Djilas is one of the most prominent, though not the only,
representatives of the current advocating for a genuine revision of communist
doctrine.
This undeniable shift of the Yugoslav communist leaders toward Moscow,
coinciding with the worsening of the Cuban Missile Crisis, inevitably
influenced the position of Congress when the foreign aid program was being
debated. However, this was neither the only nor perhaps the main reason for the
different approach to aid for Yugoslavia. This can be inferred from the
attitude adopted by the proponents of aid to Tito's regime: Unlike previous
debates, this time no one emphasized that American aid fostered the evolution
of Titoism, which would supposedly lead to a new type of communism, more
aligned with Western humanist conceptions, akin to democratic socialism or
laborism. Such illusions could not withstand the test of time, so the
supporters of the White House proposal deemed it appropriate to stress that Tito
was as communist as Khrushchev. "It is the plain truth that Yugoslavia is
a communist country," Secretary of State Dean Rusk emphasized. Vermont
Republican Senator George Alken, advocating for "minimal" aid to
Yugoslavia during a Senate session (June 6, 1962), emphasized that "no
senator has any sympathy for Tito, Gomulka, or any other communist leader of
the satellite states." The last Secretary of State in the Eisenhower
administration also warned that Tito would not abandon communism. Christian A.
Herter, intervening in the ensuing controversy, noted in an article that Tito
would like to return to the communist bloc. Clearly, by emphasizing Tito's
communism, he sought, as we shall see later, to corroborate arguments about the
danger of his return to Moscow.
A certain moderation of the terror measures in Yugoslavia is no longer
taken as evidence of a trend toward liberalization. Such a development is not
only occurring in Yugoslavia, but also, and on a larger scale, in its satellite
states like Poland. But, unfortunately, this is not about the evolution of the
respective regimes, which would be plausible from a human perspective.
Communism does not retreat in the face of the momentum of popular aspirations
for freedom, which would prove how weak communist governments are; on the
contrary, it is about the disturbing consolidation of these regimes. The
measures of mass terror and rigid control eliminated all organized democratic
opposition.
Consequently, the absence of such measures is symptomatic and does not
favor the West. This does not mean that the oppressed countries are now any
less anti-communist. They have, however, lost hope in the possibility of a
successful resistance like those in Poznan and Budapest. It is not that the
captive peoples do not wish to free themselves from the communist yoke, but
rather that Western governments failed to capitalize on the revolutionary
movements that arose under the influence of their own propaganda and their
solemn pronouncements about the imperative need to liberate the peoples of
Central Europe. When hopes for Western aid were dashed, the adverse
consequences were inevitable. Even in an unofficial American publication, we
read that the last five years have meant years of lost hope for the subjugated
peoples of Europe, while in "non-committed" countries outside Europe,
they are seen as a period of Western decline. At the same time, the Bay of Pigs
invasion was a tremendous moral blow to all those who believed in the
liberating vocation of the United States.
The prestige of the United States and the entire West was thus affected.
The prospects for neutrality increased, even in the Latin American republics,
where until then, due to distance, events in Central Europe had not resonated
as strongly as the Hungarian rebellion and later the Cuban revolution. American
policy toward the Tito regime, although with negative consequences for the
overall situation, could eventually be justified, and in part, before October
1956, even though, in our opinion, it was based from the outset on insufficient
knowledge of the true situation in southeastern Europe. However, Tito's
insistence "that different paths lead to socialism" could be
considered a divisive factor within the "monolithic" communist bloc,
especially since Khrushchev initiated the political course of de-Stalinization,
at least in theory, and showed himself willing to tolerate Tito's position. It
turned out, however, that the hopes raised were not well-founded. Khrushchev
neither wanted nor could allow theory to be put into practice, so he brutally
crushed the Hungarian revolution. With hopes dashed for active Western support,
neither "national communism" nor the rebellions of the captive
nations had any prospect of success in the face of the enormous Soviet repressive
power, since these nations were, in fact, under Soviet occupation, disguised as
the Warsaw Pact.
The repression in Hungary, the capitulation of national communism in
Poland, and the unequivocal solidarity of the Yugoslav communist dictator with
the brutal crushing of the Budapest rebellion, which culminated in the
extradition of Imre Nagy and his certain death, dashed the hopes of the
democratic left. This left believed in "the evolution of Titoism, without
justifying its indignation, since this indignation is merely a reflection of
vanished illusions about Tito as the architect of national communism, which he,
a committed international communist, always abhorred. The American policy of
aiding Tito, later extended to Gomulka," proved
not only unrealistic under the circumstances but also harmful. It was as if,
with this aid, they wanted to tell the subjugated peoples of Central Europe
that they should no longer harbor any hope of liberation from communism and
that regimes like those of Gomulka and Tito constituted the only alternative to
communism.
Faced with such facts, Congress could not take into consideration the
arguments of those who advocated the policy of aid to Tito, as practiced by
three administrations, two Democrats (Truman and Kennedy) and one Republican
(Eisenhower).
Arguments of those who advocate for political
realism regarding Yugoslavia
The future will tell how the Kennedy
administration will take advantage of the authorization granted by Congress. It
is reasonable to expect that Yugoslavia, given its large balance of payments
deficit, amounting to almost one billion pesos, which threatens to paralyze
most of its industrial production, will spare no effort to ensure the
continuation of American aid. The narrative launched and promoted by Tito, that
there is a danger of Yugoslavia's total alignment with the Soviet bloc, could
serve as a tool for further extortion.
Therefore, for the international good, it is
worth examining whether or not the premises of those who defend American
Realpolitik are justified in this eventuality. Our clear and unequivocal
position against a return to the pre-war situation in Central Europe—which
enabled the invasion by the Third Reich and then by the Soviet Union—leads us
to believe that our opinions will not be rejected or considered the rancor of
displaced politicians. Despite the serious efforts of American
internationalists to understand the reality of communist Yugoslavia, and
despite numerous studies on the subject, the observations and judgments of
those with direct knowledge and extensive experience regarding Southeast Europe
and the still little-known Balkans are neither idle nor useless. Seeking to
present more objectively the arguments put forward by proponents of the
"realist position" toward Tito's regime, we will analyze in detail
the thinking of C. A. Herter, summarized in the article cited above. It seems
to us that the main arguments of this political realism regarding Yugoslavia, formulated by highly qualified exponents of this
position—freer, of course, to express their personal opinions than officials of
the current administration—are synthesized therein.
Herter insists excessively that opposing
arguments are the product of emotions and anger, poor advisors in political
decisions. "Among the many global problems we face, few generate more
frustration or controversy" than the United States' relationship with the
problems of Central and Eastern Europe. He points out that many Americans are
originally from this region, which could be interpreted as a subtle allusion to
the electoral motives of certain members of Congress. "It pains us when we
learn that the majority of the people now living in those countries are
governed by regimes that the people neither approve of nor respect. We blame
ourselves, in part, for not having successfully opposed their absorption by the
Muscovite empire. This sentiment was reflected very recently in the Senate's
action in voting to prohibit all aid to countries 'that are notoriously
dominated by communism or Marxism,'"
Only after interpreting Congress's opposition to the "realist
position" as emotion, frustration, solidarity with the countries in question,
guilt, or powerlessness, does Herter consider the reasons for this opposition.
He does so with particular stylization, always emphasizing the emotional
aspects. These motives would be the displeasure "at the bias of the
assisted governments in favor of the Soviet Union" and "also... the
feeling that the aid given to Yugoslavia and Poland did not yield tangible results
from the standpoint of our interests," so that many American citizens were
asking themselves: What is the point of alleviating the difficulties of
communist regimes? Herter replies "that our policy is not primarily
intended to help the governments, but the unfortunate people of the countries
in question. We recognize, of course, that this helps the governments. But, for
a realistic judgment, we must consider the overall effect, and not just the
most obvious one; the subtle and indirect consequences are often more important
than those discernible at first glance."
Herter then recounts Tito's "turn to nationalism."
