STUDIA CROATICA

Year IX – Buenos Aires, 1968, Vol. 28-31

HALF A CENTURY OF ILLEGITIMATE POWER

CARDINAL FRANCIS SHEPER – NEW PREFECT OF THE CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH

STEPENT RADIC AND HIS PEASANT MOVEMENT

CROATIAN PEASANTS REJECTED THE UNION OF CROATIA WITH SERBIA IN 1918

"POPULORUM PROGRESSIO" AND THE PRESENCE OF THE CHURCH IN HISTORY

WHERE IS NORTH AMERICA HEADED?

THE MEANING OF THE RECENT "LIBERALIZATION" OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

CRISIS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN YUGOSLAVIA

ZDRAVKO DUCMELIC - REALITY AND PAINTING

THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN OF THE ANCIENT CROATIAN CHURCHES IN DALMATIA

COMMENTS AND NOTES

EXPLOSION OF ALBANIAN DISCONTENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

JORGE CASTRIOTA SCANDERBEG

DOCUMENTS

ECONOMIC EMIGRATION FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO EUROPE

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRONICLES AND NEWS

HALF A CENTURY OF ILLEGITIMATE POWER

In 1918, the first common state of the South Slavs was created:

Yugoslavia

NEVISTIC FRANJO

Many people are unaware that between the Austro-Italian borders and the Black Sea lives an ethnic group called Yugoslavs or "Jugoslavs" ("Jug" means "south" in Croatian and Serbian). These South Slavs are comprised of the following: Slovenes in the north, bordering Italy and Austria; then Croats, Montenegrins, Serbs, Macedonians; and finally, in the far south, Bulgarians.

Despite living side by side for over 1,000 years and despite their closely related ethnic background and linguistic similarities, they never managed to form a common state.

It is not our intention to examine the causes of this phenomenon. But, lest it seem strange to those unfamiliar with the subject, we need only emphasize that the general conditions were adverse in this regard, both geographically and geopolitically.

Regarding the former, it is worth mentioning the high mountain ranges, impassable especially during long winters, which fragmented the area into small, isolated regions. This fact fostered differentiation rather than unification. As for the latter, the location of these groups of people between the two rival centers of civilization—Rome and Byzantium—meant that they were drawn in opposite directions. Finally, the Ottoman invasion and occupation severed contact between the two for centuries. The Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins fell under Turkish rule, while the Croats and Slovenes were gradually incorporated into the Habsburg Empire, serving, on a higher scale of values, as defenders of Western Christendom.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire also lost its raison d'être, at least in this respect. We find ourselves in the midst of the expansion and consolidation of the French Revolution and its modern national ideals.

Among the Croats, whose numbers had been reduced by the harsh centuries-long struggles against the Ottomans, some intellectuals and politicians began to dream of uniting all South Slavs. Faced with Hungarian nationalist aggression and Austrian Germanization, they believed this was the only solution to safeguard national independence. These dreamers went so far as to even consider abandoning their historical name, adopting first "Illyrian" and then "Yugoslav."[1]

Without going into detail, this idea, thanks to favorable conditions, led in 1918 to the formation of the first Yugoslav state, which encompassed everyone except the Bulgarians, despite their also being South Slavs. It is our purpose, after a brief review of the facts, to demonstrate that the formation of this state occurred against the most fundamental principles of politics and law. The illegitimate and illegal character of this political union is inherent to it to this day. Herein lies the cause of the ills that so afflicted and continue to afflict its peoples. The drama of the internal struggles since they first came together in a common state astonished the entire world, which was perplexed by the magnitude of the tragedy.

The Allies of the First World War, even in 1918, had no intention of destroying the Danubian Monarchy, which also included the Croats and Slovenes. This view was confirmed by Minister Sonnino on October 25, 1917. Lloyd George, in turn, speaking on behalf of the British government, stated on January 5, 1918, that "the break-up of Austria-Hungary is not part of our war aims." But already the American president Wilson, responding to the Vienna armistice offer, recognized on April 18, 1918 "the just national aspirations of the South Slavs for freedom", communicating to the imperial government that his government "has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of nationalistic aspirations of the South Slavs for freedom".

This idea of the American government gave great impetus to "Yugoslavism." The Illyrian or, later, Yugoslav ideas were never embraced by the Serbs or the Slovenes.[2] Despite this fact and the Allies' desire not to destroy the Empire, at the very beginning of the First World War, the Serbian government, in its "Declaration" of December 1, 1914, included among its war aims "the liberation and union of all our Serbian, Croat, and Slovene brothers, who are not yet free."

Consequently, Yugoslav historiography cites this Serbian Declaration as the primary document relating to the formation of Yugoslavia. Thanks to it, the Serbian government is considered the foremost factor in the realization of the Yugoslav idea, originally conceived and planned by the Croats.

The second actor in this regard appeared on the international stage: the Yugoslav Committee, organized in Paris in 1915. Its main objective was also the liberation and union of the South Slavs. Dr. Antonio Trumbic, a well-known Croatian politician from Dalmatia, was its president. Despite a considerable number of Croatian Serbs among its members, it was considered the Croatian version of the Yugoslav ideal. There was constant distrust and mutual accusations between this Committee and the Serbian government.

Inspired by the same idea, and prior to the formation of the Yugoslav Committee, the national deputies of Dalmatia, Istria, and Slovenia—provinces directly under the authority of Vienna—issued a declaration on May 30, 1917, in the central parliament of the Empire, calling for the formation of a political union of all South Slavs under Habsburg rule. Among the signatories were Slovenes, Croats, and Croatian Serbs. Dr. Antonio Korosec, a Slovenian, was the recognized leader.

On the Croatian side, the Party of Right, led by Starcevic, issued a declaration on June 5, 1917, emphasizing the need for the union of Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs in a political community based on national principles and the "historical and state rights of Croatia." Serbia was not mentioned at all. According to the declaration, the new state was to be formed by Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs. The Serbs were referred to as a recognized Serbian minority in the Croatian provinces under joint Austro-Hungarian-Croatian rule, with no mention of union with Serbia.

In July 1917, delegates from the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee met for the first time. After several days of lengthy discussions, the "Corfu Declaration," named after the island where the deliberations took place, was drafted and published. On July 20, 1917, the Declaration was signed by Dr. Trumbic and Nicolas Pasic, President of the Yugoslav Committee and President of the Serbian Government, respectively.

Among the stipulations of this Declaration, point 13 is of particular importance for our purposes. It states: "The Constitution, which will be drafted by the Constituent Assembly elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, will be the foundation of the entire life of the State, the source and end of all powers and rights, and all aspects of state life will be organized in accordance with it." The following point emphasizes, among other things: "The Constitution must be adopted by the Constituent Assembly by a qualified majority."

But in the process of realizing this Yugoslav ideal, the most decisive step was taken with the formation of the National Council (Narodno Vijece) on October 6, 1918, in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. This Council was an entirely new political body, composed of politicians, intellectuals, and writers from all parts of the Croatian, Slovene, and Hungarian regions under imperial rule. Bearing in mind the common Yugoslav ideal, and without any other political or legal basis, they proclaimed themselves "political representatives of all Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs residing in the South Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary." Informing the public of this fact, they called for the union of all South Slavs into a free and independent national state, organized according to democratic principles.

On October 8, 1918, the National Council proclaimed that from that moment on, it "assumed the leadership of national policy." It rejected Vienna's offer to reorganize the Empire along tripartite lines, according to which the South Slavic territories of the Empire would form a Croatian political unit, equal in rights to the two previous parts of the Austro-Hungarian dualism.

At the same time, the Council called for the formation of a common South Slavic state based on "political and economic democracy." On November 8, 1918, the Serbian government recognized the National Council as the government of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in Austria-Hungary. Thus, we have the third protagonist in the realization of the Yugoslav idea.

To further advance the process and determine the outline of the organization of the future common state, on November 9, 1918, delegates from the Serbian government, headed by President N. Pašić, the Yugoslav Committee, and the National Council met in Geneva. The agreements reached on this occasion, aimed at reducing the differences and mitigating the contrasts that had arisen during the previous four years among the three parties, stipulated, among other things, the parity of power between the Serbian government in Serbia and the National Council in Croatia until the new state was constitutionally organized. However, Svetozar Pribčević, Vice-President of the National Council, a Croatian Serb, holding all the reins, secretly informed the Serbian government in Corfu, in the absence of President Korošić, who had traveled to Geneva, that he could obtain much more than what they had been prepared to agree to in Geneva. While communicating this to the Serbian government, he informed its representatives in Paris that the delegates of the National Council—Korošec and the others—lacked any power to negotiate with them. In addition to these two false reports, he also stopped the telegrams that Korošec and his collaborators were sending from Geneva to Zagreb, addressed to the National Council.

When the Serbian government learned that it could obtain much more favorable terms in negotiations with the Croats, Pašić fell, and with him, everything agreed upon in Geneva. Taking advantage of this general confusion in Croatia, Pribčević, with his most loyal friends, especially Serbs, and in collaboration with a Serbian army officer sent specifically to Croatia, drafted the text of the declaration of union with Serbia on November 24, 1918, during a night session of the Central Commission of the Regional Council. He selected the delegates and sent them to Belgrade, where on December 1, 1918, they proclaimed the union with the Serbian regent, heir to the throne, Alexander Karageorgevic. Simultaneously, the Serbian army occupied Croatian territory.

On December 3, 1918, the National Council dissolved itself, declaring, among other things: "With this act, the National Council ceases to function as the sovereign power of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As of December 1, 1918, the people of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes constitute a single state under the rule of the regent, His Royal Highness Alexander Karageorgevic."

These are the most important events, presented in chronological and formal order. They seem logical, imbued with a strong dose of political and democratic idealism and a commitment to justice, equality, and freedom for all. However, it is precisely these events, the historical and empirical basis of the new State, that are also the cause of that shared tragedy of its peoples, which Churchill called "the infinite height of human misery," when it culminated in open mutual atrocities during the period of the last great war. Why did this happen?

On December 1, 1918, in the turbulent world of our century, yet another power was formed, absolutely illegitimate, giving rise to a sad chain of evils that logically led to "infinite human misery," in Churchill's words.

II. We will now attempt to make this sad phenomenon understandable. To this end, a brief explanation of three legal and political concepts that form the core of our discussion is necessary: legitimacy/legality, the formation of the State, and the political mandate. We assume that these concepts are not familiar to all readers of Studia Croatica.

So, what is legitimacy? What is legality? Is there a difference between the two? Considering this problem to be the most important, we will dwell on it a bit longer than on two others: the formation of the State and the political mandate.

Legitimacy, in general terms, is the authentic and most complete authorization to govern in society, especially in a State as a sovereign political organization. Legality, in turn, is the authorization to govern, but derived from a legal norm, from the supreme law of a society, which we call the Constitution. What, then, is the difference between these two authorizations to govern?

It seems that the difference is evident from what we have just said. Legitimacy is the "authentic and most complete" authorization, while legality is a power to govern, derived from a set of laws, whose ultimate source is the Constitution. Aren't we reaching a dead end? For a person with a legal background today, the Constitution is the supreme and ultimate source of all power. By renouncing this truth, won't we lose ourselves in the enigma of what the true will of the people is? Don't we thus run the risk of falling into insecurity and chaos in our thoughts and in social reality?

This series of questions and warnings clearly indicates that we are dealing with political issues of paramount importance.[3]

Bearing this importance in mind, the most arduous and fundamental task of any sovereign society is revealed as finding, organizing, and maintaining its legitimate power. Is it possible to find it, and how?

A retrospective historical look might help us. In the historical evolution of the phenomenon and in its internal, conceptual analysis, we await the desired answer. Ortega y Gasset, it seems to us, is unsurpassed in this regard. This retrospective look continues where the historical documents leave us, and we make use of linguistic terms and meanings.[4]

Proceeding in this way, Ortega y Gasset finds only one form of public power with an authentically legitimate character. It is the power of the king, of the monarchy. Within his conception, the monarchy and the king are at the pinnacle of the conceptual evolution of public power. Before the monarchy, there were emperors. After it, there is a fragmentation of power, pseudo-legitimacy, a return to emperor-dictators, to illegitimacy.

The case of the Roman people serves as a paradigm for universal history for Ortega y Gasset. Primitive peoples in general, in their tribal period, lack a constituted central power. If one appears, it bears all the characteristics of a provisional, intermittent power. In moments of danger—threat from another tribe or famine—a skilled and courageous man steps forward, organizing the necessary resources for the emergency. Around him, the others then gather, as if "infected by his energy and enthusiasm." This exceptional man was called imperator because he prepared—or rather, unwound—everything necessary for the exceptional state. With the danger gone, the tribes reverted to their "chaotic" way of life, where customs, similar to the instincts of "social" insects, prevailed over law. There was still no law, and "anyone" could exercise power.

But with the evolution of tribal life, so too did the awareness of community. Commitments within "the dark continuity" became legal institutions. But so too did a shared "conception of life and the world." "Whether he likes it or not," it states verbatim, "every man, in order to live, has no choice but to have an idea about what the world is in which life unfolds."

This conception of the Roman people, as of all peoples, "is and can only be a religious conception." Given that the Roman people were among the most religious, it is no wonder that the center of this new Roman society was rex sacrorum (king of the sacred).

All public life was accompanied by religious rites, which could no longer be performed by "just anyone" but only by certain individuals or families who had risen to prominence "through their warrior valor, the accumulation of wealth, or their piety." Linguistically, *rex* means ruler, the one who holds absolute power.

His people believe that "the gods want him to have it," giving him "that magical grace" or charisma, as the Greeks called it. "The king, therefore, is head of state not spontaneously like the primitive imperator, but with a legitimate title... The original, prototypical, the only compact and saturated legitimacy has been, in almost all known peoples, the king by the grace of God." Faced with "this pathetic, venerable, traditional, immemorial, and mystical institution of kingship, that circumstantial, spontaneous, adventurous, and fleeting role of the emperor had to disappear."[5]

Indeed, the imperator had long since disappeared before the rex. But, even with the Republic established, the new form of the Roman state, the Senatus populusque Romanos, continued to be kingship. Auctoritas patrum was a copy of the authority of the kings. The Roman people "believed in the transcendent, as superhuman, right of the Senate..." But in time, the "schism" of the Roman soul (Toynbee) also occurred. The multiple influx of other peoples into Roman territory and the weakening of religious sentiment were the main factors of this "schism." Hence the uprisings, the seditions, the factional confrontations, and the civil wars. The rex, kingship, and legitimacy disappeared. Roman life once again turned toward the emperors. That monarchical republic weakened in its very essence. Monarchical—the people, increasingly emphasizing the republican element—the populus.

In this time of crisis—around 200 BC—"no one had a clear idea... about who should legally rule. Someone had to be, but no one possessed, in the minds of the citizens, the legitimate title to do so." At a certain point, the history of a civilization leads to the unsettling, perhaps even terrifying, realm of illegitimacy [6]. A profound analogy exists between Roman history and that of Christian nations. Here too, political power is formed on the basis of a transcendental, religious idea. The monarchy, the sacred Empire, kings by divine grace ensure the most complete legitimacy of power. But philosophical doubt, rivalries between civil and ecclesiastical power, scientism, etc., gradually erode the foundations of this conception as well. In this post-Christian era, Guillermo Ferrero attributes a purely rational value to his four "genii della Città" (geniuses of the City). "The revolutionary spirit," he says, "is right when it maintains that the principles of legitimacy are limited, conventional, fluctuating, and vulnerable to reason." However, he adds: "These principles, precisely because they are fragile, differ from other principles, being endowed with a magical life: As soon as the men allow themselves to be persuaded by the Evil One to rape them, they find themselves imprisoned by fear; "The sacred fear of the violated norm." Since fear is the general law of the universe, how can it be eliminated and the world of civilization organized? With the magical virtue and transcendental value of titles of legitimacy gone, the only remaining solution is compromise among the components of society. The fundamental principles and norms in this regard must be enshrined in the Constitution. On this point, the Italian professor agrees with the British academic.[7]

From now on, the aim is to create a closed legal order, to identify legality and legitimacy. Everything must be contained in the principles of the constitution and other laws.[8] Legality should absorb legitimacy, just as the legitimacy of kings once absorbed legality. But it was becoming increasingly clear that men cannot derive from their pure human strength rules "beyond the reach of transient impulses." Men of passion prevail over those of "reflection and cool-headedness." Not only among the governed, but also among the rulers.

Thus, too, the history of Christian peoples reached this era and sphere. The "frightening" aspect of illegitimacy. Those who sought to equate the legitimacy of power with the legality of its actions, based on constitutional principles, creating a closed legal order, have been greatly mistaken. First, by completely "secularizing" them, stripping them of all charismatic character, and second, by attempting to pass off the will and interests formulated and protected by the Constitution as the authentic will and interests of the people. Legitimacy—the will, the consensus of the people—and legality—the positive provisions—revealed their divergences in a virulent, almost insurmountable way. The "Senatus populsque Romanus" of our day march once again in divergent, almost opposing, steps. The more they tried to equate legality and legitimacy, the more their irreconcilable difference became apparent. Hence, Führer, Duce, Caudillo, and Party General Secretaries, the new imperators without legitimacy, the "who-knows-what" of our time.

First, then, what must be kept in mind when examining the illegality of the power of the Yugoslav state, formed in 1918, is precisely this concept of legitimacy-legality.

Regarding the concept of state formation, legal theory recognizes three main cases with their subdivisions: original formation, modification of one or more states, especially constitutional modification, and the extinction of several states, forming a new one. Legal theory specifies this last case as: unio extinctiva per confusionem (extinct union through confusion).

Which of these cases can we consider when the Yugoslavia of 1918 was formed? Clearly, the latter. Until that moment, three states existed: Croatia[9], Serbia, and Montenegro. Their territories and populations were united, after the extinction of their independent political existence.

This appears to be the case at first glance. But for jurists and politicians, this matter takes on a different aspect in light of legal concepts. Indeed, in this specific case, it is necessary to resort to legal science. She identifies two stages in the process of state formation: one purely factual and the other legal.[10]

What all this means for our topic, we will see later. Now we must clarify the concept of the political mandate. Here we must turn to private law. We resort to an institution of lower rank—private law, to clarify a similar one of higher rank—which accepts, to represent it for the purpose of executing in its name and on its behalf a legal act or a series of acts of this nature… “When the agent contracts in the name of the principal, exceeding the limits of the mandate, and the principal does not ratify the contract, it will be null and void…” “Ratification is equivalent to the mandate and has retroactive effect between the parties to the day of the act…”

Despite certain incidental differences, there is a substantial similarity between the mandate of private and public law. If the agent does not respect the will of the principal, acting outside the limits of the mandate or against the principal's will, in both cases—private and public—the contract is invalid, illegal, and void. But the principal can, also in both cases, and provided that the agent's acts are not against good morals or in conflict with any public interest, approve them partially or totally, giving them retroactive effect.

After this overview Having established the facts and concepts necessary for our task, we can now proceed to evaluate the legal and political aspects of the formation of the Yugoslav state in 1918.

III. We consider the process and formation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 to be absolutely illegitimate and illegal for the following reasons: All the propaganda, conferences, memoranda, the Corfu Declaration, the Geneva Declaration, the transfer of the conduct of Croatian policy from the Sabor (parliament) to the National Council, the dispatch of its delegation to Belgrade, and even the very proclamation of the union by the Serbian Regent, were merely preparatory acts for the formation of the new state.

To determine its value—its legality and legitimacy—we must first examine it from the perspective of the existence and dissolution of the State of Croatia, and then from the perspective of the legality and legitimacy of the new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Was the liquidation of the Croatian state, then, carried out legally? "The modification or extinction of the life of a state," says St. Romano, "can happen legally: when the Constitution stipulates who, when, and how it can be done, or illegally: through a coup d'état, revolution, or a similar abuse of power." Croatian history and law do not recognize any legal provision authorizing the liquidation of its existence. Who were its formal liquidators?

A political representation in the Sabor, elected in another era, in the semi-feudal, semi-oligarchic period. This representation was elected when only 20% of the population had the right to vote. Moreover, this Croatian political representation included a disproportionately high number of deputies from the Serbian minority in Croatia, a direct consequence of misguided Hungarian policy favoring this minority over the Croats. Dalmatia and Bosnia remained separate from Croatia for the same reason.

However, we cannot deny a certain desire for union with Serbia on the part of the official Croatian government of that time. The deputies of Serbian origin sincerely desired it. The Croatian deputies only conditionally, in order to find themselves on the side of the victors, as Bernard George would say. The Croatian Peasant Party of Esteban Radic and the Frank-Starcevic Party advocated Croatian independence, opposing its Balkan orientation.[11] Unfortunately, Radic and his party were just starting out and within a few years would become the main political force in Croatia, while Frank's party was already dissolving.

But despite this, the official Croatian deputies, especially the Croats, as well as the politicians of the Yugoslav Committee, headed by A. Trumbic, dreamed of a truly democratic union. To ensure this, they stipulated the necessary conditions in the preliminary agreements with the Serbs. The Croatian people must safeguard their national identity, freedom, and territorial integrity in the new state. Regarding the form of the future state, as we have already seen, the Constituent Assembly will decide by a qualified majority.

The same had been stipulated in the Corfu Declaration, as well as in the Geneva Conference and Convention. Even the National Council itself—whose president was a Slovene and vice-president a Serb—had given the delegation to Belgrade instructions that the form of the state—monarchy or republic—would be determined by the Constituent Assembly with a two-thirds majority vote. And what did this delegation do?

With the Serbian regent, it proclaimed the union as a fait accompli, accepting the monarchical form of the state. Upon dissolving the Assembly, the National Council declared itself the "sovereign" of the people of the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes in the provinces of the former Danubian Monarchy, which practically meant the "sovereign" of Croatia.

The illegality of this action is therefore more than evident. The inauthentic representatives of the Croatian people's will took a step not foreseen by Croatian law. They did so in grave conflict with Croatia's interests and contrary to the essential meaning of a political mandate, whose mission is to protect and promote the individuality of a people.

Furthermore, all of this was done through a body—the National Council—unrecognized as "sovereign" by Croatian public law and which acted against the mandate it had illegally received. That is to say: the body that transfers power and grants the sovereign mandate—the Sabor—had no right to do so, having been an ordinary, politically deficient representation without authorization from any positive law.

At the time universal suffrage was proclaimed, this Sabor represented only 20% of the population eligible to vote. Bosnia and Dalmatia, as we have seen, were still separate from Croatia. It is logical to conclude: Nemo plus juris in alteram transferre potest quam ipse habet (No one can transfer more rights to another than they possess).

Even if this were possible and legal, which we deny, the National Council, despite everything, acted against its mandate, exceeding the limits and circumventing the most basic guarantees that the Sabor had foreseen in the preliminary negotiations for the formation of the common state. For its actions to be valid, it needed the retroactive approval of the Croatian Sabor. Instead, the Serbian army occupied Croatia. The extinctive union "aequali jure" was replaced by the union by annexation. This is the reality despite a solemn disguise and political-legal formalities. Yugoslavia is an aggrandized Serbia.

But, for the moment, let us consider, as if we had said nothing about the illegality of everything done so far in favor of the formation of the new state, how all this appears from the standpoint of the legality of the new state. We know that only from the moment of the proclamation of its Constitution did we have the real possibility of legally evaluating those preparatory acts.

The elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on June 28, 1920. Discussions took place from December 12, 1920, to June 28, 1921. Irreconcilable differences arose in the proposals and counter-proposals, especially between the Croats and the Serbs.

The Croats, one historian argues, had the arguments, but the Serbs had the power. "The Corfu Declaration provided the mandatory instructions for drafting the Constitution. But Pašić, the Serbian Prime Minister and a signatory to it, declared during the war in 1918 that he considered it worthless and that he signed it only to 'impress European opinion.'" (From a conversation between W. Steed and Pašić in London, reproduced in The Yugoslav Committee - Jugoslavenski Odbor, Dr. Melada Paulović, Zagreb, p. 504).

Thus circumventing the solemnly undertaken obligations of the National Council, given to its negotiating delegation in Belgrade, which stipulated a qualified majority, i.e., a two-thirds majority for the Constitution, the Serbs, one day before the final and official vote, did not even have a simple majority for their centralist proposal.

Through intrigue and the bribery of some Turkish and Albanian deputies from Macedonia, during the night of June 27-28, they obtained the simple majority that approved the Constitution, called the "Vidovdanski Ustav." The Croats did not cast a single vote in favor of this Constitution, which should have been the legal and political foundation of the life of this "common" state.

For those who want to see clearly, the illegality of the new state's supreme law could not be more obvious. The Constitution, which was meant to be "the source of the entire life" of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, of its true legal and political existence, was voted on and proclaimed against all the canons of a seriously considered policy and against the most fundamental principles of law.

Without the participation of the will of the Croatian people, the new law was null and void for them. The only entity empowered to retroactively validate everything that had been done by the Croatians to form this state, the new Croatian political representation with the right to universal suffrage, categorically refused to do so at the decisive moment. What remained, given the total Croatian abstention, was a de facto power, or rather, "organized violence."

Returning once more to the central problem of this article—the legitimacy of Yugoslavia in 1918—we highlight this final idea: Yugoslavia was created as a constitutional monarchy. That is to say, as a power simultaneously traditionalist and progressive in the Ortegan sense. The King of Serbia, "by the grace of God," also wished to be King of the Croats.

But this king was sovereign of a Greek Orthodox Christian community, while the Croats lived under the rule of a king-emperor (Habsburg) who invoked his title of legitimacy "by divine grace and the Roman apostolic blessing." The Serbian king, representing a Christian community antagonistic to the religion of the Catholic (partially Muslim) Croats, could not have the same title for the Croats. This is especially true considering that the Serbian Orthodox religion was and continues to be at the exclusive service of the Serbian national community.

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that both communities—the Catholic (specifically the Croatian) and the Greek Orthodox—in our case, the Serbian—lived for a millennium under the mutual anathema of Rome and Byzantium, respectively. According to Ortega's conception of the problem of legitimacy, as a problem substantially of a religious nature, the two communities were evidently presented with a very high ideal in order to reconcile their differences or grant their consensus to the same king, who was considered charismatic on the one hand and schismatic on the other.

For the Croatian people, the new king and the new monarchy lacked that unique, magical, charismatic force that guaranteed a public power the character of a truly legitimate one. Nor could the "charismatic" Serbian king feel like the "charismatic" Croatian king and act as such.

Against such blatant violations of the principles of human coexistence, the rest of the Croatian army attempted resistance on December 5, 1918, which was brutally suppressed in the Croatian capital by the Serbian occupation troops. Thus, the new state—formed illegally—began with bloodshed. Thus it continued, accumulating injustices that cry out to heaven, until 1941, when the Croatian people proclaimed their independence.

In the international struggle of ideologies and interests during the last war, Croatia fell victim to the absurd idea of Yugoslavism. The Serbs, the sole beneficiaries of that community, imposed the communist order, which the Croats paid for with rivers of blood. The South Slavic peoples, consequently, entered in 1918 and especially in 1945 into the "frightening era of illegitimacy."

The dictators, the strongmen, the general secretaries of the Party are also their improvised supreme leaders without the legitimate title to power. "The fear that grips dictators is an example of the magical power of the principles of legitimacy. The dictator is afraid of his own power, having conquered it by violating the principle of legitimacy," says Ferrero.

An objective historian and an honest political observer cannot help but be convinced that in 1918, and in 1945, "the most terrible form of self-alienation, the political and mental terror of the 20th century" began, also in the lives of the South Slavic peoples, due to the formation of an illegitimate power within their forcibly shared life.

Through Belgrade's renewed attempt to "transfer into the hands of man"—first the Serbian king and then the general secretary of the Communist Party—"the original power of divinity," as F. Heer would say, an absolutely illegitimate power was formed, producing the "infinite human misery" of which Churchill speaks. But all of it was unnecessary. The right of these peoples to self-determination against the "divinity" of the kings and the general secretaries of the Communist Party would illuminate the path out of such a sinister political community. 

Cardinal Franjo Šeper - New Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith

Branko Kadić

On January 8, 1968, Pope Paul VI appointed Cardinal Francis Šeper, Archbishop of the vast Diocese of Zagreb and Metropolitan of Croatia, successor to the hero and martyr Aloysius Stepinac, as the new Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, replacing Cardinal Ottaviani. This was a key position in the Roman Curia and in the organization and governance of the Catholic Church.

The Second Vatican Council initiated a great movement regarding the spirit and reform of ecclesiastical structures, which is reflected in this post-conciliar era in all areas. One aspect of this reform, as broad as it was necessary, is the internationalization of the Roman Curia, which now has a new face. Developing an ecclesiology that emphasizes the reality of the local Church, founded on the collegiality and sacramentality of the episcopate, and granting significant powers to Episcopal Conferences, the Second Vatican Council modified the role of the Roman Curia.

The reform implemented by Paul VI draws on the consequences of this new situation. The changes made earlier this year among the prefects of the Roman Congregations, from this perspective, are highly significant. What most surprised public opinion was the departure of Cardinal Ottavini, who had become a symbol of the Church. The main change occurred in the leadership of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, formerly the Sacred Office.

It is now headed by the Croatian Cardinal Francis Šeper, a foreigner, not Italian, for the first time in the history of the Church. Also for the first time in its nearly 14-century history of unwavering adherence and fidelity to Rome, despite so many historical adversities, a Croatian prelate occupies a prominent position in the government of the universal Church.

Glas Koncila (The Council's Voice), Year VII, No. 2 (121) of January 14, 1968, Zagreb), the bi-weekly publication of the Archdiocese of Zagreb, which, despite numerous obstacles and restrictions imposed by the communist authorities, is the most widely circulated and read newspaper in Croatia, in its special edition dedicated to this important and honorable event for the Croatian nation, comments:

"This would be a significant event even if it were not a small town whose history includes only two or three cardinals, none of whom held any position in the Roman Curia. This occurs precisely at the moment of the general reform of the Catholic Church, and at the very moment when the Pope begins to reform the Vatican offices. This happens when the Church seeks, finds, and orients itself toward new directions in its history, when it tries to unite the treasure of its eternal truths with adaptation to the new times, when it takes the risk of expressing ancient truths." in new terms and ways, without impoverishing them, but deepening them and offering them as more acceptable and useful to humankind."

The Zagreb newspaper continues:

AWARD FOR THE LOYALTY OF THE CROATIAN NATION

"It is no longer a question of the former Holy Inquisition that wanted and could prohibit something, punish, or impose a veto. Its task today is much more serious and complex. Cardinal Šeper assumes it with great confidence and calm. During the Council and the Synod, he was optimistic. He believes in the healthy forces of the Church, in the Spirit that guides it; calm, he is almost certain that he will not have to resort to condemnatory and prohibitive measures."

"For us Catholics of this small (Croatian) nation, which proudly bears the honorary title of Antemurale Christianitatis (Blanket of Christianity), this appointment of one of our prelates to such a high and important office means much more. It is not merely a momentary affirmation. It stems from this nation's singular fidelity to the Roman Church.

If we were tempted to consider this honor a naive historical burden, the fruit of self-praise and an endeavor to be something and someone on the historical stage, whatever the cost, we can now say to ourselves and to others that the Church in Croatia had and has a specific role within the framework of the Universal Church.

"It is no mere coincidence that the Holy Father has shown us special attention in recent years, which has now culminated in the appointment of our cardinal as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The Pope knows that the people who throughout the centuries have remained faithful to Catholicism are enriching themselves in this era—certainly with enormous sacrifices—with new experiences that will be valuable for the future history of the Church." Without closed-mindedness or fanaticism, Croatian Catholicism does not succumb to the confused ideas of certain Western circles, nor to atheism. It remains open to all new movements and currents. It engages in dialogue, evaluating everything from its unique perspective. It carries out the conciliar reform under specific conditions (under the communist regime of Orthodox origin, Ed.) and, with its experiences and theological reflections, seeks to enrich the entire Catholic community.

"On the border of different ideological and cultural worlds, in a system where atheism has great opportunities and in a Europe that still tries to call itself Christian; between the compact body of Catholicism and the Eastern Orthodox Churches; counting as an integral part of its national body a significant group of Muslim believers, Croatian Catholicism is more than just a religious community in a particular territory. It is—we believe we can say this—the experimental field in which the Church tests the possibilities and methods of its encounter and dialogue with various worlds."

"On the border of different ideological and cultural worlds, in a system where atheism has great opportunities and in a Europe that still tries to call itself Christian; between the compact body of Catholicism and the Eastern Orthodox Churches; counting as an integral part of its national body a significant group of Muslim believers, Croatian Catholicism is more than just a religious community in a particular territory. It is—we believe we can say this—the experimental field in which the Church tests the possibilities and methods of its encounter and dialogue with various worlds." For centuries, the Croatian nation was a selfless and heroic defender of Christendom. In this ongoing and bloody struggle, more than four million of its sons and daughters sacrificed themselves, falling on the battlefield against the Ottoman conqueror, taken captive, or going into exile.

It played an almost identical role in the last war against the communist invasion, although its role and sacrifice were neither understood nor appreciated at the time. We therefore hope that in the new direction the Church is taking, which we applaud, the experiments in the union of Christian churches carried out in Croatian territory will not be detrimental to its vital national interests and genuine historical traditions, nor will its inalienable right to national independence in freedom and democracy be sacrificed.

A PROFILE OF CARDINAL ŠEPER

It is clear that the enormous responsibility now rests on the shoulders of the Archbishop of Zagreb and Metropolitan of Croatia, as he assumes the most delicate position for the development and future of the entire Church of ecumenism. To illustrate the personality of the new Vatican dignitary, we will briefly outline his origins, career, life, and work, his ideological profile, and his prominent role in the Second Vatican Council.

Šeper was born on November 2, 1905, in Osijek, an important city in northern Croatia. That same year, Bishop Joseph George Strossmayer, a native of the same city, had died. He was a prominent figure in Croatian history and famous for his intervention in the First Vatican Council, where he advocated for the reunion of Catholics with Eastern Christians. (See: Studia Croatica, No. 1(6), Year III, 1962, pp. 31-42, and No. 20-21, Year VII, 1966, pp. 127-135).

He was raised in a family with deep-rooted Christian traditions; one of his uncles was a priest. His father was a tailor and his mother a seamstress, and with their hard work they had to support four children. At the beginning of 1910 they moved to Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, where his father found a better-paying job. Šeper completed his primary and secondary education in Zagreb.

He participated in Catholic youth organizations and, drawn by the vigorous personality of Dr. Ivan Merz,[12] decided on a priestly vocation. A pupil at the Germanicum Institute in Rome, he completed his theological studies at the Pontifical Gregorian University. In Rome, he met Stepinac, seven years his senior. They studied together and were ordained priests together in 1930, thus beginning a close and profoundly important collaboration. Šeper earned his doctorate in philosophy from the Gregorian University in 1927 and in theology in 1931.

TIRELESS CATECHIST

In early March 1931, he returned to Zagreb, and the elderly Archbishop Antonio Bauer appointed him religion teacher at a high school in the Croatian capital. At the same time, he served as a catechist at a school for apprentice workers. Simultaneously, he carried out other pastoral duties, mostly without pay, living on the small stipend granted to him by the Zagreb Cathedral Chapter. He dedicated himself to the liturgical education of the young people under his care, having quickly grasped the importance of liturgy in Christian religious life. He gave lectures and published articles on liturgical issues.

ASSISTANT TO ARCHBISHOP STEPINAC

When Stepinac was appointed Coadjutor Archbishop of the Zagreb diocese in 1934, Šeper was designated his secretary, a position he held until the autumn of 1941, serving as the right-hand man of his former classmate from Rome. From this important position, the young diocesan secretary (he was 29 at the time) had the opportunity to become intimately familiar with all the ecclesiastical and national issues of his homeland, as all the threads led to the capital.

He actively participated in the Catholic youth movement, in the liturgical education of the faithful as an indispensable condition for their more active participation in the lay apostolate and as a foundation for feeling like a member of the Catholic community—ideas he would later emphasize in his presentations to the Council Fathers.

He dedicated himself to the founding of new parishes in Zagreb and its surroundings, striving to reach out to the humble people, viewing the Church more as a living community than a vigorous and honorable institution. As the archbishop's secretary, he witnessed and shared the anguish of the persecuted and threatened, who pleaded for protection and help. His keen interest in the Jewish question dates from this period, and he advocated at the Council for the urgent need to take a clear and unequivocal stance on the matter.

RECTOR OF THE MAJOR SEMINARY, PARISH PRIEST, AND ARCHBISHOP OF ZAGREB

In September 1941, in the midst of World War II, Archbishop Stepinac appointed him rector of the major seminary in Zagreb. Entrusting such a responsible position to a 36-year-old man reveals the great confidence Stepinac had in him. Šeper held this post for ten years. The war and postwar years were extremely difficult for the Croatian people. It was thanks to him that even greater calamities were averted for the seminarians and priests when the communists seized power in Croatia. As rector, Šeper did not abandon his pastoral work and the catechesis of student and working-class youth.

In October 1951, the then administrator of the archdiocese, Auxiliary Bishop Francis Salis Seewis (the titular archbishop, Aloysius Stepinac, was then imprisoned, sentenced to 16 years of hard labor), appointed him parish priest of Christ the King Parish in the Troje district of Zagreb. Being directly responsible for the pastoral care of a working-class parish under the communist regime undoubtedly proved to be a positive exercise in assuming leadership of the entire diocese.

Indeed, Pope Pius XII appointed him Coadjutor Archbishop in 1954 with the rights of a residential bishop during Cardinal Stepinac's imprisonment. After Cardinal Stepinac's death in Krasic on February 10, 1960, Pope John XXIII appointed him residential archbishop on March 5 of the same year. He was then appointed president of the Episcopal Conferences of Yugoslavia, a position traditionally held by the Archbishop of Zagreb.

The situation of the Church was very difficult. The communist regime was fighting with all means against "prejudice and the opium of religion" and, on the other hand, was persecuting the Croats as the most resistant element to the oppression of communism, directed from Belgrade. Šeper demonstrated an enviable ability to promote and awaken Christian sentiment.

He encouraged liturgical reform and the revival of Eucharistic life. He founded the Interdiocesan Liturgical Commission, serving as its first president, and organized parish and then regional missions. The pastoral successes of these missions instilled confidence and courage throughout the diocese.

At the initiative of Archbishop Šeper, special courses were organized to inform the pastoral clergy of the latest developments in theology, as well as courses for training catechists, both men and women, who would help priests impart religious instruction that faced countless obstacles imposed by the communist authorities.

FOUNDER OF THE COUNCIL'S SPOKESMAN AND QUIRT

Archbishop Šeper made a great effort to consolidate the bi-weekly Catholic newspaper Glas Koncila (The Council's Spokesman), the one with the largest circulation in Croatia, despite the restrictions imposed by the communist regime (limited paper quotas, distribution difficulties, etc.). The guiding ideas for this publication, which keeps the religious and national spirit alive in Croatia while disseminating the ecumenical thought of the Second Vatican Council, originated from him.

He also magnanimously supported the initiative of the Council's editorial staff to publish the monthly magazine Mali koncil (The Little Council)—in March 1966—dedicated to young people, which reached a circulation of 87,000 copies. The Archbishop of Zagreb's entrepreneurial spirit also led to the publication of the bulletin Poslusni Duhu (Obedient to the Spirit), which addresses ecumenical issues.

Pope Paul VI elevated him to the cardinalate in early 1965, along with Cardinal Beran of Bohemia and Cardinal Slipyi of Ukraine (three cardinals from socialist countries out of a total of 27). In his radio address of January 25, 1965, the new cardinal interpreted his appointment as "a gift to his Croatian people."

One of his first important actions as cardinal was the creation of the Pope John XXIII Fund for the construction of new churches and the establishment of new parishes in the suburbs of Zagreb and other areas of his vast archdiocese. This idea found understanding and support among the population. To date, 21 parishes have been founded, 8 of them in Zagreb.

To disseminate the ideas of the Council and the spirit of conciliar dialogue within Zagreb's intellectual circles, the cardinal, on the eve of the fourth session of the Council, established the forum Koncilska misao (Conciliar Thought) and entrusted its organization to Dr. José Ladika. Similar forums were later formed in other cities of Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.

The cardinal dedicated considerable effort to charitable work, considering it one of the fundamental tasks of the Church.

Following the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council, thanks precisely to Cardinal Šeper's initiative, the conciliar jubilee was celebrated in Croatia in a more solemn and communal manner than in any other European country.

During the fourth session of the Council—October 22-29, 1965—Cardinal Šeper took an active part in the international congress held in Rome for the reinstitution of the diaconate, a problem that had long concerned him given the need for catechesis in Croatia, then under communist rule.

In his presentation, the cardinal informed those present about the fundamental problems of the Church in Croatia and Yugoslavia: a great lack of information about the new ideological and spiritual currents among Catholics in the West, a result of our long separation from the West to which we belong. Inspired by this event, in the second half of 1966, he gave impetus and support to the publication of the first issue of the new journal Svesci — krscanska sadasnjost (Notebooks — Christian Current Affairs) with the aim of introducing and connecting our intellectuals with theological thought and Christian movements and issues in the West and throughout the world.

At the same time, these "notebooks" seek to bring together educated circles, both lay and clergy, around the ideas of the Second Vatican Council and serve as a tool to encourage all people of goodwill to engage in dialogue with one another. This journal is published by the Catholic institution of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and the Cardinal is working to transform it, on the occasion of its centenary, into a modern Catholic publishing house.

In April 1966, Cardinal Šeper visited the United States of America, where, at the invitation of Archbishop Hurley (the papal nuncio present at the ignominious trial of Stepinac in 1946), he consecrated the new votive church in St. Augustine, built on the site first set foot by Catholic missionaries. On that occasion, the Cardinal visited numerous Croatian parishes and various centers and institutions of Croatian immigrants.

The great work of historical significance, a testament to Cardinal Šeper's open-mindedness and ecumenical spirit, is the publication of the Bible in Croatian (in 1968), a collaborative effort with Croatian writers, philologists, and bibliographers.

Since his elevation to the cardinalate, Šeper's popularity has grown immensely throughout Croatia. He was present, along with enthusiastic crowds, guarded and watched over by armed communist agents, at the religious festivals held in various cities, namely: Sinj, Šibenik, Djakovo, Tekije, Pula, and Trsat, which would be recorded as historical events in Croatia for their religious and national significance.

It is worth adding here the great national pilgrimage to the Holy Land from April 19 to May 5, 1967, presided over by the Cardinal, and the much-discussed Croatian national pilgrimage to the tombs of Saints Peter and Paul, in which more than 5,000 Croatian pilgrims participated, both from the country and from the five continents. This pilgrimage deeply impressed not only Croatian Catholics but also the world press, and it so moved the Holy Father, then ill, that despite medical advice, he appeared on the balcony to express his gratitude and bless the sons and daughters of martyred Croatia. These two pilgrimages are the largest in Croatian history.

When Cardinal Šeper was elected to the doctrinal commission of the Synod of Bishops last autumn with 140 out of 188 votes, Pope Paul VI subsequently appointed him president of this important commission. It was a temporary role with a specific task, but his appointment as president of the synodal commission encouraged many who had begun to fear a certain cooling and stagnation in the reform of the Church.

Šeper's Outstanding Role in the Second Vatican Council

Among the nearly 2,100 Council Fathers, Cardinal Šeper is among the 50 prelates who shaped the course of this great ecclesiastical assembly. This assessment is unanimous among observers of the work carried out at the Council, even though its acts have not yet been published. Šeper was an active member of two preparatory conciliar commissions: the commission on the holy sacraments and the central commission.

At the opening of the sessions, he was part of the main commission "on the doctrine of faith and morals," called the theological commission. J. Dupont, a renowned bibliographer, emphasizes that "Cardinal Šeper's role in the theological commission was very significant and useful." According to Šeper himself (Glas Koncila, 1967, Nos. 25-26), five main themes particularly concerned him in his work at the meetings of the Council Fathers: the introduction of vernacular languages into the liturgy, concelebration, communion under two kinds, the declaration on the Jews, and the diaconate.

His intervention and contribution to the debate on various topics were highly valued, and several of his papers were accepted. In the third session of the Council, he proposed a clear declaration on the Church's attitude toward Jews, which should rule out any possibility that hatred of Jews could be fueled by anything stemming from the Christian faith. As he declared to the Argentine television correspondent: "The gospel of love and peace cannot serve as a basis or motive for hatred and persecution of any people, including the Jewish people."

In the same session, within the framework of the discussion on the schema "The Church in the Contemporary World," he advocated for the right to emigrate and immigrate and for ensuring the human and economic rights of migrants. He also served on the subcommittee that revised the aforementioned schema.

In the fourth session of the Council, Šeper spoke twice: in the discussion on religious freedom and on the problem of atheism in the document "The Church in the Contemporary World." R. Rouquette, a commentator for the French journal Etudes, remarked regarding his first speech that the entire matter of religious freedom should probably be re-examined according to the principle set forth by Cardinal Šeper.

His intervention on atheism attracted widespread attention. "His views were largely incorporated into the outline (MISSI, 2, 1966). The Cardinal was subsequently a member of the commission tasked with revising the text on atheism. The modification generally reflects his ideas without, however, achieving the vigor of his expression or the depth of his thought."

Such was the judgment issued by the chroniclers of the Council, M. von Galli and B. Moosburger (Das Konzil und seine Folgen, Lucerne 1966, p. 258). This speech was reproduced in its entirety by the world press. The cardinal asked that the current phenomenon of atheism not be addressed by condemning it, but rather positively, with the desire to uncover the deep roots of contemporary atheism and explain how Christians conceive of and accept living alongside atheists.

He emphasized that Christians are also partly responsible for the phenomenon of atheism, since God reveals himself to humanity through his Church as the People of God, and not only through nature. The notion of God held by many atheists is not the notion of the authentic God taught and revealed by Christ: "Let us proclaim unequivocally," Šeper said in his address, "that the narrow conservatism and immobility that some constantly attribute to the Catholic Church are inconsistent with the true spirit of the Gospel."

Although the documents concerning the Second Vatican Council will take time to be published, and it is essential to await history's judgment on the role of each council father, we believe it is not inaccurate to affirm that Cardinal Šeper's active participation was very fruitful. The aforementioned commentators von Galli and Moosbrugger write:

"Even during the first and second sessions of the Council, Cardinal Stepinac's successor was highly esteemed. The Archbishop of Zagreb, Dr. Francis Šeper, was, in fact, a very rare exception among the bishops of Eastern Europe, who lived for more than two decades separated from the theological developments of the West and obliged to limit themselves to preserving the Catholic heritage" (ibid., p. 268).

Dr. Tomislav Šagi-Bunic, a well-known Croatian theologian, in his commentary entitled "The ideological profile of the new prefect of the former Sacred Office through his actions at the Council" (Glas Koncila, No. 2(121), Zagreb, 14/1/1969), expressly states: "There is a whole series of ideas and elements incorporated into the conciliar documents due to the efforts of Cardinal Šeper.

Considering his interventions in various forums... especially in the discussion on atheism (which the theologian Ming considers the greatest opening of the Council), in which, along with Cardinal König (Vienna), he was a key figure, we can be certain that Cardinal Šeper's role in the Council was by no means to conform to the majority opinion, but rather a positive enrichment of the conciliar issues and a new approach to important problems of the contemporary Church.

In general, Šeper's stance on so many intricate and delicate problems was moderate, a middle ground between two extremes, between the conservative and the revolutionary currents. He recognized the need to innovate on certain issues and to confront problems courageously, without this implying the destruction or annulment of what is good or taking hasty measures. Šeper maintained the same position at the first meeting of the Synod of Bishops: to weigh the pros and cons. The seriousness of pressing problems, without naive optimism, meant facing them with courage and determination and proceeding to their gradual solution with perseverance and patience. Perhaps this prudent and realistic attitude earned him the trust of the Synod of Bishops, who elected him a member of the synodal theological commission, and later appointed him its president by the Holy Father.

Certainly, this moderate, prudent, active, and creative attitude influenced his subsequent appointment as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This Congregation, instituted by Paul III on July 21, 1542, under the name of "The Sacred Roman and General Inquisition," which should not be confused with medieval inquisitorial tribunals or the Spanish Inquisition, was modified in 1571 by Pius V and in 1588 by Sixtus V. Finally, in 1908, Pope Pius IX suppressed the Congregation of Indulgences. transferring all its powers to the Congregation of the Holy Office.

However, the Holy Office could not prevent the new reformist spirit inaugurated by the Second Vatican Council. Its reform was promulgated on December 7, 1965, with the motu proprio "Integrae Servandae," and since then it has been called the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This Congregation, in the conciliar and ecumenical spirit, is now changing its basic orientation. It will no longer be a mysterious body that watches over the purity of Christian doctrine and morality, pointing out and punishing errors and deviations, but rather an active center that will stimulate creative inquiry in the field of Christian thought, coordinating all efforts to reduce dangers and strengthen optimism, but always moving forward, guided by the ecumenical spirit, as declared by its current prefect, Cardinal Šeper, in his pastoral letter to the clergy of his diocese, prior to his appointment. October 24, 1963:

"It is essential that the Church be able, as soon as possible, to speak theological language that everyone can understand and feel as their own. It is an unavoidable task that, in the new world emerging before our eyes, the Church be able to act as a prudent mother to all, capable of gathering all peoples in the House of the Lord—without any privilege at the expense of others—to guide them on God's path toward eternal salvation." Since grace does not negate nature but rather elevates and perfects it, it is of paramount importance that all people in the House of the Lord may experience the joy of having contributed something to the building of the divine temple and that no contribution be rejected.

ATTRIBUTIONS OF THE CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH

Its primary task is to oversee the doctrine of faith and morals in the Catholic world. It investigates new teachings and promotes theological studies on the subject. It also encourages conferences of theological specialists. In its work, it must now collaborate with local bishops. It can prohibit a book, but must give the author the opportunity to defend themselves and inform their bishop. This congregation is also responsible for resolving matrimonial cases to which "the privilege of faith" does not apply (divorce of a marriage in which one party is not baptized, under certain conditions). It also safeguards the dignity of the sacrament of penance, but here too, the accused have the right to defend themselves.

To fulfill its mission of safeguarding and promoting true doctrine, the Congregation maintains close contact with the papal commission for biblical issues. It is also established that it must have a group of theological specialists from across the Catholic world. Its mode of action is administrative or judicial, depending on the nature of the matter at hand.

CARDINAL ŠEPER AS SEEN BY THE EUROPEAN PRESS

The world press gave extensive coverage to the appointment of the Archbishop of Zagreb as the new prefect of this highly important Congregation. His office was besieged by correspondents from newspapers, radio stations, and television channels. Below, we reproduce a few comments published in prestigious European newspapers.

When asked by correspondents from Paris-Match magazine and a major Western European radio and television network:

"Are you Croatian?" he replied:

"Yes, I am Croatian."

"Where did you study?" — In Rome, along with the late Cardinal Stepinac. We were ordained priests on the same day.

— What memories do you have of that man?

— A beautiful and fond memory. He was a holy man, firm in his convictions. He gave himself entirely to the Church.

— Was it difficult for you to succeed him?

— There were many difficulties, since Cardinal Stepinac was imprisoned.

— What is the current situation of the Church in Yugoslavia?

— We now have a little more religious freedom than before, and we hope to have even greater freedom in the future to promote religious life in our country.

— Do you believe that the experiences gained in socialist society can serve as a warning to others?

— I think so. Corriere della Sera (Milan) commented:

"Cardinal Šeper's position on Church doctrine and discipline is known to be intermediate between the two extreme currents. He could be described as 'moderate.' He adopted a highly balanced and realistic approach during the recent Synod of Bishops, presiding over the work of the theological commission that addressed the very delicate issue of the crisis of faith and discipline in the Church. During these meetings, those unfamiliar with him had the opportunity to appreciate his theological knowledge, which he had already demonstrated at the Council. In contrast to Ottaviani, who climbed every rung of the ecclesiastical ladder without ever leaving Rome, Šeper possesses pastoral experience, acquired in the challenging environment of a large Catholic diocese in a communist country. He recently turned 62."

La Stampa (Turin) points out that Cardinal Ottaviani's departure should be "seen within the broader context of the reform of the Curia that the Pope is carrying out. The Curia, incidentally, is losing its Roman and Italian character to become frankly international and universal, as it should be in a Church that calls itself Catholic. That is why the Pope, who could have chosen from at least 12 cardinals now available in Rome—'unemployed,' as they say in the Curia, half-jokingly, half-bitterly—preferred to call a foreign residential archbishop, the Cardinal of Zagreb. Francis Šeper, 62, formerly secretary and then, since 1960, successor to the celebrated Stepinac, seemed to Paul VI the ideal man, based on an indication, which could be described as democratic, emanating from the Episcopal Synod last autumn."

Paul VI very wisely appointed Šeper president of the theological commission to re-examine the issue (that is, to draft a more objective theological report, later known in the press as the Šeper Report, Ed.) and took the synodal appointment into account when the time came to name Ottaviani's successor. A sign of new times, Šeper's elevation to the post of what remains of the Holy Office is a guarantee that the Church will no longer impose a new Syllabus on us" (condemnation of modern errors from the time of Pius IX, editor's note).

The Turin newspaper then comments on the letter addressed by Paul VI to Cardinal Ottaviani after his resignation and states verbatim: "Ottaviani, therefore, receives recognition for his good service in the best possible way, which does not diminish in the slightest the revolutionary character of his departure." The Wiener Kurier (Vienna) describes this appointment "as an unexpected gesture and an important event with far-reaching consequences: because until now this position was held exclusively by a cardinal of Italian nationality, and now it is assumed by a foreigner from a communist country."

The same Viennese newspaper emphasizes that this appointment is also important because it signifies the continuation of the internationalization of the Roman Curia and is a further sign that the influence of the communist movement is disappearing. Conservative in the Curia.

The prestigious German liberal daily Frankfurter Allgemeine says of Cardinal Šeper that "at the Council he was one of the most prominent figures among the reformist bishops. He advocated for five principles: the vernacular in the liturgy, concelebration, communion with bread and wine, the declaration on the Jews, and the introduction of the permanent diaconate in the Church. He is also known to be very concerned about rapprochement between the Orthodox and Catholics." The commentator concludes that he is "a moderate reformer" and that with his appointment as prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, many things will change in the policies of that powerful ministry... Cardinal Šeper considers himself a liberal cleric... The Croatian Šeper comes from an environment where religion had to contend with state atheism and where poverty had to be fought."

The Frankfurter Rundschau states that this appointment "was received as a sensation for many reasons," given that Cardinal Šeper belongs to the liberal group and, as the first non-Italian to become head of this Congregation. "Cardinal Šeper belongs to the group of younger cardinals and at the Council he advocated for progressive ideas in the Church. With this appointment, the Pope placed him in the third position in the Curia." The same newspaper concludes its article by stating "that ecclesiastical jurists will be interested in the fact that Cardinal Šeper was appointed prefect of this Congregation, which until now has been headed by the Pope himself, who did not exercise this function merely symbolically but influenced its important decisions."

The Messaggero (Rome) states that Cardinal Ottaviani's resignation constitutes "a great and noble gesture from this man, by which he once again demonstrated his magnanimity, leaving the Pope free to reform the Curia." Regarding Šeper, it emphasizes his prudence and decisiveness and his complete lack of ambition for honors, to the point that the Pope practically had to force him to accept the presidency of the synodal doctrinal commission. It highlights his speech at the Council on atheism, in which he stated that partial responsibility for atheism also lies with those Christians who oppose any innovation or modification of the order established for centuries as if it were given and consecrated by God. "The immobility that some attribute to the Church is foreign to the Gospel and the evangelical spirit."

MY CONGREGATION IS NOT A SCARECROW

The bimonthly Informations Catholiques Internationales, Paris, No. 316-24 July 1968, in its Spanish edition, publishes a remarkable article by its Roman correspondent Giancarlo Zizola (pp. 27-32), entitled "The New Face of the Roman Curia", in which he dedicates a part to Cardinal Šeper, which we transcribe verbatim:

"Cardinal Ottaviani's successor is Cardinal Šeper. He is practically a 'young man.' The Archbishop of Zagreb is 63 years old. At the Council, his pronouncements on atheism were particularly noteworthy, and he did not hesitate to attribute part of the responsibility for it to Christians who, defending above all an established order and believing they could do so in God's name, presented a false image of the Gospel.

'You know,' Cardinal Šeper declared, 'that I have moved from a field of activity that is primarily pastoral to a sector of Church service that is completely new to me, and in which I must first and foremost find my bearings. My impressions are excellent. I have been able to verify that my Congregation is not a mysterious office, a bogeyman as is often believed, even among Catholics. Here, we work intensely, in a spirit of decisiveness, for the good of the Church. All decisions are made collegially and collectively during weekly meetings at various levels.'" The motu proprio Integrae Servandae of December 7, 1965, while addressing the condemnation of errors contrary to the doctrine of the faith, places the promotion of theological research at the forefront of the Congregation's tasks.

Therefore, there is a kind of shift in emphasis, with the focus now on the positive, dynamic aspect. Our faith is founded on divine Revelation. Theology is the science of faith; it is the effort of the human spirit to penetrate ever more deeply into the content of Revelation. As in all sciences, progress in theology is both possible and necessary, provided that the substance and meaning of revealed truth, as proposed by the authentic Magisterium of the Church, remain intact.

CROATS IN THE SERVICE OF THE HOLY SEE

Although Croatia is a small nation, its millennia-long history, much of which unfolded in the bloody and constant defense of Western Christian values on its eastern border, can be proud of its many sons who, due to their ability and virtues, held high positions in the government of the Church. Leaving aside the debatable question of Popes from Croatian territory, namely: Pope Gaius IV, a native of Zadar (Zara), Nicholas V, and Sixtus V, it is necessary to mention the Bishop of Zagreb, Augustine Kazotić, who in the 14th century, after governing his diocese for twenty years, moved to the papal palace in Avignon, where he held various high offices. for two years.

Since space does not permit us to list all those who held various diplomatic positions or served as apostolic delegates over the centuries, we will only mention the members of the Roman Curia.

Among the former, we should mention Peter Benissa, a native of Dubrovnik (Ragusa, a Croatian city-state on the Adriatic, abolished by Napoleon), a distinguished diplomat and favorite of Pope Urban VIII, who appointed him his prelate and Secretary of State. He died in Rome in 1642. Petar Stay (Stojkovic), also from Dubrovnik, held the position of head of the Secretariat for Papal Briefs to Princes.

He was renowned as a poet and philosopher, and also a professor at the papal Sapienza University and secretary of the papal Latin schools in Rome. He died in Rome in 1801. Among the Pope's "relatives" was Stephen Gradi (Gradic) (1613-1683), also from Dubrovnik, as custodian of the Vatican Library. He wrote extensively and is considered among Dubrovnik's most illustrious sons. He served for several years in the diplomatic corps of the Holy See.

The Jesuit José Marinovic, an illustrious poet, professor, and dogmatic theologian, was a papal penitentiary and theologian. After the suppression of the Jesuit order, he returned to his native Perast (Boka Kotorska, a picturesque bay on the Croatian Adriatic coast), where he served as parish priest until his death.

Currently, the most prominent and significant figure in the Roman Curia is the Franciscan Carlos Balic, consultant to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (presided over by Cardinal Šeper) and the Congregation for Seminaries, member of the Senate of the Papal Theological Academy, president of the International Papal Marian Academy, etc. (See more details on the life and work of Rev. C. Balic in Studia Croatica, No. 20-21, Year VII, pp. 83-103).

It is also necessary to mention Velimir Capek, now attached to the Congregation for Religious and head of the special commission for matrimonial issues in the Congregation for the Sacraments. The well-known theologian Professor Tomislav Šagi-Bunic is a consultant to the Secretariat for Non-Christians, and Vitomir Jelicic, O.F.M., is a consultant to the Congregation for the Sacraments.

Finally, we have Cardinal Šeper who, assisted by the Secretary of the Congregation, Monsignor Philippe, a 63-year-old Frenchman who has held this position since July 30, 1967, and the Undersecretary, Canon Moeller, a Belgian, now governs one of the most important bodies of the Roman Curia.

Studia Croatica wishes him every success for the good of the Catholic community, the Christian community in general, and all of humanity, wishing him health and personal happiness, convinced that, as a distinguished son of the subjugated Croatian people and successor of the martyr of the faith and Croatian national hero, A. Stepinac, in these changed and evolving circumstances, he will know how to advocate for the inalienable right of his homeland—a right recognized by the Church and pleasing to God—to national self-determination, so that his people may soon shake off the communist yoke and be able to freely profess their religious creed in their free and independent homeland, under a democratic regime that will respect all the political, religious, and human rights of its citizens without distinction of origin, religion, class, or race.

Buenos Aires

ESTEBAN RADIC AND HIS PEASANT MOVEMENT

EUGEN LAXA

THIS YEAR marks the 40th anniversary of the death of the prominent Croatian political leader Esteban Radic. His role in recent Croatian history is so significant that it warrants extensive commentary. He is, in fact, one of the most representative figures in Croatian history during the first half of the 20th century.

Before addressing the topic, I will attempt to illustrate the prevailing conditions in Croatia when Radic began his political career, which will help readers better understand the outstanding personality of this Croatian leader. We are referring to the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, in Croatia, as in almost all Central and Eastern European countries, peasants constituted a large percentage of the population (up to 80%).

Politically, Croatia was a kingdom associated with Hungary and Austria, still retaining some attributes of its sovereignty. Following the extinction of the national dynasty, Croatia entered into a personal union with Hungary in 1102 (sharing only common kings). This union lasted, with some interruptions, until 1527, when the Croatian estates elected the Habsburg monarchs as their kings in Cetinje.

Although, under the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868, Croatia was guaranteed the right to independence in various jurisdictions, Hungarian interference persisted, constantly creating extremely difficult and tense situations. It is worth noting that Dalmatia was still under direct Austrian rule, while Bosnia and Herzegovina had been occupied by the Danubian Monarchy since 1878.

The peasantry, as it existed in Croatia at that time, is virtually nonexistent today. In the West, and especially in the Americas, peasants have long been integrated into commercial activity and technological progress to such an extent that they have ceased to be peasants in the traditional sense. Meanwhile, communism in most Central and Eastern European countries destroyed rural structures, altered the land ownership system, and forced most peasants to abandon the countryside and seek work in the city or employment in state-run agricultural cooperatives.

In the period we are referring to, the Croatian peasant lived with his family in the countryside, which for centuries and generations had been the property of his ancestors. In the villages, with little change, generations followed one another, attached to their native land, faithful to age-old traditions and customs, and respectful of the ethical and moral principles inherited from previous generations.

The peasant lived in his village, and his fellow peasants shared with him the same principles, problems, joys, and sorrows. Such a social environment further united each peasant with his neighbors and his village. Land ownership was inalienable. The family's existence depended on its possession and proper cultivation.

The fact that these families could sustain themselves for so long was due to a specific land tenure system—the Croatian family land tenure system called Zadruga (Cooperative), which, due to its originality, is the subject of study by specialists from abroad as well. Zadruga was a self-sufficient economic unit, consisting of several related families of 20 to 60 members.

They shared the same home, cultivated the land, and raised animals. All members of Zadruga worked according to their sex, age, and ability. Zadruga met the needs of its members, even making their own clothing and footwear. Other needs were met by small artisans from the nearest towns.

In Zadruga, all members enjoyed equal rights, shared equally in the income, and elected a leader each year to direct the activities of this community. In earlier times, the peasant bartered, that is, exchanged his products for the artisan's goods. As the monetary system spread, the need for silver grew daily. Peasants incurred debts, leading to economic crises and the subsequent partitioning of Zadruga, the division of their land into parcels, and a decline in their standard of living. Peasants lacked the cash to pay for many goods they had previously produced at home. Money was always scarce due to insufficient markets for agricultural products. The 1880 Zadruga Law permitted its division, prompting the partitioning of peasant property into small plots, often insufficient to support a family.

