats were the first Slavic people to be baptized, as early as the 7th century, if they had not already been partially Christianized earlier. Baptism is linked to belonging to a rite and a specific hierarchy. Since the Croats settled within the territory of the Western Patriarchate, it is logical that they belonged to the Western Rite and were subject to the Western hierarchy, although the influence of Greek missionaries, and therefore local adherence to the Eastern Rite, should not be excluded, especially in the southern regions.

The question is whether the Western hierarchy could have remained unmoved as, after two or three centuries, Latin and perhaps even the Roman Rite were replaced by something new, Byzantine? Given that this was during the Photian Schism, a time of political tension between Rome and Byzantium due to the situation in Italy and the attitude of the Byzantine emperors toward the Popes, and considering that the spirit of reform, which would receive its greatest impetus at the Benedictine monastery of Cluny, was already being felt in Rome, the answer can only be one: the introduction of the new rite, or at least the new language, was impossible.

Looking at the problem from a historical perspective, the Slavic liturgy must have developed in Croatia long before the work of Saints Cyril and Methodius, that is, around the time of their baptism, in the 7th and 8th centuries. During this period, monks from Gaul (modern-day France) served as missionaries in Croatia. As we shall see shortly, they brought with them their Gallican rite. The region under its jurisdiction falls to the Patriarchate of Aquileia, the Archdioceses of Zadar and Split, and their suffragan dioceses. Some cities and most of the islands in Dalmatia form the so-called Byzantine Temat, where Mass is celebrated according to the Byzantine rite.

We are, therefore, in a situation similar to that of Macedonia, where rites intermingle, and this time the Byzantine rite penetrates Roman ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This is where we must look for the origin of the Slavic liturgy in Croatia. This opinion was expressed some time ago by the Bishop of Krk, Mahnic, in an official report to the Roman Curia, at a time when the problem of the Glagolitic liturgy was quite pressing.

Mahnic writes to the Holy See in his official report (in Italian): "...I deem it appropriate to add this to the opinion of those who believe that the Old Slavic language was introduced in place of Latin (that is, to replace Latin). This opinion is historically untenable and implausible. The Croats were baptized from the 7th to the 9th centuries, at a time when Latin had not yet been officially proclaimed the liturgical language of the Western Church...

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the Croats, arriving from the northeast, occupied, either by force or with the Emperor's consent, the provinces belonging to the Eastern Byzantine Empire, where Greek and other national languages were also used in the liturgy. It is undeniable that the Greek missionaries who came from Constantinople to preach Christianity to the Croats did not introduce Latin, just as the missionaries who came from Rome to other eastern provinces did not dare to introduce Latin there...

Moreover, in the In Dalmatian cities with Latin populations, such as Split, Rab, Osor, etc., Greek was used, at least partially, until the 12th century, according to Armelini (Prelezioni di Archelogia cristiana, p. 140). The same applies to the dioceses belonging to the Patriarchate of Aquileia, especially those in Istria. From this, it can be deduced (although it is not proven) that the Old Slavic language replaced Greek and in no way Latin" [63].

That the Glagolitic liturgy was in use in Croatian territory before Saints Cyril and Methodius is also attested to by liturgical biblical texts.

First, and in passing, we again mention the "kyiv Pages," much debated regarding their origin, duration, and end. St. Kuljbakin states that they are a translation of the Latin liturgy and, therefore, independent of the actions of Saints Cyril and Methodius.[64]

The main part of these pages was apparently written in Czech-Moravian territory, and the beginning was written in Croatian territory. The pages were written in the 10th century, copied from an older archetype or prototype. They contain 38 prayers belonging to 10 different Mass forms. The terminology is that of the Western Church. Those who support the Cyril and Methodius theory admit that the model was written in the 9th century, not earlier, since they link it to the work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.

K. Mohlberg, a Benedictine and professor at the Pontifical Archaeological Institute in Rome, demonstrated that the Mass formularies are based on the Paduan sacrament of the Benedictine Saint Gregory the Great (590-604), the Roman Pope. If we bear in mind that the Roman liturgy was introduced by order of Emperor Charlemagne (742-814) throughout his vast empire, replacing various local Gallican liturgies, we can reasonably ask why the translator of the "Kiev Papers" did not use the Mass formulary of his own time as a model, but rather its older form. Without finding a more logical answer, we can deduce that the model was translated at least between the 8th and 9th centuries, that is, at a time when its original was still in use.

Some time ago, a fragment of a 15th-century Croatian Glagolitic missal was discovered in Germany. This fragment contains three Mass formularies: for Palm Sunday, Holy Monday, and Holy Tuesday. Since these fragments belong neither to the Roman liturgy nor to any other known liturgy, I was consulted. After careful study, we can confirm that these formularies belong to the Gallican liturgy of Saint Martin of Tours and are found only in this liturgy.

Here, we would like to mention two things. First: Saint Martin was born in the city of Sabaria, Pannonia, around 315; he served as a missionary and bishop of Gaul, in the city of Tours, where he founded his own monastery and monastic order. He died in Tours in 397 and was buried there. Second: Gallic monks served as missionaries in Pannonia and Croatia from the 7th to the 9th centuries. If the liturgy of Saint Martin had reached Croatia, it could only have been brought by monks from the Tours region, and only during the period in which it was used there, that is, no later than the 7th or 8th century, since it disappears from Tours and its diocese afterward.

Precisely as we write this work, we are following the trail of a new and hitherto unknown missal, or at least part of one. It is a palimpsest. Deducing from two leaves that have come into our possession, the missal, or at least its original model, could be a century older than the Borgian-Illyrian Missal 4, now known as "the oldest Glagolitic missal." This missal, judging by the gradual of the third Christmas Mass, which we have before us, would be a Gallican missal. The contemporary discovery of new texts and the investigation of both old and very recent texts will surely yield results that no one could have imagined in the recent past.

While writing a review of a Glagolitic breviary from 1465 a few years ago [65], we noticed, comparing the biblical text with the Vulgate and the Greek text, that in certain places its content differs from that of the Vulgate and the Greek text. We found a similar difference in the Holy Scriptures in Ulfila's Gothic translation [66]. At first, we believed that the Croatian Glagolitic text was based on a Gothic prototype, as many had previously thought.

We then decided to study in depth the Croatian Glagolitic texts contained in the oldest Glagolitic missal. After patient and lengthy work, we have compared the Croatian Glagolitic Gospels with the translation of St. Cyril and Methodius, with the Vulgate, with the Itala, with the Vetus Latina (earlier translations before St. Jerome), and with the ancient Greek texts.

So far, we have found a thousand differences, both major and minor. While we have not yet finished this work and cannot offer a definitive opinion regarding the Gospel texts, we can state that most of the differences are found only in the Vetus Latina, primarily in the texts written in the Reims-Tours region. It is obvious that these differences in the Vetus Latina could not have crept into the Croatian texts from the Greek text, but only from the early Latin translations, which confirms once again that the Glagolitic Croatian biblical texts were translated before the translations of St. Cyril. Since the Vetus Latina was used in Gaul during the time of Charlemagne, we must conclude that the translation of the biblical texts is linked to the work of Gallic missionaries, and this no later than the 8th or 9th century.

From the above, it follows that, since there are two Slavic scripts, Cyrillic and Glagolitic, there were also two Slavic liturgies.

The more recent liturgy is linked to the missionary work of Saints Cyril and Methodius, with which the origin of the Cyrillic script is directly or indirectly connected. This liturgy eventually spread throughout the vast territory of Methodius's metropolis, which in the north extended from Moravia through all of Pannonia and included the eastern Croatian provinces: Srijem, Slavonia, and part of Bosnia; it then extended through Serbia, ending in Bulgaria and Macedonia to the south.

To the east, it reached Lesser Poland and the Russian lands (present-day Ukraine). With Methodius's death, this extensive metropolis disintegrated, primarily for political reasons, just as the entire work of the Holy Brothers originated from political and national considerations. With the disappearance of this metropolis, the Slavic liturgy gradually died out in that territory, surviving only in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, in the Byzantine rite, as these regions were under direct Byzantine influence and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Constantinople.

Another Slavic liturgy, at least a century older, developed in the territory of the western Croatian provinces: Istria, the Littoral, most of northern Croatia as far as Samobor (near Zagreb), parts of western Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and very likely present-day Montenegro. These are precisely the regions where, with very few exceptions, the Western Slavic liturgy has endured to this day. The origin of the Glagolitic script is linked to this liturgy. It developed through a natural process, and became so deeply rooted in the people that all the vicissitudes, particularly those of political origin, that accompanied it for a millennium, and there were so many, could not eradicate that Croatian liturgy.

Although the two liturgies followed their separate paths, it should not be assumed that there were no points of contact between them. The Holy Brothers, more than certainly, were familiar with Glagolitic liturgy. Moreover, as mentioned, the metropolis of Saint Methodius encompassed the eastern Croatian regions. There was, therefore, ample opportunity for ongoing mutual influence. Only by keeping these conditions in mind can we understand how Glagolitic liturgy could, at one time, reach as far as Macedonia and how, moreover, many Byzantine-Greek elements could penetrate the West Slavic liturgy, along with the aforementioned Byzantine influence in the Greek theme (province) of Dalmatia.

However, the Croatian Glagolitic liturgy did not remain a mere relic of the ages. It served its purpose both in the past and in the present.

In 1347, the Czech king Charles IV founded a monastery near Prague for Croatian Benedictines, known as Emmaus, which became the center of Slavic liturgy and later the headquarters of the movement for the union of dissenting Slavs with the Catholic Church. From there, Glagolites spread into Poland.

Matthew Karaman (1700-1771), a renowned Croatian missionary in Russia and later Archbishop of Zadar, in his numerous reports to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome, encouraged the founding in Russia of at least one monastery of Croatian Glagolite Benedictines and Franciscan Tertiary Glagolites. These monasteries would minister to Western Rite Catholics in Russia and, at the same time, bear witness to the Orthodox that the Catholic Church recognizes and maintains all rites and languages rooted in the Church. (See: Studia Croatica, No. 4, 1961, pp. 324-26).

Recently, some Slavic states, by virtue of a special agreement with the Holy See, obtained permission to introduce the Slavic liturgy into their territory, either in whole or in part. Thus, Montenegro obtained permission in 1886, the former Kingdom of Serbia in 1914, and Czechoslovakia in 1920, but only for the feast of their principal patron saints. In 1935, the Concordat with the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia stipulated the introduction of the Slavic liturgy in all Croatian dioceses throughout the territory of that kingdom, but the Serbian Orthodox clergy thwarted the entire project.

We would like to say something about the language of the liturgical books. Terms such as "the ancient Croatian language," "the mother of the Croatian language," etc., are often heard among Croatians. The Croats have no written documents in their language prior to the 6th century (the Baska Inscription, the Apostle of Grskovic, and the Vienna Pages, in the opinion of scholars, belong to that century). If we compare these documents with other contemporary liturgical writings from Pannonia or Macedonia, the grammatical and vocabulary differences are minimal, while the phonetic differences are greater. Nasals are lost, semivowels are replaced by full vowels, and the Proto-Slavic groups "tj, dj, sk" are replaced by "c, j, sc." This vocal process continues until the 14th and 15th centuries, while the grammar and vocabulary undergo very few modifications.

In contrast, if we compare the language of secular documents, for example, the statute of Vinodol (1228), we find a great deal of linguistic difference between these and the liturgical writings. From this, we can conclude that:

1) The languages of the Slavic peoples, until at least the 10th century, differed very little from one another.

2) The same thing happened with the language of the liturgical books as with Arabic, Greek, and Latin.

The current literary Arabic language is the language of the Quran, not the spoken vernacular. The vernacular of an Arab region or nation is often so different that Arabs from other regions can barely understand it. What unites Arabs today is the language of the Quran, not their vernacular languages.

Something similar happened with the literary Greek language, in fact the language of the Byzantine court, which differs from Classical Greek and even more so from the vernacular used in everyday life.

Ecclesiastical Latin also differs considerably from the classical language of Roman writers. Pope Gregory the Great (590-604) introduced it into religious use, replacing the popular or Vulgar Latin of the 6th century, which, according to the Pope, was so distorted that it was neither suitable nor worthy for liturgical services. The various later Italian dialects derived from the Vulgar Latin of that period.

As we have mentioned, the same phenomenon occurred with the language of the Slavic liturgical books. Initially, it was indeed the vernacular; later, it stabilized and became the "hieratic" (sacred) language of ecclesiastical books. Some authors, such as Vondrák, Leskien, and Hamm, rightly call it "Old Church Slavonic."

The language of the ecclesiastical books of the 6th and 17th centuries (printed in the diocese of Senj) is no longer Old Church Slavonic nor Croatian, although some missals refer to it as Croatian, for example. Kozicic's 1531 "Croatian Missal" is not the true language, but rather a mixture that would be more accurately described as "Slavic-Croatian," thus imitating our Serbian neighbors, who call their 18th-century language "Serbian-Slavic."

For the reasons stated above, the language of the ecclesiastical books can only be called, in the broadest sense, the mother of the Croatian language, though it would be more accurate to call it the older sister of the Croatian language.

III. The Croatian Glagolitic Bibliography

Since there are thick volumes on what the Glagolites bequeathed to us over the centuries, we cannot delve into details in the following review, so we will limit ourselves to pointing out the most significant aspects.[67]

Although the strict bibliography of the term refers to books and parchments, we cannot omit here three older Glagolitic documents engraved on stone, namely: the 11th-century Valun and Plomin inscriptions from Istria, and the Baska Tombstone, which, as Professor Hamm recently demonstrated, consists of three inscriptions, the first two from 1077 and the third from 1089.

This tombstone was inscribed at the Abbey of Saint Lucy, near Baska, on the island of Krk, and contains the donation of the Croatian king Zvonimir.[68] All three documents are important from a paleographic-philological point of view, as they demonstrate the development of the Croatian script and language. Furthermore, they are important from a political-national perspective, as they indicate the extent of the Croatian language and national territory from the earliest times. The gravestone in Baska bears the name of the great Croatian king Zvonimir, an ally of Pope Gregory VII, in his national form. We know the names of the other Croatian kings and princes of that era from documents written in Latin, as Latin was already the official language of educated Europe. (Since we are discussing documents inscribed on stone, we should also mention the baptismal font with a Glagolitic inscription dating from 1541 in Sterna, a place now in Slovenia. The inscription itself, as well as the names of the inhabitants, reveals that Croatian national territory extended into what is now Slovenia until the 16th century. This fact is well-known from other historical sources.)

As we have already emphasized, numerous Glagolitic documents exist, dating from the earliest times, and they pertain to all aspects of public life. Since Glagoli arose precisely from ecclesiastical and liturgical necessity, most of the documents relate to liturgical and ecclesiastical needs, such as missals, breviaries, psalters, lectionaries, rituals, codes, theological manuals, homilies, etc.

I must mention some of paramount importance: The oldest surviving missal, now kept in the Vatican Library (Borgiano-Illirico 4), was written in the mid-14th century in a large format, in two columns. The lettering is beautiful, adorned with vivid initials and typical ornaments. This missal is of great importance because it contains vestiges of the oldest Slavic liturgy, even more so than its biblical texts, which we have already discussed. V. Jagic dates it to the mid-14th century in a large format, in two columns.

The lettering is beautiful, adorned with vivid initials and typical ornaments. This missal is of great importance because it contains vestiges of the oldest Slavic liturgy, even more so than its biblical texts, which we have already discussed. V. Jagic places it in the mid-14th century, around 1350. Vajs places it at the beginning of the 14th century, between 1317 and 1323. Based on liturgical facts, we demonstrate that Jagic's opinion is more accurate.[69]

Regarding antiquities, we note that the Bodley Library in Oxford houses a missal (Cod. sign. M. S. Can. Lit. 172) whose last page is marked with the year 1310. Vajs considers this doubtful, given that the writing does not correspond to such antiquity. Based on its liturgical content, Vajs's opinion does not appear to be correct.

In addition to these complete ancient missals, there are some fragments predating them. These are the aforementioned "kyiv Leaves" from the 6th and 12th centuries, partly written in Croatian territory; the 12th-century fragments of Baska and Premuda; and fragments of the Kukuljevic Missal and the 13th-century Bribinje Missal.

The missal of Prince Novak Krbavski, now held in the National Library of Vienna (Cod. slav. 8), dates from 1368. Prince Novak wrote it himself for the salvation of his soul. The book is adorned with numerous colored and gold initials, contains several miniatures, and two large full-page illustrations.

The Roca Missal in Istria dates from the same century. Its lettering is neat. It is decorated with many initials and some miniatures. It contains the complete missal and part of the ritual, reproducing the rites of infant baptism, marriage, and various blessings. This content is more or less the same for all Glagolitic missals, and it is evident that, in terms of the rites, they were based on an archetype.

A missal that D. Parcic and I. Bercic date to the 14th century is held in the University Library of Ljubljana (Sign. C 162 a/2). We mention it because of its importance to art history due to its reproductions, and to paleography because of the rounded forms of some of its letters. It was written "pop Juri namestnik u Berme."

In the parish office of Vrbnik, a missal known as "Il misal vrbanski" is kept. Its letters are beautiful and angular. Up to folio 57, it bears Glagolitic initials, and from then until the end (L. 286), Latin initials. This is a very common phenomenon in other Glagolitic missals and breviaries.

Here we find an exceptional case. While other copyists strove to give each Glagolitic text the appropriate initial, the copyist here transcribed the Latin initials without any relation to the Glagolitic texts. Thus, for example, the third Christmas Mass, which in Glagolitic missals begins with the words "Otroce rodi se nam," begins in Latin missals with "Puer natus est nobis." It was expected that the Glagolitic missal would have the initial "O"; however, the copyist simply reproduced the Latin initial "P."

Finally, we mention the missal of the Duke of Split, Hrvoje, which dates from the 15th century. It was written by Butko. This missal was taken by the Turks of Budim as war booty to Istanbul, from where it was sent for study to the University of Vienna, where V. Jagic was a professor. On its return to Carigrad, it was lost. It is very likely that it ended up in its true homeland. The missal was illustrated with beautiful initials and reproductions. The paintings are allegorical: at the beginning, the months; symbolic: the four Evangelists; historical: various saints. According to specialists, the painter belonged to the Tuscan school.

Of the numerous breviaries, we would mention only the two-volume breviary kept in the Vatican Library (Borgiano-Illirico 5-6), dating from 1379 and 1387. This breviary is illustrated with very picturesque initials in typical Croatian ornamentation. It is of particular importance for the study of the Croatian calendar of saints. Along with the psalter and the other required parts of the breviary is the ritual section. This codex contains, at the end, the Office of the Holy Friars.

Since this office does not appear in the so-called "proprium" but at the end of the book, it is clear that it was added later. This codex is also distinctive for containing the Office of Saint Francis and its legend, written by Saint Bonaventure, the so-called "Major Legend," which makes it obvious that this is a Franciscan breviary. We should add that most Glagolitic missals and breviaries contain the Franciscan "proprium" of saints, whether they were originally written by the Franciscans or copied from Franciscan missals and breviaries. The matter is quite clear. Most rural priests were unable to translate liturgical texts directly from Latin and, for their needs, copied texts that had already been translated, mostly by monks.

When book printing was invented, the first Glagolitic printing press was established in Croatia very soon after, in 1482, in Kosinj, Lika. It was founded by Prince Anz VIII Frankopan Brinjski. He probably commissioned the type in Venice, and used as a model or matrix the missal of his wife's great-grandfather, Prince Novak Krbavski, who, as we have already seen, had written the missal himself in 1368. It was the first printing press in southeastern Slavic Europe. Suffice it to say that the first Russian book was not printed until 1611. From this first Croatian printing press came the first printed Glagolitic missal in 1483, modeled after the aforementioned missal of Prince Novak. The editor of the missal was "Godfather Plemenom Doljanin Kolunić, Godfather Broš Zakan," as can be deduced from the watermark in the missal.[70]

It is very likely that the oldest breviary, of which only one copy survives in Venice, in the Library of San Marco, was printed at the same press. After the battle at Krbava (in 1493), this region was sacked and plundered by the Turks, and the printing press, it seems, was moved to the Litoral. A series of printed missals and breviaries followed, of which we will mention the following:

In 1494, the second edition of the missal was published in Senj "with the permission and will of the Lord, of Don Blas Baromic and Don Silvestre Bedricic and of Deacon Gaspar Turcic." Canon Baromic was also the corrector of the Glagolitic breviary of 1493, and Silvestre Bedricic, Archdeacon of Senj, is the author of the book "Narucnik plebanusev" of 1507.

In 1528, a new Glagolitic missal was published in Venice, under the supervision of "Friar Paul Modrusanin, of the Seraphic Order of Saint Francis Conventual." The printers were Francesco Bidoni and Mafeo Pasyni.

In 1531, "...the Croatian Missal... corrected... by Father Simon Kozicic, of Zadar, Bishop of Modrus, printed in Rijeka at his residence..." was printed in Rijeka.

The last liturgical book printed before the Council of Trent was the so-called Brozic Code, which contains a breviary, missal, and ritual. This Code was printed in Venice, in the workshop of the sons of G. Francesco Turesani. The Glagolitic colophon reads: "Svrsenie privieli hirvackihn stampani va Bnecihn... znova ucineni po pre Mikuli Brozici plovani omiselskomn miseca marca 1531."

The year 1631 marks the beginning of a new period for the Croatian Glagolitic book. After the Council of Trent, the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome took charge of printing Glagolitic books. Its first Croatian Glagolitic missal was printed in 1631, and the first Glagolitic breviary in 1648. Both books were edited by the Franciscan friar Rafael Levaković, later Archbishop of Ohrid in Macedonia.

A characteristic of the Propaganda editions is that, linguistically, they were influenced by Ukrainian liturgical books. The cause of this alteration was due to the consultants and censors of the Propaganda, of Ukrainian origin, who considered the language of their liturgical books more accurate and perfect. To these first two editions should be added the breviary of 1688, even more Russified in its language; in 1706 Levakovic's missal was reprinted without any modification. In 1741, a new edition of the missal was published, edited by Matthew Karaman, later Archbishop of Zadar, with marked Russification. With this missal and the edition of a Glagolitic breviary in 1791, edited by Gocinic, the period of the Russian version of the Croatian Glagolitic liturgical books came to an end.[71]

By order of Pope Leo XIII, Antonio Dragutin Parcic, a canon of St. Jerome in Rome, first prepared "Rubrics and Order of Mass" in 1881, and in 1893 he edited the complete missal. In his compilation, Parcic used the oldest Croatian Glagolitic books, thus returning to the oldest linguistic form. The second edition of this missal was published in 1905, and in 1927 J. Vajs published it in Latin script. Vajs introduced a number of Czechisms into his edition and used an incorrect transcription, foreign to Croatians, thereby significantly distorting Parcic's edition.

Alongside the ecclesiastical and liturgical documents, we find a large number of secular documents; these include: history, law (canon and civil), verses, lexicons and grammars, public and private contracts, etc.

The "Vinodol Statute" of 1288 deserves mention, followed by a series of statutes and regulations governing public or public-ecclesiastical life, which today serve as a source of information on the legal life of the Croats of old.

Since there are many of these documents, and our space is limited, we cannot address each one separately.

Croatian versifiers added secular poems to their religious verses.[72] The father of modern Croatian literature, Marko Marulic of Split, found the model for his poem Judith, the first poem written in Croatian, directly or indirectly in Glagolitic texts.[73]

Thus, the Croats, who gladly studied at the renowned European universities (especially in Italy and Paris) from ancient times, enriching themselves with Western culture, did not abandon their own culture, which arose and developed on their native soil. Their efforts were not thwarted, as so many documents attest, neither by the centuries-long wars against the Turks in constant defense of Europe, nor by their more numerous and powerful neighbors who frequently tried to subjugate them politically and culturally.

IV. Saints Cyril and Methodius and the Croats

Before concluding, it is necessary to ask: what is the definitive conclusion of the most recent studies on the Glagolitic problem? Do the Croats owe anything to Saints Cyril and Methodius?

The first concise answer would be:

Regarding the Glagolitic script, today we can state with certainty that it is the Croatian national script, formed through the evolution of Latin script on Croatian soil. Paleography proves that Glagolitic is of Western origin, that is, a Latin script and not Greek, much less Eastern; Historical documents attest that Glagolitic script was known to Latin writers at least by the 8th century, that is, before the time of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Liturgical documents demonstrate that its model was the Latin liturgical manuals of the 7th and 8th centuries.

The logical conclusion can only be one: Glagolitic script predates Saint Cyril and, consequently, he could not have "invented" it (moreover, no script is invented; rather, it is formed through a natural process). Given that it is a Slavic script and that Glagolitic liturgical documents are of Latin origin, it could only have developed within the territory of the Western Rite Christian Slavs, that is, only within the territory of the Croats. Therefore, only one conclusion is possible: Glagolitic script developed in Croatia and, consequently, is the authentic Croatian script.

Cyril, if we adhere strictly to his legendary life, could only have invented the Cyrillic script, which, incidentally, is nothing more than the Greek curial script of the 9th century. It only required combining a few letters and adapting them to Old Slavic words, and Cyrillic was invented.

As for the Glagolitic liturgy, the matter seems much simpler. The Croats were baptized (or, as some insist, converted to the Catholic Church, since they were previously Arians) in the 7th century. They almost certainly belonged to the Western Rite. This rite, from its inception, could have been celebrated in Latin or in Slavic.

If it was celebrated in Latin, no one in the 9th or 10th century could have modified it, for those were the times of the Phocian schism, the conflict between the Eastern and Western Churches, and the era of reforms within the Western Church. Introducing anything belonging to the Eastern Church at that time would have been tantamount to recognizing the primacy of the East, something neither Rome nor the Croats themselves would accept. Furthermore, who could have introduced the national language?

The expelled disciples of the Holy Brothers, as is generally believed? The Moravian disciples remained in their homeland, as evidenced by the Sazava Monastery, where the Slavic liturgy was still celebrated in the 11th and 12th centuries. If there were expulsions, they could only have been the Macedonians, who were by no means numerous, at most a few dozen. That such a small group could have spread the Slavic liturgy under those circumstances is difficult to imagine. Here, too, only one conclusion is possible: the Slavic liturgy originated in Croatia and therefore remained only in Croatia.

Another question arises: what do the Croats owe to Saints Cyril and Methodius, and can they also consider them Slavic Apostles and Teachers?

Apostles (messengers of the faith) were, in the strictest sense of the word, only or almost only to the Moravians. If later the metropolitan ecclesiastical authority extended to all Slavic lands, and therefore all Slavs consider them Slavic Apostles, or currently, under the communist regime, Teachers and Enlighteners, we Croats can also call them that. Even more so than others, because we owe them more than others.

When the Holy Brothers decided to undertake the difficult mission in Moravia, they had to determine in advance the rite, language, and script they would use. Being Byzantine, the most natural thing would have been for them to opt for the Byzantine rite and the language of the region they were going to, since no one would understand Greek. But the script?

The Holy Brothers... Brothers, like high-ranking state officials, must have been familiar with the Croatian regions, at least those integrated into the Byzantine theme of Dalmatia (islands, some cities, and the western part of the Istrian coast), since they were highly regarded at the imperial court, as can be inferred from Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus's treatise "De Administrando Imperio" (On the Administration of the Empire). Constantine was quite familiar with Croatian history, citing the names of Croatian regions, rivers, and islands.

He even transmitted to us the ancient Croatian names of certain islands, which later disappeared under Roman and Italian influence. Therefore, even Saints Cyril and Methodius must have been familiar with the ecclesiastical conditions in Croatia, the Croatian liturgy, and the Croatian script. It is not improbable that they were already familiar with Glagoli in Thessaloniki, where there were many Slavs and where they learned the Slavic language.

Assuming that these Slavs possessed a certain level of education acquired in an enlightened environment, Glagolitic script could easily penetrate, directly or indirectly, into Macedonia, which, like the Dalmatian theme, belonged to Byzantium. Consequently, the choice of Glagolitic script was self-evident. If we also consider the constant attacks by the Latin clergy against the Byzantine rite, Cyril had to opt for the Latin rite very early on.

Where was he to find the model for his liturgical books? Also in Croatia. This is attested to by the "kyiv Pages," written in Glagolitic script and containing masses of the Western rite, translated from the archetype more or less used in the territory of the Patriarchate of Aquileia. It is evident, then, that the first original translation could only have been made in Croatia and not in Moravia, where later, only in transcriptions, it was adapted to the local pronunciation. This is clearly proven by the "Leaves of kyiv", which, in fact, are a mere transcription of another archetype.

In Jagic's opinion, who had closely linked the Croatian Glagolitic liturgy to the work of the Holy Brothers, the "kyiv Leaves" were written in Moravia, and only the first leaf was written in Croatia. This view is strongly opposed by the Czech scholar W. Vondrak, who maintains that the "kyiv Leaves" originated in the same place as the so-called "Frizing Leaves," namely the region of Istria-Carinthia.[74] Kuljbakin also disagrees with Jagic, without specifying where these leaves were written, but categorically denying that it could have been Moravia or any other North Slavic people.

In short, Saints Cyril and Methodius, in their missionary work among the North Slavs, made use of Croatian national script and liturgy. Moreover, this is not the first time that our national script and liturgy have spread northward. This would be repeated, as we have seen, during the reign of the Czech King Charles IV and for a third time after the First World War.

The Croats, therefore, have every right to appreciate their past and ample reason to thank Saints Cyril and Methodius, who for the first time demonstrated to the Slavic peoples and others what the Croats possess and who they are.

Today, when both Slavic and non-Slavic peoples commemorate and praise the work of the Holy Brothers, the Croats must also pay them homage and express their heartfelt gratitude. Therefore, we ask them, together with the great Pope Leo XIII:

In the heavenly court,

hear our prayer:

be a shield for the Slavs

so that they may always be with the Lord.

May one flock of Christ

gather the straying

and, following ancestral paths,

flourish in faith without ceasing.

(Ecclesiastical Hymn)

The Beijing-Moscow Dispute: Is It Merely Ideological?

Stjepan Ratkovic, Bolzano, Italy

The study we are publishing below was submitted to us a year ago, yet it has lost none of its relevance. The ongoing development of the "ideological" war between the Russians and the Chinese definitively corroborates the assertions of the author, an eminent Croatian geographer, that the disputes between the two giants within the communist "church" poorly conceal the essential and vital conflicts between the two superpowers: the Russian and Chinese nations.

The Chinese, the world's most populous nation with a high rate of population growth, aspire to new territories beyond their borders for their further development, such as the sparsely populated Asian parts of the Russian Empire. The Chinese intertwined their long-standing territorial claims with ideological and dialectical subtleties, even raising the issue of the return of vast regions that the Russians allegedly seized from them during the Tsarist era of expansion and colonization in Asia. Beijing also made sure to advocate for the liberation of Outer Mongolia.

Furthermore, during the recent Conference of Afro-Asian Peoples, the Chinese did not hesitate to veto the presence of Soviet representatives, arguing that the Russians are not an Asian people but a European one. There is no doubt that such arguments carry considerable weight in the era of decolonization, even after the end of the Khrushchev era. (The Editorial Staff)

The talks that began on July 5, 1962, in Moscow between the Central Committees of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, with the aim of smoothing over ideological differences, ended unsuccessfully after 15 days. This outcome disappointed the "comrades," those fanatically attached to the Party who docilely, blindly, and uncritically follow their leaders and believe in their infallibility. It also surprised the "critical" comrades and others who believe that those who hold power in a totalitarian state can arbitrarily determine their relations with other peoples and states, although the fate of two "leaders" of our time proves otherwise.

On the other hand, those who, following the teachings of the Swedish scholar of political and state affairs, Kjellén, see peoples and their political organizations as living beings, living organisms governed by the laws of life, including the specific vital conditions of each people and their state, were right.

The real needs of a state and the possibility of satisfying them arise from the reciprocal action of each of the properties of the state territory and the respective people, two fundamental elements that determine national policy. Kjellén was the first to introduce two new disciplines into anthropological geography when studying these influences, calling them "geopolitics" and "demopolitics."

A reasonable statesman seeks to extract from his nation's geo-demopolitical data its real needs and interests, resources, and possibilities for satisfying them, and consequently guide national policy, primarily foreign policy.

Analyzing the Russian-Chinese conflict, perhaps the most significant political event since the last world war, raises several questions that require appropriate answers:

1) In general, what is the importance of ideological identity or divergence in the life of a people or within a state? That is, what is its importance in international and interstate relations?

2) Admitting that the cause of this conflict lies in ideological differences, why did it arise precisely around the issue of the peaceful or violent expansion of communism in the world?

3) If this thesis is unacceptable as the sole and primary cause of the breakup of the hitherto "monolithic" communist bloc, what other antagonistic and real interests separate the two largest communist nations and their states?

4) How and why did this clash of vital interests—for that is all it can be—only become public now, after 15 years of apparent harmony?

5) It is understandable that initially the recriminations did not directly target the top leaders of both sides, but rather indirectly, through Tirana and Belgrade. Why precisely those two countries? For the crux of the problem, this aspect is secondary, though still interesting and illuminating. Both the communist and non-communist blocs are following this dispute with great interest, as it will determine whether the two most populous communist countries coordinate their policies, each pursues its own course, or—what would be more favorable to the West—whether their policies clash.

If it is merely a matter of ideological differences, the conflict can be resolved amicably sooner or later. However, it is another matter entirely if these ideological divergences are a symptom, or several symptoms, of the evil that corrodes and destroys communist monolithism. All indications suggest that this is indeed the case.

If the term ideology encompasses a set of ideas, thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and wills within a specific sphere of spiritual life (religious, social, political, etc.), then ideological agreement or divergence, as an important factor in the homogenization of the mass of individuals forming a spiritualized community, a higher-order social unit, can either strengthen or weaken its internal cohesion. Ideology can also act positively or negatively on the reciprocal relations between peoples and states, but here as a secondary factor, where the convergence or antagonism of other real interests already exists.

The firm political union of communist countries could be used as counter-evidence, meaning that ideological convergence can act as the main driving force of their mutual relations, but this would only hold true if the respective peoples had freely consented to that ideology and the reciprocal political bond. Likewise, Western countries did not unite closely because of their ideological convergence, but primarily because of their common defense and other real interests.

These facts justify the doubt as to whether ideological differences alone gave rise to such tense relations in the main communist parties and states. Both parties base their doctrine on Marx, both invoke Lenin, and both agree on the ultimate goal of the movement: the worldwide expansion of the communist social system. They differ only in tactics, in the paths to be followed.

Moscow is convinced that communism, due to its intrinsic advantages, will ultimately prevail and replace the "rotten" capitalist society. It believes that thermonuclear war is unnecessary and, consequently, advocates for the peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist countries. Beijing, on the other hand, considers this position a deviation from the true doctrine, revisionism, and remains faithful to the primary teachings, the "dogma" regarding the expansion and world domination of communism through revolutions and armed struggle, without considering the dangers of atomic war.

While this ideological difference is considerable, it pertains only to the method for achieving the proposed goal and does not justify the tense and almost hostile relations between the two states. There is, therefore, at least a justified doubt that these much-debated ideological differences are merely a disguise used by both Central Committees to conceal the existence of a profound conflict of real and vital interests between the two communist giants.

What those interests would be was not difficult to establish through the comparative analysis of the geo- and demopolitical factors in both States.

I

And what picture does such an analytical comparison paint? The Soviet Union, the world's largest state, covers an area of 22 million km² in Eastern Europe, North Asia, and Central Asia. More than 220 million people live in this territory today. The population comprises some 150 ethnic groups, most of them small. Russians are the most numerous and constitute the absolute majority and the decisive factor in the state. The population density is 10 per km². With the current territory, the Soviets have ample land, for decades and perhaps for centuries, for future generations.

The Soviet Union consists of two parts: the Western or European part, which extends west of the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea, and the Eastern Asian part. The former comprises 5.5 million km² and constitutes the main portion of the state. It has approximately 150 million inhabitants with a population density of 30 per 100,000 inhabitants, which represents roughly half the total population density of Europe. This is quite low compared to certain Western European countries (the Netherlands and Belgium have over 300 per 100,000 inhabitants; the United Kingdom and Germany over 200 per 100,000 inhabitants; and Italy 170 per 100,000 inhabitants).

In the hypothetical scenario that the Russians, or rather the Soviets, possessed only this territory, they would have ample space for their future generations for decades. Not only space, but also the potential for a full life. Low plains predominate; a favorable climate allows for the cultivation of all plants, while the central and southern areas encompass some of the most fertile cereal-producing regions in Europe. The Volga, the largest river in Europe, flows through this territory, and other major rivers of the European continent touch or pass through it.

The rivers are navigable and connect, via a network of canals, three seas, two of them enclosed, and the third, the Glacial Sea, open, which constitutes the only weak point in the Soviet Union's geopolitical situation. Large energy reserves exist in the waters, in the oil and gas of the Caucasus, and in the rich oil fields. Minerals are also abundant in both variety and quantity.

The production of raw materials, the energy reserves, the skilled workforce, and a large number of consumers provide a solid foundation for a powerful and diversified industry. The Soviet Union developed this industry extensively and today ranks among the world's largest industrial nations. And yet, industrial and economic development has fallen far short of fully realizing its potential.

According to this geopolitical and demographic situation, the Soviet Union, even if reduced to its western part, would, by its size and population, be the largest country in Europe, with the conditions to rank first as an economic and military power.

Moreover, the western European part of the Soviet Union represents only a quarter of the state's area. The remaining three-quarters, or 16.5 million km², extend east of the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. This is Siberia, stretching from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean (12.5 million km²), and the Aralocaspian Plain (4 million km²). Western Siberia is an immense plain, central Siberia is mountainous, and eastern Siberia is forested.

The climate is typical of Siberia, with long, harsh winters and short, hot summers. There are also very hot days. Humidity is plentiful, so plants grow almost everywhere. Half of the territory is covered by extensive Siberian forests. Cereals and other plants are cultivated in the black humus. There are great opportunities for raising livestock; numerous, fast-flowing rivers teem with fish.

The Siberian subsoil is very rich in minerals. Thus, all the conditions are ripe for industry, which the Soviets have been promoting extensively and at an accelerated pace in recent times. Administratively, Siberia is part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the largest of the 15 federal republics. There are few cities; the largest is Novosibirsk, with almost a million inhabitants.

The Aralocaspian Plain, politically known as Russian or Western Turkestan, stretches across southern Western Siberia. Its interior is a low-lying plain, extending to depressions, while the eastern and southern regions are forested. It experiences the dry continental climate of Central Asia. The bordering mountains receive abundant rainfall, which then flows down to rivers and lakes or is lost in the sand. The interior is steppe, partly desert steppe.