"Yugoslavia," he says, "in the first years after the Second
World War was probably the most combative and extremist satellite that Moscow
had recently gained. This extreme extremism created problems. Tito, in those
days, was at least more Stalinist than Stalin himself, and his militancy
created problems of discipline and control within the bloc. Stalin tried to
seize control of the Yugoslav Party from within. When that attempt failed, he
orchestrated the exclusion of Tito and his followers from the Cominform. The
Soviet dictator calculated that without their support, the Yugoslav communists
would soon submit. He was wrong, and this turned out to be his most serious
mistake. For Tito shattered the "monolithic unity" of the communist bloc, and the winds of nationalism and independence began to
blow, their corrosive effects on Moscow's control becoming more and more
evident."
"The break of Yugoslavia with Moscow," Herter continues,
"and its pursuit of an independent course provided significant political
and strategic advantages to the United States and the rest of the non-communist
world. Soviet power was repelled from the Adriatic and Italy's northeastern border.
Austria's southern border was freed from Moscow's control. The closing of
Yugoslavia's border to the Greek communists was the final blow to their efforts
to seize Greece.".
Only after interpreting Congress's opposition to the "realist
position" as emotion, frustration, solidarity with the countries in
question, guilt, or powerlessness, does Herter consider the reasons for this
opposition. He does so with particular stylization, always emphasizing the
emotional aspects. These motives would be the displeasure "at the bias of
the assisted governments in favor of the Soviet Union" and "also...
the feeling that the aid given to Yugoslavia and Poland did not yield tangible
results from the standpoint of our interests," so that many American citizens
were asking themselves: What is the point of alleviating the difficulties of
communist regimes? Herter replies "that our policy is not primarily
intended to help the governments, but the unfortunate people of the countries
in question. We recognize, of course, that this helps the governments. But, for
a realistic judgment, we must consider the overall effect, and not just the
most obvious one; the subtle and indirect consequences are often more important
than those discernible at first glance."
Herter then recounts Tito's "turn to nationalism."
"Yugoslavia," he says, "in the first years after the Second
World War was probably the most combative and extremist satellite that Moscow
had recently gained. This extreme extremism created problems. Tito, in those
days, was at least more Stalinist than Stalin himself, and his militancy
created problems of discipline and control within the bloc. Stalin tried to
seize control of the Yugoslav Party from within. When that attempt failed, he
orchestrated the exclusion of Tito and his followers from the Cominform. The
Soviet dictator calculated that without their support, the Yugoslav communists
would soon submit. He was wrong, and this turned out to be his most serious
mistake. For Tito shattered the "monolithic unity" of the communist bloc, and the winds of nationalism and independence began to
blow, their corrosive effects on Moscow's control becoming more and more
evident."
"The break of Yugoslavia with Moscow," Herter continues,
"and its pursuit of an independent course provided significant political
and strategic advantages to the United States and the rest of the non-communist
world. Soviet power was repelled from the Adriatic and Italy's northeastern
border. Austria's southern border was freed from Moscow's control. The closing
of Yugoslavia's border to the Greek communists was the final blow to their
efforts to seize Greece."
If these premises are untenable, then the conclusion that Tito has only
one path left—a return to Moscow—if the current policy of assistance to
Yugoslavia is modified, cannot be correct either. The dilemma posed in these
terms, strictly speaking, reflects Tito's wishes, as it allows him to continue
extorting the West and avoid facing the choice between accepting the West's
political conditions or unconditional capitulation to Moscow.
We will now demonstrate that the only realistic policy toward communist
Yugoslavia is to make economic aid contingent upon political and moral
concessions and guarantees that the West will not one day lose all its
advantages in southeastern Europe.
Exaggerations by Specialists Regarding Tito as the Architect of
"National Communism"
Before analyzing the premises of those who advocate for the policy of
aid to Yugoslavia, it is worth noting that despite the much-lauded empiricism
and pragmatism regarding Tito's regime, Washington conceived and practiced a
policy determined by prejudices and emotions, more so than its self-proclaimed
realists are willing to admit.
This phenomenon is undoubtedly related to the interesting and complex
process of social psychology, to which Herter alludes when he emphasizes the
feelings of frustration with US policy toward the Soviet Union. Herter, it is
true, is referring to the opponents of aid to Yugoslavia, but, strictly
speaking, it would be difficult to exclude its defenders. The political realism
so often invoked by the proponents of such a policy was conceived under the
influence of public accusations, which sought to blame for this failure among
the intellectuals now deluded by national communism. Therefore, seeing emotions
only in one sector, they seem to forget the warnings of an eminent exponent of
political science, who says:
"It would undoubtedly be entirely unscientific for the political
scientist to deceive himself about his personal prejudices, as unscientific as
it would be for the naturalist to disregard the possibility of error resulting
from the interference of uncontrollable factors such as gravitation and
weather, as well as the psychological inaccuracies of his observation.
Moreover, the first task of anyone wishing to undertake scientific work in the
sciences that deal with humankind is to become aware of their own tendencies,
so as to be able to take them into account when evaluating their
findings."
These studious intellectuals, recruited mostly from progressive ranks,
who call themselves "liberals" while their adversaries mockingly
label them "Eggheads," were accused of having abandoned the authentic
ideals of the American liberal tradition, deemed too susceptible to communism
under the influence of Central European liberalism and socialism. The
well-known survey conducted by Partisan Review of American intellectuals
revealed that progressive intellectuals, under this social pressure, are
embracing "Great American patriotism." James Burnham, a member of the
Partisan Review circle, declares himself a staunch advocate of "modern
Machiavellianism." The views of political science must be "completely
independent of adherence to any particular ideal or moral purpose."
"The United States was called to the stage before the rehearsals
were over. Its strength and potential have not matured with the wisdom of time
and suffering. Destiny has made it master of the world."
Despite the progressives' conversion to "Great American
patriotism," a latent animosity toward intellectuals is evident among the
majority. These intellectuals, moreover, act—as Aron states in the
aforementioned book—"with a vague sense of guilt for their past alliance
with communism." Hence, on the one hand, the tendency to find in "Titoism"
a retrospective justification for their vanished illusions about the
evolutionary capacity of communism, illusions that Stalin deliberately nurtured
during the last war; on the other hand, the need to explain that aid to
Yugoslavia is a realpolitik in the interest of the United States. Moreover,
even European progressives, more aligned with communists than their American
counterparts, are increasingly defending nationalist principles, acting as
fellow travelers at a time when the Soviets view European and Western
integration with alarm, overcoming old rivalries and national enmities.
Strictly speaking, both the American intellectual left and the majority
of the US population made the same mistake regarding the Soviets. The
difference is only one of degree. Americans, due to their fundamentally
idealistic approach to foreign policy, were unprepared to adopt a realistic
stance toward the Soviet Union when, by a confluence of circumstances, they
became allies during the last war with the country that is the world center of
communist subversion.
Instead of considering the Soviet Union as a circumstantial ally in the
war, where there was no choice, in order to assuage their own consciences for
the aid given to an unholy communist regime, they tried to reconcile the harsh
reality of that alliance with their own ideals, and they deluded themselves
about the possible evolution of Bolshevism. This was also aided by the innate
American tendency to view, with 18th-century European optimism, the potential
of countries whose cultural and political processes differed greatly from those
of Western Europe to spontaneously establish a system of political and
individual freedoms similar to those found in the West, as a result of a
specific socio-political evolution. Illusions about a favorable evolution of
communism, previously confined to the narrow circle of progressive
intellectuals, were shared by an overwhelming majority. Stalin skillfully
exploited this disposition and dissolved the Comintern as proof that the communists
had renounced world domination. After the war, the average American, confronted
with the reality of Soviet expansionism, sought to forget their illusions,
washed their hands of the matter, and looked for the sole culprits among
intellectuals, disregarding the scale of the problem and the circumstantial
alliance with Moscow.
There is no doubt that the American intellectual left exerted some
influence on the conception of politics practiced in relation to Tito's regime.
It is difficult, however, to verify whether that influence was decisive. Even
staunchly anti-communist authors like James Burnham, in their books and
studies, omit Yugoslavia from the list of European countries subjugated by
communists.