Furthermore, peasants occupied the lowest rung of the social ladder. In Croatia proper, serfdom was abolished in 1848, and even free peasants could not reach the level of small artisans or merchants, let alone parish priests or lawyers. These people, living in cities and towns, as if they had separated themselves from their own villages, paid no attention to the peasants, showing them contempt and even hostility.

All of this was a consequence of foreign influence on the petty bourgeoisie, attracted by imported values and ignorant of the genuine values of their own people. This contrast intensified when the children of peasants, having graduated from higher schools or trained in craft centers, returned from the cities closest to their native villages and became more fervent defenders of the "lords" against the peasants.

Politically, the peasants were no better off. The right to vote could only be exercised by those who paid more than 25 florins (about 10 dollars) in direct taxes (while state and municipal employees were exempt from this limitation), which represented much more than the average peasant paid.

For this reason, the peasant was not electorally interesting. The political parties of the time, despite their lofty patriotic ideals, had no interest in the peasant. He was not a political subject but merely an object. No one liked to approach this peasantry, which, both in terms of its numbers and its traditions, was the backbone of the Croatian people.

In such an environment, the brothers Ante and Esteban Radic were born to peasant parents in 1868 and 1871, respectively, in the village of Trebarjevo, not far from Zagreb. As children, they experienced peasant life and all its moral principles, thanks to which they were able to remain healthy and honest. Their parents, having been progressive peasants themselves, were able to provide the two exceptionally intelligent boys with a higher education. Ante, the elder, dedicated himself to philology and philosophy, while Esteban, the younger, preferred law and the political and social sciences.

Even as a student and later as a young professor, Ante Radic was struck by the prevailing imbalance in the Croatian socio-political landscape. On one hand, bourgeois politicians engaged in heated debates about abstract principles, while on the other, the vast peasant masses lay in a state of lethargy.

Ante Radic accurately perceived that in Croatia, it was precisely the peasants who, throughout centuries of foreign invasion and interference, had preserved their language and native customs, thus maintaining national identity, while the bourgeoisie, under German, Italian, and Hungarian influence, was becoming increasingly detached from the majority of the population. Seeing this state of affairs, and being himself the son of peasants, he decided to take action to enlighten and awaken these peasant masses in order to secure for them the appropriate position in society, commensurate with their importance.

With this purpose in mind, he began publishing his fortnightly newspaper, Dom, in 1898. Ante Radic envisioned that only peasants would contribute to this newspaper, addressing the problems of daily life in a clear and simple manner. His greatest joy was receiving countless letters, written with the clumsy hand of peasants, expressing their solidarity with the opinions published in Dom.

Dom soon became the favorite reading material in every village in Croatia. The peasants of mainland Croatia realized that the peasants of Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Srijem thought just like them. This shared perspective bore living witness to the unity of Croatian peasants. Ante Radic's work in drafting the Symposium on the Life and Customs of the People, published by the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Zagreb, was also of considerable importance.

Thanks to surveys with 1,600 questions covering all aspects of peasant life, from oral tradition and moral principles to tools and utensils, Ante Radic was the first to systematically codify the ethnological treasure, securing his place as Croatia's first sociologist. He worked in the sociological and cultural field until his death on February 10, 1919. His death was a grave blow to the Party, of which he was the intellectual father and founder.

But Ante Radic, a composed, calm, and scientifically methodical man, lacked the inner fire, the tribune's drive to mobilize that enormous mass of people, forge their political consciousness, and elevate them to the dignity of a political subject. These qualities and this task were assumed by his brother Esteban, who, after completing his studies in Prague and Paris, returned to Croatia in 1902.

A temperamental and contagious spirit, full of dynamism and activity, he was an excellent student. Although his eyesight was failing, he read quickly and possessed an extraordinary memory. Even as a secondary school student, he participated in student demonstrations, and as a university student, his involvement in the burning of the Hungarian flag led to his expulsion from the University, forcing him to complete his studies in Prague.

Radic did not adhere to Masaryk's ideas, despite the latter being the true political leader in Prague, because, in Radic's opinion, his ideas were alien to the Croatian people. On the contrary, he embraced the ideas of Pan-Slavism, which were very much in vogue at that time. A romantic idealist, he embraced these ideas and was a great champion of Pan-Slavism, envisioning in it the salvation of all Slavs from German expansion.

After completing his law studies in Prague, he moved to Paris, where he passed his final exams at the École Supérieure des Sciences Politiques with excellent marks.

Upon returning to his country, he agreed with his brother Ante that the main political force in agricultural communities was their peasantry, especially in Croatia, where they constituted more than 80% of the population. Therefore, Esteban Radic began visiting the villages. Even in his first encounters with the peasants, he proved to be an extraordinary orator, captivating his listeners and turning them into fervent followers and collaborators.

He spoke to them in their language, about their problems, instilling in them faith in a better future, when the peasants themselves would decide their own destiny. Radic immediately recognized the danger of Marxist ideology and was able to synthesize the deep religiosity of the Croatian peasant and their attachment to the land into two simple slogans, which until recently remained the motto of his movement: Faith in God and peasant unity, and Let us be masters of what is ours, let us defend our home together.

THE PEASANTS AWAKEN

The work of the Radic brothers bore fruit. The peasant masses began to organize, creating a sense of need for a political party. In 1902, Esteban published a work entitled "The Strongest Party in Croatia," which addressed the future peasant party.

In the newspaper Hrvatska Misao (May 1904), among the guiding principles of the new party, he proclaimed: "The Croatian Peasant Party is not a class party but a national one, and as such, it upholds all our political ideals, primarily the ideal of the independence and territorial integrity of the Croatian state."

While the new party lacked adherents in the capital, its spirit transcended to all the communes, even the most remote and the poorest, and everywhere it instilled hope in justice, freedom, and progress.

At the preparatory meeting for the party's formation, held in 1904, Ante Radic declared that his party would be based on the idea of a Croatian state and on peasant consciousness. The party was formally established in December 1904. Its first Executive Committee consisted of 19 intellectuals and 2 peasants, but by early 1905 the Committee had expanded, with peasants becoming the majority. Ante Radic was elected president and held this position until his tragic death. In 1906, Dom became the party's official publication, owning its own printing press, whose shareholders were almost exclusively peasants.

The authorities placed many obstacles in the way of the new party, prohibiting its rallies and meetings because they considered it revolutionary, as it demanded the right to vote for all those obligated to perform military service and pay taxes. Radic and his collaborators continued working diligently, but the most arduous part of this enormous task was carried out by the peasants themselves who, after strenuous daily labor, went from house to house, from village to village, spreading the new doctrine.

These were the apostles of the peasant movement, selfless men, good farmers—for according to peasant logic, he who does not know how to manage his own household well cannot set an example or guide others.

Along with the rulers, all the other parties opposed the new movement, sensing the danger posed by the peasant masses who were only now beginning to realize their strength. They sensed that the peasant party was the adversary that would surpass them. In the political arena of Croatia at that time, two parties dominated: the Croatian-Serbian Coalition and the Constitutionalist Party under the leadership of Joseph Frank.

While the former was opportunistic and maintained cordial relations with the Hungarian rulers, the latter openly opposed the government. The Peasant Party adopted the concept of Croatian state law from the Constitutionalist Party, criticizing it only for neglecting the peasantry and focusing almost exclusively on state and political issues.

Shortly afterward, the Croatian People's Party, with its clerical leanings, was formed. It adopted a hostile stance toward the Peasant Party, likely because many parish priests, then the only link between the countryside and the city, considered the countryside their exclusive domain. Their attacks went so far that the Archbishop of Zagreb, Antonio Bauer, prohibited such attacks from the pulpit in 1911. It should be noted that Croatian peasants are very religious, but not clerical.

Despite everything, the Party grew stronger every day. In the 1908 elections, it won three seats, nine in 1910, and eleven in 1911. However, in the 1913 elections, it was reduced to three seats due to electoral coalitions. aimed at preventing the victory of the peasant candidates.

When Radic learned of this result, he exclaimed: "Magnificent! Whenever we have to overcome a great obstacle, we must take a few steps back to gain momentum. You'll see, next time we'll win the majority." He was right, for in the next elections, which, due to the war, were held seven years later, the Peasant Party obtained an overwhelming majority.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PEASANT PARTY

At the beginning of 1905, the first party program was drafted. Then, in 1920, following a profound change in the situation, it was supplemented by another program entitled "The Fundamental Principles." This program is based on the ideas propagated by the Radic brothers, according to which the people possess their own soul, their own legal concepts, their own clothing and customs—in short, their own ancient culture.

"When we speak of our culture, we think of our old tradition, based on Christian civilization, and therefore we must establish and promote institutions of our law, our literature, music, and arts, and above all, our national politics" [13]. "Our policy is that of the father and shepherd, inspired by the idea that the citizen and the patriot must defend the interests of the people just as a father cares for his son and a shepherd for his flock. Beautiful phrases are not enough if the people are not given the opportunity and the possibility of deciding their own destiny. The covert politics of the bourgeois parties must be replaced by a frank and open policy, supported by the most national, most numerous, and most deserving class: the peasant class" [14].

By bourgeois politics, our party considers efforts aimed at prolonging bureaucratic arbitrariness as well as the arbitrariness of the aristocracy and capital. The peasant is a unique individual, a person of integrity according to the doctrine of the Peasant Party. His main work is cultivating the land with the help of his family. He differs substantially from the farm laborer who works for wages on someone else's land, as well as from the landowner for whom the land is merely a source of income. The peasant who lives on his land, under the open sky, is close to God and nature, under the constant influence of the mysterious cosmos. He feels that man depends on God, nature, and his destiny. This feeling bestows harmony and tranquility upon his soul, and for this reason, the peasant abhors the hustle and bustle and the tense struggle for life waged by city dwellers.

With peace and love in his soul, the peasant wants to live a quiet and simple life within his family. The peasant is the staunchest defender of the people, and a people cannot disappear as long as its peasant class remains numerous... "The peasants are the economic backbone of the people, the source of their native civilization and their political power" [15].

Already in the 1905 program, it was emphasized that the peasant movement was not only political, but also cultural and economic. In the cultural sphere, the establishment of branches of the Peasant Union was envisioned with the purpose of preserving the cultural achievements of the peasant world, namely: their national costumes, customs, and native crafts, and of promoting literacy in underdeveloped regions.

This organization was to promote all sectors of peasant cultural life, from supporting peasant writers to the reforestation of mountainous and rocky regions.

In the economic sphere, the Economic Union was envisioned, whose objective was to improve and alleviate the economic situation of the peasantry, beginning with the distribution of seeds and plants, including fertilizers, followed by the education of young people in agriculture, fruit growing, and viticulture, the acquisition of agricultural implements and machinery, boats and nets for fishermen, securing credit for peasants, and the sale of their products and manufactures without intermediaries.

These two organizations reached full development and achieved considerable success only 30 years later, thus confirming the forward-thinking spirit of their founders. From its inception, the Croatian Peasant Party had as its political objective the restoration of Croatia's national independence. "Just as a man is not complete without his own home, neither is a people complete without its own state," was a recurring theme in Radic's doctrine. "Whoever desires the freedom of his people also desires it for his country, because, resisting the domination of man by man, he cannot remain indifferent when one people groans under the yoke of another" [16]. Thus, for example, the preface to the party's 1905 program states that "the party will work for the complete unity of the Croatian people living in a continuous territory, and for the organization of their own state with legislation and institutions founded on the concept of the modern state."

With this formulation, the party accepted and embraced the idea of Croatian historical statehood, emphasizing two very important aspects of state tradition: antiquity and continuity. Since the 7th century, Croatia has had its own state, and no one later, despite various unions with Hungarians and Austrians, denied it the attributes of a sovereign state, until Croatia was forcibly incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918.

PACIFISM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE

Despite this national objective, which demanded a hard struggle for the recovery of the full sovereignty of its people, Radic was a true pacifist. But he conceived it in these terms: "Our Croatian pacifism is not wishful thinking but merely the negation of the old Prussian-Austrian militarism of the past and of Serbian militarism of the present; it is a forceful affirmation of the unwavering will and determination of a sovereign people to defend their homeland, their achievements, their state, and the republican constitution against all external enemies, with all their moral and material resources."

For the state organization, as conceived by the party, the family home, the family community, similar to the old Zadruga, where all family members were equal co-owners and where all decisions were made by vote, should serve as a paradigm and example. The village is an economic unit, organized as a cooperative.

Then comes the commune, in which each peasant has as many votes as there are people in his household. A certain number of communes constitute a župania (commitatus), where professionals are in charge of administration, etc. A župania is an autonomous political body, analogous to Swiss cantons or British counties. Cities have župania status, where all citizens, regardless of sex or profession, have the right to vote and participate in the administration of city affairs.

The head of state is elected by direct vote, holding all the attributes of a head of state, typical of a presidential system. Through a plebiscite, the people can recall the head of state, dissolve the Sabor (parliament), and propose and repeal laws. The Sabor is elected for four years by all citizens of both sexes over the age of 18. One deputy is elected for every 6,000 votes. The judiciary is independent and empowered to rule on the constitutionality of passed laws. With a view to reducing bureaucracy, the formation of professional institutions is provided for, namely: chambers of labor, crafts, commerce, etc.

Regarding Croatia's relationship with its neighbors, Esteban Radic, a skilled politician and statesman, considered several alternatives in his calculations. If complete Croatian independence proved impossible, it could become part of other multinational political bodies.

Thus, the party platform of 1905 took into account the Danubian Confederation, while the 1921 platform replaced it with an "international community" of South Slavs, including Bulgarians, because without them there would be no true South Slavic community.

Radic's political realism is very characteristic of what he said to Masaryk during his visit to Prague in early 1919. He reproached him for the destruction and partition of Austria-Hungary instead of fighting for its democratic and federal reorganization, then added verbatim: "It won't be 20 years before the German steamroller runs over you and then over us." Aren't these words prophetic?

There are authors, especially in Yugoslavia, who try to portray Radic as a supporter of the current Yugoslav idea, which is a clear falsification. Radic refuted such interpretations, stating: "Precisely because I am a Slav, I will always remain, until my last breath, in all my work, an unwavering Croat" [17].

Furthermore, in other works, the Radic brothers never miss an opportunity to emphasize Croatian national identity, categorically opposing attempts to reduce Croats to the status of a tribe. "The Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgarians are four ethnic entities, not four tribes" [18].

Regarding the Serbian minority in the Croatian provinces [19], the Radic brothers opposed all conflicts and struggles, favoring harmony and peace, while considering antagonisms to be the result of external instigation. "Peace and unity will only prevail when Serbs can spontaneously and openly say: 'We are Serbs! Long live Croatia!'"

Without a doubt, Radic's Peasant Party considered it ideal to maintain good relations with Serbia. The best way to achieve this, they believed, was for Croats and Serbs to organize their own independent states. A unified state would destroy these good and friendly relations. Speaking of Norwegian-Swedish ties, and alluding to Croatian-Serbian relations, Radic aptly observed: "...the Norwegians not only remained good neighbors and friends of the Swedes, but also renewed their fraternal relations with them."

DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

During the First World War, Radic's party continued its work. This work was obviously hampered by conscription and poor economic conditions. Thousands upon thousands of small meetings had been held in peasant homes. However, the balance of power in Sabor remained the same as in 1913. There, the Croatian-Serbian Coalition held sway, under the leadership of Svetozar Pribicevic, to Croatian Serb, who received instructions from the Belgrade government. According to his wishes and Serbian instructions, Belgrade's policy aimed to annex all the Slavic regions of the monarchy and thus create a Greater Serbia.

It was under these general conditions that the Croats entered 1918, the most tragic year in their entire national history. All the calamities and misfortunes, looting, and massacres to which the Croatian people have been subjected since then, directly or indirectly, are a consequence of that hastily arranged and imposed union of Croatia and Serbia.

The political evolution in the years leading up to and during the First World War was not favorable to the Croats, as they were betrayed by both sides of the Danubian Monarchy, sometimes by the Hungarian side, sometimes by the Austrian side. Given this situation, and as a result of skillful Serbian propaganda, especially regarding their successes in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, small groups of the Croatian intelligentsia began to look to Serbia for their salvation.

Consequently, the Yugoslav idea resonated with these political circles, which favored Croatian union with the Serbs, and according to different interpretations, in a federal or confederal form. In this context, and as a preliminary step, on October 29, 1918, the National Council, composed of delegates from all the Slavic regions of the Monarchy that embraced the Yugoslav idea, proclaimed the separation of Croatia from Austria-Hungary. The day before, Radic, in the Sabor session, demanded that Croatia be proclaimed a sovereign state and an integral part of the state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, abolishing the union and ties with the Dual Monarchy and the Habsburg dynasty.

Croatia proper, the part that officially comprised the Danubian political community, was to become the political and administrative center of all the Slavic regions of the former Monarchy. No friendly army—Serbian, French, English, or American—or enemy army should set foot on Croatian soil. These demands of Radic did not prosper.

The Sabor adopted Pribicevic's proposal to separate from Austria-Hungary, voting for the union with Serbia of the entire ethnic space of Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs, without any consideration of territorial or state boundaries, on the sole condition that the Constituent Assembly would decide on the form of the common state and its government.

The army of the Dual Monarchy was already disintegrating, and the forests of Croatia were filled with deserters who feared being drafted again and sent to the front lines. Great fear spread among the Croatian population regarding Italy's claims to Dalmatia, promised by the 1915 Pact of London as a reward for siding with the Western Allies.

This psychosis of fear and confusion was exploited by the Yugoslavs to finalize the union with Serbia as quickly as possible. Svetozar Pribicevic, vice-president of the National Council, a true traitor to Croatia, in constant contact with the Serbian government and its military headquarters, while the Croats, along with Trumbic abroad, could not make contact with Zagreb, carried out the coup within the National Council and on 11/27/1918 sent a delegation to Belgrade which, with the Regent of Serbia, proclaimed on 12/1/1918 the union of Croatia with the Kingdom of Serbia.

To clarify the scope and meaning of this "union," it is necessary to transcribe what Radic said in the previous discussions on the matter: "If the Serbs truly desire such a state and a centralist government, God help them... but as for us Croats, we want a federal republic... You know very well that the National Council does not represent the people because they did not elect it. Why haven't you convened a plenary session of all groups to vote on such a momentous decision? Because you know you are acting wrongly, and everything would become clear in a public debate. Your desire is to circumvent this Sabor, which is the worst form of unconstitutionality... You are terribly mistaken if you think you can disregard more than a thousand years of the Croatian state's history.

You are trampling on all your promises and obligations to the Croatian people, everything you have said or written, wishing to do something that has never been discussed with the people and that the people would never approve with their vote... Our The peasants—nine-tenths of the Croatian population—won their full human dignity in this war. They no longer wish to be servants of anyone, nor slaves of foreigners or fellow countrymen, of foreign states or their own, but rather they desire that their state be free, republican, just, and humane…

You are going to Belgrade. Without the Croatian people and against their will, you will proclaim state unification and then continue, without fear or shame, to govern according to the old laws and through servile and corrupt officials. Try to understand that nationality is something deeper and broader than language… From our work, the people expect freedom and new rights, rights in their homes, in their villages, and throughout the entire country. Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs are three brothers. Each has the right to be consulted.”

“You are going to Belgrade. Without the Croatian people and against their will, you will proclaim state unity and then continue, without fear or shame, to govern according to the old laws and through servile and corrupt officials. Try to understand that nationality is something deeper and broader than language… From our work, the people expect freedom and new rights, rights in their homes, in their villages, and throughout the entire country. Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs are three brothers. Each has the right to be consulted.” After Radic's speech, a great uproar erupted in Sabor, and the mob, organized by Pribicevic's agents, threatened Radic with death. He escaped by seeking refuge in the adjacent St. Mark's Church. The antagonism and divergence between Radic and Pribicevic were thus manifested in such a clear and dramatic way.

The Croatian peasants vehemently opposed the proclaimed union. In every Croatian village, cheers for the Republic were heard. When the Serbian army arrived to pacify the people with rifle butts and blows from sticks, these cheers turned into shouts of: "Down with King Peter!" (the Serbian king). Stefan Radic, for his part, fascinated by the impact of Wilson's propaganda principles, believed he could pull the Croatian cart out of the mire into which it had once again fallen.

To this end, in February 1919, he sent Wilson a memorandum with 384,000 signatures, requesting permission to convene a Constituent Assembly for the neutral Croatian republic. The effort proved fruitless. In March of the same year, the party's Steering Committee drafted and published a resolution denying the new state's government any legal standing and protesting all its administrative measures.

When Belgrade learned that this resolution had been translated into several languages and sent to foreign powers, it ordered and carried out Radić's arrest on March 25, 1919.

His experience of his first contact with the Serbian prison was harrowing: he was alone in his cell, beaten and humiliated. He suffered so much that he considered leaving Croatia and settling abroad.[20]

THE CROATS AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

But as soon as the elections for the Constituent Assembly of Yugoslavia were held on November 10, 1920, Belgrade released Radic from prison. These elections were a triumph for him, which prompted him to change the party's name. Until then, it had been called the Croatian People's Party, and from then on, it would be called the Croatian Republican Peasant Party. The election results for Croatia were as follows: Radic obtained 230,590 votes, while the revived right-wing party won 10,880, and Dr. Trumbic 6,585.

Radic's opponents, that is, the Croats in Sabor who favored union with Serbia, obtained a total of 25,867 votes. Consequently, these elections were a true Croatian plebiscite against Yugoslavia, thanks, first and foremost, to the political action of Radic and his party.

That is why the Croatian deputies left the Constituent Assembly, and the Serbs, to obtain the majority needed to promulgate the Constitution, bribed some deputies from the Turkish minority in Macedonia, paying them $6,000,000. In this way, the "legal foundations" of monarchical Yugoslavia were established.

From then on, Belgrade reacted to the Croatian opposition with widespread terrorism. Despite everything, and perhaps precisely because of it, Radic's strength grew steadily. In the parliamentary elections of March 18, 1923, his party obtained 473,733 votes. His organizations multiplied constantly.

Faced with this situation, Belgrade feared that the same policies could be transplanted to Serbia. Radic was becoming the leader of the entire opposition. The elections continue to demonstrate that his success was not accidental, a consequence of a provisional postwar state, but rather that Radic was the protagonist and promoter of a new politics deeply rooted in the soul of his people. Humanism, freedom, and justice are its most salient features.

The Radic phenomenon and his party have transcended the borders of Croatia. Zagreb became the center of opposition forces in the former provinces of the Danubian Monarchy. There, the Slovenian delegates (Slovenska Ljudska Stranka) and the Bosnian Muslims met, forming the federalist bloc, which Radic characterized as follows: "What we have achieved is more than a federalist bloc. The Slovenes, the Croats, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with their 111 deputies, 700,000 voters, and almost 5 million inhabitants awakened and organized, are united against Belgrade's centralism..." [21]

THE FAILED ATTEMPT AT COMPROMISE

To avoid danger and worse consequences, the Serbian government tried to re-establish contact with Radic. When Belgrade refused to repeal the Constitution passed against the will of the Croatian people, and in the wake of relentless persecution and police terror, Radic went first to Paris and then to London.

His complaints were ignored. From there, he went to Moscow without achieving anything. In Paris and London, he said, they were only interested in whether the capital that the Anglo-French bourgeoisie had invested in Yugoslavia would yield a good return, while "the communists are not looking for allies but only submissive servants," as he told Dr. Macek after his return from Moscow in August 1924. Belgrade shrewdly took advantage of this trip to Moscow, and the new law, called Obznana, which banned the Communist Party, was also extended to the Croatian Peasant Party. Consequently, in January 1925, all the party leaders were imprisoned. A month before the new parliamentary elections of December 8, 1925, Radic was arrested for the second time.

Despite all these measures directed against the Croatian peasant movement, his party won in all the districts of Croatia and Dalmatia and, in coalition with the Muslims, also obtained a majority in all the districts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[22] Despite this democratic triumph, Radic remained imprisoned. The Serbian government had its plans for him.

In prison, he received messages from all sides; from friends and adversaries alike. Of course, the latter warned him that he could be sentenced to 10 years in prison and that he would face the same torture he had already experienced in Serbian prisons. From the outside, there was no news of understanding or relief. In this state of mind, Belgrade, eager to regain its political prestige both domestically and internationally, offered Radic a compromise.

To forge a new path of struggle, Radic, through his nephew and party deputy, Pavle Radic, after lengthy discussions, declared on March 27, 1925, in the Belgrade parliament that the Croatian Peasant Party recognized the current political status, the regime, the Constitution, and the dynasty. Following this declaration, four of Radic's deputies joined the Belgrade government, and Radic himself, released from prison two months later, was appointed Minister of Education.

But Radic, attuned to the pulse of his people, immediately realized that this was a policy that displeased them and that the new path was misguided. To recover, at least partially, Radic launched an offensive against corruption in the ministries and even in the royal court. But the Croatian people heeded the voice of their conscience.

Indeed, in the elections of September 11, 1927, and despite Radic's removal from the government on April 15, 1926, his number of votes decreased by some 200,000. Nevertheless, from his seat in parliament, Radic, with his wit, oratorical talent, and arguments, made himself even more of a thorn in the side of the Serbian government than when it was completely abstaining. Now, out of the ministry, new avenues of struggle opened up for him. We have already seen that S. Pribicevic and E. Radic clashed in 1918, since Pribicevic "manufactured" the union of Croatia with Serbia, while Radic fought against it with all the strength of a national leader who was at that time at the beginning of his political career. But by 1926, Pribicevic had fallen out of favor with Belgrade and the Serbian dynasty.

Therefore, in October 1927, he formed the so-called Democratic-Peasant Coalition with Radic. In this way, he sought to achieve two objectives: to strengthen his political position, since his peasant party and Pribicevic's democratic party constituted four-fifths of all voters in the Slavic provinces of the former Danubian Monarchy, and to persuade the Serbian minority in Croatia, loyal to Pribicevic, to cease acting as a "fifth column" in the service of Belgrade against their homeland, Croatia.

But as the proverb says, man proposes and God disposes, and Radic rapidly approached the fatal end of his political career and his turbulent life. During a session of the Belgrade parliament on June 20, 1928, Serbian deputy Punisa Radic opened fire on Croatian deputies, killing Pavle Radic and Grigory Basaricek and seriously wounding Esteban Radic, Juan Pernar, and Juan Grandja. Radic died on August 8, 1928, from the wounds he received in this attack. Thus ended tragically his attempt at compromise with Serbia.

RESPONSIBILITY — WHOSE?

Much has been written about the responsibility for this horrendous crime. Last year, the Croatian historian Zvonimir Kulundžić published a 600-page book, entitled The Assassination of Stephen Radić, in which he irrefutably holds the Serbian dynasty and its government responsible. This was planned from the very beginning of the organization of the new state.

King Alexander had said to Matko Laginja in 1920, speaking of Radić: "It's either my head or his!" The opportunity arose during discussions about the ratification of the so-called Nettuno Conventions (a series of agreements with Italy concerning border limits to the detriment of Croatia).

The Serbian government urged their ratification as a precondition for obtaining a loan from London banks. The Croats made ratification conditional on the government's obligation to distribute the credit proportionally and according to each region's tax rate. Croatia and the other provinces of the former Danubian Monarchy paid three-fifths of these taxes.

But Belgrade offered only 3 billion dinars, while it wanted to dispose of another 9 billion as it pleased. Radic and his supporters wanted to invest this money in the most backward and neglected areas under the Belgrade regime. Of course, the discussions dragged on without resolution.

To put an end to them, the Serbian government opted for a criminal solution: the assassination of Radic and the intimidation of his deputies. And so it was done. Among a series of clues and threads pointing to King Alexander and his government as the true organizers of the crime, we highlight the following. Between June 16 and 26, 1928, an inter-parliamentary meeting on trade issues took place in Paris. Radic, as president of his parliamentary club, had the right to participate in the meeting, but the Serbian royal court did not allow him to travel. This leads us to deduce that his death was planned for that critical time, which indeed occurred on June 20, 1928. The assassination attempt was carried out, and Radic succumbed to his wounds on August 8 of the same year.

END OF A HISTORICAL PERIOD

With the death of Radic, a period in the recent history of the Croatian people comes to an end. Radic was a pacifist who abhorred all forms of violence. His methods of struggle were legal, political, and judicial. Had he survived this criminal attack, we are certain he would have shown his people the true path to avoid the catastrophes that befell them two decades later.

A true national leader, a humanist politician, full of dynamism, endowed with extraordinary political imagination, and deserving of the unlimited trust of his people, could have found the solution and prevented the disasters of the Second World War.

Dr. Vladimir Macek was elected as his successor. The situation was difficult, as it always is when one assumes the legacy of a near-genius, a man who radiates extraordinary dynamism. The difficulty of Dr. Macek's situation becomes evident when one considers that, by temperament, he was more inclined toward the ideas of Tolstoy and Gandhi, completely forgetting that his adversaries and those of his people were not English, nor were his supporters the resigned Russian peasants.

The Croatian people demanded action, while Macek preached passive resistance. Amid this misunderstanding, the disorientation and confusion of the leaders of Radić's party, Belgrade proclaimed the dictatorship of the Serbian dynasty on January 6, 1929, turning Croatia into a vast prison. All political parties, all political activity, even the Croatian name and national symbols were banned.

Einstein and H. Mann sent a lengthy memorandum to the German League for Human Rights, requesting protection for the Croatian people—a "peaceful and civilized" people, as they described them—but violence prevailed. The name of the state—The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—was changed by the will of the dictatorial king and from then on was called:

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The creation of a unified nation, the Yugoslav nation, was formally pursued, while in reality the aim was to ensure the definitive subjugation of all peoples and national minorities under Belgrade's rule, and first and foremost, the Croatian people. The persecution of Croats was a daily occurrence.

This situation prevailed until 1934 when the assassination attempt against the dictatorial king Alexander was carried out, organized by Pavelié, his henchmen, and the Macedonians. The rudder of the state, shaken to its foundations, passed into the hands of the Regency, headed by Alexander's nephew, Prince Paul Karageorgevic. He loosened the reins, granting little freedom.

The people accepted this enthusiastically, and the peasant party of Radic also resumed its activities. The following year—1935—general elections were held under the Constitution, decreed in 1931, guaranteeing all preferences to the single official party. However, the opposition, under the leadership of Dr. Macek, obtained 797,197 votes in the Croatian regions, including Dalmatia and Bosnia, against the government candidate—Prime Minister Jeftic—who garnered only 520,144 votes.

But despite this overwhelming victory for the opposition, the internal situation remained unchanged: the gendarmes and police acted arbitrarily, leading to bloody clashes with the people that often ended in massacres (Senj and Sibinj, for example).

But the terror was nearing its end. In the 1938 elections, granted by Serbian Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovic, the opposition won 943,964 votes in the Croatian regions, compared to 429,964 for the government. The Croatian Peasant Party, out of those 943,964 votes, obtained 791,332.

After this victory, the people felt that new times were approaching and that Yugoslavia was rapidly heading towards its end. Radic's party reached its golden age. Organizations in Croatian villages and cities were built upon the old foundations. Branches of the Peasant Union were formed, and the Economic Union was created, becoming a very powerful organization. The Peasant Guard and the Urban Guard were organized (paramilitary organizations under the guidance and supervision of former Croatian officers of the Austro-Hungarian army and reservists of the Yugoslav army).

The party's strength reached its peak. Rarely in the history of a people had such internal unity and cohesion been seen. It was precisely for this reason that the Serbian Prince Paul, fearful for the existence of his state and under external pressure, in view of the possibility of a new world war, concluded the Compromise with the Croats on August 26, 1939.

Croatia obtained a certain precarious autonomy and limited jurisdiction over most of its provinces. Without the threat of war, further development in this direction was unlikely. The Serbs awaited the opportune moment to revoke everything that had been granted to the Croats, but the Croats, for their part, awaited the opportune moment to free themselves completely from the Serbian yoke. This moment was really approaching for both opposing sides.

On March 25, 1941, the Serbian government joined the Tripartite Pact of the Axis powers, following months of discussions between Hitler and Prince Paul. Despite the Pact being discussed and signed by the Serbs, on March 27, 1941, Serbian military circles staged a coup, allegedly well-funded by British intelligence.

The putsch was formally directed against the Pact, whose objective was to keep Yugoslavia out of the war, but in reality, it was carried out against the Croats, who, in the Serbs' view, had gained too much freedom. The Serbs thus saw their long-awaited day. The Croats, impatient, awaited theirs.

Hitler, enraged by Serbian betrayal, marched his troops on Yugoslavia. In 14 days, this house of cards collapsed. The people, especially the Croatians, subjugated and persecuted for so long by Serbian oppression, welcomed the destruction of their prison. Thus, on April 8, 1941, two army units rebelled in the Croatian city of Bjelovar, proclaiming the Independent Republic of Croatia.

The development of the general situation inspired enthusiasm among the Croatian people because the prospect of definitive liberation opened up for them after 22 years of struggle using legal and legitimate means. Dr. Macek, Radic's successor, did not share this opinion. He wanted, at all costs, to keep the Croatians on the side of the Western Allies because he did not believe in a German victory. In this regard, and until the very last moment, he directed his messages to the Croatian people urging them to continue supporting the Serbian army, which the people ignored.

This attitude of the Croatian people was understandable. After the death of King Alexander and the reorganization of Radic's party, the entire Croatian people yearned for liberation from the Serbian yoke and the restoration of their own state. However, when the decisive moment arrived, their leader, in whom they saw the embodiment of their rights, their struggle, and their aspirations, gave up and abandoned the political scene. But the people did not hesitate for long. Ante Pavelić appeared, whose name lived on in the hearts of the people thanks to his revolutionary activity against the Belgrade regimes. After Macek's indecision and silence, on April 10, 1941, he defined his program of action briefly and clearly: The Independent State of Croatia.

It may seem ungrateful now, after the fact, to praise the two Croatian leaders. But it is evident that Macek, with his own initiative and a bit of political flexibility and decisiveness, still enjoying the absolute confidence of his people, was able to keep Croatia out of the war, even under German tutelage. He received no shortage of offers from Berlin to that effect. But he did not believe in the possibility of governing Croatia democratically under Hitler's tutelage and preferred to withdraw, when it was clearly a matter of saving the people, not principles. The general world situation advised this. When fortunes took a different turn, Dr. Macek and his people could also have changed course, especially considering the example of our Italian neighbors. Croatia's situation would have been different during and after the war.

Instead of such an attitude, Macek withdrew, enabling Pavelić to seize power in Croatia, which had been proclaimed an independent state. Pavelić was under Italian tutelage. The impatient Italians hoped to realize their long-held dreams of seizing the eastern Adriatic coast.

And they hoped to achieve this precisely through this tutelage over Pavelić. To compound this double misfortune, Pavelić rejected the collaboration of the peasant party and its organizations, banned their activities, and also dissolved the Peasant and Urban Guards, which had played such a vital role in disarming the remnants of the Serb-Yugoslav army and maintaining order and security during the most difficult moments of the transition from Serbian slavery to Croatian freedom.

Pavelić deprived himself, and unfortunately the Croatian national cause as well, of the support of a large part of his own people.

Whether Macek's repeated omissions or Pavelić's countless errors were more fatal for the fate of the people will be told by history. The policies of both contributed to the Croatian people having to endure the hell of the Second World War. Tito, the third "Croatian" politician, overseen by international communism and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which upheld the integrity of Yugoslavia under Serbian domination, sent his guerrillas to "save Serbian blood" in Croatian territory, thus beginning a war of extermination and death between the Croats and the Serbian guerrillas, brought in from Serbia or mobilized from among the Serbian minority in Croatia.

Radic's party, effectively leaderless, attempted to do "something." Through its two deputies, Farolfi and Tomacic, in collaboration with two of Pavelić's ministers, Lorkovic and Vokic, it sought to re-establish contact with the Western Allies and completely alter the course of Croatian politics. But its attempts failed; those involved lost their lives. "The Germans learned of this conspiracy and forced Pavelić to arrest the most important of his remaining colleagues," says Toynbee in his book Hitler's Europe, Vol. II, p. 274. The final catastrophe for the Croatian people culminated in the tragedy of Bleiburg. There, during four years of an extremely bloody war, the Croats lost more than 600,000 lives—12% of their total population and almost twice as many as the Serbs, whose propaganda exaggerates their losses, blaming only the Croats.

THE LEGACY OF RADIC REMAINS

The communist regime, installed in Yugoslavia after the war, systematically proceeded to destroy the peasantry, considering them the greatest obstacle to its goal of organizing a collectivist society. First, pillage was used, then expropriation, and finally, the forced relocation to the cities, where the peasants, formerly free in their villages and now part of the lumpenproletariat, sought work in the nascent industry.

Currently, some 200,000, without freedom or work in their homeland, are forced to perform the heaviest tasks in West Germany and other countries of the free world. The political legacy of Radic and the fundamental, basic strength of the Croatian people seemed destined for their ultimate annihilation.

But only a superficial observer could form this impression. The Croatian peasants still live and will survive. Stefan Radic's greatest achievement was introducing them to the active politics of Croatia, giving them a doctrine suited to their interests and those of the entire nation. He instilled in them an awareness of their own strength and practically demonstrated that they represented the greatest potential within their people.

In every free election, the peasant party triumphed so decisively that the other Croatian parties were reduced to almost insignificant numbers. In the most critical moments of the struggle against the Serbs, these parties were almost overshadowed by Radic's party, who was able to synthesize in his policies all the most fundamental elements and principles of the Croatian people, transforming the peasants into the bearers, defenders, and protagonists of Croatia's freedom and independence.

The national imprint that Radic left on the hearts of his peasants transformed the Croatian villages into the guardians of the political, social, and cultural ideals of the entire Croatian people. Thus, all those who truly fight or intend to fight for the interests of a free Croatia will find in the villages and among the Croatian peasants the most intrepid, loyal, and courageous allies. This is the legacy of the Radic brothers, especially of Esteban, who gave his life for the freedom of Croatia and the happiness of its people, first and foremost the peasant class, which was and remains, despite all the ills that afflict it, the source of life and hope for the Croatian nation's future. Herein lies our hope that one day a son or grandson of the Croatian village will lead his people to freedom and secure for them the independence and international recognition that befits them as a civilized and freedom-loving people.

CROATIAN PEASANTS REJECTED THE UNION OF CROATIA WITH SERBIA IN 1918

WHAT IS WRITTEN TODAY IN CROATIA ABOUT THE ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF ESTEBAN RADIC

Translated from the book: Reflections on the Present of the Croatians by Dr. Stanko M. Vujica, Chicago 1968.

The assassination of Esteban Radic and his fellow deputies in the Belgrade parliament in 1928 dramatized and revealed to the world the mortal ailment of Yugoslavia. Until now, little had been said or written about Radic in communist Croatia.

It is for this reason that the book by the Croatian writer and historian Zvonimir Kulundžić, *The Assassination of Esteban Radic*, published in 1964 by the Zagreb publishing house Stvarnost (Reality), was a great success in Croatia, with many copies being sold and continuing to be sold among Croatian exiles.

This book was criticized, among others, by the president of the Croatian Peasant Party, Dr. Juraj Krnjević. One of the first criticisms leveled against the author was his choice of Dr. Ferdo Culinović as the author of the foreword. Dr. Culinovic is today the spokesperson for Belgrade, playing the same role in Croatia that Juraj Demetrovic and his ilk once did.[23]

Furthermore, Culinovic was exposed as a shallow jurist and historian by Croatian Marxist historians themselves. Regarding the book itself, the essence of Krnjevic's critique lies in the observation that Kulundžic presented many true facts, but "already in the first part of his book he introduced an inaccurate assertion, extending it throughout his work, namely that Esteban Radic and the Croatian Peasant Party were not in favor at that time (autumn 1918) of an independent, sovereign Croatian state, but rather fought only for a republic and a republican organization of Yugoslavia."

Kulundžic states in his book (p. 608) that he does not consider his investigations concluded and that he "will be grateful to anyone with knowledge or testimony" that could confirm, correct, or refute his conclusions. Kulundžic should therefore bear in mind the testimony of the eyewitness and make use of his knowledge, as this person, being one of E. Radic's closest collaborators, lived through those days, forming part of the most qualified circle of the party leadership from the beginning.

The author of these lines experienced those events among the people and, reading the (mentioned) book, also came to the conclusion that there is something strange between Culinovic's introductory thesis and Kulundžic's book. According to this thesis, the much-debated Croatian question, the cause of the collapse of the first Yugoslavia and the bloodshed in the Second World War, is reduced to a conflict between the monarchical and republican forms of government.

In accordance with this thesis, Radic and his peasants believed that monarchies were responsible for all evils and that all problems would find their solution in a republican form of government. Kulundžic states verbatim: "They firmly believed that the concept of the republic contained all their age-old aspirations and hopes" (p. 142).

Consequently, when the Croatian peasants exclaimed, "The republic, the pride of the whole world," they were not thinking of an independent Croatian state but rather referring to the elimination of the dynasty. As if sensing the weakness of his argument, Kulundžic later modifies it. Radic did not fight—Kulundžic writes—for an abstract republicanism, republicanism for republicanism's sake. Republicanism, as well as later the fight against corruption, were for him merely the means to eliminate all that was sick in our State at that time, all that was concealed under the monarchical cloak” (p. 582).

Conclusion: Radic’s republicanism was in reality the fight against corruption in “that State of ours.” The conflict between Esteban Radic and Alexander Karageorgevic was not the conflict between the bearer and interpreter of the Croatian people’s aspirations on the one hand and the bearer and representative of Serbian hegemony on the other, but rather the conflict between the man (Radic), who “was truly allergic to any phenomenon resembling corruption,” and the man (Alexander) whose objectives “were ultimately pecuniary” and who “acted solely driven by this vice” (pp. 604-5). Lest anyone think I am trying to simplify or distort the thesis of Kulundžic’s book, I reproduce verbatim, as he himself summarizes, the content of his research on the last page of his work: "Thus, finally, we come to the conclusion: the ultimate meaning of the conflict between E. Radic and King Alexander was not, as is emphasized from time to time in our bourgeois historiography, the unresolved Croatian question and the antagonism between republicanism and monarchism, but much more the question of whether the meaning of power is the enrichment and legalization of corruption.

The king believed that all doors should be open to him in this regard, while E. Radic, in his capacity as tribune of the people, considered it his duty to eradicate corruption at its very root. Conflict was inevitable. All my research to date, and that which is far from over, has led me to this conclusion.

"But, on the other hand, the royal clique, united around King Alexander, in which the entire system of that time was embodied, very skillfully and with incredible cunning transferred that fundamental problem that had arisen at the very moment of the State's founding as the touchstone—the problem of monarchy or republic—to the problem of nationalities. Thus, directly and consciously, it fostered differences and hatred between the two brotherly peoples, between Serbs and Croats, taking this idea to the point of the hysteria of the so-called Croatian Question, which in its ultimate consequences led to the bloodshed between brothers, which we all know very well as the Cetnik movement on one side and the Ustaše movement on the other. Therefore, a historian cannot fail to note that for this horrific reality, for everything that happened under the label of Ustaše or Cetniks, the responsibility before history rests first and foremost on this royal clique and on Alexander Karageorgević personally" (p. 605).

An interpretation of this nature, prima facie and without any documentation, seems forced. It is impossible to electrify the masses with an everyday human phenomenon such as the corruption of the ruling class.

Anyone observing from afar during those days knew that the Croatian peasant enthusiastically and unanimously followed Radic and later Macek because he believed, regardless of their tactics and public pronouncements, that the ultimate goal of the Croatian struggle was the re-establishment of the Croatian state. "The Republic" was, for the Croatian peasant, always and only the neutral, peasant republic of Croatia.

If Kulundzic had allowed the facts to speak for themselves, the reader of his book would reach the same conclusion. I will mention just one example by way of illustration. Kulundiic quotes from the book The Formation of the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Zagreb 1958, p. 69) by Sergio Budisavijevic[24], that in the first half of November 1918, Esteban Radic and Vladimir Macek went to a village near Zagreb to see and feel what resonate in the hearts of the Croatian peasants the political events of those days had.

"From conversations with the peasants," Budisavljevic writes, "Radic was able to gather that they were happy with the Sabor's (Croatian parliament's) resolution, according to which Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia separated from Austria and Hungary, but that they were not happy with the decision that spoke of uniting Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia into a single state with Serbia and Montenegro. The Croatian peasants told Esteban Radic that they were in favor of an independent Croatian state and that relations with Serbia should be fraternal and friendly."

Kulundzic comments on this reproduction of the text as follows: "It was not, therefore, Esteban Radic who 'drove the Croatian masses mad with his republican ideas,' as our politicians, grouped in the National Council, firmly believed... but rather it was precisely the masses who imposed this program on Radic." (p. 116).

Thus, Kulundzic himself acknowledges that the program, imposed on Radic by the Croatian masses, consisted of "Croatia becoming an independent state, re-establishing friendly and fraternal relations with Serbia."

How, then, is it possible to reconcile the above with Kulundzic's assertion that Radic demonstrated through his actions "that he was a sincere and very enthusiastic Yugoslav" (p. 176) and that his struggle had no "separatist" character?

We could cite dozens of examples of such inconsistency in Kulundzic's book. I have the impression that his book in its original form had a different appearance than it does now after passing through partisan censorship and the hands of Ferdo Culinovic.

In his preface, Culinovic says that the book "deals with a subject that might at first glance lead someone astray down the nationalist path." But as it is —Culinovic points out— "Yugoslavism is emphasized, corroborated by multiple arguments regarding the need to maintain and care for the Yugoslav state community..." (p. XIX).

If my conjecture that the "Yugoslav accentuation" was added later so the book could be published is correct, then the author probably acted properly. In Tito's Yugoslavia, almost nothing could be written about the struggle of the Croatian people and the Radic peasant movement because that would endanger "brotherhood and unity."

However, Kulundžic's book has now been published, in which many truthful details about the horrors the Croatian people had to endure in the first Yugoslavia are described in a dramatic and highly engaging literary style. Even the memoirs of Mestrovic[25] and Kljakovic[26], published in exile, are cited.

I believe that reading this book will resonate deeply with the younger generations of Croatians who only knew that the first Yugoslavia was "rotten." In his critical observations on Kulundžic's book, Julio Derossi, writing in Licke Novine (Lika News, published in Gospić, Croatia) on October 1, 1967, notes: "The history in this book is truly a teacher of life. We feel overwhelmed after reading it; we feel uneasy because of its suggestive and stark truth; a calamity we ourselves caused only half a century ago."

The book's Yugoslav perspective presents no major difficulties, since the reading public is accustomed to a constant official interpretation of events.

"POPULORUM PROGRESSIO" AND THE PRESENCE OF THE CHURCH IN HISTORY

Two Aspects of Church History

FRANJO NEVISTIC

"Christians have often tried in the past to hold things back. But in critical moments of history, Christians have less reason than others to fear that a new kind of society or civilization will take away their reason for being." HERBERT BUTTERFIELD: Christianity and History, Spanish version. Carlos Lohle Editions, Buenos Aires 1957.

On March 19, 1968, a Croatian professor, a communist, delivered a lecture entitled "The Church in Our Society" at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb, before an exceptionally large audience of students.

Professor Oleg Mandic—as this professor of long-standing communist affiliation and proselytizing was called—said, among other things: "The Catholic Church has demonstrated for 17 centuries an extraordinary capacity to adapt to all the social processes of Europe. It also understands the reality of socialism, trying to adapt to it with the intention of revitalizing our society with its ideology... I believe that the ultimate goal of the Catholic Church today is Catholic communism." With hopes of containing communism forcefully without the danger of world annihilation dashed, the Catholic Church... —according to Mandic— the Church is undertaking a change of course in its anti-communist policy. John XXIII marks the starting point. From this moment on, the Church approaches the working class and socialism as social realities.

The Second Vatican Council solemnly proclaims that the Catholic Church is the Church of the poor, inaugurating the period of ecumenism with Christians and atheists, that is, with Marxists. "I have the impression," Professor Mandic has said, "that the Catholic Church is making our country a testing ground for its tactics with socialist countries."[27]

In turn, the secretary of the Communist Party of Croatia and the leading communist in the Croatian Republic, Dr. V. Bakaric, has expressed himself on the same subject as follows: "...I would add something to what someone said regarding religion, emphasizing that what has been said is insufficient for schools. We would be moving from militant atheism toward Catholicism."

That is to say, at the extremes: either one or the other. But what is de facto beyond dispute here is that a certain scientific position on religion must have access to schools, and young people must come into contact with and learn about the modern trend in the development of the Church. Especially the Catholic Church, whose development is the most interesting not only for us, but extremely interesting in general.

All the more so since a multitude of problems arise precisely here, problems of particular political importance to us.” Highlighting the existence of two currents of opinion within the Church—the conservative and the progressive—Bakaric added the following: “Certainly, this Catholic world, the world of believers, is also interested in peace and a certain social progress, but what kind of progress?” This is what we have to examine in order to see and decide which of them we will support and which tendency we will eventually not support" [28]. We deliberately begin our article with the opinions of two Croatian communists, our aim being to reflect in the pages of this journal the reality of current life in general, giving preference to the current situation of the Croatian people. The convergence of both interests in this case cannot be denied.

Prof. Mandic states that the Catholic Church is making our homeland, Croatia, its first testing ground for the application of the new tactics with other socialist countries. The problem, the confrontation between the free world and communism, is the central problem of our world at the present time.

The Catholic Church, the substantial, integral part of Christian and Western civilization, is opening new perspectives for the solution of this burning problem, making the homeland of the Croatians the starting point of its new policy. Herein, we believe, lies the reason that justifies our extensive reference to the opinions of the Croatian communists.

For To restore balance, we now give the floor to Cardinal Šeper, who, like few others, is an eyewitness to the most serious and tragic events experienced by a people of believers, such as the Croatian people, under the totalitarian and atheist regime of Belgrade. "Many Christians have opposed the progress of the world, even though it is God's will that there be more justice on earth."

Taking into account his position as a Catholic prelate in a communist country and his appointment to the Roman Curia, the Cardinal emphasized that he would not exchange his current see for one in the Western world. But he accepts this change in obedience to the Vatican's call, which seeks to "orient the Curia toward socialist countries..." "Christians bear grave responsibility in the face of atheism because they have not borne sufficient witness." The God in whom we believe is not the same God that atheists deny” [29].

The three witnesses, although from diametrically opposed conceptions of life, highlight the new orientation of ecclesiastical policy. What then is this policy? Where are its principles, its doctrine, and its practical suggestions found? In papal encyclicals, among which Populorum Progressio is the most recent in terms of date, but not in terms of the value of its content. Nothing new is said in stating that the Catholic Church does not have a special socio-economic doctrine; on the contrary, it demonstrates a marvelous capacity for adapting to social doctrines and realities throughout history. Adaptation to social realities, to socio-political systems, would be the Church's most salient characteristic in this area. From this point of view, the Church remained faithful to Christ when he said: “My kingdom is not of this world.”

But can we accept this position as definitive? Is the Church's disinterest in social and political systems really so great? And economic ones? Can we legitimately deduce this from Christ's aforementioned statement? No! Neither Christ nor his Church intended it to be understood literally.

It is undeniably true that in the doctrine and practice of the Church, the supernatural end, the ultimate end of man, is always present, elevating it as the sole value that gives meaning to our earthly life—the final cause—but it is also true that the Church, as a visible organization, actively worked in worldly affairs. Its original purpose was to shape them so that they could better serve that ultimate end.

But, unfortunately, in this work, the human element often and intensely forgot its primary mission, its essential doctrinal purpose, becoming entangled in worldly affairs to the detriment of its natural vocation, negatively impacting the feelings and lives of the faithful, especially those "humble and poor," toward whom Christ constantly demonstrated his divine preference.

Only in modern times, and precisely since the publication of the encyclical Rerum Novarum of May 15, 1891, by Pope Leo XIII, did Catholic social consciousness begin to form and its social doctrine become increasingly clear. Forty years later—on May 15, 1931—Pope Pius XI published the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, completing and expanding the doctrine of Leo XIII. In the period that followed, Pope Pius XII, in his radio messages, deepened and developed the same doctrine, and Pope John XXIII, in 1961, published Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris, with Pope Paul VI concluding the series with the encyclical Populorum Progressio.

Before analyzing the Church's doctrinal and practical stance on contemporary socio-economic matters, it is necessary to take a brief look at its adaptability and adjustment to the changing conditions of humanity's development. This will also make it easier to see the doctrinal and practical aberrations that have occurred within historical Christianity itself.

These aberrations speak a clear and unequivocal pessimistic view of human nature: Ovid's "Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor" or St. Paul's "spiritus promptus caro autem infirma" also find their full confirmation in the history of the Church.

The Church has acted freely in the world for 17 centuries. Twelve years after the proclamation of their freedom, the Council of Nicaea was convened, an occasion that reaffirmed the Church's claim to be the supreme power in society.

In 494, Pope Galesius, for example, addressed a letter to Emperor Anastasius, telling him, among other things: "There are, Emperor Augustus, two principles that govern this world: the sacred authority of the pontiffs and the royal power. The priestly role is all the more serious for the kings themselves will also have to give an account to the Lord in his future divine judgment" [30]. Bearing in mind that Christian society at that time was experiencing a period of "revolutionary" enthusiasm, a time of innovative ideas in all aspects of life, it is easy to understand how much power was intended to be placed in the hands of the hierarchy. Ecclesiastical.

Roman imperial society, fragmented by internal sedition and barbarian invasions, was becoming a true theocratic society. Spiritual power—dominion over consciences—and temporal power converged toward a single point with all its consequences, which were certainly negative.

This fact, it must be said, could not help but degenerate. Private property rapidly regained its former vigor, already established in Roman times. The princeps legibus solutus (ruler of the laws) began to exert its pernicious influence on political and social life. If all the attributions of the auctoritas sacrata pontificam et regalis potestas (princessible authority of the priesthood and royal power) converge on one place, one point, one person, then the princeps legibus solutus becomes a princeps absolutely legibus solutus.

What at first appeared as the saving grace in chaos, as a principle of organization and the common good, rapidly degenerated. The Church, bearer of the new message, the factor of order and security in a society Dying, it grew richer and isolated itself from the rest of the world in its global luxury.

There began to form the historical substratum that would much later authorize Thomas Hobbes to say, with respect to the Church, that it was "the ghost of the Holy Roman Empire, sitting and crowned upon its ruins."

Until the year 313 AD, Christianity lived in the catacombs, suffering persecution. The unity of the persecuted, cemented by supernatural faith, formed an indestructible sense of community, also making their material possessions a communitas bonorum (common good).

At that time, it is argued, private property was seen as an attachment to the material world, which makes us forget the supreme end of fleeting life on earth—eternal union with God—the final cause of existence. Consequently, property was despised and labeled—illum odiosum verbum nieum, tuum, suam (that hateful word, yours, his). An almost "communist" conception.

Entering its "imperial" era, Christian consciousness also changed with respect to private property. By the 10th century AD, many things had taken on a different character. The noble families of Rome had transferred the virulence of their opponents and social prestige rivalries to the Curia, turning the Papacy into their mere plaything. The Church had become feudalized. Prelates and bishops, when they were not direct owners, received spiritual fiefs from secular princes, as well as their investiture.

"The higher ranks became the prerogative of members of the feudal aristocracy, and many of them, like Archibald, the Archbishop of Sens, during the 10th century, squandered the produce of their dioceses on revelry with their concubines and mistresses..." "Worst of all, the Church could no longer consider Rome as a moral or spiritual guide, because the papacy itself had fallen victim to the same disease that was attacking the local churches. The Holy See had become an instrument of a treacherous, immoral oligarchy, and under the rule of Theophylact and the women of his household, especially the great Meraria Senatrix, concubine, mother, and assassin of popes, it sank to the lowest levels of degradation..." "Even in monasteries, the vow of chastity was not zealously observed, while priests lived openly as married men and frequently passed on their parishes to their sons" [31].

"The worst of all was that the Church could no longer consider Rome as a moral or spiritual guide, because the papacy itself had fallen victim to the same disease that was attacking the local churches.

"The Holy See had become an instrument of a treacherous, immoral oligarchy, and under the rule of Theophylact and the women of his household, especially the great Meraria Senatrix, concubine, mother, and assassin of popes, it sank to the lowest levels of degradation..." "Even in monasteries, the vow of chastity was not zealously observed, while priests lived openly as married men and frequently passed on their parishes to their sons" [31]. To better illustrate this era of aberrations, an era of craving absolute power—plenitudo potestatis—and boundless enrichment—infinitus diviciarum appetitus—we must highlight that during this time the feudal pyramid was formed, its head being the Roman Curia, which held in its hands a third of all the possessions of the Christian world.

From this position of power, King Louis the Pious was deposed in 833, and Emperor Charles V, in 859, acknowledged his complete dependence on ecclesiastical authority. Finding himself in danger of being deposed, he appealed to the sacred authority he had received as king, saying: “By this consecration, I cannot be deposed by anyone, at least not without being heard and judged by the bishops, by whose ministry I have been consecrated King, since they are the Thrones of God, on which God sits, and through which He issues His judgments. I have always been ready to submit to their paternal correction and their punishment in court, and I submit myself at this present time” [32].

From this perspective of power on the one hand and submission on the other, the Inquisition is easy to understand. We comprehend it, but we cannot justify it in substance, nor in many of its acts and measures against freedom of conscience. Few, even those educated in the most privileged centers of Catholicism, know that its most representative philosopher, Saint Thomas Aquinas, had already written in the 13th century: “Belief in Christ is good in itself and necessary for salvation… but if a man’s conscience understands faith as evil, his will would be wrong to adhere to it” [33]. In the same 13th century, specifically in 1229, the papal university of Toulouse was founded, bearing Rome’s pagan motto on its brow: “Pravos extirpat et doctor et ignis et ensis” [34].

Under the shadow of this terror, with no respect for freedom of conscience, the socio-political and religious life of that time unfolded. Even Pope Pius II—Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini—had as his motto: “We are convinced that states are maintained by arms, not by laws” [35].

This political, social, and religious terror also had an effect on Croatian lands. Heer himself says: "The same procedure was followed throughout the Balkans, where the Bogomili churches have reached their highest influence as 'friends of God,' as 'the people of God.'"

The most brilliant Croatian historian of our time, Father Dr. Domingo Mandic, investigating the origin, doctrine, and historical fate of the Bogomilis, that is, the Patarenes in the Croatian province of Bosnia, also refers, albeit indirectly, to the terror applied against them in complete contradiction with ecclesiastical doctrine on the dignity and freedom of the human person according to the philosophical teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Pope Gregory IX, approving the plans of the Hungarian prince Koloman (Croatia at that time was united with Hungary in a personal union: common kings) to exterminate the Bogomils, also sent a letter to the Bishop of Bosnia, Ivan, asking him to withdraw his resignation from the office of Bishop of Bosnia.

Bishop Ivan, initially enthusiastic about the action against the Bogomils, seeing the cruelty with which the "Catholic" troops proceeded, became disillusioned and, feeling deep compassion for the people, resigned his high office. Nevertheless, Pope Gregory IX, in the aforementioned letter, told him that he should continue with a firm hand to exterminate the heretics — "thus, you must vigorously and powerfully challenge the heretics and others of the Catholic faith" [36].

In the shared political and social life of Hungary and Croatia, the Codex Verbötzy played a decisive role for more than 300 years. This Codex is characterized by its implacable subjugation of the poor to the power of the landowning aristocrats, with archbishops and bishops of the Catholic Church wielding great power and vast wealth. Stephen Verbötzy was one of the wealthiest Hungarian feudal lords, but also one of the most cruel.

When the peasants rebelled against the oppression of the nobles at the beginning of the 16th century, Verbötzy organized a mercenary army that defeated the peasants, with most of the rebels perishing.

To prevent such rebellions, he enacted the "Verbötzy Code," confirmed by the assembly of nobles, leaving a very eloquent testimony to the confrontation between the aristocratic ruling class of civil and ecclesiastical landowners and their feudal subjects, called "misera plebs contribuens" (the wretched tax-paying populace). One of the provisions of this Law, a true reflection of the socio-economic reality of that time (from 1514 to 1848), stated, after listing a series of the most cruel punishments: "Furthermore, so that the memory of their treason and the temporal punishment may also be passed on to their descendants, and so that all future generations may know how great a crime rebellion against the lords is, all peasants, wherever they may reside in this State, with the exception of those who remain loyal to the king and the lords, thereby losing their freedom of movement, are subject to unconditional and perpetual servitude to their lords, without the right to emigrate..." "Dominis ipsorum terrestribus mera et perpetua rusticitate sint subjecti."

This religious and socio-economic terror has persisted into modern times. Teresa of Avila describes the Inquisition's prisons as the cells of hell: "The great woman, who had sadly grown up amidst countless persecutions and denunciations, sees hell according to the image of earthly hell that is present in every city where there is an Inquisition prison, and in every convent that has its own prison" [37].

As the medieval Christian community disintegrated and the centers of power shifted to nation-states, terror continued in full force. F. Heer notes the last attempt at this kind of terror by Louis XIV against the Huguenots, Jansenists, Catholic Quietists, etc. This terror, once again, was in the hands of the clergy. "For many days and nights the Huguenots were disturbed in their sleep and tortured until they signed documents confirming their conversion to Catholicism.

After the annulment of the Edict of Nantes by the Edict of Fontainebleau, mass conversions were obtained by force." An eyewitness, the Catholic Duke of Saint-Simon, provides the most horrendous and reprehensible testimony of what was done to these people, who did not freely profess the Catholic faith.[38]

With these ideas, conceptions, and practices, we arrived at modern times, when rationalism and liberalism inaugurated a new period in history. Rationalism and individualism are its most evident features. To ensure individual, political, socio-economic, and religious freedom, the right to property was proclaimed as one of the fundamental rights, a natural, sacred, and inviolable right.

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of the French Revolution states: "The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural rights of man... these rights are liberty and property" (Declaration II). Declaration III states: "Property being an inviolable and sacred right..." The Church vehemently opposed liberalism and the new era in all its aspects. Philosophically, it rejected its rationalism; politically, it denied the State and its popular representatives the prerogatives of absolute legislator; economically, it defended its large estates, the foundation of its institutions, whether religious or educational.

But in time, the Church, stripped of its material possessions, once again reveals its capacity for adaptation. Today, certain forms of liberalism, representative democracy, and the system of private property are considered integral not only to Western civilization but also to Christian civilization. "In turn, the entire contribution of liberalism to the idea of personal rights constitutes the most distinctive feature of Western and Christian civilization" [39].

Bearing this aspect of Church history in mind, one cannot help but be scandalized. The religious ideal that radiates divine light upon humankind as "the image of God," beings endowed with reason and free will, is corrupted and lost in the daily struggles for existence and power. This lofty ideal is degraded to a kind of ideology—a weapon in the hands of those who seek to place themselves among the privileged. That is why Joseph le Clerc du Trembley, one of Cardinal Richelieu's most fervent collaborators in the destruction of the "Holy Roman Empire," after having lived through his period of political delirium and the persecutions he led, observes: "Now, when I see how they and I live here on earth... we have lost all true discernment and are indistinguishable from pagans and Turks except in some superficialities... the Church is still pure in some souls; if it were not so, God should destroy the world right now and hasten the Last Judgment, or create a new world" [40].

The contemporary British historian Herbert Butterfield, delving deeper into his historical studies, writes in this regard:

"For me, one of the most terrible things in history—an impression I cannot shake—is that the Christian Church initiated a cruel policy of persecution as soon as it found itself in a position (and had the power) to do so. Moreover, both the Catholic and Protestant churches not only fought fiercely to maintain their power of persecution...

"Nor am I entirely convinced that, with a few honorable exceptions, the progress in social justice that has taken place in our time is due to the Christian spirit fostering generosity among the privileged classes and also the clergy, whose members (even the most privileged) seem to have bitterly resisted any change." The most notable progress is due to the fact that the working classes, by organizing themselves as a self-interested party, have become too formidable a force to ignore... Sometimes, as in the case of freedom of conscience, the Church has fought against the world, and today we are surprised by the anomaly that it was the world that rose up to defend a cause now considered just, even by two of its own clergymen...