Dams provide irrigation. Instead of wheat fields, high-quality cotton is now cultivated. Extensive steppes are suitable for livestock grazing. Mineral wealth is also considerable. Here, too, the Russians promote industry. The inhabitants are mostly Turkic and Muslim peoples, and politically, Turkestan is divided into 5 of the 15 Soviet Republics.

This vast area of Russian Asia is home to approximately 50 million people. The population density is very low, and the majority of the population consists of Russian immigrants. There are vast areas with only one inhabitant per square kilometer. The sparsely populated European part of Russia cannot further populate its eastern regions. Therefore, Russians are a people with a great deal of uninhabited space. For Russia and Russians, Siberia and Turkestan (Turan) represent, indefinitely, a reserve of living space and the budget for maintaining their economic and political power in the world.

But this Russian possession in Asia, with its advantages, also has certain negative aspects. The Russians, a European people, crossed their natural eastern border at the end of the 16th century and very quickly, in less than 70 years, established themselves on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. This was the era in which some European countries founded their great colonial empires in the New World and South Asia, conquering other peoples' territories by force and imposing their authority. The Russians did the same in Asia, so the conquered territories are effectively Russian colonies, even though they are not separated from their "motherland" by sea.

Why did the Russians embark on the conquest of new territories when they had so few people, as is the case today in Europe? The force that drove them stems from the unconscious, instinctive desire to expand, inherent in all organisms. This instinct is innate in all peoples, though latent, becoming active under favorable circumstances. The examples of European colonial conquests likely stimulated the Russian autocrats.

This instinctive expansion of Russia was fueled by the desire to secure access to the open, warm sea, a goal always present for the Russians, which they have yet to achieve. This maritime landlocked status is, in fact, the only negative geopolitical aspect of that immense country.

The desire to reach the warm sea led the Russians through Manchuria to the southern cape of Liaodong, where they built the naval base of Port Arthur and the trading port of Dalnji (now Dairen). A defiant Japan expelled the Russians from Manchuria in 1905 and in 1932 formed the state of Manchukuo. Towards the end of World War II, Moscow revoked the non-aggression pact signed with Japan and invaded Manchuria, hoping to establish itself once again on a warm, open sea.

In addition to Siberia, the Russians also occupied Turkestan in the 19th century. Their expansionist instinct was further fueled by the desire to reach the open, warm sea, the Indian Ocean, via Afghanistan, through the Kabul Passes to the Inda Plain, a route once again thwarted by Great Britain.

Whether or not there are other reasons for Russia's expansion in Asia, its vast possessions there bear a distinctly colonial imprint, which in turn contributes to its weakness.

Due to humanity's universal aspiration to constantly improve what exists, the guiding ideas in political life also change over time. Thus, the era of the discovery of new lands simultaneously signified the era of colonialism. States sought to seize a greater number of colonies, which at the same time represented wealth, power, and prestige. What is happening today? After the Second World War, large colonial empires disappeared in South Asia, while in Africa, few colonies remain to gain independence. The possession of colonies no longer implies honor, but shame. The dominant political principle of these new times is anti-colonialism.

Political development sometimes gives rise to paradoxical situations, for in the colonial liberation movement, the most eloquent champion was precisely the Soviet Union, which, nevertheless, fiercely guards its immense colonial empire in Asia. How long will this continue? Until the affected peoples themselves begin to rebel or find a powerful protector who liberates them for mutual benefit. That protector could only be a large and powerful neighbor.

Another weakness of Russia's colonial possessions is their depopulation. The population density in Turkestan is 5 per km², and in Siberia slightly more than two; consequently, it is an almost uninhabited area. But the horror vacui also applies to geographical areas if they lend themselves to human settlement and life.

At the borders, the instinctive desires for expansion of neighboring peoples clash. Neighbors, therefore, are potential natural adversaries, often enemies. A sparsely populated or empty neighboring area is one of the many factors that stimulate and co-determine the direction of a neighbor's expansion.

On the borders of Russia's Asian possessions lie North Korea, Afghanistan, and Iran—harmless neighbors. But along the remaining borders, stretching over 1,000 kilometers, lies another communist power, China, its ideological rival. This is precisely the weakest and most dangerous point in the geopolitical and demopolitical position of this Asian part of Russia.

II

Let us now examine China's geopolitical and demopolitical conditions and the policies they impose upon it.

China occupies an area of almost 10 million km², as large as Europe. From a climatic standpoint, the most valuable part is the eastern region, from Greater Hingan to the Pacific Ocean (Manchuria, northern China, and southern China. The latter two are China proper). The remaining China (outer provinces) rises in enormous terraces into the interior of Central Asia. All of this forms a high plateau; tall, long mountains, including the Himalayas, surround the plateau and valleys and block the path of humid winds (monsoons).

The smaller eastern part has a non-tropical monsoon climate, and since northern China is abundant in fertile land, it is here that the largest arable areas are found. The interior of the country is dry, and because of the lack of water, there is insufficient irrigation; steppes, suitable for nomadic pastoralism, predominate there. These steppes become deserts (the Gobi Desert) and true deserts. Most of Tibet, the highest and largest plateau in the world, is a cold desert. The three largest rivers flow through the eastern part of the country and empty into the Pacific Ocean. The large rivers that originate in eastern or southern Tibet run through deep, impassable valleys toward the Indian subcontinent.

According to estimates, China had 700 million inhabitants on July 1, 1961, more than any other country. Almost 95% are Chinese, the most powerful people on earth. The remainder consists of other Asian peoples. Considering the entire Chinese territory, the population density is 70 per km², seven times the average density of the Soviet Union (10) and more than double that of its European part (30). If nature allowed for a more or less equal distribution of the population, this density would not be excessive. However, almost 95% of the population is concentrated in the smaller eastern part, where the density reaches figures recorded in few other places in the world, while the vast interior areas are "uninhabited and uninhabitable," to use the apt phrase of one geographer.

China, therefore, is overpopulated and, in contrast to the Soviet Union, is a nation without space, like an overheated steam boiler that compresses expansively in all directions and seeks escape. In the past, the Chinese migrated peacefully from their overpopulated homeland, present-day China proper, and settled in neighboring areas. They also emigrated to other countries, especially mainland India and overseas territories. In some countries, they formed considerable minorities (in the small state of Singapore, according to the 1960 census, out of a total population of 1,600,000, 1,200,000 were Chinese).

Such a situation was not in the best interest of the newly formed neighboring countries, nor was the constant emigration of its most capable young people to other countries pleasing to the dynamic and strategic policies of the new China. Improvement projects could not provide much land in the dry, water-scarce interior, while a streamlined economy and forced industrialization could bring only momentary relief.

Internal pressure did not diminish but rather increased, strengthening the natural drive for expansion. To the south, in overpopulated India, very little space was available. A little more might be found in coastal India, in the river valleys that form the world's major rice-growing regions, but these were already very densely populated. A war against densely populated, forested islands would also not provide much new territory, even if it had good prospects of being waged against Japan.

But why should China direct its natural expansion in unproductive directions when beyond its northern and western borders lie immense, habitable, and almost uninhabited areas? Instinctive expansion follows this course, and it is quite certain that the Chinese leadership is seriously considering this matter.

Only here can new territory and new opportunities for life be found for tens and hundreds of millions of Chinese. Moreover, China would fulfill an "honorable" mission by eliminating the remaining vestiges of colonialism in Asia and "liberating" its "brotherly" peoples from subordination to the foreign, the white man. China can argue that Russia must resign itself to this, since, during the decolonization campaign, the Russians shouted the slogan "Africa for the Africans" and demanded that "Asia must belong to the Asian peoples."

This desire for primacy expresses not only vanity and the fulfillment of justified ambitions, but also carries great political significance. Communist countries do not pursue an independent policy without subordinating it to that of Moscow, which, even in non-communist countries, maintains subversive agents and cadres of blindly loyal adherents within both public and clandestine communist parties. If the communists firmly believe their victory is assured, then Moscow and Beijing will dictate world policy. What will such a role mean for the respective country? We are witnessing the feverish agitation of the Chinese communists to attract communists in all countries.

III.

The present comparison of geopolitical and demopolitical factors, combined with the ethnobiological and ethnopsychological characteristics of national identities and their states, clearly shows that an illusory idyll, a peaceful proximity without the aspirations and pretensions of one rival to what the other possesses, cannot last between Moscow and Beijing. In accordance with the laws of nature, the inevitable antagonism erupted, for now masked by the cloak of ideological differences.

Let us now examine another aspect of the problem and analyze the reasons why this ideological conflict lies in the peaceful tolerance of one side and the belligerent aggression of the other. Both arguments have their convincing explanations. As long as peace reigns, China cannot even dream of realizing its plans in Asian Russia and the communist world.

It must wait patiently, strengthen its economy, train cadres, and promote industry, especially the arms industry, in order to supply modern weapons to its army of over one hundred million. The Chinese are a patient people, but internal pressure is mounting as the population grows by 20 million per year (the Soviet Union's population growth rate is 4-5 million per year).

But the waiting period could expire with the outbreak of thermonuclear war. What would be its likely consequences? In the United States and Western European countries, cities and industries would be destroyed, and tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of men would be dead or succumb to the atomic poison.

The survivors would begin a new life on the ruins. Similar destructive effects would also befall the Soviet Union and its satellites, but the question arises as to whether the latter would maintain the imposed order and whether, within the Soviet Union itself, the Baltic, Karelian, Ukrainian, Armenian, and other peoples would not try to reclaim their national freedom. It is very likely that the destruction wrought by war would be accompanied by the disintegration of the Soviet state.

In such a predicament, could Russia defend its Asian possessions if those peoples, subjugated by their own initiative or at the instigation of others, were to rise up and the armies of its powerful neighbor came to their aid to "liberate" them and subject them to its yoke? China, without effective atomic weapons, might not even openly participate in the war against the West.

In short: nuclear war would mean for Russia, among other things, the risk of state disintegration and the loss of its Asian possessions, while for China it would mean, with negligible risk, the possibility of seizing Russia's Asian possessions and the only opportunity to secure new territory and resolve its vital problem.

It is understandable, then, that the Russians sincerely advocate against thermonuclear war and the Chinese are belligerent. Having followed the evolution of the Cold War with great hope, they were deeply disappointed by the recent shift in Russian policy, and exasperated when Khrushchev, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, suffered a severe blow to his prestige and authority in order to avoid thermonuclear war.

The question arises: why have the Russians only now realized that their powerful neighbor is a natural adversary and a rival in the unified communist movement? A suitable answer can be provided by responsible Russian leaders, but the likely reasons are not so hidden. During their penetration of Siberia, the Russians came into contact with China, an ancient but weak state, subjugated by Manchuria and its monarchs.

This weak China made concessions to the Russians in Manchuria, unable to oppose the ambitions of other European countries. The new Japan defeated China and seized Korea and Formosa. The European powers acquired bases. The consequence of this chronic weakness in China was the suppression of the Empire and the proclamation of the republic in 1912, which also failed to consolidate the country. Japan, driven by its ambitions for hegemony, invaded China.

Fighting against the Japanese were not only the Kuomintang civilian troops but also the Red Army detachments, organized, equipped, and initially led by the Russians. Meanwhile, World War II broke out, and at its end, the Red Army had seized control of all of mainland China.

The Russians perhaps believed that China, too, would follow the path of imperial and republican China, which they would organize and govern according to Moscow's economic and political interests. But they were clearly mistaken. The Russians sent many technicians and specialists to China and loaned Beijing enormous sums of money. The Chinese proved themselves highly capable in every respect, which certainly contributed to fostering their self-awareness and national pride. The Russians may not have even noticed this shift at first, especially during Stalin's era.

But in time, information about the Chinese capabilities was bound to reach Moscow, as evidenced by the many Chinese students in Soviet universities. All of this, along with a glance at the geographical map and an understanding of China's demographics, is enough for a seasoned analyst to conclude that the interests of these two peoples and states are incompatible.

Thus, a sharp shift soon occurred following Khrushchev's first visit to Beijing in 1958. Russia began to postpone its aid in China's development and the strengthening of its economic and military power, eventually suspending it altogether. In 1960, thousands upon thousands of Russian technicians were recalled, while China was already burdened with long-term debt payments.

Meanwhile, Russia took the only viable path for it: the path of peace and peaceful coexistence with the West, further disappointing and disheartening the Chinese. The schism, which was inevitable due to diametrically opposed fundamental interests, continues to be obscured by the veil of ideological differences. It is significant that both opponents deliberately exacerbated this conflict by publishing lengthy open letters dated June 15 and July 15, 1963, that is, at the time when the delegates of both Central Committees were meeting in Moscow for the purpose of settling the dispute that had arisen.

Finally, we will mention a seemingly insignificant but instructive fact: Moscow and Beijing do not engage in direct combat. They do so indirectly, striking at Belgrade and Tirana. Were these two small countries chosen by chance as targets of blows aimed at the larger ones?

The Albanians, a small people today numbering around 2.5 million, lived for almost 450 years in the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the First Balkan War (1913), they achieved their statehood, but Kosovo and Metohija, inhabited almost entirely by Albanians, were annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia, and today, as an autonomous territory called "Kosmet," they are part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (within Yugoslavia).

It is not difficult to understand why small Albania (1,600,000 inhabitants) aspires to reconquer Kosmet and incorporate its 800,000 Albanian compatriots. As long as peace lasts, this aspiration is a golden dream, but it could be realized if war breaks out, in which Yugoslavia would also be involved.

This is the same thing Beijing desires. Yugoslavia, however, for this reason and for other internal democratic and political reasons, must be resolutely against war, for the same reasons as Russia, since in war it would run a great risk of not only being defeated, but disintegrated, as happened to monarchical Yugoslavia in the Second World War. Yugoslavia goes even further and declares itself willing not to participate in the war, even if the Soviet Union were to participate. Belgrade practices a policy of relative independence from antagonistic blocs. The examples of these two small states are very illustrative, as they reveal which real factors determine the foreign policy of these countries.

Albania in the Communist Controversies

Pedro Vukota, Buenos Aires

I. Introduction

The important role that Albania plays in the latent Sino-Soviet conflict is somewhat incomprehensible and even disproportionate. Albania's transformation into a Chinese spearhead is not entirely clear: firstly, because Albania lacks the power to justify the position it has taken; and secondly, because of the doctrinal aspect with which the dispute appears to be manifesting itself. Not even the Chinese themselves, whose communist training is "second-hand," would be in a position to claim the privilege of being the true interpreters and orthodox guardians of communist doctrine, and even less so are the hastily assembled Albanian communists.

The Albanian leaders not only supported the Chinese but also adopted a stance of extreme violence, allowing themselves to speak and act in ways that were unacceptable even to the Chinese themselves, despite the fact that Albanian communism was a recent and hastily created system, imposed from the outside by force, with a small number of leaders—young intellectuals, mostly expatriates, during the decade of 1935 to 1945.

These leaders were indoctrinated abroad, since many of them were not even communists, and even today some who hold power are not considered, in essence, communists. However, at the end of the Khrushchev era, the Russians, to demonstrate their conciliatory tendencies, were ultimately forced to issue a moderate praise of Albanian communism.

Communism in Albania only emerged during the guerrilla warfare of World War II, thanks to the direct intervention of Serbian communism, now in its Yugoslav form. Acting as a classic Russian agent in the Balkans and in accordance with Serbian ambitions, Yugoslavia considered Albania an integral part of its political plans. With the Tito "schism," Russia assumed control of communist Albania, only to be replaced later by the Chinese.

The repeated interference of communist powers and the corresponding Albanian influence on the international stage, especially within the communist world, leads us to understand that we are facing a unique phenomenon, one that arises from the complex political landscape of the Balkans, and whose true origins lie in the very national issues of the region.

The national formation of the Balkan peoples, born from the Eastern Question—almost relegated to history—with the pronounced individualism and nationalism of these peoples, particularly that of the Albanians, is continually subject to the influence of natural and historical constants that imprinted a peculiar personality on each of these new nations, with such marked contrasts that even within the same ethnic group they often cause transcendental differences.[75]

The political evolution of southeastern Europe, which the zeal of scientific positivism in German Romanticism only recently classified under a common denominator, the Balkans—a classification that is certainly erroneous, as the Philosophy of History teaches us, both from a geopolitical and geophysical point of view—has, for the most part, followed a completely different course from that of Western Europe.

This error was particularly keenly felt after the decline and subsequent Turkish withdrawal and the emergence of new nation-states, when attempts were made to graft forms and imprint ideas and values from normal European evolution, without first considering the identification of most of those peoples with the Byzantine cultural tradition and the legacy of Ottoman rule.

The result was lamentable because it was precisely in that region that the balance of the Concert of Europe, established at the Congresses of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, materially fractured. The Balkans also witnessed the beginning of the First World War, whose direct consequence was the Second World War, almost universal in scope, at the end of which the communist domination—that is, Soviet imperialism—over that region was indisputable. Only Greece was spared, but only after the bitter ordeal of a national bloodbath, a veritable civil war.

Soviet communism, in its role as the continuation of classic Russian expansionism, also failed to appreciate and even dismissed the aforementioned constants that, presumably, should have been very clear to the Russians. The result was such that the first breach in the "monolithic" global communist structure of its satellites occurred in the Balkans with Tito's "schism." This was followed by a process of immeasurable proportions, with the Albanian decision to reject Russian "primacy" and side with the Chinese.

To appreciate the importance of the factors that act on the soil of the Balkans and that are mostly expressed in violent nationalist reactions and under opportune ideological forms despite the really small territorial proportions, we will recall the case of Montenegro, a tiny kingdom that at the time of the first world war came to play such an important role, in whose sad and desolate mountain village of Cetinje, which served as its capital, many threads of the great European politics of the time were tied together[76].

The phenomenon of Albania, with its 28,739 km² territory and a fluctuating population of one and a half million inhabitants, divided among three religions (Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic) and therefore cultures, plus a minority of some 800,000 people living in the Autonomous Region of Kosmet in the Socialist Republic of Serbia within communist Yugoslavia, is even more significant due to the reach of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which may well alter the course of history itself.

This situation is also illustrated by a psychologically understandable emotional aspect concerning the Russians, still burdened by an inferiority complex due to their geographical location enclosed by cold, impenetrable seas, and a persistent yearning to reach the warm shores of the Mediterranean basin, the cradle of civilization.

After a few years, that age-old desire was fulfilled with the Russian occupation of the vital Albanian coast, without shedding a single drop of blood. Having aligned their forces with the heart of the West, symbolically personified by Rome, and with the prows of the ships of NATO's powerful Sixth Fleet, they were forced, without fanfare or glory, to hastily abandon their positions, yielding, for the first time in history, to officials of the "brotherly" Chinese government on the European Mediterranean coast.

II. Formation of Albania

The political formation and determination of Albania is among the last of the Balkan nations to have developed. The fate of this people, so different from the other Balkan and European nations, where the same cultural and political components have shaped a particular character of Albanian nationality, was distinct from that of its neighbors. Geographical separation, ethnic characteristics, and the historical evolution of Albania have conditioned a very interesting history.

While other nationalities have, to some extent, managed to create and develop independence within the confines of their states, Albanian political passion and individualism have failed to unite national forces to achieve the ultimate goal of an ethnic community with a clear national consciousness.

Throughout history, the driving force behind political activity on Albanian soil has been foreign powers drawn to this country, whose defining characteristic lies in the contrasts evident in every aspect of its life. This is not to say that the Albanian people lack sufficient capacity, relegating them to a passive role in historical development, but the fact remains that, ultimately, their very political definition was shaped by European powers.

On the contrary, the exaggerated and heightened awareness of belonging to a valiant people has so greatly amplified the individualistic forces of the tribes that, lacking an institution or figure of the necessary unifying and colossal power, it was external forces that had to provide the necessary framework to unite the interests of all the tribes within the confines of the nation-state.

The Albanian complex is not subsequent to the problems surrounding the Eastern Question; however, its manifestation and effect on European politics have only been fully addressed in a relatively later period.

Perhaps in explaining the elements from which present-day Albania emerged, it might seem that we are repeating things so often discussed in relation to the other nations and political systems that arose on Balkan soil. But although they are similar or even identical in many respects, they have a different nature and a different material upon which they act in the process of creating the Albanian state.

En un espacio respaldado por altas coronas montañosas hacia el interior peninsular apareció Albania como una entidad geográficamente separada desempeñando el papel de un gran Gibraltar adriático. Gracias a estas condiciones, es el único sitio donde pudieron conservarse étnicamente casi intactos los restos de los ilirios. Pero los aspectos y condiciones geográficas, y la personalidad de cada uno de los valles entre las montañas, condicionó la división del pueblo albanés en 65 tribus, que hasta hoy día habían conservado su personalidad en la dirección de la suerte de cada una.

El pueblo albanés hace proceder su nombre de la tribu central ilírica de Albano, que vivía en la Albania actual, precisamente en la montañosa región de Kroya. A mediados del siglo II después de Cristo, el geógrafo griego Ptolomeo (Geografía, III, 12-20) la recuerda, y Constantino Porfirogenet nombra a los Αλβανοι. Hoy día son conocidos, según la denominación latina, como albaneses, o turco arnautos, mientras ellos mismos se llaman Shquipëtar, Shquipëtare y Albania Shquiperia.

Los restos ilíricos se han concentrado en el territorio que en forma cuadrangular (Valona-Ocrida-Prizren-Antivari) con pequeñas desviaciones hacia el Norte, es la patria del pueblo albanés, el cual, aunque de origen indoeuropeo, quedó como el único de su familia étnica y lingüística entre todos los pueblos y razas europeas.

La historia política de Albania ha sido muy agitada. La división primitiva del Imperio Romano la incluyó en Bizancio y administrativamente pertenecía al themato de Durazzo. La penetración de los eslavos cerró y cortó notablemente el territorio albanés por la parte Norte. Durante toda la Edad Media hasta la invasión turca, varias potencias lucharon entre sí para dominar el suelo albanés. El Bizancio, los normandos, los reyes de la dinastía Anjou, serbios y venecianos pugnaban por obtener a Albania.

El duque normando Roberto Guiscard desembarcó en el año 1081 en la playa de Durazzo, conquistando la ciudad el año 1084; Venecia, en tiempos de la cuarta cruzada, conquistó, el año 1205, a Durazzo, y el interior reconoció su dominio. El poder veneciano fue sustituido por el de Epiro, luego pasó a la posesión del rey de Sicilia Manfredo, y el año 1266 Carlos I de Anjou heredó estas tierras.

El año 1275 unió a Albania bajo el título de Reino de Albania y so el gobierno del capitán general, que fijó su residencia en Durazzo. El nuevo reino llamó la atención de todos los Estados balcánicos, pero la influencia de los Anjou en decadencia no pudo impedir que ya, el año 1309, el rey de Serbia, Esteban Uros II, ocupase Albania y se adjudicase el título de "rey de Albania". Esteban Dusan el año 1341 sometió todo el país bajo la corona imperial serbia.

La disgregación del Imperio serbio medieval fue repentina, y cuando murió Esteban Dusan, Albania se dividió en varios pequeños principados bajo el gobierno de los príncipes locales. Como la fuerza de los Anjou había desaparecido, y con el fracaso del ejército serbio en la famosa batalla de Maritza de 1371 la amenaza turca fue directa para Albania. Los príncipes locales pedían la ayuda y protección de Venecia, que estaba muy interesada en Albania^[77].

El período de las invasiones y la completa ocupación de su territorio por los otomanos en el año 1417 (Valona), fue un lapso de tiempo en el que el pueblo albanés empeñó todas sus fuerzas para librarse del yugo turco. Sin exageración ninguna, la participación albanesa en la lucha por la defensa de la civilización cristiana, fue gloriosamente representada por una de las más eminentes figuras heroicas, Jorge Castriota Scanderbeg. Scanderbeg quiso unir todas las tribus de su raza para oponerse al invasor islamita.

Turkish authority in Albania never achieved complete control over the entire country. The population living on the plains suffered most under Turkish rule, but the inhabitants of the valleys and the impenetrable high mountains, supported by Albanian resistance, were not entirely subjugated by the Ottomans. In the turbulent 14th and 15th centuries, a shared insecurity led to the organization and revival of the old tribal system.

Semi-nomadic herders and the restless masses of peasants fleeing Turkish terror coalesced into tribal military organizations for better combat. Kastriota's army drew its strength from this organization of people who lived in isolation, isolated from the rest of the world, relying on the elemental forces that life provided in the mountains.

George Kastriota Scanderbeg's military career began in 1443 in a rather unusual manner. Through a convoluted process, Scanderbeg managed to compel the sultan's keeper of the seals to provide him with a decree appointing him governor of Kroya. Kastriota's organization began operating after he was granted the citadel of Kroya by deceiving Governor Sabel Pasha with a forged document. That same night, all the Muslims who refused baptism were murdered. A few days later, another Albanian, Moses Golemi, who, as a vassal of the sultan, ruled most of the Dibrano region, joined forces with Scanderbeg, who already controlled the main fortifications and commanding mountain passes, along with other Albanian despots.

This Albanian revolt, which united all the Albanian chieftains and lords, was formalized in the spring of 1444 in Alexi, where it was proclaimed the "League of Albanian Peoples." This League, in the presence of the Venetian governor and the Montenegrin prince, Stephen Kronovich, elected Kastriota Scanderbeg as its leader and military commander.

The campaign against the Turks was temporarily suspended by the armistice between the Christian leader and the conqueror, Mehmed II, a truce that lasted only a year. The Christian sovereigns of Europe, and even Pope Pius II, wished to fully utilize the forces that had fought valiantly, but with the death of Pius II and then, in 1467, that of Scanderbeg, the Albanian League saw its existence and victories come to an end.[78]

The phenomenon of the "League of Albanian Peoples" was a political entity whose objective was clearly expressed in its struggle against the Turks. The league had a purely military character, with George Kastriota Scanderbeg as its supreme leader. The League encompassed all of Albanian territory, but the princes and tribal chiefs retained authority within their own communities. The League's capital for its meetings was Alexi, which at that time belonged to the Venetian domain. The princes and tribal chiefs, in keeping with the Albanian spirit, remained absolute rulers, yet tributaries of the sultan. Only against the Turks did Kastriota exercise supreme authority in military matters.

The movements of Turkish troops always provoked a reaction of resistance in Albania. In 1592, when the Turks attacked Austria, the Pope issued a call to the Christian world for a crusade, which generated great enthusiasm in Albania. The center of the uprising did not achieve complete success, but the Treaty of Vienna of 1615 guaranteed Austrian intervention on behalf of the Albanian Catholics, with Austria proclaiming itself their protector.

The division of the people into independent tribes and the large Muslim minority constituted the best Turkish weapon for subjugating the Albanians. However, Albanian Muslims came to occupy a privileged position; we see them as ministers, generals, viziers, courtiers, and governors of the Ottoman court, while the people paid tribute as they pleased and provided soldiers to the sultan according to his will. Any authoritarian act of a severe nature was enough to provoke an uprising.

The 19th century was no less turbulent for Albania than for any other Balkan people. After the failure of Ali Pasha of Jamnia, who, under Turkish sovereignty, managed to create an independent state, there were also other insurrections in 1835 and 1844. The zeal for the independence of the tribes or cities fueled deep hatred, struggles, and acts of revenge.

The movements for independence and freedom of the subjugated Slavic peoples in the Balkans, sponsored by strong Russian protection, had an unfavorable impact on Albania, primarily due to its predominantly Muslim population of non-Slavic origin. The fervent nationalisms also drew the attention of Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece to Albanian soil, as these countries claimed rights over the relevant parts of Albania as their "historical" territory.

The nature of the people, the complex religious and cultural landscape, the interests of neighboring countries, and the behavior of the tribes and their leaders all contributed to Albania's national awakening not occurring simultaneously with that of other Balkan nations, further complicating the country's position.

The decisions of the Treaty of Berlin sparked widespread revolt throughout Albania. The Albanian League was formed to protest the separation and territorial annexation of Albanian territory to Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. In support of the protest, the League proclaimed that it would resist the occupation of its territories with arms, and when Turkish troops withdrew from the regions, they were replaced by the League's volunteer forces.

This prompted the European powers to react, calling for Turkish intervention. A Turkish army of 30,000 men, preceded by a British naval demonstration, under the command of Dervis Pasha, entered Albania, defeating the League, whose leaders were executed or exiled, while the young prince of the Mirditi tribe, Prenk Bib Doda, was taken hostage.

The Italian-Austrian antagonism gave international significance to the Albanian anarchy. Austria intervened in Albanian affairs, taking advantage of its right of guardianship since 1615. The assistance provided by the Catholic clergy in Albania and the charitable and educational foundations gave the Austro-Hungarian Empire a certain prestige among the Albanian people.

The defeat of Italian colonial policy, culminating in the catastrophe of the Ethiopian enterprise in 1896, led to a search for compensation in the Balkans. The idea of the "mare nostrum" of the former Venetian possessions, combined with the Italian anti-Austrian program, formed the basis of Italian demands for dominating the Albanian coast. The perceived Austrian "threat" sparked great interest among all Italian circles and parties in securing their control over Albania.

Austria's internal and external situation compelled it to address the Albanian question in conjunction with Italy. Meanwhile, the Italians sought to awaken Albanian national consciousness by creating an Albanian committee in Italy, which, under the slogan "Albania to the Albanians," called for national independence. Austria, pressured by the situation, consented, in the Italo-Austrian convention of 1897 and 1901, to the autonomy of Albania, promising that in all actions concerning Albania it would collaborate with Italy.

The centralism of the Young Turk Revolution and, later, the Balkan Wars were the cause of the Albanian uprising. On November 28, 1912, in Wallonia, the solemn session of the National Assembly was held, proclaiming Albania's independence. However, the three neighboring countries invaded Albania, occupying the affected areas. The Albanian crisis aroused great interest throughout Europe, and, under the intervention of Italy and Austria, a conference of ambassadors from the great powers was held in London in December of the same year.

The conference obtained broad authority to establish and guarantee the independence of an Albanian state. Under the direction of this same international forum, a commission operated in Florence, empowered to demarcate the borders of the new state. During the period of negotiations, a provisional government operated in Albania under the presidency of Ismail Quema Vlora, along with local governments. The Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire finally reached an agreement on the definitive establishment of Albania's independence, which was signed in the Treaty of London on May 30, 1913 [79].

On April 10, 1914, Khemal Vlora ceded his powers to the delegation of the Conference of Ambassadors, which approved the Statute of Albania. Albania was proclaimed a principality under the protection of the Great Powers. Prince Wilhelm von Wied was recognized as the sovereign of the new principality.

With the creation of the new state and the appointment of the sovereign prince, under the influence of Esad Pasha Topali, revolution erupted throughout Albania. In the southern part bordering Greece, an autonomous government was established under the presidency of Zografo, the former Greek foreign minister.

The prince managed to form a government and stabilize the country by directing the Albanian gendarmerie, under the command of Dutch officers, against the Greeks. Finally, the prince, forgotten by Austria, had to flee on September 3rd, leaving Albania in a tumultuous situation. The World War led to the occupation of border areas by neighboring countries, while the Italians occupied Wallonia on December 28, 1914. The Albanian Senate placed power in the hands of Esad Pasha, but the military occupation by various armies meant that this government was practically nonexistent.

Taking advantage of its position as an ally of the victorious powers, in 1917, Italy sought to create an Albanian state under the protection of the Savoy crown. Italian General Giacinto Ferrero, commander-in-chief of the Italian occupation forces in Albania, issued a proclamation known as "Il proclama di Arcirocastro" (The Proclamation of Arcirocastro), in which, by order of the Italian government, the unity and independence of all Albania under Italian protection was proclaimed.

Austria's capitulation left Italy with an open door to further interests. In December 1918, with Italy's permission, a government was formed, but less than a year passed before the Albanians rose up against the Italians, whose occupation was reduced to only a few cities. In 1920, by the Treaty of Tirana, the Italians recognized Albania's complete independence, reserving for themselves the small, strategic island of Sasseno, at the entrance to the Bay of Valona. The conference of ambassadors from the great powers recognized Albania's territorial integrity, and that same year Albania was admitted as a member of the League of Nations [80].

La rápida carrera política de Ahmed Zogu es la mejor expresión de pronta evolución Albanian politics, whose variation and changes in state forms manifest the influences of all the elements accumulated throughout history. Ahmed Zogu, a descendant of an ancient family of rulers of the Mati tribe, commanded volunteers from his tribe during the World War, collaborating with the Austrians.

In 1920, he was still a member of Parliament; in 1922, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs and then dictator. The Catholic bishop Fan Noli overthrew him in a revolution in 1924, but Zogu soon returned, and in January 1925, Albania was proclaimed a republic, with Ahmed Zogu elected as president. During 1926 and 1927, he forged closer ties with Italy and established treaties that resulted in a degree of Italian protection. On September 1, 1930, with Italy's concession, Albania was elevated to a kingdom, whose monarch styled himself Zogu I, King of the Albanians.[81]

The reign did not last long because, when Zogu refused to join Italy through a special treaty, the Italian demonstration and the landing of Italian troops in April 1939 at Albania's main ports led to the occupation of the entire territory within a few days. The Constituent Assembly overthrew Zogu and forcibly accepted the personal union with Italy, which was proclaimed on April 16, 1939.

III. Communist Albania

The end of World War II found Albania under communist rule, which, similar to the cases of Croatia and Slovenia, occurred without prior Soviet military occupation (the similar phenomenon in Czechoslovakia has other nuances that, due to its origins, deserve a specific study).

The role of the Soviet army was played by Yugoslav communism, specifically Serbian communism, which made its presence felt after the Soviet occupation of the northern parts of Yugoslavia, bordered to the south by the Danube River and including the Serbian capital of Belgrade, where Tito's group was installed as the government. Later, thanks to effective Western aid, this group was able to occupy the eastern Adriatic coast, from Trieste to Wallonia, for communist purposes in 1945.

Albanian communization initially manifested itself as a satellite of Tito's communism, then the most prominent satellite of the USSR. This status remained in effect until 1948, when, with the outbreak of conflict between Tito and Stalin, Albania became a direct satellite of Russia. The subsequent Albanian reaction against Khrushchev's policies was practically an expression of national fear, a fear that the rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade represented a reemergence of old dangers with unbearable consequences for Albanian national pride and interests, as well as for the very survival of the ruling group.

To gain a more complete understanding of the current political situation in Albania, it is necessary, once again, to briefly revisit a series of events that unfolded during the first decades of the 20th century, knowledge of which is essential for understanding what is happening in Albania.

A tour de force by Russia, which, with the former Ottoman control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, felt confined to the Black Sea, it sought, through Serbia, at least to reach the shores of the Adriatic. This was possible because the Western powers of the Concert of Europe did not sufficiently appreciate Serbia's true role as a persistent exponent of the Russian push into Southeast Europe, despite the fact that a number of evident events, such as the brutal liquidation of the pro-Western Obrenovich dynasty, clearly demonstrated the role played by Serbia.[82]

This small, expressly continental Balkan country, backed by its great protector, the Tsarist Empire, managed to convince the Western chancelleries of its supposed right to access the sea through the ports and territories of other nations that would be incorporated into Serbia. The implementation of various, essentially absurd, projects included the annexation of regions inhabited by non-Serbian ethnic groups, whose numbers, moreover, exceeded the population of Serbia itself.

Serbia's access to the sea via Thessaloniki would have been practically achieved through the annexation of most of Macedonia and a portion of eastern Greece. Access to the southeastern Adriatic coast would have required the annexation of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania. The third alternative was to occupy the central coast of the eastern Adriatic, which would have meant seizing Macedonia, Montenegro, and almost all of Croatia—a territory twice the size of Serbia itself, already unjustifiably expanded by the Balkan Wars.

Ultimately, however, Serbia managed to realize its ambitions at the end of the First World War, which was essentially triggered by the Sarajevo Assassination (1914), orchestrated by Serbia, a protégé of Russia. The desired access to the sea was achieved through the virtual annexation of Croatia, Montenegro, and Slovenia (plus other territories), with the approval of the victorious powers, despite the national principles and right to self-determination that had justified the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.

This was accomplished through a distinctly Byzantine ruse disguised as the supposed liberation and union of the South Slavs, in which case Serbia assumed a role analogous to Piedmont.[83] The inclusion of these territories quadrupled Serbian national territory, and these countries were also politically incompatible with Serbia due to their cultural formation.

An inexplicable subjugation then occurred of entire nations with Western traditions, superior in their cultural and economic development, to a backward state, a reproduction of Dušan's medieval Serbian Empire rooted in the autocratic Russo-Byzantine tradition.

It is particularly noteworthy, in relation to our topic, that Nikolai Pašich, the decisive Serbian politician during the first quarter of this century, was not in favor of this path of Serbian expansionism. Instead of a South Slavic state, which was nationally, culturally, and religiously heterogeneous and a threat to Serbian dominance due to the western formation of the Croats and Slovenes, he preferred a Greater Serbia.

This would still include a large number of foreign territories and ethnic groups, and instead of a sea outlet through Croatia—potentially equal to Serbia—he would seek access through the much weaker Albania. Furthermore, this solution would have had significant international implications because the Albanian coast would have allowed control of the important Strait of Otranto, the Gibraltar of the Adriatic.

Pašich was fully aware of the importance of Albania's key position. Therefore, during the First World War, when Serbia was still primarily playing the role of the Russian imperialist mouthpiece, he wanted to ensure the realization of his plans at all costs, but he ran into Italy, which was no less interested. When Italian resolve became clear, an attempt was made, at the very least, to reach an agreement on the division of Albania between Italy and Serbia.

The Serbian justification rested on the inclusion of the Kosovo and Metohija region (now the autonomous region of Kosmet in the Socialist Republic of Serbia within communist Yugoslavia) in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). The Italian ambassador, Count Sforza, to the Serbian government-in-exile on the island of Corfu, referred in detail to these conversations in his memoirs, even stating that his great friend Pasich deeply loved his peasant country of Serbia and displayed an excessive eagerness for the conquest of Albania.[84]

Serbia's ambitions were thwarted by the Italian government, which was unmoved by its demands in order to retain exclusive control of Albania. At the peace conferences, the Italian position ultimately prevailed, a position to which Sonino, Nitti, and the rest of the Italian politicians of the time remained inflexible.

The secret London Pact of 1915, by which the Entente powers secured Italy's participation on their side, came at the price not only of ceding Trieste, Istria, the mainland portion of Dalmatia, and most of its islands to Italy, but also of control over Albania, including the port and city of Wallonia.