Both the Democratic and Republican administrations, without exception,
consider communism as an ideology less dangerous than as a global subversion
directed by a great power. Therefore, communist parties would be less dangerous
in their role as catalysts of popular discontent than as fifth columns of the
communist bloc. Consequently, Tito's non-integration into the communist bloc,
far from being dangerous, would offer certain advantages, as it would affect
the monolithic character of the communist world. Following the traditions of
English empiricism and American pragmatism, the historical and philosophical
aspects of the problem are underestimated.
Thus, it is considered an indisputable truth that in Russia there is the
same opposition to communist totalitarianism as in the West, and that, in the
long run, it will be defeated. These beliefs were expressed in solemn
pronouncements such as President Eisenhower's messages to Congress. With this
way of thinking, it is difficult to differentiate the specific features between
Russian and Yugoslav communism and their basic solidarity, despite internal
squabbles. Communism, as it took shape in Russia, is not authentic Marxism, a
faithful application of the theory that arose and developed in the West during
the Industrial Revolution, but rather a specifically Russian version of
Marxism, realized within the cultural and political traditions of
Byzantine-Russian totalitarianism. For this reason, resistance to communism in
Hungary and Poland—countries with Western cultures and political traditions
different from Russia's—is stronger and deeper than the opposition in
Yugoslavia, even though Tito achieved what Nagy and Gomulka could not due to
the absence of the Red Army. Despite all the controversies surrounding the
revisionism of the Yugoslav communists and the speculation about the
liberalization of Titoism, Tito and the majority of Yugoslav communists yearn
for a return to the heart of world communism. This must be attributed to
Serbia's national political and cultural tradition, rooted in the same
foundation as Russia's, and to the fact that Serbia exercises its dominance in
Yugoslavia, a country as culturally and nationally heterogeneous as Russia was
in the Soviet Union.
"National communism" in Yugoslavia presents different
characteristics than in Poland or Hungary. These countries are Western-style
nation-states, while Yugoslavia is a multinational conglomerate, much like the
Soviet Union, of which it is a minuscule and deteriorated version. Just as the
Soviet Union is, in a national sense, the heir to the Tsarist empire, so communist Yugoslavia is the political
continuation of the aggrandized Serbia of the dictatorial king Alexander
Karageorgević.
Therefore, C. A. Herter's judgment on Tito's "patriotism"
should be taken with due caution, if it refers to the national patriotism that
motivated Nagy and Gomulka. Not only did Tito, like all communists, consider
nationalism an emanation of bourgeois society, but he never demonstrated any
feeling of loyalty toward the Croatian people, from whose ranks he came,
according to his official biography. Tito's "patriotism" was reduced
to defending the interests of the dominant group in the multinational state of
Yugoslavia, with Serbia as its hegemon, even though the constitution recognized
five nationalities: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian.
Tito, as an exponent of the hegemonic group, did not champion Croatian national
interests. On the contrary, in the last war, he fought for the liquidation of
the Croatian nation-state and for the restoration of Yugoslavia as an enlarged
Serbia. After the war, he orchestrated an exceptionally bloody repression, with
all the hallmarks of genocide, against Croatian nationalism. He acted in this
way even though, before the war, the communists called Yugoslavia a
"prison of the people," just as the Bolsheviks had called Tsarist
Russia before coming to power. It has been said that Tito, as head of a
multinational state, follows the example of the Habsburgs, in whose army,
before and during the First World War, he acquired military experience as a
non-commissioned officer. It could be said, with more justification, that Tito
is the Yugoslav Stalin. Stalin, despite being from Georgia, one of the
countries subjugated by the Russian-Soviet empire, was
the political heir of the Russian tsars. Tito, a terrible oppressor of the
Croatian people, is more the political heir of the Karageorgevic dynasty than
of the Habsburgs. The latter were, at least, legitimate rulers in the
culturally homogeneous and economically complementary Danubian community, which
cannot be said of Yugoslavia or the Serbian dynasty of Karageorgevic.
To speak of Titoism as national patriotism is only possible if,
according to the conceptions of the ancien régime, the nation is defined solely
as the ruling group or the head of absolute totalitarian power.
Tito exacts a high price from the West for his fictitious services.
Yugoslavia was forced, following the Cominform resolution, to abandon
its aggressive policy against the West, in which it had previously acted as the
"most combative and extremist" Soviet satellite, when Tito was
"more Stalinist than Stalin himself." Even after the resolution
passed during the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, held
from July 21 to 28, 1948, "the Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, and Djilas
group," the target of the Cominform's attacks, continued to emphasize its
loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union.
Only when the attempt to revoke the Resolution failed did Tito's regime,
going through a difficult period under Soviet pressure and that of neighboring
satellite states, moderate its aggressive policy toward Western countries. This
resulted in some relief on the Yugoslav borders with Greece, Italy, and
Austria. However, to conclude that this relief occurred solely due to Tito's
resistance to Stalin is to apply the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, which
carries the danger of considering as a cause what is merely an antecedent.
Indeed, if we look beyond the Cominform Resolution and examine the past,
we will find that Tito's aggressive stance toward Greece, Italy, and Austria
did not align with Moscow's intentions. Soviet leaders dissuaded Tito from such
a policy and, even before the Resolution, acted against him when they deemed it
necessary for the interests of the Soviet Union and world communism.
Consequently, tensions between Yugoslavia and its neighbors would have eased
had Stalin overthrown Tito's group and installed people he trusted in power.
Tito's official biographer repeatedly emphasizes that Stalin was
displeased with Tito's aggressive foreign policy. Other authors also confirm
these assertions. Milovan Djilas, in his recent book, states that Stalin
demanded an end to the civil war in Greece in 1948. "The Americans and the
British," Stalin declared, "will never allow the sea routes in the
Mediterranean to be cut off." "We can do nothing against that, since
we have no navy." This did not prevent the Cominform from attributing the
communist defeat in Greece to the American exploitation of Tito's betrayal.
Responding to these accusations, Vukmanovic Tempo, a prominent Yugoslav
communist leader, unequivocally blamed the Soviet leaders who abandoned
"the revolutionary struggle of the Greek people" for not considering
Greece "an area of Soviet interests." Stalin also did
not support Tito's aggressive policy against Austria, which sought the
annexation of part of Carinthia to Yugoslavia. In his letter, dated May 12,
1945, and addressed to Austrian Chancellor Dr. Karl Renner, he promised the
territorial integrity of Austria. Then, two years later, Molotov declared to
Eduardo Karadlj, then Vice President of the Yugoslav government, that his
claims regarding Carinthia were without merit and that the Soviet government
was still dragging out this issue to obtain a more favorable solution to the
question of the Third Reich's properties in Austria. .
The Soviets were also dissatisfied with Tito's position in the Trieste
dispute. They signed the peace treaty with Italy, although Trieste was not
annexed to Yugoslavia as Tito had demanded. As early as May 27, 1945, in a
speech delivered in Ljubljana, Tito expressed his displeasure at the lack of
Soviet support when the communist partisans were forced to withdraw from Trieste.
Correspondence between the Yugoslav and Russian communist parties prior to the
Cominform Resolution reveals that Moscow interpreted this protest as an
anti-Soviet act aimed at dragging the Soviet Union into war, under unfavorable
conditions, against the Western democracies. This was one of the main causes of
the subsequent conflict.
Furthermore, the Soviets, far from wanting to strengthen such an
ambitious satellite state, believed that the Yugoslav agitation regarding
Trieste was damaging the Italian Communist Party. Indeed, it is widely believed
that the declaration by Western governments on March 20, 1948, regarding the
handover of Trieste to Italy, contributed to the defeat of the Italian
communists in that year's elections, when it seemed that, with the support of
the left wing of socialism, they would become a major force in Italian
politics.
It follows, then, that Stalin wanted to do sua sponte what Tito, after
the Cominform resolution, was forced to do due to his isolation: end
Yugoslavia's aggressive policy against Greece, Italy, and Austria. There is no
doubt that the aid provided by Western countries facilitated Tito's reversal.
What is incorrect is to attribute this change to Tito and present it without
reservation as a "surprising result" of American aid to communist
Yugoslavia.