"When I hear men of the Church today condemn communism and maintain that liberal democracy is the only acceptable form in a Christian society, I cannot forget that ecclesiastical authority once condemned democracy in the same terms. Just the other day I was reading what the English were saying about the French Revolution, and it bore an unpleasant resemblance to what we have said about the Russian Revolution.

"Let us suppose for a moment that communism were to take hold in the world." If the Church, which now defends democracy, were to follow the example of its past conduct, it would change its mind in a hundred minutes and tell us that, after all, nothing is more Christian than a classless society.

"One might respond to this objection that present-day communism is linked to cruelty, persecution, atrocities, and aggression. But therein lies the problem: that is precisely what democracy was like during the French Revolution. Socialism itself appears strangely linked to secularism, anticlericalism, and atheism" [41].

Is this the true picture of the Church's history? Is this its doctrine? If so, where are we headed? Doesn't Professor Mandic have the right to say that the Catholic Church is aiming for "Catholic communism"? A categorical answer, positive or negative, without examining the matter more closely, would be a very hasty one.

Regarding the negative judgments we have reproduced concerning the historical past of the Church, it is worth noting that these are the judgments of believers. Their faith is almost unshakeable. In this sense, they believed they could recognize the full historical truth without harming the community to which they spiritually belong. Moreover, they are very aware of the truth that every definition or statement is dangerous (omnis definitio periculosa). That is to say, dangerous, insofar as each one encompasses only a part of the truth.

Indeed, the Church will never be understood if it is viewed solely as a political and social institution. Those who are incapable of seeing it in the supernatural light, as the custodian of revealed truths; those who cannot perceive its metaphysical dimension, will indeed grasp only a part of the truth, but never its entirety.

Lord Acton, it is said, adopted only this latter position. For him, the truth about the Church was the truth as revealed in its political and ecclesiastical life. The struggle for power, employing the most varied, often reprehensible, methods—this, according to him, constituted the entirety of the truth.

Catholic historians, while acknowledging many unfavorable historical truths, had no intention whatsoever of corroborating the British historian's thesis. Ecclesiastical truth, seen through its political events, is part of the truth; it is a secondary concomitant of it. The Church also offers another facet of the truth, even another Truth. If we want to understand the Church, we must keep this truth in mind—both the Church itself and its mission in the world.

To "rehabilitate" the two Christian historians already mentioned, we give them the floor again, so they can explain this other aspect and another truth about the Church. "The average historian, when they reach, say, the year 1800, fails to tell their readers that in that year, as in so many years before, thousands upon thousands of priests preached the Gospel every week, constantly reminding farmers and merchants of charity and humility, urging them to reflect for a moment on the great problems of life, and leading them to confess their sins.

"Here is a phenomenon that could well have altered the nature of life and the very fabric of human history." Such has been the Church's enduring task throughout the ages: not even under the worst popes was the light extinguished" [42].

F. Heer, for his part, adds:

"Today we hardly realize the educational power that these and many other psalms, which sing of the fear of God, have exerted on religious orders and their brothers in congregations outside of Europe, by being heard daily in the liturgical seasons.

Cluny, Cietaux, Prémontré, and many other subsequent monastic movements, which arose from the Benedictine spirit and the Reformation, have repressed and punished the bellicose nobility of Europe with the fear of God, the fear of the Lord. The movement for the peace of God and the prohibition of war in specific times and places is closely linked to this." The education of man through fear, very early on and fear of God, has borne countless fruits" [43].

Speaking of the confession of sins or the preaching of the fear of the Lord, neither of the two authors speaks directly of the ultimate end of man. The salvation of immortal souls is glimpsed only behind their lines dedicated to the beneficial influence of the Church on civilization, fulfilling its metaphysical-religious, salvific mission, which was and remains its primary and essential task. Referring to the same argument, Pope Leo XIII in the encyclical Immortale Dei says:

"Although the Church, the immortal work of the merciful God, by its very nature attends to the salvation of souls and their attaining happiness in heaven, it seeks, even within the realm of perishable and earthly things, so many and such remarkable goods that they would not result; More numerous and better in quality, if the first and foremost object of its institution were to ensure the prosperity of this present life.

Indeed, wherever the Church set foot, it immediately changed the course of things: it shaped customs with previously unknown virtues and implanted a new culture in civil society, and thus the peoples who received it distinguished themselves from others by the gentleness, equity, and glory of their endeavors [44]. We could continue listing authors and works of science, art, architecture, beneficence, and charity, which form a dense network of goods, constituting the fabric of our European and Western culture in general, thanks to the Church's benevolent action in our society. By way of illustration and to restore balance, reducing the preceding negative judgments to a fair measure, we will mention the British case. Pope Gregory the Great is inextricably linked to it. Therefore, it is worthwhile to dedicate a few more lines to it.

While strolling through the slave market in Rome one day, this great Pope encountered a group of slaves, strikingly blond. When he asked them who they were, they replied in Latin that they were Angli. "Not Angli, but angelli," remarked the Pontiff, impressed by their fair faces and hair. He wished to convert them to Christianity, soften their customs, and introduce them to the Christian community and the Greco-Roman Mediterranean culture.

Highlighting the cultural, economic, and religious role of the Benedictine Order, André Maurois states: "For preaching, Gregory the Great made use of monks. Saint Benedict had founded his Order at the beginning of the century, which combined manual and intellectual labor... The task of evangelizing England was entrusted in particular to one of his monks, Prior Augustine... "From the 8th century onward, all of England became part of the Roman Church." The kings relied on the Church, firstly because they were believers and, secondly, because they knew that the Church, heir to imperial traditions, provided them with the hierarchy, organization, and experience they lacked. For a long time, bishops and archbishops served as the kings' natural ministers... On the other hand, the Church "needs civil power to enforce its laws."

The Eastern Church disputed the Roman Church's preeminence; the French Church was sometimes quite independent. English bishops requested the Pope's intervention. Thus, he sent to England the true proconsuls of the faith, who were to ecclesiastical Rome what the great organizers of the provinces were to imperial Rome. Nothing suggests a more majestic idea of the Church's university than the fact that a Greek from Asia Minor, Bishop Theodore of Tarsus, and an African, Abbot Adrian, introduced an entire Greco-Latin library to England and founded monasteries in Northumbria, whose learning rivaled that of Ireland. In a curious paradox, Mediterranean culture would be preserved for the Gauls by Anglo-Saxon monks.

At the very moment when the Saracens were invading central France and it seemed that the classical era was ending in Europe, in a reign almost barbaric, Bede the Venerable was writing his history of the Church in England. This Bede was the teacher of Egbert, who in turn was the teacher of Alcuin in York, who, summoned by Charlemagne, halted the intellectual decline in France. Thus England found its place in the history of Latin and Christian culture [45]. This cultural and civilizing mission of the Church is common to all of Europe. The brilliance of its external successes could easily produce partial or total blindness in some of its men, institutions, or organizations, confusing or even identifying its metaphysical-religious mission with the earthly one.

This is the "imperial" era of the Church, if it can be defined and placed in time. According to Maritain, it is characterized by two essential features: the myth of power in the service of God and civilization of a sacred character, imperatively requiring religious unity. These two causes, along with the antagonism between the Papacy and the emperors, caused the ecclesiastical "imperial" idea to fail and transformed it into a "theocratic utopia" [46]. Certain ecclesiastical circles were unable to relinquish this idea of the Holy Roman Empire as a historical ideal until recent times. With the entry into Rome of General Cadorna's Bersaglieri in In 1870, the Papal States came to an end. With Italian national unification and the proclamation of Rome as its capital, the ideal was definitively revealed as a utopia.

Pope Pius IX symbolically severed contact with the adverse world, closing the bronze door with the decision never to leave the Vatican Palace again. Italian Catholics were forbidden from participating in the political life of the unified Italian state. From 1870 onward, the topic of Catholics and politics became a passionate and often contentious issue. The Papacy considered that all its rights had been trampled upon with the dismantling of its temporal power and the unification of Italy.

Against this papal current, the voices of important Catholic groups rose up... to defend, in the face of all pressures, the opposing thesis: that it was precisely the end of the old temporal power that would restore freedom to the Vatican, that is, the possibility of making Vatican Rome a true center of universal influence [47]. From the foregoing, it is easy to understand that the role of the Church within Western Christian civilization is decisive, essential. This civilization conquered first place, imposing, at present, certain characteristics on all others, which authorizes us to say that Western civilization is, in a certain sense, universal civilization [48].

CAUSES OF THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF WESTERN CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION

But, on the other hand, numerous authors affirm, and it is almost a universal conviction, that this civilization is in such a profound crisis, intimately linked to the mortal danger not only of its own destruction, but also of humanity and life itself. After Spengler, this current of opinion is almost a common view.

In order to understand this crisis and the remedies that the Church offers for its solution, it is necessary to analyze the fundamental cause of the success, the superiority, as well as the failure of Western Christian civilization. Sociologists affirm that this superiority was achieved thanks to the balance that the Western world managed to find between the earthly city and the heavenly city.

Without forgetting its metaphysical-religious purpose, Western man actively dedicated himself to the conquest of nature, thus forging, through science and technology, for his society the conditions for greater knowledge, greater well-being, greater culture, and civilization. Thus, for example, within Christendom itself, Eastern Christians, under Greek influence, exhibit a considerable "dehistoricization of Christianity."

Origen is one of the most prominent theologians of the Eastern Church. Of his ideas, A. Harnack says: "Origen's gnosis is in reality Hellenic; its result is that marvelous image of the world—complicated in this case only by the consideration of the Holy Scriptures and the history of Christ—which appears to be a drama and is ultimately immobile.

Gnosis neutralizes everything empirical and historical, if not entirely in terms of its facticity, then completely in terms of its value..." The Logos, made flesh, and the immutability of God are of decisive importance for Easterners.

On the other hand, and outside of Christianity, Lao Tzu, representative of the Chinese spirit, said: "Do not act. I have learned to understand that wanting to conquer the world by action is an attempt doomed to failure... Practice inaction and everything will be in order." Such conceptions, awaiting eschatological solutions, had plunged the Eastern world "into immobile passivity" [49].

The same Spanish author states that Saint Augustine, even while aware of the dualism between the "City of God" and the "City of the Devil," had mitigated their opposition and "moderated the urgent hope for the coming of the kingdom of heaven," thus creating for humankind the possibility and the necessity of playing a role in history [50].

Maritain, in turn, analyzes the same phenomenon, but delving deeper into the heart of the problem, and departing somewhat, incidentally, from what has been said above. While Maritain accepts the idea that Saint Augustine held sway in the Middle Ages, he rightly attributes to him eschatological quietism, albeit a moderated form. In the ascendant path of the Western world, medieval thought passed through several phases of development intimately linked to the conception of human nature, its freedom, and its relationship with God or, even better, with Grace.

Augustinian Christianity held that human nature was only wounded by the original fall and not totally corrupted. Regarding the initiative to do good, man depended on God. Since the supreme end of life was union with God—an eschatological idea—the material world seemed like an inevitable evil, worthy of a certain contempt.

Awaiting divine initiative, the medieval Augustinian man already lived an almost divine life on earth, without much interest in nature and its demonic forces. "The natural mysteries of man were not scrutinized as such by a natural and experimental science." The Middle Ages was a distinctly unreflective era. The contemplation of beings, a kind of fear and "metaphysical shame," diverted man's gaze from himself and his immediate needs.[51]

Contrary to this Augustinian conception, the Protestant reformers Luther, Calvin, and Jansen declared human nature completely corrupt. Man can do no good without divine grace. It is a complete pessimism. Even with grace, man does not achieve an "organic" union with it. She envelops him solely from the outside without internal assimilation. "Man is a corruption on the path." Man recognizes his nothingness before God and has only the initiative "of crying out." Free will no longer exists. The doctrine of predestination is imposed: grace without freedom. Calvinism becomes the paradigm. God chooses those he wants to save. The surest sign of his choice is material prosperity. The duty to become rich is the principal duty and has no limits, justifying even imperialism of every kind.[52]

This species of historical Christianity has almost ended in the negation of Christianity itself. For example, Baudelaire, referring to the world of Calvinist predestination, said: "Material activity, exaggerated to the proportions of a national mania, leaves very little room for things that are not of this world."

Meanwhile, the poet Edgar Allan Poe said that the Puritans, penetrating the American West, knew only one prayer: "To implore the death of their enemies and a good harvest" [53].

Almost parallel to these Protestant ideas, a related current developed within Catholicism. This current was led by the Spanish theologian and philosopher Molina. His conception of the relationship between human freedom and divine grace is the inverse of the Augustinian view. From now on, humankind has the primary initiative, whether for good or for evil.

Divine grace is secondary. Humankind, in the tension between the City of God and the temporal city, claims for itself greater freedom and initiative. “I don’t know,” says Maritain, “if Molina was a great theologian, but from a cultural point of view, he proved very representative of the modern dissolution of Christendom” [54].

The definitive dissolution of historical Christianity in this sense came with rationalism. According to Rousseau, A. Comte, and Hegel, human nature is neither wounded nor completely corrupt. In its essence, it is good. Divine grace, admitted more as a symbol than as a reality, is absorbed by human nature.

For Rousseau, human nature is holy, while for Comte and Hegel, human reason, freed from constraints, will create a universal state, a new Roman Empire, secularized in form but sacred in content, a new “mystical body” of the Church of a rational character [55].

From now on, a new “gospel” predominates in the Western world: the “gospel of secular progress.” But despite humanity's marvelous achievements in every field of activity—science, technology, art, culture, politics, economics, and so on—the society of the new gospel is in crisis.

"The old concepts of good and evil, of truth and falsehood, have been set aside, and civilization is adrift before the storm of destruction, like a ship without masts and a rudder. The evils that the nineteenth century thought it had banished forever—proscription and persecution, torture and slavery, and the fear of violent death—have returned, and with them new terrors, unknown to the past. We have discovered that evil, too, is a progressive force and that the modern world offers unlimited prospects for its development" [56].

The contemporary world, encompassed almost exclusively and in a certain sense by this "post-Christian" Western civilization, is divided into two camps: liberal anthropocentrism and totalitarian anthropocentrism. Both wielding atomic weapons. The question of the relationship between human freedom and divine grace is no longer raised. This problem is relegated to the background or simply denied. Camus's deicide and regicide almost culminated in individual and collective suicide. Maritain dramatically describes the clash of two worlds when he says: “He (the man of bourgeois liberalism, note:) appears as a pharisaical and decadent creation, born of the puritanical, Jansenist, and rationalist spirit…

This bourgeois man has denied all that is bad and irrational within him in order to enjoy his own conscience, to be content with himself, righteous in and of himself… he makes great use of moralism and spiritualism… but emptying them of their precious content, separating them from God and turning them into myths… being himself either a deist or an atheist, and it is precisely he who has taught atheism to his communist students and heirs.”[57] This false and illusory conscience has been unmasked by Marx and Freud. The former did so in the social-ethical sense and the latter in the individual-ethical sense. According to Marx, conscience is a dissimulation of economic and class interests, and according to Freud, it is the sublimation of libido with instincts and more elemental passions.

"All of the spirit," says Freud, "all of spiritual culture, comes from the instinctual sphere, passing through the sublimation of the libido." But to deny the spirit an independent ontological existence, says H. Hessen, and to attribute to it the value of a derivative of the instinctual sphere, is in reality to deny its existence.[58]

“This bourgeois man,” says Maritain, “who is pleasing to both Christian and communist consciences, is what communism seeks to change mechanically and from the outside, using technical means and propaganda. It is precisely for this reason that it attacks not only this bourgeois man, but MAN in his very nature and his essential dignity as the image of God, as a candidate… for the highest goods of the person”: God and eternal life; freedom and spiritual life, “based on the internal realities of man but superhuman,” as well as the family with its natural rights, “whose form is determined but not created by the legislative power” [59].

ONCE AGAIN THE VOICE OF THE CHURCH

In this intellectual and spiritual climate, in these historical conditions, the Church raises its voice once again. But, after the failure of its medieval conception, does the Church have any chance of intervening successfully? Before answering, two things must be kept in mind: the “failure” is only partial; the failure of the human element in the Church; The failure of us all, but not the failure of the divine element.

The second point consists of clearly seeing the reality in which humanity and society currently find themselves. Seeing it in its entirety and in all its details, with no other consideration than that of truth. "The Christian conscience has the right and the obligation to subject facts to its own evaluation. A complacent idealism and the idealization of reality are contrary to Christianity. In discovering and revealing the daily sins and the most horrendous crimes of our lives, Christianity must have no fear or delay" [60].

Since Pope Leo XIII, the Church has been increasingly and effectively awakening the Christian conscience to see the social reality of its time.

"Because the violence of revolutions has divided peoples into two classes of citizens, placing an immense distance between them. One is extremely powerful, because it is extremely wealthy, and, since it alone controls all productive enterprises and all commerce, it attracts to itself for its own benefit and profit all sources of wealth and has considerable power even in the administration of public affairs. The other is the poor and weak multitude, with wounded spirits and always ready to riot" [61].

"I am the poor and weak multitude, with wounded spirits and always ready to riot." Pope Pius XI, in turn, reiterates the same idea in his encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno":

"First, it is obvious that in our times not only is wealth accumulated, but enormous power and despotic economic dominance are also created in the hands of very few. Often, these are not even owners, but merely custodians and administrators who govern capital according to their will and whim. These potentates are extraordinarily powerful when, as absolute owners of money, they control credit and distribute it as they please; it would seem that they administer the lifeblood of the entire economy, and that they so hold in their hands, so to speak, the very soul of economic life, that no one can breathe against their will.

This accumulation of power and resources, an almost original characteristic of the modern economy, is the natural consequence of the boundless freedom of competitors, which leaves only the most powerful survivors, which is often the same as saying those who fight the hardest." Courageously, those who least care for their conscience...; economic arrogance has supplanted the free market, the desire for profit has been replaced by the unbridled ambition for power; the entire economy has become extremely harsh, cruel, and implacable” [62]. Pius XII, in his Christmas radio address of 1944, said, among other things:

“We see how the ever-growing class of workers frequently finds itself confronted with those excessive concentrations of economic assets which, often concealed under the guise of a corporation, manage to evade their social obligations and almost render the worker unable to acquire any real property” [63]. The encyclical Populorum Progressio views the problem thus:

"To be freed from misery, to more securely secure one's livelihood, health, and stable employment, to participate even more fully in responsibility, free from all oppression and sheltered from situations that offend one's dignity as a human being; to be more educated; in a word, to do, to know, and to have more in order to be more—such is the aspiration of people today, while a great number of them are condemned to live in conditions that render this legitimate desire illusory..."

"While in some regions an oligarchy enjoys a refined civilization, the rest of the population, poor and dispersed, is deprived of almost all possibilities for personal initiative and responsibility, and often even lives in conditions of life and work unworthy of the human person... In this development, the temptation becomes so violent that it threatens to drag people toward promising messianisms that, while promising, are also illusions. Who cannot see the dangers of this: violent popular reactions, insurrectionary upheavals, and slides toward ideologies?" totalitarian?" [64].

Given this reality under such deplorable conditions, what does Christianity offer to the world today? Is there a possibility for a rehabilitation of the Christian worldview? Does Christianity have another chance?

Getting to the heart of the matter, we can say that Catholicism rejects the philosophical conceptions and practical socio-economic systems of rationalist liberalism as well as the dialectical-historical materialism of Bolshevism. Both systems are contrary to the Christian worldview. As for their philosophical conceptions, Christian doctrine rejects them because both liberal and communist conceptions are immanentist. [65] Despite the great merit of liberal rationalists who have championed "the natural ordering of consciences toward truth" (G. Marcel), the Church rejects their philosophy, both in its liberal form and aspect, and in the form in which it also arrogates to itself the "rationalist" attribute, that is, in the form of communism.

Rationalist liberalism, even though it was "a kind of secular version of Christian moral idealism" (C. Dawson), inevitably led to the devaluation of man, stripping him of any character as a superior being with a metaphysical vocation and the right to eternal life.

Dialectical-historical materialism, denying him all of this as well, also deprives him of all the freedoms that liberal rationalism had successfully championed, but which it could not safeguard in the name of epistemological doubt or agnosticism regarding the essence of man and his ultimate destiny, nor against the usurpations of economic man. This has increasingly reduced them to economic freedom, culminating in what is called financial capitalism and imperialism. Rejecting both systems, what doctrine does the Church offer us to ward off the evils and "moral atrocities" that plague the world today?

Before outlining the essence of this doctrine, it is worth emphasizing that the Church does not claim the right to solve this problem alone. It calls for the collaboration of everyone: the State, private national and international organizations, intellectuals, writers, publicists, statesmen, etc. "The present situation of the world demands collective action, which takes as its starting point a clear vision of all economic, social, cultural, and spiritual aspects" [66].

Maritain, one of the few thinkers cited in the encyclical Populorum Progressio, calls communists "students" of bourgeois man. Capitalism has given birth to communism. Therefore, Catholic social doctrine, in refuting both of them, begins by denouncing the falsehood of economic liberalism.

Paul VI says that this system is built on "private profit as the essential driving force of economic progress, competition as the supreme law of economics, and private ownership of the means of production as an absolute right, without limits or corresponding social obligations. This unbridled liberalism, which leads to dictatorship, was rightly denounced by Pius XI as the generator of 'international financial imperialism'" [67].

Contrary to this conception, according to which the economy would have its own absolutely autonomous laws, beyond the reach of ethics, the Church considers that the economy is fundamentally subject to ethical laws [68]. Everything that people do or fail to do, especially concerning reciprocal human relations, must be evaluated in the light of ethics [69].

Economic science is an integral part of anthropology. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the technical aspects of economic and social problems from their ethical aspects. Even though the Church does not intervene directly in technical problems, it considers it its inescapable duty to intervene in ethical problems. Its primary duty is to educate consciences, to enlighten them, projecting upon them the divine light of the Gospel.

THE HUMAN PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD

Having thus outlined the total horizon of humanity, society, and its institutions, Christian social doctrine, within the economic problem, finds its central value: the human person.

"In every well-organized and fruitful human society, the principle that every human being is a PERSON, that is, a nature endowed with intelligence and free will, and who, therefore, by virtue of that very nature, possesses rights and duties which, being universal and inviolable, are also inalienable" [70].

From Pope Leo XIII to Paul VI, Church doctrine tirelessly reiterated and emphasized this supreme value in human coexistence. Everything—the economy, society, and the State—must be at the service of humanity. Rerum Novarum expresses the same idea in the following terms:

"Nor should the care and providence of the State interfere, because humanity is older than the State, and therefore, before any State was formed, humanity should have received the right to care for its life and body." Pius XI, in turn, adds: “In the Creator’s plan, society is a natural means, which man can and should use, and not vice versa… Only man, the human person, whatever he may be, is endowed with reason and morally free will… Man has a spiritual and immortal soul; he is a person admirably endowed by the Creator with bodily and spiritual gifts, a true microcosm, as the ancients said, a small world that is worth immensely more than the whole inanimate world. Both in this life and in the next, he has only God as his ultimate end; he is raised by sanctifying grace to the status of Son of God” [71].

Since man precedes society; since he is the only one endowed with reason and free will, he is the first who must take care of his rights and duties before himself, before God, and before society. Human personality can, therefore, fulfill its rights and obligations only in freedom.

To take away freedom is to reduce it to an object, to make it an irresponsible being. Societies or states that organize coexistence in such a way that individuals cannot take responsibility for fulfilling their personal purpose are detestable, contrary to their natural mission.

But the truth is that individuals live within history, society, and the state. Therefore, the community also has rights over individuals. How can reciprocal rights be defined? How can they be harmonized? Herein lies the problem of freedom and authority; of the individual and society. A serious problem, one that has been with humanity throughout history: the form of compromise between these two spheres determines the type of government.

Absolute or constitutional monarchy; aristocratic or popular republic; oligarchy or democracy; plutocracy or popular or proletarian democracy. All these forms of government represent various attempts to best resolve the relationship between human freedom and the reciprocal duties to which individuals are entitled, and with the community in which they naturally live.

Much blood was shed to establish one or another of these forms of government. The ideal of a perfect government constantly inspired the discontented to rebel, but the ideal remains unattainable. A cyclical movement of forms of government, which come and go, was already observed by the Roman thinker and politician Cicero:

"Monarchy struggles for power against a despot, aristocracy against a tyrannical minority, democracy against the rule of the populace, but from the latter, a movement can also emerge, reverting to one of the previous forms. In a surprising and almost periodic circular motion, the transformation and change of the forms of the State occur. Understanding these changes is the task of the statesman."

The task of the political statesman is to foresee them as something fraught with danger; to overcome them and guide them along the right course is a sign of great wisdom and almost divine ability. Given this, in my opinion, a fourth form should be recommended, namely, the appropriate complementation and fusion of the three original forms already mentioned” [72].

Catholic doctrine offers a firm criterion for delimiting the sphere of the community with respect to the individual and vice versa. It is the concept of the COMMON GOOD. “The community has no other reason for its existence than concern for the common good. This common good is nothing other than the creation of the indispensable conditions for the human personality to realize its own life's purpose in its own responsibility" [73].

The Church has also devoted attention to the problem of socialization and statization, which particularly characterize our time. These two processes endanger the human person's "prior" rights to society. Socialization deprives man of individual initiative and makes him increasingly dependent on organizations, which impose their objectives, their will, and their mode of conduct. In short, says Liederik de Witte, there is a danger that man "will be lost in the group," that he will become depersonalized [74].

Since this process is partly a product of the development of science and technology, which require the concentration of many people with their knowledge, their will, and their capacity, man, especially Catholic man, must not isolate himself and must defend himself against this process, which can be considered indispensable for the growth of production and the general improvement of well-being and culture. Catholics should not isolate themselves in a ghetto, but rather take their share of responsibility in this process.

However, to avoid the depersonalization of man and his loss within the group, Pope John XXIII clearly clarifies the positions. Even though this process is the natural consequence of the technologization of life, it is, first and foremost, a human endeavor, the product of human knowledge and will. "The process of socialization is not the product of irresistible natural forces," says John XXIII in the Encyclical Mater et Magistra.

Consequently, what people have done wrong, when they realize it, they can undo or redo. This process, then, can serve both the good and the evil of humanity. The criterion for discerning the two seemingly opposing zones is once again the concept of the common good. John XXIII defines it as follows: "This encompasses the central point." of those conditions of society that facilitate or enable man to fully develop his values.”

Father Liederik de Witte reduces this problem to the following questions: “How is it possible to develop the phenomenon of socialization so that it is useful to the human personality?” How is it possible, despite the process of socialization, for the human personality to develop within the community in all its multiple facets? [75]

Developing this theme based on the text of the encyclical Mater et Magistra, Liederik answers these questions, recommending three measures in this regard: People must have the opportunity to freely find themselves, seeking the fulfillment of the goals imposed upon them by the new conditions of social and economic life. Despite the growth of the network of organizations and the obligations that derive from it, the objective must be carefully considered, so that everything serves, first and foremost, the development of the human personality. People must preserve their individual initiative and dignity and collaborate, with their own responsibility, with society. This is why Mater et Magistra calls the new social structure "social humanism." This is the first recommendation.

The second point is that these organizations, fraught with the danger of oppression, must have autonomy from state power. If it is of essential importance to ensure the initiative, freedom, and responsibility of the individual in the face of the phenomenon of "subsidiary," private organizations, this would be meaningless if these same values, even when socially organized, were not safeguarded against the omnipotence of the state. Otherwise, what has been given with one hand would be taken away with the other.

The third and final recommendation is that the state "have a correct understanding of the common good." The state should not place itself in the position of those directly concerned, of individuals or their organizations. They must maintain their autonomy while directly bearing their responsibilities. Inseparably linked to this problem of the individual-society relationship is the problem of state intervention in social and economic life. From Pope Leo XIII to Paul VI, ecclesiastical opinion has been changing. From the conception of Leo XIII, which reduced the function of the State to "guardian of the legal order" in the classical spirit of liberalism, we have arrived at the positive conception of the State's role. Mater et Magistra formulates this new ecclesiastical doctrine: "The State's objective is to ensure earthly well-being.

Therefore, it must not be completely detached from the economic life of its citizens. Rather, it must be involved, intervening to promote it, first and foremost to ensure the quantity of goods necessary for a virtuous life; then it must protect the rights of all citizens, especially the weak, to which workers, women, and children belong.

It must never shirk its duty to try to improve the situation of workers. The State must also ensure that employment contracts correspond to justice and equity. Beyond that, the State must ensure that in the workplace, human dignity is not harmed physically or morally."

These ideas of Pope John XXIII invoke the omnipotence of the State, its overwhelming power, totalitarianism. But his predecessors had already enunciated the principles of restoration against this totalitarian danger. Pope Pius XII, keenly aware of this danger, warned: "Communism recognizes the collective's right, or rather, its unlimited arbitrary power, to subject individuals to collective labor, without any regard for their personal well-being, even against their will and even with violence.

In this collective, both morality and the legal order would be nothing more than an emanation of the economic system of the moment, therefore of earthly origin, changeable and perishable. In short, it seeks to introduce a new era and a new civilization that is the fruit only of a blind evolution: a humanity without God" [76]. Pope Pius XII, witnessing the evils of both right-wing and left-wing totalitarianism, warned: "Whoever would deduce this accumulation of power from the common good would be acting precisely in the opposite direction. For the protection of the inviolable sphere of life, of the rights and obligations of the human personality, is the essential task of all public power."

This problem is of transcendent importance. Where individual initiative and responsibility are lacking, the totalitarian omnipotence of the State quickly takes hold; but where the regulatory intervention of the State is lacking, the evils of liberal individualism and capitalism prevail. Mater et Magistra addresses the problem in these terms: "...where the necessary political and economic activity of the State is entirely lacking, or where it is insufficient, an unhealthy disorder quickly arises.

There, an insolent exploitation of the needs of others by the least scrupulous, who are stronger, reigns." Commenting on the position of Pope John XXIII, Father Liederik de Witte says that the "workers' movement during these last one hundred and fifty years" speaks to us in very eloquent language about this abuse [77].

PROPERTY, WAGES, AND PARTICIPATION

Now, while the concept of human personality and the common good serve as cardinal points of the social problem in its theoretical aspect of Catholic doctrine, private property, wages, and participation in the management of companies play the same role in its practical aspect. By addressing these three aspects of the problem, the "evolving," changing nature of the doctrine is revealed in all three, adapting to the general conditions of each historical period in which social difficulties are once again confronted.

Regarding private property, the Church's doctrinal position considers it one of the natural rights of man. Unlike socialists, who consider private property the source of all social ills and call for its total abolition, Pope Leo XIII firmly emphasized its natural and inviolable character. But delving deeper into the problem, this same Pope distinguishes between the right to use material goods and the right of ownership over them. This opens up new perspectives.

The right of ownership is a social institution, derived from the natural right to use goods. Therefore, this social institution can and does change in the course of history. It is the legislator's task to carefully observe reality and undertake changes accordingly. What a person earns through their labor is their property, excluding others. The individual, not society or the State, must provide for their own subsistence and dignity.

The same obligation applies primarily to their family. Similarly, the right of inheritance shares in the natural character of property. But this Pope also points out that private property has a social function.

Its abuse produces social discontent and imbalance. "Add to this the fact that contracts for works and the trade of all things are almost entirely in the hands of a few, so that a few wealthy and extremely rich men have placed on the shoulders of the countless multitude of proletarians a yoke that differs little from slavery" [78].

The fundamental task of the civil legislator must be to create the conditions under which the proletariat can acquire "some property," free themselves from poverty, and de-proletarianize themselves.

These considerations of Pope Leo XIII were conceived at a time when agriculture held the greatest weight in the economic life of nations. Highly industrialized society demands other considerations and a further development of Catholic social doctrine.

While Popes Pius XI and Pius XII once again emphasized the firmness of the right to private property, they opposed any conception that sought to identify this right with morality, that is, that moral obligations would be exhausted by the obligations of positive law. The abuse of this right is evident on all sides.

Pope Pius XII emphasized this point, opposing all legal positivism, which seeks to give a human endeavor the character of "a false majesty, separating law from morality, which is extremely fatal." The State must ensure that workers can acquire private property, assuming on their own the duties of the "future head of household."

Only in this way will it contribute to the deproletarianization of workers, lifting them out of the deplorable state into which they "fell through no fault of their own," as Pope Leo XIII had said.

John XXIII marks a decisive step in the evolution of the concept of private property. According to L. de Witte, he does so in accordance with the new economic and social conditions. There are three moments that characterize this new era that demands change: 1) The separation of ownership and management of large industrial enterprises; 2) a certain degree of deproletarianization of workers, achieved through their relentless struggle and social legislation; and 3) a new scale of social values.

The first moment of this era raises the issue of worker participation in the management of companies and the distribution of profits. The second makes evident the overcoming of the previous form of deproletarianization, opening the way to other more radical forms.

The third shifts the old bourgeois criterion of value, granting greater privileges and esteem to the wealthiest, while from now on the esteem of the one who plans and directs begins to prevail, which is entirely in accordance with the very essence of human labor, "because labor is the immediate expression of human nature and therefore of greater value than wealth in material goods. These are only attributable to the value of a means," as Mater et Magistra states.

L. de Witte comments: "Let us think back a little to the encyclical Rerum Novarum: What path have we already traveled? The acquisition of property always means owning a house and a piece of land. In those times, the agrarian character of the economy predominated. The effects of industrialization had not yet impacted the economic life of society as a whole.

But today we have a different situation: wealth consists of one's own house and a piece of land, but also the possession of the indispensable means of production. For the peasant, these are his land and his tools; for the artisan, his workshop; but for the industrial worker in medium and large companies, this means a certain co-ownership of the company where he works" [79].

We still have to consider the problem of wages. It is the most important. If private property is to guarantee the freedom and personal dignity of the working man, wages are the most appropriate, almost the only, means by which he can achieve them. The proletarian has no other source of income.

But how, where, and under what conditions can one find employment? The most salient characteristic of the modern economy, of the liberal-industrial economy, is the separation of labor from capital. Bringing both factors together and distributing the benefits equitably is the fundamental question in this situation. How can this be achieved? There is freedom of contract. But the worker is alone against the capitalist, that is, the weakest against the strongest.

The Chapellier Law of 1791—this French law became the general law of industrialized countries—prohibited the formation of professional organizations, which could have served as a form of self-defense. Furthermore, labor is considered a mere commodity, whose value is determined according to the law of supply and demand.

The Church decisively rejects this conception. Labor is not a commodity whose value should be calculated as the value of muscular strength. Labor is human work, the expression of human personality, whose value cannot and should not depend on the market. We must eliminate capitalist speculation in the labor market, especially regarding the unemployed, to decrease or increase production or prices according to their selfish interests. The Church's ideal is full employment, where workers receive a just wage.

To determine this, Catholic doctrine had to go through several phases of development, from Pope Leo XIII's concept of a just individual wage to John XXIII's emphasis on worker participation in the enterprise. Against free market contracting, the Church accepts and defends workers' organizations as a form of self-defense, which will support each worker against the capitalist. Furthermore, Leo XIII raises his voice in another sense: "It is said that the amount of the wage or salary is determined by the free consent of the contracting parties, that is, the employer and the worker; and that, therefore, when the employer has paid the promised wage, he is free and has nothing more to do..."

But, since work is absolutely necessary for the sustenance of life and has the character of the external expression of human personality... "even granting that the worker and his employer freely agree on something, and particularly on the amount of the wage, there remains, nevertheless, always something that stems from natural justice and that is of greater weight and prior to the free will of those who make the contract..."

"And if it should ever happen that the worker, compelled by necessity or moved by the fear of a greater evil, were to accept a harsher condition than he would have it, because the employer or contractor absolutely imposed it upon him, that would be to do him violence, and justice rebels against such violence." [80]

With this principle, Catholic doctrine has shaken the "gods of economic liberalism." Herein lies the ethical and socio-economic justification for the struggles of workers and the intervention of the State in social disputes. Collective bargaining agreements, under State oversight, are the principal instruments.

Following the principles established by Popes Pius XI and Pius XII, Pope John XXIII undertook a new and decisive attempt to determine a just wage in the era of the Industrial Revolution. Rejecting the extremists' demand for the entirety of the product of labor, the encyclical Mater et Magistra reduced the criteria for determining a just wage to three groups: the needs for a dignified life for the worker and his family; the possibilities of the enterprise within the social environment; and the general state of national and international well-being.

Scientific and technological progress, the growth of national product and well-being must progressively bear fruit for all members of society. Even today, "...countless workers in many countries and entire parts of the world are subjected to living conditions unworthy of human beings." To solve this inhumane problem, John XXIII adds: "...thus, we consider it appropriate to draw attention to a precept of social justice: that economic progress must correspond to and follow social progress, so that all parts of the people may share in the growing wealth of the nation."

Since everything here, too, must serve the human person, the goal of the national economy is not the accumulation of goods, but their just distribution. "Therefore, the economic well-being of a people should not be measured by the quantity of goods available to its members, but by their just distribution, according to which everyone in a country should receive something for the perfection of their personalities," says Mater et Magistra.

However, "the goal must in every case be to make a company a true human community; it must imprint its character on the reciprocal relationships of the participants, despite the difference in their tasks and obligations..."

Regarding the right of workers to participate in the company, Liederik de Witte believes it is necessary to distinguish between participation in personal, social, and economic matters. Pope Pius XII granted the possibility and necessity in the first two cases, while formulating reservations for the third. Only later, in Mater et Magistra, did he reconsider this position.

"Like our predecessors, We too are of the opinion that workers rightly demand active participation in the life of the company in which they work... In any case, workers should actively participate in the affairs of their companies. This applies to both private and public companies... How this participation should be determined cannot be decided once and for all..."

To explain this right, Liederik de Witte says approximately the following: given that in the largest companies, the capitalists and the managers (directors) are not the same people, the question arises: where does the directors' decision-making power come from?

Since the collaboration of everyone in the company is already required, the center of gravity for decisions shifts from the capitalists to the working community. If capitalists invoke the right to decide in the name of their capital, others do so in the name of their labor, which is the emanation of human personality. "There is a necessity in human nature, according to which everyone who contributes their productive labor must also be able to co-determine the course of things in order to achieve, through their work, the development of their personality... The increasing responsibility that workers bear in various economic enterprises corresponds entirely to human nature; it also coincides with the direction of today's historical evolution in the economy, in society, and in the State..." says Mater et Magistra [81].

FIDELITY TO PRINCIPLES AND NECESSARY EVOLUTION

This is Catholic social doctrine in its essential features. - Despite the changes that have occurred in recent times in accordance with the conditions of economic life in general, this doctrine remained faithful to the position formulated in Quadragesimo Anno, rejecting the extremes of individualistic liberalism, with its degeneration into financial imperialism, and into totalitarian collectivism.

"Just as denying or diminishing the social and public character of the right to property necessarily leads to so-called individualism, or at least approaches it, so too, by rejecting or diminishing the private and individual character of that right, one rushes toward collectivism, or at least touches upon its tenets" [82].

In this way, this doctrine erects firm and effective barriers against extremes. The inviolability of the human person, prior to and superior to all society, which seeks to reduce them to the status of an object; private property, to a limited extent, is the guarantee of their independence and dignity. Without freedom and independence, humanity becomes depersonalized [83].

The current situation in industry demands, in the name of the freedom, independence, and dignity of the human person, participation in enterprises, to prevent attempts to render illusory the rights of beings endowed with reason and free will.

No one, therefore, can legitimately underestimate the importance of this doctrine. But what has the encyclical Populorum Progressio contributed to all of this?

"To sum it all up in one proposition, we can say: Quadragesimo Anno addressed the social order from a normative and psychophilosophical point of view; Mater et Magistra addresses it empirically and sociologically. With this, Mater et Magistra achieves greater proximity to reality; and this is, in fact, the decisive factor, because it was received throughout the world with great approval and even enthusiasm," says de Witte, concluding his work, which has already been mentioned several times.

Although Populorum Progressio took a step forward in the practical and empirical-sociological sense, the attitude of world opinion was neither unanimous nor enthusiastic. In New York, the center of global financial capitalism, the initial reaction was that it was a "reheating of Marx" and his doctrine. Furthermore, it had been said that Pope Paul VI contradicted Pope Pius IX. The latter had anathematized those who claimed that the Pope should accept and reconcile himself with progress, while Paul VI emphasized progress precisely, considering it indispensable for world peace and well-being.

But it must be said that the adversaries either do not fully understand the Church's position or say this deliberately to diminish its value. Pope Pius IX's anathematization of progress referred to the immanentist conception of progress; that progress which placed all its hopes in science and technology; in unlimited material progress and political freedom without considering ethical obligations; the progress that believed in its possibilities even after the death of God had been proclaimed.

If Paul VI accepts the idea of progress, he conceives of it as the integral development of humankind: of its possibilities, virtues, and capacities—moral, religious, and intellectual—as well as its scientific, technical, and material aspirations. There is no more eschatological passivity. Progress and well-being must be realized now in this world. The ethical sense, the eternal vocation of the human personality, must inspire all human activity, both individual and collective. Only progress of this kind is true progress.[84]

Economists and statesmen have criticized Pope Paul VI for stating that "poor peoples remain poor, while the rich become ever richer," comparing this idea to Marx's, whose consequence would be: "the expropriators will be expropriated," even though Paul VI is far from suggesting the necessity of expropriation, but rather establishes other conditions and distinctions. Yes, it is true, the Pope says:

"The earth has been given to everyone and not only to the rich. That is to say, private property does not constitute an unconditional and absolute right for anyone. There is no justifiable reason to reserve for exclusive use what exceeds one's own needs, when others lack what is necessary. In short: the right of ownership should never be exercised to the detriment of the common good, according to the traditional doctrine of the Church Fathers and the great theologians. If a conflict arises between acquired private rights and fundamental community needs, it is up to the public authorities to seek a solution, with active measures far removed from the concept of expropriation," but everything he says is far removed from the concept of expropriation.[85]

Regarding rents, Paul VI states:

"Certainly, it would be unacceptable for citizens, endowed with abundant incomes derived from national resources and activity, to transfer a considerable portion of them abroad for purely personal gain, without concern for the obvious harm they would thereby inflict on their own country."[86]

This truth must be very unpalatable to many in Latin America, where there is a certain group that defends an absolute concept of private property. Nor can the following be agreeable to these same circles:

"It is true that there are situations whose injustice cries out to heaven. When entire populations, lacking necessities, live in such dependency that it prevents them from any initiative or responsibility for cultural promotion and participation in social and political life, the temptation is great to violently reject such grave affronts to human dignity."[87]

But despite bordering on justifying revolution, Paul VI argues:

"...living together, sharing the same hope, suffering, ambition, and joy, work unites wills, brings minds closer, and melts hearts; in doing it, people discover they are brothers" [88].

Instead of revolutionary expropriation, Paul VI invokes collaboration, fraternity, and love. International financial monopolies, in particular, disliked the Pope's sound doctrine on international trade, demanding amendments regarding free contracting: that is, the rule of free trade cannot continue to govern international relations alone. Where there is parity of forces, this rule can be useful, "but it is no longer the same when conditions are too unequal from country to country; prices that are formed 'freely' in the market can lead to inequitable results. What was true about a just individual wage is also true with regard to international contracts: an exchange economy cannot continue to rest solely on the law of free competition, which too often engenders economic dictatorship. Free exchange is only equitable if it is subject to the demands of social justice" [89].

It is necessary to highlight another aspect here. It is a well-known fact that Catholic peoples, especially within Western civilization, are the poorest. This fact finds its fullest confirmation in Latin America, whose peasants live in abject poverty. Pope Paul VI, mindful of the Church's universal mission, does not hesitate to extend his solicitous attention precisely to this part of the world:

"The keen anxiety that has gripped the poor in industrializing countries is now taking hold of those where the economy is almost exclusively agrarian: the peasants, too, are becoming aware of their 'undeserved misery' [90]. Indeed, the encyclical Populorum Progressio seeks nothing other than to apply Catholic social doctrine in its entirety to international life. 'Today, the most important fact of which everyone must be aware is that the social question has taken on a global dimension... The hungry peoples are now challenging the wealthy with dramatic urgency.'"

Faced with this crisis, the Church is filled with anguish; she calls on everyone to respond with love to the plea of their brothers and sisters. The Pope has seen with his own eyes and touched with his own hands "the very serious difficulties that overwhelm peoples..." [91]. This, in short and in essence, is the social doctrine of the Church. By repeatedly expounding it, she now imbues her voice with the character of anguish. The "mystery" of the rich and the poor must be addressed in a way that differs from the traditional approach. "It is not given to us to understand why some people enjoy a carefree life, while others must bear all the work and poverty.

The solution to this painful question will be given to us only in the afterlife," said N. Berdiajew, even as he passionately denounced social injustices and proposed remedies. Almost in contrast to this vision of the eschatological mystery, Toynbee emphasizes the urgent need for a solution in this life.

“For the last five or six thousand years, as easily as we steal honey from bees, the masters of civilization have deprived their slaves of their rightful share of the fruits of society’s collective labor.” And while in earlier times these masters of civilization could cite the scarcity of goods, the lack of means of production, the necessity for these goods to belong to the elite, who play the role of common progress, it is obvious “that this argument, quite plausible up to and including the 18th century, even in our technically enterprising Western world, has been invalidated in the last fifty years by the unprecedented progress of our technology. In a society that has discovered the ‘how-to’ of the horn of plenty, the always unpleasant inequality in the distribution of the goods of this world… has become a moral enormity”[92].

Without denying that “mystery,” the Church today accepts the urgency and the possibility of contributing to reducing this dangerous tension between the rich and the poor.

TOWARD THE "SENSE OF NEIGHBOUR"

It seems to us, therefore, that the Church's magisterium has found its true path. Currently, it is accused from two extremes: by communists of siding with capitalism, and by capitalists of promoting social sedition and showing solidarity with leftists of all stripes. Professor Mandic, quoted at the beginning of this article, even speaks of an alleged ecclesiastical intention to organize Catholic communism.

We have already demonstrated the falsity of such accusations in what has been stated above. Nothing confirms this falsity better than the accusations themselves. In the struggle between two passionate enemies, any attitude of third parties that does not identify with the viewpoint of one of the two contenders is also an enemy attitude. If the Church's attitude and stance deserve to be accused by both extremes, it is fair to say that its doctrine dissents from both.

However, the Church upholds the rights of the poor; "we have become advocates for the poor," said Paul VI. But, in claiming these rights, the Church does not identify with leftism nor express any sympathy for it. It wants to identify with the poor as human beings, as human persons, deprived of their rights and dignity "without being responsible for it."

In particular, we find Professor Mandic's assertion that the Church is establishing "its first testing ground" in the country where the Croats live, for its tactical experiment with socialist countries, to be accurate.

Now, finding itself once again almost in the catacombs, the Church, with the famous 1966 Protocol concluded with the communist regime in Belgrade, is attempting, without the weapons of bourgeois society, to reconquer the lost world, relying solely on the help of Christ and using the resources derived from its effective Creed; from the capital and wealth in which the specifically Christian means of Grace and those of the "naturally Christian" soul converge.

In this regard, the statement by the Croatian Metropolitan, Cardinal Šeper, is extremely interesting when he says that atheists do not deny the God in whom we believe. He meant that in that new society there are "pious atheists"—those with a Christian nature—who do not deny the true God, the fullness of justice, freedom, and love, but rather deny the god of the rich, who seek to conceal their selfish interests with a false, divinizing facade. To engage in dialogue with these "pious atheists," Šeper expressed his preference for remaining in that society. This is why Bishop Franic of Split, deprived of ecclesiastical property and having his office in his bedroom, demonstrates such pastoral enthusiasm under a communist regime, unconcerned with material possessions, content with having only the bare necessities.

Even though the Church considers private property one of the best means of protecting human freedom and dignity, its dignitaries, forced to live in new catacombs, are willing to accept communist "idealism": to renounce private property and move toward the utopia of a communist society. For this, they rely, in part, on the solid support of their Church's social doctrine. Private property is a derived natural right; derived from the natural right to the use of material goods, this use constituting the original natural right. The right of use is indispensable and natural; property is a social or legislative institution.

But the Church is an excellent judge of human nature. She knows very well that materialistic communism, belief in it, and attempts to implement it are destined to fail; in a terrible attempt to implement it, the experiment proves to be a utopian endeavor. Human "plasticity," contrary to communist belief, only encompasses its Western qualities, and even then, only precariously.

But to demonstrate her goodwill and to categorically deny her interest in material goods, the Church asks of the new society and its power only the right and the possibility to preach the Gospel, enlighten consciences, and explain the meaning of human existence. She knows very well, both before and after, that communism is a utopia.

To convince even "pious atheists," she is prepared to walk with them to the limits where the truth will emerge undeniably. A shared experience will prove to be a more secure, fraternal, and humane experience—a truly convincing one. Reaching the point where events will demonstrate its "stubbornness," as the most prominent Croatian communist writer and intellectual, Miroslav Krleža, told J.-Paul Sartre, complaining about a social reality that refuses to conform to the utopian ideals of communism, we will arrive at the point where the absurd will surprisingly reveal its true face. The absurdity lies in its ideological stance and even more so in its inhumane attempt to implement it through violence against humanity. Communism must reconsider and revise its ideological position and rectify its practical applications.

It is precisely here that we glimpse the possibility of a new Christian conquest of the world. Eschatological anxieties, inseparable from humanity, regardless of the society in which one lives, the impossibility of realizing utopias, combined with the "post-imperial" Church, unconcerned with material goods and renouncing violence as a means of preserving the unity of faith, along with the idea of ecumenism, which seeks the unification of all Christians in a community of love, would give historical Christianity an invincible strength and a new opportunity.

Catholic social doctrine provides a solid foundation for this, preparing the conditions for a better future for the world, which is currently going through a very difficult period, and for Christianity, which finds itself, in part, once again in the catacombs.[93]

In its long struggle with liberalism and its rationalist philosophy, the Church ultimately settled for a form of coexistence with them. Its long historical experience—"knowledgeable of men," says Paul VI—led it to choose the lesser of two evils. But without true experience with communism, the Church is making extraordinary efforts in the same direction in countries under communist rule. This is truly a matter of ecclesiastical adaptation to the new communist social reality. The experience it will gain in Catholic Croatia and Slovenia, integral parts of Yugoslavia, will serve it in its subsequent actions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other countries with communist governments but with a glorious Christian past and present.

However, Professor Mandic is mistaken in asserting that the Catholic Church only acts after becoming convinced of the impossibility of containing or eliminating communism from the world by force. Post hoc ergo propter hoc—this is where Professor Mandic's error lies. Indeed, the Church lives and acts within history, and for its mission, it must also rely on purely human means. Logically, from this purely human perspective, the Church could easily accept the liquidation of a belligerent, terrorist society, a staunch enemy of Christianity, by the forces and weapons of another society with which it has already found a way to coexist and collaborate.

But to believe that the Church places all its hope in such weapons is a grave error. The Christianity of the catacombs had conquered the Roman Empire. It conquered it without foreign weapons. The power of the Creed, its ideas, and martyrdom were its primary, almost sole, weapons. No one can deny this truth, at least during the first three centuries of its existence.

But the Church, with a view to the restoration of a comprehensive humanism, also has plans for the free world, where many consider it the "triumphant" Church. We, looking at things from within, consider this "triumphant" Church, in effect, as a "foreigner" in its own land.

Where human personality is conceived as a superior stage of biophysical evolution with only one dimension—the historical dimension of its existence—denying any metaphysical vocation, that is not the Christian world. Where international financial monopolies keep hundreds of millions of people in a state of misery—illiteracy, ignorance, disease, poverty, etc.—that is not true Christianity today, even though Graham Greene highlights "repentance" for the evil we commit as a distinctive characteristic of a Christian civilization. Is there enough repentance to regenerate the truly Christian spirit?

The Latin American Episcopal Conference in Medellín, which took place this year, immediately after the solemn visit of Pope Paul VI to Colombia, established this truth and defined its position on the matter. The urgent social reforms demanded there in the name of Christian conscience are thus giving form to Paul VI's "cry of anguish" in this part of the world.

CONCLUSION

It is obvious that this ecclesiastical movement has had an impact both inside and outside the Church. On one side, the conservative-inflexible, on the other, the progressive-flexible, are vying for dominance. The arguments and counterarguments often obscure the essence of the problem.

Let us state our position, using a historical analogy. "You may embark, Justinian, if you wish; the ship is in the dock, and the sea is still open, but I will remain until the end, because kálion entáfion he basiléia, the Empire is a beautiful shroud." Thus spoke the wife of the Byzantine emperor at a time of grave internal crisis within the Empire. Commenting on the case, Toynbee adds: "Kálion entáfion he basiléia tou Theu" ("The kingdom of God is a more beautiful shroud")[94]. The empress was fascinated by the splendor of the old empire and preferred to die thus rather than seek new horizons and security. It seems to us that progressives and conservatives today, whether inside or outside the Church, find themselves in the same situation, in the same dilemma.

Conservatives are for the status quo, tranquility, and the outward splendor of an affluent society, but progressives, aware of the morbid state of this society, are urging us to take another path toward new horizons in time. Looking toward these new horizons of ecclesiastical progressives, we do so in the sense of "of one's neighbor" of Gabriel Marcel: "One can never argue with sufficient resolve against the idea that one cannot validly think today except on a global or planetary scale." Here, as always, it is the sense of neighbor that must be awakened: the only possible safeguard against calamities that will undoubtedly be universal" [95].

Populorum Progressio formulates this idea in the following terms: "... It is a matter of building a world where every man, without exception of race, religion or nationality, can live a fully human life, emancipated from the servitudes that come to him from men and from an insufficiently dominated nature; A world where freedom is not an empty word and where the poor Lazarus can sit at the same table as the rich man.” With these values, ideas, and practical suggestions for joint action, the Church once again emphasizes its presence in society. In the redemptive and metaphysical sense, as well as in the civilizing sense. It is not for nothing that even communists are paying attention to it. Moreover, those who have already seized power and hold it in their hands.

A force that acts in history, but that does not depend, in essence, on temporal means, the force that belongs to the world as “the prisoner belongs to his prison” (Graham Green), is of great interest to everyone. Especially to those who continue to vehemently deny the possibility of the existence of such forces. The communists are the most obstinate in denying it. Therefore, Christians must give them the contrary proof. A society with communist pretensions—pretensions, because communism is an impossibility—cannot take away the reason for existence of Christians. Christians must embark calmly on this new historical experiment. The Church has clarified the principles and indicated the path to be followed, a path along which some are already walking.

Sympathy and love for our neighbor, who, with us, passes through "the valley of tears" only once, must be the watchword. Without wealth, without persecution, march alongside the poor. This common march will reveal the misery of all historical attempts to organize social systems by disregarding the human personality—passionate, free, responsible, and imperishable. Thus, Populorum Progressio envisions the new opportunity for the Church and its presence in history, giving it a new metaphysical and supernatural meaning.

Buenos Aires

WHERE IS NORTH AMERICA HEADED?

BOGDAN RADICA

Perhaps never since I've lived in North America—for more than two decades—have I witnessed a crisis as profound and moving as the one of the last ten months. No American crisis has shaken me so much and reminded me of my early youth as this one, which began months ago and is still ongoing.

It seemed to me that I was returning to the years I spent after the First World War, to the dark and decisive 1920s of this tragic century. Those were years of collective revolts in the streets and squares of European cities, of riots in villages and towns, of assassinations of revolutionary and conservative leaders.

On the ruins of great empires, cracks opened and voids emerged as institutions created over centuries disappeared and old legitimacies were annulled. Values lost their absolute validity. The rise of anarchy in ideas and actions gave rise to doubts and fears in us young people. We didn't know where we were going or what direction to take. In addition to the enormous social, political, and ideological upheaval, a profound crisis arose within the outdated economic system. Liberalism was vanishing under the onslaught of unbridled democracy. Monarchies were giving way to republics. Where monarchies remained, their position was precarious and short-lived. It seemed that with the disappearance of kings, God was also vanishing; in any case, there was no security in our eyes.

Last autumn and winter, as well as this spring, these memories haunted me as I observed one of the deepest crises in North America. All the events that Europe experienced in the 1920s were now repeating themselves before my eyes on American soil. With one difference: in North America, there was no economic crisis; this country had never been as rich and economically vigorous as it is now.

But all that economic power that contributes to North America's greatness and inspires such confidence in its citizens seemed to me to be squandered. The main problem that troubled me was: would this orderly and blessed country, which in recent decades had tried to stop revolutions around the globe, also be unable to withstand the revolutionary whirlwind at its own doorstep?

Will the American dream and its entire way of life be shattered? Seeing people being killed in American cities, seeing houses burning in the poor ghettos where Black people live, and seeing representatives of Black American society being murdered, broke my heart.

The assassinations of President Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Robert-Bobby Kennedy reminded me of the times when the best and brightest men fell in European societies: Rathenau, Matteotti, Stambuliski, Radic (the Croatian democratic leader), to name just a few. That blood, that fire, evoked in my memory the European entanglements from which Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, and other totalitarian leaders of the masses later emerged.

Every day, observing the worried faces of my students, I repeated the story of my European youth, trying, through my experience, through the experience of my lost generation, to warn them not to lose the freedom and happiness that the American way of life had thus far guaranteed them.

Categorically rejecting my dire predictions, those young men and women began, as incidents unfolded in Memphis or Kentucky, in Newark, New York, or Washington, to listen more attentively and to ask me about the meaning of history, about the meaning of revolution.

Answering their questions, I felt powerless. Where to begin, and how to approach the problem? Those of us born into revolution, who have always lived through revolutions that provoke and are followed by wars, have not yet had a decade of peace to focus and examine our own conscience. We, who, expelled by revolutions, left old Europe, suddenly realized that those revolutions are also pursuing us in the New World. This feeling affected us much more than the average American who believes that his country is God's chosen one, that it did not sin against God so as not to share the fate of old Europe. How to begin, and how to frame the main problem that torments us and that torments North America?

I

FIRST AND FOREMOST, we must address the problem of intellectuals. Postwar American intellectuals began to abruptly and vertically abolish traditional values. From pragmatic and liberal philosophy, they moved to the relativism that led Europe to the abyss between the two world wars.

Since American liberalism introduced the belief that everything is permitted (permissiveness), it was not difficult for relativists and Marxists of all stripes to introduce into American life the means of total unbridled excess, which quickly led to complete and unrestricted anarchy.

The opening of the so-called "new frontiers" involved attracting the attention and interest, especially of young people, to diametrically opposed horizons in the hope of opening the door to an extremely undefined and confusing revolution.

University students were suddenly invaded by a rebellious impulse against everything that was the foundation of the American way of life. The emergence, first of the beatniks, then of the hippies and yippies, while not sweeping up the majority of university students, marked, through the violent imposition of a minority, the rhythm of American life.

This youth rebelled against everything upon which their parents had built American life, founded within the framework of a vigorous material organization. In the postwar period, American society undoubtedly became the most powerful economic society.

The philosophy of producing consumer goods transformed American society into the so-called society of total affluence, so that young Americans felt trapped and overwhelmed by wealth. It was not, therefore, as in the pre-war European period, a matter of unemployment or hunger, but of unlimited possibilities for earning, accumulating well-being, and increasing wealth.

The working masses, exclusively white, became the satisfied middle class that worked and produced, accumulating new wealth. Capitalism was rapidly passing from the hands of a minority to the working masses, with whom it distributed profits and capital. The Anglo-Saxon aristocracy was quickly disappearing, and the young American, son of parents from Central and Southeastern Europe, was occupying important positions and reaching the position of a solid and wealthy middle class.

The magic of private property, manifested not only in owning one's own apartment and having abundant food, but also in the normal acquisition of all the products of industrial civilization, invaded every corner of American life, except for the Black sector, marginalized by this recent industrial development.

From this class of former workers who two generations earlier had arrived on American soil ragged and hungry, now emerged the new class of the satisfied bourgeoisie, who could not only beautify their homes by providing them with all the comforts of modern life, especially television, but also integrate their children into a very advanced educational system. The children of former immigrants, peasants, and workers entered universities for the first time, so that in North America what Marx could not foresee came to pass: industrial society was able to send more than six million students to schools and universities, whose studies it financed mostly with its own money. Very soon, thanks to computers, universities became organized factories with an enormous bureaucracy that stifled, and continues to stifle, both professors and students.

The analysis of this American process was most fully carried out by Herbert Marcuse in his well-known book, *One-Dimensional Man*, studies on the ideology of developed industrial society, which was published years ago and went almost unnoticed, only to suddenly attract the attention of students in recent months, not only in North America but also in Europe, and in all democratic and communist societies. "One-dimensional man" is the result of industrial society, which by its nature and laws tends toward a totally organized society, both in free communities and in dependent and closed ones.

Marcuse was a German-born intellectual who arrived in North America during Hitler's aggression against free thought, and during that time he remained largely unnoticed. A Hegelian and Marxist, and a member of the renowned pre-Nazi Frankfurt School, Marcuse, in fact, discovered nothing new. Many sociologists at the beginning of the 20th century had already predicted that the industrialization of society would turn humankind into slaves incapable of thinking and acting freely.

In her book "The Tragedy of Progress," written in the 1920s, Gina Lombroso predicted that unlimited mechanical and technological progress would enslave humanity to such an extent that people would feel not only powerless but miserable. Enslaved by machines and technology, humanity would become dehumanized, as Ortega y Gasset later analyzed, and would lose its personality. But this same phenomenon, which Karl Marx, in his early discourse on alienation, attributed exclusively to capitalism, arose not only in capitalist society but also in communist society. In fact, it became more acute and terrifying in the latter than in capitalist society.

The Croatian communist intellectuals associated with the journal Praxis were among the first to perceive this fact, influenced by Marcuse, whose work provided a foundation for their main thesis regarding the development of communist society in Yugoslavia. Marcuse's attendance at the Korcula seminars (Croatia) and his contributions to the early issues of Praxis undoubtedly helped young Marxists in Croatia take this direction. In Italy, France, and especially Germany, Marcuse's doctrine manifested itself in the rebellion of university students and a certain separation of young people from the Italian and French Communist Parties.

The communist world was suddenly wounded in its structures, as was the neocapitalism of open societies. The exceptions were Mao's China and Castro's Cuba, and the idolatry of Che Guevara. Thus emerged the newest current: revolution within the revolution. Official communism had to be presented as the bulwark against this recent revolutionary phenomenon, opposed to counter-revolutions within the revolution, and the principle of law and order had to be promulgated.

People are now asking: where is communism headed? Is it tending toward conservatism? In Italy and France, as in Croatia and the Soviet Union, communism labels all these new phenomena as anarchy, Trotskyism, and Djilasism. Tito condemns all these phenomena as Maoist, Trotskyist, and Djilasist.

In North America, the "New Left," which in reality occupies marginal positions in American society, is infected by similar phenomena and by mixtures of a renewed Marxism, which incorporates all the ingredients of Marcuseism, Djilasism, Trotskyism, and is enamored with Castro, Che Guevara, and Mao.

The cultural revolution is full of aggression, violence, and repudiation of everything that is clear, defined, and forged in the forms of social order. This minority, of course, is vociferous, while the majority observes all these innovations with distrust and almost indifference, as if these clamorous pronouncements were incapable of subverting an organized and happy society. Incidentally, American society is affected by these phenomena only superficially.

But the attacks on two major universities, one in California and now Columbia, have unsettled most people. It is characteristic that when the students seized the Sorbonne, they were joined by working-class youth and certain unions, despite the official opposition of the communist leaders, while the already bourgeois American working class remained completely passive and indifferent, since American labor unions today constitute organizations of a satisfied middle class, for whom the revolutionary concept means nothing.