The subsequent creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which King Alexander II officially named Yugoslavia in 1929, and which enjoyed a degree of French protection as it was considered the southern part of the "cordon sanitaire" established at Versailles, thwarted the desire to make the Adriatic an Italian lake. President Wilson's insistence on refusing to recognize the secret pacts, arguing that they contradicted the principle of national self-determination, also played a significant role in this matter.

As a result, the period between the two wars was marked by continuous tensions on the Adriatic between Rome and Belgrade, and the issue of control over Albania became a major point of contention. Initially, attempts were made to reach an agreement on the mutual recognition of an independent Albania, but the Italian position gradually prevailed, culminating—as already noted—in the subjugation of Albania to its exclusive rule on Easter 1939.

Subsequent events created conditions that, with the outbreak of war, favored only the communists. The capitulation of Yugoslavia in 1941 and that of Italy in 1943 opened the door for the intervention of the Serbian communists in Albania, where they skillfully declared themselves adversaries of traditional Serbian expansionism and supporters of the liberation and equality of all Balkan peoples.[85]

Relations between the communists of both countries began in 1939, culminating in 1941 with the establishment of the Communist Party of Albania. The former not only helped their Albanian comrades organize their party, but also actively participated in the grouping of its members and the training of its cadres.

When the first envoy of Yugoslav communism, the Serbian Miladin Popovic, was captured in Albania in September 1941, Tito then sent Dusan Mogus, the regional secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party for Kosovo and Metohija, also a Serbian. Under Mogus's leadership, the first Conference was held in Tirana on November 20, 1941, where the Communist Party of Albania was founded with the election of its executive committee, and Enver Hodxa was elected as its first provisional secretary.[86]

In November 1942, the Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party sent the well-known Montenegrin communist of Serbian orientation, Blas Jovanovich, as its delegate to Albania. Then the supreme commander of the communist guerrillas in the Croatian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo, traveled twice to Albania to give directives to the Albanian communists. It should be noted that for the Albanian communists, since 1942,

Tito was the top communist leader in the Balkans and, as such, the exponent of Kremlin policy.[87] This is demonstrated by the significant fact that immediately after the war, the Communist Party of Albania followed the party line according to the instructions received from Yugoslavia, which in turn was in accordance with Moscow's party doctrine. At that time, the Albanians lacked direct contact with Moscow.

The Albanians imitated Tito in everything. Following the example he had set in Jajce, Enver Hodghan convened the congress in Pernet.[88] At that congress, the return of King Zogu I was prohibited, the creation of proletarian brigades was resolved, Enver Hodgja was appointed "colonel general," and the Albanian liberation army was placed under his command.

The usurpation of power was carried out in the "Yugoslav way," and even the so-called elections of December 2, 1945, repeated the phenomenon of the Yugoslav elections of November 29 of the same year. These elections resulted in an improvised, or rather, falsified, communist majority, which in turn gave legal form to the usurpation of power by the communist party.

The so-called parliament born of those elections voted for a new constitution that was an imitation of the Yugoslav and therefore Soviet one.[89] Yugoslavia, on April 28, 1945, was the first country to recognize the Albanian government. The previous year, in August 1944, the General Staff of the "People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia" sent a military mission to Albania headed by the Serbian communist Velja Stonic, who, after the diplomatic recognition, became Tito's prime minister plenipotentiary in Tirana.

According to the Serbian communist writer Dedijer, Yugoslavia was the first country to come to Albania's aid with food, supplies, loans, and professionals such as doctors, agronomists, and military personnel, as well as providing cultural support for the military and civil organization of the new communist state.[90]

Hodxa's close friendship with Yugoslavia was particularly evident in military collaboration. In the final phase of the war, as a reward, the Albanian communists sent several partisan brigades to Yugoslavia to assist the Yugoslavian partisans in liberating the Kosovo region.[91] In June 1948, the Albanian government requested that Tito's government send two divisions to southern Albania to protect its borders with Greece.[92]

The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia was signed on June 10, 1946, followed by the Treaty of Economic Cooperation, signed on July 1, 1946. This Treaty provided for the coordination of economic plans, a customs union, and a monetary union. With the Treaty of June 13, 1947, Yugoslavia granted Albania a loan of 2 billion dinars with strict stipulations for its use. It is worth noting that this loan then represented 56.7% of Albania's national budget.[93]

Furthermore, a joint Albanian-Yugoslavian oil exploration and production company was established, with equal participation in exploration and management. Albania was entitled to 50% of the capital as a right of exploitation, and the remaining 50% was distributed according to proportional share of capital contributions and investments. The initial capital was 50 million dinars. According to the Convention, Albania was to retain 75% of the profits, while Yugoslavia would receive the remaining 25%.

However, in 1947, Yugoslavia made new investments, and the profit distribution underwent a significant change, reducing Yugoslavia's share to only 12%, while Albania retained 88% of the profits.[94]

Yugoslavia also began construction of the Durazzo-Pech railway, providing Albanian materials and technical assistance.[95] During this period, relations between the two countries were very cordial, according to Hugh Seaton Watson,[96] and cultural relations were equally noteworthy. This is demonstrated by a significant fact with future implications: the Serbian language, using its Cyrillic script, was mandatory in all Albanian schools.

By 1947, due to the accumulation of all these interventions, it was clear that Albania had become a satellite state of Yugoslavia. Albanian dependence was once again evident because the first Albanian economic plan was entirely subject to the corresponding Yugoslav plan.

This is attributed to statements made by Stalin and Zhdanov at the time, according to which the Communist Party headquarters in Moscow viewed Albania's subordination to Yugoslavia as such that its presence as an independent party in the creation of the Cominform in 1947 was deemed unnecessary.[97] Stalin's subsequent change of heart stemmed from the danger he perceived from the excessive expansion of his Yugoslav satellite, which also sought to bring the entire Balkans under its political control, thereby limiting Russia's dominance. Stalin's unyielding ambitions and Russian interests rendered the Belgrade communist plan ineffective.

Dedijer states that Stalin, even at the beginning of 1948, was still giving assurances to Djilas that "... the USSR Government has no claim regarding Albania. Yugoslavia is free to swallow Albania whenever it wishes" [98].

The Albanian communists initially accepted this intervention, resigning themselves to the position of the Yugoslav Quislings in order to seize power. However, as they consolidated their power, they also indirectly fostered Albanian resistance against this new form of Serbian expansionism.

This proved relatively easy for them, given the already innate Albanian aversion to Serbia, especially after it became clear that the Serbs had no intention of returning the Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) region to Albania. According to official Yugoslav statistics, this region is inhabited by a predominantly Albanian minority of 800,000 people. (Albanians claim there are 1.5 million of their compatriots in Yugoslavia.)

The Albanian reaction, while behind Yugoslavia stood the powerful Soviet Union, which in its general policy also revived the old Pan-Slavic agitation to which Albanians, not belonging to the Slavic linguistic group, had always been reluctant, remained practically in the background until Tito's "schism" became evident in 1948. The conflict between Stalin and Tito was received in Albania with genuine jubilation. The numerous Yugoslav commissions were immediately expelled, and with the violent elimination of their interference, the Albanian communists retained power.

From then on, the aspect of the Sovietization of Albania was modified insofar as Albania submitted to direct Russian control.[99] But the important factor of geographical continuity with the Moscow-controlled world had already disappeared. The purges continued, and Enver Hodghan rid himself of the influential Kochi Hodghan and his associates, who were accused of conspiring with the Serbian Vukmanovic-Tempo to transform Albania into the seventh people's republic of the supposed Yugoslav federation.

The death sentences and subsequent executions of the "pro-Yugoslav" group formally ended Belgrade's period of influence, although it is no fabrication that the leader of Albanian communism himself was just as implicated as those executed. He merely used this means to rid himself of rivals and "cleanse" his past, because he owed his power to Tito's support.

The simultaneous Yugoslav reaction had several facets, including international ones, but it is worth highlighting here the harassment of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. Their persistent desire to unite with the Motherland served Belgrade officials as a pretext for organizing a series of "espionage" trials in defense of Yugoslavia's "national integration."

Direct Russian influence persisted from 1948 to 1956, with little noticeable change following Stalin's death. Albania, in light of these new developments, became a member of the League of Mutual Economic Assistance and, by right, joined the Warsaw Pact.

However, when Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy was accompanied by a renewed rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade, it was met with extreme caution and fear of a potential compromise between the two Slavic countries. These pronouncements provoked a violent Soviet reaction and condemnation of the Albanian leadership, leading to Albania's separation from the Soviet bloc.

The Albanian fears were not unfounded, as they had access to many elements of Yugoslav activity, particularly in the diplomatic arena, which extended even to Western powers, as seen during Tito's visit to Great Britain in 1951, where the idea of partitioning Albania was rejected.

"Tito's plan was to 'extirpate the Albanian ulcer,' that is, to eliminate the pro-Soviet regime of Enver Hodghan and transform Albania into his satellite with a regime of a certain 'national communism,' or, in the extreme case, to divide it with Greece... Regarding his Albanian adventures, Tito was forced to heed the advice to adopt a moderate stance on this issue. When the time comes to eliminate Hodghan's dictatorship... this can and must be done exclusively in the interest of Albanian freedom and independence.

Moreover, with his current attempt to meddle on his own, Tito might, instead of chasing a hare, stumble upon a wolf: neither the Soviets nor Italy would simply allow Tito, alone or accompanied by Greece, to seize Albania. It is clear that Tito, without Western encouragement and guarantees, will not dare to bite the Albanian nut..." [100].

" The sociologist D. Tomasic, a professor at Indiana University and, before the last war, in Zagreb, devotes an entire chapter to the phenomenon of Albania in his well-documented study, "The Struggle for Power in the Sino-Soviet Orbit and the Problem of the Unity of the Communist World" [101].

Once again, an observer cannot help but note the crucial role of tribal antagonism in Albanian political life, currently manifested in the conflict between the Gegas, the traditional source of political power, and the Toscas, who imposed their dialect as the official language. The communist leaders, in their anti-Yugoslav campaign, sought to quell these differences by emphasizing the external threat personified by the Balkan Pact (Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece).

This allowed them to present themselves as champions of Albanian nationalism, thereby strengthening their dictatorship over the people.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet submarine base in Albania was viewed with considerable complacency. Furthermore, the Albanians saw in the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict (1948-1955) a glimmer of hope for the eventual incorporation of Kosmet into Albania. And on the ideological front, Albania became one of the most consistent and vocal proponents of the Sino-Soviet bloc, concentrating its attacks against Titoism and "Yugoslav revisionism" [102].

The third phase of Albanian communist life was unfolding within the Moscow-Beijing conflict. At the Congress (1961) of the Communist Party of the USSR, the Sino-Soviet dispute was publicly manifested, precisely because of Albania.

With the same speed that Yugoslav influence disappeared, Russian influence followed suit. China decisively occupied the Soviet space, having made its presence felt externally with an initial loan of 123 million US dollars. Beijing, through its estimated three thousand taciturn and discreet officials, effectively directs Albanian policy, including its relations with Western countries (for example, the rapprochement with France).

Furthermore, thanks to its powerful broadcasting networks, the Chinese, operating from Albanian territory, aim to disseminate their ideology in Western countries, particularly to strengthen their support within communist parties outside the Soviet sphere of influence. They also maintain a presence in so-called socialist countries in their propaganda efforts.

To appreciate the Albanian ideological position in the new situation under Chinese control, one must not forget the similarity between Albanian and Chinese leaders in their fanaticism for power, as we highlighted at the outset, and in their somewhat late, but no less virulent, formation in communist doctrine. "Both were steeped in nationalism during their studies and both tended to be orthodox Leninists in the sense that they believed that tension, revolutionary activities, and world war made it possible to achieve their objectives" [103].

When the rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade resumed, national survival, as well as the power and even the personal existence of the leaders, were called into question for the Albanians. It was then that communist China emerged as the most suitable defender, thanks to its power within the communist camp. The Chinese readily and immediately accepted this unexpected tutelage and strengthened the Albanians' anti-Khrushchevite, or rather anti-Tito, position.

The Russians, however, believed their influence was sufficient, and thus relied on trusted individuals, but these too suffered the fate of the "purge" of those who had been accused of pro-Titanism. The only thing that remained unchanged were the key players: the undisputed Enver Hodgkin and his henchmen, now considered a pro-Beijing faction.

Throughout the process, the Chinese vigorously supported the Albanians, who were accused of "dogmatism" or "sectarianism," defending the principle of complete equality in relations between communist parties. The end of the Khrushchev era, and the positions of the opposing sides, has not yet produced any significant changes. The Albanian leadership remains steadfast, and the Chinese have only made superficial concessions in the pursuit of contacts, without compromising their own ideas and positions.

IV. Conclusion

The territorial discontinuity between the countries of the Soviet sphere of influence and Albania facilitated Albanian resistance to Khrushchev's policies and aided the Chinese communists, who, even in this matter, are attempting to assert their position and engage with the Russians on equal terms. Some observers, offering convoluted justifications, even dare to attribute the outbreak of this new and momentous crisis in the communist world to Tito, claiming that his stance contributed to it.

This thesis is entirely arbitrary, as it originates from those who seek to defend unconditional Western support for Tito. Historical developments and the facts analyzed, even when viewed from the perspective of the cold, scientifically positivist approach so fashionable in certain powerful circles but lacking historical perspective, refute these assertions. Tito's only contribution, and this from a communist point of view, was in how he knew how to exploit during the war the discontent of the Albanian people against foreign dominations (the Italian and then the German) and Greek aspirations with the sole purpose of creating and strengthening the communist regime in Albania.

Albania's geographical isolation from the Soviet bloc and the fact that two neighboring NATO members (Greece and Italy) could induce Western democracies to consider the possibility of eliminating such an unpopular communist regime, maintained through terror that the masses can scarcely endure.

A well-calculated step of this kind would certainly be a great victory for the ideal of freedom and, in turn, an impetus for the liberation process of other enslaved nations. If the necessary measures have not yet been taken, it is largely due to the lack of initiative on the part of the democratic powers and their flawed understanding and a certain disorientation regarding the complex issues of Southeastern Europe.

Russia and Serbia, in the past, have always taken advantage of the Western powers' lack of knowledge of the political landscape of the Balkans and, despite not having a real right to do so, have managed to bring the nations of the Adriatic-Danubian region under their influence or control. It should also be noted that the misguided policies of some neighboring Western countries indirectly contributed to what later became communist enslavement. In the case of Albania, specifically, Italy's inappropriate intervention played a significant role.

To prevent its adversaries and potential enemies from controlling the Strait of Otranto, Italy resorted to dominating Albania instead of achieving the same goal while respecting Albanian national identity and sensibilities, thereby forging friendship with that courageous people. Greece acted no better in fostering friendship between two neighboring Balkan and Mediterranean nations. By clinging to the old methods used to achieve Greek independence in the last century, it perpetuates the outdated aspirations of antiquated border disputes, one of the many open wounds in the Balkans, where populations of diverse ethnic origins coexist within small regions.

All of this contributes to the fact that, under the current conditions, it is difficult to incite the Albanian people to rebel against the communist regime to gain their freedom, because without some degree of engagement with the governments of Italy and Greece, the prospect of success would be uncertain.

The human factor also plays a significant role in this process. Any decision by Albania's anti-communist patriots to participate in an initiative favored from abroad could easily, due to the climate created by communism, be interpreted as the activity of agents serving foreign interests. The communist propaganda has been somewhat successful because they have managed to claim the privilege, which they do not actually deserve, of having liberated Albania from foreign oppression.

The phenomenon of a communistized Albania is a clear example of the communist exploitation of national conflicts and, in turn, a consequence of the errors of the Western powers. Morally, it makes no difference whether Albania lies under the control of the Yugoslav, Russian, or Chinese communists, the latter of whom, for the first time in history, are "before the gates" of the West.

The Albanian case generates ongoing tension of international significance and could, over time, unexpectedly trigger a chain reaction of local conflicts, which would logically lead to the disintegration of the much-debated Yugoslav conglomerate. This country, as the Austro-Hungarian successor in the Balkans, suffers from all the defects without having inherited the virtues of the Habsburg empire (these were Masaryk's words, the creator of Czechoslovakia, when analyzing his country's flawed policies between the two world wars. The case of Yugoslavia is far more acute).

The West can no longer afford to lose its ground again in such a crucial region, currently also affected by the potential "yellow peril." The time has come for someone to say, without delay: Coeterum censeo... and define the obligations. As for rights, those belong to the subjugated peoples. With this case, the European Union once again demonstrates itself as a real and unique solution to ensure that, within the diverse tapestry of European peoples, the natural rights of each nation are guaranteed.

Croatia and the Total Crisis of Yugoslavia

Jure Petricevic, Brugg, Switzerland

The vital problems of the Croatian people have rarely appeared in their turbulent past in such a grave form as they do today. The deprivation and violation of fundamental human rights, national oppression and humiliation, miserable living conditions and social injustices, coupled with the mass exodus at the end of the Second World War and the Bleiburg tragedy in May 1945, plus successive and recent waves of refugees, are of such a nature that, without exaggeration, it can be said that Croatia's situation has never been as dire as it is now. The fact that there are tens of thousands of Croatian exiles testifies to how difficult these times are for their homeland, just as they are for other oppressed nations, apart from their specific circumstances.

I. The Political Crisis

Croatia Stripped of Fundamental Human and National Rights

What characterizes the situation of the Croats in Yugoslavia above all else is the deprivation and violation of fundamental human rights. Yugoslavia, as a member of the United Nations, pledged to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 1, 1948, and subsequently invoked repeatedly by captive peoples and oppressed classes in various states.

Its promulgation greatly facilitated the liberation of Afro-Asian peoples. Along with this Universal Declaration, fifteen European democratic nations signed a Convention on the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, with a special protocol, on November 28, 1950, assuming the formal obligation to defend and protect these rights and freedoms, unlike the other member states of the United Nations. Communist Yugoslavia, in its propaganda on behalf of colonial peoples, constantly emphasizes fundamental human rights as the standard for state and social organization, yet within its borders it systematically and brutally tramples on those same rights.

Thus, in Croatia, there is no freedom of opinion, assembly, press, or association. Free political, trade union, or professional organizations are not permitted. Croats cannot advocate for their cause in their own homeland. The right to national self-determination of the Croatian people and other peoples is being brutally suppressed. A tiny minority terrorizes the overwhelming majority of the people.

Some relief from the pressure and terror exerted by the secret police (UDBA), due to the establishment of closer economic ties with the West over the past ten years, has not altered the essential character of the police and dictatorial regime of communist Yugoslavia. The situation of the Croatian people as a nation is tragic, and the situation of each individual Croat is extremely precarious. Croatia, in 1945, just as in 1918, was forcibly incorporated into Yugoslavia.

The people cannot freely decide the fate of their country or determine the framework of the state in which they wish to live. They cannot freely elect their representatives and govern their country, nor can they represent it abroad. Under the slogans of fraternity and unity, the Croatian people were twice subjugated by Serbia. Belgrade decides on all the vital issues of the Croatian people. The mere suggestion of self-determination or criticism of pre-war Yugoslavia is declared a crime.

Today, as before, Yugoslavia is considered an expanded Serbia by the ruling group, which imposes the Serbization of other peoples, appoints a disproportionate number of Serbs to key positions in the state and economic apparatus, and populates Croatian and other regions with Serbs.

The economic exploitation of non-Serbian territories is particularly evident in the neglect and marginalization of Croatian industry, the Croatian Adriatic coast, Croatia's important ports, railways, and roads, while simultaneously forcing the construction of the Montenegrin port of Bar, the Belgrade-Bar railway, and so on. All of this exacerbates discontent in Croatia, creating a precarious situation fraught with potential for tragedy. Added to this is the mass settlement of Serbs, especially in Croatia's coastal region, which constitutes a direct provocation to the Croats.

Belgrade is gradually applying identical methods in Slovenia, where popular discontent against Serbia is growing, and the idea of a free Slovenian state and Slovenian-Croatian friendship is gaining increasing support. If we add to all this the fact that the Serbs annexed Srijem and Vojvodina, seized Boka Kotorska from Croatia, and that in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serbian minority, facing the majority of Muslim and Catholic Croats, is strengthening its position with the aim of bringing it under Serbian control, then we can understand why Croat discontent against Greater Serbia and Yugoslavia is rapidly growing.

The communist policy of fraternity and unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia is entering a new critical phase. This is now openly acknowledged even by the communist leaders who until recently claimed that Yugoslavia's national question was solved and definitively off the agenda. But since 1962, under pressure from internal tensions and growing contrasts between the Serbs and the other peoples, the communist leaders have been forced to systematically and publicly debate the unresolved national question within the multinational conglomerate of Yugoslavia.

Given the sensitivity and magnitude of this problem, Tito almost always preempted it by defining the official position. In early 1964, Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, the leading communist figure in the so-called Socialist Republic of Croatia, made public statements on the crisis in national relations for the first time.

Bakaric's statement caused a double sensation: 1) During the last war, Bakaric succeeded Hebrang as the most prominent figure in the Croatian Communist Party and accepted the solution to the Croatian problem based on the Greater Serbian conception within the framework of Yugoslavia. Today, Bakaric admits the failure of that political line. 2) Bakaric sees no way out of the current impasse. He certainly continues to advocate for a solution along Yugoslav lines, but at the same time, he acknowledges the failure of such a conception. It is rare for communists to admit their powerlessness in public debates, since they theoretically believe they can resolve all issues.

This impotence and the failure of communist policy in solving the national question were recorded and commented on by the world press. As a typical example, I cite the Swiss weekly Die Weltwoche, which in its March 26, 1964 edition published an article by its Belgrade correspondent, Karl Rau, entitled "Is Tito's Main Work at Risk?", with the subtitle "Deep Fissures in the Yugoslav Federation."

Drawing on Bakaric's declaration, Rau comments that Bakaric almost openly acknowledged the failure of the nationalities policy in the multinational South Slavic state, which, supposedly, was the only one capable of overcoming age-old antagonisms through the dialectical synthesis of communism.

The author notes the crisis of the state and cites a forceful condemnation of the "local patriots," expressed by Tito at the end of February 1964, when he declared that these local patriots were demanding for their respective republics "their own army, their own currency, and even their own foreign policy."

Before delving into the analysis of Bakaric's declaration, it is worth recalling the main statements made in recent years regarding the unresolved national question and the state crisis. Let us begin with Tito's significant speech, delivered in Split on May 6, 1962, in which he acknowledged the existence of profound differences between the two peoples and republics, not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and cultural ones.[104]

Tito observed that local and closed markets were being created in the economy, that one republic was unwilling to trade with the other, which caused market barriers, generated political discontent, and so-called national chauvinism. Tito threatened to eradicate these phenomena at their root.

His observations and threats reveal the deep crisis of the state and the concern of the communist leadership regarding the national question. Tito laid bare the stark reality and essentially admitted that the policy of fraternity and the unity of the people was at odds with reality. He admitted that many communists were steeped in chauvinism, that bourgeois circles were corrupting the youth, that they were delving into their national histories and threatening the state with their chauvinism.

In another speech, delivered at the "Ivo Lola Ribar" engine factory in Zeleznik, near Belgrade, on December 29, 1962, Tito addressed the same issue and said with great concern that "nationalist tendencies," which aimed to annihilate the socialist community, were becoming increasingly evident in economic life. On this occasion, Tito renewed his threats, declaring that he would vigorously suppress these tendencies.

Tito dedicated his speech at the Seventh Congress of the People's Youth of Yugoslavia, delivered on January 24, 1963, primarily to the unresolved national question and the crisis of the state.

It is evident that the communist leaders in Yugoslavia consider the most serious current internal political problem to be national divisions, and they fear that this will lead to the disintegration of the Yugoslav state.

Bakaric on the difference in "conceptions and programs" between Croatian and Serbian communists

Nedjeljne Informativne Novice (NIN) published the aforementioned interview with Dr. Vladimir Bakaric[105], which focused primarily on the national question and raising the standard of living, in its first issue of March 1964. That issue of NIN was dedicated to reviewing the prevailing situation in Croatia. When the new constitution was promulgated in April 1963, Bakaric ceased to be president of the Croatian parliament, but as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia and as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslav, he is considered the most prominent figure of the communist regime in Croatia.

The questions posed by the Serbian journalist Golubovic already highlight the existing differences between Serbs and Croats. Therefore, we quote his first question in full.

Question: "When we present Croatia, we are extremely interested in hearing your opinion, especially since we do not want to consider Croatia as a closed republic—so to speak—with its own local problems, but rather within the broader Yugoslav community. Of course, we are very interested in the political, economic, and social profile of contemporary Croatia as an explicitly national republic."

"However, when it comes to politics, for example, I think it's not difficult for us to reach an agreement and find common ground, although perhaps we could speak of political Yugoslavism. But when it comes to cultural integration, I would say it's more of a wish than a reality, and in that respect, we don't know each other well enough. We can't talk about Yugoslavism without cultural reciprocity.

And since this topic brings all discussions to a close, we would like to begin with it. We want to ask you precisely, what, in your opinion, prevents our rapprochement?

When that Serbian journalist says that "we don't know each other well enough" and asks what prevents our rapprochement, he is referring to the Serbs and Croats, which means that there is a (imposed) Yugoslav state framework, but there is no cultural, that is, national, integration. It is solely for reasons of official policy that this problem cannot be discussed openly.

"To better understand the prevailing "national" atmosphere in Yugoslavia, it is helpful to transcribe Bakaric's full response to the first question.

Answer: "I wouldn't entirely follow your line of thought; I even believe that some of my assessments differ from yours.

If we follow the thread of your argument, if I have understood you correctly, then I would like to address first the general aspect, let's call it the socio-economic one."

"I think your approach here is correct in not considering Croatia as an isolated republic. I think that's right. I even believe that in the reviews usually given about Croatia, this aspect isn't presented properly. Croatia, and not only Croatia, is so present in Yugoslavia that, otherwise, or in isolation, this issue cannot and should not be addressed. And in the presentations that are usually presented as isolationist tendencies, this point isn't addressed well. It can't and shouldn't be addressed that way. Croatia is so integrated that any other image would be wrong.

"I'm not saying that specific things don't exist, but what is specific to Croatia coincides with what is specific to Yugoslavia. Therefore, the spheres of action, so to speak, of all material, productive, and social forces, are not limited to Croatia alone, but are felt directly or indirectly everywhere.

I think the process here is not only very vigorous but very advanced, so I couldn't say that anything separates us in that area. Sometimes, in that area, what separates us are criteria, programs, and conceptions." The material aspect of our problem is much more integrated than that of ideas. And if I may say so, often the facts presented themselves—and then a step forward was taken! If I may put it this way, in Yugoslavia what is least developed is the concept of federation, insofar as it signifies a whole, a sum of units, but rather in its indivisible aspect, the element of cohesion of the separate units.

That is very underdeveloped, and more diligent work must be done on that level. And because it is not developed, and work is very slow on that level, clashes of differing opinions often occur, which then take on an almost national character.

Bakaric, therefore, advocates for a Yugoslav solution to the Croatian problem, arguing that the Croatian issue cannot be addressed in isolation, outside the framework of Yugoslavia. However, he readily acknowledges "that we are separated by differing criteria, programs, and conceptions," even though practical integration is well advanced. This would thus represent a disconnect between theory and practice, since many things are not going well in this Yugoslav integration.

For communist policy, his observation that the concept of federation is poorly developed—that is to say, that there is no feeling or awareness of state unity—is disastrous, given that before seizing power, the communists maintained that they were the only ones capable of resolving the problem of the contrasts and conflicts among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Now, however, they openly admit that they lack a basic conception of a common state of diverse nationalities in Yugoslavia.

The second question and its answer offer nothing new, but they are interesting because they tend to soften the impression of the contrasts mentioned at the beginning of the interview.

Question: "Is that why, perhaps, when I asked what prevents us from getting closer, I omitted a very important word, namely: getting even closer, specifically, to get to know each other better?"

Answer: "Yes, even closer. Getting closer is always a multi-stage process, and I think that in that sense we can trace a line, a zigzag line, it's true, but I couldn't say, taking everything into account, that we are becoming divided. I would say that we are getting closer, although there are areas where perhaps we are separating and where trends prevail that hinder greater convergence.

We find this in general matters, in the economy and in culture. But, considering the whole, I wouldn't say that we are distancing ourselves, that the process of getting closer continues. The current situation is perhaps such that it provokes more discussions than seems necessary, but I would say again that these are limited to a rather small circle, while among the general population, among working people, they don't occur."

"The Most Prominent Croatian Communist Writer and the Failure of the Yugoslav Concept

The third question mentions the Croatian writer Miroslav Krleza in connection with Yugoslavism and the national question, which is very interesting. Krleza is the most prominent communist writer.

Between the two world wars, Krleza sharply criticized Croatian society but supported Croatia's national demands. His attitude during the Second World War and later under the communist regime demonstrated that he was a great opportunist and that his conduct did not align with his radical writing and his supposed fight for justice and equality, given his silence in the face of communist oppression and Croatia's marginalization.

Krleza did not participate in the communist resistance; he remained in Zagreb, enjoying the benefits of Pavelić's Ustaše regime, thanks to the intervention of the Croatian novelist Mile Budak, then Minister of Education, who was later condemned to death and hanged by the communists. Krleza, from the moment the communists came to power, has belonged to Tito's inner circle, loyally serving the communist dictatorship without showing any sign of opposition or reaction, although he tries to avoid being labeled a traitor in Croatia. But now, an editor of Nedeljne Informativne Novine refers to him in a singular way in his interview with Bakaric, and says verbatim:

Question: "A few days ago I was with Krleza and asked him to write something for us about Yugoslavism. He says he doesn't have time, because he believes that no less than 700 pages would have to be written on the subject, and then it would have to be definitively closed, provided, of course, that it is devoid of political opportunism. Is this political opportunism, which appears at different levels and in different spheres, what hinders our rapprochement and progress? Is this the element that must be taken into account?"

It is strange and surprising that Krleza doesn't have time to comment on the burning and fundamental political problem of Yugoslavia; Krleza, a writer who before the war wrote pages and pages on the same issue, doesn't have time to address it. His reasoning is also interesting. He doesn't have time because 700 pages would have to be written on the subject. All Croatians, including Krleza, know very well that the aforementioned problem is simple and can be addressed politically in an article, a conversation, or even just a few sentences. His argument that after those 700 pages on Yugoslavism, the matter should be definitively closed, provided it is "devoid of political opportunism," is also characteristic.

And what is Krleza's response but pure opportunism? He deliberately refuses to take a position on the Croatian national question and tries to evade it with unconvincing arguments. If he believed in the existence and duration of the Yugoslav state, he would declare himself unequivocally in its favor. His much-criticized opportunism over the last 20 years testifies that he would not hesitate to make such a declaration. But it is obvious that Krleza does not believe in the Yugoslav community, and with his evasive response, he is in fact distancing himself from Yugoslavism.

From such a prominent communist writer and intellectual, one might expect a clear and decisive stance. Therefore, his response is highly telling and, ultimately, favors Croatian nationalist thought. Krleza retreats and abandons the Yugoslav line. Perhaps he will have the time and opportunity to move forward, openly side with his people, and rise up against foreign domination.

To this question, which also implied the Serbian journalist's reproach for Krleza's reserve and evasiveness, Bakaric replied:

"Political opportunism, as you know, is a very ugly thing. Political opportunism often hinders the normal course of events. If we must be severe, then we must be so. The operation is not carried out with a rusty knife, but with a sharp one, if it must be done. For with opportunism, the solution to outstanding problems is postponed. And problems in such a process must exist, must be raised, and must be resolved. They accumulate until they are ripe for resolution, like all other problems. Consequently, they go through easier or more serious phases, but they must be resolved.

"As for the further political development of our country, there are indeed many problems of an ideological and political nature. I do not deny this; I only deny that these problems are such that they could further divide us, even though such tendencies exist."

"In the problems of Yugoslavism, there are more practical misunderstandings than fundamental understandings."

Here, we are particularly interested in the last part of Bakaric's answer to the question about Yugoslavism. Bakaric states that "we" (referring to Croats and Serbs) "have more practical misunderstandings than fundamental understandings in the problems of Yugoslavism." His observation regarding the lack of fundamental understandings aligns with his earlier observation about the lack of a concept of federation.

However, his assertion that there are "more practical misunderstandings" contradicts his first answer, where he states, verbatim, "that the material aspect of the problem is much more integrated than its ideological aspect." This contradictory position of the leading Croatian communist testifies to the importance and delicacy of the problem, but also to the difficult situation into which the communists led the Croatian people. This proves that Croatian communists are caught between a rock and a hard place: on the one hand, the people are openly criticizing them, and on the other, Greater Serbian pressure is intensifying. Hence the contradiction in Bakaric's statements.

The Serbian communists follow King Alexander's dictatorial line.

To this unconvincing answer, the Serbian journalist asks:

- Please explain.

Bakaric responds:

"For example, under Yugoslavism, many understand that the era of, let's say, the 'Yugoslavism' of Pera Živković[106] and King Alexander has returned. Others believe, given that Yugoslavia is a multinational state and that many nations have only recently gained the freedom to develop, that the latter takes precedence over the former. And based on this, on such different, such divergent opinions, other problems often arise.

However, if we discard Pera Živković as a way of thinking—in theory, we have all discarded him, but not in practical matters—then the second problem is easier to solve. It is natural that the nations that never had their freedom should feel elated. However, they obtained their freedom within the community of the peoples of Yugoslavia, and therefore, there is an element of cohesion here, at first glance, a priori, which cannot be otherwise considered. Only if all the problems are understood will it be easy to find a suitable solution.

"In practice, then, that The problem, the problem of the old approach to things in Croatia, for example, manifests itself in a whole series of ways. Many here reproach us, saying: you never emphasize Croatian identity, you don't concern yourselves with the problems of building the Croatian nation, all to create a new state of affairs very similar to Pera Žižković's.

It wasn't difficult for us to refute these reproaches, since attending to Croatian history at the moment we are creating history is commendable but not of vital importance. We must look at where the prospects lie, where the future is, what elements contribute to the development of a nation and to our own. For us, it was and remains the only possibility: to preserve this community, which asserted itself absolutely in the war, and this community, precisely because it is multinational, has an understanding of the relationships between other peoples and creates a solid foundation for collaboration on a much broader scale, not only in Europe, but worldwide. Therefore, on this point, we were very resolute.

"On the other hand, the tendency for us here, specifically in Zagreb, not to participate in solving certain problems has proven negative. It is said, for example, that foreign policy is a federal matter. Of course, we accept that. Above all, the diplomatic aspect of that policy is the absolute 'monopoly' of the federation. But foreign policy is a matter for the peoples of Yugoslavia. Consequently, every last Yugoslav must be included at the heart of foreign policy, and in everything done in this area, we are as active contributors as anyone else in this country. Understanding is essential here. We must strive for it, all the more so since, let's say, the formulation of foreign policy is linked to the international division of labor, in which Croatia plays an important role. This raises a whole series of issues, for example, economic relations between countries with different systems, the relationship between Yugoslavia and India, for instance."

"As long as we limit ourselves to trade, there are no cumbersome problems. Trade has its forms. That is to say: it's either clearing, cash payment, or credit, etc. But if a factory is built there and goods are regularly exported, then a service must be provided. From that point on, things change. We're talking about Yugoslav services in India, say, for a company like 'Rade Koncar' or 'Ingro.' Would you provide them to an Indian or an Indian capitalist, or would you organize your own? If you organize your own services, what system would that system be?

"A whole series of problems arises, then: how to proceed, what attitude to take regarding India's internal development, without interfering in its internal affairs. Everyone who works there must collaborate. Therefore, the matter—so to speak—is not limited to the 'federal' apparatus, but requires broad collaboration from a great many people.

"Consequently, all these federal problems are ours as well, and that is why we frame them in this way and consider them a necessary element of cohesion in the government of Yugoslavia. I see this as yet another reason for rapprochement, precisely because in this way we include a vast circle of people in such problems.

Then, the problems of economic construction arise. It is on this point that the most discussion takes place. We strongly oppose republicanism in the economy, although—judging by all accounts—we are accused of being spokespeople for this line with the thesis of decentralization, and things of the sort. We oppose it because we seek paths to the true terrain of economic integration within and outside the country. It must be said that most of the criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the matter, on the starting point of a bureaucratic centralism that does not understand, that wears its green or red glasses and is able to see certain 'colors' precisely because it has the wrong color of glasses." I believe that in this respect we have so far taken the first steps toward creating a better and healthier work system, and that it would be difficult at the moment to draw significant lessons.

"The initial experiences are positive, although too small to build upon for anything substantial. The difficulties are enormous, greater in people's minds than in their material aspect. For example, there was much discussion about how to facilitate market expansion, how to coordinate joint actions, which often failed for trivial reasons. I believe, however, that if we move forward energetically on all these matters, we will succeed."

The essential point in Bakaric's response is his admission that the communists rejected the Yugoslavism of Pera Zivkovic and King Alexander in theory, but not in practice. This is the main tone of the entire interview, now expressed clearly and openly.

The Croatian communists acknowledge that, with regard to the "solution" to the Croatian national question, they remain at the same point as the disastrous dictatorship of Pera Živković and King Alexander, established in early 1929 after the violent death of Esteban Radić, with the aim of breaking national resistance through more radical means. The vast majority of the Croatian people knew, even before the Second World War, and particularly during the war, that the communists could not resolve the national question because the Croatian communists had capitulated to the Serbian communists and accepted the Greater Serbian conception of Yugoslavia. After rivers of bloodshed and other calamities, the Croatian communists now recognize their failure.

This recognition constitutes a significant turning point in the postwar political process in Croatia. Croatian communists could alleviate the people's plight if they draw logical conclusions from Bakaric's assertions. However, his call to preserve "the community that has asserted itself absolutely in the war," following his negative judgments, lacks resonance and is too reminiscent of the slogan "Save Yugoslavia," supposedly uttered by King Alexander on his deathbed. The future will tell whether this is indeed a desperate attempt to salvage a failed idea and perpetuate this misguided path, or a new and sincere orientation on the part of a segment of Croatian communists in favor of their people.

The Significance of the National Question in Yugoslavia

The declarations of Tito and Bakaric regarding the vast scale of national divisions in Yugoslavia amount to an acknowledgment of the communists' impotence in the face of the will of the oppressed peoples and the national question as a historical factor that transcends the framework of communist doctrine and cannot be resolved through the means and methods of communist politics. The communist policy of "brotherhood and unity" suffered a resounding failure.