Without Russian support, Yugoslavia could not pursue an aggressive
anti-Western policy, even if Tito had tried. Croatia and Slovenia, located in
the Mediterranean and Central Europe, share long borders with democratic
countries. Yugoslavia's neighboring countries, Greece and Italy, are members of
NATO. Even economic factors, such as Croatia and Slovenia's growing influence
towards Western industrial centers, dictate that Tito must compromise with
Western countries if he does not want to become entirely dependent on the
Soviet bloc.
With the conflict with Stalin, Tito had no choice but to seek help from
the West. In this emergency, the democratic powers had another alternative:
instead of lending political support to a communist tyranny, they could exploit
the impasse of Tito's regime to liberate the peoples of Yugoslavia from the
communist yoke. The communist regime was not yet consolidated. The resistance
of national and anti-communist forces was very vigorous. The satellite states
exerted strong pressure on Belgrade. It is unlikely that a potential rebellion
would have been treated as Hungary's later rebellion did. Instead, it is very
likely that the communist governments of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania would
have taken advantage of the internal crisis of Tito's regime to claim
Vojvodina, Macedonia, and Kosmet, respectively—contiguous territories densely
populated by the nationals of those countries.
The overthrow of the most aggressive communist regime would have meant
permanent strategic advantages for the West, and, moreover, the example of the
defeat of the clamorous communist tyranny would have stimulated the resistance
forces in the satellite states far more than all the subtle discussions about
Titoism as national communism, which—as we see—cannot lead to the liberation of
oppressed peoples. Instead of yielding ground, another path was feasible, with
serious prospects of pushing the Soviet Union back to its pre-war borders and
then exploiting the latent national antagonisms there.
Nevertheless, the argument for supporting Tito in his fight against
Stalin prevailed. Now they want to justify it by highlighting his popularity
among the vast anti-communist masses in Yugoslavia. In fact, the supposed
popularity of Tito's foreign policy boils down to the fact that the oppressed
peoples of Yugoslavia, faced with the dilemma of either communist tyranny under
the powerful protection of the Soviet colossus, or a communist tyranny weakened
by the conflict with Moscow and internal divisions, logically preferred the
latter as the lesser evil. However, this evil is so great that few in
Yugoslavia and Central Europe understand how it was possible that the Western
democracies did not try to help the subjugated peoples of Yugoslavia liberate
them from the communist yoke. This omission depressed freedom-loving people,
emboldened the communists, and harmed Western interests in neutralist
countries.
A Danger That Doesn't
Exist
Aside from the question of whether the advantages derived from the
Tito-Stalin conflict resulted from Western aid to communist Yugoslavia, we will
analyze the arguments of those who defend this policy and maintain that a
firmer stance from the Western powers, coupled with insignificant concessions
from Moscow, would inevitably lead to Tito's readmission into the communist
bloc.
First and foremost, it is necessary to thoroughly examine the causes,
nature, and scope of the Belgrade-Moscow conflict. Then, we can discuss whether
this conflict stemmed from the personal reasons of the actors and other
contingent factors, or whether it reflected constant social and political
conditions—that is, determining factors that are difficult to alter.
If we consider the prevailing relations within the communist bloc
without prejudice, we will see first and foremost that the Stalin-Tito conflict
was perhaps the first, though not the only or the most important, symptom of
the crisis in relations between the Kremlin and the governments of its
satellite states. Therefore, regardless of the scale, it was not Tito who broke
"the monolithic communist unity," as tension existed between Moscow
and both satellite governments, especially between the Soviet Union and Red
China, which refused to accept the role of a Soviet satellite.
In the new situation that emerged after the Second World War, such
tensions were unavoidable and depended not on individual will, but on objective
factors. Until the end of the last world conflagration, the Soviet Union was
the only communist country. Communist parties outside Russia operated in a
diaspora, in many cases illegally. For all of them, the Soviet Union was the
homeland of the world proletariat, to which they owed loyalty above their own
countries. Under such circumstances, the Moscow headquarters of international
communism was able, in its relations with communist parties outside the USSR,
to practice the Leninist principles related to discipline and the monolithic
unity of the Bolshevik party without major disruptions.
Since the leaders of world communism were simultaneously the government
of a great power with deep-rooted aspirations for world domination, the various
communist parties, mere sections of the Comintern, aligned their activities
with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, subordinating their national
interests to the interests of "the homeland of the world
proletariat." Thus, in the last war, while the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was
still in force, the communist parties opposed the Western
"plutocracies." In the second phase of the war, with the outbreak of
the German-Russian conflict, the communist parties organized resistance
movements to relieve German pressure on the Soviet front and to gain ground for
postwar communist expansion. With the defeat of the Third Reich, the communists
shifted their allegiance once again. They fought against "Western
imperialism," which until then had been a welcome ally. "Lenin had
precedents for his image of Moscow as the ideological and political
headquarters of a universal state.
The idea of Slavophilism, which conceived of Moscow as the Third Branch,
as the center of a universal religion and a world state, was not foreign to
him." The Soviet Union would not have been able to dominate most of Europe
at the end of the war without the monolithic system of the Communist Party,
defined by Stalin as "the total and absolute unity of will and
action." It is the foundation upon which the entire edifice of the
expanding Soviet empire rests. This unity is practiced ruthlessly, despite
declarations about the independence of satellite states. In keeping with
Russian imperialist traditions, the Soviet Union exercises its hegemony in all
spheres—military, political, economic, and even cultural—with evident
tendencies toward Russification. With characteristic Russian arrogance, even
the most moderate criticism of Soviet methods is repressed. "The principal
instrument of America is freedom; that of Russia is slavery," Alexis de
Tocqueville observed long before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime.
This system of total subordination of the interests of satellite states
to those of the Soviet Union—sometimes without distinguishing whether the
interests of the Russian Empire or "the homeland of the Soviet
proletariat" were being defended—inevitably provoked opposition in the subjugated
countries, and not only from anti-communists. Even staunch communists could now
see that the conflicting interests between communist countries did not
automatically disappear under communist internationalism, as many had hoped.
The satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe largely retained their
borders drawn after the First World War, so that territorial claims still
persist within the communist system today. The only territorial changes were
made to the benefit of the Soviet Union, at the expense of Finland, the Baltic states (effectively annexed by Russia), Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Furthermore, countries with a Western cultural and
economic tradition now depend on Russia, a situation justified by Soviet
leaders in the interest of world communism.
For reasons of political expediency, the "people's
democracies" formally behave as sovereign states, independent of the
Soviet Union. The virtual Soviet occupation is disguised by the Warsaw Pact.
Stalin, however, ensured "monolithic unity" through control of the
communist parties, the true power brokers. In this way, the Soviet government—which is also the party leadership—maintains
complete dependence on the satellite governments. This control is reinforced
and guaranteed by the presence of the Red Army. The importance of this military
control is demonstrated by the fact that only communist countries where Soviet
troops are not stationed, such as Yugoslavia, Red China, and Albania, were able
to oppose the dictates of the Soviet leadership.
In the Soviet satellite system, the suitability and loyalty of those who
control the communist parties, and through them the governments in the
satellite countries, are of paramount importance. Local leaders must be
unconditionally loyal to the Kremlin's directives, always aware of their
dependence. A satellite receives light and heat from the sun, while
gravitational force fixes its orbit. Leaders of satellite countries who, in
contrast to Moscow, seek support within their own nation or rely on their own
merits and popularity, are not true satellites and, therefore, cannot be
tolerated.
This moment took on great significance with the emergence of the
controversial Tito Stalin. The Yugoslav dictator came to power as a creation of
Stalin himself, who installed him in 1937 as General Secretary of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia, replacing Josip Cizinski Gorkic, a native of Bosnia but of
Ukrainian descent. Gorkić was accused of Trotskyist tendencies and
disappeared from Russia during the infamous purges that targeted most of the
former Yugoslav communist leaders. (Tito played a shadowy role in this, one
that remains unclear.)
Stalin, seeing the failure of communist tactics in Germany, which had
actually benefited National Socialism, inaugurated the Popular Front policy.
Instead of continuing to attack socialists, the democratic center, and the
left, it was necessary to infiltrate and win them over under the guise of
fighting a common enemy. The same tactic, albeit somewhat modified, was applied
internationally during the last war, when the Soviet Union, due to a confluence
of special circumstances, allied itself with the Western democracies. At that
time, the "anti-fascist fronts" were transformed in certain countries
into "national liberation movements" whose primary objective was to
seize power.