These revolutionary phenomena not only surprised the communist leaders but also left them without a response, since they had not taken into account the new currents within the working class that neocapitalism in Europe gradually raised from the level of the discontented proletariat. In North America, there is no proletariat, since the Black sector is the subproletariat, while the so-called proletariat has become the middle class. So, on whom should the "New Left" in North America rely: on a few hundred students or on the masses of the black subproletariat?

II

Herein lies the central problem of North America: the fate of Black people and the path they are taking. The "New Left," capitalizing on the exasperation of the Vietnam War, counted on winning the support of Black people and thus providing the answer to the main American crisis linked to riots and rebellions in the Black ghettos.

However, Black leaders rejected any collaboration with the white members of the "New Left." This was clear when Stockley Carmichael and Ralph Brown, two prominent leaders of the young Black Marxists, refused to occupy the buildings of Columbia University alongside white students and barricaded only one building, refusing to admit any white students. Racism triumphed over Marxism here. The Black slogan was: no fusion of Black and white people, which seriously damaged the leaders of the "New Left." Just as American liberalism failed to solve the Black problem, so too did the neo-Marxist leftist movement.

At what stage does the Black question now stand? We would not be exaggerating when we say that old Anglo-Saxon America failed to solve the Black problem. More than a hundred years have passed since the emancipation of Black people, proclaimed by Abraham Lincoln, but little or nothing has been done to incorporate Black people into progressive industrial development.

Black people remained, in that progress, on the extreme margins of American life. The first objection might be: the blame lies with white people, both southerners and northerners. But that objection would be made too hastily. Black people are also to blame, unable to take advantage of all the opportunities that the Industrial Revolution offered to American society, a revolution that branched out precisely after the formal emancipation of Black people and after the Civil War between the North and the South. While, say, the masses of immigrants from southeastern Europe managed, over those hundred years—that is, in four generations—to integrate into American life, with great sacrifices, despised by Anglo-Saxons, without any support except their own strength and resources, and have now risen to the level of the middle class, Black people remained stuck in the same positions they had always occupied.

The reasons are complex and difficult. If you ask an Anglo-Saxon, they will not give a clear and precise answer. If you ask an American of Irish, German, Scandinavian, Italian, Jewish, Slavic, or other European origin, their answer will be obvious. Why did we succeed and Black people didn't? That is their simple answer.

We too were persecuted and abandoned; no one cared about us, and yet we climbed the ranks in American society to the point of leaving Anglo-Saxons behind in many positions. Why didn't Black people do the same? Because, the answer continues, the Black man didn't know how to free himself from the chains of slavery and the darkness of his race. A more impartial Anglo-Saxon emphasizes: the cause must be sought in the fact that the Black man's progress was hindered by the color of his skin.

Thus, the American dilemma became a tragedy. While the Yankee intellectual fled from himself, wandering the world to solve global problems in the last two decades, at the same time, one might say out of boredom, he neglected the problems of his own society.

Liberating Europe, liberating Asia, liberating Latin America, liberating Africa from poverty, hunger, and backwardness was his main concern, with the purpose of contrasting the American revolution with the Russian revolution, while neglecting the poverty and backwardness existing in every city of his country.

After twenty years of squandering money around the world, disseminating American sociological theories, the Yankee intellectual suddenly remembered that this poverty and backwardness existed on the corner of his street. Among the thousands of books and studies published in the last two decades on every conceivable problem, about ten years ago a book by the Swedish scholar Myrdal appeared, largely unnoticed, on the American dilemma: the problem of Black people.

Meanwhile, American sociologists, economists, and writers were busy writing theses on Titoism, Maoism, Castroism, and so on. Dollars were squandered in support of Tito and his failed economic experiments, while it should have been considered that Black people, too, would one day demand their place in the sun in their own rich homeland. Saving the world while neglecting their own house was the colossal error of American liberalism and humanism. Black people are now rising up and demanding a solution to their misery.

In what way? The overwhelming majority of Black people maintain that their problem can be solved through compromise. But their minority members act in a revolutionary manner, not following a predetermined revolution, but rather violence. When the white man realizes, these Black people maintain, that we are capable of burning down his cities and killing, he will give in. These revolutionaries go further and say to their majorities:

"Until now you have resigned yourselves and suffered everything. You were and still are the Black people of 'Uncle Tom's Cabin.' Here you have it, even the passive resistance of Dr. Martin Luther King ended with his assassination; he too was Uncle Tom. We continue on the path of armed and violent resistance. They killed both Kennedys because they wanted to make concessions to Black people. That is why we demand accountability and violence as the only means capable of solving our problem."

The tragedy of Black Americans is not a simple problem. Its solution encounters great difficulties. It goes without saying that the federal government is, as always, on the side of the persecuted minority. It is acknowledged that there are two societies, the Black society separate from the white society, but unequal. The possibility exists not of uniting both societies, since integration between races is neither easy nor quick, but rather that they remain separate but eventually become equal.

On this point, there are differing opinions. Addressing the misery of Black people with government subsidies is neither a correct nor an effective solution. This is already practiced in most American states, but its results are meager and minimal. Black people must be empowered through education and training so that they can be as productive as possible and cease subsisting on state, municipal, or federal handouts.

This process requires the efforts of several generations of Black people. Those Black people who have risen to the level of the satisfied bourgeoisie must also contribute to this task and effort. But precisely these Black people flee the ghetto as soon as they have the necessary means. Among Black people, there is no sense of reciprocal solidarity, which was always present in national communities in North American society and contributed to their development and preservation in relation to other national groups.

The cases and examples of the Irish, Jews, and Italians, who not only strengthened but also preserved those national groups in their social development, even made them vigorous national forces that influenced the development of the entire country. In those communities, family strength contributed to their maintenance and progress, while colonial practices not only erased the Black family community but also prevented its development in the strict social and economic sense.

The father, after uniting with a woman and having several children, very soon abandons the family and leaves the mother with the entire burden of supporting and educating the children; the poor woman in the big cities struggles as best she can, joining with other men or remaining alone, often turning to prostitution. All of this constitutes a serious legacy of colonial exploitation, which, unfortunately, neither whites nor blacks were able to resolve satisfactorily for both.

Likewise, it is a mistake, on the part of both blacks and whites, to consider the black sector as foreign in North American society. All aspirations to make the black person a product of African American civilization are spurious. The black American is part of that land, I would say its constitutive part; he speaks its language, which is not African but American English.

His appearance in North American life, his contribution to North American culture (folklore, music, religion, etc.) is his autochthonous contribution as it was formed over centuries on North American soil. In pre-industrial civilization, when North America was an agrarian country, in my opinion, the black person, especially the southerner, was not alienated. He became alienated in industrial civilization, to which he never adapted and in which he always remained a foreigner. While the machine conquered the white man and he submitted to it, the black man despised it and kept his distance. Anglo-Saxon philosophy, which incidentally found the most perfect form of government, refused to integrate the black man, perhaps unconsciously applying against him the biblical principle of non-fusion with other races. It must always be remembered that, subconsciously, the Anglo-Saxon is a hardened racist, considering himself chosen for being white and the black man inferior because of the color of his skin.

This principle was adopted by all the peoples of southeastern Europe who settled in North America, and the attitude of an Irishman, Ukrainian, Pole, or Italian toward Black people is more racist today than the attitude of intellectualized Anglo-Saxons, who now rationalize this attitude in order to uphold the principle of equality in social relations, without which there is no democracy.

To this position of the Rockefellers and Fords, the Roosevelts and Thomases, and a large part of the leading Jewish families, we must now add that of enlightened Irish people like the Kennedys, whom the man of the emerging middle class hates precisely for acting humanely toward Black people.

It is important to emphasize here that, unlike the Protestants, the Catholic hierarchy showed more understanding and more efforts on behalf of Black people than the other churches, although in practice the Catholic Church encountered and still encounters great opposition from its faithful.

In the interest of impartiality, we must emphasize that the federal government—especially the executive branch and the Supreme Court, the first to adopt and proclaim the principle of racial equality—demonstrated, both during the Roosevelt administration and those of Kennedy and Johnson, a great willingness to transform and modernize American society through racial leveling, granting Black people a solid foundation for their moral and material advancement.

Congress lagged behind in this matter because it depended on its voters. State and municipal authorities were similarly at a disadvantage, as they were dependent on the interests of local voters.

In Europe, on the other hand, national minorities have always been persecuted by the supreme power, the instigator of pogroms both in the old structures and today in the communist system. The case of the Jews in the Soviet Union and Poland conclusively demonstrates that the communist leadership acts in a manner similar to Tsarist or bourgeois methods, without even mentioning the predominance of one people over others, as is the case in the multinational societies of southeastern Europe and the Balkans.

Great Serbian racism towards Macedonians, Croats, or Albanians is not an individual attitude but rather that of the ruling leadership, whether Pašić or Ranković. In short, contemporary nationalism with racist undertones constitutes a terrible evil for humanity, and it will be difficult for North America to free itself from this contagion without significant upheavals.

What solutions are possible? The most radical propose the separation of North American societies and the formation of three Black states in the South, which would be joined by Black people from the North and the ghettos. It is difficult to imagine that the American consciousness of unity would accept such a solution. It only remains for Black people to begin working and, with their own resources and the support of the community, raise their standard of living and thus achieve equality with white people. Such a process requires the efforts of several generations, but it is the only one capable of yielding lasting and enduring results.

We are convinced that the pragmatic sentiment inherent in the American mentality will prevail over all other considerations, since if Black people allow themselves to be seduced by young ideologues and engage in civil war or guerrilla warfare, they will lose the battle against the white people, who are stronger and more powerful than they are. Black people, therefore, have no other option but to join the general transformation of the country by virtue of the American Constitution and the strength of its democratic system.

III.

This process must inevitably lead North America back to itself and limit its actions in the world in defense of its own interests. For only one thing can be asked of every society, and certainly of American society: to put its house in order in a way that corresponds to its interests. Democracy can serve as an example to the extent that it organizes its internal system in a humane and optimal way.

If democracy is in crisis, it is unlikely to guide the world along a successful democratic path. This is now understood by writers in the Kennan school of thought, who for the last twenty years have wasted their time trying to liberalize the world, aiding Titoism and similar phenomena, which are neither essential for North America nor for the world.

North America cannot repeat de Gaulle's example and waste time developing his theories while leaving France in a grave social crisis, without addressing its own country's major problems. There are significant contradictions between the internal reality of the United States and Washington's foreign policy. We have frequently drawn attention to this fact.

American intellectuals amplified these contradictions tenfold in order to indulge their illusory visions of a more progressive world. Imbued with the ideas of Rousseau rather than Locke, these intellectuals initiated an unnecessary revolution that has no place in American development, since American evolution has surpassed Marx and all his followers, with all their theories that lack any basis in American life.

The time is approaching, therefore, when American leaders must follow the course of their country's reality. That path is the American environment, the only one capable of opposing right-wing and left-wing reactionaries, because that environment has thus far preserved American unity. Therefore, all those who observe North America, from within or without, must take into account the essential aspect of its process: it is not a leftist country, but rather the vast majority of its society is composed of vigorous conservative forces that love liberty because liberty allows them to preserve the principle of private property. The Kennedys and the Kings fell because they did not adhere rigorously to that principle.

The opening of "the new frontiers" seemed, in the eyes of the vast American masses who for three generations had secured a comfortable economic life, like a deviation from the social revolution that, as in socialist and communist societies, would tend to deprive them of the goods they had acquired with great effort.

The American middle class is wealthy, vigorous, and resilient, and views with suspicion any innovation that seeks to deprive it of its property. It upholds the principle that its political freedom must also guarantee it economic freedom and independence. Well, it was only in this generation that this class realized it owns the goods acquired through sweat and hard work.

This isn't just felt by the merchant or the businessman. The worker feels it in their unions. That's why workers aren't socialists, nor do they believe they'll find happiness in socialism. There are two beliefs that drive American life: faith in God and faith in private property. Then comes faith in democracy, which makes the existence and progress of the other two beliefs possible.

The American people's unrestricted hatred of communism stems precisely from the fact that the overwhelming majority is convinced that communism deprives humanity of these three beliefs. In this respect, the American people follow their sound instincts rather than the nebulous abstractions of their intellectuals, whose confused attitudes contributed to the American people questioning the necessity and value of education and culture. Precisely now, when, after the Second World War, a spiritual renaissance began in North America and yearnings for spiritual and artistic quality manifested themselves, intellectuals began to erode the American worldview with their doubts.

The rebellions in universities, organized by student minorities and young professors, only serve to frighten the American middle class, which asks itself: does it make any sense to send our children to university only to have professors and hippies lead them into a revolution that has nothing to do with the country's fundamental values?

Sowing hatred toward the so-called national establishment, separating children from the values upon which their parents founded their lives, and the decomposition of a healthy society through the spread of LSD, various narcotics, and the psychedelic atmosphere—all accompanied by the almost pathological, unrestrained sexual life preached by certain professors in their classrooms, the Marcusean abuse of everything permissible—should lead a basically healthy society to the void of despair, decadence, and psychological breakdown.

When Marcuse preaches the elevation of Eros (unrestricted sex) against Thanatos (the numbing effect of society, limited by the rigid organization of all societies), this does not simply mean a return to Nietzsche, whom Marcuse, in his nebulous visions, links to Marx and Freud. It means destroying the unity of society in the name of anarchy and total disorientation.

Although Marcuse's vision of American life is far removed from the life conceived, practiced, and desired by the vast majority, it nevertheless awakened certain forces capable of limiting the mechanization of society and liberating it from rigid rationalism and liberalism. It is solely in this that I see his value, and in having managed to awaken a similar rebellion in the youth of communist society, left without faith or direction.

But while Marcuse destroys in his negative analyses, he proposes no constructive solution, except anarchy, which devours all community and society. Marcuse succeeded, by awakening the youth, in presenting communism as an outdated and conservative solution that, at least in its pronouncements, proclaims to defend the premises of order and law. His revolution within the revolution, insofar as it weakens the communist system, will bear fruit, but it is obvious that it will not harm American society for the reasons previously stated.

Even North America, with its technological intervention in the world, inaugurated a revolution of enormous proportions, as it spread its contagious formula of an industrial society across all continents. With its quantitative and technical discoveries, it opened new frontiers and new possibilities for humanity.

It is now up to North America to transform the quantitative into the qualitative and offer humanity the opportunity to master machines and technology and subordinate science to human values through the realization of a new humanism.

This process that North America is undergoing, and with which it is creating the history of the future, is very difficult, as it is subject to intrinsic transformations without which there is no happiness for humankind. Economically powerful and very firmly organized, North America must overcome this painful and difficult transition from the total conquest of the products of a consumer civilization to a qualitative civilization, in which humanity will safeguard all the values that distinguish it from animals and machines.

Furthermore, the civilization of computers and technocracy must be curtailed, violence and gunfire as means of settling scores must be abolished, and humanity must be awakened to the awareness that it is a divine creation, capable of finding happiness and joy in the reconciliation of its matter with its spirit, thus enabling humanity to resume its dialogue with God, without which it cannot truly exist.

For a century, the need to reform the educational system has been felt, since rationalism and liberalism have distanced students from their role as creative beings.

But this must be done not through violence and anarchy, but through the development of new human forms, governed by an established and just order.

I am convinced that after the recent crisis, a better world will emerge, in which technological and economic values will be subordinated to spiritual values, because without the predominance of the spirit, there can be no intrinsic progress for humankind. In every open and free society, not only are there alternatives for a positive solution, but these are innumerable. Since American society is both free and open, it is more than likely that suitable alternatives will be found.

Human salvation lies in finding the various alternatives that a free society offers. Since American society is sound in its essence, I believe that North America will emerge from the current revolution renewed and vigorous.

The old North America is disappearing, and a new one is forming, and the future is on its side. The path to that future will not be easy, but it will be reached, sooner or later, since this century is the century of North America, which must be guided by the course our century seeks through the revolution we are witnessing.

L'Ulivello, Italy.

THE MEANING OF THE RECENT "LIBERALIZATION" OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

STANISLAO MECIAR

The international repercussions of certain disagreements and controversies among the communist leaders of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, East Germany (the Soviet-occupied zone), Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria during 1968 created the impression that the foundations of living conditions in Czechoslovakia were being altered, and that the ultimate goal of these changes would be the country's departure from the communist system.

This impression was created by the communists themselves, who orchestrated a spectacular campaign of polemics that, prior to August 21, had not exceeded the bounds of fraternal coexistence, even at the height of the most bitter mutual accusations.

The communists are not swayed by the sentiments of those who wish to define freedom and democracy differently than that permitted by the definitions and principles of the Soviet Communist Party, based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine. "Socialist democracy" is defined in all dictionaries (even philosophical ones) as "a political system in which supreme power belongs to the working people, headed by the working class under the leadership of the communist party."

According to the principles outlined in the new "Program of Action" (April 1968), the aim is to build this "socialist democracy" with "a human face" (Alexander Dubcek), as the second phase of the socialization process in the country, after "people's democracy," which in turn was merely a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat during the transition period between capitalism and socialism.

We all know that a government led by the communist party is always a minority government. It is a minority government that does not respect the rights of the majority, whereas democracy in the Western sense means the existence of a majority government that respects the rights of the minority (Clement Attlee). In Czechoslovakia, "liberalized" and "democratized" by the communists, the formation of a minority, communist government was not considered during the months of January to August 1968, in flagrant contradiction to the true meaning of democracy.

The causes of all this upheaval are purely economic. Whatever communist political or ideological demonstrations or criticisms of the prevailing conditions during the 20 years since February 1948, when the Communist Party seized power and established its dictatorship, all the noise generated was intended to obscure the essential causes: the resounding failure of the "socialist" economy in Czechoslovakia, as occurred in Yugoslavia, was observed in Hungary and Romania, and has been evident for half a century in the Soviet Union. The inability to solve economic problems based on communist doctrine leads responsible leaders to seek alternative solutions to their predicaments.

In the Czechoslovakian case, the country reached the brink of disaster due to economic collapse, the low performance of its enterprises, the constant deficits of its numerous factories, its incompetence in international markets, and other factors. The state paid a high price for its protection and "eternal friendship" with the Soviet Union, handing over up to 60% of its industrial production, which left billions of crowns in debt that Moscow never repaid.

Although the USSR supplied certain products and raw materials, especially wheat and crude oil, it did so at higher prices than it did to customers within the capitalist sphere. For example, a ton of crude oil was sold by the USSR to Czechoslovakia for $23 and to West Germany for $18. Moscow's imperialist economic exploitation of Czechoslovakia resulted in the weakening of its productive capacity and the decline in the productivity of its industry due to the wear and tear of machinery that had not been renewed for 23 years.

Prague was forbidden from participating in the Marshall Plan by Stalin's orders, and a lack of foreign currency made it impossible to purchase new machinery from the West, especially West Germany, whose companies had previously built a large part of Czechoslovakia's industrial plants. The declining economy not only failed to meet the demands of the USSR, which, by increasing its military budget and demanding compliance with its contractual obligations, was putting ever-greater pressure on its satellite state, but centralized planning and costly bureaucracy offered no way out of this precarious situation.

Consequently, discontent grew among the masses, who could no longer bear the burden of sacrifices, waiting in vain for the fulfillment of communist promises. This situation also created fertile ground for discontent within the ranks of the Communist Party, where reformists began to raise their voices, offering solutions but demanding guarantees and the power to implement them. The chaos was all the more striking because the positions of capable leaders—who, during the era of the so-called "cult of personality," were prosecuted, liquidated, and imprisoned—were filled by people completely unprepared for the task at hand.

A complete overhaul became essential, and thus the era of "liberalization" and "democratization" was prepared and inaugurated, pursuing two main objectives: to restore the chaotic economy and to improve the deficient state administration.

Both could be achieved by acquiring new machinery from the West to re-equip industry. For this, the state would need a gold guarantee or backing from the USSR, based on Czechoslovakia's large balance in COMECON, whose treasurer is Moscow, since the currency of socialist states is inconvertible in capitalist countries. This naive aim of the reformers was met with a response on August 21, 1968, when the USSR spent over $500 million to obstruct liberalization, instead of supporting efforts to attract Western economic aid to Czechoslovakia.

To present a favorable image to the West, the reformers simulated a democratization process, with evident success, as evidenced by press coverage and the positive reactions to the new leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It is important to remember that the liberalization and democratization process was instigated, developed, directed, and controlled by the communists themselves, and its primary purpose was to remove from power the group of leaders who had failed in their leadership and who had brought things to the brink of disaster.

When the liberal reformers took the reins of the Communist Party and the government, they realized that the Stalinists could only be removed by a powerful grassroots movement, because they controlled key positions in the economy, the media, and the administration. This grassroots upheaval was so powerful and successful that it threatened to undermine the foundations not only of the Stalinists but also of the liberalizers themselves, since the people realized that it was possible to free themselves from the communist yoke and that this was the moment of decision.

II. The enthusiasm that Alexander Dubcek, along with his reformist collaborators, brought to the work of renewing economic life could not be limited to this area of activity alone, but was immediately reflected in other fields that, according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, depend on the economy.

When speaking of the new possibilities for solving the outstanding economic problems, linked to other areas of life, Dubcek himself encountered such a spontaneous and enthusiastic response from the people to his reformist actions that it took him much further than the projected liberalization and democratization. It should be clearly understood that at the beginning and in the essence of the process initiated, there was never any talk of liberalization outside of communism. The only topic discussed was the democratization of communism.

Despite all this loyal leadership and its strictly limited intentions in accordance with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the results of the Dubčekian New Wave clearly demonstrated that a conception of life, socialism, and democracy was resurfacing among vast segments of the population—a conception entirely different not only from the image of the Novotnian era, but also quite distinct from everything known in Soviet society.

This change was not undertaken with the intention of replacing Marxist-Leninist doctrine with some ideology influenced by capitalist society, but rather spontaneously as a result of efforts to escape the stagnant, one might say, failed socialist society of the Novotnian era. There was talk of a new socialism, but the words were filled with a content entirely contrary to the poor definition of official socialism and the even poorer implementation of its program.

The attempt to create a new type of socialism "with a human face," one that would better and more adequately address the improvement of living conditions, soon found itself facing an attempt to replace the content of socialism with new slogans and a new program, which, when put into practice, would bear no resemblance whatsoever to the old image of socialist society and humanity.

The new slogans placed under the banner of socialism offered the possibility of renewal for humanity and society, opening up sources of creation that had previously been forbidden. Forces that had previously been subjugated were now unleashed, becoming the driving force, for they offered the possibility of expressing the fullness of human ambitions that had been suppressed until then by the rigorous and strict adherence to orders, orders that were utterly misguided and in flagrant contradiction with the primary needs of humankind and social coexistence.

Consequently, under the banner of liberalization and democratization, demands arose for respect for the human person and their inalienable rights, such as the right to freely chosen work in a suitable location so that families could live together. The list of demands stemming from the protests against the practices of the Communist Party during the Novotnian era would be innumerable; these practices were characterized by persecution, crimes, and terror against the families of loyal party members, party leaders, those who had fallen from grace, and those condemned and executed as traitors. The crimes committed against non-communists and anti-communists were never discussed, because—as we have already pointed out—the liberalization process only affected party comrades. The aim was to win the favor of communist cadres, not to provoke reactions from the majority of the people.

The new party leaders sought to erase from the public's mind the terrible memories of the era that was considered to be forever behind them. The best form of this new kind of "brainwashing" consisted not only in replacing the memories of horror with the promises of a socialism "with a human face," but also in allowing street demonstrations, meetings, and the free exchange of opinions and criticisms.

It was about replacing the image of the society that had existed until recently, demonstrating that under the banner of socialism, conditions could be created that would grant humanity the full realization of its creative potential. The intention of the promised democratic socialism was to prove that the socialist ideal could be realized in the life of a national community if its members agreed on the methods, respecting human beings and placing the well-being of all at the center of their objectives.

Therefore, horizons opened without barriers, the word "freedom" began to be mentioned, and people spontaneously began to practice certain kinds of civic freedoms, such as: meetings in support of the new party leadership's program of action, celebrations for the new party leaders, and later, commemorating and venerating national heroes of earlier times who, during the Novotnian era, had been declared traitors and their cults banned (such as the illustrious figure of the Slovak national hero and liberator, General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, whose monument was erected by the people on a mountaintop and left abandoned to the elements, with no one able to lay a wreath on the anniversaries of his sacrifice). The sweet word "freedom" was spoken at mass gatherings.

Religious processions were revived before the numerous effigies of the Blessed Virgin Mary that had existed in Slovakia for over a thousand years, attracting pilgrims, something that had been completely forbidden during the Novotnian era.

In magazines and newspapers, even those run by communists, expressions of repudiation of the past were published, mixed with disapproval of the restrictions obeyed by the communists themselves during the Novotnian era and now condemned as a sign of backward thinking.

These criticisms and disapprovals remained within the party line, but they gained wider dissemination than ever before because they touched on taboo subjects, gradually leading to a re-examination of the errors committed by the communists themselves—leaders and writers who suddenly discovered within themselves the courage and capacity to discuss previously inconceivable cultural, political, national, and international problems, dangerous not only for the authors themselves but for the entire group in which such doctrinal deviation manifested itself.

We could cite countless examples in this regard, especially among the younger generation, educated in communist schools. This new approach to the essential questions of life never deviated from the party line, and if there were any instances of such expression, the party itself disapproved (for example, the so-called 2,000-Word Manifesto).

The adversaries of communism have been unable to use words. During the period of so-called liberalization and democratization, matters were disputed among comrades, the party's paid staff—that is, the minority of the Czech and Slovak people. But at the level of criticism of the Novotnian past, in many cases even communist writers expressed the thoughts of the entire citizenry, who had no opportunity to voice their views, since events were still unfolding primarily among the ruling class, the elite in the service of the party, or the so-called "new class."

III. If liberalization is viewed in light of the repression by the Warsaw Pact's "friends" bloc, which, in short, may simply be a premeditated manipulation, the true motives of the Soviet leadership remain unknown. Nor is the true role played by the actors in Prague and Bratislava known. They remained in power despite the invasion and the continuous challenge posed by both sides, as is often the case in any sporting event, this time played on a dangerous field where bullets struck not the communists, but the victims of communism.

If the liberalization process had been genuinely pursued, with a view to a true liberation from the unbearable situation prevailing in Czechoslovakia, things could not have ended this way. Undoubtedly, they ended badly, and this was true not only for the communist leadership of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, but also for the population of the invaded country, subjected indefinitely to a renewed dictatorship.

The communist leaders in Moscow, Prague, and Bratislava were surprised by the strength of an opposition they considered completely eradicated from society after 23 years of internal repression, systematically carried out against all opposition elements. Things ended badly for society itself, which allowed itself to be misled by the illusion of an evolution of communism that had never occurred before and could not occur, since any evolution would mean the end of communism.

The failure of communist leadership on both sides—the Soviet and the Czechoslovak—demonstrated its profound backwardness in the human sciences (especially in psychology and sociology and their many branches, developed in the Western world and disregarded in the Soviet sphere), perhaps only exploited in those areas that provided the ruling power with support for the execution of plans aimed at conquering world domination by brute force, plans conclusively demonstrated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event that could only surprise those naive enough to believe that an evolution of communism in general was possible.

When the game, instigated and consciously tolerated by the Kremlin, took a turn that escaped the permitted intention, there was no way to rectify the course of events through other methods and gain political control, because the communist leadership has no persuasive instruments in its arsenal other than sticks, the handling of which was perfected to perfection and supplemented with more modern weapons.

The technical execution of the invasion astonished not only England, but also many Western countries that have not experienced the oppression of Soviet power firsthand. They are unaware, therefore, of how the USSR always proceeds against its own subjects when they dare to express their human feelings outside the permitted mold, outside the conditioned reflex, as observed by the famous Russian scientist Pavlov in dogs. Based on this discovery, the communist regime "scientifically" developed its procedures to force millions of human beings to obey the orders issued by the Kremlin's ruling group.

If Alexander Dubcek himself did not participate in this dialectical process leading to a better and more voluntary adherence of the non-communist masses to the socialist-communist program, he was undoubtedly a victim of illusion in conceiving of a transformed communist society based on a spontaneity limited only to a segment of society: that composed of party comrades and the groups they represented in the National Front.

Just as one cannot play with fire, neither can one play with freedom. Either one grants the full scope of its exercise, or one loses it again. The communists of the liberal wing sought to grant greater freedom only to themselves, in order to present themselves to the masses as superior to the Stalinists. In this way, they sought to win the support of the masses, spontaneous support, which they achieved to a certain extent, as was effectively demonstrated during the Soviet repression and its initial phase, when people enthusiastically organized not only resistance against the invading armies but also voluntary work brigades to save the harvest—work expressly undertaken to support and back the Dubcek regime.

It could well be argued that the prolongation of the Dubcek regime was primarily due to this spontaneous support from the masses, influenced by the illusion he aroused within the ranks of the communists, in their eagerness to displace the orthodox opponents, and at no point with the intention of granting political freedoms to the masses.

This contradiction can only be understood thanks to the interruption of the liberalization process, since the masses did not have the opportunity to grasp the true scope of this process, which failed to achieve its objective even in the previously defined field of party renewal. The aim of the liberalization process was not to liberate the people from communism, but to save the party from its utter incapacity, demonstrated during the periods of Antonín Zápotocky and Antonín Novotny.

An attempt was made to renew the party cadres with the internal condition that consisted not only of removing the orthodox from the leadership, but also of recruiting new forces, persuaded by the new "Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," which, in essence, contained basic party points that had gone unfulfilled for 23 years—according to the official view—not due to errors of the party itself, but due to the errors of corrupt officials. The party did not make mistakes in the Novotny era either, and surely it did not make any in the Dubček era either.

This must now be demonstrated as Dubček is forced to rectify his leadership. If he fails, the blame for what happened during the liberalization process and the subsequent "normalization" phase will be attributed to him, and not to the party.

If he succeeds, despite the disillusionment of the masses, he will remain in power, just as Gomulka remains in power in Poland after the prolonged period of corrections that crowned his liberalization process in his time, deceiving the masses by failing to deliver on his promises.

It is important to remember something crucial in Dubček's liberalization process: he attempted to regain the trust of the masses by invoking his good intentions and demonstrating his willingness to give communism a "human face." The liberal wing of the party did not intend to change the system, admit the participation of new parties, or introduce democratic procedures in governing the country and addressing fundamental problems.

It was merely a matter of renewing the party's cadres with popular support, as the party was completely bankrupt in every area, not only economic, but also cultural and social. This was the ordinary power struggle between two factions within the Communist Party, and when signs of a victory for the liberal wing emerged, alarm spread through the Communist headquarters, first in Germany—the Soviet-occupied zone—and then in Poland.

In East Germany, the communist regime is maintained thanks to the strict application of Stalinist norms, taken to such an extreme that it surpasses even the USSR in rigor. The victory of the liberal wing in Prague seriously threatened the antiquated regime of Walter Ulbricht, who could not risk the advent of a liberalized government on his border, because he is determined to demonstrate to the Kremlin that only his satellite model can guarantee the future of communism.

Ulbricht's Stalinism posed a greater threat to Dubcek than Novotny's orthodox wing, which was easily detached from party control. The rivalry between Dubcek and Ulbricht was key to the power struggle in Prague because it threatened to expose the cruel and inhumane regime of East Germany, something that concerned the Kremlin more than the fate of Dubcek's liberalism. The fate of liberalization was at stake, not because it would fail, but on the contrary, because it had proven to be quite feasible and capable of granting the regime advantages by winning over the valuable spontaneity of the popular masses within the party and, even more so, outside its ranks.

Liberalization did not conceal the danger of betraying the Marxist-Leninist principles that inspired all the articles of the Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. These were not deviations, but rather rectifications of the communist program.

This was clear to the Kremlin, which dedicated its attention to a thorough analysis of each point of the Program. There were discussions in Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava, where Kremlin officials managed to persuade even Ulbricht to consent to Dubcek's liberalization. Dubcek had won two rounds. But the fight wasn't over.

Ulbricht refused to give up and won the third round due to Dubcek's carelessness. Dubcek overreacted to his supposed victory, praising, and allowing himself to be praised by, Tito and Ceaușescu, which further alarmed the cautious Comrade Ulbricht. To his astonishment, Ulbricht realized he couldn't enter Prague to confer with Dubcek, but instead had to travel to Karlovy Vary, near the border with West Germany.

But there, too, he had to acknowledge that what was unfolding in the history of communist regimes in Europe was not an experiment, but a new reality that was surpassing not only the Novotnian era in Czechoslovakia, but could even bring about the end of his own regime, built on the foundations of Stalinism.

The third round did not end the fight, which continues. We await the new blows that the Warsaw Pact allies continue to exchange. The third round was won by Ulbricht at the expense of the USSR, which can be partially satisfied for having temporarily saved perhaps the most important link in the chain of satellite states—East Germany—which constitutes a key position in the USSR's entire global policy and strategy in the West.

The process of liberalization, that is, the survival of communism in Czechoslovakia, could not be eliminated without risking unforeseen consequences. We know that the opposition of the popular masses throughout the country—Czechs, Slovaks, and national minorities—against the brutal Soviet oppression justified the liberalization process and set a precedent not only in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs but also gained international significance.

Ulbricht's victory will unsettle the victors more than the vanquished. Although the curtain of "normalization," which signifies a return to the past, fell on Czechoslovakia, the lessons learned during the liberalization period will be used in the struggle of peoples who will always be mindful of the threat of an inhumane regime that forcibly suppresses freedom and condemns hundreds of millions of people to slavery.

IV

No one can deny that the persistence of the Stalinist regime in Prague so many years after the Berlin and Poznan uprisings and the Hungarian uprising demonstrates that new motives must have arisen within the country, provoking and fueling a ferment of discontent and opposition. The Stalinists in Prague remained unmoved in the case of Poznan, nor during the Budapest revolution. Liberals either did not exist or were still in their embryonic stage.

However, in the case of the Budapest uprising, a reaction was noticeable in Slovakia, since, to prevent a similar movement, the Slovak border with Hungary was quickly occupied by units of Czech soldiers.

From then on, Slovakia demonstrated its discontent in various ways against the regime prevailing in Czechoslovakia, a country considered by Slovaks to be a national prison, since after the Second World War they were forced to coexist with the Czechs.

Although the Treaty of Kosice, signed in April 1945, guaranteed the Slovak people equal rights with the Czech people, in practice, Czech petty imperialism soon resurfaced, treating Slovakia as conquered territory and imposing a more severe centralism than in the period of 1918-1939, thanks to the application of communist terror by the Czechs.

Due to the control exerted by Czech emigrants, heirs to Czech pocket imperialism in the countries of the free world, Western public opinion is unaware of this struggle of the Slovak people for equal rights in a state whose very name assimilates that of a nation that was constituted as such 1300 years ago, and which, during the years of its national independence in 1939-1945, demonstrated its political, economic, and cultural capacity in defending its interests and the Christian values of humanity.

For this reason, the Western world is unaware of the struggle of the young Slovak generation, which, from 1956 onward, clearly expressed its discontent with the Novotny regime. Slovak writers and intellectuals, in congresses and newspapers, demanded reforms and freedoms for the Slovak people. But always in vain, bearing the consequences for any attempt at "rebellion."

This protest movement was observed with increasing intensity during the Novotny era. Slovak communist leaders were imprisoned, condemned by the Stalinist regime of Antonín Zápotocky and Antonín Novotny, accused of "bourgeois nationalism," a typical Czech invention used to separate the Slovak opposition party.

Novotny also attempted to apply this accusation against the general secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, Alexander Dubcek, during the confrontation within the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in late 1967, and leveled similar accusations against Slovak intellectuals and Communist Party members who demanded respect for the law and the constitution in dealings with Slovaks.

When Slovak protests against the abuse of power met with similar protests among Czech communists, Novotny could be presented with a vote of confidence in the party and later in the head of state, thus beginning the process of liberalizing the regime and transforming the state into two federalized entities—the Czech and the Slovak—thus fulfilling, after 23 years of struggle, the obligations undertaken in the Treaty of Kosice of 1945. In Slovakia, therefore, the program of liberalization and democratization developed in conjunction with the program of federalization, which constituted the long-awaited basic condition for any other aspect of restructuring the lives of the two nations under a single state umbrella.

Although the law on the federalization of the state was only passed in parliament after the invasion, on October 28, 1968, the spontaneous resistance of the Slovaks to the Soviet intervention on August 21 equaled, and in many cases surpassed, the resistance of the Czechs on their own territory. The Slovaks had their own particular reasons. This was the second Soviet occupation of Slovakia.

The first, in 1945, annihilated Slovak independence, and this second one threatened the liberalization movement, upon which the fate of federalization depended. Federalization was carried out despite the presence of the Soviets and the intrigues of the Orthodox Czechs. Nothing could stop the liberalization movement among the Slovak people, a movement initiated in Slovakia by Alexander Dubček, a Slovak. The cry for justice and freedom were the slogans that immediately ignited the enthusiasm of the youth and the masses.

The current existence of a Slovak state united with the Czech state in the Czechoslovak Federation signifies not only the recognition of the Slovak people's right to self-determination, but also marks the continuation of an active role for the Slovak nation in Europe, where its name was silenced by Czech imperialism, protected by Soviet colonialism.

In this way, the sacrifice of the Slovak people, paid to the cause of freedom during this critical period—which is far from over and will demand many more efforts, struggles, and sacrifices—has been rewarded. But this fundamental victory—reclaiming their name, their home, the expression of their will, the creation of new cultural values, and the defense of their ancient Christian heritage—will fill younger generations with optimism, boldness, and inspiration as they rebuild their present and future in collaboration with all the peoples of the world.

In this new reality, a new source of resistance emerged, fueling the subsequent liberalization process that began in January 1968 and continued even during the first months of the Soviet occupation—that is, against the strong current of disengagement among the Warsaw Pact nations.

To better understand the importance and scope of this process, currently hampered by many obstacles, and to contemplate it in its broadest sense, we must resort to a deeper interpretation. This interpretation will allow us to project this much-debated period of struggle—primarily between two groups of communists, the Czech and the Slovak—and the resulting divisions between different doctrinal currents of communist socialism, onto a universal scale.

WHOEVER HAS THOUGHTFUL ANALYSIS of the accounts of those persecuted, tortured, and imprisoned without any justification; the statements of mothers about the suffering of their children; of husbands describing the ordeal of their wives mistreated by communist "comrades," friends, and collaborators;

And he who followed for months the struggle to "liberate" themselves from the climate of terror in which millions of human beings, both communists and non-communists, were forced to live; he who was also able to grasp the deepest meaning of certain expressions of joy among the masses who gathered again—after 23 years of prohibition—in the processions, commemorations, and venerations of their national heroes; finally, he who is observing the recent process of the new adjustment of the regime of terror and analyzing the reactions of the youth who are defending themselves against the threat of new misfortunes suffered by their parents and their fellow human beings, is undoubtedly witnessing a true psychodramatic process that would merit a profound study by Jacobo L. Moreno.

The author of "Psychodrama" speaks of a "creative revolution," "the greatest, the longest, the most difficult, and the most singular of the wars that man has undertaken during his trajectory... It has no precedent or parallel in the history of the universe. It is not a war against nature, nor against other animals, nor of one human race, nation, or state against others. It is not a war of one social class against another.

It is a war of man against phantoms, the machine, cultural conservatism, the robot..." (Jacobo L. Moreno: Psychodrama, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 1961, p. 79). In adapting to the prevailing living conditions in a so-called "socialist"-communist country, which destroyed in man all notion of individual freedom, depriving him of the right to decide about his life and choose the path of his fulfillment, forcing him to revolve like a true obedient robot of the system that uses him as an object of its machinations, in such adaptation and the reactions provoked, we can study and value the psychodramatic therapy that began to be experimented with in the first eight months of 1968 of the so-called "liberalization" in Czechoslovakia.

Although the struggles and clashes between two communist groups did not foreshadow any outcome other than the customary elimination of the weaker party's power, something new suddenly emerged in this confrontation. The victor did not rush to liquidate his adversary with the customary methods, but rather dedicated himself to the resurgence of something entirely different, which at first was considered a "call to the grassroots." A broad wave of criticism ensued, initially expressed as protests and demands aimed at removing the "orthodox" from leadership positions. However, within these collective criticisms and protests, a previously unknown motive emerged, reflected in the spontaneity of demonstrations not limited to factory councils, student circles, writers, and intellectuals, but extending throughout society as a confession of all that had been suffered under the recently overthrown regime.

At first, the spokespeople were solely the communists, as they alone had access to the means of expression and publicity. And it was they who had spontaneously submitted to the psychodramatic healing process, for it was indeed this process that could be observed everywhere, in all spheres of public life, and how it removed the obstacles imposed in previous decades and found a collective, massive expression, reaching even the ranks of the anti-communists and anti-communists—people excluded from events and mere cogs in the machine of the ruling system.

As a consequence of this spontaneous collective confession by those persecuted by communism, who found liberation in this "theater" before the astonished eyes of the country's inhabitants, it was easy to organize meetings that offered the opportunity to release their suffering by reliving their drama in vivid words and in accounts widely published in magazines and newspapers.

No one noticed when this fervor, in search of catharsis, having encompassed the official sphere, also spread to the spheres of the population, where the spontaneous condemnation of the recently overcome communist era intensified and where the demand for regime change emerged—not only in the leadership but in the entire system of government responsible for so much devastation in all areas of life: the economy, politics, and culture, but also in mental health and the creative capacity of a people bewildered and diminished in their activity by the lack of freedom. People began greeting each other with smiles, the anthem "Resurrexit" was already being sung; a new era was dawning.

And at the very moment of this psychodramatic upheaval, the invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies struck like lightning, bringing to a close what we might interpret as the beginning of a "creative revolution" in the sense of J. L. Moreno's definition. This revolution consists of the detachment, or rather, the liberation of creative energy, spontaneously directed toward the restoration of human dignity, its promotion as an entity that takes responsibility for fulfilling its destiny and takes the initiative to carry out its individual and social mission.

It is curious that it is precisely this situation created by the invasion that fully rehabilitates the character of a psychodramatic process in the debated liberalization process in Czechoslovakia, since it was this situation that conditioned people's behavior and motivations and provoked a distinctly spontaneous reaction against the invaders, against the traitors and collaborators of the military operations.

If before the military intervention the spontaneous reaction of the people was not so clear regarding the behavior of the masses in the different regions of the state and among different strata of its inhabitants, the armed intervention acted as an auxiliary factor in unleashing the mass hatred, repudiation, condemnation, and reaction against the invaders and against those who collaborated with them. Unfortunately, this reaction culminated the initiated liberalization process and also the supposed revolutionary process of spontaneous decision-making in the change of mass behavior, in the desired union with the leaders who previously acted as an auxiliary ego in the psychodramatic operation. Everything noticeable in the first months of the implementation of the new system of control, censorship, and obedience—that is, the new subjugation of the people—may retain some of the results of the change brought about by the spontaneous renewal experienced during the brief period of liberalization. This may help the leaders achieve, in the shortest possible time, the imposed normalization of life in the country.

But the continuation of the "creative revolution" in any sphere of public life must be completely ruled out. After "normalization," public life will once again be constituted on the basis of rigid orders to be obeyed, whether spontaneously or by force.

VI. The goal pursued by Alexander Dubcek after the invasion is continually displayed with the slogan of a new socialism "with a human face," unlike the previous socialism implicitly characterized as "without a human face."

Unfortunately, the Kremlin hierarchy doesn't care what face the people make of their definitions of communism. On many occasions, Stalin proudly boasted that communism was giving humanity to a new man, the "Soviet man." This ideal persists to this day in the titles of ideological literature and on the front pages of the Soviet press: not only is this "man" preparing to conquer the moon, but also the man who has lost his nationality, has no religion, does not think, is not governed by his own will and decisions, and serves only as a robot for the purposes of party leadership.

This "new man" also came to Czechoslovakia with the mission of defending his "brothers" from the counterrevolution and acted like a robot executing the most senseless orders of his superiors.

And in this contrast we must seek the root of the tragedy of our times, when we see how people trained in blind obedience to senseless orders terrorize, shoot, crush with tanks, and humiliate the human beings who have spontaneously and savingly embarked on the path of incipient liberalization, all to impose only "the human face" of socialism!

It has been said many times, and remains an inalienable truth, that communism does not evolve and cannot evolve, that it is just as it was in its early days: closed, brutal, impenetrable, and unchangeable.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia confirms this once again.

All attempts at dialogue with communism always end in the trap set by the Marxists. Every opportunity presented to it during its 51 years of existence was exploited by the "new men" of the Kremlin to strengthen their power. They engaged in dialogue and collaborated with the Nazis, with the capitalists; They are willing to dialogue with the Churches, keeping in mind their own end: world domination by fair means or foul.

But even a horse has four legs and still stumbles. The brutality demonstrated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia compels us to seek justification for such an excessive and unusual attitude. They acted as if the very existence of the communist empire were at stake.

This demonstrates that the Kremlin hierarchy had observed the potential scope of the so-called liberalization carried out in Czechoslovakia and had discovered something truly new and surprising that was manifesting itself, and even more so, that was taking place in this country, loyal to Moscow's orders almost indefinitely.

What happened that surprised the Kremlin sages, that compelled them to dedicate so much valuable time to analysis and study, traveling to the borders of Slovakia and then to its capital, Bratislava? And what did they discover that compelled them to prepare a military action unprecedented in peacetime and against an enemy power, as if the very existence of the Soviet empire were seriously threatened?

After what has been said above, it is quite clear that in Czechoslovakia, an evolution was taking place under communism that threatened to give it a human face on a scale that undermined the very foundation of the doctrine. The Communist Party's program of employing the methods it had used for half a century was being put into practice and was gaining the enthusiastic support of the citizens, even those opposed to the previous doctrine and regime.

The boundaries between communists and non-communists blurred in the course of implementing the new "program of action," so much so that in many cases, the impression arose that there were no more communists in the country, or that everyone was now a communist. A disconcerting situation for any communist leader. And it was this behavior that the Kremlin leaders considered a danger to their survival. They began to suspect the loyalty not only of the population, but also of the party leaders and government officials themselves.

The spark of the masses' spontaneous reaction to the exhortations of the new Dubčekian leadership was capable not only of setting the Communist Party ablaze, but the entire country, in which the Kremlin placed its trust and which was the cornerstone of its security and power in Central Europe.

This case demonstrated that evolution under communism was possible, giving it a "human face," as proclaimed by the leaders of liberalization in Prague and Bratislava. But at the same time, it proved that this evolution has no limits and is accompanied by the rapid evaporation of communist doctrine.

It was remarkable how, within a few weeks of the liberalization process beginning, the words used by people, politicians, and writers, in articles, discussions, and studies, began to change. Words long banished from the language reappeared, as if they had been imprisoned along with their authors, burned with the books, or hidden away in private property with limited use.

Suddenly, voices silenced for a quarter of a century began to be heard; meetings were filled with enthusiasm; smiles appeared on the faces of political leaders; interactions with people returned to humane manners; and even Stalinists supported Dubcek's work.

The power of communism was evolving in a direction unknown to the Kremlin hierarchy and surely unknown to Dubcek as well, "who was driven more by a humanist intuition, seeking to awaken the truly human in the people who had endured, during the years of the Zapotocky and Novotny regime, a hell imposed by the communist party. Dubcek wanted, or tried to discover, the existence of the man behind the mask imposed by the previous regime, and he set out to entrust this man, liberated from the constraints of the past, with the implementation of a new program for the communist party, the implementation of a new socialism 'with a human face.'

And this was his fault, his greatest fault in the eyes of the Kremlin hierarchy, since no one could be wiser than they. To demonstrate this, they organized not only the very costly armed intervention of August 21, 1968, but also proceeded to re-educate the liberalizers led by Dubcek, and anyone familiar with the persistence of the Soviet leaders knows that they will continue in this re-education until the anniversary of the invasion was imposed as Czechoslovakia's new national holiday.

Dubcek's model of "liberalization" was not the first attempt in the 51 years of communism's evolution. There were many similar efforts, carried out with premeditated action by communist leaders, later stifled by themselves when they no longer bore fruit or when it was no longer convenient to delay the despotic march with useless detours. The humanization of communism, it is evident, is not possible, since any evolution in a humanist direction would mean the end of the doctrine in practice.

For this logical reason, Dubcek's attempt to humanize the inhuman doctrine, to put into practice the disparate directives that, on the one hand, prohibit being a human person and, on the other, manipulate humanity to impose themselves and dominate, had to fail. This could be a tragedy for millions of people who suffer the consequences of these limited games, in one part of the world or another.

The only advantage of this Dubcekian liberalization experiment could The lesson to be learned by millions of free human beings and their leaders, responsible for the fate of humanity, is to no longer be enthralled by similar trials, for there will be no evolution under communism as long as a communist government exists that uses this doctrine as an instrument of domination.

Buenos Aires, 1968.

Crisis of Economic Reform in Yugoslavia

Economists and Party Leaders on Reform

Jure Petricevic

I. Introduction

The Eighth Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, held in December 1964, acknowledged the existence of a serious economic crisis and the unresolved national question. In its conclusions, it recommended the necessary measures that, within the existing political and economic system and the framework of the political and state organization, should resolve all the major socio-economic and political problems.

The Congress set the course and objectives for resolving the serious crisis of the communist economic and political system and the Yugoslav state. On July 24, 1965, the Federal Assembly in Belgrade, after lengthy preparations at the highest party and state levels, approved the conclusions on economic reform, to be implemented immediately, with the groundwork already laid by certain preliminary measures.

The main objectives were: the self-management of economic enterprises, which primarily encompassed income distribution and investment policy; then income distribution based on performance; the integration of the Yugoslav economy into the common market; and raising the standard of living. Other important aims of the reform were: the reduction of so-called public expenditures (of the state, the party, the police and military apparatus), the increase in private consumption within the framework of national income distribution, and the intensification and stabilization of the economy.

The adoption of the principle of self-management not only in businesses but in all sectors of economic, social, and political life represented a victory for the Croatian-Slovenian-Macedonian opposition within the Communist Party, with the support of the Albanian and Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, against Great Serbian centralism and Ranković. This opposition led to Ranković's downfall in the summer of 1966 and created the climate and conditions favorable for more far-reaching political changes.

Various means were employed to achieve the reform's objectives. The dinar was devalued, and the new exchange rate with the dollar, effective July 26, 1965, was 1250 instead of 750. Prices were also significantly increased, and their exchange rates were modified. However, there were no wage increases, and workers' organizations received instructions regarding the distribution of their income. Changes were also made to the so-called secondary instruments of income distribution (primarily relief from various taxes and personal income tax breaks). New customs tariffs were introduced.

Pension, family, and disability allowances were increased. Imports were restricted to conserve foreign currency and due to the large deficit in the balance of trade and payments. However, the necessary foreign currency to stabilize the dinar was lacking, especially after the cessation of substantial US aid, which had substantially mitigated Yugoslavia's persistent economic crisis and enabled costly experiments by the communist regime, particularly in the field of improvised industrialization. Now the Yugoslav economy had to secure the necessary foreign currency on its own, that is, increase exports and services (for example, tourism) to such an extent as to achieve a positive balance of payments and generate surpluses.

The economic reform did not touch the foundations of the political and socio-economic order. It pursued the liberalization of the economy by freeing businesses from the centralist bureaucratic apparatus and implementing market mechanisms based on the laws of supply and demand within a political order that, with certain exceptions, still bore all the hallmarks of the totalitarian and monopolistic Communist Party in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. It constituted a compromise between the totalitarian socio-political system and a free market economy.

During the 1966-1970 Five-Year Plan, the economic reform was expected to have a significant impact. However, important methods and measures from the previous plan were retained. Its greatest weakness, the centralization of investments, remained unchanged, so self-management could not be practiced and important long-term investment decisions continue to be made in Belgrade, hindering development.

Even credit policy, along with the banking system, remained unaltered. The economy was neither intensified nor was the economic structure improved; instead, investment continues irrationally in new objectives. The quality of industrial products was not improved to compete in the international market. Nor did their quality satisfy domestic market demands, which is why unsold goods accumulate.

Lately, the balance of payments continues to worsen, and the creation of foreign exchange reserves from domestic resources, despite the growing number of Yugoslav citizens employed in Western countries, has remained a dream, let alone their convertibility. Unemployment has reached a level that exceeds the tolerable limit in a developing economy, where changes in the economic structure cause imbalances and the transfer of labor from one sector to another.

The real increase in the value of production and national income is decreasing, and economic stagnation is becoming increasingly pronounced. Nevertheless, the demands of central state bodies and institutions do not diminish. In this regard, the subtitle "national income exceeded by 3% and the budget by 15%" of the article published in Vjesnik on October 18, 1967, entitled "The Process Stalled," is characteristic. The 3% increase in national income is nominal, meaning it does not account for the considerable rise in prices.

This indicates that there was no real increase; in fact, real national income actually decreased. A certain decline in agricultural production, which, due to tax burdens and credit restrictions, cannot develop freely, does little to compensate for the major shortcomings of the economic system. Tourism partially offset the negative balance of payments, although Belgrade's centralist policies hinder this important source of foreign exchange through its investment policies, given that the Croatian Adriatic regions are the center of tourism and Belgrade is unwilling to promote them.

The data presented illustrate the current state of economic reform and the overall development of the economy in Yugoslavia. These figures testify to a profound crisis in the economic policies currently being implemented under the guise of economic reform, but they also point to a serious crisis within the very economic system that this reform is meant to address. But since the economic system is intimately linked to the political order, these phenomena simultaneously reflect the political crisis of the regime and the State. Therefore, the fate of the current totalitarian regime and the State itself will depend to a great extent on the future course of socio-economic reform.

The economic reform is now in its third year of the 1966-1970 five-year plan. This stage invites us to take a position regarding the success of the economic reform. In this respect, the assessments of the communist leaders, as expressed in the "Conclusions" of the Eighth Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, held in Belgrade on September 23, 1967, are valuable.

These conclusions were published on November 24, 1967 (Vjesnik, November 26, 1967). These would be directives for the further implementation of the reform and for the 9th Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, to be held in early 1969, whose main theme would be precisely the reform. (According to unofficial reports, it seems that it will also address the new constitutional reform with a view to reorganizing the state on the basis of a "confederation." For the moment, this is conjecture.)

Since Tito declared on Belgrade television (December 29, 1967) that 1968 would be "one of the most decisive years" for economic reform, and since the communist leaders have been incessantly emphasizing the far-reaching political implications of reform and self-management since 1965, the time has come to review and assess the results achieved and to issue instructions for future action.

The Communist Party, being committed to the reform, must take a stance. The "Conclusions" mentioned above constitute an important official evaluation of the reform, as do various statements by Tito, Bakaric, and other communist leaders. Preparatory work for the Ninth Congress is being carried out in this spirit.

Here, we are particularly interested in analyzing the assessment of the reform made by competent economists. Almost simultaneously with the publication of the "Conclusions" of the Eighth Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, Vjesnik (Zagreb, November 19 and 22, 1967) published excerpts from a joint study on the economic policy of Yugoslavia, and particularly on the economic reform.

In early 1968, this study was published by Informator in Zagreb and was prepared at the Zagreb Economic Institute and the Research Center of the Faculty of Economics in Zagreb, with the collaboration of the Belgrade Institute for Foreign Trade, as well as several economists not affiliated with the aforementioned institutions.[96] To this day, this study remains the best and most comprehensive overview of Yugoslavia's economic reform and economic policy published in that country.

During the preparatory work, 34 monographs were drafted and partially photocopied, some of which have already been published. As stated in the Prologue, this study aims to "provide a dynamic assessment of the current stage of development in relation to the implementation of the economic reform objectives. Within this framework, an analysis was conducted of the economic conditions and the performance of institutional factors, that is, the measures of economic policy, and the systematic solutions to the basic fluctuations in production."

This study, divided into 10 chapters, analyzes various aspects of the current economic policy, the reform in all its assumptions, means of action, and results achieved. Furthermore, it addresses the possibilities of the next phase of the reform with several suggestions and proposals.

The study does not consider the fundamental problems of the current political and economic system of Yugoslavia. It simply investigates and analyzes the policy in its reform phase and within the framework of the existing political and economic system. This approach does not coincide with the position of the political leadership, that is, the Communist Party. Precisely because it does not raise fundamental political and economic problems and does not question the existing system, it is easier to compare the economists' and the Party's criteria and draw conclusions about the successes achieved and the prospects for economic reform. Identical phenomena are viewed through different lenses, making their comparison highly relevant and interesting.

It represents a confrontation between the criteria of economic science and the criteria of the communist leaders. It is also interesting because the communist leaders have taken and continue to take significant economic measures without regard for science and the opinions of economic specialists. The Party sets the course and resolves economic problems, actions that science should then confirm and ratify. Here, however, science takes a negative stance toward the economic measures and solutions.

To better understand the current phase of the political and economic process in Yugoslavia, we will refer to the opinions of economists and the Party regarding economic reform. First, we will review the aforementioned study and then the positions of the Party, Tito, and Bakaric, in order to draw some important conclusions. It should be noted that some state and Party officials also participated in the preparation of the study.

II. THE POSITION OF ECONOMISTS REGARDING ECONOMIC REFORM

We will transcribe some results from the study "Current Problems of the Economy and Economic Policy of Yugoslavia." This work is very concise, analytical, and draws conclusions. It is obvious that we can refer only to the most important results. For better orientation, we will respect the order and titles of the chapters of the study under examination.

1. The Consistency of the Objectives of Economic Policy and the Evaluation of Their Implementation

Centralism is the fundamental characteristic of the Yugoslav communist regime. The authors begin by noting that economic policy in the early stages of the self-management system was "primarily the result of political decisions made by central bodies."

This policy, due above all to centralist administrative methods in investment and foreign trade, "constantly exacerbated the contrasts that caused disruptions in the economic performance of both the domestic and international markets." The inflationary financing of investments led to a constant rise in prices, "offset by the corresponding nominal increase in the income of economic organizations, which constituted another independent stimulus to the inflationary spiral." Bureaucratic centralism and inflation are thus directly related.

The result of these trends is the continuous worsening of the social and material conditions of development, the disruption of economic conditions, insecurity, and significant fluctuations in economic processes. The consequence of inflationary financing of investments is "almost always the replacement of the liberal period with a short-term restrictive economic policy." This unbalanced process resulted in insufficient growth in national income.

To curb this, the socio-economic reform was inaugurated in 1965, marking the beginning of a higher stage in the self-management system. This reform consisted primarily of transferring the rights to dispose of the means of reinvestment to the direct producers.

Changes were made to the economic position of economic groups and the conditions of production, which were linked to changes in price relations and the monetary system. The aim was then to gradually eliminate the static elements of the social relations system and, consequently, the centralist administrative methods in economic management.

While positively evaluating the reform's objectives and its initial results, economists highlight a number of difficulties. The first significant difficulty is the decline in real personal income in certain sectors, considered, admittedly, a temporary necessity but contrary to the reform's intentions. Furthermore, although on a temporary basis, administrative control of prices was maintained. But of paramount importance is the federation's key position in investment decisions, even though the economic sectors "were in a position to make investments, albeit on a limited scale."

Regarding this power of the federation, the study states: "At the same time, the federation's participation was reduced, although it maintained fixed and secure sources of income (interest on assets, annuities, and interest on loans), without revising its existing obligations. It was noted that these measures were temporary, although they remained in effect until the end of 1970. Therefore, and for other reasons (e.g., the structures of ongoing investments), greater difficulties arose and continue to arise in the area of investment. This was to be expected, given that it was one of the key problems that needed to be resolved, and where statist forms of economic control were most firmly maintained and persisted for the longest period."

From this observation by the economists, it can be inferred that the reform, from the outset, did not resolve the key problem of self-management: the decision-making process regarding investments. Centralism persists and is the seed of the reform's first failure.

The Social Development Plan of Yugoslavia 1966-1970 encompassed the realization of the reform's objectives. The plan set the fundamental goals for that period: the sustained rise in the standard of living, particularly individual consumption; the further development of socialist social relations, especially the growing role of direct producers and various organizations; and the accelerated development of the underdeveloped republics and regions. As a prerequisite, the plan stipulated the fulfillment of these tasks: economic stabilization, currency and domestic prices, increased production and the convertibility of the dinar; and the accelerated training of managers and scientific personnel.

Economists declare that these objectives and conditions... They respond to the reform's intentions, offering this negative assessment: "However, these are very principled formulations that, for the most part, paralyze general political positions regarding the development of the social system and the aims of social and economic development.

That, of course, is important, but to implement a concrete economic policy, especially in the short term, specifying and quantifying these objectives, tasks, and conditions is the direct basis." It is then noted that the five-year plan did not develop even the basic numerical data on the rise in social product and national income, on the increase in the number of employed people, on labor productivity, investments, and the standard of living, even though this data is "the very foundation of an economic policy."

The economic experts thus declare that the reform's implementation plan was drawn up superficially and hastily.

Next, regarding the objectives of the five-year plan, it is stated: "Even a superficial analysis of the specified objectives and tasks of the five-year plan indicates that it is an optimistic program." Consequently, the objectives were set more according to aspirations than concrete possibilities.

Thus, the plan, on the one hand, relies on "strengthening the material basis of self-management, with the liberalization of objectives, with a stable market, with the trend towards the convertibility of the dinar, with the liberalization of foreign trade..." and, on the other hand, "with fixed means to finance the investment obligations of the relatively large federation."

This distribution "immediately created the impression of excessive strain, especially since no tensions were taken into account and no contingency plans were considered, also omitting the analysis of exogenous factors: natural, foreign trade, subjective, and political. Projections up to 1970 were made linearly, without considering dynamism and fluctuating trends; in other words, our rich past experience was disregarded."

The study also emphasizes that "the plan's optimism is, in fact, even greater because it presupposes the possibility of better utilization of existing conditions and, on that basis, better results, primarily in terms of generating the means for a higher standard of living." Economists also state that errors in planners' calculations can call into question the entire structure of distribution, and that "in relatively sound planning of investments, reserves, general consumption, and interventions in the economy, the failure to meet these budgets makes the achievement of one of the fundamental objectives of economic policy, as formulated in the plan—namely, the constant rise in the standard of living—questionable."

The plan guarantees an important role for the federal government in the distribution of national income. "The federation, according to the plan, ensures the resources for its investment obligations, general consumption, and reserves..." Under such conditions of rather frozen prices, the federation's influence on economic trends is decisive.

Such a plan, at the current stage of economic development in Yugoslavia, should, in the opinion of economists, contain a solid analysis of planned production and distribution. Initially, planned and actual trends were compared. In 1967, no comparisons were made. Instead, a kind of qualitative analysis was conducted, and everything boiled down to the general conclusion that the short-term objectives of the reform had already been achieved.

Economists consider this procedure inadequate with respect to the efficiency of economic policy in the past year: "The curve of production, distribution, and consumption, in almost all its basic indices, is much slower than that projected by the five-year plan for the period 1966-1970."

These trends, if they continue, could hinder the implementation of the policy. outlined in the plan. "Among all of this, the fact that the slowing rate of production growth was most pronounced in industrial production is concerning, where growth was not expected on average in 1967." The downward trend in export growth is ongoing.

These results, in the economists' opinion, would be meager. Thus, the utilization of productive capital is weaker due to the slowing rate of production growth, labor productivity declines, and the profitability and efficiency of the economy show downward trends.

"Market and price stability, particularly evident in recent times, was therefore achieved under conditions of downward trends not only in material production but also in the qualitative indicators of the economy." "During the last two years, there has been an absolute decrease in the number of people employed in the social economy, and real investments in basic economic assets and non-economic activities have also decreased significantly."

Regarding the accumulation of basic and operational capital, the study It notes that while basic funds decreased, the old system of investments through central bodies was maintained, so the position of workers' organizations, that is, of the direct producers, did not change qualitatively.

Their total resources for investments in basic funds "barely exceed amortizations, so it cannot yet be said that one of the important objectives of the reform, namely, the transfer of the right to dispose of the means of reinvestment to the direct producers, has begun to materialize decisively. This, of course, implies the old weaknesses in investment policy..."