The national question, therefore, is of paramount importance in Yugoslavia. This is also recognized by the communist leaders. The people and foreign observers know that the crux of the national question lies in Croatia and its relationship with Serbia, given that the Croats are the most numerous non-Serb people in Yugoslavia, and, of course, the Croatian problem was also an incurable ailment of pre-war Yugoslavia.

The national question of Yugoslavia takes on even greater significance when one considers that, in addition to the Croats, neither the Macedonians nor the Albanians consider their national question resolved. This is fueling discontent in Slovenia regarding Greater Serbian policy, and in Montenegro, repressed national tendencies are emerging.

In the postwar tension between Yugoslavia and Albania, Albania's national demands play a far more significant role than ideological issues, and in this arena, Yugoslavia faces greater danger than in the ideological struggle. The large Hungarian minority (over half a million) must also be considered. Following the incorporation of Vojvodina into Serbia, they are largely subject to Serbian authority, but in a moment of crisis and state collapse, they would turn against Greater Serbian policy, given their traditions and current circumstances.

Serbia proper constitutes a quarter of Yugoslavia's total population. Even when Serbs living in other republics are included, they remain a minority compared to the other peoples of Yugoslavia. If one takes into account that a high percentage of Serbs outside Serbia disagree with Greater Serbian policy and would readily come to terms with Croats and Hungarians (from Vojvodina), then Serbia's position becomes even weaker.

This numerical disparity and the geographical position of the non-Serb peoples must not be overlooked when considering national issues in Yugoslavia. In the event of political upheaval in Yugoslavia and Southeast Europe, all non-Serb peoples would turn against Belgrade and Serbia, unless Serbian representatives recognize this danger and the need to reach an understanding regarding the peaceful separation of Serbia, Croatia, and the other non-Serb peoples.

Rankovic secures Tito's succession

An even more complete picture of Croat discontent emerges when reviewing the current ruling team in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. In 1963, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its constituent republics "voted" for a new constitution. On this occasion, Aleksandar Rankovic, a Serb and head of the UDBA (political police) and all the secret police services from the time of the guerrilla war to the present day, was designated as Tito's successor in the Communist Party (now the Communist League of Yugoslavia) and as head of state.

Rankovic is considered not only by the opposition but also by Croatian communists to be a Greater Serbian chauvinist and a declared enemy of Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Albanians. Rankovic is consolidating Greater Serbian positions and filling key posts in the party and state institutions with his cronies.

In parallel with the constitutional reform in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, I. Krajacic was appointed Speaker of Parliament, replacing Bakaric, thus assuming the top position among the communists. He is the local head of UDBA and a docile executor of orders issued from Belgrade. While Bakaric, after the dissolution of Hebrang, accepted the Greater Serbian policy of restoring Yugoslavia under Serbian leadership and was therefore appointed head of the communists in Croatia, now, after 20 years, he is removed from that position and replaced by the notorious terrorist and police chief Krajacic.

Although Bakaric accepted the Greater Serbian concept, he did not entirely satisfy the Greater Serbian ruling class. His statement, discussed above, indicates possible discontent among Serbian communists with his stance and reveals existing conflicts between Serbian and Croatian communists. Future developments will show whether this is indeed a deeper crisis among communists, triggered by the national question. One thing is certain, however: Krajacic's appointment as head of parliament in Croatia signifies a resurgence of the Greater Serbian course and a strengthening of Rankovic's policies in the "Socialist Republic of Croatia." This increases tensions in relations between Serbs and Croats and, consequently, deepens the crisis of the state.

II. The Economic Crisis and Social Difficulties

Yugoslavia, in addition to suffering from the unresolved national question, is afflicted by the progressively worsening crisis of the state. Its incurable ailment also includes tremendous difficulties in the economic and social spheres.

The Yugoslav economic system remains the same, despite the adjustments introduced after the conflict with Moscow in 1948; that is to say, it is typically communist. The means of production (except for the main agricultural sector and small artisans), as well as the entire economy, are socialized: they belong directly to the state or to collectives, which are dependent on the state for their decisions. Central and bureaucratic planning, the absolute power of the state and the communist party without control or accountability to the people, is another characteristic of economic life in Yugoslavia.

Forced industrialization was supposed to elevate Yugoslavia to the status of highly industrialized countries in a short time. Initially, the regime resorted openly to forced labor. Today, youth brigades, especially in road and railway construction, constitute a form of forced labor, since young people can only seek employment after having participated in these brigades.

Titoism attempted to forge its own path in achieving socialism, diverging from certain Soviet methods. The main correction to the previous Soviet economic system involved a degree of decentralization of enterprises and greater autonomy; collective farms (kolkhozes) were forcibly dissolved, and peasants were allowed to manage their farms freely. Then, through workers' councils, so-called workers' self-management was implemented, and foreign trade was partially "liberalized," increasing ties with Western democracies. All these measures coincided with massive American aid, which, in effect, facilitated various experiments by Tito's regime. However, despite all these measures, the fundamental principles of the Yugoslav economic system remained unchanged.

The economic outcome of Titoism was negative, and the experiment of "liberalizing" the economy failed. As Tito himself admitted in his speech in Split on May 6, 1962, this experiment can be described as a fiasco.

Despite the substantial American contribution in money and food, estimated by some to be three billion dollars; despite the aid provided by several Western European countries and the International Monetary Fund, aimed at stabilizing the Yugoslav currency and aligning its exchange rate with its real value, as declared by Tito, a trade deficit of 800 million dollars was incurred, a deficit that continues to grow.

The entire Yugoslav economy is in a disastrous state. The situation worsened in 1963 and 1964. The hopes of the communist leaders to quickly develop their own industry and increase exports of manufactured goods vanished: imports exceed exports, hence the growing balance of payments deficit.

Misguided investments in industry, widespread corruption, disorganization in commerce, chronic inflation and disproportionate increases in the price of consumer goods relative to workers' and employees' wages, pressure exerted on peasants, insufficient food production, and dependence on foreign aid—all this, coupled with the lavish lifestyle of the "new class" and the profound social crisis, constitutes the legacy of Titoism and communism in Croatia.

The causes of this catastrophic state lie in the system itself, not in supposed secondary measures of economic and state policy. Today, workers in Yugoslavia are stripped of their fundamental rights, oppressed, exploited, and dragged into abject poverty. They practically live in slavery.

Since 1961, the Yugoslav economy has been characterized by a return to centralism, officially termed "economic integration." This trend is growing daily and has political underpinnings both domestically and internationally.

The worsening general economic situation and the decline in the standard of living of the consuming masses are presented as the internal reason for forcing "integration" or economic centralism, as the communist rulers hope to achieve greater economic impact through better coordination. Another important internal reason for this increased centralism is national division or economic chauvinism, as Tito put it, which hinders cooperation between republics and companies and leads to disintegration.

These "separatist nationalist tendencies" in the economy are felt especially in Croatia and Slovenia, as the national question manifests itself predominantly in the economic sphere. In this regard, the incident that occurred in early 1964 at the important Zagreb industrial plant, "Rade Koncar," is very characteristic.

A meeting was held there to discuss raising wages for workers and employees and increasing the price of manufactured goods. Finally, after lengthy discussion, the communist delegates made it clear and unequivocal that the factory produced enough good-quality goods, that prices could be lowered and wages increased, but that the majority of the profits had to go into the federal treasury in Belgrade. Loud protests erupted after this statement by the communist delegate.

The financial effect of economic "liberation" following the break with Moscow, and especially the introduction of new measures in 1952-53, proved negative. By 1961-62, despite continued food aid from Washington, it had reached catastrophic proportions due to the growing balance of payments deficit in foreign trade, which could not be addressed in the same way.

Yugoslav economic policy and the entire economic system faced an unforgiving choice: 1) abandon the centrally planned communist economy and allow greater freedom in the organization of enterprises and the market; exempt peasants from tax discrimination and burdensome taxes; and permit free competition between the socialist and private sectors in all economic disciplines; or 2) return to the pre-1952 and pre-1948 state, that is, return to rigid centralism, planning, and bureaucracy; in short, adopt the Soviet economic system and re-establish closer ties with the Soviet bloc.

In 1962, Tito's regime opted for the second solution. The political rapprochement with Moscow on the international stage and the coordination between the Yugoslav and Soviet communist parties facilitated and, in fact, dictated this decision. Since Tito did not want to abandon communism, this path was logical.

But the economic consequences were unavoidable: their most visible result is the growing hardship and the decline in the already very low standard of living of the vast consumer masses. This new orientation is determined by political motives and signifies the failure of Titoism as a particular variant of communism in economics and politics, both domestically and internationally.[107]

In assessing the current economic and social situation in Yugoslavia, two factors are of paramount importance: 1) the peasant problem in the economy, and 2) the problem of the standard of living and, consequently, the workers' problem.

These are the sectors where the economic policies of Tito's regime are most evident, and these problems are constantly being discussed, new solutions sought, and new plans and remedies announced. The year 1964 is marked by discussions about the standard of living; lately, agriculture and agricultural policy have played a very important role, and therefore it is important that we address these issues.

Failure of Communist Agricultural Policy

In 1953, the collective farms (kolkhozes) were dissolved, partly due to the catastrophic decline in food production, and partly due to new measures implemented by Tito's regime in response to the conflict with the Cominform. Even before the dissolution of the kolkhozes, the private agricultural sector, which covered most of the land area, had increased to 88%.

The remaining 12% consisted of state assets, the remnants of peasant work cooperatives (kolkhozes), assets of agricultural cooperatives, and other state entities. All of this constitutes what is called the socialist sector of agriculture, to which must be added the relatively small area of privately owned land, cultivated by cooperatives in partnership with the owner, according to the signed contract.

This portion, roughly one-tenth of the arable land, should, according to official policy, produce sufficient quantities of food and raw materials for the market, and all the funds allocated in the national budget for agriculture are assigned to this sector; this sector also has access to substantial agricultural loans for acquiring implements and machinery. Furthermore, agricultural experts primarily focus on this small agricultural sector.

In short, all the positive measures of agricultural technology are concentrated in that small socialist sector, which is far from being able to satisfy the country's needs for agricultural products. On the contrary, private peasant farms are subject to onerous taxes and discrimination.

The peasant farm, in theory, is free, but it must pay such high taxes that it neither generates profits nor can it progress. The peasant cannot access credit under certain conditions, that is, if he agrees to co-participation with the "cooperative," which in most cases he refuses, because in this way he becomes dependent on it and incurs heavy obligations, regardless of the farm's economic performance.

Nothing is done to promote and modernize the private sector; instead, pressure is exerted on the peasant to abandon his land, which in fact happens. The situation in the countryside is so bad that both young and veteran farmers leave the countryside for the city in search of employment and a new profession.

Due to these measures, agriculture in Yugoslavia is stagnant, and climatic factors, on average, play a very minor role. It is a regrettable fact that the unconditional American food aid provided to Tito has enabled the intensification of measures and pressures against the peasantry and has contributed to the expulsion of peasants from their ancestral homes and the abandonment of the countryside, which in certain regions has reached alarming proportions.

Speaking in Split in 1962, Tito announced his intention to rapidly promote and support the socialist sector of agriculture at the expense of the private peasant sector. Lately, this trend has indeed intensified and is increasingly reflected in the purchase and leasing of peasant lands by agricultural cooperatives. Given the pressure exerted on peasants to abandon their homes, this transfer of land is significantly facilitated.

Nevertheless, the food supply is insufficient and worsening. The consequence is a sharp rise in food prices and an increase in the cost of living. The bread supply depends heavily on imports, that is to say, on US aid. In recent years, imports have almost equaled the volume of wheat produced in Yugoslavia. This means that the market's wheat supply and the provision of the agricultural sector in Yugoslavia are covered almost 50% by domestic production and 50% by imports and US aid. Interestingly, this dependence on foreign aid is not decreasing but rather increasing.

Thus, despite the best wheat harvest in 1963, wheat imports increased compared to 1962 (imported wheat and wheat flour amounted to 800,000 metric tons per year in 1961 and 1962, and in 1963, according to provisional data, exceeded one million tons). Meat production is entirely unsatisfactory, and as a result, the market is poorly supplied or deprived of meat, causing prices to rise dramatically. The socialist sector's participation is very small due to the complexity and cost of livestock production. The chronic shortage of meat and related products is a persistent phenomenon in all communist countries, and Tito's Yugoslavia, thanks to its new agricultural policy, is among them.

Low Living Standards and Worker Discontent

The constant rise in prices and low wages, the lack of meat and housing, the growing unemployment, and the large influx of unskilled peasant labor have created an extremely serious situation in recent years. Workers are discontented—there were cases of them refusing envelopes containing their wages, which was considered a strike, but the authorities did not retaliate—and the communist leaders have so far been unable to resolve these problems. There have also been instances of attempted strikes. The situation worsens, forcing the communists to publicly discuss the problem of living standards. From the beginning of 1964, this issue dominates party political meetings, labor unions, businesses, and the press.

To discuss this problem, a special meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Croatia was convened on January 30, 1964, and it reached several conclusions. Dr. Bakaric addressed this pressing issue extensively in several interviews. At the meeting of the Croatian Federation of Trade Unions, held on March 28, 1964, on the standard of living, S. Vukmanovic and M. Baltic presented their reports.

This topic also dominated the agenda of the Congress of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia. Reports and discussions on the standard of living are given priority in the program of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, to be held in Belgrade in November of this year. It could be said that this year, the Yugoslav question is marked by national issues and the standard of living.

According to statements by communist leaders, special meetings of party organizations, press reports, statistics, and other sources, the standard of living was as follows:

A worker cannot normally live on their work alone. Along with their permanent job, they must find another job or "changa" (called "paid work" in Yugoslavia), or in large families, the problem of making ends meet is solved by having several members work and live together. The second job worries the worker and the employee more than their permanent job, so they do not dedicate themselves to it with the necessary commitment. Therefore, official figures regarding working hours—for example, 45 and 42 hours per week—present a misleading picture, since the worker and the employee actually work many more hours.

The standard of living of the workers should be the indicator of the success of communism, which supposedly strives for the well-being of the working class and its government. It was precisely in this respect that Tito's communist regime disappointed.

Today, even communist leaders must acknowledge that they cannot compensate workers for their labor in a way that allows them to live a decent life and meet all their fundamental economic and cultural needs. They force workers to seek additional work or engage in illegal activities, whereas in the free and democratic world, a worker's wages ensure a decent life for their family. Due to the declining standard of living, workers become apathetic and politically disaffected.

The workers' discontent is understandable given that the salaries of high-ranking officials are 20 times greater than the wages of workers in the same establishment. Regarding profit distribution, there are cases where a worker receives 2,000 dinars while the managers receive 80,000, as Tito noted in his speech in Split (1962). But what did Tito say about the workers' demands to strike? He cynically replied that they would be striking against themselves, and that this could not be allowed. Nevertheless, news reports of worker protests and attempted strikes are very frequent, but the communist regime, of course, represses all such attempts and reports in the press.

As a consequence of insufficient wages, theft and fraud occur in the factories. Irregularities on the part of factory managers must also be mentioned. Since there is no popular and democratic control over the leaders, who are almost always communists, embezzlement, travel allowances, and the purchase of various items for personal use and at the company's expense are commonplace. These "economic crimes," heavily criticized in the press and sometimes punished in the courts, are an integral part of the communist system.

Instead of improving the situation of workers and employees, as promised for years by Tito and other leaders, it has worsened in recent years. The prices of basic goods are rising faster than wages. The purchasing power of wages is constantly declining. At the aforementioned meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Croatia, it was acknowledged that the cost of living is rising faster than wages, that the main causes of the rising cost of living are the increase in prices and rents; that there is a shortage of food, particularly meat; and that the average worker's income cannot cover the rent for standard Yugoslav housing.[108]

The communists are not proposing any new measures to remedy the crisis. They are, however, proposing the strengthening of the socialist sector in agriculture with the aim of lowering the cost of living—that is, measures that have been tried for years and have yielded negative results.

The Housing Crisis

Communist leaders proposed rapid and efficient industrial construction as a solution to the housing crisis. This measure had been implemented for years but without achieving the desired objectives.

Regarding housing, two major problems arose: 1) Demand could not be met due to the persistent housing shortage. The excessive industrialization of the country had relegated housing construction from the outset. The proletarianization of the countryside and the peasantry led to the migration of the workforce to cities that could not absorb it in terms of either employment or housing. 2) Rent was disproportionately high relative to wages, and this ratio was changing, increasingly to the detriment of the worker. Government-built apartments were too expensive, and the state could not provide workers and employees with housing that matched their income (Bakaric statement, see Vjesnik, February 1, 1964). The communist authorities are powerless and, apart from grandiose promises, offer no concrete solutions.

Unemployment and the Sources of Labor

In Yugoslavia, there are many unemployed, and unemployment is rising, but the authorities, for reasons of prestige, do not acknowledge it. To obtain foreign currency and alleviate unemployment, a certain number of workers are allowed to seek employment in the free countries of Europe. These are mostly unskilled workers. From the questions posed by a reporter from Nedeljne Informativne Novine to Bakaric in the aforementioned interview,[109] it can be deduced that at the beginning of 1964 there were about 150,000 workers employed abroad, with the permission of the Yugoslav government.

Of these workers, almost half, 70,000, come from the Socialist Republic of Croatia. It is curious that most of these workers are employed in West Germany, even though relations between Bonn and Belgrade are very tense, almost hostile. The severe economic crisis forced Tito's government to allow workers to seek employment in an "enemy" country.

The communists often tried to explain the low standard of living by citing large investments, especially in industry. However, this explanation failed to account for the profound economic crisis.

The Total Crisis - Workers' Self-Management

The primary cause of the plight of the vast popular sectors lay in the communist political and socio-economic system. Consequently, a large proportion of businesses were irrational and unproductive. Other countries, also severely damaged during the war, such as West Germany and France, rebuilt quickly and now offer their citizens a high standard of living. Yugoslavia, despite substantial American aid, remained at a very low level of development and still struggled with the basic difficulties of supplying the market and improving the living conditions of the broad masses.

The agricultural policies of the Titoist regime resulted in a persistent shortage of food products, driving up prices and burdening consumers. The newly announced agricultural measures will not improve the situation; rather, the shortages of meat, milk, and other products will continue, leaving Yugoslavia dependent on American aid despite the great potential of its domestic production.

In previous years, the communists emphasized workers' self-management as an important and historic achievement of Titoism. From the outset, it was obvious that the power of workers' collectives and councils was largely nominal and that the main decisions regarding investments, wages, and profit distribution were made by the communist party and company directors, while workers' self-management served as a façade behind which the corrupt and exploitative communist leaders hid. Lately, workers' self-government is not discussed as much, and in discussions about how to raise living standards, workers' councils are barely mentioned. The propaganda machine has also lost its effectiveness in this area in the face of harsh reality.

From the foregoing regarding the standard of living and the workers' problem, it follows that: workers and employees in Yugoslavia cannot satisfy their basic needs with their normal wages; the communists, during their 19 years in power, failed to resolve the fundamental social problem; the workers' standard of living is declining; and the masses are exploited worse than in the initial phase of capitalism. The pressing social problem is the best proof of the total failure of communist policy. For a radical improvement in living conditions and to make possible a progressive rise in the standard of living of the working masses, the communist system must be changed and a democratic system introduced, with the realization of the right to self-determination of oppressed peoples.

III. The International Situation and the National Problem of Yugoslavia

During recent years, Yugoslavia's international relations shifted politically, and it became almost entirely integrated into the Soviet bloc. Particularly after the conference of non-committal and neutralist countries held in Belgrade at the end of 1961 and Tito's trip to the Soviet Union in 1962, Tito's regime, in general terms, followed the line of Soviet policy, with previous differences and disagreements disappearing.

On the issue of armaments and atomic tests, on Germany and Berlin, on colonial policy, on the tension arising in East Asia, and regarding the European Economic Community, Belgrade's position was identical to Moscow's. The strain and recent break between the Soviet Union and Red China brought Tito even closer to Moscow.

For Croats and other Western peoples, Yugoslavia's integration into COMECON and its opposition to European integration and the European Economic Community as a path to unifying the political and economic forces of free European nations are of great interest. The communist regime in Belgrade is thus harming the economic interests of Croatia and Slovenia, which are oriented toward the West due to their geographic location, economic ties, and traditions.

As Yugoslavia shifted toward Moscow, a serious crisis arose in its neutralist policy, which aspired to lead the bloc of non-committal countries, particularly those in Africa and Asia, and even Latin America and other continents. Since Tito is no longer considered heretical regarding the ideology and implementation of the communist program, Yugoslavia is losing the attributes of a neutral country, which served as the main argument for the Washington government to provide Tito with substantial aid over the past 15 years. Therefore, Titoism, as a peculiar variant of communism, is being liquidated not only locally but also internationally, especially given the growing opposition to Soviet domination in communist countries, as demonstrated by the case of Romania.

Titoism arose from the contrasts and difficulties within the communist bloc, and for the same reasons, it is losing its relevance. This fact takes on international significance, given that the areas of interest of the Soviet bloc and the West clash and intersect within the territory of Yugoslavia, making it of interest not only to the peoples of Yugoslavia but also to the great powers to see which side Yugoslavia or its constituent parts will lean towards should this multinational conglomerate disintegrate.

With Tito's regime's rapprochement with Moscow, Yugoslavia's relationship with the Western European powers changed. However, this relationship took on new dimensions in the wake of the deepening Sino-Soviet conflict and the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Since Washington's official policy was not to weaken the Soviet Union's international standing—both to continue negotiations and, following the nuclear test ban agreement, to explore new possibilities for lasting peace, and because of the conflict between the Soviet Union and communist China—Tito, as a close friend of Moscow, continued to benefit from American policy in the new international landscape.

The conflict within the communist bloc accelerated the transition from the "Cold War" to one of "essential coexistence" between the Western bloc, led by the United States, and the Soviet bloc. In this conflict, Washington was opposed to China and sought to avoid any action that could weaken Moscow's position. Indeed, without that conflict, current American policy would not be very different, since official American circles, trying to avoid nuclear war at the cost of great sacrifices, do not want to intervene in the internal affairs of European communist countries; they hope that gradual changes will occur in those countries that would soften the dictatorship and gradually liberate the captive populations, thereby reducing tensions and the global communist threat. The Sino-Soviet conflict only underscored this American position, making it easier to justify to public opinion, which largely disapproved of the enormous aid given to Yugoslavia, especially since Tito returned to the Moscow line.

De Gaulle and the Peoples of Eastern Europe

While a few years ago one could speak of a unified Western policy toward the Soviet bloc and the communist countries, this is no longer the case. With the subsidence of the threat of war, greater differentiation emerged within the Western bloc. Since de Gaulle came to power, France has increasingly distanced itself from joint policy with the United States. France's new political course was unequivocally manifested in the issues of European integration, where France seeks to take the lead and reduce the influence of London and Washington. Regarding Eastern Europe, France does not entirely follow the American line. While the major Western nations agree on matters of principle concerning communism and the defense of common interests, growing divergences are emerging in political tactics. France refuses to follow the American path and wants to negotiate directly with Moscow and resolve all important issues. In doing so, de Gaulle aims to demonstrate that France is a first-rate world power.

What French policy will ultimately be regarding the Soviet Union and the peoples of Eastern Europe is not yet clear. However, France's interest in developments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe is certainly significant, and it is likely that French policy will also differ from American policy in this area. Unlike Washington's policy, today the relevant circles in Paris are interested not only in relations with communist regimes but also with subjugated peoples and with the future order of that part of Europe, whose people cannot currently express their will freely. Although a defined conception of French policy in that part of Europe is not yet apparent, it is possible that there will be rivalry and greater divergences with the American position.

Washington's policy is much clearer: for now, it does not seek to change the status quo. Consequently, it is not interested in political changes in Yugoslavia. However, should major crises arise and the people attempt to liberate themselves through their own efforts, Washington would likely modify its attitude toward the peoples of Yugoslavia.

If the opposition forces become a political force, there will be significant changes not only within Yugoslavia but throughout the Danubian-Adriatic-Balkan region, and those responsible in Washington will have to take a position by reviewing their foreign policy. Given the American tradition of supporting the freedom of all peoples, the oppressed nations can certainly count on the support of American public opinion. The essential point for American policy is that these changes do not provoke an atomic war, which no one desires.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the current course of American policy is unpopular and sometimes provokes a strong reaction from the captive peoples. The long-term goals of Washington and oppressed peoples are identical: freedom, democratic order, and the unification of the entire world in its spirit. But the current American policy of tolerating the status quo in Eastern Europe and its apparent disinterest in unresolved national problems and the discontent of vast popular masses in the European communist bloc is criticized in those countries.

The United States now faces the danger that, despite the shared long-term objectives, an anti-American sentiment will emerge among these peoples, similar to that which arose after the war in many countries, especially former colonial powers and, to some extent, in Western Europe itself.

Danger of a conflict between Yugoslavia and Albania

The open hostility between the Soviet Union and communist China is impacting Yugoslavia's international position, which is why the Croatian national question and other unresolved national problems in Yugoslavia are gaining importance as international factors. The relations between Yugoslavia and Albania have recently become very clear.

Albania and Yugoslavia occupy opposite ends of the communist spectrum. Behind Yugoslavia is Moscow, and behind Albania, Beijing. While "ideological" issues play a significant role in the Yugoslav-Albanian conflict, the Albanian national program aimed at unifying all Albanians in a single state carries far more weight.

The Albanian national minority lives in compact communities within the contiguous territory of Albania and, according to Yugoslav data, numbers 800,000 people, roughly half of Albania's total population of approximately 1,600,000. Since the founding of the Albanian state in 1912, the Albanian "national minority" in Yugoslavia has aspired to join Albania, but Serbia has not allowed them to realize their national aspirations.

The autonomous territory of Kosovo Metohija (Kosmet) within the Socialist Republic of Serbia does not resolve the Albanian problem, which remains unresolved. Consequently, the tension between Albania and Yugoslavia stems more from the Albanians' territorial demands than from ideological disputes. Returning to the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia has Moscow's support in its struggle with Albania. Meanwhile, Albania, backed by Beijing, accuses Yugoslavia of oppressing the Albanians in Kosovo Metohija.

In early 1964, the Albanian press, in its frequent attacks, openly raised the issue of the national liberation of the Albanians annexed to Yugoslavia. Violent reactions from official Yugoslav circles and the party organ Borba indicated that the crisis between Yugoslavia and Albania had entered the phase of an undisguised dispute over borders, which could have very serious consequences.

By constantly referring to the national question of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, Enver Hodza's dictatorial regime found a strong popular support, despite its extremist communist stance. Hodza rid himself of the Russian presence and its military bases in Albania, while his new Chinese protectors were far away. In the eyes of the Albanians, this constituted a remarkable success for the Hodza regime in defending Albania's national interests, despite the unpopularity of the communist dictatorship.

Regarding the growing tension between Yugoslavia and Albania and the potential international complications that could arise from this conflict, the following facts should be highlighted. Neither Yugoslavia nor Albania are members of the Warsaw Pact, that is, the military alliance of communist states. Both countries are therefore outside of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In the event of an open clash between Belgrade and Tirana to resolve the border dispute, neither the member states of the Warsaw Pact nor those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can automatically intervene with armed forces. Any border conflict could be contained without the risk of a world war. Of course, small local conflicts tend to escalate. But at present, the Soviet Union would hardly decide on a military intervention, as it would be labeled an aggressor, not by the "capitalist" West, but by certain communist countries. Furthermore, the West, and North America in particular, would not intervene militarily, but would oppose any Soviet intervention.

In short, there is a possibility of a local conflict without significant danger of escalating into a world war. Internal instability in Yugoslavia and such a conflict could shake the foundations of the Yugoslav regime and state. Furthermore, the communist regime in Albania would also be at risk.

This is a potential development in the near future. Forces are in motion that will develop dynamically and cannot be stopped without radical intervention. In any case, the Yugoslav-Albanian conflict currently represents the weakest point in the communist system of southeastern Europe and directly affects not only Albanians but all the peoples of Yugoslavia, particularly Croats, Macedonians, and Slovenes, who will try to take advantage of this conflict for their national liberation and to establish a democratic regime within their borders.

Macedonia, a bone of contention between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria

The Macedonian problem also opens up unique prospects for development. This is the vital problem for Macedonians, who aspire to their complete liberation and unification, but on the international stage, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek interests clash. Among the major powers, the Soviet Union is primarily interested.

After the war, the Greater Serbian authorities had to make concessions to the Macedonians, recognizing the Macedonian name and language and allowing the organization of a Macedonian administrative unit as one of the "republics" within the Yugoslav federation. The Macedonian Orthodox Church was subsequently recognized, although the Metropolitan Archbishop of Macedonia remains subordinate to the Serbian Patriarch.

The Macedonians are currently halfway to their complete emancipation. The supreme national goal of the Macedonians is their complete liberation from Serbian rule and the union of the Macedonians of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece within their ethnic territory, with the support of the Aromanians, an ethnic minority related to the Romanians.

While Tito was in opposition to Moscow, Bulgaria frequently raised the Macedonian question and attacked Tito's policies, since the Bulgarian rulers considered the Macedonians to be a branch of the Bulgarian people and Vardar's Macedonia, now part of Yugoslavia and Greece, to be an integral part of Bulgarian national territory. However, with Tito's rapprochement with Moscow, Bulgarian criticism of him subsided, as he is now in the same bloc as Bulgaria, and Moscow, at least for the time being, does not allow conflicts between Belgrade and Sofia.

As the internal crisis in Yugoslavia deepened and its relations with Albania became more strained, the Macedonian problem gained greater importance. If the Yugoslav border with Albania is threatened, the question of Macedonia will inevitably arise. The Macedonians will strive to complete their national liberation, and the simmering Serbian-Bulgarian conflict will intensify.

Should Slovenia, Croatia with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosmet rebel, Moscow would have to take a position on the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict. Then, not only the status of the Yugoslav part of Macedonia, but also that of Pirin Macedonia in Bulgaria and Aegean Macedonia in Greece, would automatically come to the forefront. The Macedonian problem would become a major issue in international relations. However, the main dynamic forces would likely shift after the crisis with Albania had culminated, which, given the prevailing situation in the Balkans, could be the beginning of the solution to a series of major political problems.

IV. Prospects for Croatian National Liberation

The crisis of the state, coupled with the economic crisis and the difficulties Yugoslavia faces internationally and within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, endangers not only the existing regime but the state itself. The economic crisis and worker discontent stem from the communist system and its specific economic measures, while the political and state crisis is due to Yugoslavia's Greater Serbian character and dates back to the very origins of the state established in 1918.

Tito's policy of supposed brotherhood and unity does not differ essentially from the pre-war policy practiced by monarchical Yugoslavia, although, at least in theory, it acknowledges the multinational composition of the state and, formally, through purely administrative measures, attempts to deceive non-Serb peoples and world opinion into believing that the national question has been definitively resolved. Now, the weight of this problem is shaking not only the regime but the state itself.

On the international stage, Yugoslavia is currently vulnerable, primarily in its relations with Albania. This vulnerability is becoming increasingly apparent as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's current protector, is forced to shift from offensive to defensive for the first time since World War II due to conflicts within the communist bloc and under the threat of thermonuclear war. Even the efforts of the Romanian communists for greater independence weaken the position of Yugoslavia and the Titoist regime amidst the current upheavals.

Within Yugoslavia, antagonistic forces and currents clash in various spheres. Last March, Miha Marinko, a Slovenian communist leader, acknowledged that workers' strikes had occurred in Yugoslavia. The frequent strikes in Yugoslavia are receiving increasing coverage in the foreign press (see the article "Problem of Yugoslavian Economic Policy," published by the prestigious Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung on April 30, 1964).

Agitation and infighting are rampant within the communist ranks, which the regime is unable to prevent, regarding internal economic, political, and ideological issues. Indeed, several factions exist, including the Greater Serbian faction, which plays the dominant role and seeks to preserve Serbian hegemony for the future. With Rankovic's appointment as Tito's successor and his gradual consolidation of power, this group brutally displays its current dominance.

Now, the Croatian communists themselves are pressuring their leaders to side with their people and fight for Croatia's national interests instead of continuing to play a miserable role as accomplices in their people's oppression. Bakaric's statements on the burning Croatian national question and the criticisms of the leaders for their ineffectiveness in defending Croatia's national interests are the first significant sign of a certain degree of opposition and independence of thought, even among the Croatian communist leaders.

More important, however, are the opposition forces in Croatia and other parts of Yugoslavia, outside the communist ranks. Among the anti-communist forces of the Yugoslav peoples, there are no significant differences regarding the communist regime. It is a fact that democratic forces are the defining characteristic of the opposition. Greater differences exist concerning the national question, and the danger remains that Greater Serbian conceptions will clash with the national aspirations of the Croats and other national peoples and minorities.

Since Serbia is a small minority compared to the other peoples, its position is weaker, and in the event of open conflict, Serbia would be at serious risk. Therefore, it is in the Serbs' own interest to recognize the right of others to self-determination and the creation of nation-states so that, with combined forces, they can overthrow communism. In this way, Serbia has a greater chance of freeing itself from the communist yoke.

But, given past experience, the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia must be prepared for several opportunities: on the one hand, to extend a conciliatory hand to Serbia in the anti-communist struggle and in favor of democracy, and on the other, to remain vigilant for a possible clash and open conflict with the Greater Serbs should they deny them their fundamental human and national rights.

The most critical phase in the unfolding of the crisis of the Yugoslav state and regime will occur when Tito steps down from power, or in the event of his sudden death.

The total crisis of the Yugoslav conglomerate transcends the borders of Yugoslavia, affecting several neighboring peoples and the fundamental interests of the free world, as well as those of the communist bloc. Croatia, by its tradition and current orientation, stands on the side of the West and the democratic world. According to reliable information, the people of Croatia do not expect their liberation from a Western army or a world war, which no sensible person desires, nor do the responsible powers possessing atomic weapons. On the other hand, the experience of recent years shows that uprisings, local and regional wars, coups d'état, etc., can occur without the official and direct intervention of the great powers, and that many small nations have liberated themselves through their efforts and struggles without the outbreak of the dreaded Third World War. It is likely that changes will occur in the near future without triggering a general conflict.

The Croats demand the realization of one of the most essential human rights: the right to self-determination of peoples. The logical consequence of this right is the State of Croatia, so the fundamental aspiration of the Croatian people to live in freedom is entirely consistent with this universally recognized natural right.

The State of Croatia cannot be an end in itself.

The primary objective of the Croatian national struggle is the establishment of the State of Croatia throughout the national territory.

This State would play a crucial role: establishing and guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all its citizens, including those of minorities, and facilitating the normal development of the Croatian people.

The political, economic, and technological process is leading to the integration of the European continent and the entire world. This process is unfolding, and nothing can stop it. The days of the self-sufficiency of individual states or groups of states are over. Nation-states acquire new significance in the era of continental and universal integration.

However, they continue to exist and serve as basic units for the formation of broader communities. Current international cooperation in the direction of continental and universal integration is not carried out directly but through states. This is one of the fundamental principles of international cooperation in our time. States, by mutual agreement, relinquish a portion of their sovereignty for the benefit of the larger community.

This is the path the future State of Croatia must follow, contributing to European and universal integration and promoting international cooperation. But first, the main requirement must be met: the Croatian people must exercise their right to national self-determination. This principle applies not only to Croats but to all the peoples of Yugoslavia, first and foremost to the Slovenian and Macedonian peoples, and the significant Albanian national minority. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin problem will resurface. Other peoples of Eastern Europe also face similar problems.

Since Croatia, by its spirit, politics, and economy, is oriented toward Western Europe, it is undeniable that Croatia, once free, must be among the free European nations. Some small European states that participate or wish to participate in European integration include Iceland, Luxembourg, the Republic of Ireland, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden. Croatia, due to the size of its territory and the number of its inhabitants, is among the most favored of this group.

It is not difficult, then, to explain the natural course that several peoples who make up Yugoslavia today wish to take. The Yugoslav conglomerate is compromised in the eyes of its members. The forces tending toward its disintegration are considerable, and the trends of the process are clear.

Judging by the current situation, several autonomous states will emerge from the territory of Yugoslavia. If we resort to outdated criteria, then the creation of new states might seem dangerous to us, and to certain Western circles, ignorant of the dynamic aspirations of oppressed peoples, even a step backward. On the other hand, in the era of full European integration, all these states can join the European Economic Community and the projected political frameworks without difficulty.

Therefore, such a solution is natural and acceptable both for the free countries of Western Europe and for the peoples currently subjugated in southeastern Europe. If, for example, Luxembourg can join the European Economic Community as an independent member, why shouldn't Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania have the same right? Today, from the ruins of colonial empires in Asia and Africa, predominantly small states are emerging, although national consciousness there is far less developed than in European countries. These new states are entering international organizations as equal members.

On the other hand, the peoples of southeastern Europe, within different political frameworks, were associated for long periods in political, military, economic, and cultural terms, and some of these ties still exist. For example, the Croats and Hungarians coexisted as two associated states in a single community for 400 years (1102–1526). And together with Austria, they lived in the same community under Habsburg rule for another 400 years (1527–1918). Part of Croatia and its eastern neighbors, the Serbs, were under Ottoman rule for 400 to 500 years.

Yugoslavia as a state was created about four decades ago and is therefore a very recent political formation and, in fact, a painful experiment that did not bring its constituent parts freedom and has cost them dearly in blood and immense material damage. The historical process shows that a rapid transition from one regional community to another is still possible today. Furthermore, if necessary, the newly created states may settle their specific relations among themselves and with their neighbors and establish political and economic cooperation.

Despite past negative experiences, we Croats must extend a hand for such cooperation, but on the condition that these new relations are always established at the level of sovereign states and free peoples, and not decided by a few in the name of the people, or resolved by force, as happened in the Croatian case in 1918 and 1945. All Yugoslav and Austro-Hungarian conceptions are obsolete and cannot serve as the basis for new solutions.

Every attempt to impose outdated and obsolete solutions against the will of the people will meet with open opposition from the Croats. In free cooperation with the other peoples and states of Southeast Europe, the Croatian state, by virtue of its location in the Danubian-Balkan-Adriatic region, will be an important factor in maintaining peace. However, there will be no peace in that part of Europe until a comprehensive and democratic solution is found to the national question of Croatia and the other historical-national entities.

The current crisis in Yugoslavia and the possibility of its disintegration are attracting the attention of Western political circles concerned with the concrete issues of arranging relations between the new states that will emerge from the dismembered Yugoslavia.

So far, all attempts to form or consolidate broader state communities in the Danubian-Adriatic-Balkan area have failed. Recent European developments also indicate that lasting solutions to major problems cannot be achieved through cooperation among small nations on a narrowly regional basis. Nor would creating a Balkan federation solve the national or common problems of that region. Given the distrust of non-Serb peoples toward Serbia, such a federation in the current situation could only be achieved by force.