With the war over, in the new situation and in those countries where the
communists came to power, they rigorously implemented the system of
totalitarian communist government, eliminating their former allies first. On the
international stage, the Western allies were transformed in the blink of an eye
into "imperialist warmongering instigators." This change of tactic
required abandoning slogans about national independence and achieving "the
total and absolute unity of will and action" of the expanding Soviet
empire, adopting an intransigent stance toward both internal and external
adversaries of communism. If some communist leaders felt too content in their
role as rulers of the newly independent countries, the principle should have
been applied: new policies, new executors. It turned out, it is true, that some
communist leaders did not adapt well to the new situation, even though Stalin,
even before the war, tried to hand over the leadership of the communist parties
to absolutely loyal people, eliminating intellectuals and replacing them with
former workers, without formal education, but aware of their ability,
militancy, discipline, dedication to the communist cause, and above all,
personal loyalty to Stalin.
When these subversive elements, lacking a broad
perspective, occupied key positions in the satellite states, inevitable
difficulties arose. The leaders,
deprived of the conditions for independent action, had to act for years and
years with a degree of independence (the dissolution of the Comintern) as
defenders of national interests against the occupation and influence of the
Third Reich and Fascist Italy. They were prone to defend both personal and, in
some cases, national interests. Although they did not openly declare themselves
against the Moscow leadership, antagonisms and rivalries for influence
persisted among the satellite governments. Tito can serve as a typical example.
He was a metalworker who received political training in Russia. As general
secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party, he resolved internal party
conflicts, fueled by intellectuals, following Stalin's instructions. He
achieved some successes through his independent actions against Stalin's wishes
and was the first to fall with his group when Stalin, for the reasons mentioned
above, initiated a new political course, introducing changes in the communist
leadership of the satellite states.
During the previous war, Tito took advantage of the inaction and Great
Serbian chauvinism of General Draza Mihailovic, thus bringing him into conflict
with the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, which was recognized by
Moscow. Mihailovic, Tito's rival in Serbia, was formally the Minister of War in
the government-in-exile. Stalin, while needing the support of the Western
democracies, which backed the Yugoslav government in London, did not want such
conflicts. Only in the final phase of the war did Tito have Moscow's support,
and at the end of 1944, the Red Army installed him as president in Belgrade.
He then had to fight without direct Moscow's backing, since, under the
agreement between Churchill and Stalin, the restored Yugoslavia was to be a
sphere of ambilateral influence, so the Soviets could not occupy Yugoslav
territory and have absolute control of the country. Later, following the
Cominform resolution, the Yugoslav communists bitterly complained that Stalin,
while he needed the Anglo-Saxons, was willing to divide Yugoslavia. Moreover,
as mentioned, even after the war, Stalin did not support Tito's territorial
claims. His opposition to Tito's plans for a Balkan federation under Belgrade's
leadership is well known.
Stalin's position was determined by numerous factors, the main ones of
which have already been mentioned. It should be added that Stalin disliked an
overly powerful and arrogant satellite state that, under the pretext of
defending Serbian interests, had united the resistance forces during the war.
Nevertheless, Tito was able to oppose Stalin precisely because of the latter's
shifting tactics with the Western Allies, which were so heavily criticized in
Belgrade. Stalin did not insist on the occupation of Yugoslavia, which,
moreover, was already a communist country. On the other hand, despite the
similar structure of the Communist Party of Serbia and its traditional
allegiance to Russia, Tito was able to oppose Stalin, also due to the
megalomaniacal mentality of his collaborators, so characteristic of the social
psychology of the Balkan mountain people.
Furthermore, non-Serbian communist leaders from Westernized countries,
such as Croatia and Slovenia, vehemently abhorred Russian-Soviet concepts and
the practice of communist monopoly. Tito had the opportunity to witness
Stalinist methods firsthand during the purges in Russia, in which he
participated. He knew that within the autocratic tradition of Eastern Europe,
the loss of power meant the loss of all privileges, the endangerment of
freedom, and even one's life. The fate of certain communist leaders in Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, eliminated by Stalin during the process of
consolidating "monolithic unity," provides clear evidence of this.
Therefore, Tito, until then "more Stalinist than Stalin
himself," had no choice but to oppose Moscow's dictates. Capitulation
would mean losing the privileges of power, freedom, and life itself. Opposition
was risky, but the only way to save all of that. Cornered, Tito, though a
fanatical communist and impervious to intellectual concerns like those of
Djilas, sought and obtained the support of the capitalist West, which he so
despised, hoping for and anticipating its imminent collapse. Thus, the
communist dictator, backed by the monolithic Communist Party, had to find
ideological justification for his actions when accused of betraying communist
ideals. A long controversy then began regarding relations between communist
countries and the Soviet Union.
Once again, Tito was lucky. As is well known, relations between the
governments of Moscow and Belgrade reached a complete understanding after
Stalin's death and Molotov's withdrawal. Tito's standing with his fellow
communists improved, but this does not mean that the conflict between the
Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties, which hold power in both countries, has
been resolved. The Yugoslav leaders cannot accept the Soviet interpretation of
unity, which implies the Kremlin's right to completely control communist
parties in satellite states and to eliminate unfavorable and incompatible
leaders.
It is obvious that Tito cannot agree to these conditions, nor can Moscow
renounce its concept of the monolithic unity of international communism.
Profound changes—not just minor concessions—would have to occur in the Soviet
leaders' views for Tito to rejoin the communist bloc without risking his power,
his personal freedom, and his life. What Red China achieved—that is, the
tolerance of certain differences in the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist
doctrine—cannot be expected of Yugoslavia, a weak and small country dominated
by Serbia, which has been considered a sphere of Russian interests for
centuries.
Therefore, all objective factors indicate that Tito cannot return to the
Soviet bloc and that Yugoslavia's questionable independence would not be
jeopardized if the United States were to modify its aid policy.
The Real Danger
Ignored
The independence of Tito's Yugoslavia, in the opinion of proponents of
the "realist position," would be of such importance to US interests
that even larger contributions and even more detrimental moral and political
concessions would be justified.
Regardless of whether the easing of tensions on Yugoslavia's borders
with Greece, Italy, and Austria served Stalin's purposes, and setting aside the
question of whether such advantages should have been paid for at such a price,
it is undeniable that in the first years following the Cominform Resolution,
there were changes in this sector favorable to the Western powers. It suffices
to mention the Balkan Pact of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in Ankara on
February 28, 1953, by Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, which a year later, with
the additional act signed in Bled on August 9, 1954, was transformed into a
military alliance. Since Greece and Turkey were members of NATO, and since
Yugoslavia was then under pressure from the Soviet bloc, it was, in effect, a
defensive alliance against Soviet aggression.
However, after Stalin's death, and following the exchange of visits
between Khrushchev and Tito, the Balkan Pact very quickly became a dead letter.
Tito and the Yugoslav communists welcomed the first opportunity to re-establish
friendly relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Khrushchev's visit
to Belgrade and a series of pronouncements on the culpability of Stalin and
Molotov for the conflict with Yugoslavia pleased Tito's vanity and were met with
great relief by Yugoslav communists, who were displeased by the break with the
Mecca of world communism. This turn of events called into question the
independence of Yugoslav foreign policy from Moscow. This did not, however,
discourage Western defenders of the policy of assisting Tito. They interpreted
Khrushchev's concession that "various paths lead to socialism" as a
confirmation of their illusions regarding national communism. Indeed, they
could argue that this view had had some impact on the satellite states during
the first phase of de-Stalinization. The Hungarian rebellion, in its early
stages, implied a resistance by the communists themselves to the Stalinist
conception of the methods of communist unity.
However, the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution and
Gomulka's opportunistic policies demonstrated that there were no prospects for
the success of national communism in the Warsaw Pact countries, where Soviet
troops were stationed. "The case of Yugoslavia is particularly significant
because the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations indicates that rebellions
against the Russian type of monolithism do not necessarily negate the
imperative need for communist unity in relation to the non-communist world.