The weaknesses of the new economic policy are evident in the excessive accumulation of reserves of the means of personal consumption, which today constitutes a significant burden on the economy. "These are not the reserves economically necessary for the normal process of reinvestment and commercialization," the aforementioned study points out, adding that a considerable portion of these resources cannot be considered accumulation in the true sense of the term, since "among these reserves is also unsold merchandise that, due to its quality and inadequate storage, cannot be sold under the new economic conditions that the reform began to develop."

The rate of growth in individual consumption is slow, and the share of this social level in national income has declined considerably.

Regarding the success of the economic reform, the study reaches this conclusion: "The preceding discussion indicates that the proclaimed development policy is unfolding slowly and partially, which hinders the realization of the basic intentions of the socio-economic reform, despite certain positive results achieved so far. The current economic policy influenced these trends, but more than anything, the insufficient development of the economic system. In this context, the weaknesses of our planning system, which are evident in its technical (analysis and projection) and systematic aspects, must also be highlighted."

This assessment is clear and negative. It means that Yugoslav economic policy is flawed, that the economic system itself is unsound, and the planning system is unsound.

Regarding social planning, the following observations by economists are noteworthy: "The procedure for developing the plan and other bases of economic policy has not yet evolved into a democratic process of consultation and mutual decision-making among associated producers... Because the federal plan still points to the central bodies that decide on economic issues, the federal plan, in practice, remains the basis of economic policy. This is also the case with the five-year plan for the period 1966-1970, as well as the annual plans for economic policy in 1966 and 1967.

Based on simple calculations and projections, this plan accurately ensures the total resources for the federal administration and other federal needs, and to the greatest extent independent of actual economic conditions. This is obvious when it comes to investment obligations, where even the amounts of these investments are fixed for each major operation, strictly limited in time." Rigid centralism and bureaucracy, therefore, remain in place.

This logical analysis of the objectives of the economic reform, the social plan, and the results achieved offers a complete picture of the new phase of Yugoslav economic policy and its economic system. The assessment is rather negative. Yugoslav economic reform is on the decline. Following this precise and comprehensive analysis, we will extract some important data from the other chapters, elaborating somewhat more on the last chapter.

2. The characteristic elements of economic development in the intervening period

Forced industrialization and agricultural production at pre-war levels are the essential characteristics of economic development up to 1958. Regarding the distribution of accumulated capital and funds, until 1963 the prevailing trends were that "Concern for reinvestment is a matter for 'society' and its organs, primarily the federation." These resources came from the economy, extracted from the direct producers.

he federation possessed the most reliable sources of capital, which were steadily increasing, while the participation of workers' organizations in accumulations and funds was incidental, a residual dimension. These resources of the workers' organizations "were insufficient for serious action, especially in certain economic sectors and branches." Because of this policy, before the reform, the rate of individual return mattered less than the "normal" interest on loans. "Thus, the obligations arising from loans exceeded the means available to repay them."

Certain changes favoring workers' organizations occurred after 1964. Data indicate that in 1964, economic organizations were "the largest debtors of social investment funds and credit banks."

In the economic organizations sector, financial outlays for investments were almost twice as high as the resources accumulated, which constituted a constant source of inflation. Issuing more money than needed for commercialization enabled the artificial increase in accumulated capital and accelerated the inflationary process.

Inflationary financing, especially of the federal government and the general investment fund, was another persistent source of inflation. "A source of inflation was embedded in the banking system and credit relations."

It is then observed that "the growth rate of the money supply always exceeded the growth rate of social product, national income, and overall economic growth." In 1962 and 1963, the increase in the money supply reached a record high, amounting to approximately 31%. This, of course, disrupted the balance between goods and liquid money.

Investments, primarily driven by political considerations, consistently exceeded investments in operating funds. The increase in total investment kept pace much faster than the increase in social product. This means that investment consumption outpaced material resources.

This inflationary investment consumption is determined by the socio-political order. This can be inferred from the factors that economists believe influenced non-real investments. These factors are numerous, namely: "the system of income formation and distribution, the central position of social investment funds as the primary holders of capital accumulation, the decisive role of socio-political factors in investment decisions, the relegation of economic and rational criteria in investment financing, and others."

Due to the mismatched formation of operating funds, numerous structural imbalances arose in the market, increasing the deficit of many important products, driving up prices, and exacerbating the balance of payments deficit, while at the same time, stockpiles of other products increased due to the inadequately formed demand structure.

According to the study's findings, economic relations with other countries exhibit the following main characteristics: "Under the impact of rapid economic development and changes in the structure of all categories of consumption, the volume of imports grew at a pace that the export of goods and services could not match. Therefore, Yugoslavia, during this period, is characterized by a negative balance in both the trade balance and the current account balance... The trade balance has constantly fluctuated around a deficit of approximately 200 million dollars in recent years... Similar trends are seen in the fluctuating balance of the current account balance, which in the last 10 years has shown notable fluctuations, ranging from a deficit of 217 million dollars to a surplus of 65 million dollars in the exceptional year of 1963." (The suspension of import expansion).

"Therefore, over time, a large external debt accumulated, aggravated by monetary concentration and unfavorable terms in the area of convertible currencies." From this clear assessment by economists, it can be deduced that the dinar cannot stabilize due to the large external debt. The situation is aggravated because Yugoslavia is passive with countries in the convertible bond market (Western countries) and active with clearing countries (Eastern countries).

The distribution of foreign currency is centralized and restrictive, and has become "a brake on the normal development of the reinvestment process and the effective expansion of the base for settling existing financial obligations abroad and for incurring new debt."}

The full effects of imports could not be harnessed, while "exports did not contribute to increased efficiency in domestic production." Trade relations with other countries are insufficiently developed. "These relations are characterized by the fact that, until now, there has been no well-conceived policy on capital imports, on productive-financial linkages, or on long-term export financing."

In this regard, it should be emphasized that economic policy in this area was haphazard, rushed, and improvised. "Therefore, in the planning framework, foreign trade appeared as an essential residual dimension rather than a fundamental determinant of overall economic development.

Under these conditions, foreign economic relations did not contribute to the efficiency of domestic production and became an independent source of structural distortions and a complementary source of inflationary impulses. This further diminished the prospects for a more lasting solution to the balance of payments problem."

In the opinion of the study's authors, the balance of payments deficit, being transitory, would not be so significant, as it appears in all developing countries. However, this deficit has become a permanent feature and "is the result of constant imbalances in internal economic relations and the consequence of economic policies not effectively aimed at eliminating these imbalances."

"The result of these phenomena is the growing difference between the real parity of the dinar... and the settlement parity, that is, the rate that governs in foreign trade."

"It can therefore be said that this process is one of the notable causes of economic instability: the inflationary trend rises and ultimately leads to the inevitable devaluation of the national currency."

"For this reason, finding a suitable path to integrate ourselves into the international division of labor, increasing economic output, and enhancing the social profitability of foreign trade is one of the central problems of our development policy." This criterion of the economists refers not only to the period prior to the reform but also to the current phase of economic development during the reform.

3. Basic Economic Trends in the Period 1964-1967

This extensive and well-documented chapter reviews economic development during the reform up to the end of 1967. Due to space limitations, we will only highlight some data and results of general interest.

The development trends in 1965 and 1966 reflect a much more moderate dynamism compared to the period prior to the reform. A decrease in the pace of development is expected for 1967. While the average real growth rate of the social product for the three-year period 1965-1967 was 3.8%, only 0.8% is expected for 1967.

That this growth is highly unfavorable is demonstrated by comparing it with the 1966-1970 five-year plan, which projected an average annual growth rate of 7.5 to 8.5% for gross social product and national income. This is a very negative result, especially in certain industrial sectors. Even the small increase in the 1965-1967 average is largely due to agricultural production, which was relatively good in 1965 and 1966. The decline in agricultural production in 1967 was reflected in the lower growth rate of total social product and national income.

Individual consumption increased by only 4.3% on average over the three-year period, whereas the plan projected an increase of 8 to 9%; the productivity of the social economy increased annually by 4.9% instead of 6 to 7%; and industrial production increased by 4.4% instead of 9 to 10%. Investments in basic social services fell by 5.3% annually instead of rising by 6 to 7%; the export and import of goods and services increased at the same rate, so the unfavorable balance remained unchanged. In the three-year average from 1965 to 1967, the cost of living index rose by 21.3%, compared to an annual increase of 6.8% in the average from 1957 to 1964.

These figures paint a bleak picture of the results of the economic reform. This reform, therefore, failed to achieve its intended objectives and constitutes a resounding failure.

The rate of capital accumulation decreased during the reform, and its structure was highly unfavorable, since "the share of capital used to increase productive funds intended to cover abnormally accumulated reserves increased considerably." Investments in basic capital decreased significantly, so that in the last three years even the nominal value of net investment fell, although prices increased considerably.

The study emphasizes that the share of net economic investment in basic and operating capital, at 21% of national income in 1967, is still very high. The economists conclude that "the crux of the problem regarding the revival of Yugoslavia's economic development lies not in reducing the volume of investment or in the decreased accumulation, but in the structure and rationality of investment consumption." Here, it is crucial "to restructure the course of monetary accumulation in accordance with the reform's aims, which prioritize the intensification of economic development."

The development of the structure of means for financing investments, according to the beneficiaries, is of great economic and political importance. The figures bear this out. While in 1966, compared to 1965, the federal government's share increased by 102%, the share of economic organizations increased by 50%, and that of other organizations decreased by 8%, while investments by the republics increased by 11% and those by local entities by 17%.

The largest increase in investments occurred against the objectives of the reform (investments in the economy, social funds, and the budget). In assessing these relationships, it is important to emphasize that the "workers' organizations" also include banks that are not decentralized. The Yugoslav Investment Bank plays the leading role in investment policy. The study states verbatim: "It is often overlooked that the vast resources for financing reinvestment are concentrated in a single bank, the Yugoslav Investment Bank. In 1965, this bank controlled, directly or indirectly, more than 45% of total gross investments in the basic assets of the Yugoslav economy."

"We emphasize this point because, despite the trend toward improving the situation of productive organizations in terms of having the means for reinvestment, the economy lacks sufficient resources for consistent modernization."

Thus, in 1966, most investments were directed toward new objectives, financed primarily by factors outside the economy. In projects financed solely by the Yugoslav Investment Bank, over 25 billion new dinars have been absorbed, representing more than 50% of gross economic investment. The study emphasizes that this investment policy continues.

Another reform objective has also not yet been achieved: the modernization and reconstruction of the economy. The study notes that insufficient resources are being allocated to these ends, even though this "was one of the fundamental goals of the reform." Economic organizations lack these resources because they are diverted for various reasons.

Loan obligations and forcibly separated assets play a particularly significant role here. Analyzing the problems of the development policy for businesses, the study underscores that "successful implementation of economic reform necessarily requires a review of the existing investment policy at both the social and business levels. Therefore, the struggle for capital accumulation and the means of investment, and their distribution, becomes the central issue of economic policy." Despite the privatization process, many of these decisions are still made by state bodies, which decide the fate of companies, discriminating between them.

"This means that the very existence of a company is still decided outside the economy, including the possibility of individual decision-making."

"If we add to this the monopolistic position of large banks and the monopolies of large foreign trade companies, it becomes clearer under what conditions our companies operate and what their possibilities are."

Regarding the planning of the Yugoslav centralists, the following judgment is made: "The stunted social planning must be elevated to a higher level through the application of scientific methods and its incorporation into the mechanism of self-government."

Finally, the economists conclude that companies, under current conditions, must seek short-term solutions, as they lack the essential elements for long-term orientation.

To achieve this objective, complementary social action is needed, which should include: a clearly defined long-term developmental orientation for the country; a review of the current investment policy and allocation of operating resources; a relaxation of production-financing collaboration between domestic and foreign companies; and programs for the phased implementation of economic reform. Without these changes, the economy is not amenable to reform. Changes in organization, investment, and conceptualization are necessary.

4. Consumption in the Sphere of Living Standards

The total real volume of consumption in the sphere of living standards (individual and social) shows a meager increase (1966: +1.5%). One of the obstacles to increasing personal consumption is the enormous accumulation of reserves without economic justification, and "the justification for this process is even less justifiable. At the level of businesses, purchasing power is realized in the distribution of goods and services, which is economically unjustifiable, and, given the banking system, purchasing power becomes a restrictive factor for realization and production."

After twenty years of depression in personal consumption, a new process of redistribution is now beginning. However, economists add that "current rates of personal consumption and consumption at the social level are not high, but, on the contrary, still low."

As soon as the economic reform was implemented, the purchasing power of personal income, especially income from work, declined. It then increased, but real consumption based on labor income grew less than national income and the funds available from unproductive consumption.

The real development of social consumption proved unfavorable during the course of social reform. Previously, social services (schools, ambulances, hospitals) were insufficient and outdated, and now "the problem of reinvestment... in these activities is extremely acute." The real volume of consumption in these activities was narrower in 1966 than in 1964.

5. Monetary and Credit Policy, Economic Liquidity, and Reinvestment

According to the reform objectives, the monetary and credit system should have relieved the central bank. However, due to linear monetary and credit constraints, new problems arose that "considerably delayed the process of positive changes in the economy."

The study offers this diagnosis: "Gradually, this begins to paralyze industrial production, even the entire reinvestment process. The economy is mired in reciprocal debts and loans that increasingly aggravate the operations of even the most capable productive organizations; the banks proved incapable of resolving this process. It is evident that the normal courses and relationships in the economy are distorted."

Cessation of monetary expansion and severe liquidity depletion. A sharp reduction in overall liquidity led to a slowdown in economic modernization, proclaimed as one of the primary goals of the reform. "Modernization thus became a primary and insoluble problem. The real economic liquidity was reduced by the new monetary and credit policy, even though the economy's own resources increased considerably.

For this reason, accumulation proved insufficient for the first time. The economic distortion is manifested in the fact that inflationary sources persisted while monetary policy had deflationary effects. The linear depletion of liquidity affected practically the entire economy, which had to be reflected in the decline in the economic growth rate and the accumulation of economic organizations—that is, the entire economy. With these measures, economic organizations once again became the arena for deficits, and their self-financing potential diminished."

The political restriction on credit became the primary factor limiting the use of freely available investment resources, primarily by economic investment organizations, in basic sectors.

The center of gravity of economic policy consisted of the restrictions imposed by the National Bank, which were intensified in 1967. However, this intensification of the restrictive monetary and credit policy manifested itself only in economic organizations. The new credit policy was primarily expressed in the decrease in investment.

But the severe restrictions, contrary to expectations, produced negative results in the import sector. Monetary and credit policy lost its connection with real economic activity and "is entirely subordinated to the political assessment of the economic situation." Liquidity, or the money supply, is determined arbitrarily.

This analysis of monetary and credit policy leads economists to this considered conclusion:

"The complex problem of improved economic organization, of its automation, raises the fundamental problem of stable financing, based on self-financing and financial self-organization in a highly complex sense, not only with regard to the dinar but also with regard to foreign exchange. These issues are barely addressed, so that through a decidedly restrictive credit policy and a centralized foreign exchange policy—even where monetary control of the economy is inappropriate—this process is completely paralyzed, leaving the economy in uncertainty and subject to chance, due to various maneuvers and bank usury..."

Therefore, a review of the relationships between the central bank, commercial banks, and the entire banking system is imperative. The study states the following: "A thorough analysis demonstrated that the problem of the banking status that would be adapted to the new system remains unresolved, as does the issue of bank management and decisions regarding bank credit policy. Therefore, the assertion that they are becoming a new power over the economy is not far from the truth. Commercial banks, due to a confluence of circumstances, proved incapable of directing resources in a developmental direction, while the interest rate, as an instrument meant to influence the fluctuations of money and capital under certain conditions, failed completely."

The State, therefore, transferred the right to decide on investments, credit, and foreign exchange to the banks, organized in a centralist manner, which exploit and stifle the economy. In this way, self-management and modernization are impossible, while the banking system, in close collaboration with the central powers, has become its own undoing.

6. Employment Problems

Prior to the reform, annual employment growth averaged 6-7% over fifteen years. Since there was a surplus of workers in both the formal and non-formal sectors before the reform, this growth rate must have slowed. Thus, in 1965, employment increased by only 1.4%, and in 1966 it fell by 2.7% compared to 1965. The number of unemployed is estimated to be the same in 1967 as in 1966. The economy is now absorbing less of the growth in the labor force, which is one of the consequences of the reform.

But this absorption problem is becoming increasingly acute. Until now, most of this growth in the labor force went to work abroad. Now, these opportunities are diminishing, so the number of unemployed is growing. A particularly difficult problem is the employment of newly skilled workers. Economists estimate that 60,000 new technicians will need to be employed annually outside of agriculture in the coming years.

If we add the employment of the new non-agricultural workforce, then the minimum annual employment would amount to 80,000, or 2%. This absorption would be possible if the non-agricultural sector achieved an annual growth rate of 6-7%. We have seen earlier that this rate is much lower and that it almost disappeared in 1967, which paints a bleak picture for new jobs.

The surplus of unskilled workers, obviously outside of agriculture, amounts—according to the study—to 500,000, while the annual fluctuation in employment would amount to 700,000. These are high and alarming figures.

Regarding employment, the study states: "In employment, especially concerning technicians, there is no long-term policy, nor programs or plans that reflect the needs and possibilities of the economy and its interests, related to development and developmental policy. In the current phase, labor is not sufficiently engaged in the reinvestment process, which constitutes a serious economic problem. This problem also presents other aspects, especially political ones."

Both the political and economic aspects of unemployment can lead to major changes and upheavals.

7. The Market and Prices

Before the reform, the central government, due to the rapid increase in prices in March 1955, decided to freeze them. The economic reform significantly altered internal price relationships. However, the study emphasizes that "the new relationships, based on parity with world prices, were established using theoretical calculations and not through market mechanisms. Based on these relationships, prices were once again frozen." Nevertheless, this administrative fixing of domestic prices according to certain "world" prices, in the economists' opinion, was bound to lead to further anomalies. These calculated and frozen prices were maintained for "two and a half years," while today "these relationships are an anachronism and lack any economic sense."

The study then highlights that "excessive administrative control prevented the coordination of prices with real relations in the material structure of production and social exchange. A certain moderation in the general increase in prices is the result of various consumption restrictions and not the consequence of establishing balanced relationships in the structure of production and consumption," and "the price freeze acts as one of the factors contributing to economic instability."

The liberalization process has thus far unfolded at a very slow pace, while price liberalization has only applied to a few products. Economists are calling for an accelerated liberalization process to enable a change in the current price structure.

But in addition to price liberalization, "other components of the economic system and economic policy must also contribute to the effective functioning of the market mechanism," while "the market structure should be one of the basic criteria for price liberalization." Economists consider the market mechanism to be the primary regulator of economic life.

8. Economic Relations with the World

The reform of economic relations with the world has been taking place since 1965 under relatively unfavorable conditions. "The degree of economic stabilization was insufficient to change the official course and realize the direct effects of the devaluation on increased exports and reduced imports.

However, it turned out "that not all the difficulties in the sphere of economic relations with other countries were properly assessed and that more attention was paid to the problems of changing the official exchange rate than to economic policy measures..." The expected effects of increased exports failed, and with them, the temporary incentive to exports to revive economic activity.

Although the current liberalization did not worsen the country's foreign exchange liquidity, there was a very unfavorable development in the regional orientation of imports. Imports from the convertible currency zone increased, while those from the clearing currency zone decreased. "The current account balance with convertible currencies could not be improved even by the reduced imports of food from the United States, due to the payment terms for said imports."

Thus, "the foreign exchange reserves of convertible currencies, very important for the Further dynamism in the process of import liberalization and the convertibility of the dinar. Scarce foreign currency available to the economy has been decreasing due to significant credit obligations contracted in previous years."

In this sense, many companies find themselves at a dead end. To this must be added the old problem of centralism, since "the current monetary system for financing the economy in foreign currency relies on vertical exchange rates... for which the National Bank is solely responsible, with regard to external financial equilibrium."

Economists suggest pertinent solutions, changes regarding clearing-type countries, and the reorganization of distribution and the foreign exchange market. Regarding the burdens involved in the exchange of goods and services with socialist countries, the study highlights "that economic solutions are possible only if the behavior of the direct participants in the exchange of goods and services is modified and if long-term relationships are established between importers and exporters."

That Yugoslavia is registering losses in these relationships is inferred from the following suggestion: "Yugoslav actions will be more effective if they are accompanied by similar actions in socialist countries, aimed at increasing their exports to Yugoslavia." It is also emphasized that trade policy should always be geared towards reducing existing customs and non-customs barriers.

9. The System of Distribution, Self-Management, and Internal Organization in the Economic System

Self-management must originate with the producer, leading to the democratic decentralization of enterprise organization. Regarding investments, it is argued that "the investment system under conditions of workers' self-governance requires a more efficient market mechanism, a better system for distributing the social product, and social planning on new foundations." The distribution principle should be based on performance, that is, income, and not on labor and effort expended, regardless of the economic impact.

In the current phase of development, the organizational role of the State in the economy has been eliminated, but strong state influence persists in this area, as the study underlines. Even commercial banks are subject to significant state influence. The economic activity of producers should unfold within two basic mechanisms: 1) the operation of economic laws on a relatively open market, and 2) mutually agreed-upon social planning based on an essential and joint economic policy. Current social planning lacks this virtue.

The further process of self-management requires greater margins for accumulation within the economy. "Insufficient accumulation within the economy and large investment resources outside the economy indicate the need to find a suitable way to centralize internal investment resources for larger-scale objectives of general interest."

"Large-scale projects, important for the development of the entire country, must be carried out with freely centralized accumulation, that is to say, with loans or joint investments, which in turn means with equal participation in management and profit."

"Therefore, it would be advisable to decentralize the former social investment funds, transferred to banks, according to the companies that formed them..."

"In this way, the so-called 'economic banks and similar entities' will lose their character as 'state banks'—federal, state, or local—and will depend more on the economy, since they will cease to be successors of the former social investment funds that tend toward permanent reinvestment."

Direct producers and their organizations should participate in the drafting and proposal of regulations. However, there has been little change in this area. Economists observe that these regulations are dictated outside the economy "and that they still unnecessarily interfere in that part of the operations of workers' organizations, in their internal and reciprocal relations and the organization of their self-governance, which today should be the domain of their autonomous regulation. The functioning of the economy is hampered by administrative provisions..."

They then object that these provisions are too extensive, descriptive, and imprecise, subject to different official interpretations. The most interesting are the provisions on the financial operations of economic organizations, issued by the Federal Finance Secretariat. "Thus, for example, in 1966, the Secretariat's explanatory bulletin published more than 700 provisions, 200 of them relating to sales tax. Frequent amendments and additions to the provisions further complicate and obscure any clear guidance."

Finally, the study recommends discarding the principle that "what is not prescribed is not permitted," replacing it with the principle that "everything that is not prohibited is permitted."

10. Final Reflections

In the chapters reviewed, in addition to analysis and critique, the path to new solutions was also pointed out. This final chapter offers a concise summary of the positions presented, highlighting some problems.

The essential point is that the changes were not implemented "in the way that was assumed when the reform was launched, which hindered the achievement of better results both in the process of production relations and in that of the productive forces." In the formation and distribution of income and in the way resources are utilized, "the dominant position of socio-political communities was maintained. Monetary and credit policy remains subordinate to central decisions, based on non-economic criteria..."

The banking system does not adapt to economic needs, "and the foreign trade system, as well as the allocation of foreign currency, is largely centralized. Prices are mostly subject to administrative measures, which prevents the market mechanism from having an adequate influence on economic performance. The planning system is primarily oriented toward the needs of central bodies and toward securing the means to fulfill prior investment decisions."

"The solution to the inherited errors in investment, of meager, dispersed, and unbalanced capacities, now falls primarily to economic organizations, while social investment resources continue to be spent according to the same principles and in the same manner as before the reform. The restrictive credit policy further narrowed the margins of independence for economic organizations."

"The development policy envisioned in the 1966-1970 plan is not being implemented, either qualitatively or quantitatively. The Yugoslav economy is currently experiencing a significant slowdown in the rate of economic growth, especially in industry."

"Under conditions of sluggish growth, the elements of the old system are becoming increasingly evident."

The right to dispose of the means of reinvestment was supposed to be granted to workers' collectives. This was the fundamental intention of the socio-economic reform. "However, those changes that would signify a qualitative difference from the previous state have not yet been made," economists say. The old investment system persists. The study states:

"One of the main causes is the maintenance of the flawed system of concentrating investment resources in a few central banks, heavily influenced by socio-political communities, and the current methods of raising new funds for the federation's investment obligations and other needs of central bodies.

Federal obligations are explicitly fixed in the five-year plan, and federal laws maintain interest rates on operating funds, ensuring a continuous flow of resources almost independently of the economy. This contrasts sharply with the intentions and the idea behind the reform that was established, yet this system will remain in place until the end of 1970. However, this is already debatable, since the amount of resources for large-scale construction projects, financed by the federation, is constantly growing, making it certain that these projects cannot be completed by the end of 1970 with the allocated funds."

The old and unhealthy investment structure persists. Instead of modernizing and intensifying existing businesses, new plants are being built. According to the investment report at the end of April 1967, 77% of total gross investment in basic resources was being used for new projects.

Since banking and economic interests are not identical, there was "a significant alienation of income from workers' organizations, primarily through unjustifiably high interest rates."

"...Monetary and credit policy assumed very limited functions... and had negative effects not only on the modernization process but also on the marketing process and, consequently, on overall reinvestment."

"... Monetary and credit policy assumed very limited functions... and had negative effects not only on the modernization process but also on the marketing process and, consequently, on the entire reinvestment process." "The extremely severe restrictions made it impossible to finance the production of marketable goods, causing difficulties for the most capable workers' organizations, which had to suffer the consequences of the mismanagement of an economic sector—that is, the consequences of a poorly calculated economic policy. Global and mechanical access under restrictive conditions prevented the development of a credit system that could sustain sound production and business orientation."

Even the rigid restriction on consumer credit negatively impacted economic development.

Expectations regarding export expansion and maintaining imports within the limits determined by the balance of payments were not met. "The basic characteristic of economic relations with the rest of the world is the close correlation between the decline in the growth rate of industrial production and the increase in imports of industrial products."

Significant difficulties arose due to the export orientation toward clearing countries (communist and developing countries), which reduced their imports. In the opposite direction, relations unfold in the realm of convertible currencies, where Yugoslavia's liabilities increase.

In the foreign exchange distribution system, "the concept of central concentration and redistribution of foreign exchange was maintained, without any attempt to introduce new markets into monetary operations to create the conditions for the convertibility of the dinar."

The new price regulations and freezes had harmful consequences. "The frozen prices of most products and profit margins, on the one hand, and the free formation of prices and margins for a smaller number of domestically produced goods and imported products, on the other, distort the import structure."

The frozen prices exacerbate the reorientation of economic organizations toward other products and negatively impact product quality.

The entire social planning system exhibits significant weaknesses. "It is still geared toward the needs of socio-political communities and therefore cannot offer a satisfactory economic and political basis for direct production." The necessary resources for investments and other federal obligations are allocated.

Since "the five-year plan is not being implemented in terms of the rate of income growth, nor in terms of performance and productivity..., by allocating funds for federal obligations and other socio-political communities, other sectors of consumption must be restricted..."

"...The vast majority of surplus labor performed or produced is beyond the reach of economic organizations, that is, of direct producers. Almost 69% of surplus value is spent outside of economic organizations." This percentage is very high. "Therefore, the struggle for the accumulation and distribution of investment resources becomes the central problem of economic policy."

Important decisions regarding businesses are made by state bodies, "and the existence of businesses still depends to a large extent on external factors. If we add the monopolistic position of large banks and foreign trade companies, it becomes clearer under what conditions our businesses operate and what their possibilities are."

In conclusion, the economists propose several suggestions to correct the current economic policy and strengthen the economic system in accordance with the reform's aims. First, they propose correcting the current investment policy and the five-year plan according to the principle of continuous planning.

Credit policy must be thoroughly reviewed. First, monetary issuance must be linked to the objective needs of economic life. A stable and realistic conception of the necessary amount of money and a rational system of credit relations between commercial and central banks are called for. The status of banks must be reviewed. Parallel changes in the foreign exchange system and foreign trade are necessary.

A structural change in economic relations with the rest of the world is also required. In this regard, the domestic market must be gradually opened to the outside world. This also requires internal changes to the economic system, especially the promotion of elements of the domestic market and price stabilization as a tool for promoting productive factors.

"The agent of the transformation of economic relations with the rest of the world must be the economy itself." This implies increasingly intense competition between domestic and foreign producers in the internal market. For the further development of foreign relations, it is important to abandon the premise of the automatic formation of export flows and adopt a practical policy of direct export incentives. All of this requires a clearly defined, long-term policy.

The first condition for solving the unemployment problem is to revitalize and reorient production and the entire economy.

To implement these proposals, economists are calling for a review of the five-year plan for the period 1966-1967. All stakeholders should participate in social planning.

The principle that economic organizations are the primary agents of reinvestment should govern the income distribution system. Regarding social insurance, the existing contradiction between the rights and obligations of insured individuals should be resolved.

A complete reorganization of the insurance system is needed, particularly concerning pensions. The old practice of blocking and seizing funds from economic organizations after basic distribution should be abandoned; the internal distribution system must be based on the principle of distribution according to performance.

It is of paramount importance that internal relations within the economic organization depend as little as possible on legal regulation.

III. GREAT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ECONOMISTS' ATTITUDE TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORM

The political and economic experiments of the communist regime in Yugoslavia gave rise to profound crises. In the ensuing difficulties, reform emerged under pressure from below. Its primary aim was the elimination of political and economic centralism and the implementation of self-management in all sectors. Reform was the indispensable corrective to the great evil that oppressed the peoples of Yugoslavia.

It is a fact that it arose under pressure from the communist opposition, whose spokespeople were the Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians. The reform was expected to save the regime, the system, and the state. This is how the communist leaders framed the problem, openly declaring that the survival of the communist system, its power, and Yugoslavia itself depended on the success of the reform (Bakaric).

After two and a half years, the question of its success is now being raised by public opinion and economists.

Politically, the economic reform undoubtedly brought much benefit and change. First, it created a climate for freer discussion after 20 years of Rankovic's terror. The reform made legal criticism and attacks on Great Serbian hegemony and centralism possible. Invoking the aims and spirit of the reform, the opposition within the Communist Party ousted Rankovic, the head of the political police.

The indirect, political aspect of the reform is therefore positive, although the non-Serbian peoples have not yet achieved their "self-government," that is, liberation from foreign power. Better conditions arose in the struggle for national self-determination and democracy.

We have discussed the economic results previously, and summarizing the economists' assessment, it is clear that the main objectives of the reform were not achieved. All economic life and the functioning of enterprises are subject to the interests of the federation and its organs.

The unlimited power of the Yugoslav Investment Bank makes self-management and economic reform a crude caricature. This is also evident in the debate between the director of said Bank, Milenko Bojanic, and Vladimir Veselica in Vjesnik u srijedu in late 1967 and early 1968. The new course in the arrangement of foreign loans and aid for investments proves it. In early April 1968, the World Bank signed an agreement with the Yugoslav Investment Bank for a $50 million loan to complete the Belgrade-Bar railway line. The loan was granted for 25 years at 6.25% interest.

This loan is a burden for all regions of the state, although only the central authorities decided on the construction of the railway and the port of Bar. According to foreign reports related to the aforementioned loan, the construction costs of the railway will amount to $211 million and will fall on the federation and the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Also in early April, news broke of an agreement between the French industrial conglomerate Péchiney and the Yugoslav government for the construction of an aluminum plant in Titograd with an annual capacity of 50,000 tons of aluminum.

It is well known that the Yugoslav Investment Bank decided to build the aluminum complex in Titograd against the economic interests of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia. These Croatian provinces, therefore, decided to establish their own aluminum plant, using their own resources, without federal participation. But now, they will have to contribute to the construction of the Titograd industrial complex.

The omnipotence of the Yugoslav Investment Bank and the lack of self-governance are fully reflected in the subheadings of the aforementioned controversy, Veselica-Bojanic. We quote some characteristic subheadings: "The Federation gave the Yugoslav Investment Bank 1.476 trillion old dinars in the form of loans with a repayment term of 30 years." "Why are the federation's previous decisions elevated to the pedestal of the 'sacred' without taking into account the actual situation of the companies?"

“Why was there almost no discussion about the hundreds of trillions of off-budget federal resources, while the ‘1% case’ of the personal income tax was treated as a spectacle?” “The economy is once again in the position of submissively begging the administration and banks for the very resources it created.” “Total business investment in the first months of last year amounted to 444 trillion dinars, which is less than the amortization that, at the same time, totaled 591 trillion.”

In practice, then, investment policy is becoming increasingly centralized, with long-term decisions being made, while self-management remains a dead letter.

It is to the credit of the economists in Zagreb and some in Belgrade that they offered a technical and logical analysis, drawing conclusions about agrarian reform. Its study using the scientific method justifies the struggle for the economic independence of the "republics," the autonomous regions, and the peoples, as well as their aspiration to self-determination.

This study also demonstrates the catastrophic policies being implemented in the supposed reform and the tragic consequences of continuing them. Their continuation necessarily leads to greater exploitation and economic ruin, both for the peoples themselves and for the oppressed.

Furthermore, this study constitutes a programmatic economic platform for all liberal forces in Yugoslavia in their struggle against Great Serbian hegemony and centralism in the economic sphere, under the pretext of legality. In this arena, Croatian, Slovenes, and Macedonian opposition circles cooperate closely.

The economists' study provides them with a firmer foundation and many arguments to justify their demands and claims. It is a kind of Declaration of the Economic Rights of the oppressed regions and peoples of Yugoslavia. Its importance is even greater considering that representatives of the Croatian government also collaborated in its drafting, namely representatives of the Sabor (parliament) and the government: Dusan Dragosavec, Ivo Perisin, and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar.

The duty of the communist leaders in Croatia, of the Bakaric-Tripalo circle, would be to adopt the economists' analysis and demands, as these address the primary problems of the existence of the Croatian regions and the Croatian economy. Their duty would also be to link up with other republics and united forces, based on the economists' program, to demand radical changes in economic policy.

The latest pronouncements of Bakaric (a prominent communist figure in Croatia), incidentally, follow a contrary course, as we shall see later. If the communist rulers in Croatia continue with this policy, they assume great responsibility for the grave consequences that will follow.

We note in passing that the study we are reviewing suffers from a flaw. It judges agricultural policy in a summary and positive manner. Despite the good harvest in 1965 and 1966, agricultural policy is negative, since discriminatory measures and onerous taxes paralyzed the private sector, that is, 85% of the cultivated land and an even higher percentage in livestock production. It goes without saying that the study's primary objective was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of economic policy and draw the relevant conclusions.

IV. THE PARTY'S POSITION REGARDING THE RESULTS AND SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF THE REFORM. THE PARTY AGAINST THE ECONOMISTS

1. Conclusions of the Eighth Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia

The eighth meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, in its final session on January 23, 1967, held in Belgrade, addressed issues related to reform. Based on the introductory report and subsequent discussions, the "Conclusions" were drafted, reflecting the position of the Yugoslav communist leadership regarding the results and subsequent progress of the reform. The "Conclusions" also serve as directives for the Ninth Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia.

The main report was delivered by Roman Albreht, who devoted the first and most important part to criticizing economists. The "Conclusions" also contain a severe critique of economists. This undoubtedly refers to the study by the Zagreb Economic Institute, "Current Problems of Economic Courses..." Albreht presents the analysis and influence of economists in these terms:

"Many doubts, discussions, and critical observations were provoked in public opinion by the theses of certain economists who, under the guise of a critical analysis of the progress of reform, tried to characterize self-management, because of its social essence, as an obstacle to an efficient and rational economy, to artificially contrast the market character of production with self-management and the humanization of social relations, and to contrast economic science with economic policy."

Albreht then criticizes the economists, among whom are many communists, and also Vjesnik, who reproduced extensive passages from his study and several commentaries.

"The divergences that currently exist between the assessments of certain economists and the assessment held by the Central Committee, the Federal Assembly, and other political and parliamentary bodies give rise, more or less, to these suggestions: 'Give us, According to economists, the possibility of fixing things and solving all problems without any difficulty exists.

There is only one condition: society and all its members must obey us. In recent months, we have heard and read such suggestions. Above all, certain economists completely disregard two important facts.

The first fact is that politics is also a defined science, based on scientific knowledge; the second fact is that scientific knowledge concerning social relations cannot be applied by decree, but rather the struggle for its application is an extremely complex social operation.En esos esfuerzos el papel decisivo lo desempeña el conocimiento y el sentido por las relaciones sociales, por las tendencias que ocultan, por las fuerzas que llevan al progreso, etc.

"Precisely for this reason, two fundamental problems, or rather two suggestions, were raised in the discussions. First, it would be necessary to appreciate with greater political awareness the moment in which certain attitudes are adopted, as well as the publicity that accompanies them. What does it mean, for example, when a work on reform is published in which the author concludes that its essential components differ from the knowledge and actions of economic policy?

And this occurs at a time when all creative social forces, down to the last worker, are engaged in carrying out the reform, and when such a work is given wide publicity in a widely circulated newspaper. It is worth considering the political value of that decision. Second, communist economists, just like scientists, professors, publicists, etc., must invariably be required to demonstrate a certain political sense of responsibility with respect to the times in which we live."

This criticism, and threat against economists, was expressed more sharply in the "Conclusions" of the eighth meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia on 24/11/1967. That fragment reads:

"The Communist League will, as always, base its policy and practice on the results of progressive social thought and scientific research. From now on, it will also fight with the vigor of scientific truth, arguments, and experiences acquired in self-management against attempts to impose, under the pretext of science, the conservative, bureaucratic-statist conception of the development of society.

Such attempts are also manifested in contrasting self-management with an efficient and rational economy, the market character of production with self-government and the humanization of social relations, and economic sciences with economic policy. The Communist League expects its members and other progressive scientific workers to wage an intense ideological struggle against these and similar tendencies, starting from the positions of the further development of self-management."

This condemnation and threat is all the more characteristic because it also refers to several communists who, as scientists and specialists, clashed with the Party and, in fact, disobey it. Science and conscience clashed with partisan totalitarianism, which resorts to the vocabulary of force and policing, recognizing science only when it serves its interests with submission.

Some 50 contributors and authors of the study entitled "The Current Problems of the Economic Courses and Economic Policy of Yugoslavia" are now listed in the index, as were last year's signatories of the Declaration on the Position and Designation of the Croatian Literary Language. The conflict between the hierarchy and bureaucrats of the Communist Party and intellectuals and scientists is widening and deepening. The schism within the Party is profound, and the opposition ranks among Croatian communists have grown considerably stronger.

The question now is, what program does the Party offer to overcome the economic crisis? The aforementioned "Conclusions" should constitute the new program for economic reform. However, we will search in vain for concrete measures within them to eliminate the well-known difficulties in all economic sectors. These "Conclusions" are overflowing with trite phrases about "the further progress of self-management," about "a higher form of socio-economic relations," about "the rational organization of socialist labor," etc., without offering any concrete solutions. Despite addressing income distribution, investment policy, the banking system, unemployment, balance of payments difficulties, and the crisis in foreign trade, etc., all they manage to offer are used and generalized phrases.

Reading this document without knowing the real situation, one might think that these are minor and temporary difficulties in the economic process in Yugoslavia.

The Party's "Conclusions" fail to even hint at a serious economic crisis manifested in the decline in industrial production, the passive growth of the balance of payments, the terrifying unemployment, the drop in the standard of living, the failure of investment policy and self-management, etc. Are communist leaders living in a fantasy world, or do they believe that difficulties will be solved by a miracle or some magical force? "The American miracle," which for years helped resolve serious economic crises, has disappeared from the horizon, and force alone cannot solve fundamental political and economic problems for long.

The Party took the clearest stance in its "Conclusions" against the economists' analysis and proposals. But this position undermines reason, the scientific method, and progress. It is the attitude of nihilists and tyrants. It is the language of the UDBA (secret police).

2. Tito and Bakaric on the Future Course of Reform

Tito referred several times to the successes and tasks of reform. For example, at the so-called 20th Jubilee Conference of the Zagreb branch of the Communist League of Croatia, he spoke at length about reform on March 20, 1968.

Tito spoke of "remarkable successes of reform," but added that nevertheless, "certain qualitative and essential reform objectives" had to be achieved, among which, first and foremost, was the reconstruction and modernization of the economy.

He acknowledged the lack of necessary resources, which had to be drawn from domestic resources and "foreign loans." He listed what needed to be achieved, such as improving the balance of payments and creating new jobs for some "40,000-60,000 skilled workers and other young, qualified technicians."

He repeated other hackneyed phrases, but glossed over the failure to decentralize investments as the central problem of the reform, the reduction in industrial production, and the insufficient growth of social product and national income. Nor did this speech contain concrete measures to resolve the serious economic crisis.

But he used condemnatory language against intellectuals and economic specialists. In suppressing these tendencies, Tito was much clearer than in the measures he would take regarding the reform. Here we reproduce his condemnation of economists (Vjesnik, 21/3/1968):

"In developing our concepts and carrying out social and economic reform, as well as in our struggle for creative development, we must clearly differentiate ourselves from our ideological adversaries, who are few in number and who, in bad faith, exploit our difficulties and weaknesses to attack the democratic course and direction of self-management in the social process. They sow confusion and doubt, and are objectively and sometimes subjectively allied with bureaucratism and reactionary social forces.

A consistent and decisive struggle for the realization of the democratic socialist course and self-management in the development of our society presupposes and requires a frank and direct ideological and political struggle against all tendencies and currents that seek to hinder our development and obstruct the path of the creative efforts of the working people. We will not allow monopolies of various groups to become entrenched and repeated in any sector of social life, not even in science and culture."

Small groups that operate outside the structures of self-management and democratic institutions, but against the policies of the Communist League. The repression of such attempts and the unmasking of their true nature constitute an important condition for the renewed impetus of scientific, cultural, and artistic creation.”

At the same conference, Bakaric also spoke extensively about reform. In his long presentation, the most interesting point was the proposal not to dwell on the first phase of reform but to focus attention on the question: “What should we do, and how, for the next stage?” It is very easy to overlook serious problems after the first stage has failed. Bakaric did not offer a new and concrete proposal but paraphrased well-worn phrases and wishes. But these wishes did not materialize, and the economic situation worsened.

On this basis, reform cannot continue. Furthermore, trust among communists in their own Party was broken. Tito admitted this in his speech of March 20, 1968, calling it a major obstacle to the progress of reform. The leaders live detached from the rank and file and the working class. Tito said: "Separated from the workers, they do not see the true meaning of self-management, democracy, distribution according to performance, and socialist relations."

The Party is incapable of solving the economic problems, and moreover, today, the necessary material conditions for a successful continuation of the reform are lacking.

V. AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE REFORM, A NEW POLITICAL SOLUTION IS NECESSARY

The reform, in its two and a half years of implementation, failed in its main objectives. Self-management, growth in national income and living standards, modernization of the economy, increased industrial production, activation of the balance of payments and integration of the Yugoslav economy into the international market, and the convertibility of the dinar all yielded negative results.

The conditions for achieving these objectives have worsened. As the Communist Party and the central authorities in Belgrade persist in their policies, the predetermined goals will not be achieved in the future under the same conditions. Therefore, the reform can be considered a failure, and Yugoslavia is facing a new and serious economic crisis.

And it is not just about the economic crisis. The economic reform pursued major political objectives, as it is an unavoidable consequence of the crisis of the social and state order in Yugoslavia. The current economic crisis is only one stage in the political process. Therefore, the solution must be sought first and foremost in the political arena, returning to the root causes of these difficulties. A sine qua non for resolving the fundamental problems lies in the consistent elimination of centralism and the establishment of autonomy in the "republics" and free decision-making in the economy.

To achieve this, it is necessary to implement a democratic system with freedom of political organization and action, which implies the abolition of the Communist League's monopoly, already worn out and incapable of sustaining, even by force, the intolerable political and economic situation. This calls into question the entire state organization and raises the issue of national self-determination.

The leaders of the Party and the State are confronted with these problems, which condition the solution to the economic problems. In the preparations for the Ninth Congress, the Party leaders do not address the crux of the economic problems, and as for the Party, they do not address them.

Behind the scenes, rumors circulate of an imminent state reorganization on a "confederal" basis. Nor could that solution substantially improve the situation if the problems are not addressed frankly and directly. Maintaining the political monopoly of the Communist League and preventing the establishment of a democratic system and fundamental political freedoms would not even allow the "confederation" to overcome the difficulties.

The solution to all the problems afflicting Yugoslavia must be sought and awaited from the very strength of the peoples involved. External intervention is unlikely today. In recent years, Tito has been striving to strengthen his ties with the Soviet Union.

Internal difficulties played a significant role in the pro-Soviet orientation on the external front, as Tito hoped to consolidate his domestic position with Soviet support. However, the new course indicates that Tito will not be able to count on Soviet intervention should internal conflicts arise. This is evidenced not only by the events in Czechoslovakia but also by the very recent shift in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

The Kremlin's position regarding Bulgarian relations concerning Macedonia does not favor Belgrade's interests. While this does not mean that the Soviet Union supports Sofia's aspirations to incorporate Vardar and the Aegean Macedonia, it is clear that Moscow does not consider the Macedonian question definitively settled. Would the unification of Macedonia into a single state with Soviet assistance facilitate Moscow's access to the Mediterranean?

Furthermore, the stance taken by the Yugoslav delegation at the "Conference of Progressive Parties of the Mediterranean Countries," held in Rome, demonstrated that Yugoslavia now opposes the presence in the Mediterranean not only of the US Sixth Fleet but also of the Soviet fleet. Consequently, there are deeper divergences between Soviet and Yugoslav policy. In the Arab-Israeli War, and until recently in this respect, Belgrade and Moscow were in agreement.

Brugg, Switzerland, April 24, 1968.

ZDRAVKO DUCMELIC - REALITY AND PAINTING

ADOLFO RUÍZ DÍAZ

For many people, engaging with painting is resolved and exhausted in a tireless process of classification. A painting, a painter, are pretexts for extracting a label from their mind and attaching it, without further ado, with a kind of magical trust, to the name and the work. Once the affiliation is established, they can move on to something else. The rest doesn't matter. These simplifications no longer outrage me.

Rather, I admire the tenacity of those who tirelessly attend exhibitions and museums for years and years to reiterate such a tedious operation. I leave the reflection on this behavior to psychologists and sociologists for now. The pages I am writing now do not authorize me to undertake inquiries of this magnitude. Everything I have said so far has a much more concrete purpose.

I believe, indeed, without malice aforethought and to establish a starting point, that for professional marker painters, Ducmelic's painting—and especially that reproduced in this volume—must be extremely unsettling.

Ducmelic paints with a calm disregard for established conventions. His disdain is neither a denunciation nor a deliberate act of dissent. It is a fact. He is not concerned with placing himself outside of groups or movements, schools or sects. He does not profess insularity or anarchy.

Precisely for this reason, his work offers us a wealth of resonances that can only be grasped, understood, valued, accepted, or rejected from what it itself expresses, and always in strict terms of painting. Contrary to what rhetoric advises, I have risked anticipating the most arduous and the most important aspects.

But, in the end, it is better this way. In the last twenty-five years, painting, with varying degrees of decisiveness, has sought commitments of diverse kinds. Partly as a reaction against the exaggerations of a supposedly pure painting that prevailed in the first decades of the century. Partly, and this is very close to the former, as a way of reaching a much wider and more diverse audience than that of times we call happy, forgetting their catastrophes and exalting our own.

The list of motivations could be expanded. It's unnecessary. The result is that painting today tends to seek its justifications outside of itself. Contrary to the prevailing trend, Ducmelic's work, the direction that guides the evolution of this work and, to emphasize, with unequivocal precision, his latest paintings, is based on the conviction that painting has its own irreducible language.

Through this language, it can capture the most varied impulses and take part in the merciless uncertainty we live in. What his painting denies, without postulating any doctrinal will in this denial, is that what a painter says must be found in his painting and from the problems that his painting poses.

This pictorial self-sufficiency was, of course, not achieved from the outset. One of the points we must address with the greatest care is the aforementioned evolution of Ducmelic's work and, in particular, how this artistic biography should be understood. Let it be clear from the outset that any necessary foray, due to the demands of language, into other fields presupposes its origin in painting and its ultimate return and fullness of meaning within it.

A painting of uncommon communicative power leads one to consider the temptations and seductions of lyricism. An inherited superstition, from which the average viewer has not yet fully freed themselves, leads them to immediately identify what the painting says with an outpouring of emotional states that they attribute to the painter and that the painter puts into the work. Once again, Ducmelic's painting refutes this kind of preconceived notion.

Ducmelic's painting, just as it does not accept being a vehicle for ideologies or passions dictated from outside it, prior to it in the surroundings and professed without reference to painting, also does not yield to placing itself under the dictates of a psychological interiority taken as a stimulus and exhibition, as a soul that paints itself so that others may understand and share it.

Ducmelic's painting must be understood as a work of art, as a realization produced by a vision or a technique, and not as content that has sought its form. When a viewer recognizes in Ducmelic's painting an irreplaceable experience of themselves, this revelation does not come from emotionally perceiving the illustration of a mood or even a temperament they consider their own.

The communication that Ducmelic establishes lies in the fact that, thanks to the painting, the viewer participates in an organization that the painting, and only the painting, could offer. Ducmelic's painting only secondarily and dispensably touches upon what the scholastic and romantic aesthetics of the last century, with undeniable candor, called the expressive plane.

It is, on the contrary, a consistent, meticulously crafted attempt, achieved through technical lucidity, at cosmic painting. Instead of seeking and flattering what we already were before experiencing it, the painting imposes upon us a world of carefully calculated patterns. The old opposition between intelligence and sensitivity, between spontaneity and disciplined foresight, is abolished. To recall Paul Valéry, Ducmelic's painting does not evoke, through imitation, emotions already existing in anyone's daily life.

It aspires to produce emotions without a model, emotions that the painting itself evokes and sustains through its very presence. In short, a world that includes us in its affirmation and that, to be grasped, compels us to enter into norms different from those governing our habitual behavior. Often splendidly sensory, rich in concrete suggestions, these displays must pass through our intellect to reveal themselves to us.

* * *

My first encounter with Ducmelic and his work dates back to 1953. We were two newcomers to Mendoza and knew absolutely nothing about each other. No one bothered with the formality of introducing us. He was painting, and for quite some time we barely exchanged the words necessary to maintain the comfort of silence. Later, while he was drying his brushes, we started a conversation about aspects of his craft that concerned us both.

Since then, I have closely followed the progress of his work and have written a few things about it. I have been able to share in some of the difficult moments that make up the destiny of a painter who truly wants to be one. The important thing is that a friendship began in painting and has endured without being harmed by the inevitable intrusion of our daily lives. Anything else I could add now belongs to biography and confidences.

I do want to mention, however, that we have had some very good times together. He is a man who knows how to listen and how to converse. He likes books, and one of the ways to approach them is to peek into his library. We often listen to music together, and more than once hours have passed without us noticing, repeating a liturgical choir, a song from his homeland, or a Mozart quartet on the record player.

We will never know for sure whether the path to a work of art is an inquisition of the unprecedented or the ever-renewed, fought-for, and deepened rescue of what was our initial truth, a truth that the passage of time conceals, distorts, perverts, and annihilates. This question is crucial when dealing with Ducmelic.

His painting is not only essentially cultured but would be inexplicable without recognizing the passage of history within it. Ducmelic comes from a land of inexhaustible crossroads and painful borders. The history of his land is a tangle of many stories that combine and tear each other apart, clash and destroy each other, strengthen and rejuvenate themselves. Croatia is one of the most intense homelands imaginable.

All these conflicts are present in Ducmelic's paintings without the slightest anecdotal concession. They stand out with a kind of forcefulness that suppresses chronology to lend them a nobility that evokes for me at times an epic distance and at others the geographyless premonitions of dreams born in the most luminous and terrible moments of wakefulness. Ducmelic has extracted from his native Croatia a version that includes us all.

Not the slightest hint of documentary detail, nor the slightest picturesque triviality. He has preserved neither faces nor names. This Croatia is inseparable from the paintings that the reader now has at hand and which have not lost the best of their splendor in the reproductions. Although the reader does not know which land is present in the painting, which is created within it, they will recognize the taste of battles, the rhythmic march of work and days, the sea as ineffable as childhood and always renewing its origins. There is the ultimate solitude of the victor and the ultimate solitude of the vanquished.

The human figures that assert themselves amidst stony landscapes and ancient geometries are not utopian beings, ephemeral characters. They are pictorial metaphors of destruction, striving to reach existing fullness. So powerful is the overcoming of isolable contingencies that this world Ducmelic constructs seems to come to us from a future that will emerge when time ceases.

The homeland of memory is found in painting, deciphered in the horror and hope of a planet that awaits us, whose laws we ignore, and yet is evident in its mysterious advent and perhaps stands erect before our windows if we dared to open them.

But all this would be worthless if the protagonist of the painting were not painting itself. We must erase any literary influence from what I have said and turn as quickly as possible to the paintings. Because the cosmic order that Ducmelic evokes is expressed without the slightest symbolic carelessness, without the slightest flattery of the well-known vulgarizations of various esotericisms that circulate on the street.

Ducmelic's painting, his profound version of the roots of his homeland, is constructed from the most precise vision and elaboration. In particular, it does not rest on a play of figurations, but rather, and this is crucial, these are expressed from the material itself and through an arduous exploration of it.

It is now clearer why it seemed essential to me to point out from the outset, at the risk of being outspoken, the self-sufficient nature of his painting and the violence involved in delving into it with the inadequate instruments that are words. It is now clear, I hope, the gravity of noting the absence of doctrinal intentions, in the broadest sense, in this painting, which, in its veracity, contradicts any eloquent transposition and deviates from any program.

Throughout history, aesthetic reflection has pointed to a fundamental dialectic whose gravity is only apparent when the process of artistic creation is examined without the interference of vain theories. The terms of this dialectic are, to use Latin terms, art and nature. On one hand, there are the artist's gifts, those capacities that no acquisition can replace in their absence.

On the other, there is what can be acquired and whose possession requires diligent practice, discipline. "Art" in this sense is distinguished from mere skill acquired through repeated experience in that it includes, as an essential ingredient, knowledge, a clarity given not by mere operation but by intelligent reflection. What distinguishes "art" or technique, then, is not so much the aptitude for producing something specific, but rather the certainty in the knowledge of what one wants to do and the reason for each of the steps to reach that result.

According to this conception, often called classical and already formulated with remarkable rigor by Aristotle, "art" is above all intelligent production. It is, distinctively, a form of knowledge, a high mode of understanding organized into a transmissible body of concepts. And here the aforementioned dialectic arises.

Both ingredients, nature or the pool of capacities, require the participation of art for their realization. But all acquireable knowledge remains a mere external fiction of art when it is not implanted in a suitable nature, when its acquisition is not prompted by a mandate from that nature which seeks to be realized.

The moment when the artistic process is exaggerated, and one goes so far as to claim that mere aptitude is sufficient for the creation of a work, is immediately recognized as having the other element: the knowledge acquired through reflective practice throughout the artist's life, which is just as necessary as talent.

Conversely, when one attempts to reduce a work of art to a mere result of "art" itself, to the exercise of a technique acquired without personal and inalienable gifts, the reference to that capacity inherent in each individual arises with equal necessity. Its absence renders works more or less skillful, more or less valuable in themselves, but irremediably outside the realm of aesthetics.

I wanted to revisit these inevitably somewhat academic questions to highlight a point that the apparent centuries-long familiarity with these ideas tends to overlook. It is worth emphasizing because Ducmelic's work raises and presents it with a dangerously admirable acuity.

The classical conception of technique, in its most fruitful sense, shows that while there is a dialectic between personal aptitudes and acquired technique, the latter is not an addition to one's personal essence, something like an instrument added to what one already possesses and which is truly our own. Because technique is acquired, in turn, thanks to an aptitude, a capacity, or a talent that no technique can replace.

Among all the aptitudes that make up an artist's personality, technical aptitude stands out, so uniquely theirs, so personal, so spontaneous, and as irreplaceable as the others. The opposition between technique and spontaneity arises when technique is misunderstood. This oft-repeated opposition results when technique is not technique at all, but mere craft.

Craft is the deviant exercise of technique, the mechanical trivialization of art deprived of its deep integration into the artist's personality. If a more vivid formulation is preferred, craft, when given the leading role, is the manipulation of means without connection to real problems. It is lifeless art. The true drama of the dialectic we have recalled lies, then, in the fact that throughout an artist's life, each of his actions is threatened by falsification.

As soon as the problems that drive his painting, and that involve and set in motion the entirety of that man who wants to be the artist, disappear, he will fall into a falsification not only of his works but of himself. He will not only produce works of art that are apparent and essentially fraudulent, but he himself will be tainted by fraud as a man—his life will no longer be truly his own. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that the artist risks his life in one of his works.

The question Ducmelic poses is that of the painter endowed with extraordinary technical aptitude, practiced tirelessly and honed by an apprenticeship in the best tradition. Each of his paintings carries a maximum risk. Today, to survive, the painter must confront the ruthless demands of a world driven by mass production. The path to success is overwhelmingly open today due to the sheer number of works an artist can release onto the market.

The inescapable question posed to us by a painter like Ducmelic, through the weight of his constant labor, boils down to a struggle between the ease of a technique capable of countless feats and a vocation that knows, with both pain and joy, that each painting is either a problem that admits no stratagems or a mere artifact to be sold and hung on walls.

More than once, witnessing his prolific output, I have feared for Ducmelic's fate. I have resolved not to indulge in biographical confidences and will not dwell on the moments of anguish I have glimpsed throughout our fifteen-year friendship. His work alone, from the finished painting to the most cursory sketch, is enough to answer these questions.

Ducmelic has known how to overcome temptations. In Ducmelic's work, mastery of the craft never stifles the painting's original problem. What has been said so far has attempted to place this authenticity in its true dramatic weight. By examining his entire body of work, it becomes clear—and this will become increasingly evident in the future—that each stage Ducmelic has traversed leads to the next with unwavering integrity.

When one of the phases suggested he could stoop to mere production, when the craft was self-sufficient, Ducmelic has not hesitated to suspend the task and seek the purification of a new path or, even more admirably, has suspended the practice of painting altogether to immerse himself in the search for problems. It is often noted how much Ducmelic has painted.

I wanted to remind you now that this work includes pauses he has imposed upon himself. If I admire him for what he has painted, I admire him no less for his courage to stop painting when he believed his art demanded it.

From a very early age, Ducmelic possessed the tools to engage in the seductive deceptions of virtuosity. From the simplest sketch to the most elaborately crafted work, skillful generosity and unsuffered happiness lay in wait, ready to pay the price of bribery. Ducmelic has learned to master his talents, and this is also due to his willingness to accept them.

The cult of false spontaneity, so highly valued today, is undoubtedly one of the most insidious ways of feigning authenticity. Fearing that their dedication to a craft beyond their aptitudes will be noticed, more than one artist resorts to simulating problems, working against the limits of their abilities or nature. This distortion of talent is done to feign a tension that is merely, at best, psychological, not artistic. It's like a baritone trying to convey sincerity in his singing by singing like a soprano.

Ducmelic has known how to accept his limitations. To give just one example, he has not shied away from that quality of vigor manifested without panting, which is elegance. Both in the strokes of a muscular fluidity capable of the most delicate precision without imposing any geometric patterns, and in the sensory beauty of color, Ducmelic has faced the reproach of the falsely violent. Well-cut clothing is no less virile than the self-serving displays of the false prophet's rags. A soft voice is no less powerful than shouting. Ducmelic has fulfilled himself and will continue to do so through the virtues that destiny has bestowed upon him.

It is customary when speaking of a painter to delineate the stages of his career. I confess that, in general, I don't find this procedure appealing. Not so much because of its clarifying or illustrative intent, but because its foundations tend to remain too blurred. Its main flaw lies in presenting as defined and definable situations what can only be understood in light of a prior and more decisive dynamic project or sign than the supposed stages.

Only from this total project do the divisions lose their awkward character of segments, revealing what is, in reality, a unified march toward a goal that the artist seeks in order to be himself. To put it better, the key to this process is biographical rather than strictly aesthetic. Be that as it may, given the preceding pages, I see no impediment to outlining periods or phases in Ducmelic's work. I have already attempted to elucidate what I understand by his way of conceiving painting and how he has dedicated his life to it. What follows must be read with obligatory reference to this context, and even then, without considering it beyond what expository convenience allows.

* * *

WHEN DUCMELIC ARRIVES IN ARGENTINA, 1949, he has left behind the hesitations of a novice. He is what is usually called a fully formed painter: he has begun to express his own voice, and his painting is now oriented toward the personal appropriation of the techniques he has learned. These techniques have undergone the inevitable assessment that heralds the first steps toward the complete responsibility for one's own path. His apprenticeship has been intense and enriching. He has seen much.

He has forever overcome the formidable disproportion between what is known through information and what is truly experienced. This learning process unfolded during one of the most brutal periods in history. Ducmelic belongs to a European generation that had to define its personal life in years when simply maintaining physical life seemed beyond human strength. It was an era we tend to forget too easily due to its horror, a time when everyone, near or far from the catastrophes, felt everything they believed to be safest and dearest crumbling before their eyes.

His paintings from his early years in Argentina unequivocally bear the scars of these ordeals, but also an intense conviction that he survived them thanks to his faith in painting. It's not a matter of making pronouncements. But for men like Ducmelic, painting was a salvation, an accentuation of vitality when almost everything spoke of death.

These paintings from his early years in Argentina favor a muted, though not muted, palette. The passages are clear. The evident, yet measured, expressionist inclination is balanced by an architectural poise where the material acquires decisive importance. What will always be one of Ducmelic's defining characteristics is already emerging: the affirmation of the order of corporeality understood through movement.

His brushstrokes obey memory with agile firmness. Ducmelic already possesses, like the Renaissance painters, what André Lhote considered indispensable for pictorial invention. He only needs to refer to the model as a corrective guide, and very infrequently at that. He has arrived at an understanding of bodies as organized entities and can allow himself a wide range of transpositions without violating what constitutes a human figure, a horse, a tree, or a rock.

Ducmelic invents his figures and approximates them to their perceptible or analyzable structure to the precise point where expressionism could become naturalism and, if it continues down this path, decided and tedious naturalism. An expressionism respectful of reality in its intimate presence in each of its manifestations. Expressionism stops when the forms could be transformed into symbols or gestures of the painter's situation rather than a universal order that gravitates in each component.

We find in a concrete solution what I anticipated at the beginning when I described Ducmelic as a cosmic painter. But precisely because it is interpreted as an omnipresent totality, the order itself and all that comprises it eliminates any inclination to adhere to the immediate data of everyday vision. Ducmelic is already directing his painting towards what will be a precise affirmation in the paintings that the reader finds in this magazine.

If realism is understood as the acceptance of an order that transcends us and that we are not entitled to modify according to our whims, Ducmelic exhibits in this period the well-articulated announcement of a realist vocation. But understanding it in this way implies precisely a methodical suppression of naturalism, in the first instance, and, more importantly, a correction of expressionism as an autonomous end in itself.

Seen from today's perspective, Ducmelic's paintings from the period we are discussing respond to a decidedly classical spirit. Imagination and reason work in harmony so that the work is an order that, as such, does not passively reflect what ordinary perception offers. But in the construction of this order, the beings and things that the painting proposes maintain, in relation to the painted world, a lucid necessity of the same kind that the painter recognizes and reveres in the total order or universe.