Regional interstate communities in Europe, even those of the Benelux type, have failed to resolve significant political, economic, and military problems. They constituted a transitional phase toward a broader European state community, or they failed. The union of European nations is feasible only within a European framework. Such is the trend of the current process.

Messianism and the Russian-Soviet Mission in the World

Anton Knezevic, Münster, Westphalia

I. The Messianism of European and Asian Peoples

In several countries, we find messianic ideologies, both in the past and present. The term messianism was coined by the Polish philosopher and mathematician Hoene-Wronski (1778-1853), considered the scientific founder of this ideology, as he was the first to expound and define the concept in his book Prodrome of Messianism or Abstract Philosophy.

1. What is messianism?

Messianism, according to the Polish thinker, is a cultural phenomenon that constantly accompanies the course of historical events in renewed forms. Messianism is, strictly speaking, humanity's unattainable yearning for spiritual resurgence, change, or reshaping—whether of the individual, a people, or a religion—that will lead to this reform. Messianism, therefore, signifies the elevation of total consciousness, which can result from a resounding success or a reaction against external collapse. At its core, it testifies that a subjugated people cannot perish, since God has predestined them to a mission, a sublime vocation.

Consequently, messianism is faith in the new era—foreseen by God—for whose fulfillment God Himself chose the executor.

From its origins, humanity awaits two important events: Divine revelation and its realization; in other words, the emergence of absolute truth and its materialization as general well-being in social relations.

Messianism can be deduced from the existence of human nature, from its messianic yearnings and aspirations. Several religions contain seeds of messianism; even radical rationalism conceals within itself elements of messianism. Both religion and rationalism do not refer only to the metaphysical existence of humankind, but also affect other spheres of earthly life: the economic, the political, the scientific, and so on. It would be incorrect to understand messianism as an outpouring of religiosity, since the idea of the poetic symbolization of peoples who sacrifice themselves or suffer for an ideal is evident, for example, in 19th-century Polish and French literature.

The Saint-Simon movement provides a rich theme for messianic reflections in France. In the last century, the French people were revered as Christ among the nations. In the magazine Glob (January 29, 1832, No. 113), we read: "France was the Christ of the nations. France drank the revolutionary chalice... France mounted the cross." France was the Christ of nations...

Victor Hugo proclaimed similar ideas in his poem L'univers à moi (1832):

Come forth, children, the first chosen ones,

Who follow my new Christ,

The Christ of nations...

Even rationalism, which substantially tends toward the universal rule of the intellect, gave rise to a whole series of messianic ideologies. The French Revolution, with its reformist impulse, has its roots in rationalism. From rationalism, the path leads to the recognition of the reality of the intellect, and from there to criticism and, ultimately, to metaphysics.

Generally, a distinction is made between individual, religious, national, and racial or class-based messianism. It suffices to define national messianism: if the mission of a chosen people consists of establishing God's reign, then it is national messianism, which we find in antiquity among the Persians and Jews, in the Middle Ages among the Arabs, and finally in 19th-century France.

If, instead of divine Providence, we place historical necessity in its materialist conception, it becomes evident that Marxism, that is, Bolshevism, is founded on messianic ideology.

The yearning and ultimate goal of messianic currents are quite varied.

Hebrew messianism, whose most perfect form is fully manifested in the Old Testament, yearns for the coming of the Messiah who will establish an ideal moral order in the world. Christian messianism, derived from Hebrew messianism, longs for the Divine reign, whose initial phase unfolds in time, and whose perfection lies in eternity.

The messianic ideology also includes the chiliasm of various ancient sects, meaning the belief in the coming to earth of the millennial God and the reign of peace in this world, which ends with the final judgment; then the messianism of Protestant sects and, ultimately, the messianic attitude of various philosophical doctrines of the 18th and 19th centuries.

2. Fichte and Hegel on the Mission of the Germans

Here we must highlight the German messianism of the philosopher Fichte. In the opinion of this German thinker, the German people, amidst the general moral decay, are predestined, by virtue of their spiritual gifts, to modify the prevailing world order and replace it with a new moral order. In his book *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (Redeem of the German Nation), Fichte elaborated on the plan for the education of the German people with a view to this moral reform of the world.

The moral renewal of humanity, Fichte states, will come from the German people, for only within them lie the seeds of human perfection. It is the only country today with a living language that has, in effect, surpassed all other peoples in its poetic creations and liberal arts. The cause of this distinction between Germanness and foreignness is the fervent faith in the origins of humankind, in freedom, and in the constant progress and refinement of the historical process.

Another German thinker—Hegel—attributes a special mission not only to the Germanic peoples but also to the Latin peoples, without even mentioning the Slavs. For Hegel, among the Germanic peoples, the Germans are predestined to fulfill their historical vocation. History, this thinker defines it, is the existence of the state of intellect, and the force that drives this process is the universal spirit, whose instrument is the spirit of each people and its great personality. Peoples are merely expressions of the universal spirit for a specific period. When a people has fulfilled its mission, it relinquishes all its rights, withdraws from the historical stage, and, according to Hegel, cedes leadership to another people. A people can be the creator of a historical era only once and then disappear from the world stage, since, having fulfilled its mission, it is exposed to disintegration, having previously enjoyed as a co-participant in the spirit of world history.

The theory of the French thinker Charles Gobineau regarding the Germanic peoples' accession, as the ultimate and superior race, to the world stage is particularly interesting. His ideas influenced Richard Wagner, his son-in-law Henry St. Chamberlain, Friedrich Nietzsche, the racist theorist Heinrich F. Gunther, and ultimately, National Socialism.

3. The English and Their Mission

Aside from French national-revolutionary messianism and German messianism, it is worth mentioning English messianism, which was preceded by the Puritan Revolution. During the Puritan era, the English believed themselves to be God's chosen people. The first herald of messianic ideology was, in fact, John Milton. Centuries later, Lord Salisbury would uphold the messianic conception in England.

He believed that the course of events was the work of Providence, which had chosen England to promote the moral progress of the world. Lord Gladstone expressed similar sentiments regarding England's messianic role, emphasizing that Divine Providence entrusted the English with a great mission. Lord Curzon dedicated his book, *Problems of the Far East*, to those who believe that the British world empire, to this day the most powerful in universal history, is, in reality, God's instrument, charged with promoting the idea of good according to divine will.

4. Messianism and Asian Peoples

Messianism is even embraced by Asian peoples, and the Persian, Islamic, and Buddhist messianic traditions should be highlighted.

a) Persian Zoroastrian messianism and its eschatology, which includes its Messiah, Saoshiant, and the Last Judgment, aspire to victory over evil and the rebirth of all humanity.

b) Islamic messianism, which awaits the coming of the new prophet and the renewal of humankind, contains both a strong faith in the moral mission of Islam and in the unification of all peoples.

Popular Islamic belief, even today, is imbued with faith in the coming of the Mahdi, the divine spokesperson for the universal revolution that will bring an end to the current historical events of the world. Indeed, the Islamic Brotherhood firmly believes in the mission of Islam, called to bring humanity a new order, one that has not yet been achieved by even the greatest thinkers and reformers.

Islam possesses—as Islamic messianists maintain—a true brotherhood that recognizes no privileges of any kind, for its mission is not directed toward any particular class, people, or race, but toward all of humanity. Islam is a universal religion; its leader is the successor or representative of the one who received the final revelation of divine universal law. Ideologically, Islam is a movement that entails a unique social and cultural system.

To achieve the goals of Islamic ideology, all its adherents must participate in the "holy war," which is the instrument of the revolutionary struggle against the remaining flawed social systems. According to the Quran, these systems are based on laws created by men and are therefore the cause of disorder and evil in the world. To achieve this end, the "holy war" requires everyone's utmost effort. Furthermore, it is the duty of every Muslim to participate in this struggle for just truth within the social and political order of the community.

Islam is the only religion that commands its followers to implement the new order of social reality in its entirety. The political ideal of Islamism can only be achieved through the organization of a world empire. Islam, as early as the 11th century and before European liberalism—its interpreters emphasize—introduced democracy. European ideologies—liberalism, socialism, communism—offer only partial solutions; Marxism and capitalism are, in essence, the two sides of the same coin of materialism.

The stark contrast exists between the United States and Russia on the one hand, and Islamism on the other. Communism is a partial, not a complete, solution to these problems. The West fails to understand that without the whole, truth is error. To the decaying West, Islamic theorists offer the social consciousness inherent in the vocation of modern Islam.

The idea of Islamism's social mission, as it was formed upon its basic principles in the rationalist modernism of India and Egypt, still plays a significant role there today.

c) Messianic Expectation in Java. - Nowhere in the Islamic East of Asia were popular messianic chiliastic ideas of such paramount importance in recent times as in Indonesia. The contradictions between empirical, political, and social reality and its ideals were psychologically overcome through messianic expectation. The 1950 Javanese revolution, which implemented the Indonesian nationalist program of independence, reveals in the masses' psychological depths the expectation of Ratu Adela, king, savior.

Even before, when social conditions under Dutch rule were difficult, the Indonesian masses found solace in the expectation of this Ratu Adela, whose reign would signify the beginning of a golden age.

At the end of the last century, before modern nationalism took shape in Indonesia, messianic elements were already present in the Javanese social movement propagated by Samin. His doctrine—known as Agame Adam—took deep root among the Javanese. Agame Adam—according to Samin—predating Christianity and Islam, contains seeds of communism, which correspond to the popular peasant culture of Indonesia. The Dutch government at the time tried to eliminate this innate communism because it hindered the modernization and progress of the Indonesian national economy.

Later, Samat, a relative of Samin, structured a similar program in which messianic ideas carried more weight than Saminism, that precursor to the Indonesian national movement. According to the teachings of Samat (who died in 1920), the coming of the messianic king from the West and East should coincide with the return of the land to the Javanese peasants, land seized by the Dutch.

d) Buddhism and Messianism. - Hindu messianism awaits the messianic incarnation of Vishnu and the new era on Earth, the coming of Mitreya, the messenger of the final truths of Buddha, and his 60,000-year messianic reign. Consequently, this dark age will end with the return of Vishnu in his incarnation.

Vishnu's promise that his messianic return will aim to avenge humanity and restore the earthly paradise is interpreted as a vow to liberate India.

Gandhi, who in certain agricultural regions of India was revered as the incarnation of Vishnu, envisioned in the coming of Ramuraj the realization of a chiliastic-type divine empire, in which caste distinctions and differences between Hindus and Muslims would be erased, and the untouchables would definitively disappear.

Gandhi identified the mechanical civilization prevalent today in the West with the Hindu Kali Yuge, whose end he conceived as the chiliastic realization.

India is destined, Buddhist thinkers preach, to lead the world, for what other purpose, then, would Hinduism have—as the Hindu Aurobino Ghose emphasizes—than to attempt to re-establish the paradise of the gods on earth?

Another Hindu thinker, Mukerjee, who holds similar views, highlights that India's social organization precisely implies the solution to the social problems posed but not resolved by the West.

Such messianic figures are almost entirely devoid of value in India's political ideology today.

The origins of Burmese patriotism must undoubtedly be sought in messianic ideology. The idea of the end of empire, which in Burma appears as the universal salvation of all living beings, is also relevant.

e) Messianic expectation in Lamaism. - The ideal conceived about the future still contains, even today in the Lamaist world, a widespread expectation of the messianic coming from the north of the last ruler of Shambhala. With the victory of his troops, Buddhism will spread across the globe, thus fulfilling its purpose, for utopia will reign in the world—the ultimate goal of Mitreya's chiliastic expectation.

Lamaist chiliasm before the Russian Revolution shared certain ideological similarities with Russian messianism. Indeed, messianic figures emanating from Lamaism played a significant political role in Mongolian Bolshevism.

To messianic ideologies, we must add the currents within mystical circles, mediums, and Freemasonry, and finally, various sociological doctrines that exerted and continue to exert a strong influence on modern Europe.

Both communism and fascism, along with related totalitarian movements, seek to give the world a new order and a new structure. Thus, class messianism finds its expression in the emphasis on the mission of the proletariat.

II. Messianism and the Slavs

To these messianic yearnings and tendencies is added, finally, the messianism of certain Slavic peoples, primarily the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and Russians.

Messianic thought among the Slavs matured most fully in Russia and Poland, two of the main representatives of the Slavs. Russia, except for the Tatar domination, was almost always independent, and Poland repeatedly lost its national freedom. In reality, there is a great difference between Russian and Polish messianism. The Poles want to save humanity with the help of France, to which they assign the leading role. The Russians, on the other hand, feel strong enough to accomplish this task, while the Slovaks and Czechs—considering themselves too weak to carry out a universal mission—imagine the power of the Slavic peoples guiding humankind toward a new and better order.

According to the ideology of Czech and Slovak messianists, the Slavs should build a common Slavic culture, as they are destined to assume the cultural leadership of the Germanic and Latin peoples, who are already disintegrating. Jan Kollar conceived his Slavic idea as a program, devoid of political content; he wholeheartedly accepted the Herderian ideal of humanity, dreaming of the brotherhood of all peoples under Slavic cultural leadership, politically united in a state without borders.

1. Czech Messianism

Czech messianism—essentially chiliasm—appears to have been developed by the 15th century under Jan Hus. It has a religious and national character and would later lead to serious and disastrous conflicts with papal Rome.

The Hussist movement, or the Czech Reformation, spread among the Czech people, who knowingly invoked the biblical, prophetic idea of the chosen people. The Czechs had identified with all of humanity, which, as a whole, represents the people of God. The events of that time were decisive, for, following the death of their martyr Jan Hus at the stake, the Czechs embraced his teachings and considered themselves champions and defenders of the authentic doctrine of Sacred Scripture.

2. The Messianism of the Poles

The idea of vocation, widespread especially in the 18th and 19th centuries among educated Poles, implies the principle that the Polish people are like Christ among other nations; they succumbed to superior forces, but will rise again from the political tomb when the victorious day of freedom and brotherhood dawns. The source of Polish messianism, as with other Slavic messianic currents, was the work of Hegel and Schlegel, particularly Herder's ideas concerning the Slavs. German metaphysics, romanticism, and idealist philosophy significantly influenced philosophically elaborated messianism.

That era, however, proved highly conducive to the rise of messianism in Poland, since after the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon, everyone in Europe, and especially in France, expected momentous events. Moreover, it was a widespread opinion that the end of the world was approaching. This spiritual current permeated cultured European circles, and the Poles, drawing on the Saint-Simon movement and the doctrine of Lamennais, connected it to their dreams about the future, perfectly aligning it with messianic ideology.

The Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz responds to Fichte's Discourses to the German People with his own political conception, proposing that the Polish mission is a logical consequence of Poland's history, since while other European peoples worshipped material goods, the Poles remained faithful to God and their faith. Their form of government is based on the idea of freedom and the federation of peoples. The Poles constitute the exemplary model for the future of the world order. They, like pilgrims, will be apostles of the new ethical-religious vision of the world. The religious character of their actions will be accentuated by the analogy between the death of Christ and his resurrection. Poland was—says Mickiewicz—the bulwark of Christian civilization, a pillar of balance and eternal peace in Europe, and it will be the spiritual guide of the Slavs who must prepare the way for a universal federation.

3. Russia and its mission

The messianic currents in Bohemia, Slovakia, and Poland had no influence on the evolution and formation of the consciousness of the Russian mission. Russia's mission to bring to humanity, first and foremost to Europe and the Slavs, the renewal of its cultural, religious, economic, social, and political life, is a phenomenon that has accompanied Russia's past for centuries.

This is partly understandable if we consider the separation of the Russian people from the rest of the world, their character, and, finally, the relationship of the West with Russia. While the origins of Russian political and social messianism are to be found in Western cultural influences, religious messianism is more a consequence of the Russians' embrace of Eastern Christianity.

Exclusivist and messianic ideas first emerged within ecclesiastical circles. Of paramount importance for the formation of Russian messianism in general was the fact that the Russians received Christianity from Byzantium via Bulgarian mediation. From this point, and later due to the ecclesiastical schism, a sense of exclusivity and estrangement from the West began to develop in earnest.

Initially, the Russians had been politically linked to the West through the Great Russian principality of kyiv, founded by the Vikings. The Tatar invasion caused religious and ecclesiastical development in Russia to take a distinct course, leading the Russian people to become completely detached from Europe, not only ecclesiastically but also culturally. The Tatar rule, which lasted more than 250 years, left a deep mark on all aspects of Russian life. This was reflected, first and foremost, in the formation of the national character, language, and customs, but the Russians also adopted many other elements from the Tatars related to legislation, social order, and military organization.

a) The Exclusivism of Russian Orthodoxy

Certainly, the most important factor in the development of ecclesiastical life. In the interest of truth, it must be emphasized that the Tatars were very tolerant of the religion of their subjects and that the Russian Church enjoyed the full protection of the Tatar khans. Dignitaries of the Orthodox Church were as respected at the court of the Tatar rulers as representatives of other religions: Buddhism, Samanism, and Islam. It was precisely this Tatar tolerance toward the Russian Church that decisively influenced the position Orthodoxy would later take toward other Christian denominations. The Russian Orthodox priests, who were the only Christian representatives in the Tatar world, developed the conviction that they were the sole and true exponents of Western Christianity.

Tatar tolerance certainly facilitated the subsequent development of the Russian Orthodox Church, but it could not prevent the consequences, nor could it alleviate its isolation from the West, nor could it prevent the Russian people's growing cultural distance from the rest of the world.

The shift of all aspects of life from the south to the north—from Kyiv to Moscow—led over the centuries to the formation of two peoples: the Russian and the Ukrainian. Of course, at that time, national consciousness was not as clearly defined as it is today among the East Slavs, being a product of centuries of historical development.

The isolation of the Russian Church deepened even further after the fall of Constantinople (1453), as the last, rather weak, link between the clergy and the Russian people and the Ecumenical Patriarchate disappeared. A favorable moment then arrived for the Russian Church to consider itself, within the ecclesiastical order, the heir to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, while at the same time the Russian Tsar claimed succession to the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire. Indeed, in 1480 Ivan the Terrible crowned all the Russian lands and symbolically incorporated the Byzantine double-headed eagle into the Russian state coat of arms, considering himself, through his marriage to Princess Sophia, the legitimate heir to the Eastern Roman Empire. Moscow then proclaimed itself the "Third Rome" and asserted its claim to primacy over other Christians.

This viewpoint was clearly and unequivocally expressed by the monk Philofey in his letter to Tsar Ivan the Terrible, whom he considered the sole legitimate sovereign of Christians and head of the Apostolic Church, whose seat was no longer Rome or Constantinople, but Moscow.

In these words of the elderly Philofey, the religious and political vocation of Russia was expressed, and Ivan the Terrible, founder of Russia as a Eurasian empire, carried out his plans of conquest in Siberia under the sign of the cross.

The attempt by Protestantism to take root in Russia failed, as Ivan the Terrible positioned himself at the head of the defenders of Orthodoxy. His theological disputes with Rokito, preacher of the Czech Brethren, clearly demonstrate that he was convinced of the correctness of Orthodoxy, while Catholicism and Protestantism were, for him, heresies. The efforts of the Reformation to influence the religious life of Russia were fruitless, and the unionist attempts of the Roman Curia met the same fate.

Grand Prince Basil the Blind deposed Metropolitan Isidore of Moscow, who had accepted the union. Moscow prevented any rapprochement with Europe, however minimal, since the Russian clergy and the rulers of Moscow were convinced that Orthodoxy was the true religion and, moreover, believed that Western influence was harmful to the Russian people.

The exclusivity of Russian Orthodoxy continued to be emphasized later, particularly during the reign of Peter the Great, and the Protestant religion was branded a hotbed of heresy. During this period, a foreigner assigned Russia a political, cultural, and religious mission for the first time. The German philosopher G. W. Leibniz, appointed by Tsar Peter the Great as his secret legal advisor, argued that Russia should play the mediating role between Europe and Asia, and that the Christianization of non-believers in Russia was the primary task in this process. Thus was formulated the theory of Russia's political mission in Asia, which would be carried out systematically and consistently from then on.

The Croatian Georg Krizanić had already attributed a special mission among the Slavs to the Russian Tsar. This Catholic priest was in 17th-century Russia, where he proposed to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich that all Slavs be politically united under Romanov rule. Krizanic, with his Pan-Slavic ideology, is the intellectual initiator of the Pan-Slavic movement, which would only culminate in the 19th century. (On J. Krizanic: Studia Croatica, Year 1962, No. 1, pp. 31-42).

b) The Slavs and the Political Leadership of Europe

The German philosopher J. G. Herder, in his work Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity, invites the Slavs to realize the humanist ideal. In his ideals, he refers to the Eastern Slavs. Herder theoretically establishes all the prerequisites that will pave the way for the Russian people to assume their messianic role. The Slavs in general, Herder argues, must now continue the spiritual life of humanity; they have the mediating role between the new world and the old one that is decaying.

The West, therefore, speaks in these terms, through the voice of a philosopher, to the Slavs, telling them that the West itself is disintegrating and that they alone are capable of saving and renewing the world. Herder, it is true, assigned this salvific role to the Ukrainians, but the Russians fully embraced his theory, appropriated it, and elaborated upon it.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that events in Europe corresponded to the thesis of the Russian mission, since the Russians had liberated the European continent from Napoleon, and Tsar Alexander I was glorified as the savior and liberator of Europe. At the beginning of the last century, Russia was on the verge of assuming leadership in Europe. During that time, a common struggle was waged against Napoleon, and for the first time, a certain rapprochement between Russia and the West took place.

c) Slavophiles on the religious and cultural mission of Russia.

In the 1930s, the spiritual life of Russia was in full swing. Two factions emerged, their main theme revolving around Western culture and its relationship to Russia. The Slavophiles vigorously defended Russian Orthodoxy and folk traditions, while simultaneously advocating a break from the West. They openly embraced messianic ideals and unequivocally stated that Russia's role was to lead Europe.

The Russians learned from Rousseau, Herder, Voltaire, and other thinkers that civilization, identified with the West, was in decline; Russia was not civilized, which was its advantage, the Russian thinkers concluded; the Russians were, therefore, that longed-for people, fresh and uncorrupted, capable of carrying on the cultural work with inexhaustible strength. The crucial problem for the Russians was: What to do with the rotten West? Crush it or save it? We will save them, the Russians said; we are the true Christians, we even love our enemies.

The Russian messianists continued reasoning: If the Germans—according to Hegel—were empowered by the Reformation to assume cultural leadership, then the Russians are even more predestined, given that they possess a pure, pristine Christianity. Russia defeated Napoleon and the "decadent" French, demonstrating its strength. Russia is revered throughout the world and enjoys universal prestige. Napoleon himself prophesied that Europe, in fifty years, would be Cossack, and Rousseau saw in the Russian peasant, the muzik, the longed-for Messiah.

I. Kirezevsky, the spiritual leader of the Slavophiles, embraced Herderian ideas about the vocation of the Slavs. He wanted Russia to continue learning from Europe so that, equipped with knowledge, it could assume the leadership of humanity. In his book On the Character of European Civilization and Its Relation to the Civilization of Russia (1852), Kirezevsky maintained the opinion that Russian Orthodoxy would save Europe.

This Russian thinker was still modest and tolerant, insofar as he imagined this salvation as a kind of antithesis between Russian and Western culture, in which the savior would learn many things from the culture of the saved. Kirezevsky did not conceive of Slavophilia within an exclusivist-nationalist framework like his later followers. He tries to argue his messianic claim solely with the advantages of Orthodoxy.

"Why are the Russians destined, at a given moment, to take charge of the salvation of humanity?" Kirejevskiy asks. And he answers: "All European peoples fulfilled their mission. Europe constitutes a cultural whole, and during this process of European cultural unification, the independence of certain ethnic groups coalesced. Precisely for this reason, in order for Europe to survive, it needs a new center—the heart—of the new world, as Italy, Spain, Germany, England, and France successively were." Kirejevskiy, of course, also sees the United States of America, a fresh and young country, but one too distant from Europe and with a still very one-sided education. "Russia adopted the foundations of its civilization from all peoples, and that is why it is pan-European, and because of its geographical position, it is destined to influence Europe."

In connection with the Russian vocation in the religious sphere, A. Homjakov (Komyakov) emphasized the role of religious Orthodoxy, which, he declared, is the expression of authentic Christianity. Orthodoxy, together with the spirit of old Russian folk culture, embodies the healthiest essence of the East, and only an attachment to this true Christianity, as it persists in the Russian people and resonates in the Russian Church, will facilitate salvation and general religious and spiritual renewal.

The Russian Tsarist government had adopted Slavophile ideology, seeing in Orthodoxy, Russian folk culture, and autocracy the foundations of its existence. European ideas, supposedly detrimental to the foundations of the empire, were therefore inaccessible to the Russian people, which necessarily led to Russia's isolation. The Tsarist government adopted this isolationist stance in a pronounced way in the mid-19th century, when, in the Crimean War, the West fought on the side of Türkiye and against Russia. This Western stance not only disappointed the Russians, but was considered a betrayal of the Russian people by Europe.

d) The Russian "Westernists" and the Dilemma

Against the government and the Slavophiles stood the Westernists—a group that initially rejected the messianic idea, considering the Russian people too immature for such a mission. The Westernists advocated for the cultural interpretation of Russia within Europe and upheld a universal cultural community. The Slavophiles initially opposed all political action; their program was moral and religious reform, while the Westernists demanded a transformation of foreign policy and believed that the salvation of Russia and Europe lay in the so-called "reform revolution."

Over time, the Westernists gradually shifted from opposition to radical and revolutionary action. They recognized Russia's unique mission but did not believe in the disintegration of Western Europe. On the contrary, they have unwavering faith in Europe and criticize their own country. On this point, they agree with the German philosopher Schelling, who assigned each nation a particular mission. Thus, the Russian Polevoy admits that his country must fulfill a special mission in history, but nations do not become extinct; on the contrary, they have only just begun to fulfill their tasks.

A. Hercen, a recluse, lived abroad and from there judged the Russian situation. He was convinced that the old world—which constitutes the guiding idea of the philosophy of history—is beyond saving. Christianity, which renewed the Roman Empire, is decaying from within. The Reformation and the French Revolution constitute emergency external aid, momentary assistance. Hercen contrasted old Europe, which was dying, with Russia, which is the new world that will bring salvation. Revolutionary Europe, Hercen reasoned, will naturally and organically annex itself to Russia. The man of the future is the muzik—the peasant—just like the worker in France. Tsarism will disappear just as Russian intelligence will, for they have fulfilled their task: mediating between the Russian people and revolutionary Europe.

The historical role that Hercen, preacher of Russian messianism, assigns to Europe must encompass all Slavs. A Slavic federation will not replace their social republic but will clear the path for it.

The Russian philosopher Chaadaiev, without being a supporter of either Slavophiles or Westernizers, vehemently opposed the mission of the Russian people. Initially, it is true, he was quite convinced that Russians were called to mature the ideas derived from the old social order and to respond to the ultimate problems facing humanity. Later, he changed his mind. For Chaadaiev, peoples are both moral beings and historical entities. While individuals need years to become educated, peoples require centuries.

We Russians, Chaadaiev reasoned, are, in this respect, to some extent an exception. We belong to the group of peoples who are not included in the inventory of humankind; even more: we exist to impart an important lesson to the world. The lesson we are called to give will not be in vain, but it is impossible to predict or prophesy how much misery and misfortune will befall the world before the Russian mission is fulfilled, given that Russia—which lacks a past and culture—is an example and a warning to other peoples, showing where oppression and cultural isolation lead.

Chaadaiev prophesied a unique historical path for Russia, for which Russian Orthodoxy is precisely responsible, as it prevented Russia's connection with cultural Europe. With equal criticism, he attacked the Russian state concept that diverts Russia's development. Chaadaiev emphasized that Russia can in no way save Europe; on the contrary, the salvation of the Russian people lies in their connection with the West.

The Tsarist government declared Chaadaiev an outcast for this position and ordered him to spend the rest of his life on his estate in the Russian interior.

e) Pan-Slavism and Pan-Russianism

A segment of the Russian intelligentsia embraced the messianic idea, its most prominent exponent being I. J. Danilevsky. In his book Russia and Western Europe (1871), Danilevsky proclaimed that the era of Slavic culture had already begun, one that would replace Latin and Germanic cultures, which he saw as being in decline. He distinguished ten historical-cultural and racial types in the historical process.

The new Slavic cultural type would replace the Latin-Germanic type—in reality, the European type. A complete synthesis would be achieved, after further elaboration, from the remaining historical-cultural types, whose constituent elements were only partially developed. Cultural types, until now, had been structured unilaterally: religion (Israel), culture (Greece), and state organization (ancient Rome).

The Germanic and Latin peoples fulfilled their political and cultural missions, but their cultures were incomplete, and therefore their states exhibited an oppressive character. The consequence of this partiality is anarchy in Europe; in the religious sphere, this anarchism manifests itself in Protestantism, in philosophy in materialism, and in the socio-political sphere in the struggle between political democracy and economic feudalism. Only the Russians would organically unite these four elements: religion, culture, politics, and socio-political organizations. The originality of a successful solution to the socio-economic problem in Russia would be reflected in the organization of the new order.

Danievsky, in parallel, presented in his work the Pan-Slavic conception that envisioned all Slavic peoples in a federation of states under the leadership of Russia. It is strange that the borders of this Slavic empire almost coincide in general terms with the limits of the current Soviet Empire. It is also interesting that Danilevsky included non-Slavic peoples—Hungarian, Romanian, and Greek—in his imagined empire.

Danilevsky, with his thesis on cultural types, laid the foundation not only for Pan-Slavism but also for Russian spiritual, cultural, and political expansionism. He is the most characteristic representative of Pan-Slavic messianism in the second half of the 19th century, which embodies the idea of the mission of holy Russian Orthodoxy.

Danilevskiy particularly emphasized Russia's difference from and separation from Europe, demanding the cultivation of Russian folk culture and categorically rejecting European reforms, especially their spirituality and liberal conceptions. This goal, he argued, would be achieved through the inevitable struggle against the West, which, besides being necessary, would also serve as a remedy.

F. M. Dostoevsky shared the messianic ideas and ideology of Kiryevsky, Danilevsky, and other Pan-Slavists. Therefore, the protagonists of his novels repeatedly refer to Russia's global mission and emphasize the idea that the salvation of Russian culture lies not in the "decadent West," but in the original spirit of the Russian people. Dostoevsky particularly stresses faith in Russian Orthodoxy and its ecumenical mission.

For him, the Russian people are the sole bearers of God on Earth and are therefore, of course, called upon to renew or save the world in the future in the name of the "new God." The Russian people, Dostoevsky emphasizes, have been given the keys to life and the new Logos. The mission of the Russians, the sole custodians of genuine faith in God, is Europe and all of humanity. The Russian people are the representatives, guides, and saviors of poor humanity and, of course, its masters, since Europe must not forget that Russia occupies one-sixth of the world map.

In his messianic vision, Dostoevsky clearly defined pan-Russianism and the exclusivism of holy Russian Orthodoxy.

K. Leontiev also speaks in his works of Russia's messianic role. Initially, he believed that Russia would take the lead and bring a new culture to the world.

For Leontiev—as for the Slavophiles Khomyakov and Kiryevsky—Eastern Christianity represents the cornerstone of the new culture. Unconditional and unwavering fidelity to the traditions and ideals of pristine Russian culture will preserve the Russian people from the disintegrating and leveling process in which European peoples find themselves. The goal of Russian policy must be religious and cultural separation from the West. Leontiev, much like Danilevsky, advocated for the union of all Slavs, to which the Greeks, Romanians, and even the Turks and Persians should be added. All these peoples would form a kind of Eastern confederation, naturally under Russian hegemony.

With his plan, Leontiev surpassed all other pan-Russians, since his empire encompassed all of Southeast Europe, including the Adriatic, Istanbul, and the Near East. The borders of this vast empire reached westward into Central Europe. Leontiev's faith in Russia was wavering, as evidenced by the question he posed: Would Russia join Europe or persist in its estrangement? Would it develop its unique culture and save Europe, which was still possible? Where would Russia's path lead, to ruin or to ascension? Under Solovyov's influence, Leontiev concluded that Russia did not have a special cultural mission to fulfill, but only a religious one: the achievement of ecclesiastical unity.

Leontiev feared that Russia, or rather Russian tendencies, would merge with the contemporary European spirit, thus bringing about a fatal reciprocal impact. A Russia completely leveled in both spiritual and material terms, Leontiev believed, would lead a subversive, universal international movement that would inevitably tend to confound everything and, ultimately, annihilate humanity, thus ending the world historical process. This, Leontiev declared, would be a kind of mission: a historical mission of extraordinary importance.

f) Russia's salvation lies in its religious and cultural connection with Europe

V. S. Soloviev, the most prominent Russian theological thinker and moral philosopher, opposed Orthodoxy, Russian messianism, and Pan-Russianism. He saw the salvation of Russia, the Slavs, and the rest of the world solely in the reconciliation of the Russian Orthodox Church with Rome. He vehemently combated the Slavophiles and their messianism, emphasizing that, while they had assigned Russia a great mission, they had overlooked the fact that the Russian people were not sufficiently morally equipped to fulfill it. Soloviev poses the question: how can salvation come from the Russian peasant who lacks a past and spiritual culture?

N. Berdyaev, the last great Russian thinker of recent times, was convinced that Russia was capable of fulfilling its religious mission only in spiritual communion with the West and its Christianity. Berdyaev observes with regret that Russia's destiny is unique and differs from that of other nations. "The contradictions of the Russian character are incomprehensible to a Westerner. We have not experienced humanism as Western Europeans have," Berdyaev emphasizes. "But we experience the crises of humanism more intensely than the West. In our past, we do not exhibit as much activity as Westerners, but the religious problem is much more subtle in our country."

All of 19th-century Russian literature is imbued with a yearning for the religious transformation of life. This is evidenced by the fates of Gogol, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and others. Religious thought dominated the lives of the Slavophiles, as well as those of Chadayev, Soloviev, Leontiev, and Fyodorov. This theme appears in almost all recent religious-philosophical currents. All Russian thinkers were gripped by discontent regarding the value of culture; all yearned for the transformation of the Church and the attainment of the higher self.

The spirit of the Russian people did not accept secularized culture and always returned to the problem of religious creation. The Russian idea is that of a theonomic culture; in its positive aspect, the Russian spirit is directed toward the Apocalypse—the end of the world. The negative aspect of this theonomy entails the danger of a nihilistic tendency: the rejection of all values, of all meaning in life.

Precisely for this reason, the anti-Christian temptation in Russians to create the image and likeness of the divine empire, that is, the atheistic empire in this world, acquires maximum vigor and extreme tension. Consequently, the Russian people are, to a very high degree, an apocalyptic people. Religious anthropology can only be eschatological or apocalyptic.

The problem of humanity can find its authentic religious solution only in conversion to the Paroussiac Savior. The new creative period of Christianity will begin in Russia in the spiritual realm of Orthodoxy, not yet fully realized or expressed, and which has not yet reached perfection. Berdyaev concludes that only the religious-spiritual community with the West and Western Christianity will enable Russia to fulfill its religious mission.

The philosopher Karsavin, a contemporary of Berdyaev, speaks of the Russian as a uniquely capable being, quick to absorb new ideas and able to adapt and reshape himself within other cultures. This extraordinary capacity to assimilate cultural values is psychologically and historically linked to a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the good of humanity and Europe. Deeply rooted in the Russian character, this philosopher emphasizes, is the propensity for self-denial and self-sacrifice. For Western psychology, with its pronounced instinct for self-preservation, the "selflessness" of Russian politics, for example, is incomprehensible. The armed intervention of Tsar Nicholas II or the willingness of the Russian Bolsheviks to transform their country "into an experimental ground for the well-being of humanity" was inconceivable to the West, Karsavin reasons.

[The text abruptly shifts to a seemingly unrelated topic:]

4. Bolshevism and the Messianic Expectation of Asian Peoples

During the 19th century, the Russian intelligentsia simultaneously shifted between several quasi-religions: first embracing materialism and Darwinism, and finally socialism. From each theory, the Russians—enthusiastic, prophetic, and fanatical—developed a new dogma, making it their absolute ideal and subordinating all aspects of life to it.

Religious and ecclesiastical elements are also present in communism, and these exert a powerful attraction on Asian and African peoples. The Soviets, among other things, skillfully exploited the expectation of a Savior inherent in the mental framework of the Islamic, Buddhist, and Lamaist masses. The social factors of Islam and Buddhism provided Soviet specialists with a highly favorable starting point for applying messianic ideas, leading them to deduce that the founder of Islam is the protector of the helpless and oppressed, and will one day appear as a liberator.

It is worth noting here that the Russian spiritual tradition, like that of Asian countries, contrasts with the modern West, characterized by the ideological framework present throughout its various phases. As in Russia, so too in the history of Islamic and Hindu state formations, the blurring of their proto-metaphysical or cosmic image and the resulting disdain are linked to messianic expectations, and their fulfillment fuels the hope for a new ideal harmony between that proto-image and the state formation, driven by socio-revolutionary tendencies.

This expectation of the arrival of great figures, whose appearance will bring blessedness to the earth, is characteristic of the popular masses in the East. Bolshevism exerts its power of attraction in Asia also by operating in a nationalist vein, continuing the messianic traditions of the East regarding world empire. Indeed, the impact of communism is strongest where it is intentionally linked to the oral traditions of Asia and Africa.

It is interesting to recall that immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, an appeal was made to the peoples of Asia, outlining the theoretical foundations for possible cooperation between the Soviet Union and the national movements of the East. Thus, in the 1920s, the Soviets addressed Kemal Atatürk, Riza Shah, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and more recently, Arab and Indian politicians. This skillfully worded invitation resonated in the East at the time, exerting a strong influence on the ideology of salvation. In this regard, it is important to mention Kemal Pasha's friend, T. Rusti, who in 1920 announced that Islam contains the basic ideas of socialism and also glimpsed certain communist components within the Islamic religion.

Since the state and political objectives of the world are identical to the mission of the proletariat and ultimately to the right of peoples to self-determination, and since the population of the East—and especially the Muslim population—is proletarian in nature, communist propaganda did not face significant difficulties.

a) Islam and Communism

Popular Islamic belief continues to await the Mahdi, the bearer of the universal revolution, sanctioned and guided by God, which will put an end to the current world order. This revolution will drown the existing atheistic and unjust order in a sea of blood, then conquer the entire globe for Islam, which will ultimately bring justice to all.