Tito did not hesitate to side with Khrushchev against Imre Nagy as soon as the
latter, pressured by the rebels, agreed to introduce a multi-party system and
request aid from the West. If Tito did not fully integrate into the Soviet
bloc, it was not due to US aid, but because Khrushchev insisted on the
Leninist-Stalinist thesis of the unity of world communism, which implies rigid
and total control of state organs in satellite countries.
In Moscow, theories of communist 'polycentrism' and, specifically, the
creation of a directorate that would govern the policy of the communist world
with the equal participation of the Soviet Union, Red China, and Yugoslavia in
the first phase, could not flourish. If the Soviets had to tolerate certain
Chinese criticisms, a power of First, they are unwilling to tolerate any such
actions from Yugoslavia, a relatively small and weak country, which they
consider to be within their sphere of influence. Furthermore, the Soviet
leadership did not fail to take preventative measures against the perceived
threat of a Chinese candidacy for the leadership of the communist bloc.
On the one hand, they accelerated the Russification of Central Asia to
prevent the danger of Chinese expansion, and on the other, they intensified
their political and economic control over satellite states, with the aim of
consolidating the Soviet empire's positions in Europe, conquered by Stalin.
This prevents Tito from exploiting the tension between Moscow and Beijing.
Nevertheless, the communist headquarters in Moscow is now less inclined than
ever to abandon the principles of communist monolithism, the only thing that
could facilitate Tito's return to the communist bloc without submitting to
Moscow's total control and without risking his removal as leader of the
Yugoslav Communist Party.
Tito's aspirations also face sharp Chinese criticism regarding Yugoslav
"revisionism." Beijing, which has not yet carried out Its expansionist plans run counter to Khrushchev's
interpretation of "peaceful coexistence." Having already established
its satellite system, Russia needs a pause to consolidate its conquests, gather
new strength to secure its leadership of the communist world, and perhaps
achieve global dominance through extortionate tactics without resorting to war.
Virulent Chinese communism refuses to compromise, and by attacking Tito, it
seeks to undermine Khrushchev. Khrushchev, even if he wished to, avoids
provoking the Chinese by making concessions to Tito that align with the
Yugoslav dictator's desires and ambitions. China's forceful stance on this matter
is evident in its defense of Albania against the alleged agreement between Tito
and Khrushchev to subordinate it to Yugoslavia.
Tito, having reached the sad realization that he could not occupy a
position of influence and personal security within the Soviet bloc, tried to
establish himself as one of the leaders of the Third World, a position
incompatible with the strength and importance of Yugoslavia. We have already
seen that the hopes of certain American circles that the neutrality propagated
by Tito would be equidistant between Moscow and Washington were not fulfilled.
That Tito thought quite the opposite is evident from the program of the League
of Yugoslav Communists, approved at its congress held in Ljubljana in 1958.
This program states that the nationalization practiced by certain newly
independent countries should not be interpreted as the beginning of the
capitalist system, but rather as the first step toward socialism.
This also aligns with communist theories concerning "national
liberation movements," whose independence would be the first phase of
total "liberation," that is, the establishment of the communist
regime. This also aligns with Tito's "positive coexistence" and
Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" (a mere difference in
terminology), which Soviet ideologues define as "the highest form of class
struggle." Neutrality, in Tito's interpretation, would consist of
establishing ties between Soviet communism on the one
hand and the politicians and bureaucrats of underdeveloped countries on the other.
Tito presents the initial industrialization achievements of Yugoslavia to the
Afro-Asian peoples as an attractive example for capital-poor countries.
Industrialization in these countries would be viable only through socialist
methods.
We are thus witnessing the paradoxical phenomenon of the US, champion of
democracy and the free market, financing the campaign of the Yugoslav communist
dictator against the interests and influence of the West and of themselves.
They not only finance Tito's costly economic experiments but also directly fund
the propaganda that Yugoslavia could not afford on its own. In just over a
year, Yugoslavia granted loans totaling more than $100 million, namely: $40
million to India; $15.4 million to Ceylon; $10 million to Indonesia; $10
million to Ethiopia; $10 million to the United Arab Republic; $5.5 million to
Sudan; $5 million to Morocco; and a five-year loan to Ghana to finance a number
of industrial plants. It also granted loans to certain Latin American
countries, especially Brazil and Argentina.
All of this should prove the effectiveness of the Yugoslav communist
system. The Tito regime also engaged in intense direct propaganda. According to
official figures, in the period 1950-52 alone, 111 newspapers were printed in
Yugoslavia in 17 languages, in addition to large editions of books and
pamphlets in the main languages. This activity increased over time. Although
Tito, in his frequent trips to Asia and Africa, also visited countries whose
governments were closer to Eastern absolutist monarchies than to "people's
democracies," his preferences leaned toward countries with the potential
to quickly transform "aid for national liberation" into a communist
takeover. Yugoslavia systematically defended the Castro regime at the UN, as
well as Gizenga's aspirations in Congo and the leftist factions in Algeria.
At the same time that the foreign ministers of the 19 Latin American
republics unanimously condemned the Soviet intervention in Cuba at the
Washington meeting, considering it a danger to the free institutions of the
Western Hemisphere, Tito, in a joint declaration with Brezhnev, president of
the Soviet Union, released on October 3 of this year, blamed the United States
for the strained relations with Cuba and invited them "to normalize"
their relations with the Cuban communist regime.
"Bearing in mind the strained situation of relations between the
United States and Cuba," the joint statement reads, "and some of the
aggressive and imperialist declarations from extremist circles in the United
States, which are sowing unrest in the world, both sides declare themselves in
favor of the normalization of relations." They called for "normal
relations" to be established on the principles of "peaceful
coexistence," at a time when Russian technicians were rapidly assembling
the bases for their missiles with atomic warheads, something
the Yugoslav dictator was likely aware of.
In the same communiqué, Tito adopted the Soviet viewpoint on all issues
of world politics, even opposing the political and economic integration of
Western Europe.
This coincided with a series of solemn joint Yugoslav-Soviet
declarations and with the recognition, included in the program of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (1961), that Yugoslavia "belongs to the socialist
camp" and that it had "wisely adopted the socialist path."
Yugoslavia's current "independence" from Moscow lies in its
refusal to sign the Warsaw Pact. Tito did not do so for fear of the presence of
Soviet troops in Yugoslavia, which would imply their total control of the
country. His emphatic adherence to "peaceful coexistence" is also due
to Khrushchev's delaying tactics, which buy him time. An open conflict between
the two blocs would force him to take a stand and allow foreign troops to enter
the country, both of which would mean the end of his power.
Tito's opposition to the stationing of Soviet troops in Yugoslavia
undoubtedly brought certain advantages to the West. However, it is also
necessary to consider that, despite the enormous investments and moral
commitments, the advantages derived from the Balkan Pact disappeared, and Tito
refused all military cooperation with NATO member countries. To avoid certain
Western contacts and controls, Tito renounced new American aid.
The value of such "independence" diminishes when one considers
the very real possibility of Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet bloc should
changes occur in the communist leadership in Belgrade. This is especially true
in the case of Tito's death, an elderly man exhausted by his turbulent life.
His political heirs have been the subject of much discussion in the European
press for some time. Within Yugoslavia, a silent struggle exists among his
presumed successors, related to the planned reform of the Yugoslav
constitution.
The Serbian communists want to strengthen central power in order to
perpetuate Serbia's hegemony over the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Moscow, in
turn, favors this centralist trend, as it traditionally abhors Western
influence through Croatia and Slovenia and hopes that the new Serbian communist
leaders, less involved during the Tito-Stalin conflict, might accept Soviet
conditions. This would align with Serbia's traditional aspiration to be
Russia's proxy in the Balkans, thus facilitating its hegemony in southeastern
Europe. With Russian support, Serbia could oppose the territorial claims of
neighboring countries, particularly Bulgaria, regarding Macedonia, and Albania,
which demands the annexation of adjacent territories
inhabited by 800,000 Albanians and refuses to be a satellite state, a position
assigned to it by both Belgrade and Moscow.