Hence, the order of the painting, being strictly pictorial, is integrated with the universal order and, as a work of the intellect, is a step or effort toward understanding it. When I say this, I insist, it is in this first stage more an intention than an achievement, more a gesture toward the future than an unbroken possession. But this caveat underscores rather than weakens what makes Ducmelic, around 1950, a defined painter. The project that guides all his painting is already underway, and before any delimitation into stages, it allows us to recognize it.

In the establishment of this order, the function of matter stands out. Or rather, the often obsessive search for a transfiguration of materials to translate a kind of insoluble mystery in the fabric that sustains things and beings. The unification of the painting in this stage comes more from this materiality than from spatial composition or chromatic harmonies.

These are reduced to a minimum to give greater prominence to a combination of thicknesses, densities, roughness, and friction. The painted material is handled with a frankly inquisitive and even reckless intention. The opacities of watercolor are incorporated into the oil paint. This, in turn, enriches, complicates, and diversifies the support in successive layers.

Thus, Ducmelic often separates the various strata with glued-on papers to obtain a surface of disconcerting appearance. However, this arduous process of elaboration, this grinding away of the normal possibilities of the pigments, does not constitute an ultimate goal. There is no doubt that such heterodoxies fulfilled a purifying role. They are the elimination of the last traces of formal schooling, which, for their definitive understanding, are put to the test, denied, and challenged.

But in any case, the painting is not reduced to subjecting materials to a trance: at least until now, it was not possible to predict that Ducmelic would depart from a vision in favor of the elaboration of objects. Even in his paintings, I don't know what Ducmelic would think of them today, where the first impression leads one to wonder how they were made, where the process takes center stage and through it seems to exhibit a result that calls for further manipulations. What remains is the predominantly visual order, the decidedly formal quality that sustains them.

Ducmelic, by way of contradiction, corroborates the intelligent, not sensual, accent of his work in this adventure of sensuality that surfaces quite frequently and even obsesses him at times during his Argentine period. Order and materialization, studio adventure, and a final prudence that, they say, watches over the temporal sense of the painting. On the one hand, literally, Ducmelic accepts that the painting is as ephemeral, as destructible as the world that has just emerged from a stage set on destruction.

On the other hand, this mixture of materials has something of the rummaging through ruins to salvage something from the rubble that allows us to continue living and, going a step further, to ask whether all this destruction doesn't reveal a profound force untouched by human folly and capable of saving us. If we consider the themes, while an image of subtle flattery occasionally appears—a woman's face, an airy undulation of fabrics, a touch of clouds or grass—these paintings, so dense in their palpable nature, are imbued with an irreducible ambiguity.

As works, as acts, as painting itself, they affirm a hope in the task and, from that hope, a confidence in an order that the painting itself constructs in harmony with what exists. But these decisions ultimately fail to overcome a tension of the opposite kind. The act of painting, the painting itself, the order that the painting recognizes and manifests, are at once covertly a kind of threat, an insinuation that the passage from forged illusion to undeniable reality depends either on the gratuitousness of our own choices or perhaps on a gift that at most can be glimpsed but which, barely questioned, eludes us.

One might thus conjecture whether Ducmelic's painting in this stage does not live from a more religious than aesthetic root, whether the realism that a pictorial analysis authorized us to attribute to him does not rather consist of a diffuse anguish before the sacred.

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Among the possibilities of this first stage, one could discern, without violence, perhaps more clearly in the tempera paintings than in the oils, the non-figurative style that would dominate Ducmelic's work between 1958 and 1965. During this period, Ducmelic made his mark in a movement that, in multiple variations, permeated all of painting. The exploration of techniques unfolds in a splendor of surfaces and textures, brought, without loss of vigor, to luminous refinements.

Tensions are attenuated, and an undeniable joy grows in the handling of color and space. Freedom and rigor, work and play are reconciled in a production that, compared to the previous stage, relaxes into the careful precision of a celebration. As is inevitable, I do not hesitate to affirm that, setting aside any judgment, the paintings in this stage of Ducmelic's work are those that moved me the most. I continue to believe that this marks the decisive entry into the maturity of his work.

The non-figurative vision does not negate the organized materialization of the previous years. Ducmelic enlisted in the reflective wing of this movement and, once again, did not succumb to the improvisations, whims, and mischief that often distorted it. Moreover, it is worth noting that Ducmelic never stopped creating figurative works. Both approaches, in the inner workings of their process and even in their results, not only unfolded without opposition but complemented each other. Perhaps it could be argued that more than one non-figurative painting is a version of another in which the problem arose from the figure.

A sumptuous quality of beautiful objects. Ducmelic shifts his palette, handling tone-on-tone with particular pleasure in the cool tones. He articulates trellises and nets with a renewed grace that sometimes evokes music, often the tapestries of his homeland, or also vegetal and aquatic allusions. There is a rediscovery of memories, a way of expressing things we liked long ago without representing them, showing them in the subtle shifts of a color or a pattern, in an unusual light that pierces the greens and blues.

The studio never rests. The procedures vary in successive trials. Particularly successful is the use of printing inks in glazes over an oil base and the application of materials like gesso, diluted to vary the supports. But the dominant impression, in contrast to the previous stage, is the triumph of the translucent and transparent over the thick, somber, and opaque. Without weakening its principles, the order of the painting accepts and cultivates a luminous vision, countering the previous preference for emphasizing the impenetrable and earthly.

There was talk of a slide toward the decorative. Nothing could be truer, provided we remove the foolish disdain still attached to the term among us. Decoration, of course, because the painting is constructed with a view to a habitable environment: a house, a room where hours of our lives are spent.

Decorative, because the painting also aspires to be valued as one thing among things and accepts, when necessary, passing almost unnoticed, as an ingredient in the order that surrounds us and surrounds it. Unnoticed, but not gratuitous or dispensable. Its suppression would jeopardize the entire system in which it functions and which it perhaps elegantly governs.

Only great painting can alternately assume the roles of protagonist or a voice in the chorus. Its quality is evident in the fact that the chorus must be worthy of it. I ask those who diminish decoration in favor of a supposedly greater painting whether they don't risk becoming too isolated and depopulating the finest traditions of painting.

Around this time, rather toward the end of his non-figurative period, Ducmelic produced corporeal constructions. He tended, it seems to me, to take them somewhat lightly. Aside from the fact that I like them very much, I would like to dispel this confusion of grace with frivolity or insignificance. Far from being a mere interlude or diversion, these inventions, somewhere between sculptural and architectural, are indispensable for deciphering one of the most problematic periods in Ducmelic's career.

Ducmelic did not hesitate to work on these constructions with all the knowledge that his painting had taught him. The apparent surrender to playfulness, and even the playful elements they possess, do not detract from their essential character in the development of the painter's entire oeuvre, nor do they diminish their value as rigorous investigations.

Ducmelic, as in Pop Art, requisitions the components from his surroundings. He rummages through old trunks of disused objects, rescuing pieces of metal and wood. He forges, nails, turns, and experiments with patinas. He works his constructions until he removes all traces of stockpiles or assemblages of haphazardly collected materials. He does not succumb, as the dominant version of Pop Art often does, to deliberate bad taste, to the aggressive and anti-artistic.

In their cordiality as potential toys, they know how to maintain their distance. To touch them, yes. But according to a delicate and precise ritual. “Sometimes,” I wrote on the occasion of an exhibition, “they admit… physical movement and make change an organized duration… Much more could be said about these works. One could ask, for example, if we are not facing one of the most arduous mutations of our time: the conquest of operations that are no longer sculpture or painting and have ceased to be hesitant accumulations tainted by chance, mere things among things.”

Ducmelic’s corporeal inventions have arisen, it seems to me, from the incitement to view from multiple angles that his non-figurative period develops. They are a consequence of the rupture of “classical” composition, closed in on itself and founded on the mathematical authority of its organizing centers. The “classical” requirement that the viewer adopt the single point of view that the painting postulates is called into question by a painting that does not represent anything explicitly related to daily experience.

The viewer no longer has a first reference or point of reference in their memory. The painting confronts the viewer, forcing them to invent a way of perceiving it, imposing upon them the responsibility for a behaviour that, at least initially, the painting does not communicate. In short, the space of the non-representational painting appears to us as a rupture with the usual or ordinary space, on the one hand, and with what until now was considered pictorial space, on the other.

By not alluding in any way to things we already know, the space of non-figuration consists of an impossibility of interacting with it according to our habits. Or, more precisely, this impossibility stems from the fact that it functions more like a thing than an image.

That the painting represented nothing was equivalent to breaking with something more serious than tastes or aesthetic convictions. What non-figuration demanded was embracing the risks of new behavioral patterns that might allow us to re-enter the aesthetic field and decide whether that space was or was not a painting, whether or not it had value as a work of art. More than not knowing how to look at the painting, what enveloped the average viewer was the bewilderment of not knowing what to do with something that contradicted the usual appearance of painting: its explicitly imaginary nature. The characteristic of non-figurative space is that, to arrive at what it unfolds as an image, it is essential to first grasp its initial manifestation as a thing.

The painter himself is not exempt from these bewilderments. The spaces he creates also seem to suggest themselves to him as things; an artistic possibility emerges in them, at the very end of the creative process, that contradicts the imaginary nature. It is a call that articulates, with greater or lesser force, the fragmentation of the image in order to attempt its undisguised corporeal materialization.

What began as a painting now problematically aspires to be sculpture. The invented space, from its intimacy, reveals its potential place among things, and the painter faces the dilemma of either ceasing to be a painter, stifling a perhaps honest realization of the space he has invented, or, on the contrary, accepting the challenge, engaging in physical work and venturing into sculpture, or something that must be called that to avoid complicating the ambiguous situation into which painting has pushed him.

Ducmelic's inventions are an attempt to escape painting from the summarily outlined situation. They are his response to the final problems posed by his non-figurative painting, and, interpreting the process from its subsequent implications, a new pictorial solution achieved from outside painting in the established terms.

The constructions thus fulfilled a cathartic function. As for the informalist period, they signify its effective exhaustion. They are the conscious exploitation of the last possibility that this order presented to him. But, in light of the entire process, they are one of the factors—in my opinion, the most important—that drive the return to figuration, his third and, so far, final stage. The most evident aspect of this stage will be, moreover, a yearning for volume, a frank embodiment of the gaze, a construction of images that do not hesitate to manifest themselves to us with frank tactile illusionism.

The reproductions published here respond to an inspiration seemingly closer to the first stage than to the second. There is no objection to accepting this initial impression, provided a couple of caveats are made. For starters, it would be an oversimplification to consider it a stage in the same sense as the previous ones. What we already have is certainly enough to understand, in its broad strokes, what to expect regarding its meaning in relation to the past, to the process already completed.

But let us not forget that it is an open stage. We can still judge it in its actual state for the simple reason that Ducmelic still seems to have much to say about it. This affinity with the first stage should not be confused with repetition or regret. Any resemblance to the past is supported by other experiences, justified by problems that, in their precise context, were foreign to the first stage. Any return to the past must be understood from new perspectives.

The technique, to begin with, is different. I don't know of many comparable examples today of such perfectly controlled craftsmanship, so meticulously crafted and subject to a specific style. It is a space that, starting from primarily smaller formats, unfolds pictorially in profound expanses of unsettling magnificence. Ducmelic embraces, without hesitation and even with a touch of audacity, a style of painting with a museum-like feel.

He achieves a resolutely smooth painting, employing glazes and varnishes to arrive, through successive transparencies, at a surface of vitreous consistency, a total suppression of the external manifestations of matter in favor of an inner depth where the interplay of values even ventures into refined and unsettling illusionism.

Master of itself, the painting does not shy away from incorporating elements not long ago considered decidedly corrupting. It does not fear indulging in what, not many years ago, would have been unequivocally dismissed as literary or would have been rehabilitated with the label of surrealist. The solution lies once again in the impeccable balance with which these ingredients are placed under the dictates of an order of unimpeachable pictorial authenticity.

Just as in its first stage Expressionism was restrained by respect for the consistency of things, and these assumed their painted existence in correlation with an accepted order of the universe, now Ducmelic seeks to include in this order a world built with rigorous vertigo, where the very resemblance of what we see increases its independence from the common manifestation of beings and things. It is a hallucinatory and hallucinatory world achieved through the exasperation of intelligence.

The very illusionism that sometimes reaches the delightful and unsettling procedures of trompe l'oeil does not seek deception but the purest exaltation of painting and the pictorial; an illusionism that, strictly speaking, does not intend to make us believe the painted entities are real, but, on the contrary, to confer upon them their own reality, an energy analogous to the entities to which we are accustomed, but which only exist by virtue of the powers of the painting, and from these powers grants us access to the possibility of other existences.

The realism attributed to the first stage rises to a more complex version. A pictorial world where, indeed, the human condition is present in its entirety, but an integrity that attends less to what already is than to what is possible, less to what already exists than to what could be if humanity were to wholeheartedly commit to developing all the potentialities of an intelligence that imposes its own demands in order to assimilate them into indefinite variations. A realism that coincides in its aspirations with Borges's unveiled combinatorics. A real world like that of Ray Bradbury's stories.

The craft no longer questions itself. It operates within a technique, acknowledging the necessity of a style. The earth tones, the iron oxides, compose a foundation of execution and support that, in the final display of the painting, have lost all heaviness without betraying the density required by the transparencies. The values are diversified in modeling and modulation. The brownish tones tend to resolve into golden reflections, a seething glow or incandescence.

The non-figurative phase shines in certain blues, in the dazzling or bloody touch of reds that, from mysterious perspectives or peering into the massive architectural or mineral foregrounds, converge in a luminous simultaneity, a clarity that springs from the bodies and from them imposes itself on the contours.

Every serious work compels us to re-examine our ideas, our judgments, and our prejudices. Ducmelic's work, devoid of novel stridency, questions the future of painting.

Nothing is easier than getting by with a death certificate. It doesn't commit us much and allows us to greet with jubilation, when the time comes, any resurrection, true or fictitious, sincere or self-serving. But funerals leave us with the question hanging over us. It is more honest to ask ourselves what in painting justifies or encourages such necrophilia and how we have arrived at positions that propose the destruction of art as a solution.

The trajectory of Ducmelic's painting offers us, in foreshortening and vivid abbreviation, what remains today of a tradition that begins in the Renaissance. Ducmelic shows us—and this is the clearest part of his lesson—that the procedures that have been practiced over the last three centuries have not become obsolete.

His final period explores what can still be said without severing ties with the past, without professing a kind of Adamism or historical anarchy. But he also teaches us that the system in which these procedures functioned is no longer entirely our own. His current paintings exhibit with unexpected clarity that what no longer serves as the foundation of painting is the pursuit of knowledge that propelled it as an illusion back in the 15th century, which charted its course for the next two centuries and which, already burdened with reservations and upheavals, with new, still-blurred illusions and short-term disappointments, was still sufficient to underpin a conception of painting that was not only shared by Cézanne but, as we now clearly see, extended to the Cubists.

What has been happening, and what is undeniable now at the end of the last century, is that painting, as an approach to deciphering reality, has become anachronistic in relation to the profound changes our surroundings have undergone. While in the mid-17th century the reality sought by painting still coincided with what philosophy and science understood as reality, today both positions seem to have lost all valid connection.

The connection, at best, constitutes a problem that each painter, with no support other than their own strength—a task that is more about clairvoyance than research—must confront. Among the glimpses of a solution offered is non-figuration: a disregard for existing things in order to construct things without a model or, with even greater audacity, to let the materials articulate themselves, restricting the artist's technique to following the indications of their materials.

Another attempt at connection is found in Op Art. It programmatically sets aside expression or lyricism to place painting under the tutelage of what is scientifically known about perception and thus proposes works that, with scientific technique, serve as matrices or models for applications on a massive scale.

The work that emerges from Op Art is, consequently, more akin to a device, or rather, to the plans of that device, than to a painting in the sense in which Vermeer or Braque painted it. The unique individuality of the painting, its unrepeatable condition, is abolished. We could examine other responses or glimpses. We could, for example, elaborate on the confusion that reigns today between automatisms translated into painting and what could be considered a technique.

There's no need to dwell on the common denominator of this crisis, which is painting itself. The fracture between knowledge through artistic intuition and knowledge through scientific inquiry means, quite simply, that the idea of beauty as a foolish interpretation of reality as a harmonious and intuitive construction, as a closed or conclusive harmony, is unattainable to us.

Does this mean that what science tells us about reality will suffice, that it will be enough to live without needing to turn to art as another anchor, as an indispensable interpretation for continuing to live in a more authentic way than that of mere consumers in an era obsessed with production rather than the product? Will art's destiny be to remain among the many tranquilizers or stimulants that our era produces?

Let's not take anything for granted. Let us not attribute certainties even to the most terrifying threat. Because if there is one thing the average person is beginning to realize, it is that one cannot live on science and technology alone. The various kinds of rebellions erupting everywhere spring from this increasingly unyielding conviction.

The astonishing race of technologically advanced and technologically evolving science aggravates rather than alleviates the situation we are experiencing. Not because of knowledge and its applications themselves, but because we have misunderstood them for what they truly are and what they can, by their own inherent imperative, provide us.

Modern science, very different from that which arose with the Renaissance, rests, in turn, as a human endeavor, on the most dangerous fragility. The admirable precision it accumulates daily underscores that for science to exist, it must have foundations that science cannot give us, nor can it give itself. A kind of clockwork mechanism resting on a thin film that guarantees no defense against the absorption of the abysses it covers.

Will the destiny of painting be a multiplying industrial superficiality for the empty hours of men incapable of illusions, who delude themselves into thinking they can live without them? Doesn't painting offer the possibility of diving into the abyss and, from its depths, revealing the truth to us with the grandeur of a prophecy? I hear these questions as I look again at Ducmelic's paintings.

Whoever reads this now, return to the paintings as soon as possible. They are the ones that hold the word, free from the dangers of mere phraseology. No, it doesn't matter if we are wrong. Disagreements don't matter. In Ducmelic's painting, there is something he has tried to express, driven by the conviction that painting must emancipate itself from the written word and venture into the sea in which we all founder. The metaphor of travel is unavoidable. Will we be able to reach the shores where new cities were or will be built?

I summon lines, bodies, colors. An archaic adolescent beside the legendary horse invites me into the silences where painting speaks its truth. In a second, my life flashes before my eyes, along with what I may yet have to live, and, forgetting myself, my inexplicable joys seem near. Ducmelic brings me the painting. Heraclitus crosses my memory: "The advancing fire will judge and condemn all." The blaze engulfs my admirations, my reasoning, my skepticism, my knowledge, my questions. The paintings are there. Let us look at the paintings.

Mendoza, 1968.

THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN OF THE ANCIENT CROATIAN CHURCHES IN DALMATIA

MARKO JAPUNDZIC

With the great barbarian invasions of the 4th and 5th centuries, Roman Pannonia and Dalmatia changed their appearance. At the end of the 5th and beginning of the 6th centuries, along with the Avar invasion, came the great masses of Slavs, subjugated by the former, and almost simultaneously or slightly later, seven Croatian tribes of Alan-Iranian origin arrived with the Goths as their allies.

These latter, driven by the Huns, first occupied the Carpathian region, then around 455 they were in Lower Moesia, and after being subdued by Theodoric's Ostrogoths (479), they took part, as their allies, in Theodoric's incursions into Italy, remaining as border troops in the already subjugated Roman province of Dalmatia.

It is worth noting a historical fact: in Europe (perhaps in the entire world) there is no people of pure race; rather, all peoples are a mixture of diverse lineages and often of diverse races. It suffices to recall that the modern Italian people are the result of the mixture of Etruscans, Romans, Goths, Lombards, and other Romance, Germanic, and Slavic elements. The same is true of the Croatian nation, which is a mixture of Alan-Iranian, Gothic, and Slavic elements with remnants of Romanized Illyrians and other Mediterranean populations.

The Croats of Iranian origin brought certain features of Persian architecture and other distinctive characteristics, which we will discuss later.[97]

It is very likely that the Croats of Alan-Iranian origin had already been baptized under the Goths and were Arian, as attested by the medieval historian Thomas Archdeacon of Spalato,[98] and only in their new homeland did they embrace Catholicism along with the Slavs, who were baptized by Roman missionaries, as the Croatian historian Šegvić believes.[99]

In contrast, the historian Sakac maintains that the Croats were baptized only after their arrival in Dalmatia.

Be that as it may, this is not directly relevant to our discussion. The truth is that Pope John IV, a Dalmatian (640-642), sent his legates to Dalmatia to recover the relics of the holy martyrs of Salonica and Dalmatia. A little later, the Croats made a pact with Pope Saint Agatho (678-681), promising not to attack Italy, and Saint Agatho, in turn, pledged the protection of the Holy See to the Croats.

The fact is that by this time the Croats were already Catholic Christians, and from this period they began to build churches in a style quite distinct from the Romanesque style they had already encountered in Dalmatia.

I. THE ORIGINAL FORMS OF THE CHURCHES

The ancient Croatian churches are built with very simple materials, that is, with unhewn stone, and are very interesting because of the diverse types of architectural plans.

There are longitudinal and circular plans. All old Croatian churches have vaulted roofs. These vaults can be of various types: semi-cylindrical, dome, semi-dome, and cruciform. The apse varies in shape and size: circular, square, or circular on the inside and square on the outside.

The dome is enclosed within a square, or a round or octagonal drum.

We are only interested here in churches with a circular plan, since only these have that peculiar shape considered an original Croatian characteristic. This characteristic consists of their construction, as Croatian architects say, in a "trefoil," "tetrafoil," and "hexafoil" plan (figs. 1, 2, 4, 6, 8), with a conical dome (the so-called "eemer," which we will discuss later), and if the church has a square pediment, the transition from the square shape to the dome is made with squinch-like finials.

Here are some examples of old Croatian churches with a trefoil plan:

San Donato, on the island of Krk (Veglia), is a small church with a trefoil plan (fig. 1). The central space, or apse (pedritto), is square (3.80 x 4.50 m); two niches covered with semi-domes are added to the side walls; the sanctuary has a niche enclosed within a square and covered by a semi-dome.

The entrance space is square and covered by a cylindrical vault. The central space, or apse (piedritto), supports a conical dome that has all the characteristics of the so-called Croatian "cemeri," that is: base, ring, and conical point. The transition from the square shape to the dome is achieved by means of squinch-shaped finials (pennacchi a tromba). This small church was built at the end of the 7th or beginning of the 8th century [100].

Another example of a trefoil church is the 9th-century Church of St. Chrysogonus on the island of Krk, near Glavotok (figs. 2 and 3). The central section, or upright post [piedritto], is cylindrical or round. Three niches covered by semi-domes rest on this rotunda, and the entrance space is square, covered by a cylindrical vault.

The dimensions of this church are rather small. The central diameter is 5 m, and that of the niches is 2.50 m. Between the niches are four pilasters supporting the "cemer" arches (Gurten in German). At the point where the arches converge, a closed square with a coffered ceiling is formed.

The central section is covered by a dome that has the same characteristics as the "cemer": base, ring, and conical point.

At first glance, it appears to be a central structure typical of Byzantine art, but this is not the case. This church, and even more so that of San Donato (fig. 1), has a central axis typical of basilica churches, and is characterized by its entrance space, which is neither a vestibule, nor an atrium, nor the circular area of Byzantine churches.[101]

The church of San Nicola near Nin (Nona) (figs. 4 and 5) has a tetrafoliate plan. This church, both in its dimensions and its form, is very similar to that of San Chrysogonus on the island of Krk, seen previously. The only difference lies in the entrance space, which is square from the outside, and inside ends with a niche covered by a semi-dome, which, together with three other niches, forms the so-called tetrafoliate shape.

Furthermore, on the exterior, a crenellated cornice was built over the central section during the Turkish wars, as the church, due to its strategic position, served as a military observation tower. The construction dates from the 9th-10th centuries.[102]

Another church with a tetrafoliate plan is that of Santa Cruz de Nin (Nona). It is precisely this church that has given rise to a large number of treatises and discussions about a possible original Croatian type (fig. 6).

This small church was built by Prince Godeslaus in the 8th century, as can be read on the architrave of the portal, and served as the chapel of the prince's palace, which was almost entirely destroyed during the Turkish wars. Only this church remained. It is built partly on top of a pre-Roman structure, and therefore has a crooked wall.

The fundamental plan is that of a cross. The two side aisles, almost the same length (9.20 m) and width (9.00 m), intersect with the central nave, and where they intersect they form a pier [piedritto] that creates a drum enclosing the conical dome. The transition from the square to the cylindrical form is achieved by means of squinch-shaped finials [103].

The Church of the Holy Cross is not a Greek cross, as has often been thought, but rather, from an architectural point of view, a true tetrafoil; that is, the four semi-domes are arranged around a central dome. Only these semi-domes are enclosed within the square, and thus, externally, the church has the shape of a cross [104]. The Church of the Holy Trinity near Split (Spalato), which dates back to the 10th century (fig. 8) [105], is also hexafoliate in shape.

The central part is shaped like a rotunda and is surrounded by six niches lower than the central rotunda, which once enclosed a dome, now lost. Three niches serve as apses for the altars, while three others opposite have an entrance door.

II. SOME THEORIES ON THE ORIGIN OF ANCIENT CROATIAN CHURCHES

As a Croatian archaeologist notes, some scholars, such as Etelberger, Freeman, Jackson, Hauser, Gelcich, and initially Jelic himself in his "Guide to Split," saw in these churches an influence of Byzantine art, while Croatian scholars observed a distinct Dalmatian-Croatian style [106].

According to Rivoira, the type of cruciform church with a squinch-shaped dome was introduced by Lombard masters (magistri comancini) in 1007 at the baptistery of Galliano, and from there this style spread to Dalmatia in the 11th century [107].

Similarly, Monneret de Villard, who believed that Dalmatian masters owed everything to Lombard architects, without much reflection, places all Dalmatian buildings featuring squinch plumes in the 11th century, since prior to this period they were also unknown to the Italian architects who were the masters of those Dalmatians.

Monneret de Villard also sees the baptistery of Galliano (c. 1007) as the prototype of these churches and concludes that Lombard masters, under the influence of Byzantine-style buildings, created a special Lombard style characterized by the dome with squinch plumes, and that this style penetrated Dalmatia from Lombardy.[108]

Frey supports another theory, the so-called "parallel theory." According to him, Dalmatian architecture is nothing more than an imitation of buildings that are highly developed in style and construction, but with a primitive technique.

In Byzantium, buildings were constructed with regularly shaped bricks, which allowed for the use of hanging or spherical plumes. In Armenia and later in Dalmatia, they built with stone, leaving only the squinch plume as a possible type of dome.

The squinch plume and the conical dome are of Eastern origin. Since in Dalmatia after the 8th century one can no longer speak of Eastern influence, the only conclusion (according to Frey) is that this phenomenon is purely local, due to the only material available for construction.[109]

Karaman also reaches the same conclusion, but from a different perspective. According to Karaman, the same type of construction can be found in various parts of the world when circumstances demand it. What a master of antiquity could do, or what a master in East Asia has done, a master in Europe could equally do if identical circumstances and needs had arisen. Therefore, Karaman asks: Why should the art of constructing such forms have developed only in one part of the world and from there spread to other regions? [110]

The Serbian archaeologist Vasic opposes Jelic's opinion regarding an autonomous type, and Karaman and Frey's opinion regarding certain parallel phenomena.

Vasic's theory, contrary to Jelic's opinion on the Church of Santa Cruz in Nin, is based not on the church's characteristics, but on an imaginary plan. He sees in the Santa Cruz plan neither a Greek cross, as Jelic saw it, nor a tetrafoil, as Karaman maintains, but a church with three naves.

As evidence for his theory, he cites the 6th-century Church of Saint Catherine in Pula, which—according to him—would have had three naves, each with its own apse, and the central one with a dome. [111] Vasic finds the prototype for this type of church in France, for example, in the 11th-century church of Saint Jean de Verges.

According to Vasic's theory, certain churches are flanked by two chapels, which replace the transept, each with its own apse. The church of Saint Jean would belong to the same type as that of Sainte-Croix de Nin, with the difference that Saint Jean lacks a dome.[112]

The reason for placing the chapels alongside a central building would be due to structural considerations; that is, the pressure of the dome and the vaulted ceiling must be supported by the walls, and it is precisely for this purpose that the side chapels were added.

Yet another phenomenon exists. Many basilicas were formed by combining several pre-existing buildings into a single structure. This phenomenon is very common in Asia Minor, where various chapels and churches were built around a "martyrion," later united into a single temple.

For this reason, Vasic concludes: the Eastern-type church penetrated France; from there, in the time of Charlemagne, it passed to Istria and through Istria to Dalmatia.[113]

III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED OPINIONS

Before issuing a critical judgment on the aforementioned opinions, let us take a look at similar types of churches from the 5th to the 9th centuries in neighboring lands. The Italian architect Cattaneo, in his work "L'architettura in Italia dal sec. VI al mille in circa," presents some examples in Italy.

San Esteban alla Rotonda in Rome, from 468-482, has a circular plan. Cattaneo says that this church is of Latin-Barbarian art [114].

San Satiro in Milan, from the year 879, has a square plan with three apses. The octagonal dome and the upper part are from the 14th century [115].

The plan and the elevated part of the baptistery of Biella is a square upon which rise four semi-domed niches. The central square is defined by four arcades, which support a second series of very singular forms, giving the external impression of an octagon with equal sides [116].

To all that has been said we can add yet another example, which Diehl mentions, namely: the church of San Marco in Rosano. A square divided by four pillars that form a Greek cross. The central part and the four side walls support a dome. The three apses are all located on one side [117].

In France: this number [of churches] could include the church of St. Germain des Prés, which is a square divided by two transverse naves forming a Greek cross, each ending in an apse.

Likewise, Charlemagne's church in Aachen: Aix-la-Chapelle. A round church in whose interior eight pilasters frame an octagon, and between the pilasters eight chapels or spaces.[118]

And now let us return to examine the various opinions of the writers cited above.

Monneret de Villard—who, in essence, adopts Rovoira's opinion, and therefore the latter's criticism also applies to the former—knows neither Krk nor Dioclea. He does not accept that the plan of Santa Croce was made under the influence of Asian Minor styles, as Jelic maintains, and arbitrarily concludes that all Dalmatian buildings are the work of Lombard masters who were influenced by neighboring Byzantine constructions.

It is evident that Monneret is unfamiliar with contemporary scholars (Strzygowski, Diehl) and, moreover, to prove his thesis he alters the chronology.[119]

Starting from his point of view, that is, that Dalmatian masters owe everything to Lombard masters, without much examination, he places the Dalmatian buildings, which have trumpet plumes, in the 11th century, since they were previously unknown even to the supposed Lombards.

However, trumpet plumes are already found in the corridors of San Donato in Zadar (Zara), which all writers, including Monneret de Villard himself, place around the year 805.[120]

The foregoing applies even more readily to the church of Saint Catherine in Pula, which already has a dome with a squinch-shaped finial and dates from the 6th century, therefore four centuries before this type of dome appeared in Lombardy.

Because of the central form, the dome, and the vaulted roof, it was often thought that Dalmatian buildings had been influenced by Byzantine architecture, and this was all the more true since Dalmatia had been under Byzantine rule for some centuries. (The "Dalmatian theme," which included islands and some cities, with brief intervals, from the fall of Thessaloniki until the 11th century)[121].

Since the characteristics of the Byzantine type are now well understood, this opinion has also been discarded.

The basilica form with a dome (Hagia Sophia in Thessaloniki), churches with a Greek cross plan (Nea of Basil I), churches with a dome supported by an octagon (Daphni), and churches with a trioonca sanctuary belong to the Byzantine type. However, this same style is completely unknown in Dalmatia and in ancient Croatian architecture.[122]

Santa Croce, considered by many to be a Greek cross, is not actually one. Santa Croce is a tetrafoil, that is, it has four semi-domes arranged in series around the central dome, but enclosed within a square wall, and externally the church is cruciform.[123]

With the foregoing, we have undoubtedly answered Vasic. One cannot even speak of a three-aisled union, and moreover, a simple glance at the church reveals that it comprises two buildings which, viewed from the outside, form a cross, while from the inside they form a tetrafoil (fig. 6).

Vasić, with his method of reconstructing things, has clearly demonstrated that he was pursuing an aim that is by no means the discovery of truth.

If we wish to know with certainty the origin of these churches, it will be necessary to examine all possibilities.

In the opinion of the renowned Polish archaeologist J. Strzygowski, a great expert on Oriental architecture, Aachen Cathedral itself is a mixture of various types, primarily Hellenistic and Coptic; therefore, it cannot be the original French type.[124] Consequently, this type did not necessarily influence the Dalmatian forms, but rather could have arrived directly in Dalmatia from the East.

But since the 8th century, there have been no direct political or cultural relations between the Far East. And in Dalmatia, it will be necessary to exclude a direct influence from the East.

As for Byzantium, its political influence was intense and direct during certain periods, but it was not reflected in architecture.

Jelic, writing about Santa Croce in Nin, says that until the decline of the 9th century, neither Byzantine-type nor Alpine-type buildings used the conical dome placed on the "pendulum plumes." No example of this type is found during the 6th and 7th centuries on the opposite shore of the Adriatic, and therefore there is no need to look for it.[125]

The consequence, according to Jelic, is that it will be necessary to look elsewhere for such an example, and in fact he finds it in Persia, albeit indirectly.

As we have already mentioned, the ancient Croats-Alans arrived from Persia and, passing through present-day Poland, along with the Goths and Lombards, settled in Poland and Roman Dalmatia. Together with the original inhabitants and the Slavs, who arrived almost simultaneously, they formed a new nation, bringing with them their own type of small buildings called "cemer."

The oldest "cemer" evidently served as tombs, but later for other uses, most frequently as shepherds' huts.

"Cemer" are stone buildings, rather small in size, although some larger ones exist. They are generally round, and rarely square. The bases are wide and gradually taper to a conical point. On the exterior, the transition from base to point is indicated by several rings (fig. 10).

The material is always rough, overlapping stone, without mortar, and yet these buildings are very dry because they do not allow rainwater to penetrate. The doorway is usually so low that one cannot enter without stooping. Clearly, they were not used as living quarters.

Each "cemer" has three essential parts: the base, the ring, and the conical point.

This method of building construction appears to have originated in Chaldea. Not only was the palace of Sarbistán built with ellipsoid domes using small pieces of material, but each dome is clearly divided into three parts: the base, the ring, and the conical point. Because the building material was not mortared but simply layered, each arch necessarily ended in a point.

The nuraghi in Sardinia are built using the same system, but are conical in shape and lack rings. They are larger and served as dwellings, temples, or fortifications.

They are also similar to the talayots of the Balearic Islands and the specchie of southern Italy.

Although similar in construction, they differ in form, and perhaps share the same origin in Italy and Spain, where they entered through Africa, while in Dalmatia they arrived directly from the East.

The buildings of ancient Greece in Nicaea and elsewhere, known as tholos tombs, are built in the same way, but with well-worked stones of considerably larger dimensions.

Regarding the Dalmatian "temer," they come in various forms: rectangular with a pointed vault; square with an ellipsoid dome; and round with an ellipsoid dome.

The churches of San Donato on the island of Krk and Santa Cruz in Nin are built with a square plan and a conical dome. With a round floor plan and the same dome, the churches of St. Chrysogonus on the island of Krk, St. Nicholas in Nin, and others share this style.

This type of construction lasted from the 7th to the 11th centuries. With the disappearance of the Croatian national dynasty and the arrival of numerous foreign Benedictines, the basilica type was introduced.[126]

Alongside this type of construction, which the Croats imported from their ancient homeland, we must not forget the monuments they found there.

Since this type of church is found especially in the territory between Šibenik and Split, we cannot fail to mention the majestic palace of Diocletian with its mausoleum and temple, which, according to Strzygowski, was built by the same masters responsible for the almost identical imperial palace of Antioch. The same author states verbatim: “Those times are long gone when, in Diocletian’s palace in Split, one saw a degeneration of classical art, an outpouring of a daring whim, and for this reason it was regarded in the history of art with cold indifference; and the fact, full of significance, is recognized that in Split, for the first time in Europe, one finds in architecture that informing principle which led to the development of Romanesque art, so that today we ask ourselves with increasing insistence where Diocletian drew the artists who worked animated by that spirit” [127].

The German F. Schneider opines that Diocletian’s palace was built under the influence of Greek art, or that it was the work of the same masters who erected for the emperor Diocletian his new residence in Nicomedia on the Propontis [128].

Strzygowski opposes this thesis, and after a careful examination of the eastern monuments in Mesopotamia and Egypt, and excluding other hypotheses, he arrives at this conclusion: "...the settlement of Philippopolis (modern-day Sehehba), built by Philip Arabus (244-249): a quadrangular walled enclosure with streets and colonnades radiating from the four gates and converging at a central courtyard. Furthermore, there is a marked analogy with Split: the fourth street intersects the long axis of an adjacent building at the intersection, in front of which, to the left of the colonnade, in a square, stands the Philippeon, a monument to the imperial family" [129].

However, this similarity does not lead to the conclusion that one monument, stylistically speaking, is directly dependent on another, since both palaces could be based on a third structure, namely, that of Antioch.

Anyone who has read Libanius's description (Libanius, or. XI) of the palace at Antioch may well be convinced that the palace in Split bears a striking resemblance to it. This is why Strzygowski concludes: "Not a little of what is called Romanesque, and which, according to inherited scholastic opinion, is traced back to Rome, has its origin here, in this corner of Syria and Asia Minor."

Split, more than other cities, deserves to be one of the first stages of Oriental art in its journey to the West, and does not belong, as our honoree's namesake (Shneider) had admitted, to the realm of Roman representations; in this palace, the Greek spirit is not at the service of a Roman idea, for although what surprises us, almost imposingly, on the shores of the Adriatic, are the forms that originated from the union of Greece with the East, Rome has no say in the matter.[130]

CONCLUSION

FINALLY, based on everything discussed, we can draw some practical conclusions. The square form, with its characteristic conical dome placed on squinch-shaped plumes, is undoubtedly the same square "cemer" but better developed; the same must be said regarding the round form. Ivekovic shares this opinion.[131]

Regarding the niches, instead of considering them, as Strzygowski does, as influenced by the type of ancient Slavic pagan temples, whose forms are rather uncertain, it would be better to see them as a felicitous combination of the ancient octagonal forms found on the site—that is, like Diocletian's Mausoleum with its more or less defined niches, and the Temple of Jupiter with the "cemer" forms that were a distinctive feature of Croatian architecture. In this latter case as well, the forms of the ancient Croatian churches should be considered an original Croatian type, because this form, too, is a novel combination, not a mere imitation.

Strzygowski shares this view, for, speaking of the originality of Croatian art, he states: "...I have tried to compare the emergence of the Croatians in the figurative arts with the origins of ancient Greek art." This, as well as Croatian art before 1102—before the Hellenistic period of Alexander transformed into the new direct art—had its own development over several centuries, belonging to the North and not to the "ancient" (ancient art).

We miss one of the most important points of contention regarding the shared Balkan soil if we take a superficial view of ancient Croatian art and believe that the South Slavs derived their primary art from the Mediterranean, while importing it from the North" [132].

Rome.

COMMENTS AND NOTES

EXPLOSION OF ALBANIAN DISCONTENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija want to join Albania

The discontent of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia is not recent. It was widespread in pre-war Yugoslavia and, despite some improvements, it still simmers in present-day Yugoslavia. The cause of this discontent dates back to the founding of the state of Albania (November 28, 1912) as a result of the 1913 London Conference that ended the Balkan Wars.

After the occupation of much of Albanian territory by Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, and following the defeat of Turkey, the Albanians, along with the Macedonians, became the primary victims of Serbian expansionism, which annexed Kosovo and Metohija. In this way, with the help of Russia and France, Serbia emerged victorious in the Balkan Wars against the Ottoman Empire.

But the acute Serbian-Albanian conflict arose from the end of the Russo-Turkish War with the Peace of San Stefano in 1878, which awarded territories to the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro at the expense of the Albanians. The unification of Albanians into a single state has been the national problem for over 50 years; it is desired by Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija as well as in Tirana, first during the Kingdom of Serbia, then in Yugoslavia, and now in communist Yugoslavia.

Today, the Albanian position is much stronger than before the war for two reasons: 1) The official recognition of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, their limited autonomy within the framework of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and a degree of power have strengthened them to such a degree that they publicly and in an organized manner rise up against Serbian rule and, in recent times, even demand their incorporation into the motherland of Albania; 2) Because of Albania's territorial claims against Yugoslavia, no major power will come to Belgrade's aid.

Instead, Albania has at least the moral support, for now, of Communist China, which, through Albania, is trying to counter Soviet power in the Mediterranean and southeastern Europe, weakening and eroding the state of the "heretic" Tito. Precisely because of this Chinese support, Albanian demands to incorporate Kosovo and Metohija take on great significance. In this way, Albania and Communist China are leading Tito into a dead end.

From the Yugoslav perspective, Albanians who live in territorial contiguity and in almost compact groups with their motherland are considered a minority and, according to the official Yugoslav terminology, a "nationality."

According to the official Yugoslav population census of 1961, 915,000 Albanians lived there, representing 4.9% of the total population. Consequently, today this figure hovers around one million, while Albanian circles believe that the Yugoslav statistical data is low, that is to say, deliberately falsified.

Albania, according to UN data[133], had around 1,900,000 inhabitants in 1965, so its current population can be estimated at around two million. Discounting minorities in Albania, the total number of Albanians can be estimated at around three million, who live in a fairly compact manner within their national territory, unnaturally bisected by the Yugoslav state border.

Given that a third of Albanians live separated from their homeland, this division constitutes a serious national problem, not merely an ethnic minority issue as Yugoslavia interprets it.

The Tito-Hodza conflict, despite its ideological facade, fundamentally stems from the national question and the natural aspirations of Albanians for unification. Hence the persistent attacks on Tito. The Albanian opposition does not differ from that of Enver Hodza, the communist ruler of Albania, on fundamental national demands.

The Hodza regime's long campaign against Yugoslavia was suspended only due to the occupation of Bohemia and Slovakia, when Tirana also feared a Soviet military invasion. But this campaign soon resumed, once the Albanian leadership believed the Soviet threat had passed and because China had promised political and military support in the event of Soviet aggression. For the same reason, the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija are extremely active. For them, the brief truce brought about by international events was undesirable.

Albanian "nihilistic nationalism" and Serbian "imperialist and unitarist nationalism" in Kosovo and Metohija

The gravity of the Serbian-Albanian conflict is clearly reflected in the speech given by Veli Deva on November 14, 1968, in Pristina at the 10th regional conference of the Communist League of Yugoslavia for Kosovo and Metohija. Veli Deva was the chairman of the Communist League's provincial committee and, therefore, the official spokesperson for the "Yugoslav solution" to the Albanian problem. Deva characterizes Albanian nationalism in the following terms:

"Certain members of the Albanian nationality exhibit a nihilistic nationalism and blame the current situation, even the objective difficulties, on the socialist system and regime, primarily on the leaders who, supposedly, are not waging a consistent struggle for national equality... On the other hand, among members of the Serbian nationality, there is a nationalism with imperialist and unitarist characteristics. They do not acknowledge the urgency of solving so many problems to ensure more complete equality between Albanians and Turks.

Not long ago, regarding the national assertion of these minorities, which they considered a threat to the position and rights of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples, this nationalism also attacked the Communist League of Yugoslavia for supposedly granting too many rights to Albanians and Turks" [134]. In interstate relations, the demands of the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija for independence and the Albanian-Serbian conflict are reflected, according to Veli Deva, in a dangerous way, namely: "...Certain tasks for the communists of Kosovo and Metohija stem from the fact that these relations, as they are, should not exist between two neighbors bound by many factors. Taking into account common interests,"

Deva stated, "our country, its state and political leaders have done and are doing everything within their power not only to normalize Yugoslav-Albanian relations but to promote them for mutual benefit. The suspension of anti-Yugoslav propaganda in Albanian news outlets in the first months after the occupation of Czechoslovakia was welcomed in this province and throughout the country. This was considered proof of the Albanian government's goodwill to improve relations with Yugoslavia."

"But," Deva continued, "it is necessary to say that we are disappointed to notice in recent weeks new attacks and slander against our socio-economic and political system and against our foreign policy, against state and political leaders and especially against Comrade Tito. Making good relations between neighbors impossible and straining them in no way benefits peace and cooperation in the Balkans, and above all, it does not benefit either countries or their people in the short or long term.”

Albanian Demonstrations

Therefore, it is not surprising that on November 27, 1968, on the eve of the Albanian national holiday and the anniversary of the uprising against the Turks under the leadership of the Albanian national hero Skenderbeg, demonstrations were organized in Pristina and three other locations in Kosovo and Metohija—Urosevac, Gnjilan, and Podujevo—against Serbian dominance and the regime.

The speakers at these demonstrations, composed mostly of students and the younger generation, called, under Albanian flags, for the proclamation of Kosovo Metohija as a republic and its equality with the other republics that made up communist Yugoslavia. Integration into Albania was even demanded.[135] In Pristina, the demonstrators cheered Enver Hodža, protested against Veli Deva and smashed the windows of almost all businesses with Serbian inscriptions. The same correspondent reports that the offices of the Serbian newspaper Jedinstvo were demolished, along with other buildings.

The National Zeitung correspondent notes that in recent months there have been smaller demonstrations and anti-Serb slogans plastered on walls. "Numerous Serbs holding high-ranking positions in the administration, companies, and organizations of Kosmet, often disproportionately, requested transfers due to the increasingly tense situation and feeling insecure."

The Serbs had to make concessions, abolishing the current official name Skipetares (Siptami) and replacing it with Albanians. Furthermore, the Albanians apparently won the right to fly their national flag, previously prohibited, on national holidays alongside the Yugoslav flag. Regarding the use of the Albanian flag Buchelí writes: "But this concession already provoked clashes with the police: Albanian nationalists raised the Albanian flag — red background with the black eagle of the Albanian mountains — on their houses not only on national holidays but for weeks at a time and even carried it at wedding celebrations."

On the afternoon of November 27, 1968, Veli Deva, on behalf of the Communist Party of Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija), denounced the demonstrators as a group of hardened enemies of Yugoslavia serving foreign interests, and announced a relentless struggle against all chauvinists who wanted to subvert the socialist system and destroy the "unity and fraternity" of the peoples of Kosmet. That same evening, the provincial executive council, that is, the provincial government within the framework of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, also condemned "the targeted demonstrations" aimed against "socialism, self-management, and the constitutional order of Yugoslavia."

The provincial government characterized the demonstrations as a hostile, organized, and synchronized action. Another statement from the provincial government said that public service agents in Pristina were "forced to use force," that "10 agents and 4 men were injured, and one demonstrator lost his life," with approximately 40 people injured. In the following days, protests rained down, orchestrated by various Albanian organizations in Kosovo and Metohija. The protests and rallies of political, labor, and youth organizations, along with numerous telegrams and scathing statements, were intended to prove that the demonstrators were not Albanians but rather a handful of desperate individuals incited by others.

We have seen that the Albanian national question is of paramount importance for the survival of Yugoslavia, since Tirana demands the partition of the Yugoslav state into its constituent parts. The Albanian demonstrations of November 27, 1968, were a momentary reflection of the deep discontent among the population of that region. This was how the foreign press and Western political circles interpreted it.

Given the severe regime of the secret police (UDBA), it was not easy to produce posters, flyers, leaflets, issue statements, or deliver public speeches in four major cities of the Albanian minority without the full support and spontaneous participation of the inhabitants. A major wave is moving that could cause political upheavals and earthquakes in Yugoslavia.

Activation of Sino-Albanian policy against the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

The Albanian national demonstrations took place during the visit of a large Chinese military delegation to Albania, giving them great international significance.

Surely the Chinese military delegation's arrival from Beijing during the Albanian national holiday was not a coincidence, as it emboldened the demonstrators from Kosovo and Metohija. The Chinese military delegation was headed by Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff, accompanied by the Vice Commander of the Chinese Air and Naval Forces, as well as several prominent party officials.

Their demonstration visit was undoubtedly intended to warn the Soviets against aggression against Albania, but it also signified support and backing for Tirana in its conflict with Yugoslavia. The celebration of the Albanian national holiday, in the company of the distinguished Chinese guests, lasted a full week. Bearing in mind the aid promised to Tirana by Mao Zedong, Head of State Lin Biao, and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in their congratulatory telegram, Albanian politicians were able to act decisively against the Soviet Union. Western circles speculate that secret agreements regarding Chinese military aid were signed between Beijing and Tirana.

Albanian Prime Minister Shehu announced substantial Chinese economic aid in the form of industrial plants and loans.[136] It is estimated that the Chinese will build naval bases and rocket platforms in Albania. In this way, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union, communist China would appear as a third power in the Mediterranean. Of course, on a modest military scale for now.

If we add to this the fact that during the Chinese delegation's visit, Shehu had declared that Albania wished to maintain diplomatic relations with all states, regardless of their political system, and that at the same time, Communist China expressed its desire to improve its relations with Washington, then we can expect that Tito and Moscow will not have as many opportunities to maneuver in the field of international politics. Moscow had already reacted angrily to the Chinese declaration, and Tito remained very reserved regarding Chinese activity through Albania, as reflected in his press conference in Jajce on November 30, 1969.

Tito underestimates the vital interests and demands of the Albanian people

It is interesting to observe how Tito judges the demonstrations and demands of the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija. When questioned by the correspondent of the Belgrade newspaper Politika, Tito responded by downplaying the Albanians' demands. He sees his problem in this way:

"Regarding the events in Kosovo and Metohija, I think it's being over-dramatized and it's not as some imagine. We knew there were reactionary elements there who, in the past, especially during the war, gave us a lot to do. The enemy still exists there, and on the other hand, there is foreign interference. Therefore, it's a group that incited some students and young people who were breaking shop windows, which also happens in the West and in almost every country.

There are few countries that haven't registered similar cases. Why dramatize it now? It was proven that the leaders in Kosovo, made up mostly of Albanians and, naturally, Serbs and Montenegrins, managed to put an end to the incidents. Not by force, but by explaining to the people what was happening. Today, the population repudiates that approach.

There were demonstrations in which the people said they would not allow certain individuals to hinder their internal development, even if it meant the destruction of the Unity and fraternity in the territory of the autonomous province. Kosovo and Metohija have made great progress in recent years thanks to the participation and assistance of the more developed republics, including the Republic of Serbia. Therefore, nothing tragic happened there. Now it is all over, and I think it is time to stop exaggerating it."[137]

For Tito, then, with pre-prepared and directed condemnations, the Albanian problem is erased from the agenda. It is a rather convenient "solution," one that means disregarding the fundamental demands and vital interests of the Albanian people. The Albanian national question arose in 1912 and has become relevant again today due to Tirana's insistent demand for the unification of all Albanians.

Attacking Soviet and Titoist "revisionism," with the help of communist China, Tirana skillfully incorporated the Albanian national question into the global political agenda and added it as an appendage to the Sino-Russian conflict, in which, in Beijing's eyes, Tito belongs to the Soviet camp.

In this way, Albania has Chinese backing for its national and territorial aspirations. Tito cannot expect help from anyone against Tirana's demands to rectify the border with Yugoslavia under Beijing's tutelage. The Washington government will be careful not to provoke any conflict or friction with China, not only because of the Vietnam War, which the US must end as quickly as possible, but also in view of the new phase in Sino-American relations, which tend toward a degree of cooperation, the delimitation of spheres of interest, and China's entry into the UN with the Washington government's approval.

Tito's regime also cannot count on Soviet support in the event of open conflict with Albania, not only because of its serious implications with China, but also because Moscow backs Sofia's aspirations to Macedonia, which, like Albania's, tend toward the dismemberment of the heterogeneous state of Yugoslavia. Thus, Yugoslavia, due to its "solution" to the national question and Tito's constant maneuvering on the international stage, finds itself squeezed between two major powers that threaten its existence.

This impasse in Tito's policies is now also recognized by Western political circles. Thus, W. Staehelin, correspondent for Basler Nachrichten (December 3, 1968), following the Albanian disturbances in Kosmet, wrote in his chronicle entitled "Albania in the Depths": "This occurred on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the celebration of Yugoslav liberation.

It was necessary, therefore, for a quarter of a century to pass before Tito realized that there are oppressed minorities in his country. Now Tito is making a virtue of necessity. Does this bring him any benefit? Tirana has no interest in making a pact with Belgrade so as not to give the Soviet fleet a reason to intervene. In opting for Moscow, he surely did so not only for ideological reasons but also with the oppressed skippers in Yugoslavia in mind..."

The next phase of Albanian national liberation: The Republic of Kosovo and Metohija

The Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija and the regime of Enver Hodza, united in coordinated action, will not allow themselves to be divided by Tito or the Serbs. If armed conflicts do not erupt in the Balkans in the near future, which cannot be ruled out, then the political situation of the Albanians in Yugoslavia should improve, and subsequently the separation of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija from the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo and Metohija as the seventh republic of Yugoslavia will take place. These demands have been repeatedly made by the Albanians and third parties, and now clamorously during the recent public demonstrations of November 27, 1968.

The new reform of the Yugoslav constitution promulgated in 1963 has been in the works for some time, and this issue will certainly also be addressed at the IX Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, scheduled for March 1969. On this occasion, there will likely be presentations advocating for the separation of Vojvodina from Serbia and the proclamation of Vojvodina as a republic. These demands are not new.

The creation of the Republic of Kosovo and Metohija is now inevitable. The Serbs would do well to begin negotiating with the Albanians immediately regarding the situation of the Serbian minority and other minorities in Kosovo and Metohija, and not oppose and combat the just Albanian demands. The Serbs, along with Tito, will lose this battle. It would be prudent to consider the subsequent incorporation of Kosovo and Metohija into Albania and to think about the fate of the national minorities under the rule of Tirana.

Below are some statistical data on Kosovo and Metohija. According to the Yugoslav population census of March 31, 1961, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija had a total population of 964,000, of whom 647,000 were Albanians (67%), and 227,000 were Serbs (24%). The Montenegrin minority numbered 38,000 (3.9%) and the Turkish minority 26,000 (2.6%).

The number of Croats there was 7,000, Muslims 8,000, and "undefined Yugoslavs" 5,000. As already mentioned, the total Albanian population in Yugoslavia is 915,000, of whom 647,000 live in Kosovo and Metohija, with the remainder scattered throughout other regions. The largest Albanian minority lives in Macedonia (183,000), followed by Serbia (51,000). The area of Kosovo and Metohija is 10,887 km², compared to Montenegro (13,812 km²), Serbia (55,968 km²), Vojvodina (21,506 km²), Bosnia and Herzegovina (51,129 km²), Croatia (55,538 km²), Slovenia (20,251 km²), and the total area of Yugoslavia is 255,804 square kilometers.[138]

Brugg, Switzerland, 1968.

Jure Petricevic

JORGE CASTRIOTA SCANDERBEG

On the occasion of the 500th anniversary of his death

On January 17, 1968, the 500th anniversary of the death of George Kastrzeit Scanderbeg (Georgius Scanderbey), Prince of Albania and celebrated warrior, known as "the last of the heroes of Macedonia," Albanian colonies and centers around the world commemorated their national hero with grand celebrations.

The Vatican also joined in the commemorative events, given that George Kastrzeit Scanderbeg was, for twenty-five years in the mid-15th century, one of the pillars of the defense of Western Christendom, and especially Italy, against the Turkish onslaught, a role that John Hunyadi played around the same time in Croatia and Hungary.

In Croatian folk epic poetry, George Kastrzeit Scanderbeg (Jure Kastriotic) is one of the central figures and a favorite protagonist. In his time, he was considered not only the greatest hero of Europe but also the staunchest defender of Christian civilization against the threatening and overwhelming Ottoman invasion.

George Castriota was born in 1405, son of John Castriota, one of the Epirote princes subjugated by the Turks despite his valiant resistance. Defeated and made an Ottoman vassal, he was forced to send his son as a hostage to the court of Sultan Murad II in Adrianople, where he was educated in Islam.

The Turks changed his name to Iskender (Alexander), adding the noble title Scanderbeg. Handsome, vigorous, intelligent, and skilled in political and military arts, he rose rapidly and at the age of 19 was invested with the mandate of a sandjacate. His courage, audacity, and military talents earned him the sultan's trust, who gave him command of several expeditions.

After his father, Scanderbeg, died in the battle near NiŠ in 1443 between Ottoman and Christian troops, he sided with the Christian commander John Hunyday, facilitating his victory. He returned to Albania, incited his compatriots to revolt, and within a few months, through a daring coup, seized Kroia, the capital of his former hereditary states, along with other towns and fortresses, liberating Albania and Epirus from Ottoman rule. He solemnly renounced Islam, organized the army, especially the light cavalry, called the "Praetorian Guard," and was appointed head of the Confederation of the Lords of the Spire and commander of the army on March 19, 1444.

Victories over the Turks

Sultan Murad II sent 25,000 soldiers chosen from among the Janissaries, led by Ali Pasha, to quell the Albanian insurrection. Scanderbeg awaited them with 15,000 men in the mountain passes, crags, and defiles near Debar and, maneuvering skillfully, on June 29, 1444, defeated the invaders, who suffered 7,000 casualties. His life from then on was a series of victories over the Muslims, who called him the White Devil of Wallachia, and the Christians considered him a second Alexander the Great, as both hailed from neighboring regions.

However, in his efforts to consolidate the country, he had to confront the Republic of Venice, which in 1430 had signed a peace treaty with the sultan, eager to retain its coastal possessions in Albania, its trading posts, and the lucrative trade with the Levant. Tired of Venetian intrigues, he defeated the army of the Republic of Saint Mark near Skadar (Scutari) in 1448 and shortly afterward defeated his ally Mustafa Pasha, capturing him along with 12 high-ranking officers and 2,000 soldiers. After this double victory, Venice signed a peace treaty with Scanderbeg on October 4, 1448, only to break it months later, reverting to its old intrigues and provocations, especially when Kastriota allied itself with the Kingdom of Naples, Venice's rival.

Scanderbeg, Hero of Europe

At the beginning of 1450, Sultan Murad II, accompanied by his son Muhammad, marched on Albania with 100,000 soldiers and laid siege to Kroia, Scanderbeg's capital. This army—the most powerful of its time and almost equal to the Ottoman army that would conquer Constantinople three years later—was well-equipped and provided with cannons of a caliber previously unknown.

Scanderbeg left 4,000 men in Kroia and, with 8,000 soldiers, retreated to the neighboring forests and mountains, from where he harassed the besiegers with incessant raids, surprise attacks, and ambushes, giving them no respite day or night. After five months of bloody siege and without conquering the citadel, Murad II returned to Adrianople, having lost 20,000 soldiers.

This brilliant victory of Scanderbeg resonated throughout Europe, and its protagonist was glorified as a great hero and defender of Christendom. Pope Nicholas V, King Alfonso V of Naples, the Duke of Burgundy, the Croatian-Hungarian king, and the Croatian Republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) sent special delegates to congratulate him on his resounding triumph.

Several volunteers from Italy, France, Germany, and England arrived in Albania to fight under Scanderbeg's command. The country was devastated and in ruins; substantial and urgent aid was needed. Since Europe was divided and embroiled in domestic disputes, little help was provided.

Furthermore, as King Alfonso V of Naples was openly opposed to the Ottomans and the Republic of Venice, Scanderbeg signed a mutual assistance agreement with him on March 26, 1451, in Gaeta, Italy. Alfonso V was not in a position to send all the necessary aid against the new campaigns undertaken by Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror.

In 1452, Scanderbeg defeated two Turkish armies. On May 29, 1453, the Turks seized Constantinople, an event that terrified the Western world, as Mehmed II's main objective was now the conquest of Rome. Pope Nicholas V made a dramatic appeal to the Christian world, urging it to unite in a crusade against the Ottomans.

Despite the critical situation, the West remained divided by numerous squabbles and disputes; the monarchs and rulers ignored the appeal, preoccupied with their own petty interests. The Republic of St. Mark was the first to deny its solidarity and in 1454 signed a new peace treaty with the Sultan.

"To defend the West and European civilization, only tiny Albania with Scanderbeg and the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom with Hunyady remained. With Hunyady's death in 1456, Scanderbeg was the only Christian combatant against the Turks. From then on, he would appear in papal plans as the sole leader of a crusade," comments Ljubo Cuvalo in his well-documented article on George Castriota Scanderbeg (Danica, May 8, 1968, Chicago, USA), which served as our main source for outlining this brief sketch of the Albanian hero.

The Crusade Fails and New Turkish Attacks

Pope Callixtus III began organizing the crusade against the Turks in 1457, and Scanderbeg was to play the leading role, to whom the Pope conferred the title of "Captain General of the Holy See." This action failed due to conflicting interests and the religious indifference of the Renaissance princes.

Pius II, successor to Callixtus III, brokered the grand alliance of European monarchs and princes in Mantua in 1459. Even Venice was prepared to join; however, the undertaking ultimately failed. Meanwhile, Scanderbeg had to confront the troops of Mehmed II once again. His closest friend and ally, Alfonso V, died in 1458, and his son, Ferdinand, lost most of his kingdom following the uprising of the Italian barons, whose aim was to place Prince René of the House of Anjou on the throne of Naples.

King Ferdinand even sought help from Scanderbeg, who, after negotiating a truce with the Turks, crossed the Adriatic with 3,000 seasoned horsemen and defeated Ferdinand's opponents one after another, restoring his kingdom. He soon had to return to Albania, and in 1462 he routed three Ottoman military expeditions, which far outnumbered his forces.

As a consequence of 20 years of incessant warfare, Albania was devastated, ravaged, and depopulated, its fields uncultivated, its population decimated. With all attempts to organize a crusade having failed, Scanderbeg was forced to sign a peace treaty with the sultan in Skopje on April 27, 1463.

This treaty alarmed both the Pope and the Republic of Venice, who pressured Scanderbeg to revoke it. He eventually did so, and in August 1463, an agreement was signed between Albania and Venice against the Ottomans. Pope Pius II officially proclaimed the crusade and appealed to all Christian peoples to join him. The Christian army was concentrated in the Italian ports, but due to a lack of unity and organization, it failed to embark, and upon the death of Pius II, the troops dispersed. Scanderbeg remained alone in that region, facing the powerful Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror.

During 1464/65—the tragic and final period of the Albanian epic—the Sultan sent several expeditions against Scanderbeg, determined, at any cost, to break down the last barrier preventing him from invading Italy. The Albanians, under the brilliant command of their captain, resisted valiantly and in several successive battles defeated the Ottomans, inflicting enormous losses.

Scanderbeg took full advantage of the local topography and the geographical features of his country, mountainous and forested. Employing every military stratagem, he skillfully maneuvered and, with his small army, managed to defeat the fanatical adversary, who was far superior in number and military equipment. For this reason, the Turks nicknamed him the White Devil of Wallachia and considered him invincible, as if he were a mythological god.

In August 1464, Sultan Mehmed II led his 150,000 soldiers to conquer Kroia. Scanderbeg employed the same strategy and tactics he had used in 1450 against Murad II. He left a garrison of 4,000 men in the fortress and, with the rest of his troops, relentlessly harassed and attacked the Turks. A master of ambushes, daring raids, and surprise attacks (a precursor to modern guerrilla warfare), he targeted the weak points of the Ottoman defenses.

Months passed, the outer defensive walls gave way, but the citadel of Kroia, with its handful of heroic defenders, held firm. The enraged sultan ordered the devastation of the country and the slaughter of its male inhabitants, taking women and children captive who would later become Janissaries. Leaving 80,000 soldiers under the command of Balaban Pasha to continue the siege, Muhammad II returned with the remainder of his forces. On the way, he established the fortress of Elbasan as a base and captured the city of Chidna, where 20,000 women, children, and the elderly had taken refuge, ordering their execution.

Balaban Pasha continued the siege of Kroia, hoping that hunger and lack of ammunition would force its valiant defenders to surrender. In this tragic situation, Scanderbeg traveled to Italy to personally request aid from the Pope and King Ferdinand of Naples. He arrived in Rome on December 12, 1466, and was received with great honors and applause by the Romans. In April 1467, he returned with meager reinforcements.