This view, according to the Islamic thinker Iqbal, also finds points of convergence between Islamism and Communism. For him, the Quran is the harbinger of capitalism's death and the protector of the helpless peasant masses in Asia. The Soviet Union, therefore—Iqbal emphasizes—is unwittingly fulfilling God's work. The Soviets seized a page of the Quran and are in the process of carrying it out.

Modern interpreters of India, Pakistan, and Indonesia often contrast capitalism with Islam and socialism. Capitalism and Islamism are seen as two opposing poles. Communism, moreover—in the opinion of some Islamic thinkers—acquired a national character and thus lost its original features.

Only Islam in world history reflects a true image of the ideological state, for it knows neither race nor geographical boundaries. Islamic thinkers acknowledge contradictions in methods and interests between the Soviet Union and North America, but they do not deny that there is a certain principled divergence in worldview between American (pragmatic) materialism and Soviet dialectical materialism.

Such ideas played a decisive role in the historical development of Islamic modernism in Java, as they did in India and Pakistan. The Indonesian Nationalist Union of the 1920s embraced Marxism, and during Dutch rule, the slogan about pernicious capitalism was propagated—referring, of course, only to Dutch capital—and was effectively linked to Islamism.

b) Lenin and Muhammad

In certain Islamic circles, Lenin was considered the prophet Muhammad, and Moscow Mecca, while in the Soviet revolution, attempts were made to find a parallel in divine pronouncements. Imagining Lenin as the incarnation of Ali—the expectation of the Messiah—corresponds, in fact, to the image held by the vast popular classes in Persia. The aforementioned poet Iqbal, also the main preacher and reformer of Pakistan's national ideology, speaks very favorably of Lenin. In his trilogy "Lenin, the Angelic Song and the Commandment of God," Lenin, an atheist in life, is found in the presence of God and denounces the injustice that prevails in God's world.

An epic poem about Lenin is said to have emerged among the Muslim population of the Soviet Union. A Soviet source from 1920 suggests that this poem speaks of Lenin—pleasing to God—as God's chosen one, whom Allah himself entrusted with establishing the new order on earth. The legend surrounding Lenin, widespread in Central Asia, says that Allah was seeking his servant so that happiness might reign on earth. This legend tells of a wise man who advised Allah to approach Lenin, endowing him with magical power.

The communist revolution is presented as a religious war within this supposed popular Islamic superstition. It is likely that this is a clever tactic of communist propaganda, with a purely political aim, given that communist propaganda skillfully exploited this legend in Islamic countries, especially since attempts were made to present Lenin to Russian peasants as if he were a saint.

c) Lamaism, Buddhism, and Communist Propaganda

The Soviets even linked the figure of Buddha with Lenin. Thus, in the 1920s, within the modernist Lamaism of the Soviet Buryats, it was disseminated that Buddha had been a precursor to Lenin.

It can be admitted with certainty that messianic ideas, contained in communist ideology, penetrated Lamaism, having a great impact on the outcome of the Chinese revolution.

There are also Buddhist interpretations very favorable to communism. Communist ideology, which finds fertile ground in Asia, is interpreted as the inauguration of a new historical era. Thus, by way of example, the Buddhist monastic brotherhood Sanga exhibits strong communist tendencies. The current crisis is interpreted as a prelude to the Cakkavati period, followed by the coming of Mitreya.

Leftist intellectual circles in Burma believe that Buddhism is the scientific religion of the world, but that its principles are communist. On this subject, the Marxist U Ba Swe says: "Now I believe that for anyone who has engaged intensely with Buddhism and has correctly understood its doctrine, there is no impediment to becoming a Marxist." The Burmese journalist Poyazar believes that Karl Marx was directly or indirectly influenced by Buddha. Followers of Buddha maintain that he went further than Marx, for he pursued not only the leveling of social classes but the transcendence of existence in general.

It is interesting that both Islam and Lamaism were untouched during the religious persecutions unleashed in Russia in the 1920s, since these religions constituted very important links with the Asian parts of Russia. The communist slogan at that time already proclaimed: The Soviet Union brings light and freedom into the dark night of oppressed peoples.

d) Moscow on the verge of realizing its ambitions?

The theorists of Russia's global mission enjoyed considerable sympathy and popularity among a certain bourgeois class in Tsarist Russia, whose government was convinced of the empire's political role. Driven by the desire to achieve the pan-Russian objective—in reality, to fulfill its political mission in Europe—the Russian Empire entered the First World War, a fact clearly evident from the statements of Izvolsky, then Russia's foreign minister. He envisioned—as the Croatian sculptor Ivan Mestrovic informed the author of this work—the creation of a vast Slavic empire, meaning, of course, Russia, into which all Slavic peoples would be drawn and united.

The Russians did not achieve political and territorial expansion after the First World War, as the country was in the throes of the Bolshevik birth pangs. The achievement of the pan-Russian objectives came after the Second World War, yet Moscow was not fortunate enough to gain dominance in Istanbul and Trieste. Alongside the political and religious aspects of the Russian mission, the idea of social reform in Europe and throughout the world emerged, particularly after the war, through the Marxist socio-political doctrine adopted by Russian leaders to fulfill their global mission.

The Russians' conviction that they were destined to bring humanity a new social order through Marxist doctrine provoked opposition throughout the free world. And the peoples who today live under the communist yoke (Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, etc.) reject communism and aspire to political, economic, and religious-cultural freedom.

Two hostile blocs confront each other: the communist East, represented today by Moscow and Beijing, and the democratic West, led by the United States of America. The West contrasts communism, its tyranny and dictatorship, with the idea of freedom and democracy, and respect for human rights in all countries of the world.

The Bridled Pegasus: Contrasts and Hopes in the Literatures of Yugoslavia

Gojko Boric, Cologne, West Germany

The fate of the literature of small peoples is to remain little known. Literary creators from such peoples often appear late in the literary "production" market. Moreover, among Slavic literatures, little interest is paid to the literature of the South Slavic peoples. Only a chance and spectacular event like the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Ivo Andric attracted the attention of publishers and readers in certain countries that, until now, had been uninterested in the modern literature of the peoples of Yugoslavia, rich in its thematic variety and complex in its approach to artistic and human problems under complicated and contrasting conditions.

Therefore, it is important to point out a few fundamental truths about the political, cultural and national mosaic that for various reasons and in a superficial way is usually referred to as the "Slavic Southeast".

Without delving into the nationalist controversies that continue to simmer beneath the seemingly tranquil mantle of Tito's dictatorship, one cannot ignore the substantial differences among the peoples comprising the multinational conglomerate of Yugoslavia. Within this complex of differences, the fact that the boundary between two distinct European cultures—Western and Eastern (Byzantine-Russian)—separates the two major populations of Yugoslavia, the Croats and the Serbs, is of paramount importance.

To this must be added the differences in historical processes, traditions, the degree and type of their respective civilizations, as well as past conflicts, justified or not, and so on. For these reasons, Croatian and Serbian literature can be discussed separately (despite the linguistic similarity), a fact that foreigners often fail to consider. Indeed, official Yugoslav representatives attempt to erase and conceal these differences from the outside world for political reasons. This same stance has recently become increasingly evident in domestic cultural policy, which we will address later. A Retrospective Look With and Without Anger

At a meeting of Yugoslav writers, Miroslav Krleza[110], leader of the Croatian Marxist writers, admonished his young, rebellious colleagues in these terms:

“The role of the Communist Party over the past three decades, with its whole series of predictions, turned out to be the only real one. Foreseeing with absolute clarity that the collapse of the bourgeois superstructure would inevitably occur, the Communist Party created the preconditions to be able, under extremely difficult circumstances, to wage the struggle that ultimately led to the accomplished fact within which we are all here, in this plenary session, sitting and deliberating. Without that policy of the Communist Party and without that political consummation today, we would not be here, nor would this plenary session be taking place.”

In this threatening warning, there is much stark truth. The arrival of the communists to power meant, in many cases, a complete break with the past, although their dominance was not solely due to the military victory, but rather had been prepared between the two wars.

However, it was not possible to eliminate the "outdated criteria" of most Croatian intellectuals at once without resorting to brutal repression. The Stalinist period from 1945 to 1948 abounds with examples of the most vulgar extermination, both of cultural institutions and non-communist individuals.

Along with the flood of "victorious" communist guerrillas, those rare "cultural workers" and "popular artists," who had joined Tito's forces, returned from the forests. Upon their return, they occupied leading positions in cultural life. The prestigious Croatian literary publication Hrvatska Revija (No. 4, 1955, Buenos Aires) details in its jubilee edition several dozen men of letters, arts, and sciences from Croatia who paid with their lives for their anti-communism.

Some sympathetic intellectuals waited in the wings, but most trembled before the ban on working, persecution, and violent death. We will mention the most prominent: Professor Kerubin Segvic, writer and historian; Dr. Albert Haller, literary critic; Dr. Mile Budak, renowned novelist; Dr. Ivo Guberina, historian; Dr. Julio Makanec, professor of philosophy; Gabriel Cvitan, young poet; Andrija Radoslav Bauerov-Glavas, young literary critic; Marijan Matijasevic, poet; Monsignor Dr. Janko Simrak, historian and theologian; Branko Klaric, poet; Vinko Kos, poet; Zlatko Milkovic, novelist; Milivoj Magdic, publicist; Daniel Uvanovic, journalist and scientist; Tijas Mortigjija, publicist and university professor; Vilim Peros, journalist; Vjekoslav Blaskov, trade unionist; Ilija Jakovljevic, writer; and many others, less well-known but valuable and indispensable to the cultural life of the Croatian nation. It is estimated that in the grim Tragedy of Bleiburg, when Tito, with British aid, captured nearly 300,000 Croatians—unarmed soldiers and civilians fleeing the communists—between 5,000 and 8,000 intellectuals perished. For a nation of some 6 million inhabitants, this constitutes a tragedy of enormous proportions, irreparable for decades.

In those adverse years, those who had previously carried machine guns rose to the forefront of "cultural life"; those who had been unable to excel in fair competition due to a lack of talent and qualifications. Now they became dictatorial, in a sphere where dictatorship has no place. How abnormal this situation was is illustrated by the fact that even Krleza, the most prominent Marxist writer in the entire communist East, in the opinion of Elias Ehrenburg, had to remain silent at that time.

The decisive year of 1948

With Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the situation in the country's cultural sphere slowly changed. The break with Zhdanovism[111] energized the lesser-known and politically undefined communist writers. Previously, prominent Marxists from the Belgrade group (Oto Bihalji-Merin, Oskar Davicho, Marko Ristic, Dusan Matic, Aleksandar Vuco, Milovan Djilas), who had previously drawn their meager artistic inspiration from French modernist movements, after paying a temporary tribute to "socialist realism," openly advocated, in their works and polemics, a more individual creative endeavor. Thus, for example, the prominent Serbian writer Oskar Davicho[112] in his novel "Pesma" (The Song) attempted to portray a revolutionary as a man of flesh and blood. In the poem "Covekov Covek" ("Man of Man"), Davicho—stimulated by Djilas's articles—sought to expose the tragedy of man within a totalitarian system. Naturally, the book was banned.

The situation in Zagreb was somewhat different. Croatian cultural life was greatly affected by the purge of non-Marxist writers and publicists, while their Marxist opponents—with the exception of Krleza—remained mired in mediocrity.

A number of pre-war writers remained politically uncommitted after the war. The foremost Croatian poet, Tin Ujević,[113] once attacked as a "nationalist" and "decadent," wrote regularly thanks to the support of younger writers. Stanislav Simić, an excellent literary critic,[114] was forced into silence for years. Ivan Raos,[115] a playwright with an original style, had to publish his plays in the so-called socialist society at his own expense, and there was no talk of staging them.

The main difference between the literary climate in Zagreb and Belgrade is the disproportionate opportunities for protest, or, to put it more concretely: the disproportion between the semi-freedoms in western and eastern Yugoslavia. We could write books on this discrimination, which is detrimental to Croatia, a Westernized and Catholic country, so we will limit ourselves to noting a few facts as an illustration of the fragility of a nearly free system, whose flaws are fully reflected in its inability to resolve the heterogeneous problems of the past.

Critiques of the Past under the Conditions of the New "Freedom"

After the fatuous glorification of the inhuman struggle of the communist guerrillas, which even the writers themselves considered atrocious and humiliating for "man within man," more objective assessments of the communist guerrilla movement emerged after the upheaval of 1948.

Branko Copic[116], a Bosnian Serb, published the novel Gluvi barut ("The Silent Gunpowder") in 1958, which also garnered attention in Western Europe. This novel impresses like a horrifying nightmare. For the first time, something happened that had previously been unimaginable: the pseudo-heroic veil of the criminal communist guerrilla, which fought exclusively to seize power, was lifted.

Many wondered how it was possible to publish such a novel in a country where every new edition is subject to rigorous censorship. The reasons given were: 1) Formally, the book presents a positive image for the communists. They do not abhor the abuses and crimes committed "in the interest of the revolution." 2) The novel's ending condemns the errors of the "bloodthirsty commissar," against whom a "genuine communist" rises up. 3) Copic presents these crimes as isolated incidents, while the "party" remains unscathed.

Despite these unconvincing reservations, Copic's novel is a valuable document, lacking great artistic merit but not without moral value, and can be taken as a sign of the crisis of the "new class," lulled by lust and pleasure.

Incidentally, this reckoning with one's own past first emerged, tentatively, in the works of young Croatian writers, encouraged by Novak Simik's novel Druga obala (The Other Shore). The defining characteristic of this novel is its more humane approach to the former nationalist adversaries who fought alongside the Germans against the communists in the last world war. It was suddenly revealed that they, too, were human beings.

The young Croatian writer Slobodan Novak,[117] who distinguished himself with his long story Izgubljeni zavicaj (The Lost Homeland), stands out both artistically and for his anguished moral search for the guilty party and for the burden of guilt. He believes that the crimes of the communist guerrillas were not good, but rather should never have occurred. This is a step forward from Branko Copic's position. His story "Izgubljeni zavicaj" symbolizes the absurdity of war and the pursuit of victory without regard for human sacrifice. Crimes cannot be justified, Slobodan Novak argues, not even by the victory of the "revolution," since what does this victory mean in the face of the death of a just man? All of Novak's literary work is imbued with pessimism under the weight of such moral conclusions, which until now were considered an attribute of "bourgeois" writers.

At first glance, the difference between the literary works of Belgrade and Zagreb within this, I would say, moralistic trend is noticeable. Belgrade writers can be much freer and more open, while those from Zagreb act with greater artistic pretensions, but they must always proceed with care and caution.

As an example, consider the novel by the Montenegrin writer Mladen Oljaca, *Molitva za moju bracu* (Prayer for My Brothers). Oljaca was the first to boldly declare: "I don't like a writer who doesn't speak boldly to the point of madness. A socialist writer shouldn't always think like the Politburo." The theme of Oljaca's novel revolves around the fate of a young man, deceived by communist propaganda, which leads him to total submission to the Communist Party. He and his comrades, before experiencing the fatal consequences of their actions, dreamed of the establishment of an "earthly paradise" after the war.

Disfigured by the atrocities of war, some never found peace. This generation was required, supposedly in the interest of "supreme ideals," to commit atrocities and barbarity. They accepted them, even though inwardly they rebelled. The end of the war brought no peace to these people. The part of their conscience, untainted by the horrors of war, rebelled day and night, causing unease, disrupting sleep, and embittering even the happiest moments of oblivion. For the first time in Serbian literature, the tragedy of former guerrillas who neither know nor can find their place in the so-called new socialist society is described, and, rejected by it, they die under the weight of remorse.

There are even masochistic traits in this settling of accounts with the past. Milivoje Perovic, a lesser-known writer, described, like an expert in psychopathology, the spiritual spasms of a former guerrilla who fears the past and cannot find solace in the present. Although his novel Planina Vlaina (Mount Vlaina) didn't reach the moderate artistic merit of a Copic, no one better than Perovic captured that peculiar absence from real life, so characteristic of schizophrenics. In the end, Perovic doesn't offer a "salvation recipe"; his pessimism is deeper than Slobodan Novak's.

National Problems and Literature

It would be too complicated and would take us away from the topic at hand if we were to discuss at length the national contrasts within the "second" Yugoslavia, a problem that inevitably affects literature. Political problems, as a part of life, also interest non-Marxist writers in Yugoslavia. They become particularly prominent when the proverbial conflicts between Serbs and Croats are on the table, conflicts that even the communists failed to neutralize. Let's see how these concerns are reflected in literature.

While foreign writers, politically "reactionary" but with artistic merit, are discussed with a double standard (the political views of F. M. Dostoevsky, Knut Hamsun, Ezra Pound), Croatian "right-wing" writers are simply ignored or underestimated. And where they should be acknowledged, they are absent as if they never existed. A comparison with similar practices by National Socialism is inevitable here; they published the poems of Heinrich Heine without crediting him because of his Jewish heritage.

The "literary republic" of Belgrade enjoys far greater freedom in this regard. The Serbs have long since rehabilitated their "reactionary" writers, both artistically and humanly. When it came to exiled writers who, through their activities against the ruling regime, landed on the "blacklist"—such as two notable Serbian writers, Miloš Crnjanski and Raštko Petrović—a way was always found to include them in Serbian literature.

A curtain of total silence has fallen over the best Croatian novelist, Mile Budak, who, incidentally, played a role as a nationalist politician. (Even the literary critic Hans E. Braun described Budak "as a writer of genuine talent in his country," in the Austrian socialist weekly Heute, November 25, 1961.) All the literary creations of the political exiles, among whom stand out the refined lyric poet Viktor Vida[118] and the novelist and poet Anton Bonifacic[119], inspired by French culture, are completely ignored, even though their works are on par with the best literary achievements in the country.

Of particular importance are the periodic instances of national conflicts between the cultural representatives of Croatia and Serbia, expressed in literary polemics and even in official interventions. We will mention a few characteristic cases: The now-defunct journal of young Croatian writers, Krugovi (The Circles), published a survey in 1957 on the cultural sections of the Yugoslav press, which served as a new pretext for pointing out all the shortcomings of cultural life.

In this survey, many gave free rein to their discontent with the dilettantism and rigid politicking of the "cultural spokespeople." Josip Gostic, the celebrated singer, replied when asked what he thought about cultural life in Yugoslavia: "...too much politicking, too many things unrelated to culture." The veteran Croatian composer Jakov Gotovac called for "...much more freedom for everyone." Others expressed themselves in similar or even more forceful terms. Borba, the organ of the Communist Party, was incensed. Not so much by the responses themselves, but by certain marginal notes in the aforementioned magazine, which accused those responsible of dissent in the commemoration of cultural anniversaries of Croatia's past, while the anniversaries of other South Slavic peoples were celebrated with great pomp in Croatia itself.

Borba's article on Krugovi's drift into "chauvinistic waters" compelled the editors of the latter to publish a self-confession of repentance in issue 2-3 of 1957 under the title "Examination of Conscience." That wasn't enough for the ruling circles: Krugovi magazine had to change its editorial staff, but it lost interest and relevance, and the group of writers who gathered around that magazine gradually dispersed, and after a few years the magazine ceased publication.

The small Slovenian nation, culturally the closest to the West, also faces difficulties with Belgrade's centralism, to the point that Slovenian communists took to the pages of the magazine Nase Sodobnosti to speak out against the "leveling" demands of the Serbian writer Dobrisa Cosic.

A somewhat comical, somewhat serious incident occurred last year in Belgrade on the occasion of the opening of an exhibition by a Serbian "modernist" painter. Not only because of the themes of his paintings—a pompous glorification of Serbian history—but also because of his program, published in the catalog, in which he demanded that all South Slavic peoples, as an initial stage in the struggle against "the influences of Western European culture," be compulsorily adopt Cyrillic script instead of the Latin script used in Croatia and Slovenia, this painter signaled new symptoms of the awakened national intolerance in this ethnic melting pot that is Yugoslavia. Although many, in their naiveté, thought that such conflicts already belonged to the past, a notion that Tito's propaganda disseminated with some success in the West, portraying them as having internalized these problems.

However, these manifestations should not be exaggerated. They certainly cannot be revealed in all their virulence, since the "communist sentinels of conscience" are vigilantly watching to prevent any cracks of discontent from appearing in a structure without solid foundations.

The Hostility of Books

Books in Yugoslavia are a luxury item today. The cartoonists of the Communist Party's newspaper, Borba, portrayed the book lover (owner of a library of only twenty volumes!) as a potential embezzler of "national funds." Only the wealthy can currently afford books in Yugoslavia—that is, the members of the ruling class. Sixty publishing houses, both large and small, publish books and magazines in Yugoslavia in a disjointed and chaotic manner, without any plan or program, and with "capitalist criteria." Interestingly, the state authorities themselves had to intervene through the Assembly (parliament) to coordinate publishing activity.

To improve their financial situation, many publishing houses began publishing sensationalist and tabloid literature. Even that doesn't save them. It is estimated that there are books worth over eight billion dinars, equivalent to about ten million dollars, stored in various warehouses throughout Yugoslavia.

This severely damages magazines and periodicals. There were years when in Zagreb—where before the war even high school students had their own magazines—only one literary magazine was published. Later that number increased, but this was quantitative rather than qualitative progress.

"Magazines are the driving force of literature," said Stanislav Simic, a prominent Croatian literary critic. This role was not fulfilled by Croatian postwar magazines. The literary publicist Ivo Hergesic expressed the impotence and unpopularity of Zagreb's magazines in these terms: "It's a painful problem. In that era (referring to the period of the two world wars), there were literary magazines, and it could be said that they were both too numerous and too few.

Today there are relatively many, but I don't think they fulfill their purpose. Why? Because they are published irregularly, because they don't systematically follow our cultural and political activities, because they lack a defined identity, that is, a firm and consistent stance. Finally, our magazines depend too heavily on regular funding and are not very oriented toward the reading public, which should be their main support" (Narodni List, July 3, 1958).

For a time, the journals of young writers Krugovi and Medjutim were exceptions. Krugovi was indeed a touch of Western influence amidst the stagnation and conformism of Yugoslavia's cultural life. This journal was founded by several groups of young Croatian writers, both Marxist and anti-Marxist, following the retreat of the anemic "cultural" mafia, shielded by the official ideology, which, while not dead, is intellectually buried. For a time, Krugovi was a genuine literary product in an environment that could not tolerate such authenticity. Later, due to its drift into "chauvinistic waters," it was deprived of its main editors and, finally, as we have noted, ceased publication. The student writers' journal Medjutim suffered the same fate.

But it was within the pages of these publications that the postwar generation of Croatian writers was formed, a generation that in many respects reveals the failure of the communist break with the past. The first seeds of the "new literature," free from communist influence, emerged in the works of these writers. Therein lies the historical value of these "literary engines," prematurely stifled.

"The New Literature" and Its First Attempts

To appreciate Croatian postwar literature, one must recognize the chasm between "old" and "young" writers. These differences stem not only from the usual generational contrasts or external changes, but primarily from the new notion held by young writers: a definitive end to past mistakes. Fed up with political commitments to the ruling regimes and with the aesthetic certainty and traditional worship of foreign influences, these young writers opted for an independent path.

Their decision was most effectively affirmed when the editorship and management of the Zagrabian journal Knjizevnik (The Writer) passed into the hands of this independent group of young writers. This group declared itself a closed entity, sharing certain criteria regarding culture and literature. For the sake of documentation, we will quote below some salient paragraphs from his Declaration published in issue No. 29, November 1961, of Knjizevnik.

"We believe that our contemporary literature should maintain continuity with tradition and the authentic values of the past, while simultaneously developing in step with the trends and achievements of contemporary world literature. So that we may be modern in our own way... We oppose those who slap ideologies onto our writing like labels, those who, behind grandiloquent words, borrowed thoughts, monuments, and relics, hide their incapacity, their lack of ideas and creative imagination in literature..."

"We are against technocratic civilization, against the harmful and mass-produced spread of mass culture that demands a simplified art, 'affordable for all,' instead of seeking paths of gradual engagement with contemporary art..."

"We oppose the false modernism that translates into artificial and confusing constructions, into absurd and belatedly imitated formalist experiments, against irrational and dehumanized abstractions." "At the same time, we oppose the waxen, schematic socio-realist heroes, the 'engineers of human souls,' we are against directed literature in general..."

"We advocate a rigorous distinction between the writer's social and private person and their literary work. We want literature to be discussed separately, for a writer's value to be assessed according to their work and not their position in society..."

"Deciding the fate of literature is solely the responsibility of the public, and we do not wish it to be judged in corridors and behind closed doors..."

Antun Soljan, editor-in-chief of the aforementioned magazine, is aware of the difficulties a writer must face within a system that demands absolute subordination to its purposes:

"All literature throughout history has grappled with some kind of hammer and anvil, but the hammers and anvils of our time are forged from better steel, and their blacksmiths are more powerful (because they are better organized) than ever before. They take turns wielding this tool, they forge and are themselves shod scientifically, but the blacksmiths no longer hammer the iron for no reason, but rather 'in the name' of something and someone."

Doesn't one infer from these indirect and circumspect words a lament for the ideological pressure on art, which in Yugoslavia is quite "indirect," yet ever-present?

The contributor to the magazine in question, Dusko Car, justifies the special interest shown by young writers in the so-called anti-heroes of our time. Discontent with the environment in which they must live, these "rebels" distance themselves from society, thus seeking to preserve their individuality and simultaneously protest against the experiments on humans that the communists have been carrying out for the past 16 years in Yugoslavia. Dusko Car says:

"At a certain point, satiated with the fruitless search for nonexistent heroes, about whom so much was theorized during the period of directed literature, and immersed in the atmosphere of new quests, the authors of this prose sought a more individual path to find heroes and antiheroes of our current reality.

They don't boast of their 'righteousness,' they don't want to be outsiders within their literature, within the society they describe... They think with the ideas of rebels, they express themselves with their language, they live the lives of weary rebels, and that is why their condemnation, or rather, their assessment of the situation, impresses more directly and convincingly: they don't presume to offer an infallible interpretation, a moral or lesson, but rather their writings are experienced as a personal defeat and tragedy."

This identification with the protagonists ("antiheroes") of their novels and short stories perfectly illustrates the relationship of these young writers with the prevailing ideology.

Something must be said about the editors of this truly courageous magazine. Antun Soljan, editor-in-chief, even before the "young writers" appeared, was one of the most productive and original Croatian writers. The characters in his prose works are isolated individuals in an environment that doesn't understand them.

Soljan placed man outside of "concrete time," thus coming into direct contradiction with Marxist principles regarding the decisive influence of external factors on human development. Soljan has a thorough knowledge of Anglo-Saxon literature and, in cooperation with his friend Slamnig, produced excellent translations. Vlado Gotovac, a sharp polemicist, is the enfant terrible of Croatian literature; a poet and critic, he excels in lucid formulations and literary judgments, but at times he is seduced by witty and narcissistic themes. Slobodan Novak was the first among the young writers to assert himself through his expressive maturity.

He is one of those seeking to justify the crimes committed by the communist guerrillas. Ivan Kusan, a prominent writer of children's literature, established himself with the novel Razapet izmedju (Cleft Between). He succeeds in describing the atmosphere and psychological states of isolated intellectuals. Ivan Slamnig, the "Soljan lookalike," is one of the most distinctive young Croatian writers. Ironic, disillusioned, preoccupied with the trivialities of life, which together reflect the "philosophy of life" of most of the postwar generation, he is immersed in the problems of the "asphalt man."

The poet Vesna Krmpotic tries to express the refined vibrations of her emotions and meditations in sublime verse. Two critics, Dusko Car and Tomislav Ladan, still relatively unknown, excelled in their respective fields: Ladan in the artistic sphere, Car in the political.

The most lasting result of the work of young writers is their discovery of "another life," independent of all official interpretations and efforts at transformation. Beneath a thin layer of external circumstances vibrates an authentic, warm, humanly complex, "unofficial" life, with all the features of a "society in transition" and individual people within it who do not conform to the mass-produced images of communist propagandists. This pulsating notion of life's division finds its echo in all the works of young writers.

In this respect, the scene of political demonstrations in Krsto Spoljar's novel Mirno Podneblje (The Quiet Atmosphere)[120] is interesting. While the agitated mob, led by communist arsonists, attacks the library and the American consulate, two main characters try to break into the consulate with the intention of stealing. They couldn't care less about the political charade of the other demonstrators. The complete disinterest of Spoljar's characters in the external official events of the country they live in was achieved with the well-known trick of inserting headlines and slogans from official propaganda that are as captivating as the snow of yesteryear.

Antun Soljan's novel *Izdajice* (Traitors) is a representative work about the "anti-heroes" of communist Yugoslavia. In the novel's preface, the author attempts to justify his interest in these dissidents to an imaginary engineer, a cold and pragmatic builder of the so-called better future. The entire novel exudes a warm attentiveness, a love for those isolated in an environment devoid of respect for the individual, making the nebulous engineer—a symbol of the "party" and of power—appear not only empty and inhuman but also unreal.

The interests of the new generation of writers differ in many respects from those of older writers. For the first time in Croatian literature, the city and its inhabitants are the focus; relationships between men and women, especially sex, attract considerable attention; The desire to live an individual life is the main driving force behind his novels; a disdain for traditional, outdated norms characterizes the characters' behavior; a revulsion toward grandiloquent gestures and false pathos, a cynical attitude toward exaggerated emotions, and a cold, almost resigned, endurance of external life mark his trajectory.

Formally, the new literature draws on the innovations of Western writers. While German literature previously influenced the style and taste of writers, now it is primarily American literature, and to some extent French literature, that has the greatest impact. The short story and poetry are particularly cultivated. Long novels are no longer written. Lyric poetry flourishes as never before.

But let's see what happened to the magazine Knjizevnik. There was hope that good wine would come from this raw material if the "greater powers" (read: the Communist Party) didn't interfere. Very soon, the first official counterattacks began. Vjekoslav Kaleb, a writer who followed "the line" and an official in the Writers' Federation, "anathematized" the editorial staff of Knjizevnik.

After the second issue, which was of high quality in its content but more moderate in its polemical approach, the Yugoslav communists silenced the publication using their characteristically treacherous methods: they suspended the essential subsidies without which no magazine can survive in Yugoslavia. The magazine's founders and editors were harassed, and some were dismissed from their public sector jobs. The hope for an independent literary magazine was crushed in its infancy.

Tito's closer ties with the Soviet bloc and the synchronized attacks on intellectuals and visual and literary artists foreshadow a new Zhdanovist course. Tito, like Hitler before him, interfered publicly and insolently not only in the ideological aspects of artistic creation but also in formal and structural matters. And just as the presumptuous painter from Braunau[121] primitively attacked non-figurative painting, cynically observing that "abstract painters" lacked good eyesight, so too did the Yugoslav dictator rage against abstract art, which, by its content and meaning, escaped his grasp and understanding.

Everything that has been done to date in the artistic field in Yugoslavia is due to certain semi-liberties that were granted when the "party," after the break with Moscow, was determined to consolidate its position among intellectuals. Today, the differences between Moscow and Belgrade communism are minimal. Yugoslav communists are returning to the warmth of Soviet communism. This has repercussions in the arts and sciences. The question is whether the wheel of progress can be turned back without a major crash and without breaking its axle.

DOCUMENTS:

A note from the Yugoslav communist government to the Catholic episcopate regarding exiled priests

Moma Markovic, a member of the Federal Executive Council of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia (the central government), addressed note No. 01-264/1 from Belgrade on March 30, 1963, to the Presidency of the Catholic Episcopal Conferences based in Zagreb, which reads as follows:

With the desire to bring to your attention a serious problem of particular concern, by authorization of the Federal Executive Council, I am addressing this note to the episcopate of the Catholic Church in the People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the struggle for the preservation of world peace, humanity is making enormous efforts both through the United Nations and through a whole series of collective and individual actions by countries and the most prestigious figures. By striving tenaciously and consistently for peace, coexistence, and just relations in the world, our country has gained special prestige in the eyes of the international community.

These selfless efforts to preserve peace, and the enormous sacrifices our peoples made to building their country, contributed to consolidating the freedom and independence of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. In accordance with this pacifist policy and the resulting internal democratic development of Yugoslavia, the Federal People's Assembly (parliament) of Yugoslavia promulgated the Amnesty Law in March 1962, imbued with humanitarian principles and concern for all its citizens willing to respect social and human values. The law applies to all emigrants who demonstrated that they would use their abilities and vocation constructively, regardless of their country of residence.

This act of the Yugoslav government, however, contradicts the interests of extremely reactionary circles around the world, which are devising various ways to prevent emigrants from regularizing their status and their relations with their country.

Precisely because this noble gesture found a favorable echo among so many exiles eager to normalize their relations with their homeland, while remaining good citizens of their adopted country, Ustaše, Chetnik, and other hostile elements abroad began to unleash their fury against the emigrants, against our citizens, and against representatives of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

In this respect, the activity carried out against Yugoslavia and the interests of its citizens by Ustaše terrorists and other subversive elements abroad stands out, resorting even to the most brutal methods, such as terrorist attacks, assassinations, and the like.[122]

It is with regret that we must note that a considerable number of Catholic priests exiled from Yugoslavia participate in these hostile actions against our country and even appear as its organizers.

The recent attack in Bad Godesberg, a town notorious for its violence, in which Momcilo Popovic, the caretaker of the Yugoslav embassy building, was the work of Rafael Medic, a Yugoslav priest who, until his arrest, was serving as an exiled priest in Dortmund. This crime has deeply moved and outraged our citizens, reminding them of the tragic and painful experiences our people endured during the Second World War. It is only natural that this crime has been met with strong condemnation from world public opinion.

Unfortunately, the Bad Godesberg attack is not an isolated incident, as it has been followed by terrorist attempts against our embassies and consulates in foreign countries (in Chicago, Vienna, and Brussels), which further worries, upsets, and infuriates people both at home and abroad. That is why it is logical that in various rallies and in the press, when the crimes of the Ustachi are discussed with ferocity, the names of Catholic priests are also cited, among others.[123].

We believe it unnecessary to reiterate the reasons why some Catholic priests decided to leave our country along with the internal quislings and the occupiers, as they are well known. Abroad, with the help of the Catholic Church and its organizations, they were given the opportunity to regularize their status and fulfill their priestly duties normally.

However, the political partisanship of the wartime era led some priests to adopt ideas that prompted them to undertake such activities, inevitably bringing them into conflict not only with universally recognized norms of morality and ethics, and with priestly duties and obligations, but also with the laws of the countries that offered them hospitality. Their crimes abroad resulted in a situation where the respective authorities that granted them asylum must deprive them of their liberty, expel them, or advise them to abandon their parishes.

The extent to which certain Catholic priests are recalcitrant in such subversive activities is illustrated by the following examples: While the West German justice system is investigating the case of Father Medic and a group of Ustaše for the crime perpetrated in Bad Godesberg, and while the West German authorities are banning and dissolving an anti-Yugoslav organization that masqueraded as a Catholic association, expatriate Catholic priests from Yugoslavia are collecting financial and material aid for them.

Among the spokespeople for this action are Francisco Lodeta and Domingo Susnjara from West Germany, Guillermo Cecelja from Austria, Serafino Vistica from the United States, Dragutin Kamber from Canada, as well as other priests.

It has long been known that certain priests, members of exile organizations, have subordinated certain Catholic newspapers to their anti-Yugoslav activities and in them express their solidarity with all actions hostile to Yugoslavia, including the crime in Bad Godesberg. This is how they abuse Catholic newspapers: "The Spokesman of the Heart of Jesus and Mary," edited by Father Guillermo Cecelja in Vienna, "Danica," "Nasa Nada," and several others.

It is also known that some priests abroad belong to and even lead extremist Ustaše organizations, act as spokespeople for anti-Yugoslav demonstrations, sign various declarations against Yugoslavia, and serve on several committees and commissions whose purpose is the fight against Yugoslavia. Among them are the well-known priests Esteban Kukolja, president of the Ustaše exiles in West Germany, followed by Krunoslav Draganović, Esteban Lačković, Vasilj Vendelin, José Bujanović, Kresimir Zorić, Milan Simćić, and many more.

At the same time, we must acknowledge that in our country there are also Catholic priests who are linked to these and other exiles with hostile intentions. They have carried out various financial transactions and smuggling operations with them, receive material services and assistance in various forms, and thus participate in illicit and punishable acts.

In pointing out this subversive and anti-Yugoslav activity, we are convinced that you will share our view that this activity is in clear contrast to fundamental ethical principles and contrary to the interests of the people of Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to believe that the Catholic Church, too, cannot remain indifferent to what has been stated, and particularly to the hostile activity of exiled Catholic priests, since such activity obviously cannot benefit the efforts and subsequent measures aimed at regularizing and normalizing relations between the Church and the State of Yugoslavia.

For the aforementioned reasons, and based on the repeatedly expressed opinion that efforts to regularize relations between Church and State are in the mutual interest, it was logical to expect that the episcopate of Yugoslavia would consider this problem and take appropriate measures against these priests, applying ecclesiastical prescriptions. This was all the more true given that all governments and progressive circles worldwide repudiated the aforementioned terrorist and subversive activity.

To claim that such individuals abroad are beyond the jurisdiction of their dioceses of origin would not be convincing, since, in that case, nothing could prevent bishops and archbishops from taking the necessary steps and exerting influence to prevent such hostile activity by Catholic priests exiled from Yugoslavia. In our opinion, this would also be consistent with the positions expressed at the Second Vatican Council, both through the words and messages of Pope John XXIII in favor of peace and fraternity among the peoples of the world, and with the general trends of adaptation of the Roman Catholic Church to current conditions and times.

The Federal Executive Council takes this opportunity to express its esteem for the Presidency of the Episcopal Conferences of the Catholic Church in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Moma Markovic, m.p.

Member of the Federal Executive Council

BOOK REVIEW

Federal Ministry for Expelled Persons, Refugees, and War Victims: The Fate of Germans in Yugoslavia

F. Nevistic, Buenos Aires

"The Fate of the Germans in Yugoslavia," Düsseldorf, 1962, pp. 633).

Many know that Friedrich Engels was not German in the strict sense. But he was born in Germany, lived a good part of his life there, knew the German environment well, and wrote in German as if it were his mother tongue. "It is well known," he himself says, "that we Germans have a terrible and weighty Gründlichkeit, a radical depth or profound radicalism, whatever you want to call it."

The book we are reviewing is further proof of this German radical depth. It consists of 633 pages and offers interested readers perhaps the most complete picture of the unfortunate fate that befell the German national group in communist Yugoslavia.