With Russian backing, Serbia could implement measures of extreme
repression against the discontented peoples of Yugoslavia, especially the
Croats and Slovenes, who, during the period 1945-1948, when the Russian
colossus stood behind the Serbian leadership, endured perhaps the most
difficult times in their long history. This repression took the form of a
veritable genocide, about which the free world knows little or nothing. The free
world is only partially familiar with religious persecutions that tended to
exclude not only the social influence of religion, but also the influence of
the West in general.
In favor of Yugoslavia's possible return to the Soviet bloc, one can
also cite the many affinities between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Both are
multinational states, dominated by a people: the Soviet Union by the Russian
people; Yugoslavia by the Serbian people. Hence, a certain
analogy in their political and social structures. Yugoslavia's internal
order is a faithful copy of that of the Soviet Union. Yugoslav communism is
closer to Russian-style Marxism than communism in other countries with a
Western tradition. The Serbian communists, when most
dependent on American aid, never ceased to emphasize the "corrosive
nature" of the "rotten West's" influence. Moreover, there is solidarity among the "new" communist class at
the international level.
Although Tito ordered a ruthless crackdown on Stalinists within the
ranks of the Yugoslav Communist Party at the height of the conflict with the
Kremlin, in this struggle he acted in accordance with his Russian-style
political training. He managed to restore Yugoslavia thanks, first and
foremost, to Serbian support. He was tolerated in Belgrade as the restorer of
Yugoslavia based on an expanded Serbia, despite his officially proclaimed
Croatian origins. It is worth noting Tito's complete lack of patriotic
sentiment, given that he is lauded as the creator of national communism. The
multinational Yugoslav state represents for him, first and foremost, an
instrument of power. Raison d'État is the guiding principle of his policy.
Hence, in the current situation, he strives more for the favor of Moscow
than for that of Washington. In this respect, he acts with stark realism. The
Western powers refrain from exerting pressure on his regime, so he is careful
not to provoke Moscow, the only serious threat. When he cannot participate on
an equal footing in leading world communism, Tito contents himself with the
role of the tolerated schismatic. Khrushchev accepts this political game and
does not jeopardize Tito's communist regime, hoping that Yugoslavia will
eventually rejoin the Soviet bloc. His primary objective, in the current phase,
is to consolidate the Soviet Union and its empire in Europe, transforming them
into a firm foundation, a bastion of the world communist revolution. Meanwhile,
China and Yugoslavia are to fulfill other roles in their respective spheres
within the overall strategy of the world revolution.
Although this state of affairs does not align with Tito's innermost
desires, he accepts it, as it allows him to be tolerated by the communist
countries and to secure the base of his regime, comprised of a relatively small
group of militant communists. Those who reluctantly distanced themselves from
the Soviet bloc now applaud every rapprochement with Moscow, which for Serbian
communists is not only the headquarters of the world revolution but also the
motherland of the Orthodox Slavs, Serbia's natural protector.
It seems that Tito is not overly concerned with the question of his
political legacy. When he thinks about future relations with Moscow, his
sympathies, those of a committed communist with a Russian education, lie with
those who would like Yugoslavia integrated into the Soviet bloc. Among them, it
is as if there were a tactical agreement: what Tito
cannot achieve, his successors will.
The Need for a
Genuine Policy Toward Communist Yugoslavia
We have been able to outline the main aspects of the Tito-Stalin
conflict. However, it can be concluded that after an objective study of the
nature and scope of this conflict, it is clear that the assumptions of the
proponents of the realist policy towards communist Yugoslavia are neither
accurate nor precise, and therefore cannot serve as a basis for a successful
policy.
First, the abundant aid provided to Tito for over a decade cannot be
considered a trigger for any strategic advantages for Western democracies. In
this case, the post hoc, ergo propter hoc proposition is worthless, since Tito
had to abandon his aggressive policy against the West before he had requested
and received financial, food, and military aid, as well as some kind of
guarantees against attack by the Soviet Union or its satellite states.
He had to abandon this policy, which was senseless and dangerous without
the support of the communist bloc, as soon as his fellow communists and allies
became his adversaries, seeking to bring to power men unconditionally loyal to
Stalin. The continuation of the aggressive policy of "more Stalinist than
Stalin himself" would have led Western governments to support the
resistance of the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia, doubly dangerous for Tito:
as a popular reaction against communist tyranny and against Serbia's hegemony
over the other peoples and numerous national minorities. In this way, the West
would likely have achieved greater strategic advantages without having to make
uncomfortable political and moral compromises.
These advantages would have been permanent, not dependent on Tito's
oscillating policies between Washington and Moscow. Even if Stalin had
eliminated Tito's group, the aggressive anti-Western policy would have been
mitigated. It is true that in such an emergency, initial successes like
Yugoslavia's accession to the Balkan Pact, ultimately directed against the
Soviet Union, would not have occurred. These would
certainly have been ephemeral successes. They depended more on Moscow than on
Washington, because when Soviet pressure against Tito's regime eased after
Stalin's death, the reversal immediately occurred, calling into question the
aforementioned strategic advantages of the West.
The authors of this Realpolitik regarding communist Yugoslavia are
highly unrealistic in their premises about the scope of the conflict between
the Yugoslav communists and the center of world communism in Moscow. Judging
relations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe according to the criteria and
standards prevalent in Western civilization proves incapable of fully
understanding the relationships prevailing within the age-old autocratic
tradition of the Byzantine and Russian empires and their reflection in the
communist conception of discipline and monolithic unity.
They mistakenly assume that the determining factor in the Stalin-Tito
conflict was the latter's supposed patriotism, while what was at stake was
preserving his own interests and privileges, since, according to the deeply
rooted Byzantine tradition, the loss of power also implies the loss of life. If
national interests were also involved, Tito's group conceived of them in terms
of conquest and the preservation of its absolute power. "La patrie, c'est
moi!" (The homeland, it's me!) It is also necessary to bear in mind that
the defense of "national interests" in a multinational state like
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union signifies the expansionist nationalism of the
dominant ethnic group.
A policy conceived on false premises, insufficient knowledge of the real
situation, and moreover, misinterpreted, could not provide long-term political
advantages. The independence of Yugoslavia, so highly valued by the State
Department, is already proving highly problematic, as there is a serious danger
that, should there be a change in Yugoslavia's political leadership, all
dissension between the Yugoslav and Soviet communist parties would be
eliminated, given the existing agreement between the two countries on major
international issues. In such a case, the West would definitively lose all its
advantages in Southeast Europe. The consequences would also be felt in the
internal relations of the European Union itself.
The United States should take all necessary measures to prevent such an
unfavorable development. It is essential to ensure that so many material
sacrifices, and above all moral ones, are not in vain. To this end, the State
Department should abandon the inconsistent premise that dictator
Tito, faced with political conditions, would have only one alternative: to
capitulate to Moscow. From the outset, there has been another, less drastic
alternative: making concessions to the West.
Solely due to the defensive nature of American policy toward communist
expansionism and a naive optimism regarding the spontaneous evolution of
communist regimes, prevalent especially among intellectuals, this alternative,
which corresponds to the true situation within the communist bloc, was not
considered from the beginning. Furthermore, Belgrade is aware that its return
to the Soviet blockade would signify an unconditional capitulation, with all
the inherent dangers for Tito's group, whereas by making significant
concessions to the West, its physical integrity would be safeguarded. This
notion lies at the root of Milovan Djilas's evolution toward Western
conceptions of socialism.
One of the prejudices, perpetuated and disseminated by the propaganda of
the Yugoslav regime, is also the legend of Tito, a proud and patriotic figure,
willing to capitulate to Moscow, with all the dangers that entails, rather than
accept political conditions from the West. Such naiveté is likely to elicit
only humorous comments in a cruel and implacable environment where the struggle
for power is the guiding principle of politics, for it is the condition for
self-preservation of those who hold absolute power.
The legend surrounding Tito's patriotic pride becomes untenable in light
of a critical and objective analysis. For Tito, as for all genuine communists,
the dictatorship of the proletariat takes precedence over national interests.
If Tito, being above all a fanatical communist, could request and receive aid
from the capitalist West he hates and whose downfall he desires and prepares,
he can also sacrifice his patriotic sentiments, if he has any. Therefore, all
his solemn pronouncements that he would never make political concessions amount
to mere Eastern bargaining, at odds with reality. There is precedent that
proves Tito would be capable of repaying Western assistance with political
concessions.