The newly recruited Albanians, reinforced by a small number of Venetian troops, numbered only 13,000. With this army, Kastriota first defeated the new Turkish expedition that had come to the aid of Balaban Pasha, and then, in a bloody battle and with exceptional maneuvers, forced the besiegers of Kroia to flee.

This resounding defeat disconcerted Sultan Mehmed II, who was determined to conquer the entire Adriatic coast and invade Italy. In July 1467, he gathered his entire army and for the third time began to besiege Kroia. At the same time, he closed the Albanian ports to prevent any potential aid from the Western monarchs. He ordered the execution of all refugees who refused to embrace Islam. Kroia, once again, offered heroic resistance; the sultan, enraged and humiliated, had to abandon his campaign and, on his return journey, seeking revenge, subjected all of central Albania to fire and sword.

The Death of Scanderbeg

On January 17, 1468, Scanderbeg died in Ljes, where he had convened the Albanian League to consolidate the union and devise new defensive measures. His sudden death caused shock and fear throughout Europe and plunged his unfortunate country into mourning. After heroic feats and superhuman efforts, Albania succumbed to the overwhelming Ottoman power in 1478, following a grueling resistance in Kroia and Skadar.

Albania became a Turkish domain, most of its population embraced Islam, and the country stagnated in every respect precisely at the time when the Renaissance was beginning in Europe. More than 200,000 Albanians left their homes and dispersed to various countries, particularly southern Italy, Calabria, and Sicily.

The first wave of exiles fleeing the Turkish onslaught occurred in the third decade of the 15th century and reached Apulia and Calabria. The second group of emigrants consisted of mercenaries of King Alfonso who helped him conquer Calabria in 1443, settling there and founding several Albanian colonies such as Caraffa, Corfizzi, Cizzerie, etc., preserving their language, customs, traditional costumes, folk songs, etc., to this day.

The third group of Albanian refugees moved to Italy when Scanderberg came to the aid of King Ferdinand in 1461 against the condottiere Giacomo Piccinino, and as a reward received the regency of Apulia with the fiefdoms of Monte Sant'Angelo and San Giovanni di Rotondo. Juan, son of Scanderbeg, was named Duke of San Pietro in Galatini in Naples, while the Marquesses of Atripaldi, whose line became extinct in 1873, were descended from Stanisa, Scanderbeg's brother.

Decades later, Croatia would suffer a similar fate. Along with Hungary, Croatia defended Europe against Turkish incursions until the end of the 18th century. Thousands of its descendants emigrated and settled in neighboring countries. To this day, in the mountainous Abruzzo region of central Italy, specifically in Molise, several villages with Croatian inhabitants remain. These residents, in addition to Italian, speak the Croatian dialect of their time and maintain many of the old customs of their homeland.

To appreciate the role Scanderbeg played in containing Ottoman expansion in Europe, one need only recall that Mehmed II, after the conquest of Albania, crossed the Adriatic without major setbacks and conquered Otranto. This landing of the Turkish army in southern Italy caused terror throughout the country.

The Pope was preparing to flee to France. Fortunately, Mehmed II died in May 1481 without realizing his dream of seizing Rome. The struggle for the throne between his two sons weakened the momentum of the Ottoman conquest. Bayezid prevailed, but he did not follow his father's expansionist policies in Europe with the same fervor.

The figure of George Castriota Scanderbeg stands out in European history. Poets, writers, statesmen, and military leaders considered him one of the greatest heroes and strategists of all time. Paolo Veronese, the celebrated Renaissance painter, immortalized Scanderbeg's feat in his painting The Siege of Scutari, which is kept in the Doge's Palace in Venice. "He surpasses all military leaders, ancient and modern, in the command of a small defensive army," wrote General James Wolfe, hero of Quebec.

The statesman and thinker Sir William Temple (18th century), in his essay on "the virtue of heroism," places Scanderbeg among the seven great military leaders. The French poet P. Ronsard called him "the glory of his century," and the American poet E. W. Longfellow immortalized him in one of his beautiful poems entitled "Scanderbeg's Return to Croatia." Voltaire believed that if the Byzantine emperors had fought like Scanderbeg, the Eastern Empire would never have fallen to the Turks.

Scanderbeg in Croatian folk poetry

As already mentioned, while George Kaspriota waged incessant battles in his region, the Croats offered tenacious resistance to the overwhelming force of the Ottoman Empire. Albania fell to them, Bosnia fell in 1463, and a few years later Herzegovina. Throughout the 16th century, most of Croatia was invaded, but not conquered.

The struggle continued until the beginning of the 19th century, leaving indelible marks on Croatian history, because in part the fight was between brothers of different religious faiths, some Christian, others Muslim. It is no wonder, then, that the heroic deeds were deeply etched in the memory of the people, who then passed them down from generation to generation in the form of popular epic poetry; in ten-syllable verses, sometimes distorting, exaggerating, or misrepresenting historical events, as often happens.

The Croatian bard, poet, and rhapsode Andrija (Andrew) Kacic Miosic (1702-1760), drawing on popular epic poetry, composed his widely disseminated collection, The Pleasant Discourse of the Croatian People (Razgovor ugodni naroda slovinskoga), first published in Venice in 1756. This collection is a chronicle in verse, decasyllables, and prose, based on history and popular tradition, with all the characteristics, epithets, embellishments, and elements of popular epic poetry with Romantic tendencies.

This widely circulated collection rescued many historical figures from popular oblivion, imbuing them with legendary, almost mythological, auras. An entire cycle is dedicated to the exploits of George Kastriotic, to his bravery, skill, and his invincible sword. Even today, many Croatian peasants know several of these poems by heart and recite them, accompanying their monotonous chanting with the typical single-note instrument called the gusto. We reproduce in Spanish some of the characteristic verses, referring to the heroism of Kastriota and Hunyady:

"Murad the Sultan weeps and sighs,

Murad the Sultan weeps and sighs,

And curses his bad luck.

With bitter tears he complains

Before his captains and viziers:

“Two swords wreak cruel havoc upon us,

One is wielded proudly by John Hunyadi,

The other is brandished by Prince Kaspriota.

So difficult it is for us to wrest them from them;

Let us implore the Almighty God

To protect us from those lions,

Brave dragons, thunderbolts of the sky.”

With this note, we wish to pay homage to the illustrious defender of Western Europe, which, we bitterly observe, never knew how to appreciate or repay the enormous sacrifices that small nations like Albania, Hungary, and Croatia contributed to its salvation, well-being, and cultural and economic progress by defending its eastern borders. The situation is repeated today: these nations are subjected to communist dictatorship, and their suffering finds little echo and little understanding in the affluent and almost indifferent Western society.

DOCUMENTS

At the request of the State Assembly and Senate, California Governor Ronald Reagan proclaimed April 10, 1941, Croatian Independence Day.

The following is a transcription of the original English and Spanish versions of the respective Resolution and Proclamation:

Whereas the United States is the hope of enslaved nations in today's divided world; and

whereas these nations look to the United States as a citadel of human freedoms, to lead them to the attainment of their liberation and independence on the basis of the right to self-determination guaranteed in the Charter of the United Nations; and

whereas Croatia, one of the enslaved nations, is at present subjugated by the force and terror exercised by the Yugoslav communists; and

whereas communist Yugoslavia has recently assisted the Soviet Union in establishing naval power in the Mediterranean, to further red expansion; and

whereas communist Yugoslavia has prevented the election of representatives to the Sabor and the Croatian nation has been deprived of the basic human rights of self-determination, free elections, economic freedom, culture, religion, and even language; And

Whereas more than 150,000 Americans of Croatian origin live in California, participating in the economic, cultural, and political development of the Golden State, always remaining vigilant against communist aggression by sharing their knowledge and experience; and

Whereas the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the overwhelming majority of the people of oppressed nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace together with these potential American allies; and

Whereas it is fitting that we should clearly demonstrate to these peoples, through appropriate and official means, the historic fact that the people of the State of California share with them the aspiration to regain their liberty and independence; Therefore,

THE CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, CONCURRING WITH THE SENATE, resolves that the members urge Governor Ronald Reagan to proclaim April 10 as CROATIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY throughout the State, inviting all citizens to express their renewed support for the just aspirations of all peoples to national independence and human liberty; and in this regard resolves that the Chief Clerk of the Assembly transmit a copy of this resolution to the Governor.

CONCURRING ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION No. 64

adopted by the Assembly on March 14, 1968.

Signed:

JESSE M. UNRUH

President of the Assembly

Attested to:

JAMES D. DRISCOLL

Chief Clerk of the Assembly

RESOLUTION OF THE CONCURRENT ASSEMBLY No. 64

adopted in the Senate on March 18, 1968

Signed:

ROBERT H. FINCH

President of the Senate

Attested by:

J. A. BEEK

Secretary of the Senate

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PROCLAMATION

Whereas the Croatian nation, since the dawn of its history in the seventh century, has had to struggle to preserve its liberty and independence, and the pursuit of democratic processes created, more than a thousand years ago, one of its oldest elected parliamentary bodies, the SABOR; And

Whereas Croatia is currently subjugated by force and terror inflicted by Yugoslavia, which has prevented the election of representatives to the Sabor and has deprived Croats of the basic human rights of self-determination, free elections, economic independence, culture, religion, and even language; and

Whereas more than 150,000 Americans of Croatian descent live in California, participating in the economic, cultural, and political development of the Golden State, remaining vigilant against communist aggression by sharing their knowledge and experience;

THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, hereby proclaim April 10th CROATIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY, to honor these Californians, and I invite all citizens to express their renewed support for the just aspirations of all peoples to national independence and human freedom.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Great Seal of the State of California this 4th day of April, 1968.

Signature:

RONALD REAGAN

Governor

Attest: (illegible signature)

Secretary of State

ECONOMIC MIGRATION FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO EUROPE

An overview of the social, national, and republican composition of Yugoslav economic emigration

ZVONIMIR KOMARICA

ECONOMIC MIGRATION FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO EUROPE

An overview of the social, national, and republican composition of Yugoslav economic emigration

ZVONIMIR KOMARICA

It is impossible to give an exact figure for economic emigrants from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter abbreviated as SFR Yugoslav) and its six republics due to the lack of comprehensive statistics on the matter and the fact that we cannot classify two categories of emigrants, however small, as exclusively economic migrants due to their specific reasons. These are the emigrants from Istria who go to Italy and those from Macedonia who settle in Turkey.

However, estimates and calculations based on our own statistics and foreign data and evidence allow us to establish that there are currently 360,000 economic emigrants from Yugoslavia in Western Europe as long-term or seasonal workers, excluding those benefiting from "bourgeois transit." This figure includes the families of workers and those who left the country illegally, without documents, and found work in Western European countries. We have deducted the number of those who returned.

The Social composition

A true picture of the social composition of workers, technicians, and professionals is provided by data relating to their place of employment. Two surveys conducted (one with a direct question and the other in writing) among 2,500 respondents showed that in 1967 the social composition of Yugoslav citizens in five Western European countries was as follows:

Unskilled workers 58.2%

Skilled workers 36.3%

Highly skilled workers 5.0%

No response 0.5%

The bulk of unskilled workers are peasants. They generally perform rough and auxiliary tasks that workers in their respective countries avoid. The two remaining groups performed similar tasks in their homeland to those they perform abroad.

This social structure of our compatriots, outlined in general terms, would merit extensive commentary from various perspectives. We will limit ourselves to noting that no other country of emigration has such a high percentage of skilled workers with advanced or university degrees. as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

These two groups constitute 41.3% of total European emigration from the territory of Yugoslavia. This figure sheds sufficient light on the origin of this emigration. There is no doubt that skilled and highly educated workers can only come from the more developed "republics." Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the composition of our economic emigration in Europe by republic.

Composition by Republic

Taking into account the results of three surveys conducted in 1966 and 1967, as well as data from the census and statistical institutes of each republic, we are able to provide a more precise answer to all these questions. We also provide the percentage of each republic in the total population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

	Participación de c/república en el total de obreros en Europa	Porciento de c/república en el total de habitantes de Yugoeslavia (censo de 1961)
RSF de Yugoeslavia:	100
Bosnia y Herzegovina	22,1%	17,7%
Montenegro	0,2%	2,55%
Croacia	50,1%	22,4%
Macedonia	3,1%	7,6%
Eslovenia	15,1%	8,6%
Servia	9,4%	41,2%

These data also reveal specific characteristics. While in other southeastern European countries emigration flows from the less developed areas, in our country the opposite occurs. Almost 80% of our citizens emigrated after 1965. That is to say, after two decades of persistent efforts and sacrifices to develop the underdeveloped areas.

In that sense, undoubtedly, certain results were achieved. Hence the fact that currently the least developed regions in the Soviet Union have an income of $300 per capita. One would normally expect that the primary reasons for emigration—that is, meager wages, unemployment, and the ambition to raise the standard of living—now, after two decades (of the communist system), affect all socio-political communities in Yugoslavia equally. If some regions were, before the First and Second World Wars, relegated economically, socio-politically, and in terms of investment policy, and therefore had to emigrate en masse, the triumph of the socialist revolution should have eliminated the causes of that state of affairs.

If they arise, for various reasons, it would be logical to include them among the negative phenomena and combat emigration by all means, especially where migration is most prevalent and where it endangers the interests of the community. Viewed from another perspective, we should try to ensure that the burden of this migration is shared equitably by all our socio-political communities.

The populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia gravitate primarily towards German-speaking countries, that is, towards the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. There have been attempts to find political reasons for this orientation. However, it turns out that the reasons for this channeling lie, apart from the economic dynamism of these countries, in practical, we might say linguistic, reasons.

That is to say, the technical terms for tools, equipment, and materials, especially in construction, in Croatian and Slovenian are borrowed from German. Regardless of the historical reasons for this, this knowledge helps workers find employment more easily and orient themselves more quickly. It is useful to both the worker and the employer. Muslims (Croats of the Islamic faith, editor's note) and members of the Serbian minority, originating from these republics, are represented proportionally to their numbers.

The greatest burden falls on Croatia.

As we have seen, our republics are not represented proportionally and equally in European migration processes. An ideal, equitable, and truly equal economic and political relationship would be one in which the percentages of emigrants from each republic were identical to, or at least approximately equal to, the percentages in the population of the Soviet Union. Arguments related to tradition, previous migrations, and easier access due to existing connections might justify a certain percentage of the migration flows from the socialist republics of Croatia and Slovenia. The true causes must be sought elsewhere, especially given that 75% of workers left in search of employment in the last four years. Tradition and family ties certainly influence migration to overseas countries.

If we consider the equitable share of the "necessary evil" and the losses resulting from the departure of young, vigorous, often skilled and educated men, it is interesting to compare the number of emigrants in Europe with the population of each country. Specialists in migration issues refer to this ratio, expressed as a percentage, as "migration rates."

The migration rates of the main countries of emigration at the beginning of 1967 are shown in the following table:

PAIS	Número habitantes en 000	Número emigrados a Europa en 000	Tasa migratoria en porcientos
Grecia	8.500	250	2,94
Italia	51.600	2.000	3,88
Yugoeslavia	19.450	360	1,85
Portugal	9.200	370	4,02
España	31.600	600	1,90
Turquía	31.100	196	0,63

Viewed in relation to other countries, the migration rate of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRS) of 1.8% can be understood, but not justified. This, in reality, is not the problem. If the FRS of Yugoslavia were not, as its constitution states, “the federal republic of free and equal peoples and nationalities,” then we could discuss migration from the perspective of its economic and demographic implications.

If in Yugoslavia there existed a “monolithic unity” of the working class with a supranational Yugoslav consciousness of belonging to a culture, a language, and an economy, then the problems of our migration would be much simpler. But the reality is different, whether we like it or not. The 1961 census revealed that of the 18,549,000 inhabitants, these ideal, nationally undefined Yugoslavs constituted less than 2%, or only 317,000. This percentage is even lower among emigrants from the Soviet Union employed in Western European countries. We will discuss this point further later.

Migration Rates from the Yugoslav “Republics”

REPUBLICA SOCIALISTA	Número de habitantes	Número emigrados a Europa	Tasa migratoria
Bosnia y Herzegovina	3.594.000	79.560	2,21%
Montenegro	511.000	720	0,14%
Croacia	4.281.000	180.360	4,21%
Macedonia	1.505.000	11.160	0,74%
Eslovenia	1.647.000	54.360	3,30%
Servia	7.967.000	33.840	0,47%

Since the population census has not been conducted since 1961, we have used the estimate from the Federal Statistical Institute dating from mid-1965. If we analyze the comparative table of migration rates for our republics, we should note two groups.

The first group comprises the republics whose migration rate exceeds 2%, namely: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. The Socialist Republic of Croatia stands out in this group, with a migration rate more than 2% higher than that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and almost 1% higher than that of Slovenia.

The second group, whose migration rate is less than 1% and ranges between 0.14% and 0.74%, consists of Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia. Here, those percentages are approximate, we could say equal.

If we compare these groups in relation to the migration rates of other southeastern European countries that have economic migrants in Europe, we will notice that the migration rate of the Socialist Republic of Croatia surpasses that of countries like Portugal and Italy.

These countries were at the forefront of global migration in the last century. It is obvious that today Croatia ranks first among European countries in terms of the number of emigrants relative to the number of inhabitants. Since we do not have data on Mexico's migration rate, we cannot affirm that this rate is the highest in the world.

We ask ourselves, what are the reasons for such a high migration percentage from Croatia and Slovenia? The main reason usually cited for emigration is the natural population growth in the respective country. However, finding a satisfactory answer in this area is difficult, because the republics with the lowest population growth experience the highest migration, and vice versa. The facts show that the average natural increase in Croatia is 11.2 per thousand, in Slovenia 11.1, in Macedonia 16.2, and in Montenegro 21.9 per thousand, respectively.

National composition of emigrants

NACIONALIDADES	migraciones europeas Porcentaje en el total las repúblicas de la RSF de Yugoeslavia	Porcentaje en el total de la población RSF de Yugoeslavia y en 000
Montenegrinos	0,8%	3,10%	514
Croatas	64,2%	23,20%	4249
Yugoeslavia	1,55% (5'9% en 1953)	1,17%	317
Húngaros	1,3%	2,72%	504
Musulmanes	1,7%	5,25%	973
Macedonios	1,9%	5,64%	1046
Eslovenos	14,8%	8,55%	1589
Servios	23,0%	42,10%	7806
Skipetares	0,90%	4,94%	915
Demás nacionalidades	0,2%	3,19%	591

The data presented clearly demonstrate the disproportionate representation of different peoples and nationalities in European labor migration. The percentage of Croats in these migrations is twice their percentage in the population of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, and that of Slovenes is slightly less than twice. For other nationalities, this percentage is significantly lower than their percentage in the total population of Yugoslavia.

As the comparative tables faithfully reflect, our socio-political communities—socialist republics—do not share equitably in the burden and losses that the obligations imposed by the current economic reforms are causing to their economies.

Croatian workers in Europe represent a capital of over $3 billion.

To estimate, at least approximately, these losses, we must draw on the theoretical knowledge of other countries. Calculations by insurance companies and other institutions in developed countries show that the average "production costs" of a 20-year-old man amount to $10,000. While this is a rough estimate, lacking scientific precision, Italian specialists in the field use it in their studies, which we will also do here.

Two surveys conducted in five European countries revealed that 3% of emigrants are under 20 years old. This means we can work with the figure of 349,200 people whose per capita value is $10,000.

For the entire Russian Socialist Republic (RSF), the value of the "human capital" provided amounts to $3,492,000,000. This is the price we pay for bureaucratic-centralist planning, the extensive economy, low productivity, and low wages. This is part of the price we pay today for the delay in the reconstruction and modernization of various economic sectors.

The loss distributed across republics.

REPUBLICA SOCIALISTA	Número de Ios emigrandos mayores de 20 años	Pérdida del capital humanoen US$
Bosnia y Herzegovina	77.173	771.730.000
Montenegro	698	6.980.000
Croacia	174.949	1.749.490.000
Macedonia	10.735	107.350.000
Eslovenia	52.729	527.290.000
Servia	32.824	328.240.000

Therefore, according to this conditional theoretical calculation, the gift of "human capital" that our republics make to the economies of the developed countries of Western Europe is not small. It should be borne in mind that for the countries of immigration—Austria, Benelux, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland—this capital is not conditional or theoretical but practical and tangible.

An analysis (Dr. Ivo Vinaki) proved that of the net products created by the workers of the SFR of Yugoslavia in Western Europe, almost four-fifths, or 78%, remains in the respective country. The retention of the exorbitant share of the net product of the workers, for whose "production" they invested nothing, reveals one of the secrets of the rapid and dynamic growth of all economic sectors in the aforementioned countries. The socialist state exploits migrant workers.

Our statist and interventionist organs, as well as a part of the press, frequently consider in a one-sided manner the benefit to the community that derives from the Emigrants. Satisfied with the reduction in unemployment, they often emphasize "the positive balance of invisible exploitation."

In this balance, they usually underline the constant increase in workers' remittances, which rose from $15 million in 1957 to $121 million in 1967. To further impress, they compare this with foreign exchange earnings from tourism, which totaled $9 million in 1957 and nearly $138 million in 1967. Yes, that is true, but it is only one side of the coin.

In fact, those millions are "crumbs" compared to the net products created by our workers abroad. In 1966, workers' remittances represented only one-tenth of the net product created by Yugoslavian workers employed in "temporary jobs" in Western Europe. Considering the national composition of the migrant workers, more than Half of the foreign currency income from remittances sent by workers and emigrants arrives in the territory of the Socialist Republic of Croatia.

Remittances from emigrants decrease every year, while those from workers, who are gradually becoming emigrants, increase steadily. Their increase is not related to the increase in the number of workers, because some of these workers cannot bear the loneliness and bring their families with them or establish them abroad. A survey organized by the Institute for Migration and Nationalities recorded that 27.4% of workers do not send remittances to their families or do not have them in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

According to estimates made by specialists, the foreign currency income from worker remittances sent to the territory of each republic would give the following approximate breakdown:

SFR OF YUGOSLAVIA 100%

Bosnia y Herzegovina	26.741.000	22,1%
Montenegro	242.000	0,2%
Croacia	60.621.000	50,1%
Macedonia	3.751.000	3,1%
Eslovenia	10.271.000	15,1%
Servia	11.347.000	9,4%

A sum twice as large, or nearly $250,000,000, is held by our citizens in deposits in the Western countries where they work.

The profits are absorbed by the Federal Fund in Belgrade.

In this sector, the decentralized education system contrasts sharply with the centralized foreign exchange system. Since the financing of education and schools in the current system falls exclusively to the respective socio-political community—municipality, republic—it would be normal for the "profits" earned by emigrants to be distributed in such a way that they at least partially offset the expenses of their respective socio-political communities.

These demands have been made for years, but without success. According to the foreign exchange system and the banking regime, which, despite all the efforts of progressive reformers, remain in force, the foreign currency income flows into the Federal Foreign Exchange Fund (headquartered in Belgrade).

The Exchange Rate System Harms Workers

If we consider that one dollar in European exchange markets is worth approximately 500 old dinars more than its official rate, it turns out that the National Bank of the SFR of Yugoslavia earned 6.5 trillion old dinars, not counting the exchange fees and taxes on 121 million dollars transferred in 369.05 trillion old dinars. These trillions of dinars, of course, benefited the families of emigrants. However, one must ask whether these sums can be the only compensation to our community for the enormous loss of "human capital."

In 1967, approximately 77 trillion old dinars were transferred to the territory of the SFR of Yugoslavia. From this sum, due solely to the different exchange rate, the National Bank "earned" 3.31 trillion old dinars.

It is hoped that positive changes will occur in the current conservative and centralized foreign exchange system. This would create the conditions for increasing foreign currency inflows from workers' remittances and for increasing the number of foreign currency accounts in our country.

But, for now, the most urgent task is to create new sources of employment in the areas where this negative phenomenon is most acute, using all available resources, including workers' remittances. This would represent a significant contribution to those reformist measures aimed at halting the transfer of national income within the economy.

This would also facilitate the implementation of a long-term, operational development policy, enable greater employment and better wages, and ultimately, allow for the efficient use of workers' knowledge and experience.

Croatia's migration rate is the highest in the SFR of Yugoslavia and in Europe not because Croatians like to look for work in other countries, but because, among other reasons, in the last three years, Croatia, in accordance with the demands of economic reform, has had to restrict investment.

Zagreb, Croatia, September 1968.

BOOK REVIEW

BERNARD GEORGE: L'OCCIDENT JOUE ET PERD LA YOUGOSLAVIE DANS LA GUERRE, Editions de la Table Ronde, 1988, Collection: L'Histoire Contemporaine, Revue et Corrigée, dirigée par Pacques Daurent et Gabriel Jeantet, París.

This book has been written with all the virtues of the French spirit: clarity of thought, elegance of style, and an unsurpassed commitment to objectivity. Herman Neubacher, the Third Reich's plenipotentiary for economic affairs in southeastern Europe, hurries on April 5, 1941, in a Mercedes to reach the villa of Romanian General Ion Antonescu on the outskirts of Bucharest as quickly as possible.

Hitler has instructed him to inform the general of his decision to destroy Yugoslavia. Deep in the back of the car, the German diplomat thoughtfully surveys the political landscape of all of Europe, especially that part of southeastern Europe. The author, B. George, with an extraordinary capacity for synthesis, highlights the opposing interests of the actors in the unfolding and unfolding drama of war.

Under the impact of German success and in the shadow of the German-Soviet pact, the entire world was disoriented. Everyone sought direction toward Berlin. Belgrade, too. On March 25, 1941, Yugoslavia joined the "Pact of Steel," signed on September 27, 1940, between Germany, Italy, and Japan. At that time, Germany absorbed "more than half of Yugoslavia's foreign trade." Furthermore, in previous negotiations, Hitler had promised the Serbs the city of Thessaloniki and guaranteed Yugoslavia's neutrality. This decision by Belgrade could not be prevented by the intervention of the King of England nor by all the friendships he maintained with the West. However, the Serbian officer corps, dissatisfied with their inability to realize their dreams of attacking the Italians in Greece and subjugating Albania with French support (General Weygand), staged a coup, eliminating the Regency and proclaiming the adolescent Peter II King of Yugoslavia.

The coup impressed Hitler, jeopardizing his dream of regaining the leading role in that part of the world, a role once held by Habsburg Vienna. Irritated by this Serbian attitude, Hitler issued Instruction No. 25 to his political and military collaborators, ordering the destruction of Yugoslavia on the very day of the coup, March 25, 1941. In view of the imminent attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler wanted to destroy Yugoslavia with a swift action, both to impress the adversary and to avoid wasting precious time.

In this respect, Hitler was entirely successful. The occupation of the country, the author states, was possible because "the Yugoslav army could not understand... much less implement a genuine defense plan along its disproportionately large borders, lacking any natural or traditional advantages." V. Dedijer, Tito's official historian, accuses the Serbian bourgeoisie and dynasty of having betrayed the true "national" and "class" interests of the Yugoslav people.

Apart from these causes, the French author says: "...another one is added, undoubtedly the most serious. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which twelve years later was christened Yugoslavia!—a multinational creation of the Treaty of Versailles—did not withstand the test of war and defeat. All the peoples grouped under the name of "South Slavs" did not see the defeat of the Serbian apparatus as an irremediable catastrophe.

The Slovenes welcomed the Germans, and "entire Croatian units, due to their traditional hatred of the Serbs, refused to fight or went over to the enemy" (p. 38). From this moment on, Hitler had to provide some solution to such complex problems and interests, which until then had not been addressed due to a lack of understanding, especially regarding "the Croatian question."

Aside from the destruction of Yugoslavia, it is worth highlighting some moments, emphasized by the author, which undoubtedly form part of his attempt at revision and A correction to history. V. Dedijer states that approximately 3,000 people were killed in Belgrade by German air raids, but many more perished under the ruins.

The German historian W. Görlitz estimates the number of victims at 15,000 to 20,000, while the historian Alan Palmer puts the figure at 17,000. Bernard George adds his opinion: "This number pales in comparison to the 135,000 who died, burned alive by phosphorus in Dresden on February 13 and 14, 1945," citing the English historian David Irving's *The Destruction of Dresden* (in Hiroshima there were 71,000 deaths).

Stalin's Russia, which had recently signed a pact of assistance with Yugoslavia, turned its back on it during the German attack. On April 13, 1941, Stalin himself, upon seeing the German military officer Hans von Krebs at the Moscow train station, patted him on the shoulder and said, "We will always be friends, won't we?"

As for the "legend" Hitler had created about Croatia, it's worth remembering that Instruction 26, in which Hitler outlined the fate of the Yugoslav territory, makes no mention of Croatia whatsoever. This historical document irrefutably refutes the legend perpetuated by the Serbs.

When referring specifically to the Croatian question, the author quotes the surprised words of former Austrian Federal Minister and former Austro-Hungarian army officer H. Neubacher regarding Hitler's and his foreign minister's lack of geographical knowledge of the Balkans when asked if Croatia was part of the Balkans. Neubacher, who commanded a Croatian unit in the First World War, knew Croatia and Serbia well, which qualified him to say that Croatia did not belong to the Balkan world.

There is a geographical concept of the Balkans, B. George continues, and another cultural-political one. This distinction is inextricably linked to Eastern and Western influences, respectively. "One of the essential internal dividing lines of Europe is the line between the Western and Eastern spheres of influence." Thus, Hungary escaped being considered part of the Balkans, while Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia did not. But

the case of Yugoslavia, a recent creation, presents a special problem. Indeed, Serbia was Byzantine under the Eastern Empire, Croatia was not. Serbia suffered under Turkish rule, Croatia was not. Serbia was outside the Austro-Hungarian borders, Croatia was not. This phenomenon explains the permanent fragmentation of the Yugoslav state after its creation (1918), and at the heart of these intractable problems lies the Croatian question" (p. 44). To clarify his thesis, which is certainly correct, the author presents a brief historical-genetic account of the Croatian question. Yugoslavia, according to him, is a "historical anecdote" in a much more accurate sense than Belgium, as General de Gaulle had described its case:

"Although there was an ethnic group... called South Slavs: the Slovenes, the Croats, the Serbs, the Bulgarians, the Macedonians (the Montenegrins who are Serbs and the Bosniaks who are Croats), they never formed a common state." With the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, the unification of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs into a common state "was by no means a political consequence that had to arise on its own...:"

This State "owes its birth to the will of the victorious powers in 1918... The cultural and character differences that existed, of course, between the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes were a factor contrary to the formation of a common State." Speaking of the similarity, almost the identity, of the Croatian and Serbian languages, the author adds: "...but on the cultural level, these two peoples are quite separated by those lines of division that we in Europe invoke: the Croats belong to the Western Latin world, the Serbs to the Eastern Byzantine world.

While the Croats follow the Roman rite, the Serbs are part of the Slavic Orthodox Christian world. Thus, one of the symbols of divergent cultural tendencies is that the Croats use the Latin script and the Serbs use Cyrillic characters. These differences within their very similarities have given rise to a true mutual hatred." There were, among both sides, especially among the Croats, superior spirits who made efforts to mitigate it, but without much success” (pp. 43 and 45).

In the following passage by the French author, which we reproduce here, there is an inaccuracy and a truth, which we will specify immediately: “The Croats retained their independence only for a short time, achieved at the beginning of the Middle Ages. The territories that were the cradle of the Croatian nation quickly fell under the sovereignty of the Hungarian crown. Dalmatia was a Venetian colony for a long time. Bosnia and Herzegovina remained Turkish until 1878.”

The indisputable truth is the accurate enumeration of the Croatian national territories, including the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The inaccuracy lies in the claim that Croatia quickly lost its independence. Croatia remained sovereign under its own kings from the 8th century until 1102, when it concluded the “Personal Union” with Hungary.

The Croats recognized the Hungarian kings, while retaining complete sovereignty within their own kingdom. Considering the state structure of the time—without a central administrative apparatus, a stable and centralized army, or central finances—the Croatian feudal nobles, with the Ban at their head as prorex, effectively enjoyed complete sovereignty.

This personal union, during the centuries of Turkish siege and subsequent hardships—the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 4,000,000 Croats killed on the battlefield and taken captive—gradually transformed into an increasingly real union. The common defense against the Turks was the primary cause.

For the same reason, in 1527, the two nations recognized the sovereignty of the Austrian throne. From that moment on, the Habsburgs assumed the role of the most responsible organizers of the defense against the Ottoman invasion. Only when this danger diminished and the idea of modern nationalism arose did the Croats and Hungarians begin to distance themselves from Austria. Vienna, in turn, sought to give this multinational community an Austro-German character and identity.

This was a moment of great influence for the Croats and Hungarians in an Austro-centrifugal direction. In the contradictory vicissitudes of the 19th century, the Croats and Hungarians had completely separated in 1848; reuniting with Austria in 1867 and 1868, respectively, only to completely dissolve that great community in the service of Western culture and Christianity in 1918. It is true that the Hungarians in 1867 and 1868 had achieved a greater degree of independence than the Croats, but the Croatian people had not lost their awareness of their rights or the objective of their national struggle. Croatia at that time was still at the climactic and most tragic point in its history, which we call the state of "relics of former reigns of Croatia."

The Turks had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Venice had annexed Dalmatia, and Austria had annexed the Napoleonic succession along with Dalmatia, which had severely weakened the Croatian people.

It is an inevitable law of human history that physical and numerical weakness is also reflected in politics. Nevertheless, the Croats never completely lost their sovereignty until 1918. Therefore, the French author is right, even if partially detrimental to us, when he states: "Under the crown of Saint Stephen, that is, within the framework of Hungary, the Croats enjoyed a certain autonomy..." With this, he somewhat rectifies his earlier assertion about the supposed "rapid loss" of our independence. The terms and concepts used here are quite different and almost inapplicable to that period and those conditions.

A State Without Legal Existence

In addressing the problem of the formation of the Yugoslav state in 1918, the author accurately captures the facts and provides a fitting interpretation. The so-called "People's Council" and the pro-Yugoslav politicians in Croatia at that time were anything but a "democratic representation of the Croatian people."

The union with the Serbs on December 19, 1918, carried out by these men without representative character, in reality constituted a "coup d'état" in Croatia. "The mass of the Croatian people did not support this decision, achieved through highly undemocratic means. The people found themselves facing a fait accompli."

The first Croatian victims of the struggle for independence fell for protesting. "The Constitution called Vidovdan" was drafted without the slightest contribution from Croatian representatives. Only six years after the formation of the new kingdom was the risk taken to calling general elections.

The result revealed the complete absence in Croatia of the idea of a common state, because the party that opposed it as an open adversary was a clear victor in this electoral struggle: the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, whose leader was Esteban Radić. From that moment on, he became a legendary leader of Croatian nationalism. The Croatian deputies were excluded from the Belgrade parliament to clearly demonstrate that they considered this new state to be a state without legal existence" (pp. 48 and 49).

The differences between the two peoples became increasingly evident. The conflict was escalating. In 1925, the Serbian Minister of the Interior, M. Drašković, was assassinated by communists. The Serbian government, under the pretext of fighting communism, decreed the so-called "Obznana," an exceptional semi-legislative measure, directed primarily "against Croatian nationalism."

"Croatian national parties and organizations, including all associations of a religious nature, were dissolved as hostile to the state, even though they... had nothing to do with the assassination. Their leaders were arrested." "It was French intervention, not these measures, that prevented civil war and the destruction of the new state. Under French pressure, Radić recognized the Serbian dynasty of Karageorgevich and removed the term 'republican' from his party's name.

He himself was appointed Minister of National Education, and his deputies entered the Serbian parliament. But nevertheless, the struggle continued." Thus, on June 20, 1928, a catastrophe with grave consequences unfolded, an unprecedented event in the history of European parliamentarism. During a session of the "Skupština" (parliament), Deputy P. Račić fired several shots at Esteban Radić and his neighbors... This attack by a Serbian fanatic reopened the chasm between the two camps.

All the Croatian deputies left the Belgrade Skupština. The words Radić uttered on his deathbed, “Never to Belgrade!”, were considered his testament and his daily command, bequeathed to the entire Croatian people” (p. 50). Afterwards, the “royal dictatorship” was established (January 6, 1929), which the author aptly calls “the Serbian dictatorship.” All political activity was banned, and Croatian political parties and organizations were dissolved. “By opting for Serbian centralism, the king thus deprived himself of any possibility of overcoming the state crisis by negotiating and seeking a compromise with the Croats.

This decision, of course, also meant his own death sentence. From this moment on, his elimination was a foregone conclusion. Croatian nationalism reached its peak. A radical faction emerged, surpassing the demands of the peasant party.” Shortly after Radić's assassination, Dr. Ante Pavelić, a Croatian lawyer and national deputy, founded the secret revolutionary and nationalist organization Ustaša, derived from the word meaning "rebel, insurgents" (p. 50).

The author immediately highlights Pavelić's anti-Yugoslav activity, his flight abroad, his prior organization of the National Civil Guard, and his defense of the Macedonian rebels against Belgrade's accusations, which earned him invaluable Macedonian friendship. Due to a lack of assassins among the Croats, the author says, it was the Macedonians who lent them their man, who killed Alexander Karageorgievich and the French minister Barthou in 1934.

In his exile, the author says, Pavelić sought only to draw world attention to the Croatian cause, while Hungary and Italy had other plans. With the assassination, he achieved what he sought. "In Western countries, Yugoslavia's political and economic standing plummeted." Both at home and abroad, people wondered whether Yugoslavia could hold on" (p. 53). Accepting the idea (of Meštrović, even though he doesn't mention it) that King Alexander, the main supporter of the Serbian dictatorship, intended to return to democratic constitutional life by granting free elections, the Regency did indeed call the people to elections in 1935, in which the leader of the opposition, the Croatian leader and Radić's successor—Dr. Maček—inflicted a tremendous moral defeat on the regime.

Thus came the period of 1938-39. During this period, Germany had annexed Austria, Bohemia, and Moravia, rendering the Little Entente, on which Yugoslavia based its foreign policy, useless. "Therefore, from now on, the Yugoslav political leaders are attempting a political reorientation towards Germany and Italy," on which their security largely depended. "The Croatian leaders found themselves forced to adopt the same attitude" (p. 55).

In trying, they found that "most of those interested in these matters were pro-Serve. The central figure was Georing himself, who was very warmly received and entertained during his visit to Belgrade. The organizer of these lavish receptions was the German Consul General in Belgrade, Franz Neuhausen.

From that moment on, his word carried more weight in the German Foreign Ministry than that of Ambassador Viktor von Heeren. The Croats found some understanding only within the ranks of the secret service, especially among officials of Austrian origin,

The Croatian Question at the Heart of the Matter

When Hitler began to resolve the complex Yugoslav problem, "whose essential part was the Croatian question," his hands were tied. It was the Duce of Italian fascism who considered himself the most interested party and the one authorized to have his say. Mussolini, in fact, attempted, through two secret agents, to find a solution with Dr. Maček, who, after hesitating, rejected the Italian offer as unacceptable.

Pavelić, being in exile in Italy, had, according to the author, to accept the imposed conditions. But, he later adds: "Ciano stated... that Pavelić had promised Italy that he could definitively extend its sovereignty over the entire (Adriatic) coast with the exception of a few cities." Pavelić, for his part, declared that he never considered anything other than a temporary handover of some footholds for the Italian navy (pp. 57 and 58). Without investigating the objective reality in this regard, the author states that this very dispute was the fatal cause of Italo-Croatian and Italo-German relations. Italy made a grave error in unleashing the war in the Balkans, seeking to eliminate its "German ally."

Therefore, the Germans understood that it was in their interest to deal directly with the Croats. After the Italian failure in Greece, Yugoslavia fell into the German sphere of influence. Mussolini and Ciano had to relinquish control of Yugoslavia after the meeting in Oberskelberg (November 18, 1940) with Hitler, "even though nothing was signed in writing." The Germans could have seized the opportunity and, in contact with Dr. Maček, head of the Croatian peasant party, created an independent state without Italian interference. But Ribbentrop was opposed to such a step, which was advocated by Rosenberg, head of foreign policy for the National Socialist party (p. 59).

Ribbentrop sent Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer to Croatia, who dealt directly with S. Kvaternik, a former Austrian colonel and Pavelić's representative in Croatia. After describing the vicissitudes of these negotiations, the French author states something extremely interesting: "In the absence of Dr. Maček, the leadership of the Croatian peasant party in Zagreb hesitated somewhat.

They were left with only one alternative: either to go into opposition and, contrary to the Croatian desire, not participate in the restoration of an independent Croatian state, or to accept the candidate on whom the Germans and Italians had reached an agreement, that is, S. Kvaternik." Thus, in an atmosphere of unanimity among the Croats, as well as among the German and Italian allies, not without reciprocal reservations, the new Independent State was proclaimed... on April 10, 1941" (p. 60).

Pavelić and his difficulties

The political vacuum created by the dissolution of Yugoslavia had to be filled by Pavelić with the organization of the Croatian state. Along this arduous path, Pavelić immediately encountered two decisive dates in his work.

On May 6, 1941, Hitler promised Pavelić the integrity of Croatian territory, that is: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia and its coastline, Sriem, Slavonia, and Zagorje. The Germans would station in Croatia only the troops absolutely necessary for the war. But on June 13, the Italians imposed the Protocols of Rome. Thus, Croatia was practically divided into two occupation zones, the German and the Italian. In the Italian zone, Croatian sovereignty was reduced to zero.

The Croats saw that the Italian intention was to flood the entire Dalmatian coastline, including the islands, as far as Boka Kotorska. The proclamation of an Italian prince as King of Croatia prevented a personal union with Italy. Italy also annexed part of Slovenia and Istria; Montenegro was proclaimed a principality with a personal union with Italy. Thus, "Ciano's dream of a transversal axis and a completely Italian Adriatic was almost within his grasp" (p. 68).

Hitler, for his part, with Instruction No. 31 of June 9, 1941, proclaimed the entire area "Kriegschauplaz Süd-Est" (Southeastern War Zone). In Croatia, General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau was appointed "German General in Croatia" or "Military Commander, with full powers in Zagreb."

This appointment was recommended by General Keitel. Glaise was a former minister and a former colonel. Austro-Hungarian..., "was an admirable connoisseur of Serbia and Croatia." He advised Hitler, upon assuming his new task: "Few concessions to the Italians, do not allow the Ustaše dictatorship in Croatia, and do not administer Serbia in a formal, direct military manner" (p. 69). No one, says the French author, took these wise precautions into consideration, which later "provoked the war of all against all."

Everyone against everyone

Germany committed the bulk of its forces to the attack against Soviet Russia. It did not devote sufficient attention to the complete disarmament of the rest of the Yugoslav army. In Montenegro, a "clandestine arms depot of the former Yugoslavia" remained; the factions clashed with one another with a prodigious thirst for blood (p. 77).

To explain this sad phenomenon, the French author reproduces the account of Dr. R. Ibbeken, special officer in the southeastern command for the study of the living conditions of the peoples in that European region. The Allied Tribunal at Nuremberg had accepted him, at the suggestion of Field Marshal List's lawyer, as an impartial and qualified witness. His account, while not always favorable, was nonetheless very interesting.

When asked about the relations between the population and the occupying forces in Yugoslavia, Dr. Ibbeken distinguishes between the Serbian and Croatian cases. In Serbia, there was initially calm and a state of expectation. Two months later, the attacks and sabotage began. The phenomenon, a surprise to the Germans, appeared simultaneously in various parts of the country.

List himself was the first to suspect a central, hidden force behind it. Six months later, it became known that the movement was led by Serbian Chetniks under the command of D. Mihailović. However, he was unable to centralize the actions. "This is one of the characteristics of Balkan guerrillas. Every Balkan military leader is inspired by a vague idea of one day becoming a true leader and imposing his own policies. This is Tito's great merit, who was the first to know, with the help of an ideology based simultaneously on Slavism and Communism, how to impose a truly unified organization on the ground," he stated verbatim (p. 79).

Regarding the same problem in Croatia, Dr. Ibbken said the following: “It was necessarily completely different. And it couldn’t be otherwise, because Croatia was an independent state, in which the Wehrmacht officially had no say… We couldn’t have direct relations with the population as in Serbia. Croatia was an independent state, not under the authority of the Wehrmacht, but under a regime in the hands of the Ustaše” (p. 80).

When asked to characterize the Ustaše, Dr. Ibbken said that it was a Croatian liberation movement, but that it later became “a kind of fascist organization.” As for their fighting methods, he said: “The methods were typically Balkan, those of the partisans” (p. 81). Dr. Ibbken stated that the Ustaše were expected to organize order, but they became an anarchic force. Especially since they were the organ of the Croatian government, they prevented German intervention in the excesses against the Serbian population.

We fully understand Dr. Ibbeken's attempt to mitigate the responsibility of his own military before an international forum of justice. Therefore, we do not wish to dwell on the matter further. Bernard George's footnote will be illuminating: "It is necessary to add that in Croatia there were German SS police units—Gruppenführer Kammerhofer—that answered only to the authority of Himmler himself" (p. 82).

Origin of the Guerrillas

In response to the Tribunal's question about the extensive activity of the guerrillas, Dr. Ibbeken replied: "To provide a sociological explanation for their sudden and forceful emergence on the political scene of the Balkans, it is necessary to reiterate that the will to fight was incited by religious motives, from which it also derived its extraordinary fanatical character.

This particularly pronounced fragmentation of the guerrilla groups, their disorganized and self-initiated actions, and their conduct of warfare even in the smallest villages and high mountains can only be explained by the character of the people themselves. The Balkans, especially the central region of Serbia and Croatia, lived and continue to live according to the principles of a patriarchal order; that is to say, the family is the true political cell within which human beings are accustomed to live and think."

The smallest community there represents the most important authority he knows. The order of the head of the family, the leader of a "tribe" of about fifty people, is sacred. Such an authority need only say, "Tomorrow a rock must be thrown at the first truck that passes," and that will be enough for this would-be assassin to be executed the next day...

The guerrillas were recruited in the Balkans from a population accustomed to living by the idea of blood vengeance. One could almost write the history of the Balkans during these last five years, and that of the last five centuries, as a history of blood vengeance on one side or the other” (p. 86). Noting that this “atomization” of forces had only been surpassed by Tito, Dr. Ibbeken says that this fact did not contribute to mitigating the conflicts.

It intensified them even further, with the people fighting on one side with the četniks, on the other with the Ustaše, and on the other with the Wehrmacht. “What school did this population belong to that produced so many snipers?” the Tribunal asked Dr. Ibbeken. He replied: “This school is a product of centuries. To tell the truth, the guerrillas, taken one by one, have no need of a school. The condition of being a sniper is a tradition there.

It dates back to the time when these unfortunate peoples were enslaved by the Turks for centuries: the time when what was called the hajduk was formed.” The tradition of this hajduk is still alive today in folk and heroic songs, in literature, and in all the political conceptions of the Balkan people” (p. 87). Regarding the extent of the partisan movement, Dr. Ibbeken said: “To be a guerrilla fighter, one needed weapons above all else.

The Balkan man is accustomed to possessing his own firearms or bladed weapons. His first thought, when foreign troops invade, is not to surrender his weapons but to hide them even better. That is why, immediately after the campaign ended and the Yugoslav army capitulated, a considerable number of weapons were scattered throughout the country.” This was child's play for a population living in isolated villages, one might say created specifically for guerrilla warfare..." (p. 87).

- Dr. Ibbeken expressly attributes a scientific, rather than purely personal, character to this account.

At the end of the chapter "The War of All Against All," Bernard George concludes: "The cruelty in southeastern Europe was distributed in the best way in the world" (p. 100). But despite everything, and under the influence of historians W. Hagen and W. Goerlitz, German military accounts, and especially Dr. Ibbeken and H. Neubachen, who, we might say, belongs to the pro-Serbian camp, Bernard George adopts their opinion that Serbia, "humiliated and mutilated," represented at that time almost a factor of security against "turbulent Croatia, brimming with pride, with a passion for revenge for prolonged oppression, and, it must be said, with courage" (p. 100).

Before offering a critical assessment of these theses, we wished to publicly acknowledge our great debt to the French author for having refuted the infamous C. Malaparte regarding the "affair" of a basket full of human eyes on Pavelić's desk. Bernard George, lacking the necessary literature to characterize Pavelić's personality, has resorted to Malaparte's book Kaput, but with respect to this detail he says: "No serious witness, certainly, will attest to this legend about a basket of eyes, which surpasses even the disasters of war." One must take into account the enthusiastic Mediterranean lyricism, the inevitable lie of Ulysses” (p. 98).

A false thesis on persecutions

The aforementioned authors, as well as Bernard George, attribute the persecutions of the Serbs for confessional reasons, “the holy war,” to the Croats, especially the Ustaše, which is absolutely inaccurate. Dr. Ibbeken says the same regarding the guerrilla movement, highlighting and explaining at the same time the fanatical nature of their struggles. Here we must say: qui bene distinguit, bene docet. One must distinguish between the Croats and the Serbs.

The guerrilla movements were Serbian movements. First came the nationalists, of whom it can be said simply that they were guided by their Serbian-religious-Orthodox nationalism. The communist partisans, in their pure Marxist sense, were far removed from religious contamination. Later, Marxism, Serbian nationalism, and religious fanaticism became intertwined, almost by default. The Ustaše reacted to the fanaticism of the former according to the old saying: when one is among wolves, one must howl.

We find Bernard's insinuation that Cardinal Stepinac himself "enthusiastically" greeted the resurgence of the Croatian state for confessional reasons, "mixed with politics," quite surprising. Bernard George has rightly stated that the Croatian people never recognized Yugoslavia as their legitimate power, that they constantly fought against all kinds of injustices imposed by Belgrade, and that, consequently, independence on April 10, 1941, was proclaimed by "unanimous consent of the Croatian people." What could and should have been the attitude of the highest-ranking ecclesiastical dignitary of the Croatian people in the face of this unanimity?

The persecutions of the Orthodox were not because they were Orthodox. This is sufficiently proven by the fact that there were Orthodox Christians among Dr. Pavelić's closest collaborators. General Dragojlov, whom Bernard George calls the "architect" of the Croatian armed forces, using his data on the matter published in "Die Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift" (Cahiers V-VII), was Orthodox, as were General Gruić and the Bosnian politician Dr. Besarović.

Similar cases could be cited at all levels of Croatian society. The struggle was waged between Croats—Catholics, Muslims, and Orthodox—on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs on the other. The reason for Tito's success and his secret lies here, in the Croat-Serb antagonism. To fully understand this phenomenon, one must have a good understanding of Croat-Serb relations.

For several centuries, in fact, an ethnically distinct minority of the Croatian people has lived scattered throughout Croatia, especially in its mountains. This Orthodox population, brought to Croatia by the Turks or fleeing the Turkish invasion, lived harmoniously alongside the Croatian people, serving with them in the "military frontiers" (organized by the Habsburgs and extending throughout Croatia) in the fight against the Turks and participating in several European wars under the Croatian banner.

Only in the 19th century, with the rise of modern nationalism, did they begin to identify as Serbian. How did this process unfold? The Serbian Orthodox Church is a national institution. In Serbia, to be Orthodox is to be Serbian, and vice versa. Under the influence of Hungarian intrigues, especially those of the Khuen Herdevary and Greater Serbian propaganda (see our Bosnia and Herzegovina edition), the Orthodox population of Croatia began to distance itself from its homeland and serve foreign interests.

First those of the Hungarians, and then those of Serbia. "Divide and conquer" had become the motto of Budapest and Belgrade. Serbia sent its Orthodox priests, teachers, and money to spread Serbian propaganda, especially among the Orthodox population of Bosnia (see I. Meštrović: Uspomene na Ljude i Dogadjaje, Buenos Aires 1964). Croatia, on the other hand, has no national church. Its Catholicism is a universal religion, as is Islam, which the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina partially embraced during the more than 400 years of Turkish rule.

Therefore, Catholic and Muslim Croats collaborate closely in the proclamation, organization, and defense of their homeland, Croatia. The vast majority of Orthodox Christians, feeling Serbian, turned their backs on Croatia. Their main objective was to destroy Croatia and subjugate it to Serbia and Belgrade. To illustrate what we are saying, we will mention the case of S. Pribićević, leader of this Serbian Orthodox minority in Croatia.

As early as 1898, in a speech delivered in Zemun, a Croatian city, he publicly stated that Belgrade's policies were decisive for Serbs in Croatia. True to this principle, Serbs in Croatia and Serbia declared in their newspapers—Srpski Književni Glasnik in Serbia and Srbobran in Croatia—in 1904, "a war of extermination" against the Croatian people.

Despite all the cover-ups and attempts at softening our mutual relations later on, Serbian policy remained faithful to this objective. The Serbian minority in Croatia, in the service of Budapest, accepted the role of Belgrade's mouthpiece and instrument of oppression against Croats in their own home from 1918 onward. With the proclamation of Croatian independence in 1941, this situation came to an end, and it had to end.

Now, when Bernard George says that the Balkan population was hiding weapons, it wasn't the Croats but the Serbs who were doing so. Serbs in general, and the Serbian minority in Croatia in particular. The Serb-Yugoslav army, at the time of its dissolution, destroyed entire Croatian villages—Mostar and its surroundings, for example—and slaughtered their inhabitants. The weapons hidden by the Serbs in Croatia were waiting for the opportune moment to be used against Croatian independence. First it was the četníks, then the communists, and finally both together.

The Croatian people found themselves facing these aggressors almost completely unarmed. There wasn't a single arms or ammunition factory in Croatia. The Italians didn't allow them to arm themselves. The Croats had no reason, at least initially, to hide weapons and attack the German or Italian troops. From a legal and political standpoint, they weren't occupying forces. Whom, and with what weapons, could they then attack and pursue?

The Croatian armed forces only began to organize in July 1941. The uprisings in Serbia—by the četniks and the communists—had already begun. The first Croatian unit was the 36th Infantry Regiment, immediately sent to the Soviet front, where it perished before Stalingrad, "covering itself in glory," as the same French author put it.

Consequently, if the Croatian Orthodox Christians had remained loyal to their homeland, Croatia, no one—least of all individual criminals—would have violated their rights as men and citizens. But, as the American judge Theodore Hoeke stated in the trial against the Croatian Minister of the Interior, Dr. Artuković, held in Los Angeles in 1959, the United States had interned its citizens of Japanese descent in camps simply because war had broken out between the U.S. and Japan, even though they had not committed any act against American internal order.

How could the Croats not fight, and at times even go too far, against citizens who had long been their oppressors, who had prepared their attack positions beforehand against Croatia's eventual independence, and who rebelled when the Croats were just taking the first step toward organizing their own authorities? It was not the Orthodox religion, then, but the Serbs with weapons who were the true enemies of the Croats. If the right of peoples to self-determination has any value, and the Serbs denied it to the Croats on their own Croatian land, organizing insurrections, destruction, and massacres, did the Croats have to stand idly by and witness these atrocities?

The Germans, in applying reprisals, according to B. George, were no less cruel than the other actors in this tragedy, even though he grants them the mitigating circumstance of not being the first to commit atrocities. The Croats deserve the same mitigating circumstance, all the more so since they reacted in legitimate self-defense. No one can equate those who defend their rights with the aggressors. Otherwise, we find ourselves in a world without firm criteria of right and wrong, becoming a jungle without light. This should also be Bernard George's conclusion, not the other.

The Italian Occupants and Their Policy

Regarding Italian policy, the author notes: "It must be said that Italian policy in Yugoslavia was completely irrational and indirectly strengthened the partisans. It was impossible to discern a guiding principle in the measures taken successively by the Italians unless we admit that they constantly referred to the idea of winning over the German ally in order to avenge themselves against the Croatian people, who showed little sympathy for the fascist 'Empire'...

"Through a special regime imposed in the first zone of the Italian occupation, Dalmatia and the main Adriatic ports were practically annexed. Croatian sovereignty over these territories was merely nominal." Furthermore, numerous Italian divisions were stationed there, in territory of little agricultural productivity. Since these divisions did not receive their supplies from Italy, they had to live essentially off what was available locally. This led to a "serious food shortage..." (p. 131).

"The collaboration of the Italian units with the partisans went very far, bordering on betrayal of the alliance's interests, preferring to deal with the rebels rather than fight against them. As the war dragged on, the reality of the negotiations between the Italian units and the communist partisans regarding weapons and ammunition became increasingly evident. Prices were even set for weapons (rifles, field guns, etc.) that the partisans used constantly" (p. 133).

In agreement with W. Hagen, our author also states the following, referring to a German-Croatian-Italian offensive against the partisans: "Roatta (the Italian commander) had informed the German liaison command that the Italian offensive would take place in the direction of Sarajevo. Suddenly, without any military justification, he left a sector of about 80 to 100 km south of the dividing line between Germans and Italians completely unobstructed.

Tito's partisans rushed through this open corridor. Subsequently, other movements by the partisans were carried out in such a way that it became easy to discern a clear synchronization between them and the Italian troops. Despite the lack of formal proof, these events transformed German suspicions into the certainty that Roatta was conspiring with the četniks and Tito's partisans, always to the detriment of the Germans and the Croatian state" (p. 132).

Was it, therefore, possible for the Croatian government to maintain order under such conditions? Is Croatia guilty of the "turbulence" it is accused of creating in the face of a "humiliated" Serbia, whose motto—"economy of Serbian blood"—was put into practice by sending waves of rebels from its territory into Croatia, so that, with its established minority there, they could sow chaos and death?

The četniks—Serbian nationalists—and the partisans—Serbian communists—backed by reinforcements from Serbia and Montenegro, and the numerous Italian divisions, had as their supreme objective the devastation, destruction, and annihilation of Croatia. The differences between them were secondary. They all fought only with weapons.

But regarding the Germans and the Croats, Bernard George says: “On the other hand, the partisans bore witness to the cruelty inflicted upon the Germans who fell into their hands, which did little to inspire reason in the Germans when they acted in kind. As for the Croats, they were massacred the moment of their capture without any form of trial” (p. 119).

With this grim observation, the author concludes his book by describing the tragic fate of the army and the civilian population who had abandoned their homes seeking refuge and protection from the Allies in Austria. These exiles believed in the norms of international law, trusting that freedom was the primary objective of Western democracies in the face of communist totalitarianism.

The Tragedy of Bleiburg

Before listing the horrific cases of extermination of the Croats at the end of the war in 1945, Bernard George says: “To identify a common enemy, against whom revenge must be taken, means to invoke unity; to practice revenge is a good way of consolidating it. Therefore, here, the first acts of revenge that had to be committed found their target in the people of 'the great Yugoslav community': the Croats. It goes without saying that the Croats always wanted their independence; it goes without saying that the Croats fought to the end, not so much alongside the Germans but against the Serbs and the Communists.

Therefore, all those who believed they were serving their nation-state were branded traitors, and all opponents and witnesses were liquidated as much as possible. First and foremost, the female combatants, the soldiers now disarmed; disarmed by the Western Allies. Thus soon began in Bleiburg what Croatian authors call “The mass Katynism of Tito’s regime” (p. 332).

“According to the most reliable sources,” the author says, “the number of those killed in Slovenia alone after the surrender at Bleiburg is generally estimated at 130,000” (p. 242). Nearly 70,000 Croatian soldiers were killed in Maribor; 20,000 in Kočevje, etc., thus continuing “the death march” to the eastern borders of Yugoslavia.

At the end of this most sorrowful chapter of his book, Bernard George says: "The cause of these massacres, sometimes undisguised and even publicly highlighted, is easy to understand. The Croatian martyrdom should serve as a warning to the Slovenian people, who, too, have shown certain separatist tendencies. Moreover, the Croatian elite was decimated, and the domination of the new regime was able to establish itself with maximum authority through intimidation. Historians estimate that between 200,000 and 300,000 paid with their lives for this restoration of 'Yugoslavian unity and brotherhood' (p. 246)."

The same fate befell the German soldiers. Taken prisoner at the end of the Second World War, approximately 80,000 were liquidated in violation of all international laws concerning prisoners of war. Something similar has also happened to the German minority in Yugoslavia. From 500,000 people at the beginning of the war, their numbers dwindled to about 50,000. The rest suffered the terrible fate of extermination in one way or another, or expulsion. All this despite the fact that this minority had arrived there before the Serbs; despite having lived for centuries in that territory, which was either Hungarian or Croatian, never being Serbian national territory.

A worthy testimony for an unworthy anniversary

The book we have just discussed was published precisely on the 50th anniversary of the formation of that Balkan state (Yugoslavia). Without mentioning this anniversary, the author has touched a raw nerve. This wound has been infecting the healthy organism of the Croatian people, also producing incurable wounds on the other peoples who had the misfortune of living in Yugoslavia.

We believe the balance is also negative for the Serbian people, who consider themselves the most interested in the existence of that multinational state. The source of the shared tragedy is the Serbian belief in their ability, in the 20th century, to dominate peoples more culturally and economically developed than themselves and who also outnumber them. "Imperialism" that would be comical if it weren't so tragic.

***

Bernard George and the journal La Table Ronde deserve our highest praise and recognition. Their work does honor to the French people. Their intellectual integrity and spirit of objectivity, as well as a clear will to overcome all biases, have elevated them above all "the victors who write history."

Despite certain misunderstandings regarding the details of that complex reality, Bernard George has given the purest testimony of the spirit, whose primary interest is objective truth, discarding all other considerations.

We believe that only in this way will a revision of history, and logically, of international politics, be possible. Everyone urgently needs it, especially Europeans, currently reduced to the role of satellites of two global superpowers.

The author has used, among other sources of information, the special edition of our magazine: The Tragedy of Bleiburg, Buenos Aires 1963.

F.M.N. PHYLIS AUTY: Yugoslavia (New York: Walker and Co., 1965, pp. 251, with 95 illustrations and 2 maps).

Many books have been published in English in the last twenty-five years about the country of the South Slavs, and Miss Auty's monograph is among the best.

Unlike many authors who failed to grasp its importance, Phylis Auty underscores the national question as the crucial issue facing Yugoslavia.

In the first three chapters, the author comprehensively recounts the history of the major nations and the six republics that comprised Yugoslavia. These pages are lavishly illustrated and include two maps. The chapter "Revolution and After" addresses the establishment of communist Yugoslavia.

In the following two chapters, she analyzes the Yugoslav industrial revolution, the changes that followed the 1948 split with the Cominform, and the development of self-management and Workers' Councils, the latter two being the most distinctive features of Titoist communism. The author also emphasizes the regime's virtual surrender to the peasantry when it was compelled to reverse its short-lived policy of agricultural collectivization.

In this "transitional country," socialism is nothing more than "a stage in communist development prior to full communism," while democracy "means that the people participate in government, through elections of representatives at all levels." However, "it does not imply full freedom of political choice and freedom to change the foundations of political power" (p. 209). Statements like these demonstrate that Miss Auty, while impressed by some of the regime's successes, is also aware of its shortcomings.

The author writes: "There were no bloodbaths in Yugoslavia; the excesses committed at the end of the war as reprisals were inherent to the situation and, compared with other revolutions, were not widespread." It seems that Aunty is completely unaware of the mass executions that took place at the end of the 1945 war (See: "Tragedy of Bleiburg," special edition, Studia Croatica, 1963, Nos. 10-13, Editor's Note).

There are certain historical inaccuracies in the book. For example, Glagoli is not a language but an alphabet whose origin scholars have not yet fully clarified. Cyrillic is also not a language but merely an alphabet. It is not known whether Saint Cyril invented it. Vuk Karadžić did not "develop" the modern form of the written language. Before his time, the Serbs used a mixture of Church Slavonic and Serbian in their literature; Vuk took the dialect spoken in Herzegovina and adopted it as his literary language.

The author calls Duklja (Dioclea) a Serbian state. However, many historians—including Dominik Mandic in all his impartial studies—emphasize the fact that Duklja was part of the former Red Croatia. Even Soviet historians accept the existence of Red Croatia; some Soviet historical atlases show that Red Croatia extended as far as the Bojana River in northern Albania. Ms. Auty also does not clearly state the nationality of the inhabitants of the Republic of Dubrovnik. They were always Croats.