The statistics on the German ethnic minority in Yugoslavia before and after the Second World War, the history of its development, its economic capacity, its professional life, its religion, as well as a legislative summary of its status during the war, are all presented exhaustively in this voluminous publication. But its main objective is to inform world opinion about the extermination and dispersal of the German national minority in Yugoslavia during the war and immediately after its end.

The territory inhabited by Germans in Yugoslavia was divided during the war into three regions, each with its own legal status. These were the Germans residing in Croatia; those in Banat, based in occupied Belgrade; and those in Bačka, annexed by Hungary, based in Budapest. The legal and political status of the Germans in Croatia, though smaller, was almost privileged.

Once the war ended, the true martyrdom of this ethnic minority began. Because some of its members had participated in the war against the Yugoslav communists and because of their partial loyalty to the Croatian authorities, the new Yugoslav communist authorities took measures against the entire group, which had recently reunited—measures that can rightly be considered a veritable extermination.

Expropriation, imprisonment, torture, executions, and expulsion from the country were the measures that reduced the number of Germans from over 500,000 before the war to only 56,000. Jure Kastelan, an active supporter of Tito during the war and a partisan poet, proudly calls this extermination a triumph of "liberation."

Numerous testimonies, given by refugees of various professions and ages, complete the harrowing drama experienced by the German ethnic minority after several centuries of settlement in that region, contributing their diligence, knowledge, industriousness, and discipline to the development of that area, which did not always offer the same advantages. We neither wish nor can add anything to the book's documentation.

We do, however, wish to make a few marginal observations. The book, when referring to Croatia, always uses quotation marks when citing its official name at the time: Independent State of Croatia. The quotation marks could be interpreted as a certain judgment, a certain underestimation of the Croatian case.

But the German ethnic group, at least those residing in Croatia, should know, and do know well, that the Croatian people were unanimously in favor of independence and national sovereignty. If, despite everything, neither reality itself nor these two attributes achieved their natural and desired brilliance, a considerable part of the blame also falls on their German allies.

The second observation is this: The Belgrade regime, despite the extermination of the German group and the total confiscation of its assets, which were of very high value, is now demanding payment of several hundred million dollars in reparations from the federal government in Bonn. We believe that this claim by Belgrade is unfounded and unjust. Most of the devastation in Yugoslav territory during the war was caused by Tito's communists. Therefore, it goes against the elementary principles of law to demand payment from others for damages caused by the communists who are now demanding compensation.

Furthermore, the regions of Srijem, Banat, Baranja, and Bačka were never part of Serbia, neither historically nor ethnically. Thanks to the war "compensations" of 1914-1918, Belgrade annexed them and, after the Second World War, reaffirmed its "right," which is clearly the right of the strongest. The statistics from Belgrade irrefutably testify that Serbs were and are a minority in those regions where they arrived seeking refuge after their unsuccessful uprisings against the Turks.

Even adding the number of Croats in that area to the Serbs, the "Yugoslavs" would still be in the minority. But the Croats never freely accepted the union through which the Serbs claim to have acquired the political title of the "Yugoslav nation." Finally, what gives the Serbs the right to exterminate the Germans residing on Croatian national soil? The centuries-long coexistence of this group with the Croats proved fruitful in every respect. Prominent Croatian figures such as Ritter-Vitezovic, Strossmayer, Stadler, Bauer, Zimmermann, and so many others attest to this symbiosis.

The Serbs are now claiming this right once again through the violence of war, which has triumphed for them. Finally, we believe it appropriate to remind those "Yugoslav headlines" that Napoleon said—admittedly too late—that force and law impressed him more than anything else in the world, but that in the end, law triumphs over force.

BOOK REVIEW

United States Government Printing Office: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945

Ángel Belic, Buenos Aires

(Washington, 1962, Vol. XII, The War Years, February 1 - June 22, 1941, pp. 1109).

This volume of German diplomatic documents covers the period when Germany reached its peak power. Eight months had passed since the signing of the armistice with Vichy France, and relations with Russia were conducted within the framework of the Non-Aggression Pact and a very intense economic exchange. The United States was still far removed from the war. In addition to the 50 divisions stationed in France, Germany had 200 divisions available at that time (Hitler stated this to Hungarian Minister Sztojay on March 28, 1941, p. 371).

In this volume, presented in chronological order, are verbatim translations of telegrams from the German Foreign Ministry to its representatives abroad and vice versa, followed by detailed minutes of conversations between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and other high-ranking German officials with foreign political representatives; and minutes of Hitler's meetings regarding war preparations and conduct. The book includes an analytical list of the documents, categorized by the countries involved, making them easy to consult and study.

All of this constitutes authentic material for chronicling the foreign policy of the Third Reich and also for the history of other states that were then in contact with Germany. Certain responsible politicians presented these ties differently than the way they are portrayed in the documents published in this volume.

This period also encompasses the critical German-Yugoslav relations, which were very friendly in February-March 1941, strengthened by extensive trade and cooperation, culminating in Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941. Two days later, relations took a dramatic turn following the Belgrade coup. Relations became unfriendly, and the blitzkrieg against Yugoslavia, launched on April 6, ended in a few days with the country's disintegration. The Croats rose up and proclaimed their national independence from Serbia, occupied by the Germans, as a defeated nation.

The fact that the Croatian national uprising coincided with these events does not diminish the value of their long struggle for national self-determination. The Serbs, however, seized upon this circumstantial fact, striving to persuade everyone that it was not the Croatian people who desired their national independence, but only the Axis powers.

The documents in question clearly prove the opposite. Before the coup in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, Hitler had no intention of destroying Yugoslavia. Indeed, all the documents show that he fervently desired Yugoslavia to remain a unified state. The minutes of Hitler's meeting at the Berghof on February 14, 1941, with D. Cvetkovic, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, contain these words from Hitler (p. 90): "German policy toward Yugoslavia, even that of his predecessors, has always been the same, because there were no political differences of any kind between the two countries.

Germany considered Yugoslavia a trading partner that provided a market for German exports. Germany exported its manufactured goods to Yugoslavia; at the same time, it imported Yugoslav goods, food, and raw materials, and in the future, it will provide an ever-increasing market for Yugoslavia. This is of decisive importance."

In Ribbentrop's telegram of March 7, 1941, to the German legation in Belgrade (p. 231), regarding the secret meeting between Prince Paul and Hitler, there is this paragraph: "The Führer emphasized Yugoslavia's interest in adhering to the Tripartite Pact, as it would have Germany as a partner, guaranteeing both its present and future territory. Furthermore, we expect nothing from Yugoslavia but its adherence to the Tripartite Pact; in particular, we do not expect its participation in the war. We will ensure that Salonika, once the war is over, belongs to Yugoslavia."

In the memorial recording Hitler's conversation with Cvetkovic after Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941, the following is written (p. 355): "The Führer emphasized during the conversation that he had always been a sincere and honorable friend of Yugoslavia. He assured Cvetkovic that, should Yugoslavia find itself in a precarious situation or believe it had cause for complaint, it would always find in the Führer a friend, mediator, and honest and loyal advocate."

These statements were made before the war with Yugoslavia. During the war, after the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, Dr. Ante Pavelić, the Croatian head of state, met with Hitler at the Berghof on June 7, 1941. On this occasion, Hitler, without batting an eye, reiterates his thesis on Yugoslavia (p. 977): "Recent events (referring to the war with Yugoslavia in April 1941) have made him (Hitler) an unintentional instrument of the liberation of Croatia, since he had no intention whatsoever of taking action against Yugoslavia."

From the quoted statements, it is obvious that the restoration of the Croatian state was not part of the plans of the German Third Reich, as the opponents of Croatian independence try to portray it in order to diminish the plebiscitary nature of the Croatian national uprising. The truth is that this revolutionary uprising was the genuine expression of the national aspiration for self-determination, manifested by the Croatian people during the 23 years of monarchical Yugoslavia's existence in every election and other mass demonstrations.

BOOK REVIEW

J. B. Hoptner: Yugoslavia in Crisis - 1934-1941

Milan Blazekovic, Buenos Aires

(New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. XV, 328).

J. B. Hoptner's book, "Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-1941," is perhaps the first attempt by a foreign historian to challenge, based on the internal and external political realities of Yugoslavia during that period, Churchill's assessment that with the coup d'état in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, Yugoslavia "had found its soul," as well as Churchill's opinion at the time that the coup was a consequence of popular anger "at the country's betrayal due to the weakness of its rulers." In Hoptner's view, this assessment by Churchill is reflected in all subsequent interpretations of pre-war Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Therefore, the author's main objective is to examine the attempts of a small state to adjust its position to the superior strength of its two neighbors (Germany and Italy), at a time when its two allies (France and England) were first unwilling and then unable to provide more concrete assistance than advice. Furthermore, and related to all of this, the author aimed to expose the efforts of a multinational state, subject to manipulation and pressure from all sides, to maintain internal peace. The author thus outlined the structure of the work and revealed his basic position regarding the main political actors (Stojadinovic, Cvetkovic, Prince Paul, and General Simovic), namely, their political rehabilitation in light of the experience that "a small power must continually adjust its sails to the opposing winds stirred up by the great powers," and that in times of crisis a small state is not permitted to remain aloof, that is, "the great powers at war do not grant a small state the luxury of neutrality or independent thought." (p. 299)

In the chapters "Roots in the Crisis" (12-21), "Yugoslavia in the European Order, 1934-1937" (22-60), "Neutrality Agreements" (94-108) and "The Anschluss and After" (109-135), the author presents the foreign policy of Yugoslavia from its creation until the fall of Stojadinovic, which occurred in early February 1939, based on previously unpublished Yugoslav diplomatic correspondence and official publications of French, English, Italian and American documents, and numerous other memorials. After a brief initial analysis of Serbo-Croatian relations and their divergent views regarding Yugoslavia's internal order, the author embarks on a detailed description of the foreign policy of the great powers and its influence on Yugoslav foreign policy, which reached its peak in early 1937. At that time, Stojadinovic had concluded a five-year political agreement with Italy, guaranteeing, among other things, the inviolability of Yugoslavia's borders and prohibiting the activities of the Croatian revolutionary organization, the Ustaša.

With this agreement, Stojadinovic fulfilled a long-held desire of France and England, who for years had sought to enlist Italy as an ally against Germany, thus requiring friendly relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. However, while France and England, as well as the other democracies, neglected the economic factor in international politics, Yugoslavia became increasingly dependent on the German market for its exports. By 1938, trade with Germany had become an integral part of the Yugoslav economy. However, the Munich Pact marked the end of an era in international history, and after the Anschluss, Yugoslavia prioritized its security over its loyalty to the seemingly immutable alliance system. Neutrality became the cornerstone of Yugoslavia's foreign policy from Stojadinovic, through Cvetkovic, to Simovic, a policy Hoptner considers logical and positive because it contributed to the maintenance of the Yugoslav state and its allies within the French security system.

In domestic politics, however, Stojadinovic could not achieve the same success. "Clearly under the influence of his triumphs as foreign minister, he—it seems—wanted to downplay, even avoid, the internal problem, the Croatian problem," says Hoptner. The outcome of the 1938 elections, Stojadinovic's "authoritarian ambitions," and, to a greater extent, his refusal to acknowledge the need to satisfy the Croatians in the new situation, led to his downfall and the formation of a new government headed by Dragisa Cvetkovic.

In the chapters "On the Tightrope" (136-169), "End of Neutrality" (170-201), "Journey to Vienna" (202-243), "Intermezzo" (244-246), and "Yugoslavia Enters the War" (247-292), Hoptner vividly and dramatically describes the negotiations with Dr. Vladko Macek, the Croatian leader, the signing of the agreement between Macek and the Yugoslav government, the creation of Banovina Hrvatska (the Croatian Banatus), Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, the coup d'état in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, and the subsequent defeat and disintegration of Yugoslavia.

In this part of the book, more so than in those already reviewed, the author, in addition to the sources already mentioned, makes use of the data and information provided verbally or in writing by the main actors in the events recounted.

In these chapters, more than in the earlier ones, the interdependence of internal political problems and external influences and interests is highlighted. The author very aptly points out that "the Croatian dream of independence" was not the exclusive domain of the Croatian "ultranationalists"—the Ustaša—but rather that the Croatian deputies, at their meeting in Zagreb on January 15, 1939, passed a resolution warning the Western powers of the impossibility of the Yugoslav conception of a common state between Croats and Serbs, and declaring all acts of the Belgrade government null and void, especially the pacts with foreign powers.

Hoptner also highlights Göring's refusal to meet with Macek's representatives, referring them to Italy instead, because "Yugoslavia belonged to the Italian sphere of influence," and notes his instructions to German diplomatic missions to avoid contact with Croatian organizations.

Although Hoptner does not mention the statement that Dr. Macek gave to the Associated Press correspondent on 3/21/1939, ("The Croatian question must be resolved quickly and one must understand that it would be of little consequence to the Croats whether it is ordered by Roosevelt or Hitler." - Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Paris, Sept./Oct- 1930, p. 73), his account of the Macek-Cvetkovic negotiations, as well as of Cvetkovic's policy in general, is an inventory of hitherto little-known political details, an example of expository clarity and testimony to the historical objectivity attainable by a foreign historian exposed to all sorts of personal impressions and judgments, obtained during the exchange of opinions with various political factors of the time.

With great insight and knowledge of the subject, the author recounts Cvetkovic's difficulties in forging an active coalition of all Serbian political parties, and on the other hand, the negative attitude of Churchill, Roosevelt, Hitler, Mussolini, and even the Soviet Union toward Yugoslavia's neutrality. While the Axis powers insisted on adherence to the Tripartite Pact, promising Thessaloniki in compensation and other guarantees, the British secret service, the SOE, under Hugh Dalton, was preparing the ground in Belgrade for such an eventuality.

Gold reserves were transferred to Great Britain in May 1939. The United States pressured Prince Paul and the government not to go beyond the non-aggression pact. Although the mission of American Colonel William Donovan failed, it had a psychological effect: many in Belgrade believed that Donovan had promised aid as soon as Yugoslavia attacked the Italians in Greece.

Despite the Macek-Cvetkovic agreement, the country and public opinion remained divided regarding the government's domestic and foreign policy. While certain Serbian circles, such as the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, the leaders of Serbian opposition parties, and some Serbian military groups, clamored for war against the Axis powers despite their complete lack of military preparedness, the profound silence of the Croats and Slovenes signaled their total disagreement with any policy that might open the way for Axis armies to advance into Croatia and Slovenia. Having received guarantees for territorial integrity and promises for Yugoslavia's access to the Aegean Sea, and having overcome the government crisis by replacing two Serbian ministers with two more, on March 25, 1941, Cvetkovic and Cincar-Markovic signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna.

The coup d'état of March 27, 1941, orchestrated by a group of Serbian military officers supported by the Serbian Cultural Club, led by Professor Slobodan Jovanovic, immediately lost all international impact. Simovic, our prime minister, like Cvetkovic, refused to come to the aid of the British in Greece.

He, too, wanted to maintain the previous policy of neutrality and adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Crowds took to the streets of Belgrade to acclaim the new government, believing it would renounce the Pact. Hitler believed the same; he, who never seriously intended to attack Yugoslavia, now had to improvise new strategic plans, the author concludes, citing several sources on the matter.

The Yugoslav policy of neutrality was successful as long as the balance of power existed in the Balkans. The failed Italian attack on Greece provoked the intervention of England and Germany on Italy's side, forcing Yugoslavia to gradually abandon its strict policy of neutrality. According to the author, the Allies did not show Yugoslavia the same patience and diplomatic discretion they had demonstrated in the case of Sweden, which, under similar circumstances, signed an agreement with Germany allowing German military transports to transit through its territory.

Summarizing the results of his research, the author concludes the final chapter of his book—"In Retrospect"—by stating that the coup of March 27th set Yugoslavia's political fate in motion, initiating a process that would find its resolution years later, with little regard for the political judgment of Western democracies and little concern for the peace of their political conscience.

Although the author writes about Yugoslavia and its rulers with sympathy, having grown fond of his subject through a decade-long study to the point of feeling no alternative, the reader versed in the matter must acknowledge the author's absolute scientific objectivity in exposing the political problems that were tearing Yugoslavia apart internally. However, these problems, as presented, compel us to question the very purpose of a multinational state community that, in its first serious test on the international stage, could not survive—that is, could not even confront the crisis with the unanimous support of its constituent parts.

The aforementioned example of Sweden, a country homogeneous in its national identity, is more than eloquent. A state that attempts to resolve its national problem through interstate arrangements (Italo-Yugoslav Political Treaty of March 25, 1937), or seeks a viable solution only when an international crisis threatens to escalate into inevitable war (Cvetkovic-Macek Understanding of August 26, 1939), lacks a democratic foundation. The main political actors and protagonists of the crisis were the Serbs, whose national interests coincided with those of the Yugoslav state, so closely intertwined that a foreign observer would not perceive the Serbian national motivation.

Croatian national interest, which in Yugoslavia could only manifest itself as opposition, is generally perceived by world public opinion as an unsympathetic separatism, despite the enshrined right to national self-determination. Since Serbian national interest was congruent with and represented by that of Yugoslavia, it is incorrect to use the term "Yugoslavs" instead of "Serbs," as they always held absolute control over the army and the country's foreign policy. It must be acknowledged, however, that such a distinction between terms presents a certain difficulty for any historian dealing with a particular historical period from a state, rather than a national, perspective, these two notions carrying special significance in a multinational state. This difficulty, however, is no excuse regarding the specific period of preparation and execution of the coup d'état of March 27, 1941, since it was carried out purely and exclusively by Serbs in their own interest, whether national or personal. Furthermore, equating the coup plotters with Cvetkovic and Prince Paul regarding responsibility or irresponsibility for the ultimate fate of Yugoslavia, attributing it solely to the great powers, seems neither fair nor historically tenable. By placing both political groups on the same level with regard to their responsibility, the author no longer has grounds to blame the great powers, who, without the coup, would not have been able to drag Yugoslavia into the war.

Referring to the situation in postwar Yugoslavia, Hoptner states in the introduction that the people are currently in a process of adapting to their foreign social and economic system, which this time was not imposed from the outside, but by the people themselves in Yugoslavia. It is to be expected that the author—who, according to the publisher, is preparing the second volume, which will deal with the activities of the Yugoslav government in exile—will conclude that the same powers and interests that drove the coup plotters this time supported the communists, who without such support would never have been able to seize power.

The author's assertion on page 7 that Stjepan Radic and four other Croatian deputies were shot dead in the Belgrade parliament by a deputy from the Radical Party of Montenegro, "whom Radic gravely offended," is historically untenable. If, as the assassin's defense argued, the offense was the true motive, then the alleged offender was Deputy Pernar, not Radic. According to all the evidence in the case, Radic's assassination was not a mere coincidence.

As an event that prompted a change in the country's constitutional order, it warrants a more thorough analysis of the reasons behind Radic's violent death. It is true that Ivan Mestrovic's memoirs, which provide an account of the matter, were published too late to serve as a reference for the author, while Svetozar Pribicevic and his work "La dictadure du roi Alexandre" do not appear to the author to be a reliable source, as they are not listed in either the index of persons or the bibliography of Hoptner's work.

The assertion on page 26 that King Alexander's death had a clear unifying effect, given that the people closed ranks against the external threat, is also exaggerated. In reality, the public outpouring of grief in the non-Serbian regions was orchestrated by the Interior Ministry in Belgrade. The external threat in 1934 was far less significant than in 1941, as it failed to unite all Serbs, let alone the other nationalities within the country.

Despite these and other general and specific observations that could have been listed in this review—namely, the author's failure to corroborate certain personal references to various figures involved in the events with other sources—Hoptner's book remains one of the most informative works on the final period of monarchical Yugoslavia.

BOOK REVIEW

Dr. Milan Stojadinovic: Neither War Nor Pact

Ivo Bogdan, Buenos Aires

(in Serbian; Ed. "El Economista", Buenos Aires, 1963, pp. 764)

The author of this voluminous memoir, Ni rat ni pakt—whose subtitle reads "Yugoslavia Between the Two Wars"—was a prominent Serbian politician during that period: a leading member of the Serbian Radical Party, Minister of Finance in the 1920s under the governments of Nikola Pasic, and Prime Minister from 1935 to 1939, retaining the Foreign Ministry portfolio. It is interesting to note here that the Undersecretary of that ministry was the novelist and Nobel laureate in Literature, Ivo Andric. Stojadinovic was overthrown in 1939 due to his Führer-like ambitions, and in 1941, on the eve of the German invasion of the Balkans, the Cvetkovic-Macek government handed him over to British military authorities in Thessaloniki. From there, he was transferred to the island of Mauritius, where he remained confined until 1946. He then settled in Buenos Aires, taking advantage of his Italian connections as a former admirer and friend of Ciano and Mussolini. He founded the weekly newspaper "El Economista." He died in Buenos Aires in 1961. His memoir, "Neither War nor Pact," consists of 87 chapters, an index of names, and a brief preface by the editors, which clearly altered the original text.

Stojadinovic first describes in considerable detail his studies, his administrative career, and his entry into political life, and then his public service, which constitutes an interesting portrait of Serbian society. His entire narrative is woven together with references to prevailing situations and figures. But it reflects, in most cases, the subjective attitude of an ambitious and deeply resentful politician who, unexpectedly, was brought down at the very moment he felt omnipotent and was preparing to establish himself as the Yugoslav Führer.

In his exasperation, he frequently crosses the line of good taste. Hence, reading this book is unpleasant due to the author's egotism, in addition to being written in a cumbersome style and with false pretensions of brilliance. Nevertheless, the material presented is very appropriate for studying the idiosyncrasies of a typical Serbian politician between the two world wars, and the society in which he operated and rose to power. Despite the very mediocre literary value of this book, written with bias and imbued with a chauvinistic Greater Serbian spirit, it at least facilitates the understanding of the Serb-Croatian conflict. It is also of some interest because the author's contemporaries did not write their political memoirs.

Stojadinovic, from an imaginative height and with insolent presumption, refers to his contemporaries, at times bordering on the level of scandalous gossip. He treats only Nikola Pasic, the Serbian statesman who introduced the young and ambitious finance expert to the political arena, with a degree of objectivity. Stojadinovic became closely associated with Pasic, convinced that he could more easily realize his political ambitions under the wing of the all-powerful leader of the Radical Party.

Indeed, Pasic, as an exponent, or rather an agent, of Tsarist Russia, became the strongman in Serbia after the horrific assassination of the Obrenovics (1903), Austrian protégés, when King Peter I Karageorgevic, a Russian protégé, was enthroned. Peter I, a weak sovereign, tolerated the omnipotence of his prime minister, which to the outside world appeared to be Serbian parliamentary democracy before the First World War. This situation changed when King Peter appointed his youngest son, Alexander, as regent. (His eldest son, George, was declared mentally insane and then committed to an asylum, from which he was freed by the German occupation forces and later exploited by the communists for propaganda purposes.) Alexander, educated in Tsarist Russia and faithful to the autocratic Russian and Serbian traditions of Byzantine origin, tried from the outset to eliminate the influence of Serbian political parties and even the group of conspiring officers who had overthrown the Obrenovićs and installed the Karageorgevićs. In 1914, exactly 50 years ago, they organized the assassination of Sarajevo with Alexander's knowledge. It was necessary to eliminate Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, considered a dangerous adversary of Serbia.

He was believed to have planned to grant Croats and Serbs equal status with Hungarians (trialism), thereby eliminating the causes of the nationalist agitation of the Serbian conspirators who sought the dismantling of the Danubian monarchy. Through intrigue, and especially with the staged Thessaloniki Trial and the execution of the conspiracy's leader, Apis Dimitrijevic, Alexander managed to make the Serbian army his docile instrument. He then gradually restricted Pašić's power until his complete elimination, replacing him with subservient and easily manipulated politicians.

It seems that Stojadinovic failed to distance himself from Pasic in time, and with Pasic's downfall, he remained sidelined until the death of King Alexander in 1934. Stojadinovic recounts at length the events that led to Pasic's fall. He criticizes both Pasic's adversaries and his own, including King Alexander himself. Stojadinovic would later consider the greatest impediment to his ambitions and aspirations to be the Croats' struggle against Serbian hegemony, for national equality and democratic freedoms.

This explains his extreme bias and conceit when discussing Croatian politics and politicians in general. To this personal bias, we need not add his position as a Great Serbian chauvinist. As such, he considered it normal, disregarding the right to national self-determination, for Croatia to be included in a subordinate position within a state where Serbia exercised hegemony, despite representing only a quarter of Yugoslavia's total territory and population.

Serbia, moreover, was relatively backward compared to the annexed territories that had previously formed part of Austria-Hungary, which were far more advanced administratively, economically, socially, and culturally in general. Stojadinovic was not sympathetic to the Croats, because although they were in a subordinate position, they always had enough power to harass Pasic and later Stojadinovic.

Alexander, for his part, instead of acting as an arbiter, took advantage of the tension arising from the Croatian opposition to oust Pasic, install his own people in power, and then orchestrate the attack against the Croatian representatives in parliament. The victim of the attack was Esteban Radic, the undisputed leader of the Croatian opposition, the "uncrowned king of Croatia."

Stojadinovic narrates all these events from a personal perspective. He also criticizes the King-dictator, but he either fails to understand or refuses to acknowledge that the political evolution culminating in the monarch's personal dictatorship was consistent with Serbia's political tradition. Despite the skillfully maintained legend of Serbian democracy under Peter I Karageorgevic, invented for the consumption of the Croats and Serbia's Western protectors, Alexander, in his struggle for absolute power, followed the Serbian tradition of an autocratic, Eastern-style government.

The king was in control even before establishing the dictatorship in 1929 and while the pseudo-democratic system governed by the 1921 constitution remained in place. Even under this system, no government was ever overthrown in parliament. Governments changed at the behest of the royal court.

To achieve a parliamentary majority, it was enough for a Serbian politician to be mandated to form an elected government, as such governments invariably won a majority. In part, this was because Serbia, as a matter of principle, votes for the official candidates, and in part because the numerous national minorities—Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, Hungarian, German, and Romanian—risked persecution. As a result, the official candidates were sometimes proclaimed elected without the formal act of voting taking place. Only the Croats offered effective opposition.

Stojadinovic could not publicly condone the assassination of Radic in the parliament building and the fact that Alexander used this crime as a pretext to establish his dictatorship instead of providing due redress to the Croats for the violent death of their leader. Nor could he take an active part in the established dictatorial regime because of his commitment to Pasic. Nevertheless, he harbored resentment toward Radic until the very end, considering him one of those responsible for Pasic's overthrow. Punisa Racic, a member of parliament for the Serbian Radical Party and Radic's assassin, was "elected" along with Stojadinovic on the same list in Montenegro. Stojadinovic claims that when the assassination occurred, he was in Paris, participating in meetings of the Parliamentary Union, in which Radic was also supposed to participate, something he had opposed. With this, Stojadinovic indirectly confirms the accusations of several authors implicating him in the preparations for the attack and that he opposed Radic's move to Paris for that purpose. There is evidence that Stojadinovic, later as prime minister, provided financial support to Radic's assassin. Of course, he remains completely silent on this point in his book.

Stojadinovic, like the other Greater Serbian politicians, failed to grasp the gravity of the events that culminated in the assassination of Radic and the establishment of King Alexander's dictatorship. In the name of state and national unity, Alexander denied not only Croatia's distinct state identity—a reality that had existed for over a millennium until 1918—but also decreed the non-existence of the Croatian people as an ethnic entity. The Serbian king, backed by the army, the Serbian national church, and corrupt Serbian political parties, removed the name "Croatian" from the state's title by decree (until then, Yugoslavia had been called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) and banned the Croatian flag and national symbols. The Serbs, however, retained their national church and flag, as well as their military and state traditions, because the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was the equivalent of Greater Serbia.

Stojadinovic, as a Greater Serbian chauvinist, either could not or would not properly appreciate the Croatian opposition to the dictatorial regime, since that opposition sought the realization of the right to national self-determination and the restoration of a Croatian state, independent of Serbia. During those years, even the handful of Croats who harbored illusions about the possibility of an understanding between Croatia and Serbia, based on the democratic principles and equality of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, dismissed the Yugoslav idea.

Stojadinovic only came to power for the second time after the death of the dictator King Alexander. Therefore, he used the 1934 Marseille assassination attempt, perpetrated by Macedonian and Croatian nationalists, and its immediate and underlying causes to criticize politicians within his own party. However, he did not blame them for the policy of tyranny and oppression that led to the assassination attempt against the king, but rather for failing to properly protect the dictator.

As prime minister, Stojadinovic turned a deaf ear to the legitimate demands of the Croatian Peasant Party for recognition of Croatian sovereignty, at least with the scope and attributes it had enjoyed under the Danubian monarchy. On the contrary, Stojadinovic continued the methods of the royal dictatorship, and in his memoirs, he insists on the fiction of a supposed Yugoslav national unity in an ethnic sense. All Croatian warnings that such a union by dictatorial decree would lead to war between Serbs and Croats, and that the tense relations between Serbia and Croatia would favor both the ambitions of the Axis powers and the subversive activities of the communists, proved fruitless.

As prime minister, he prioritized the maintenance of Serbian hegemony over political and individual freedoms. Consequently, he did not hesitate to embark on a political course directed against the system of alliances established by France, Serbia's protector after Tsarist Russia. Wishing to isolate the Croatian revolutionaries, who were necessarily seeking the support of the revisionist powers—unfortunately, the only ones who showed any interest in Croatia's right to self-determination—Stojadinovic openly sided with the Axis powers. He considered this abandonment by Serbia's allies and benefactors a very clever move against the Croatian opposition. What mattered was preserving Serbian hegemony and—of course—his personal power as the savior of an aggrandized Serbia. To maintain Serbian gains at the expense of the oppressed peoples, who constitute the majority in Yugoslavia, and to satisfy his lust for power, Stojadinovic was willing to introduce a fascist-style dictatorship. Today he denies this in order to emphasize his efforts to save the Yugoslav monarchy. His entire book tends, first and foremost, to demonstrate that the policy of abandoning Western democracies was the only possible way to safeguard the Yugoslav monarchy under Serbian hegemony.

For Stojadinovic, the main culprit in the fall of the Serbian monarchy was Prince Paul Karageorgevic, who, as one of three regents, effectively wielded royal power from Alexander's death until March 27, 1941, when the younger Peter II Karageorgevic was enthroned in a coup d'état.

In his diatribes against Prince Paul, Stojadinovic does not shy away from personal attacks. He even questions the former regent's origins, accusing him of intending to seize the crown from his young relative and of overthrowing Stojadinovic, whom he had kept in power for four years, because the latter had opposed the regent's supposed ambitions. Stojadinovic shared his hatred for Prince Paul with his adversaries in the Serbian opposition of the time, who could not forgive the regent for having kept Stojadinovic in power for four years, until 1939, and for not handing it over to them after Stojadinovic's electoral defeat, but rather to the supporters of a swift reconciliation with the Croats and Slovenes.

Stojadinovic, in reality, fell because he had failed in his attempt to break the Croatian opposition. In the elections held at the end of 1938, he won a majority only in Serbia, which was not difficult given that voting was public. In Croatia, despite the persecutions and the public nature of the vote, the vast majority of votes favored the Croatian Peasant Party.

The Slovenian Party and the Muslim Organization (in Bosnia), despite their ties to Stojadinovic, abandoned him because they opposed centralism. Even the majority won by force in Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo-Metohija, and Vojvodina was not enough for Stojadinovic to claim a majority victory. The influence of London and Paris on Prince Paul, who was angered by Stojadinovic's pro-Nazi policies, both domestic and foreign, must also be considered.

Days before the outbreak of World War II, in August 1939, a belated and flawed agreement was signed between the Croatian Peasant Party and the royal government in Belgrade. Under this agreement, Croatia obtained limited and provisional autonomy over the annexed territory, subject to ratification by the Yugoslav parliament after the accession of King Peter II, then a minor.

The regent accepted this agreement under pressure from the international situation, hoping that this act would enable Yugoslavia to eventually resist the Axis powers. It was clear that neither the Croats nor the other oppressed peoples would defend, in the event of war, a state they rightly considered their national prison. Therefore, certain concessions were made to the Croats.

This hybrid solution, naturally, did not satisfy the Croats, but what is less understandable is that it did not satisfy the so-called Serbian democratic opposition either. The old Serbian parties, fundamentally chauvinistic, disapproved of even these minimal concessions to the Croats.

They proclaimed that the compromise was excessive and harmful to Serbia. Their agitation resonated among the generals, all Serbs, and within the ranks of the Serbian national church. In accordance with the Byzantine tradition of coups d'état, led by military and ecclesiastical leaders, a violent change of government was to be expected soon. The discontented remained silent until 1941, knowing that London and Paris insisted on Croatian participation in the cabinet.

Otherwise, any opposition from the Yugoslav army to the Axis powers would be ineffective, given that the majority of soldiers were not Serbian, although all the generals and the vast majority of officers were. Initially, even the Soviets favored the new government for having established diplomatic relations with Moscow in order to gain some support against Berlin's pressure. However, this dependence on London, and later on Moscow, soon became its Achilles' heel when military events took a swift and decisive turn in favor of the Axis powers.

With France defeated and on the eve of Hitler's Eastern Campaign, the government formed from the Serbian-Croatian agreement, at the behest of Paris and London, had to compromise with the Third Reich, eager to secure its right flank. Thus, against the wishes of the government and the Regent, Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact was signed. This step was taken only after the Serbian military leadership reported that the Yugoslav army could not offer any serious resistance to the German war machine. The promise that the army would not demand free passage through Yugoslav territory and that Yugoslavia could remain neutral, like Sweden, proved decisive.

Stojadinovic admits that the coup d'état in Belgrade, following the signing of the Tripartite Pact, was primarily motivated by domestic politics. Indeed, adherence to the Tripartite Pact was merely a pretext. The coup plotters wanted to eliminate Croatian influence and therefore desperately sought to reach an understanding with Rome and Berlin.

Stojadinovic's thesis, expressed in the title of the book under examination, is that neither the pact nor the war was necessary. Only he was capable of saving Yugoslavia. Had he not been overthrown and remained in power, his influence in Rome and Berlin would have been so great, Stojadinovic argues, that adherence to the Tripartite Pact would have been unnecessary. Yugoslavia would have remained outside the armed conflict and would have been saved from disintegration, the Serb-Croatian War, and ultimately, communist domination.

This argument concludes Stojadinovic's book, which was conceived to support this thesis. The author thus attempts to clear himself in the eyes of the Serbian public of the charges of having betrayed Yugoslavia's old Western allies and of having followed in the footsteps of Hitler and Mussolini, driven by personal ambition.

Stojadinovic's main thesis lacks a solid foundation. His pro-Nazi policy was dictated less by foreign policy considerations than by domestic ones. Like the coup d'état of March 27, 1941, organized by a group of officers with the support of Serbian ecclesiastical and political dignitaries, his policy was inspired by anti-Croatian sentiments. In both cases, the aim was to prevent Croatian participation in state affairs, that is, to avoid abandoning the unitarist policy of the Serbian hegemons.

Certainly, Rome and Berlin welcomed Yugoslavia's defection from the security system under Stojadinovic's government. This service was readily repaid by limiting the freedom of Croatian political exiles, knowing full well that the leaders of the semi-legal Croatian opposition were staunchly democratic.

Hitler was very grateful to Stojadinovic for his support of the annexation of Austria to the Third Reich and for abandoning Czechoslovakia during the Sudetenland crisis. At a time when the Axis powers' dominance was not yet firmly established, Hitler was willing to repay this support with small concessions at the expense of others, in this case, the Croatian resistance. The Third Reich invoked the right to self-determination only when it benefited them and always stripped it of its democratic content. This is why Berlin readily agreed to the policy of unconditionally maintaining the multinational state called Yugoslavia under Serbian hegemony, especially since it faced no real risk.

Stojadinovic could then supposedly act as a partner with equal rights. But with the situation changed, and German military dominance secured in 1940-41, the balance of power in Europe was different, as were Hitler's demands. In this new context, Hitler was no longer content with the empty promises of the rulers of Southeast Europe.

He demanded the passage of German troops through their territory and adherence to the Tripartite Pact. If Stojadinovic, promoted to Führer in a country as heterogeneous nationally, culturally, and politically as Yugoslavia, had exercised his power on the eve of Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union, it is almost certain that he would have demanded a more active, perhaps more tangible, participation from a government violently resisted than the mere adherence to the Tripartite Pact demanded of the government overthrown by the coup of March 27, 1941.

Stojadinovic, who adhered to the Axis ideology, would not have avoided either the "pact or the war" as a sympathizer of the Axis powers. Even under Stojadinovic's rule, the Yugoslav monarchy could not have escaped its fate, being an artificial political entity, created against the will of its constituent peoples, maintained by force yesterday by a Serbian nationalist dictatorship and today under a communist dictatorship. Every general conflict must necessarily lead to an acute crisis in such a state.

It turns out that Stojadinovic's book completely failed in its main thesis. However, it does contribute to a better understanding of Greater Serbian politics, which was harmful not only to the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia but also to Serbia itself. Furthermore, Stojadinovic, exasperated and resentful of the thwarted ambitions of a pathological egocentric, a Balkan politician devoid of moral scruples, publishes data and judgments that shed considerable light on Greater Serbian politics.

He does not conceal the role of official Serbia in the Sarajevo assassination, which he identifies as the immediate cause of the First World War. Unwittingly, he provides evidence of the unbearable situation of the Croats in the Yugoslav monarchy, which is linked to the subsequent events that culminated in communist rule. Stojadinovic's memoirs reveal how weak the foundations of the much-touted Serbian-French friendship truly were, a friendship the Serbs saw as an inadequate substitute for Russian tutelage.

Defending himself against accusations of having forged a friendship with Fascist Italy, implicated in the Marseille bombing, Stojadinovic clarifies this issue, which is still discussed in democratic countries with confusion and sensationalism, without any aim of establishing historical truth. Stojadinovic argues that Fascist Italy did not want the attack. Indeed, Mussolini did not want further complications with France at a time when he was preparing for the conquest of Ethiopia; rather, he sought to secure French support.

Out of personal resentment, Stojadinovic recounts the scandalous history of the Serbian ruling class between the two world wars. It paints a stark picture of the Serbian rulers who brought great misfortune to the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia and to Serbia itself.

Unintentionally, Stojadinovic wrote a testimony against Yugoslavia, a state established in 1918 and re-established in 1945 under abnormal circumstances, through the violation of democratic rights to self-determination and the national principle. Such a conglomeration was and remains a challenge to the sense of international justice and, as such, cannot be a positive factor for peace.

BOOK REVIEW

Ludvig Vrtacic: Einführung in den Jugoslawischen Marxismus Leninismus

F. Nevistic, Buenos Aires

("Introduction to Yugoslav Marxism-Leninism," Ed. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1963, pp. 288.)

This book is, in reality, only a "preparatory work" for the monograph the author plans to write on the subject. Furthermore, it is part of a series of investigations into Marxism-Leninism in communist countries outside the Soviet Union. This series is being published under the general title "Soviet," sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. The work under review was commissioned by the Institute for Eastern Europe at the University of Freiburg. Judging by this publication, it is reasonable to assume that the author will fully achieve his objective.

The book is divided into four chapters: the organization, where the author describes the political and national structure of Yugoslavia, its scientific institutions, academies, universities, philosophical societies, journals, bibliography, publishing houses, etc.; a review of philosophical literature, divided into three groups: translations, systematic Yugoslav literature, and Yugoslav literature dedicated to the history of philosophy; an introduction to the bibliography; and the bibliography itself.

With this introduction, the author has overcome the most arduous part, enabling him to later write a book that would encompass all the essential characteristics of Marxism-Leninism within a well-defined ethnic and geographical context.

Ludvig Vrtacic is completely unknown to us, which is why we cannot, a priori, accuse him of any bias. Of course, in some elements of his work, the author is entirely dependent on what the Belgrade establishment provides, such as in the population statistics, where there is an attempt to inflate the Serbian population and diminish the Croatian one.

Thus, for example, according to data from the 1959 Statisticki Godisnjak (Statistical Yearbook), an official Yugoslav annual publication, there were 3,975,550 inhabitants in Croatia and 4,458,400 in Serbia at that time, but the total number of Serbs in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia at the same time was 7,065,923, while the number of Croats was only 3,975,550.

This significant difference in favor of the Serbs is revealed as artificial, especially if we add to the number of Croats the 998,698 Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are an integral part of the Croatian people. For them, under a Greater Serbian regime with the long-standing aim of turning Bosnia and Herzegovina into Serbian provinces, it is very dangerous to declare themselves Croats, and they do not want to define themselves as Serbs because they are not.

For this reason, Yugoslavs have declared themselves nationally undefined. Our author explains this phenomenon, quite wrongly, claiming that it reveals a desire to overcome "the multinational character of the country," even though Yugoslavia, in this respect, was the most complex of all the communist countries after Soviet Russia. What is done out of fear is clearly not a virtue.

To avoid the greatest evil, the Croat Muslims adopt a tactic they consider useful against a temporary evil, and that's all. To tell the truth, Vrtacic, in his footnote no. 4, chapter 1, says that the central government tries to overcome and eliminate the ethnic groups (Volksgruppen) to create "a unified Yugoslav culture," but he acknowledges that all this is merely "outward appearance" (Schein). (It is incomprehensible to us how the author suddenly speaks of Volksgruppen if, we assume, he accepts the existence of nationalities.)

He then explains his accurate assertion: "In reality, the possibilities for the development of each of the nationalities in this, as in other fields, are subject to the financial policy of the government and depend on the central organs occupied by Serbs. We find ourselves here in a situation quite similar to that of the Soviet Union, and as regards the phenomenon of the multinational structure and its problems, the Yugoslav case still surpasses the Soviet one."

The author also erroneously claims that the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Fine Arts in Zagreb was "practically dissolved" when, in 1941, it was renamed the "Croatian Academy of Sciences and Fine Arts." Here, the author cites M. Markert's *Jugoslawien (Ost-Europa-Handbuch)* (Cologne-Graz, 1954), making it impossible for us to discern Markert's or our author's opinion on this matter, although it seems to us that Markert defends the view that it was simply a name change.

Vrtacic underscores the illusion of cultural unity among the nationalities of the Yugoslav conglomerate, even today. The change of name from Yugoslav Academy to Croatian was a natural expression, in legal form, of what was keenly felt as a cultural and political reality, given the vast contrast in culture and interests between Croats and Serbs, which constitutes the central problem of that multinational state, maintained by a totalitarian police state. We believe that errors of this nature will not affect L. Vrtacic's future work, nor diminish its value in the specific field to which he is dedicated.

BOOK REVIEW

Croatian Academy of America: Journal of Croatian Studies (vol. II)

Milan Blazekovic, Buenos Aires

(1961. Annual Review of the Croatian Academy of America, Inc. New York, NY, p. 196.)

With the second volume of the Journal of Croatian Studies, the Croatian Academy of America continues to fulfill its established program. While the first volume (see Studia Croatica, Nos. 2-3, 1961) contains primarily historical works, this volume addresses pressing issues facing the Croatian people in cultural, economic, and legal matters. The contributors employ methods and approaches typical of the scientific circles in the North American environment in which they live and work.

Professor Krsto Spalatin has published a study on the common orthography of Croats, Serbs, and Montenegrins, in which he first traces the evolution of orthography that began in 1960, based on the resolutions of a commission composed of six Serbian and five Croatian linguists. This commission developed a common orthography for Croats and Serbs, adhering to the official dogma of the Yugoslav communist regime regarding the "brotherhood and unity" of the peoples comprising present-day Yugoslavia. The author highlights the complexity of the issue, given the fundamental differences between the literary languages of Croatian and Serbian, the two distinct alphabets—Latin in Croatia and Cyrillic in Serbia—and a number of other differences, particularly lexicographical ones.

The problem of technical and scientific terminology is especially challenging. For all these reasons, the authors of the language reform adopted the position that Serbs and Croats must maintain their distinct alphabets and dialects (Serbs using "ekavski," and Croats using "ijekavski"). Professor Spalatin criticizes the confusion students face when following the official orthography with its intermingled Serbian and Croatian variants, some of which may still be in use. He emphasizes that there is no common Croatian-Serbian literature, nor is there a Yugoslav language, just as there is no Swiss language.

In the author's opinion, it is quite curious that the recommendations of the linguistic commission were correctly implemented without imposing foreign forms on Croats, as this would only increase the existing antagonism between the linguistic and national sentiments of Croats and Serbs. In any case, this would create confusion in the linguistic process, undermining the discipline normally imposed by standard orthographies, grammars, and dictionaries. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that linguistic unity can be enforced where political and national unification has failed, a goal the communists have been striving for for twenty years, achieving the opposite results with their methods of force.

The Croatian poet and writer Ante Nizeteo addresses the same topic and in the same vein in his article "On the Croatian Language and Literature," written in connection with the publication of two books by Professor Ante Kadic: "Croatian Reading Book with Vocabulary" (see Studia Croatica, 1961, p. 229) and "Contemporary Croatian Literature."

In an extensive 42-page article entitled "The Balance of Payments Deficit in Yugoslavia, 1944-1957 - Analysis of its Origin and Effects on the Yugoslav Economy," Josip T. Bombelles clarifies, with 8 diagrams and 23 tables, the reasons for the Yugoslav deficit, which reached $1,517.9 million during the period indicated, according to the 1958 United Nations Statistical Yearbook. From a professional scientific standpoint, this study is beyond reproach.

However, a publication of this kind should present Croatia's participation in the economy of the multinational Yugoslav state and demonstrate that the proportionally larger Croatian contribution is used by the central government in Belgrade to the detriment of the Croatian economy. Branko Peselj's *Contemporary Croatia in the Yugoslav Federation: Its Constitutional Status and Socioeconomic Position* is a meticulously researched study. Based on official sources, the author concludes that Croatia possesses certain attributes of sovereignty within the Yugoslav federation, since the constitution guarantees Croatia, as well as the other "republics," the right to self-determination and secession. He also attempts to refute the officially held "consummation theory." That is, communist theorists maintain that the right to national self-determination is a natural right of every nation; however, once exercised in the "correct" sense, it is extinguished and cannot be revived.

Therefore, according to this official interpretation, Croatia's right to national self-determination has only historical significance. Peselj opposes this thesis, arguing that the exercise of a right is a matter of fact, not law, since the Croatian people, contrary to what the communists maintain, never had the opportunity to exercise their right to national self-determination, and therefore could never freely express whether they wished to join the Yugoslav federation, and if so, under what conditions. The Croatian people have been forced by the communists to accept a fait accompli, which entails a problem of fact, not law. "It is not a question," the author says, "of whether the Croatian people have the right to national self-determination, but only when, how, and in what way they can exercise this right in their greatest benefit and best interest."

Analyzing the specific characteristics of the Yugoslav federation, the author concludes that, without prejudice to its formal legal structure, supreme power lies not in the hands of the federal government, nor in those of the governments of the individual republics, but rather in the hands of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. "Ultimately, this means that the federal government and the governments of the republics are merely instruments of the Communist Party, through which the party implements its resolutions and its program." However, Serbs and Montenegrins represent 66% of all party members, holding more than 50% of the seats on both the Central Committee and the Executive Committee.

Given this ideological and political situation, we consider the discussion of the constitutional status of these republics, based on the formal legal structure of the Yugoslav federation and the conclusions drawn using the legal concepts of non-communist countries, to be of little practical value.

Furthermore, Peselj partially accepted communist theories regarding the situation that arose after the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, thus leaving the problem of Croatia's legal status during the war unsatisfactorily explained. As some treatises on international law already demonstrate, in time, legal literature will offer more accurate interpretations of the events in Southeast Europe during the last war than those provided by Yugoslav legal scholars. It is regrettable, therefore, that the author of this study, although starting from different assumptions, has shared the legal theories of the current communist rulers. This is deplorable because the aforementioned work will surely serve as a reference for English-speaking authors.

In short, the Journal of Croatian Studies is a very valuable and useful product of Croatian scholarly journalism, written in English, and all the more commendable because it is the result of the dedication and patriotism of Croatian immigrants.

---

^[1] Ver: "Negociaciones sobre Modus Vivendi entre Yugoslavia y Santa Sede", Studia Croatica, Año II, Vol. I, pp. 87-91; "Fracaso de las negociaciones para llegar a un modus vivendi entre Belgrado y Santa Sede", Studia Croatica, Año II, Vols. 2-3, pp. 216-217.

^[2] Francois Bernard: "De nouveaux rapports entre le Saint Siège et la Yougoslavie", La Croix, 6/3/1964.

^[3] Véase el texto del memorándum en Studia Croatica, Año II, Nro. 1, pp. 81-86.

^[4] La Croix, 29/2/1964, París.

^[5] Ver texto del Memorándum de los obispos al mariscal Tito del 25/9/1952 en el libro de R. P. Théodore Dragoun: Le dossier du cardinal Stepinac, París 1958, pp. 224-233.

^[6] Ya, diario católico español, relatando las formas brutales de la persecución de la Iglesia, que todavía rigen en los países de tras de la cortina de hierro, dice: "La técnica de los comunistas de Tito es, como decimos, más refinada. Menos cruel, pero igualmente perversa. El seminario, alegan los comunistas yugoslavos, tiene gastos, ha de tener ingresos, y si tiene ingresos y gastos se trata de una empresa comercial. Veamos cómo está la liquidación de impuestos de esta empresa nacional. No se persigue a los seminarios. Tan sólo se trata de evitar defraudaciones a la Hacienda pública. Si el seminario no puede pagar sus deudas al Estado, entonces no queda otro remedio que la incautación del edificio para satisfacer las deudas contraídas por contribución". "Diversos sistemas de la persecución religiosa en los países comunistas", Ya, 19/4/1964, Madrid.

^[7] Al respecto, es muy ilustrativo el informe de la revista Dobri Pastir (Sarajevo 1958, Año IX, vols. I-IV, pp. 261-266) sobre la participación de los clérigos de las provincias franciscanas de Bosnia-Herzegovina en el último decenio, en los trabajos públicos en las filas de las "brigadas juveniles de trabajo". Si bien se trata de una publicación que sin permiso de los obispos y la Santa Sede, propaga la colaboración del clero con el régimen comunista, de dicho relato se colige que en esos trabajos participaron "voluntariamente", junto con los seminaristas, sus superiores para protegerlos y prestarles ayuda en esos trances.

^[8] L'Osservatore Romano, 4/3/1964.

^[9] Paul Yankovitch: "Les rapports s'améliorent entre l'Eglise catholique et le gouvernement yougoslave", Le Monde, 25/2/1964, París.

^[10] Le Figaro, 4/3/1964, París.

^[11] La Croix, 6/3/1964, París. - En una entrevista S.E. el cardenal Koenig, arzobispo de Viena, destacó que el Vaticano trata directamente con los gobiernos comunistas con el fin de mejorar la situación de los católicos. Las dificultades son numerosas a causa de la doctrina oficialista contraria a toda forma de la religión. "Pero hay que distinguir entre la teoría y la práctica. Ellas generalmente tendrían que marchar al paso igual, pero es sabido que, por ejemplo en Yugoslavia, existe una doctrina comunista y, al contrario, en el plan práctico, hay un modus vivendi que permite cierta libertad a la Iglesia: los obispos pueden salir del país; pueden publicar alguna cosa. Por otra parte es cierto que no hay enseñanza religiosa en las escuelas, etc." (La Documentation Catholique, París, Nro. 1428, col. 908)

^[12] Mons. Cardinale, jefe del protocolo de la Secretaría de Estado del Vaticano en L'Osservatore Romano, 7/3/1964.

^[13] El original publicado en la revista El Catolicismo, San Pablo. Citado según la versión castellana en Cruzada, Buenos Aires, diciembre 1963.

^[14] "Exterminio y expulsión de la minoría étnica alemana de Yugoslavia", Studia Croatica, Año IV, Nş 14, pp. 186-191.

^[15] Dinko A. Tomasic: "Nueva clase y nacionalismo", Studia Croatica, Año I, Nş 1, pp. 61-67.

^[16] Albert Mousset: Bonaparte marxiste: Tito, Le Monde, 4/11/1952, París.

^[17] "La tragedia de Bleiburg", edición especial de Studia Croatica, 1963.

^[18] Arnold J. Toynbee: Estudio de la Historia, Buenos Aires, ed. EMECE, vol. II, p. 193.

^[19] Josip Broz Tito: Politicki izvjestaj CK KPJ, Belgrado 1948, pp. 73-74.

^[20] Consultar amplia documentación en las obras de Cavalli, Pattee y Dragoun. Ver nota 23.

^[21] La Carta Pastoral fue firmada por dos arzobispos y tres obispos. El primero en firmarla fue Mons. Aloysius Stepinac, cuyos sufrimientos son asaz conocidos; el segundo Mons. Ivan Evangelista Saric, metropolita de Bosnia, fallecido en el exilio (ver Studia Croatica, año II, Nş , pp. 91-94), el tercero, Mons. José Garic, O.F.M., obispo de Banjaluka, que, enfermo se asiló en Austria, donde pronto murió; el quinto, Mons. Janko Simrak, obispo greco-católico fue arrastrado de una cárcel a otra y murió en un hospital por las torturas sufridas.

^[22] Texto íntegro en Studia Croatica Año IV, Nro. 1-4, pp. 210-213.

^[23] Ver texto íntegro en Studia Croatica, Año I, Nro. 1, pp. 40-43; Cavalli Fiorello, S.J.: Il processo dell'Arcivescovo de Zagabria, Roma 1947; Richard Pattee: The case of cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, Milwaukee, 1953; Théodore Dragoun: Le dossier du cardinal Stepinac, París, 1959.

^[24] Ver el texto completo del memorándum en Studia Croatica, Año II, vol. I, pp. 81-86.

^[25] Consúltese Studia Croatica, Año IV, vols. 1-4

^[26] A. Smith Pavelic: Gran Bretaña y Draza Mihailovic; `Studia Croatica', Año III, vol. 1, pp. 43-57.

^[27] Svetozar Pribicevic: Diktatura Kralja Aleksandra, Belgrado, 1952, pp. 251-256, 260.

^[28] Studia Croatica, Año I, Nro. 1, p. 44.

^[29] "Le communisme et la Eglise catholique", ver capítulo "Les associations ecclésiastiques", Editions Fleurus, p. 409, París.

^[30] Véase texto íntegro en: Théodore Dragoun, op. cit., pp. 248-264.

^[31] Ver texto del memorándum en Studia Croatica, Año II, Nş 1, pp. 81-86.

^[32] Ver nota 21.

^[33] Ver nota 23.

^[34] Dobri Pastir, Sarajevo, 1955, Año IX, t. 1-4, pp. 229-271.

^[35] En 1943, en tres diócesis de la provincia eclesiástica de Bosnia y Herzegovina había 540 sacerdotes; cf. Krunoslav Draganovic: Le diocesi croate ed. "Croazia Sacra", Roma, 1943, pp. 181-234.

^[36] El nombre Danica (La estrella matutina) fue popularizado por la Sociedad Literaria Croata San Jerónimo, fundada hace más de un siglo por el cardenal Haulik con el propósito de difundir la cultura popular a través de libros apropiados. Esa entidad editora distribuyó, antes de la llegada al poder de los comunistas, millones de libros entre el pueblo, mayormente gracias a los esfuerzos del clero. La edición más popular fue el almanaque Danica. Esa sociedad meritoria, que tenía sus edificios, editorial y muchas fundaciones, fue prohibida por los comunistas. Ahora se trata de fundar una entidad editora con objetivo similar, pero ya no con el nombre de San Jerónimo, uno de los padres de la Iglesia occidental, nacido en Croacia, sino con el de los SS. Cirilo y Metodio para acentuar de esa manera la vinculación de Croacia con el Oriente. Además, los franciscanos croatas en Chicago (EE.UU. de América) publican un semanario con el mismo nombre.

^[37] Ed. Centro pastorale per l'emigrazione croata, Grottaferrata (Roma), Nş 3-4, 1964.

^[38] Texto completo de la carta: Théodore Dragoun, op. cit., pp. 224-233.

^[39] Rasko Vidic, Situacion de la Iglesia en Yugoselavia, Ed. Publicisticko Izdavacki Zavod “Jugoslavija”, Belgrado 1962

^[40] Los católicos en Yugoeslavia constituyen el 38 % de la población, son casi exclusivamnte croatas y eslovenos; los ortodoxos llegan al 42 %, son mayormente servios, pero también macedonios y montenegrinos incorporados a la Iglesia nacional servia, contra su voIuntad, por supuesto.

^[41] Sluzbeni Vjesnik Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve (E1 vocero oficial de la Iglesia ortodoxa servia), Belgrado 19/7/1935. Cabe destacar que en Yugoeslavia los servios constituyen apenas la tercera parte de la población, mientras Bulgaria y Grecia son países casi homogéneos en lo religioso. La constitución del Reino de Rumania reconocía como religión del pueblo no sólo la ortodoxa, que es la de la mayoría, sino también la católica romana, integrada entonces principalmente por los greco-católicos de Transilvania.

^[42] El arzobispo de Montreal, cardenal Léger, con motivo de la inauguración de una nueva parroquia católica croata, dijo en su sermón que era buen amigo del arzobispo metropolitano de Croacia, monseñor F. Seper, quien le había expresado durante el Concilio Vaticano II, cuando se habló de la libertad religiosa en Yugoslavia, lo siguiente: "Desgraciadamente, nuestra libertad no va más lejos del altar divino". (Cf. Danica, semanario católico, Chicago, III 22/2/1964).

^[43] Studia Croatica, año II, Nros. 2-3, pp- 224-6.

^[44] J. Hamm: Gramatika starocrkvenoslavenskog jezica, Zagreb, 1947, p. 15.

^[45] El duque Guillermo de Aquitania y el abad Bernone de Baume fundaron en 910 el conocido monasterio benedictino de Cluny, cuyo propósito era: la libertad y la reforma en las órdenes religiosas y en la Iglesia. El monasterio dependía directamente de Roma, exceptuado de la jurisdicción obispal.

^[46] J. Dobrovsky (1753-1829), autor de numerosas obras en el campo eslavístico. Con él se inicia el estudio científico de la filología, la literatura y la historia de los pueblos eslavos. Observó una actitud negativa respecto a la glagolitza croata. Cf.: Masaríkov slovnik naucny, 2, 307.

^[47] G. Dobner (1719-1790), sacerdote checo niarista e historiador. Autor de numerosos trabajos históricos. Enseñaba muchas cosas, que la ciencia confirmó a posteriori, y también que la escritura glagolítica es mucho más antigua que la cirílica Cf.: Masaríkov slovnik, 2, 304.

^[48] Magnetius Hrabanus Maurus, n. en 784 en Magonza, de donde su sobrenombre Magnetius; Maurus es su nombre religioso y Hrabanus el nombre de pila. Escritor eclesiástico muy productivo, sus obras se hallan reunidas en Migne Patristica Latina. Primero era diácono, luego abad en Fulda y, por último, arzobispo en Magonza, donde falleció en 856. Sobre el origen de la escritura habla en la obra De inventione linguarum, Migne P. L. 112, 1579-1584.

^[49] Dikljaninov Ljetopis, originariamente escrito en latín y más tarde vertido al croata. Hay varias ediciones impresas: Presbyteri Diocletiani, De Regno Slavorum, publicó J. Lucius (Lucic) en su obra: De Regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae libri sex, Amsterdam, 1666, 287-302; F. Sisic: Ljetopis Popa Dukljanina, Belgrado - Zagreb 1928; V. Mosin: Ljetopis Popa Dukljanina, Zagreb, 1950.

^[50] A. Theiner: Monumenta Germaniae histor., Epistolae VII, 222. Ver esta epístola y la mayor parte de los documentos relativos a la liturgia eslava en I. Prodan: Borba za glagolicu - I sio Povijest glagolice i njeni izvori. Suplemento B. pp. 1-127.

^[51] Vatroslav Jagin, n. en Varazdin, Croacia, el 6/VII/1838, f. en Viena el 5/V/1923. Profesor universitario en Odesa, Rusia, luego en Berlín (desde 1874) donde fundó su famoso Archiv für slavische Philologie; sucesivamente, profesor en Petrogrado, Rusia (desde 1880) y en Viena (desde 1886). Fue la figura central en los últimos cincuenta años de su vida en el ámbito de los estudios eslavísticos. Editor de antiguos textos: El Evangelio de Zograf, en 1879; el Evangelio mariano en 1883; el Salterio de Bologna, en 1907 y tantos otros. Escribió una larga serie de trabajos sobre el origen de la escritura glagolítica, la lengua eslava antigua y la literatura; se dedicaba también a los estudios arqueológicos, históricos y literarios de los pueblos croata, ruso, y demás eslavos. Aquí nos interesa primordialmente su obra acerca de la escritura glagolítica (escrita en ruso): Glagoliceskoje pismo, Sanktpetersburg, 1911.

^[52] Cf.: K. Segvic: Hrvatski jezik u katolickom bogostovlju. Con motivo del 1300º aniversario del bautismo de los croatas, Zagreb, 1941.

^[53] Ulfila (gót. Wulfila), oriundo de Capadocia en Asia Menor, n. por el año 311, f. alrededor del 338. Eusebio de Nicodemia lo consagró obispo cuando rozaba los 30 años. Actuó cierto tiempo como apóstol visigodo en la cuenca danubiana. Tradujo al idioma gótico el Nuevo Testamento. Su traducción se conoce con el nombre Codex Argenteus y se guarda en Upsala (Enciclop. Italiana. IV, 629).

^[54] J. Hamm: "Postanak glagoljskog pisma u svijetlu paleografije", Nastavni Vjesnik 46 (1939) 36-61, Zagreb.

^[55] W. Lettenbauer: Zur Entstehung des glagolitischen Alphabets, Slovo 3 (1953), 35-50. Zagreb. Otras obras sobre el mismo tema: K. A. Pertz: De Cosmographia Ethici, libri tres, Berolini 1853; M. Hocij: Die westliche Grundlagen des glagolitischen Alphabets, Südostdeutsche Forschungen IV 1940), 509-600, Munich.

^[56] Según una leyenda, el obispado de Aquilea fue fundado por San Marcos el Evangelista, sucedido por San Hermagoras el Mártir. Por de pronto, en el Concilio de Arlés en 314 encontramos al obispo de Aquilea. En 568 el obispo Paulin se proclamó patriarca y se trasladó a Grado. En 605 hay dos patriarcas: uno para el territorio bizantino con sede en Grado, y otro para la parte longobarda con sede en Aquilea. En 802 Carlomagno dio al patriarca Paulin toda la Furlania (Friuli), Istria y Recia (Suiza actual y parte de Austria). El patriarca Poppo (1019-1045), alemán, fue autorizado a acuñar su propia moneda e implantar una organización política particular. De ese modo el patriarcado se transformó en un grande y poderoso principado feudal. Desaparece en el siglo XVI, a raíz de las luchas políticas entre Venecia y Austria. Los patriarcas de Aquilea desde los siglos VIII-IX y hasta la desaparición del patriarcado eran de origen germano-galo, o germano solamente. El patriarcado desempeñó papel importante en la propagación del cristianismo en aquella vasta región y fuera de sus fronteras (Cf. Enciclop. Catt. I, 1722-1727).

^[57] Petar Skok: Uslovi zivota glagolice, Slovo Staroslavenskog Instituta 3 (1953), 60.

^[58] Löwe H.: Ein literarischer Widersacher des Bonifatius, Virgil von Salzburg und die Kosmographie des Aeticus Ister, Mainz, 1952. (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Abh. der Geistes-und Sozialwissenschaften. Lase Jg. 1951. Nr. 11)

^[59] J. Vasica: Slovenska liturgie sv. Petra, Byzantinoslavica VIII. (1946) 1-54.

^[60] Las Hojas de Kiev, fragmento de misa del siglo X, transcripto del modelo del siglo IX. Tratan sobre ese tema: Mohlberg C., Il Messale Glagolitico di Kiev (sec. IX), ed il suo prototipo Romano del sec. VI-VII. Memorie della Pont. Accademia Romana di Archeologia, Vol. II. Roma, 1928. Vajs J., Kánon charvatsko-hlaholskégo vatikánského misali III. 4. Prostejsek hlaholskyh listu Kievskych. Casopis pro moderní filologie XXV (1939) 113-134 y Mesni rád charvátsko-hlaholského misalu III.4 a jeho pomer k moravsko-panonskému sakramentari stol. IX. Acta Academiae Valehradensis XV. (1939), 2, 89-141. J. Vasica: Slovanska liturgie nove osvetlena Kijevskymi listy. Slovo a slovesnot VI (1940) 65-77.

^[61] Este misal se guarda hoy en la Biblioteca Vaticana - Fondo Borgiano-illirico Nº 4. Fue escrito a mediados del siglo XIV.

^[62] Sobre el origen de esta liturgia existen varias teorías. Algunos creen que se trata de una liturgia occidental. Cf.: Hanssens J. M.: "La liturgie romano-byzantine de Saint Pierre" - Orientalia Christiana Periodica IV, Roma (1938) 234-258 y V. (1939) 103-150; Cizevskij D.: "K voprosu o liturgiji Sv. Petra". - Slovo staroslavenskog Instituta 2, Zagreb (1953), 36-40.

^[63] Ver el trabajo de M. Polonijo: "Prvi uzmak glagoljice u krckoj biskupiji", Radovi stsl. Instituta, 2, Zagreb (1955), str. 199.

^[64] St. M. Kuljbakin: Staroslovenska gramatika, Belgrado, 1930, p. 7

^[65] M. Japundzic: Glagolski breviar iz g. 1465. Radovi stsl. Instituta, Zagreb, 2 (1955), 155-191.

^[66] Ver nota nº 10.

^[67] Algunas reseñas más completas de la bibliografía glagolítica: R. Strohal: Hrvatska glagolska knjiga, Zagreb, 1915; I. Kukuljevic-Sakcinski: Bibliografija hrvatska, Zagreb, 1860; I. Milcetic: "Hrvatska glagolska bibliografija", Zagreb, Starine 33 (1911), xv - 505; Vj. Stefanic: "Glagoljski rukopisi otoka Krka", Zagreb, 1960, Djela J. A. knj. 51; J. Vajs escribe extensamente sobre los misales glagolíticos en su obra: Najstariji hrvatskoglagoljski misal, Zagreb, 1948, y sobre los breviarios glagolíticos en: Najstarsi breviár chrvatskohlaholsky, Praga, 1910.

^[68] Acerca de la lápida de Baska se publicaron varios trabajos, desde su hallazgo hasta hoy; citamos sólo los estudios de fecha reciente: Vj. Stefanic: "Opatija sv. Lucije u Baski i drugi benediktinski samostani na Krku", Croacia Sacra, 1936; J. Hamm: Datiranje glagoljskih tekstova", Radovi stsl. Instituta, Zagreb, 1 (1952) 22-37; B. Fucic: "Bascanska ploca kao archeoloski predmet", Slovo stsl. Instituta 6 (1957), 247-262, Zagreb.

^[69] M. Japundzic op. cit., p. 190.

^[70] Z. Kulundzic: Problem najstarije stamparije na slavenskom jugu (Kosinj 1482-1493), Zagreb, Narodna Knjiznica 1 (1959), 21-28.

^[71] Sobre la rusificación de los libros glagolíticos, y particularmente del misal de 1741, ver: M. Japundzik: Matteo Karaman, (1700-1771), Arcivescovo di Zara, Roma, 1961.

^[72] Zacinjavac es el nombre más antiguo para poeta que fue cantator-versificator. Cf. F. Fancev: "Gradja za pjesnicki leksikon hrvatskoga jezika" - Gradja za povijet knjizevnosti hrvatske, XV. (1940), 182-200, Zagreb; P. Skok: "Sitni prilozi proucananju pjesnickog jezika nase srednj. knjizevnosti i najstariji izraz pjesnika". - Prilozi za knjizevnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor. Knj. 18, sv. 1-2 (1938), 209-301, Belgrado.

^[73] Marko Marulic (1450-1526), de Split, estudió en Padua idiomas, literatura clásica, filosofía, poesía y retórica. Se ocupaba también de pintura y escultura. De regreso a su país, llevaba una vida ascética y contemplativa, sometiendo su cuerpo a largos ayunos y vigilias. Entre numerosas obras literarias, la más conocida en croata es Judith, o en forma completa La historia de la santa viuda Judith en versos croatas compuesta (en 1501) y en latín: De institutione bene beateque vivendi juxta exempla sanctorum. Esa obra fue pronto traducida al italiano, francés, portugués, checo, alemán y croata, y en este mismo siglo tuvo 19 ediciones. Se sabe que San Francisco de Javier llevaba en sus largos viajes por el Oriente, además del breviario, el libro de Marulic De Institutione. En cuanto a Judith su éxito fue extraordinario tanto en su época como después. En dos años después de su publicación tuvo tres reediciones. Aunque Marulic no fue el primer poeta croata, por su importancia ocupa el primer lugar. Cf. F. Trograncic: Storia della letteratura croata, Roma (1953), p. 44 y sigs.; M. Kombol: Provijest hrvatske knjizevnosti do narodnog preporoda, edición II, Zagreb, 1961, pp. 81 y sigs.; P. P. Barnola S.J.: Anepifanía americana de un insigne humanista croata, Studia Croatica, Nº 1, año 1, pp. 58-60; Ante Kadic: La literatura renacentista croata, Ibid., Nº 9, 1962, pp. 287-308.

^[74] CF. W. Vondrak: Altkirchenslavische Grammatik, Berlín, 1912, p. 30; el mismo autor: O purodu Kijevskych listu a prazskych zlomku, Praga, 1904. S. M. Kuljbakin: Izvestija otdelenija russkago jazyka i slovesnosti 10 (1905), 320-338; el mismo autor: "Du Classement des textes vieux slaves". - Revue des études slaves 2 (1922), 106-201.

^[75] Pedro Vukota: Formas Estatales en los Balcanes, Ed. Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales y Coloniales, Madrid, 1951.

^[76] Walter Goetz: Historia Universal, Madrid, 1933, T. VIII, p. 379.

^[77] Sobre el Adriático se cruzaron numerosos intereses político-económicos. Dominar, por la posición natural, el pasaje del Adriático al Jonio, o sea, el canal de Otranto, significa ser elemento fundamental en el equilibrio de esos intereses. Aunque es el más pequeño de los Estados balcánicos, Albania, que goza de tal posición geográfica, ha influido notablemente en el pasado sobre las alternativas de los Balcanes (Albania - A cura dell' Ufficio Studi dell' I.S.P.I., Milano, 1940).

^[78] Vicenzo Talarico: Vita di Scanderbeg, Firenze, 1943.

^[79] Amadeo Giannini: L'Albania dell'Independenza all'Unione con Italia, Milano, 1939. Trattati ed accordi per l'Europa Danubiana e Balcanica, Roma, 1934.

^[80] Justin Godart: L'Albanie, París, 1922

^[81] Italo Zingarelli: I Paesi Danubiani e Balcanici, Milano 1938.

^[82] Luis André: Les Etats chretiens des Balkans depuis 1815, París, 1918.

^[83] Ferdo Sisic: Dokumenti o postanku kraljevine SHS, Zagreb, 1920.

^[84] Carlo Sforza: Costruttori e distruttori, Roma, 1945; Jugoslavia, Roma, 1948.

^[85] Drago Zalar: Yugoslav Communism - A Critical Study, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1961.

^[86] Julian Amery: Sons of the Eagle - A Study in Guerrilla War, London, Macmillan, 1948.

^[87] Vladimir Dedijer: Jugoslavensko - albanski odnosi, 1938-48, Zagreb (Borba) 1949.

^[88] Wolff Robert Lee: The Balkan in Our Time, Cambridge Mass., Harward University Press, 1956, p. 232.

^[89] Hugh Seaton Watson: The East European Revolution, London, 1952, p. 226.

^[90] Vladimir Dedijer: Op. c. pp. 158-60.

^[91] Mehmed Shebu: Albania y navecherieto na osvobozhedenito; bitgata za Tirana, Sofía, 1935, p. 35.

^[92] Wolff: Op. c. pp. 320-21.

^[93] Dedijer, Op. c. pp. 171-172.

^[94] Hugh Seaton-Watson, op. c. p. 253.

^[95] Wolff, op. c. p. 276.

^[96] Hugh Seaton-Watson, op. c. p. 253

^[97] Vladimir Dedijer: Tito, New York, p. 311.

^[98] Dedijer: Ibid. p. 480.

^[99] Dedijer: Ibid.

^[100] Poruka, London, 1. V. 1953, p. 9.

^[101] "Estudios sobre el comunismo", Santiago de Chile, julio-septiembre de 1962.

^[102] D. A. Tomasic. ibid.

^[103] D. A. Tomasic. ibid.

^[104] Jure Petricevic: "La Crisis del Titoísmo y Yugoslavia", Studia Croatica, Año III, Vol. 2-3, pp. 178-193.

^[105] Citado según el diario de Zagreb Vjesnik del 8/3/64 que reprodujo la entrevista con pequeñas modificaciones.

^[106] El general Pera Zivkovic fue uno de los oficiales serbios que en 1903 asesinaron bárbaramente al último Obrenovic y su esposa Draga Masin, y entronizaron a la familia Karageorgevic. Luego se desempeñó como comandante de la guardia real y como persona de confianza del rey Alejandro, que en 1929 lo nombró presidente del gobierno de su régimen personal, que decretó el dogma oficial de la unidad nacional de los serbios y los croatas, implantando un curso anticroata que motivó la crisis y el desmembramiento de Yugoslavia en 1941. Los comunistas fueron perseguidos bajo ese régimen, que calificaron como "la dictadura real militarista-fascista". En la última guerra Zivkovic colaboró con el gobierno exiliado del rey Pedro II. Es característico para las relaciones nacionales en la Yugoslavia comunista que ese general pudiese regresar a Belgrado, donde vivió hasta su muerte y cobraba la pensión del gobierno comunista, mientras que los generales croatas, que lucharon contra el comunismo, junto con muchos políticos democráticos, fueron muertos. Lo que dice Bakaric de "muchos" que conciben el yugoslavismo como Zivkovic y el rey Alejandro se refiere también a los comunistas serbios.

^[107] Desde el 17/9/1964 figura en COMECOM una delegación yugoslava como "observador asociado"

^[108] Vjesnik, Zagreb, 31/1 y 6/2/64.

^[109] Vjesnik, 8/3/1964.

^[110] Miroslav Krleza, nacido en 1893, escritor dramático, novelista, poeta, ensayista y crítico de arte, de orientación marxista, acerbo crítico de la sociedad y de los fenómenos literarios. Actualmente director de la "Enciclopedia Yugoslava" y presidente de la Academia de Artes y Ciencias de Zagreb.

^[111] Zdanovismo, la visión comunista de la vida y del mundo, denominada según Zdanov, colaborador de Stalin en el ámbito cultural.

^[112] Oskar Davicho, comunista, novelista y poeta serbio. Sostienen tendencias modernistas en la literatura serbia.

^[113] Tin Ujevic, máximo poeta croata, hermético y enjundioso pensador. Discípulo de los grandes poetas franceses del fin del siglo pasado, más tarde se independizó alcanzando indiscutible grandeza original. Después de la guerra fue encarcelado cierto tiempo por los comunistas.

^[114] Stanislav Simic, crítico y poeta croata. Influido por la literatura alemana (Karl Kraus) escribió críticas y sátiras acerbas contra los vicios y defectos sociales.

^[115] Ivan Raos, dramaturgo y cuentista. En sus dramas trata de problemas morales y se distingue por su estilo lapidario y el sentido para los enfoques escénicos.

^[116] Branko Copic, escritor comunista serbio. Aunque fiel al "partido", se enfrentó con las depravaciones y con los jerarcas de Belgrado de la "nueva clase". Ver "Studia Croatica", Año IV, Nº 1-4, pp. 39 y 200-209.

^[117] Slobodan Novak, ex guerrillero, luego templó sus armas en la literatura. Observa una actitud crítica ante el pasado de los guerrilleros de Tito.

^[118] Viktor Vida, poeta lírico croata, muerto trágicamente en el exilio, en Buenos Aires, en 1961. Pese a la distancia de sus fuentes lingüísticas, escribió poesías de valor antológico.

^[119] Ante Bonifacic, poeta, novelista y ensayista croata, influido por Valéry. Exiliado desde 1945. Escribió novelas que fragmentariamente constituyen el apogeo de la prosa croata en la emigración.

^[120] Krsto Spoljar, escritor croata, aborda los problemas del hombre de la ciudad.

^[121] Lugar de nacimiento de Adolf Hitler.

^[122] Consultar el artículo: La farsa de la amnistía política en Yugoslavia, Studia Croatica, Año III, vol. 2-3. pp. 235-39.

^[123] Ver artículos: La fraternidad y la unidad de loso pueblos de Yugoslavia en vez del derecho de autodeterminación y Los exilados exigen el derecho de autodeterminación para Croacia, Studia Croatica, Año III. 4, pp. 251-71, 349-55.