Her assertion that during Matija Gubec's peasant rebellion in the 16th century "thousands of villages" were burned is perhaps poetic license. The entire territory of Croatia at that time, reduced by Ottoman conquests to its western parts, barely comprised thousands of villages. The execution of Gubec in front of St. Mark's Church in Zagreb is more legend than historical fact.

Dalmatia was not only "in close historical association with Croatia," but was also the cradle of the medieval Croatian state. The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is complex, and the great controversy between Croatian and Serbian historians still persists regarding this republic. The Croats consider Bosnia and Herzegovina to be Croatian lands (see the special edition of Studia Croatica "Bosnia and Herzegovina", 1965, Nos. 16-19, (Editor's note)) and their Muslim and Croat population.

Auty's assessment of certain historical figures is debatable. The last king of Montenegro, Nicholas Petrović, was a good Montenegrin patriot primarily concerned with the future of his small country. The author writes (p. 73) that Esteban Radić "never became a leader beyond the regional boundaries, but he was immensely popular in Croatia." Radić, before his tragic death in 1928, was the national leader of the Croatian people and had supporters in many parts of Yugoslavia.

Most deplorable is the harsh and inaccurate portrait the author paints of Archbishop A. Stepinac. It is widely known that Archbishop He was no friend of the regime in power during the last war in Croatia. He constantly and persistently lamented the excesses committed between 1941 and 1945, without distinguishing who perpetrated them. His innocence is generally recognized in the West today.

Unfortunate examples of duplicity can be found in Auty's account of the events of the last war. She records the atrocities committed by the Ustaše in Croatia, but fails to mention that the četniks (Serbian nationalists) murdered thousands upon thousands of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then part of the Croatian state, and treated countless Catholics in Croatia in the same way.

In Draža Mihailović's biographical sketch, there is no indication whatsoever of who was responsible for so many atrocities during the war, while the author finds no words to exaggerate Pavelić's guilt. Aside from all that, Pavelić did not die in South America but in Spain. All the armies of Occupation: the German, the Italian, the Hungarian, and the Bulgarian all committed countless crimes. In a historical account, it is essential to tell the whole truth, not just part of it.

In the "Who's Who" section at the end of the book, it states that Dr. Vladko Maček, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, "remained in Croatia during the Second World War." The uninformed reader might get the impression that Dr. Maček was free or even collaborating with the regime in Croatia. The author failed to mention, however, that Dr. Maček was interned or imprisoned by the Pavelić regime throughout the war.

There is some inconsistency in the book regarding the use of diacritics in South Slavic names. It is necessary to point out other minor errors; the city of Siran in Istria does not exist; the name is Piran.

In her bibliography, the author should have included Charles Zalar's excellent book, *Yugoslav Communism*, which, in my opinion, is the best-documented analysis of the Yugoslav problem written in English.

In the labyrinth of contradictory evidence, of the confusing accusations and counter-accusations that infest the historiography of the Balkans, it is difficult for a foreign observer to present an account that fully satisfies all those concerned.

One of the book's conclusions states:

"The question of Yugoslav unity is of paramount importance for Yugoslavia. The greatest 'test' of Tito's work is not whether his communist regime will remain unchanged, but whether he founded a stable and united Yugoslav state that can survive into the future" (p. 218).

On the eve of Yugoslavia's 50th anniversary, this question is even more important after so many events and momentary changes following the Fourth Plenum held in Brioni two years ago. Although recent events have rendered the book in question somewhat outdated, it nevertheless deserves to be included in the English-language historiography on Yugoslavia.

John Carroll University, U.S.A.

George J. Prpić

GEORGE J. PRPIC: The Croatian Immigration to America after 1945, - Cleveland 1967 (Reproduction Center of John Carroll University), pp. 21.

The issue of Croatian immigration to the United States has been a subject of constant interest and study for Professor G. J. Prpic since his doctoral dissertation at Georgetown University, presented in 1959 under the title The Croats in America. Following his work Kroatische Auswanderung nach Amerika vor 1914, published in the Viennese journal Der Donauraum, 1964, pp. Pages 167-174, Prpic focuses on the study of Croatian immigration to the United States after 1945, an intricate and largely unexplored issue, given that U.S. statistics are based on the immigrant's country of origin rather than their nationality.

The author attempts to determine the number of Croatian immigrants residing in the United States, a problem that has been a major unknown in the history of Croatian emigration. He analyzes the Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for 1965 and 1966, examining data from different periods and under varying legal statuses, paying particular attention to the fact that U.S. authorities compile their statistics not according to nationality but rather according to the country of origin or birth.

Assuming that 60% of immigrants from the territory of Yugoslavia are Croatian, the author draws the following conclusions:

From 1920 to 1940, approximately 34,000 Croatians arrived in the U.S.; about 5,000 settled as "displaced persons" prior to the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, and about 8,000 under the provisions of this law. Between 1945 and 1956, about 5,000 immigrants arrived from Croatia; around 25,000 Croatian immigrants of various categories settled between 1956 and 1966. Consequently, the total number of Croatian immigrants after 1945 amounts to about 43,000.

Following the establishment of the State of Yugoslavia (1918), it can be safely assumed that at least 75,000 Croatians settled in the United States. According to Croatian data, the author maintains that almost 25% of Croatians live abroad, which is more than double the percentage of all other national groups in Yugoslavia. Prpic, therefore, concludes that 2,000 Croatians settled in the US annually over the last two decades.

Croatian immigration, like that of other nationalities, occurred in several waves, reflecting the characteristics of each period. The period from 1945 to 1953 comprised thousands of refugees from concentration camps in Europe. The second wave of immigration, from 1953 to 1960, included many young people and families joining their parents, who had emigrated from Croatia in 1945 or shortly thereafter.

Immigrants after 1960 are part of the general Croatian exodus and comprise men and women who spent 15 years in the "socialist country" under the communist regime and whose ideas and mentality differ from those of the "old emigration" of the 1945-1953 period.

Prpic emphasizes that never in their history have Croatians had so many thousands of intellectuals, artists, priests, professionals, skilled people, merchants, writers, and young people in their prime living in the United States as they do now, and states: "These facts affect all of us, Croatians in North America and in Croatia. It is time to re-examine these facts, to examine our consciences, and to ask some important questions:

Can the Croatian nation afford such an exodus without jeopardizing its future? Can Croatians endure such a tremendous drain of their young blood, arts, and sciences? Is it truly necessary for so many young people to emigrate and start new lives in a foreign environment? Are the reasons for emigration primarily economic or political, or a combination of both? What will happen to the villages, towns, and cities that lose so many young people? Who will take their places?

Can the thousands of immigrants who "made America" in this country and live in abundance and freedom deny their compatriots the right to leave their homeland?" paternal? Since the presence of Croatian immigrants in the United States is an incontrovertible fact, the question is how they can help their homeland and their people. How can Croatia benefit from its children living in the United States?

The author disagrees with the opinion of certain circles that consider this exodus a tragedy for Croatia and evokes the example of the Irish and Jews, while emphasizing that Croatians have emigrated throughout the centuries. Prpic believes that North America was enriched by Croatian immigrants, and whether the Croatian nation lost anything with their exodus will be revealed by the future.

Although we do not entirely share the author's opinion regarding the example of the Irish and Jews, except that, in the case of the Irish, he is referring to emigrants from Ulster, we believe, based on news from Croatia, that the exodus of the last two decades has altered the ethnic makeup in many Croatian regions, favoring other nationalities from Yugoslavia. The author, it is true, foresaw this phenomenon in all its implications. Therein lies the political value of Prpic's work. The responsibility for considering the future of that nation rests with those responsible in Croatia.

Milan Blažeković

DER OFSTERREICHISCH-UNGARISCHE AUSGLEICH UND 1867 - VORGESCHICHTE UND WIRKUNGEN. Editor: Dr. Peter Berger. Publisher: "Forschungsinstitut für den Donauraum", Vienna 1967 pp. 230 (Verlag Herold - Vienna - Munich) "The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 - Historical Background and Effects." Director: Dr. Peter Berger, Publisher: "Institute for Danubian Basin Research," Vienna 1967, pp. 230. (Publisher: Herold - Vienna - Munich).

On the occasion of the centenary of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the Institute for the Problems of the Danubian Area, whose quarterly journal is Der Donauraum, under the direction of Dr. P. Berger, published a symposium entitled "The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 — Historical Background and Effects." Twelve specialists address the problems of that political community of different Central European nations, the state community which, in reality, from its formation until 1867, did not have a proper name, better known by its non-diplomatic designation as the Habsburg Monarchy (The Empire). Austrian—named after the Edict of Francis I of August 11, 1804, and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy since 1867).

Two contributors expressly address the Austro-Hungarian Compromise: "The Austrian Law of 1867 on Common Affairs of the Monarchy" by Ernesto C. Helblig, and "The Hungarian Law on the Convention of 1867" by Antonio Radvanszky. Both laws, by their content and, especially, by their origin, signify the end of the struggle between Habsburg centralism and Hungarian dualism, between the aspiration for a real union and the yearning for the original personal union.

This divergence stems from differing interpretations of the Hungarian Pragmatic Sanction of 1722/23. José Tziibl, in his seminal article, "The Origin of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1713-1867," outlines the institutional development of Austria-Hungary up to 1848, along with the nationality issue and the rise of democratic ideas between 1815 and 1848, as well as the constitutional reforms during the monarchical crisis up to 1867.

In his article, "The Austrian War of 1866," Oskar Regele clarifies the international and internal conditions under which the Monarchy emerged victorious at Custozza and Vis, but was ultimately defeated by modern Prussian weaponry at Sadova (Königgrätz) on July 3, 1866. Meanwhile, Hugo Hantsch, in his article "1866 and Its Consequences," addresses the problem of the Monarchy as a multinational state, contrasting the national consciousness of each of the nations with their shared state consciousness as parts of the monarchical community.

After the defeat at Sadowa, the Austrian emperor recognized the dissolution of the German Confederation, allowing for a new organization of Germany without Austrian participation. But from this point on, the problem of the Monarchy's position as a great power, whose foundation rested precisely on the Austro-Hungarian community, arose again.

It is for this reason that a compromise between the two parties had to definitively determine their positions and political-legal status. By accepting the essentials of Hungarian state-legal ideology and dividing the Monarchy into two parts with two governments and a single sovereign, Austria was left without the necessary concentration of state power. The Monarchy lives under a fiction of imperial unity with the legal title "of the kingdoms and lands represented in the Council of State," precisely because these were sabotaging the Council.

The lands (Länder) without representation in the Council are precisely Hungary and the associated lands that support the Hungarian thesis, shielded by the symbol of the Crown of Saint Stephen, on the state-legal idea of Hungary. Although this dualism, according to Hantsch, should have given rise to decentralization and a gradual transition to a federal organization, all attempts to make concessions to the Slavs of the Monarchy were thwarted because of the Hungarian conception, according to which all these legitimate aspirations would signify an attack against the legally constituted dualism.

Thus, due to centralist Austrian liberalism and Hungarian opposition, the "Fundamental Articles of 1871," which promised the Czechs... important concessions. This problem is the subject of Rodolfo F. Wierer's contribution under the title: "The Czech Fundamental Articles of 1871", for whose formulation in many aspects the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise served as an example, which Dr. Branko Peselj deals with in his article - The Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868 –

A legal-constitutional essay.

Dr. B. Peselj on the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise — Croatia as a subject of international law

After outlining the historical background of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise (Chapters I and II), in Chapter III Dr. Peselj addresses the legal clarification and assessment of the Compromise based on the opinions of international and national authors, highlighting the difference between its political and legal aspects.

Although the discussions and stipulations regarding it were conducted in principle as between two equal nations, the Hungarian partner was nevertheless in a better position not only due to its numerical and economic strength, but also because of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which guaranteed it a more favorable status both de facto and de jure.

The author emphasizes that the Compromise was undoubtedly an instrument that created a state community, in which the participating nations retained their individuality and their most fundamental sovereign rights. This stems from the very origin of the Compromise, as two constitutional acts, two independent resolutions from two parliaments, were necessary.

For example, Professor Demonbynes considered Croatia and Slavonia to be separate territories within Hungary "like Hungary within Austria" (Les Constitutions Européennes, Paris 1883, p. 242), while Professor Brie viewed Croatia's relationship with Hungary as "in many respects an irregular real union" (Theorie des Staatenverbindungen, Stuttgart, 1896, p. 70). G. Horn went a step further, asserting that the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen should be called "Hungary-Croatia" and the dual monarchy: Austria-Hungary-Croatia (Le Compromis de 1868 entre la Hungrie et la Croatie, Paris 1907, p. 145).

The accuracy of these statements, which we cite only as examples, confirms the fact that with Article XLII of the 1868 Hungarian Parliament, Transylvania was simply incorporated into Hungary, forming a unitary state with it.

Therefore, the Hungarian text of the Compromise, when listing the contracting parties in the Introduction, omits the designation "The Kingdom of Hungary united with Transylvania," as the Croatian text does, mentioning only "Hungary." Invoking Article 4 of the Compromise, which guarantees Croatia's sovereign rights, and considering that future constitutional amendments are only possible with Croatia's participation, and taking into account that, according to the 1867 Compromise for common affairs—which also include foreign relations—the approval of the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments is indispensable, the question arises: whose approval is required for international agreements on matters common to Hungary and Croatia, such as mutual legal assistance, extradition, and matters of religious affiliation?

Since international agreements of this kind cannot take effect without the consent of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor Croata de Zagreb), the author logically opines that the Compromise thus ensures Croatia's sovereignty in international affairs, albeit in a limited but sufficient form to make Croatia a subject of international law (p. 178).

Furthermore, parity with Hungary was guaranteed by the recognition of Croatia "as a political people possessing its own territory and by the fact that Croatian deputies in the joint parliament could use their own language" (Art. 59 of the Compromise). Moreover, the Croatian flag was recognized as equal to the Hungarian flag in parliament, while on Hungarian coins, alongside the title of the Hungarian king, the title of the king "of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia" also had to appear (Art. 64).

Relying on the opinion of J. Pliveric and G. Horn, the author emphasizes that one of the most significant shortcomings of the Compromise was its failure to foresee an independent body—a Constitutional Court—to which the parties could turn and raise their claims in order to obtain an objective and impartial ruling on the meaning, interpretation, and application of the Compromise, which is why the conflicts had been resolved through political pressure to the detriment of Croatia.

In his concluding reflections (Chapter IV), Dr. Peselj formulates three fundamental positions regarding the Compromise: the position of the Unionist Party, which signed the Compromise with the Hungarians, maintaining that it was the maximum that could be achieved under the given conditions; the position of the National Party, which fought for its radical revision; and the position of the Party of Law, which rejected the Compromise, demanding parity for Croatia with Austria and Hungary.

From today's perspective, the author says, it is clear that the Croatian contracting parties were not Hungarian traitors and puppets, as they were labeled by critics of the Compromise. "Their weakness was above all a lack of courage to shoulder a certain responsibility of government, a lack of understanding of the importance of economics in the politics of the modern state," the author emphasizes, referring to A. J. P. Taylor (The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, New York 1965, p. 137).

Dr. Peselj concludes that the Compromise of 1868 was far from the goal to which the Croats aspired, but from the standpoint of constitutional law, it meant much more than the other peoples of the Monarchy, excluding the Austrians and Hungarians, were able to achieve.

Considering the nature of this symposium, it is not easy to agree with the opinion expressed in "Europa Etnica," 2/1968 (Editor: Wilhelm Braunmüller, A-1092, Vienna, Savitengasse 5), that Peselj's contribution is important "despite being somewhat lacking in its exposition." Logically, Peselj's contribution could have been broader, especially regarding the content of the Compromise and its legal, political, and state evaluation. In accordance with his general stance,

Dr. Peselj avoids any aggression towards the Hungarians, which, conversely, is not absent from some of the contributions. Furthermore, all of this would not have altered the points the author seeks to emphasize regarding the legal nature of his work, based on specialized literature, including recent publications.

Given that the symposium director intended to cover all the most important aspects of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, it was essential not to omit such interesting articles as "The Compromise of 1867 and the Armed Forces of the Empire" (Johann-Christaph Allemayer-Bedk), "The Economic Consequences of the Compromise of 1867" (A. Brusatti), or "The Ecclesiastical-Political Status in the Danubian Monarchies of 1867" (Erika Weinzierl).

In particular, the clarification regarding the laws of nationalities, which constituted the core of the problem of the Monarchy together with Austro-Hungarian relations, should not have been omitted. Here we have, firstly, G. Stourzh's article, "The Equality of Nationalities and the Austrian Constitution of December 1867," with the subtitle "On the Origin and Meaning of Article XIX of the Basic Law on the General Rights of Citizens," and finally, C. A. Macarthny's article, "The Hungarian Law of Nationalities of 1868," which acknowledges as an irrefutable fact the constant transgression of this law by Hungarians.

However, it does not hold only Hungarians responsible, but also national groups with a national consciousness (this law has nothing to do with Croatia—Author's note), since neither party accepted "the doctrine of the Law of Nationalities."

Despite the repetitions, an inevitable characteristic of all symposia—the director was well aware of this—this collective work is a valuable contribution to the study and understanding of the legal, state, national, and political issues of the Danubian peoples. It therefore deserves to be recommended.

Milan Blazekovic

Prvislav. Weissenberger Raganzin: Relations between Austria-Hungary and Chile, Part 2*, The Mission of Count Starzenski, Prime Minister of Austria-Hungary, to Chile (1903-1904); offprint from the Annals of the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, 1968, p. 63.

This study is a coherent continuation of the work Professor P. Weissenberger published in the Annals of 1965 and 1967 (see Studia Croatica, vol. 20-21, p. 208 and vol. 34-27, p. 216) on "The Destiny of the Peoples of the Danube Basin" and "Relations between Austria-Hungary and Chile: Year 1900."

Professor of Philosophy of History at the Faculty of Philosophy of the aforementioned University, the author recounts in a well-documented manner the activities of the first diplomatic representative of Imperial Vienna in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, based in Santiago, Chile: the Polish Count Leonardo Starzenki, "a man of proven trustworthiness and singular expertise in business," as Emperor Franz Joseph I describes him in his autograph letter of introduction.

Professor Weissenberger reproduces in full the diplomatic and consular reports of the Habsburg representative, which he found in the Hans-Hof and Staatsarchiv of Vienna and which are published here for the first time. These reports illuminate a period of Chilean political life and also refer to the reactions of the industrious, prosperous, and well-reputed Croatian colonies in Chile and Bolivia.

At that time, in the Dual Monarchy, where the Slavic majority felt relegated to a secondary status, and especially the Croats, due to the non-compliance with the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise (Nagodba) of 1868—a topic that will be addressed in a separate study in the next volume—great discontent spread due to the disastrous policies of the Viceroy of Croatia, Count Khuen-Héderváry, aimed at the Magyarization of Croatia.

There were protests and vigorous resistance that also spread to the Croatian colonies in Chile and Bolivia, made up mostly of Croats from Dalmatia, who demanded greater freedom for their distant homeland and the restructuring of the Danubian Monarchy into a trialist system, composed of three completely equal state entities: Austria, Hungary, and Croatia.

Based on Chilean documentation, Austrian archives, and information from the Croatian community, the author highlights, from a Chilean perspective, the events that foreshadowed the impending collapse of the Austrian Monarchy (1918). This collapse was attributed to the short-sightedness of its rulers in Vienna and Budapest, and primarily to the elderly Emperor Franz Joseph I, who occupied the throne from 1848 to 1916 and failed to adapt to the new currents and the new spirit that animated his numerous subjects of Slavic origin (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs).

The work under review is a valuable contribution to the study of relations between Austria-Hungary and Chile and, at the same time, clarifies, through the "southern repercussions," the causes of the disintegration of the old Habsburg Empire.

B. K.

JOURNAL OF CROATIAN STUDIES,

VII-VIII, 1966-67, Annual Review of the Croatian Academy of America, Inc., New York, pp. 200.

The Croatian Academy of America, overcoming several obstacles, particularly of a financial nature, has just published its yearbook for the biennium 1966-1967. In this way, its dedicated directors, Jerome Jareb and Karlo Mirth, fulfill the difficult task they have set for themselves of providing English-speaking readers with objective, truthful, and well-documented information on the history, culture, economy, and emancipatory aspirations of the Croatian nation, as well as on the contributions of the United States of America, its new homeland.

The contents of this double issue consist of varied material—studies, documents, book reviews, notes, and information of various kinds—which we will briefly outline below.

The philosopher Christopher Spalatin, Professor of Modern Languages at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, addresses the pressing controversy surrounding the name and status of the Croatian literary language, sparked by the Declaration on the matter issued last March by 19 representative Croatian cultural institutions and organizations, and by a draft resolution on the same topic from a group of Serbian writers (see Studia Croatica, Year VIII, Vol. 24-27, pp. 3-30).

In his analysis, the author aptly explains that this is not a discussion at a scientific and philosophical level, but rather a reflection of Belgrade's tendency to impose the Serbian literary language on the Croats—a language that is, of course, quite distinct—by all means and resources of state power. Although the underlying linguistic substrate is similar, almost identical, their literary languages are very different, resulting in two literatures: Croatian and Serbian, each with its own unique traditions and readership.

Nada Kestercanek Vujica, a Croatian writer and current director of the library at Wilkes College in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, offers us, with confident yet tender strokes, a portrait of the Croatian novelist, poet, and short story writer Sida Kosutic (1902-1965).

A fragile and delicate figure, with a self-absorbed nature and a profound religious nature—which saved her "from cosmic despair and anguish"—Sida Kosutic, in her masterpiece *S naših njiva* (From Our Fields), a trilogy that realistically depicts the suffering lives of the peasants in her native region, not far from Zagreb, between the two world wars, when Croatia was forcibly incorporated into the state conglomerate of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Her poetry is rather intimate, delicate as fine china, like an "impressionist pastel." The communist regime imposed absolute silence on him, erasing his name from all histories of Croatian literature, encyclopedias, and lexicons. Kostercand illustrated the poetic portrait of S. Kosutic by translating several of his poems into English.

Frank Lovrich, professor of sociology at Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina, in an extensive and exhaustive sociological study (pp. 31-163), presents a scientifically rigorous account of the life, customs, and activities of a group of Croatian immigrants in Louisiana, settled in the Mississippi River Delta, not far from New Orleans.

It is a meticulously specialized and documented work, written in light of modern sociological science. The first Croatians from the Adriatic province of Dalmatia arrived in New Orleans around 1820; later, they arrived in larger groups, especially at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.

Being skilled sailors, they began venturing into the Mississippi Delta around 1830, settling in the area known as Oysterville and dedicating themselves primarily to oyster farming and orange groves. "Oysterville can be characterized as a rural, culturally homogeneous community dedicated to oyster farming, inhabited by Croatians who settled in the area in the first half of the 19th century. This colony was continually augmented by subsequent waves of immigrants from both the country of origin and other Croatian colonies in this country."

This community, partly isolated due to geographical reasons, managed to preserve the sociological peculiarities of its region of origin, exhibiting features more akin to a Gemeinschaft than a Gesellschaft—that is, a social system containing components or structures such as family, community, religion, informal kinship, and social stratification.

The author, using a scientific method, analyzes the social system and its successive changes in this unique community, which should not be confused with the old institution known as the zadruga (cooperative), still present in rural areas of several Slavic countries. According to the 1960 census, this community, scattered across the isolated branches of the Mississippi Delta, numbered 1,364.

Lovrié then meticulously describes all aspects of community life in Oyetterville: its relationships and interactions, the influences of other ethnic groups and its struggle to preserve its own characteristics, its economic vicissitudes, its vigorous community solidarity, its mutual aid societies and economic cooperatives, family ties, and the conflicts that arise from contact with the city and through the school between the older and younger generations.

In his insightful work, the author successfully demonstrates how the Croatian colony in Oyetterville, Louisiana, was able to preserve its distinctive cultural and social traits, brought from its native province of Dalmatia, despite inhabiting a region that has recently been subject to rapid cultural fusion and assimilation.

"In summary, the author believes that the Croats of Oysterville were able to preserve their ethnic identity and group cohesion by combining the elements that constitute various social structures within the system, and the elementary and guiding processes that articulate these elements. Despite the changes from within and without that disrupted the system's equilibrium, the Croats were able to make the necessary adjustments to restore it. Of course," Lovric concludes, "the community today differs in many ways from the community of a hundred years ago. But the social relationships and interactions (both internal and external) necessary to adapt to the environment or to protect from that environment what is essential for existence and survival are still present and appear healthy and vigorous."

In the Documents section, Bogdan Radica publishes the letter addressed to him by David Sarnoff, president of the Radio Corporation of America and its subsidiaries, recounting some of his memories of the famous scientists Nikola Tesla (born in Croatia) and Michael Idvorsky Pupin, who "became famous in North America and at the same time contributed to American greatness."

In the Book Reviews section, Matthew Meštrovic discusses the interesting book published last year in Croatia, Razmatranja o povijesti Hrvata (Reflections on Croatian History); Karlo Mirth reviews the well-documented book, published in Zagreb in 1967, Hrvati izvan Domovine (Croats Abroad), which establishes that a quarter of Croatians reside in foreign countries.

George J. Prpic reviews Phylis Auty's book Yugoslavia, and Christopher Spalatin critically analyzes Monica Partridge's Serbo-Croatian: Practical Grammar and Reader, published in Belgrade, and Carlton T. Hodge and Janko Jankovic's Serbo-Croatian: Basic Course. Finally, reference is made to our Studia Croatica, highlighting, among other things:

"Among various Croatian publications, a scholar of Eastern European and Croatian issues will be particularly interested in the work of an institute that promotes American-Croatian cultural ties. Its name is the Croatian-Latin American Institute of Culture, and since 1959 it has been publishing the journal Studia Croatica in Spanish. In this journal, Croatia's cultural and political problems are addressed and analyzed by leading Croatian intellectuals in exile, not only residing in Argentina but also in the United States, France, Germany, Switzerland, and other countries."

"Studia Croatica published works on various aspects of Croatian life: folklore, history, science, arts, literature, and other topics. Special emphasis was placed on the thorny issue of Serbian-Croatian relations. The editorial staff closely and critically followed the evolution of the communist system in Yugoslavia, both in the economic and political spheres. One issue, with comprehensive documentation, was dedicated to the horrific, Stalinist-scale crimes committed by the Yugoslav communist regime in the months and years following the 1945 armistice. This special issue is titled The Tragedy of Bleiburg.

"An excellent study on pre-war Yugoslavia was written by the former Vice-President of the French Senate, Ernest Pezet." Another special edition, published under the title Bosnia and Herzegovina, constitutes a scholarly work on the history of Bosnia.

Despite its numerous, easily understandable difficulties, the Journal of Croatian Studies admirably fulfills its purpose and serves as an authoritative source for those interested in Croatian affairs.

Branko Kadic

FRANJO TROGRANCIC: Poeti Croati Moderni, Milan 1965, pp. 266.

A Croatian intellectual has lived in Italy for about 20 years, and in a short time, he has developed a prolific cultural career. Professor Francesco Trograncic's mission is to present the literary values of his people to the Italian world of letters and culture.

In his work, *Storia della letteratura croata* (History of Croatian Literature), he made a personal confession: "Guided by professional conscience and aided by patriotic love, I have believed it useful and legitimate to write, for now, the history of Croatian literature." This explains his intellectual pursuits. Without fanfare, in his position as a professor of Croatian and Serbian literature at the University of Rome, he has published ten works since 1950, summarizing his research on the subject. Only one is written in his native language; all the others are in Italian.

Two works deal with the evolution of Croatian literature from its origins to modern times, and the rest are translations into Italian. These works are: 1) Letteratura medioevale degli Slavi Meridionali (Rome, 1950); 2) Storia, della literatura croata - XV-XIX centuries.. (Rome, 1953); 3) Antologija hrvatske lirike (Rome, 1953); 4) The death of Smail-aga Cengijic (Genova, 1958); 5) Foglie springi e frutti autunnali; 6) Vladimir Vidric: Poesie (Rome, 1955); 7) Racconti e leggende della Croatia - Ivana Berlic Mažuranic (Rome, 1956); 8) Ivo Cipico: Novelle (Rome, 1958); 9) Racconti popolari croati (Rome, 1959) 10) Poeti croati moderni (Milan, 1965).

All this in 15 years. An enviable intellectual feat with the consequent physical and material strain. Moreover, all the works are self-published. It is the work of a pioneer, a dedicated scholar of his homeland's cultural heritage. It must be emphasized that his History of Croatian Literature is the first work of its kind written in a foreign language, which, incidentally, was essential for the world to objectively understand and delve into the Croatian literary heritage, and for scholars and specialists in the field to have access to this previously unknown material.

The other works also possess a specific value in this respect. The introductions written by Trográncic are not mere conventional and bibliographical entries. They are always essays and studies on the authors he discusses, scientifically developed, sometimes with a completely new approach (Cipico).

Naturally, this work did not go unnoticed by the public and critics, both Croatian and foreign. His works were remarkably well received and resonated deeply among Croatian critics and Italian literary circles.

These few words were necessary to situate Professor Trograncic before discussing his latest work: Poeti croati moderni (Modern Croatian Poets).

The meaning of the word “moderni” might suggest that it is a study of contemporary poets, which could lead to some confusion, because the anthology also includes poets who emerged and established themselves poetically in the last century, and some who died in the first decades of this century (Vidric, Matos, Kranjcevic, for example).

From this perspective, and also considering the material presented, the title “One Hundred Years of Croatian Poetry” would be more appropriate. However, we must understand the title in the sense of a literary school in Croatia called "Hrvatska Moderna" (Modern Croatian Poetry), which encompassed not only literature but cultural life in its entirety, including political, social, and economic aspects. That is, the whole life of a people.

When speaking of "Hrvatska Moderna," one always includes the poetry of the period between the two World Wars and the postwar era, although "Modern Croatian Poetry" died out as a literary movement between the two wars, while as a school, it ended with the outbreak of the First World War. In the second half of the 19th century in Europe, a certain rebellion arose against the old Romantic forms, and new currents appeared in poetry in search of new horizons and new expressions.

Symbolism, with its great representatives Baudelaire and Paul Verlaine, sought new verses, new ways of penetrating the inner world and discovering its anxieties. It demanded rhythm, melody, and music. Impressionism gave greater This demand gave impetus. These movements signified a new artistic expression, new in form and content. Under the influence of this French school, the Viennese (Herman Bahr) and the Czech (J. S. Machar) schools were born, the former emphasizing artistry as its primary mission—art for art's sake—and the latter enhancing the social, even political, context.

The young Croatian intellectuals of that time, in contact with these new currents and their representatives, brought these new ideas into their country's literature and, in their struggle with the "old guard," created the "Modern Croatian" movement, demanding that all these elements of spiritualization be elevated to poetic expression. And so we arrive at an inevitable clash. Two factions emerge: the "old guard" and the "young guard."

he "Modern Croatian" movement, although not representing a uniform literary and cultural expression, has left its mark on poetic creation and molds all poetry up to modern times, including that of the period between the two world wars and, of course, the postwar era. After the Second World War, a new, undefined poetry appears, poetry still searching for itself after so much wandering among nebulous, imposed, and decreed ideas; dictated motifs and concepts.

The introduction to this anthology is a comprehensive, concise, balanced, and serene essay on the birth and evolution of modern Croatian poetry from the "Hrvatska Moderna" to the present day. It is an invaluable guide. In just a few pages, it situates all of our cultural issues, also incorporating socio-political perspectives. Equally valuable are the notes on the poets whose verses he translates. They are poetic sketches. In just a few lines, the author often provides a complete picture of the poet with insightful opinions on the value, temperament, significance, and evolution of their poetic work.

Previous works edited by Professor Trograncic have demonstrated his profound knowledge of the art of translation, but we believe that with this anthology he has reaffirmed this, even surpassing it in many ways. He was able to coordinate the rhythm, meter, and musicality without sacrificing a single original element of the poet. The clearest examples that confirm all of this are the verses of Milan Begovic in "Liddy." These verses read with the same rhythmic ease as the original. The same is true of Matos's delicate sonnet, *La consolazione dei capelli*, Sudeta's *Le mani*, Vida's *Il sarcófago*, and many others. Reading them is a true poetic delight.

We regret the exclusion from this anthology of the distinguished poet of the Catholic literary tradition, Ivo Lendic, who currently lives in Buenos Aires and contributes to Croatian literary journals. Trograncic mentions him in the introduction, discussing the religious, spiritual, and mystical elements in modern and contemporary Croatian lyric poetry.

Buenos Aires

Ante Gazzari

CHRONICLES AND NEWS

IN MEMORIAM OF PROFESSOR ESTEBAN RATKOVIC

On November 19, 1968, Croatian Professor Esteban (Stjepan) Ratkovic passed away at the age of 90. He was the former rector of the Higher School of Pedagogy in Zagreb, a minister in the Croatian government during the war, and ambassador to Berlin. He spent the last 22 years of his life in Varna, near Bolzano, Italy, where he taught at the secondary school run by the Capuchin Franciscan Fathers. Known for his elegant manner with students, teachers, and ordinary people alike, as well as for his vast culture and knowledge, and for his lively and sparkling humor, he was accompanied by an extraordinary number of people from all walks of life to his final resting place in the local cemetery.

Professor Ratkovic, born in 1878 in the town of Glina, Croatia, was the son of a fourth-generation teacher. Almost by some primal law, this scholar felt most comfortable and happy when working in the field of education, whether as a teacher, professor, principal, inspector, or minister of education. After completing his secondary studies in Sarajevo, he pursued university studies at the Higher Pedagogical School in Vienna and later at the Faculty of Philosophy in the same city and in the Croatian capital, Zagreb.

His specialization was geography and natural sciences. In 1906, he began his service in Dalmatia, which at that time was still separate from Croatia and under the direct rule of the Habsburgs. There, as a secondary school teacher, he remained until 1918. Working on various plans for the coordination and unification of school and educational laws in Yugoslavia, Professor Ratkovic was appointed professor at the Higher Pedagogical School in Zagreb and later its rector. With the proclamation of Croatian independence in 1941, Professor Ratkovic joined its first government as Minister of National Education.

In 1943, the Croatian government appointed him ambassador to Berlin, but for health reasons, he requested to leave the diplomatic service to dedicate himself to his profession. The final catastrophe of the last war found him in Vienna. From there, he went as a Croatian exile to Varna, Tyrol, where he taught for 22 years at the Seraphic Seminary.

Based on his studies and writings, Professor Ratkovic was an ethnologist-sociologist. His preferred subjects were ethnology, social biography, geopolitics, philosophy, and individual and social psychology. In these fields of study, he hoped to find the factors that constantly influence the formation of a people's history.

The fruit of his assiduous study is his work entitled "What is a People, a Nationality, a Nation, a Tribe, a Race?" Providing Croats under the Belgrade regime (in 1935) with scientific arguments for their national identity, Professor Ratkovic's book was banned.

The second part of this work in preparation, which was to be entitled "The Influence of Space and Environment on the Development of a Nation," never appeared due to the war and the new positions he held. Only in 1955 and 1956, in the Croatian Review (Revista Croata), Buenos Aires, did he publish a summary of the planned work based on his memory, as the manuscript remained in Croatia under the communist regime, under the title "The Decisive Factors in the Life of a Nation" (Croatian Review, 1955, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, and 1956).

In a publication of the Croatian government offering a global view of Croatia, Professor Ratkovic contributed the article "Some Elements of the Nature, People, and Economy of the Independent State of Croatia" (German edition in the form of a symposium, "Die Kroaten," Zagreb, 1942).

In addition, Professor Ratkovic contributed to several German and Austrian journals in his field under the pseudonym K. G. (Krunoslav Glinski or K. Milin). Under the same pseudonym, he published several historical and cultural reflections interwoven with personal recollections, namely: "Dr. Pavellic and His Government," "Croatian Review," 1959, p. 4478; "Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Time of Kranjcevic," "Croatian Review," 1960, p. 283; "Reading Mestrovic's 'Memoirs,'" "Croatian Review," 1962, p. 420. In "Studia Croatica," he published an essay entitled "The Beijing-Moscow Dispute: Only Ideological?" (Year V, Nos. 1-2 [14-15], 1964). The premises and observations of Professor Ratković in this work resonate with full force.

With these lines, the editorial staff of the journal "Studia Croatica" and the Croatian-Latin American Institute of Culture, of which Professor Ratković was correspondent and member, respectively, pay him their final tribute and wish to perpetuate his memory as a great scholar, scientist, and exemplary patriot.

His time in exile will remain visible; his example must not be forgotten by future generations of Croatians.

M. Blažeković

IN MEMORIAM OF DR. CARLOS ALBERTO ERRO

Studia Croatica deeply regrets the unexpected death of its esteemed collaborator, Dr. Carlos Alberto Erro, who passed away on August 4, 1968, in Buenos Aires, from a heart attack.

A prominent figure in Argentine public life, Carlos A. Erro was one of the most faithful guardians of his country's cultural heritage and republican traditions. He was a staunch champion of both individual and national rights and freedoms, unwavering in his constant struggle for the ideals of a true democracy. With a solid foundation in politics, law, and sociology, he dedicated himself to the study of Argentine emancipation and its institutional process.

Many of his insightful studies focused on the leading figures of Argentine history—namely: Rivadavia, Moreno, Echeverría, Alberdi, Mármol, Sarmiento, and Mitre. "They were," emphasizes the prestigious Buenos Aires daily La Nación, "for his republican creed, heroic champions and at the same time paradigms of civic virtues; he drew inspiration from them for his preaching and his outreach, which was not limited to the printed page but extended to the realm of education and cultural institutions."

His first book, "Medida del criollismo" (1928), was described as "admirable" by Waldo Frank, and in that collection of essays, according to the Chilean critic Ricardo A. Latcham, "a kind of literary theory circulates regarding the differences in how Europeans and Americans experience life"; with "Tiempo macerado," a sharp analysis of an era, he proved, in the opinion of Federico de Onís, that "Argentine thought reaches its maturity"; "Diálogo existencial" (1937) is one of the first studies on the existentialist philosophical movement published in Argentina. In this work, Carlos A. Erro recounts his dialogues with the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, which he later expanded upon in another informative and exegetical essay, "Existential Philosophy" (1942). He was deeply interested in exploring the problems of national identity, and the fruit of his reflections was the remarkable essay "What Are We Argentinians?" (1946).

Dr. Erro taught as a tenured professor of sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of Buenos Aires from 1956, and of continental history at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the National University of La Plata from 1959. He served three terms as president of the Argentine Society of Writers, received numerous distinctions and awards, and was a member of various cultural institutions.

Dr. Erro was born in Gualeguaychú on July 27, 1903. In his writings, lectures, and national and international congresses, he consistently defended the rights of writers in both the spiritual and material realms. A perfect expression of this unwavering attitude is the speech that Dr. Erro delivered at the solidarity event for the Croatian writer Vinko Nikolic, organized by the Saro Ignacio Study Center in the halls of the City Hotel in Buenos Aires on July 13, 1967. This speech was published in Studia Croatica, No. 24-27, Year VIII, pp. 129-133.

We transcribe below two paragraphs from this profound dissertation in homage to the freedom of the Croatian writer and director of the prestigious quarterly Hrvatska Revija (Croatian Review), Vinko Nikolic (who, at the request of the communist government of Belgrade, based on intrigues and false accusations, was expelled from France, and whose publication, edited for 15 consecutive years in Buenos Aires, was seized and its printing prohibited):

"On behalf of the Argentine Society of Writers, I have the honor of participating in this event that pays tribute to and vindicates the Croatian writer Vinko Nikolic. The fate of a Croatian writer, or a writer of any other nationality, cannot be indifferent to us Argentine writers, because we believe that freedom is the cause of humankind, and that, as General San Martín said in Lima, 'all liberal men of the world are brothers.' The servitude of a single man affects the freedom of all men. When a writer is oppressed anywhere in the world..." In this land, all writers are oppressed.

"On behalf of the Argentine Society of Writers, inspired by the ideals that nourish and define the tradition of our nation, we tell the illustrious exile that it is our fervent desire to see him return to his homeland and that we offer our heartfelt wishes that this may be possible without delay, so that he may finally live in freedom near the green meadows, the shady forests, and the beautiful Adriatic coasts of his beloved Croatia."

The indelible memory of Dr. Carlos Alberto Erro will remain etched in the hearts of the children of Croatia who, like him, cherish their own freedom and that of others.

B.K.

LIFE PRESIDENT OF THE CROATIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS DIES

On December 21, 1968, Professor Dr. Tomas Matic, Life President of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (formerly known as the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts), died in the Croatian capital, Zagreb. The burial of this distinguished figure of Croatian culture took place on December 24, 1968, in the small town of Požega in Slavonia, Eastern Province of Croatia, next to his father's grave.

Dr. Tomas Matic (1874-1968) is one of the most prominent historians of early Croatian literature and Croatia's cultural past. His research in both fields and the resulting findings represent an invaluable contribution to Croatian literary and cultural history, and we will provide a more detailed account of this in the next issue of Studia Croatica.

Z. B.

A MERITORIOUS SIXTY-YEAR-OLD

On March 3rd of this year, in the city of Chicago, friends of Rev. Father Ljubomir Cuvalo organized a banquet in his honor. Several speakers highlighted the personality of this modest Croatian Franciscan, originally from Herzegovina, Croatia. Rev. Cuvalo has been working tirelessly for over 34 years within the Croatian community in the U.S. as a zealous shepherd of souls. But this dynamic and affable Catholic priest does not limit himself exclusively to strictly pastoral activity; Father Cuvalo is also a fervent patriot.

The sufferings of his people and his homeland of Croatia are also his own. During the last war, amidst the denigration of the Croatian people and their struggle for independence, Rev. Cuvalo raised his voice, organizing a movement in favor of a democratic Croatia. Despite the unfavorable turn of events at the end of the last war, Father Cuvalo did not give up.

He immediately organized radio broadcasts defending the Croatian national cause, raised funds for refugees, and, with his fellow Franciscans, purchased the weekly newspaper Danica, becoming its first editor. Through his personal guarantees and those of his confreres, he saved hundreds of people from communist persecution and extremely difficult living conditions. The organization United Croats of North America owes its existence to Father Ljubomir's initiative.

Rev. Cuvalo, born on February 29, 1908, in Herzegovina, once again took charge of the editorship and writing of the weekly Danica, the oldest independent Croatian newspaper in North America, reflecting in its pages a broad historical knowledge and, even more importantly, bearing witness to the great heart of a patriot.

Studia Croatica joins in the tribute organized by the friends of this highly meritorious worker in the pastoral, charitable, cultural, and patriotic fields.

CONFERENCE OF CATHOLICS IN GERMANY

To mark the celebration of GERMAN CATHOLICS DAY this year in the city of Essen, Croatian priests also organized Croatian Catholics Day for seasonal workers and exiles. Bishop Lach from Zagreb, Croatia, attended and celebrated a solemn Mass, accompanied by 10 Croatian priests. After the religious service, a large conference was held with presentations by Croatian priests and laypeople. Professor Lucas Brajnovic spoke on the topic: The Role of the Bank in the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council. Reverend Pavlinic spoke on: The Catholic Press in Croatia, and Reverend Cecelja on: Past and Recent Croatian Emigration. There were some very interesting discussions. Dr. B. Jelic, one of the most prominent Croatian patriots and tireless fighters in Germany, also spoke, pointing out the potential negative consequences that could arise from the infamous Protocol, signed in 1966 between the Holy See and the communist government in Belgrade, should it be unilaterally implemented.

A CHILD PRODIGY

Shirley Irek, a Croatian child prodigy, achieved great musical success in the USA. On December 14, 1968, she performed Beethoven's Piano Concerto No. 2 in B major in Hollywood. The piano part was played by S. Irek, the daughter of a Croatian family that immigrated after the last world war. The young artist, who had been performing publicly since the age of nine, was a resounding success. The applause and congratulations were endless. The American newspaper Sherman Oaks Sun, publishing her photograph, wrote, among other things: "The most musically talented child in the world today."

A PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEORY

Dr. Ivo Sivric, a Croatian Franciscan, was appointed professor at Duquense University, Pittsburgh, USA, last September. Dr. Sivric will teach courses in dogmatic theology, a subject of transcendental importance and very delicate in our times of science and technology, which have brought us the age of the atom and interplanetary travel.

ORDINARY GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CROATIAN-LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURE

On January 10, 1968, the Ordinary General Assembly of the Croatian-Latin American Institute of Culture was held, at which the new Board of Directors was elected:

President, Dr. Francisco Nevistic; Vice President, Dr. Mateo Luketa; Secretary, Milan Rakovac; Treasurer, Dr. Božidar Latkovic, Members: Juan Rojnica and Dr. Radovan Latkovic; Review Commission: Dr. Milan Blažekovic and Dr. Juan Hühn.

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[1] Miroslav Krleža in his speech on the occasion of the 130th anniversary of the Croatian Renaissance in Zagreb, which took place in 1966. Cf.: Dr. S. Vujica, Razmatranja o Sadašnjosti Hrvata (Reflections on Contemporary Croatia), Chicago 1968, pp. 19 and 20.

[2] Victor Meier: Newer Nationalismus in Südosteurapa, C.W. Leske Verlag 1968, p. 37.

[3] "The function of commanding and obeying is decisive in every society. Since the question of who commands and who obeys is murky in this one, everything else will proceed impurely and clumsily... It is therefore not surprising that a slight doubt, a simple hesitation about who commands in the world, is enough for everyone—in their public and private lives—to begin to become demoralized," J. Ortega y Gasset: An Interpretation of Universal History, pp. 145, 6, Madrid 1960. G. Ferrero attributes the same importance to this problem: "...because among all human inequalities there are such important consequences and therefore such a need to justify oneself, as inequality derived from the paterfamilias. Except for a rare exception, one man is worth more than another; perchè uno deve avere il diritto di coman-dare e gli naltri il dovere di ubbedire?", G. Ferrero: Potere, p. 29, Milan 1947. Hans Kelsen, in turn, says: "All of history can be considered from the point of view of organization. (Democracy, according to him, is the organization of freedom and the necessity of society. Note:) In this sense, history is nothing other than the eternal struggle between the will to rule of one, his desire to subjugate the will of others, of many, and the effort of these to free themselves from the power of others and shape their own destiny," State Form and Worldview, Tübingen, 1933, p. 16.

[4] "In history, if one wants to go very far back, one must renounce documents, because 'very far back' in time people did not know how to write. There are only the stones of the ruins, which are enigmatic because they are mute, and there are only words whose past origin linguistics can reconstruct," J. Ortega y Gasset: Op. cit., p. 140.

[5] J. Ortega y Gasset: Ibid. pp. 154, 55, 58, 60, 1.

[6] J. Ortega y Gasset: Ibid., p. 44.

[7] G. Ferrero: Op. cit., pp. 31, 35. See: James Bruce: Les Democraties Modernes, Vol. II, p. 589, where it says: "The people decided to re-establish, to put certain rules beyond the reach of the transitory impulses provoked by impetuous passion or caprice, and to make them the considered expression of their ideas and intentions. This implicitly means recognizing that majorities are not always right and that even they themselves feel the need to be protected by themselves as people of reflection and cool-headedness."

[8] Carl Schmitt: Legalität und Legitimität, p. 8.

[9] Croatia separated from Austria-Hungary in 1918, where, during centuries of existence within that political community, it always retained certain attributes of sovereignty.

[10] "The formation of a new State, in its procedure, is a fact or a series of facts that cannot be the object of our legal evaluation while they are still occurring, from the point of view of the legal order of this State, for the simple reason that it does not yet exist and only begins to exist when these facts are completed... The newly constituted State may retroactively take them into consideration and determine their effect. All this for the simple reason that the state order, by its very nature, is an original order, which is why we cannot deduce its norms from other orders, foreign to it and different from it... See: SANCTI ROMANO: Principii di Diritto Costituzionale Generale, Rome, p. 191."

[11] See the article in this issue of Studia Croatica: "Croatian peasants did not want union with Serbia in 1918" by Dr. S. Vujica.

[12] Prominent Croatian intellectual of Jewish origin from the ranks of Catholic Action. He died in 1928 as a man of exemplary Christian virtues.

[13] Croatian Misao, Zagreb 1897.

[14] Sabrana Djela, Volume VII, p. 77, Zagreb.

[15] Croatian Misao, Zagreb 1902.

[16] Sabrana Djela (Complete Works), Volume IV, p. 203, Zagreb.

[17] Croatian Misao, p. 328, Zagreb.

[18] Croatian Misao, p. 231, Zagreb 1902.

[19] According to Croatia, Land, People, Culture, Eterović-Spalatin, Vol. 1, p. 17, Toronto, 1964, Orthodox Serbs constitute 21.4% of the total population of Croatia in the Croatian provinces. This data comes from official Yugoslav statistics of 1953, including the Serbian population settled during the time of monarchical and communist Yugoslavia. (Editor's note).

[20] Zvonimir Kulundžić: Atentat na Stjepana Radica (The Attempt on the Death of Esteban Radic), Zagreb, 1967.

[21] Slobodni Dom, Zagreb, 1923.

[22] Radic received 532,872 votes.

[23] The very few Croatian collaborators of the Serbian dictatorship between 1929 and 1941. (Editor's Note).

[24] A Serbian politician from Croatia.

[25] Ivan Mestrovic: Uspomene na ljude i dogadjaje, Buenos Aires, 1964.

[26] Jozo Kljaković: U Suvremenom Kaosu, Buenos Aires, 1952.

[27] Glas Koncila (The Voice of the Council), bi-weekly publication of the Diocese of Zagreb, No. 8(127), April 14, 1968.

[28] The Croatian Review, No. 3-4, 1967, p. 391, Munich.

[29] Blanco y Negro, No. 2907, p. 34, Madrid 1968.

[30] Mansi, Sacroryum Conciliorum Collectio, VIII, 31, cited by S. Frondizi: The Modern State, Buenos Aires 1945, p. 49.

[31] Christopher Dawson: This is how Europe was made, Spanish version, Buenos Aires 1947, page. 351.

[32] C. Dawson: Op. cit. p. 240.

[33] L'Abbé René Laurentin: Les problèmes du Concile, "Le Quotidien" of 3/9/65, Buenos Aires.

[34] Friedrich Herr: Religious terror, political terror, Spanish version, Barcelona 1965, p. 78.

[35] F. Heer: Op. cit., p. 82.

[36] D. Mandić: Bogomilska Crkva Bosanskih Krstjana (Bogomila Church of Bosnian Christians, Chicago 1962, pp. 155, 6.

[37] F. Heer: Op. cit., p. 29.

[38] F. Heer: Op. cit., p. 33.

[39] "On Liberalism", Clarín, November 13, 1967, Buenos Airee.

[40] F. Heer: Op. cit., p. 97.

[41] H. Butterfield: Op. cit., pp. 142, 3.

[42] H. ButterfieId: Op. cit., p. 144.

[43] F. Heer: Op. cit., p. 9, 10.

[44] Pontifical Encyclicals, Complete Collection, 1832-1959, Guadalupe, Buenos Aires 1959, Volume I, page. 322.

[45] André Maurucis: Histoire d'Angleterre, Paris, Fayard, 1937, pp. 55, 6.

[46] J. Maritain: Umanesimo Integrale, Italian translation, Rome 1946, pp. 116, 117.

[47] E. Ruiz García: Europa de los Europeos o Europa de los Americanos, Madrid 1966, p. 126.

[48] See: A. Toynbee: Civilization Put to the Test, Spanish translation, Buenos Aires, EMECE, 1960.

[49] Luis Díez del Corral, El Rapto de Europa, Madrid 1954, pp. 172, 198.

[50] Luis Díez del Corral, Op. cit., p. 174, reproducing the idea of Ch. Dawson.

[51] J. Maritain: Op. cit., p. 19.

[52] J. Maritain: Op. cit., pag. 23, 4. and A. Siegfried: Les Etats-Unis d'aujour d'hui.

[53] H. Massie: L'Occident et Son Destin, Paris 1956, p. 19

[54] J. Maritain: Op. cit. p. 26.

[55] Ibid., p. 28 and Luis Diez del Corral: Op. cit., pp. 178, 9, 180 et seq.

[56] Ch. Dawson: The Judgment of the Nations, Buenos Aires 1944, page. 11.

[57] Engels similarly describes 19th century English society.

[58] Wertphilosophie, 1933, pp. 134, 136, 7.

[59] J. Maritain, Op. cit., pp. 69, 70.

[60] Nikolai Berdiajew, Christentum und Klassenkampf, Lucerne, 1936, pp. 8, 9.

[61] Papal Encyclicals, Vol. I, p. 446, Guadalupe Edition, Buenos Aires 1959, Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

[62] Papal Encyclicals, Op. cit., pp. 1316, 17.

[63] Papal Encyclicals, Op. cit., p. 1295.

[64] Paul VI: On the Development of Peoples, pp. 191, 22, Kairos Editions, Buenos Aires.

[64] Paul VI: On the Development of Peoples, pp. 191, 22, Kairos Editions, Buenos Aires. [65] A. J. Toynbee: Civilization Put to the Test, EMECE, Buenos Aires 1960, pp. 191, 2: "According to this conception, the individual human being is but a part of society, of which he is a member. The individual exists for society, and not society for the individual. Therefore, what is significant in human life is not the spiritual development of souls but the social development of communities. In my opinion, this thesis is not true; and when it has been accepted as such and put into practice, it has produced moral atrocities."

[66] On the Development of Peoples, Op. cit., p. 23.

[67] On the Development of Peoples, Op. cit., p. 31.

[68] "Our program rests on the premise that the system of free competition has not failed in our time, but rather that this system has not yet been fully utilized." Quoted by Hayek: The Way to the Kingdom, German translation, Zurich, p. 28. To clarify these two opinions, Hayek, a neoliberal, states: "The fundamental principles of liberalism do not have elements that would cause it to become a rigid dogma; there are no harsh flames that would remain burning forever... There is a particularly great difference between the conscious creation of a system in which free competition will yield the most imaginable results and a passive resignation to existing institutions."

[69] Liederik de Witte: Church, Work, Capital, German edition, Limburg 1964, p. 9 - A. Huxley. Unser Glaube, Stockholm 1939.

[70] John XXIII: Encyclical Pacem in Terris, Vatican Polyglot Typography, Buenos Aires 1963, page. 3.

[71] Pontifical Encyclicals, Op. cit. Divini Redemptoris, p. 1488.

[72] Cicero: Staatslehre, Stastsverwaltung, Augsburg 1958, p. 87.

[73] Liederik de Witte. Op. cit., p. 37

[74] Liederik de Witte: Op. cit., p. 42.

[75] Liederik de Witte: Op. oit., p. 46.

[76] Pontifical Encyclicals, "Divini Redemptaris", Op. cit., page. 1485.

[77] Liederik de Witte: Op. cit., p. 58.

[78] Papal Encyclicals, Op. cit. Rerum Novarum, p. 424.

[79] L. de Witte: Op. cit., pp. 80, 81, 82, 83, and 86.

[80] Papal Encyclicals, Op. cit., p. 349, Quadragesimo Anno.

[81] Our readers can find more extensive information, for example, in the cited work by the Jesuit Liederik de Witte, which served as our guide. We also took fragments from the encyclical Mater et Magistra from his work, which is why the translation of these fragments may be less precise, having to be done directly from the text.

[82] Pontifical Encyclicals, Quadragesimo Anno, op. cit. p. 1289.

[83] J. Maritain: Principes d'une Politique Humaniste. "En vertu d'une dialectique internale inévitable, la divinisation sociale de l'individu, inaugurée para le liberalisme bourgeois, conduit à la divinisation sociale de l'Etat, et de la masse anonyme incarnée dans un Maître qui n'est plus un chef normal mais une sorte de monstre inhumain dont la toute puissance repose sur le mythe et la mensonge; et en même temps le liberalisme bougueois fait place au totalitarisme révolutionnaire", p. 24.

[84] C. Dawson: Op. cit., p. 11: "Thus, it is no accident that the period which has seen the culmination of the modern development of scientific and economic power has brought Western civilization to the brink of ruin. For our pruning is our own destruction, and the world is intoxicated and poisoned by power, as primitive peoples were by alcohol, the germ and gunpowder of a more advanced civilization."

[85] Populorum Progressio, Ed. cit., p. 29.

[86] Populorum Progressio, Ed. cit., p. 30.

[87] Populorum Progressio, Ed. cit., p. 34.

[88] Populorum Progressio, Ed. cit., p. 32.

[89] Populorum Progressio, Op. cit., pp. 53, 4.

[90] Populorum Progressio, Ed. cit., pp. 20, 1.

[91] On the Development of Peoples, op. cit., p. 15.

[92] J. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 27.

[93] Croatia finds itself in this situation. Its people and priests have endured years of great trial, fighting for the most basic human rights and for the right to national self-determination. The communist regime in Belgrade, oppressing the Croatian and Slovenian people, was the first to accept the Church's new experiment with socialist regimes, and this same regime garnered much sympathy in the free world. In this way, it attempts to consolidate its utterly illegitimate power over the Croatian people. Therefore, we reproduce here the Church's teaching on this matter: "...Since all peoples have either already attained their freedom or are on the path to attaining it, in the near future there will no longer be any peoples dominating others, nor peoples obeying foreign powers. The people of all countries are either citizens of an autonomous and independent state or are about to become so. No one likes to feel subject to political powers imposed by force upon their own community" (Pacem in Terris, cited, p. 5).

It is our firm belief that the Croatian national right to self-determination, the idea of a new ecclesiastical apolitical stance toward socialist regimes, and the ecumenical ideal are not in conflict in principle. However, we are compelled to ask what the true intentions of Serbian Orthodox Belgrade are under the communist regime. Every individual or nation has the obligation to safeguard its rights, regardless of the most idealistic plans, wherever they may originate. History teaches us that few ideals are achieved. This is especially true in the specific case of Croatian-Serbian relations, where two religions clash—a task for ecumenism—two cultures and two national legal systems—a task for national apolitical stance—and communism clashes with Christianity—a task for Church and State. Croats and Slovenes are peoples devoted to the Catholic Church. It is therefore obvious to call the attention of its representatives to the question of whether these two peoples are living under foreign power. so that they may observe whether both peoples like "feeling like subjects" of Belgrade's power. It is, says Paul VI, a matter of building a world... "where freedom is not an empty word," and that is precisely what the Croatian and Slovenian peoples yearn for.

[94] A. Toynbee: Op. cit. p. 171.

[95] Marcel: Decline of Wisdom, p. 110, EMECE, Buenos Aires 1955.

[96] "The current problems of the economy and economic policy of Yugoslavia." Informator, Zagreb, 1958, pp. 148. Editors: Dr. Dusan Dragosavec, Isak Drutter, Dr. Ivo Fabinc, Prof. Drago Gorupis, Prof. Dr. Rikard Lang, Prof. Dr. Mijo Novak, Prof. Dr. Ivo Perisin, Dr. Mijo Sekulic, prof. Dr. Jakov Sirotkovic, Dr. Dragomir Vojnic. Editorial secretary: Dr, Vladimir Horvat. Participating as members of the broader editorial team were: Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Vlado Stipetic and Dr. Berislav Šefer,

[97] Jelic, L., Dvorska kapela Sv. Kriza u Ninu, Zagreb 1911, pp. 26-32.

[98] Thoma Archidiaconi Spalatensis, Historia Salonitanorum Pontificum atque Spalatensium, in Joannis Luciji "De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae libri sex", Amstelodami, 1668, p. 310-370.

[99] Šegvic K., Hrvatski jezik u katolikcom bogostovlju. Prigodom 1300- godisnjice pokatolicenja Hrvata, Zagreb, 1941.

[100] Ivekovic C. M., Bunje, cemovic, poljarice, in Zbornik kralja Tomislava, Zagreb, 1925, p. 426.

[101] Ivekovic C. M., Bunje, p. 427-428.

[102] Ivekovic C. M., Bunje, p. 428.

[103] Jelic, Sv. Kriz, p. 12ff.

[104] Karaman Lj., Iz kolijevke hrvatske proslosti, Zagreb, 1930, p. 21.

[105] Karaman Lj., Bastina djedova, Zagreb, 1944, p. 20-21.

[106] Karaman, Iz kolijevke, p. 18.

[107] Rivoira, Le origini dell'architecture Lombarda, Milan, 1908, p. 192.

[108] Karaman, Iz kolijevke, p. 31.

[109] Monneret de Villard, L´Architettura chromanica iz Dalmazia, statto “Rasegna vereiningung del Architekte”, IV (1911), p. 9ff..

[110] Karaman, Iz kolijevke, p. 25.

[111] Vasic M., Crkva Sv. Krsta u Ninu, in Strenua Biliciana – Bulicev Zbornik, Zagreb-Split, 1924, p. 450.

[112] Vasic, Sv. Krst, p. 449.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Cattaneo R., L'Architettura in Italia dal sec. VI al mille circa, Venice, 1889, p. 27.

[115] Cattaneo, L'Architettura, p. 216.

[116] Cattaneo, L'Architettura, p. 222.

[117] Diehl C., L'art byzantin dans l'Italie méridionale, Paris, p. 191.

[118] Lasteyrie de R., L'Architecture religieuse en France d l'époque romaine, Paris, 1929, p. 120.

[119] Jelic, Sv. Kriz, page 27.

[120] Karaman, Iz kolijevke, p. 31.

[121] Vasic, Sv. Krst, p. 460.

[122] Karaman, Iz kolijevke, p. 20.

[123] Karaman, Iz kolijevke, p. 21.

[124] Stszygvwski J., Der Dom zu Aachen und seine Entstellung, Leipzig, 1904. p. 1-44.

[125] Jelic, Sv. Kriz, p. 11 and 21.

[126] Ivekovic, Cemeri, p. 413-429.

[127] Strzygowski J., Spalato, una tapa dell'arte romanica nel suo passaggio dall' Oriente nell'Occidente - Supplement to the "Bulletino di archeologia e storia dalmata" an. 1908, No. 1, 2, p. 1.

[128] Strzygowski, Spalato, p. 2.

[129] Strzygowski, Spalato, p. 14.

[130] Strzygowski, Spalato, p. 16.

[131] Strzygowski, Mögliehkeit des kroatischen Einflusses auf dem Western, an Die altslavische Kunst, Ausburg, 1929, pig. 213:… habe ich versucht, das Auftreten der Kroaten auf die Bildende Kunst hinzu vergleichen mit den Anfängen und dem Werden der alt griechisehen Kunst. This hat, ebenso wie die Kroatische vor 1102, bevor Hellas set Alexander in the new Machtkunst aufging, Jahrhunderte einer Eigenenwicklung durchgemacht, die dem Norden, nicht der "Antike", angehbrt. Wir lassen uns einen der wichtigsten Vergleichsstoffe auf dem gemeinsamen Balkanboden entgehen, wean wir die altkroatischen Kunst nach wie vor oberfliichlich hinnehmen und glaaaben, die Südslaven Witten ihre in Dalmatien noch erhaltene, vom Norden mitgebrauchte Frãhkunst erst am Mittelmeere angenommen".

[132] Ivekovic, Cemeri, p. 426.

[133] FAO: Production Yearbook, 1966.

[134] Vjesnik, 11/15/1968, Zagreb.

[135] National Zeitung, 11/30/1968, Basel, article by correspondent C. Buchan entitled "Tyrana attracts the skipetares; Le Monde, November 29, 1968, Paris, article by its Belgrade correspondent Paul Yankovitch: "Demonstrations by Albanians in Kosmet provoked serious incidents."

[136] Neue Zürcher Zeitung, morning edition of December 6, 1968.

[137] Vjesnik, December 1, 1968, Zagreb.

[138] The data cited were taken from the 1968 Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, published by Savezni zavod za Statistike