This is unequivocally proven by their withdrawal from the Trieste
dispute in 1954. At that time, they repeatedly threatened to unleash war if
Trieste were incorporated into Italy under the 1948 declaration by the Western
governments. That withdrawal—as Sir Anthony Eden, an active participant in the
negotiations and the settlement regarding Trieste, concluded in 1956,
notes—"had cost the Allies dearly in men, money, and ill humor. It took
considerable effort to convince the Yugoslavs, but we were able to sweeten the
pill. One of the sweeteners was financial, and in this respect, the United
States government was generous and prudent. It offered twenty million dollars,
to which our Chancellor of the Exchequer added two million pounds to help
defray the construction of a new port in Area B and for other needs."
This single instance of eliminating one of the most virulent hotspots of
the Cold War with a paltry compensation would be enough to dispel the myth that
Tito is unwilling to make political concessions, were it not for the deeply
ingrained prejudices among Western experts.
There is no doubt that any proposal of political conditions to Tito's
regime would currently encounter certain difficulties. Belgrade is already
accustomed to receiving abundant aid without any reciprocation. Moreover, in
the event of Western pressure with potential support for the resistance of the
oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia, Tito could count on some Soviet backing. In
any case, he would think twice before requesting Soviet military intervention,
as that would amount to unconditional surrender to Moscow.
For Tito, Yugoslavia's "independence" from the Soviet Union
matters more than it does to the United States. His continued hold on power
depends on it, and that is what Tito values most. Given the evident alignment
of Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policy, Yugoslavian independence loses its value
for the United States. In the current situation, Washington, even if it did not
obtain the desired guarantees through economic and political pressure, would
not lose much; on the other hand, if it did obtain them, their value would be
such that they would justify a certain risk.
The question of political concessions in Yugoslavia's internal affairs
requires careful examination, unlike the problem of Tito's foreign policy.
Regardless of the controversy over whether Tito is merely seeking
self-affirmation in the "Third World" or is cooperating with the
Soviet Union, US funding of Tito's agitation in Afro-Asian and even Latin
American countries makes no sense. What is the point of demanding that South American
governments isolate themselves from Castro's Cuba with a Great Wall of China,
while simultaneously funding a regime that aligns itself with Fidel Castro's
regime in its role as a Soviet proxy?
As relations between Moscow and Belgrade improve, it becomes increasingly
clear that, despite the disagreements between Moscow, Beijing, and Belgrade,
basic solidarity exists toward non-communist countries. There is a striking
similarity between Tito's position regarding underdeveloped countries, as
expressed in the 1958 program of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and the
statements made by his bitter critic, Zhou Enlai, in his speech of August 20 of
the same year, in which he advocated for the transfer of anti-Western agitation
from Asia and Africa to Latin American countries.
The Chinese communist ideologue maintained: "...that the peoples of
Latin American countries have something in common with the peoples of Asia and
Africa. They have common goals: to oppose colonialism, to oppose aggression and
imperialist intervention, to demand peace, to oppose war, to press for
independent development of the national economy and to emerge from
underdevelopment; in other words..., the peoples of Latin American, Asian, and
African countries have common aspirations and demands." If Tito wants to
trade with the Western Hemisphere, fine, but what benefit can his announced
visit to several Latin American countries bring? From this necessarily
incomplete analysis of such a complex problem, it follows that the current
policy of "calculated risk" of aid to Tito's regime was not properly
adapted to the real situation.
We are not among those who deny all value of this policy. We agree with
them when they emphasize the moral factors inherent in the policy of aid to a
communist dictatorship by the democratic powers of the Christian West. But we
believe that simply denying the efforts made, without offering an alternative
to current policy, means abandoning the oppressed peoples of Central and
Eastern Europe to their sad fate. An imperfect, activist policy is always
better than total abstention.
What we consider untenable in current politics are the unfounded
assessments of relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Because of petty
squabbles, the proponents of so-called Realpolitik failed to consider that the
liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia could serve as a powerful instrument of
political and economic pressure, which was within their reach. Nor did they
attempt to secure guarantees that the provisional and limited strategic
advantages of the West, resulting from the Moscow-Belgrade antagonism, would
not be lost in the event of political changes in Belgrade.
After so many missed opportunities—the last being the Hungarian
Revolution—the current possibilities are quite limited. Nevertheless, given the
evident danger of Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet bloc, the only remaining
option, albeit belated and in a less than favorable situation, is to prevent
another defeat for the democratic countries in their struggle with the Soviet
bloc. It is less risky to risk failure than to passively await an unfavorable,
seemingly inevitable, turn of events. Even if the desired success is not
achieved, the attempt to prevent Soviet control in the Adriatic-Danubian-Balkan
region would have positive moral consequences that should not be disregarded,
even by those who subscribe to political realism, unless they believe, in the
traditional spirit of realpolitik, that moral values are
irrelevant in political affairs.
An attempt, however belated and unproductive, to influence the situation
in southeastern Europe would rekindle the hopes of oppressed peoples and would
be interpreted worldwide as proof that the United States and other Western
democratic powers are not abandoning their commitment to liberation. The repercussions
within the United States itself would be favorable, as it would invalidate
accusations of betrayal, such as those leveled after the last world war when
disillusionment with the Soviet ally was widespread. The first victims of
public disappointment would be the academic specialists, current supporters of
the policy of aid to Tito's regime, stripped of any political conditions or
guarantees.
"Freedom cannot be upheld in one place by surrendering it in
another," declared Secretary of State Dean Rusk on September 30,
explaining why concessions in Berlin could not be made in exchange for
advantages in Cuba. The principle of the indivisibility of freedom and the
liberating vocation of the United States, summarized in those words of Rusk,
should not be systematically forgotten when it comes to the hopes of the
oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia.
One of the clearest symptoms of such an attitude, and therefore of the
propagandistic success of Titoism in Western democratic circles, is the
systematic omission of any mention of Yugoslav communism when discussing the
need to liberate the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe from the communist
yoke. To cite just one example, the representatives of the subjugated peoples
of Yugoslavia are not included in the unofficial organization of the Assembly
of Captive Nations of Europe, even though they are victims of communist tyranny
like the other peoples of that region.
Moreover, certain peoples of Yugoslavia suffer double oppression: that
of the communist regime and that of their own nation, since they are deprived
of the right to national self-determination, that is, to have their own
nation-state. The same is true in the Soviet empire, where the peoples, with
the exception of the Russians, lack true national freedom. By silencing or
embellishing the bitter truth about Yugoslavia, ignoring the fundamental rights
of its peoples in order not to offend a cruel dictatorship, no political
advantages are gained; rather, the sincerity of Western governments in
defending the principles of our culture is called into question. At the same
time, the neutralist propaganda of the "third position" is fueled,
which presents the conflict between two blocs as a mere struggle between two
imperialisms. Consequently, the other peoples - according to Tito's propaganda
- should adhere to the policy of "non-committed nations", as useful
as it is supposedly morally justified.
Only by upholding the right to freedom of all countries under communist
captivity can the moral authority of the leading powers of the West be
affirmed, giving deeper meaning and justification to the sacrifices essential
in the defense of freedom threatened by international communism.
Francisco J. Orlich,
first American president of Croatian origin
Ante Bonifacic, Chicago
Croats learn from their national history that there were 27 grand
viziers in the Ottoman Empire during its height, of Croatian origin and
lineage, and that Croatian was the diplomatic language at the court of
Istanbul. At the same time, all of Europe followed with admiration and trembling the struggle of the peoples of the Danube basin
against Turkish penetration into Europe, and Pope Leo X also conferred upon the
Croats the title of "Antemurale Christianitatis" (Blanket of
Christendom).
This psychological trait of dynamism, impetuosity, unwavering loyalty,
and adherence to ideals also entails the tragedy of the Croats since their
arrival in the Mediterranean in the early Middle Ages.
Politically fragmented and divided religiously, the Croats gave their neighbors
some of their most illustrious geniuses. Laurana was Bramante's teacher, and
Julio Klovic, "Croat of Croatia," as he often signed his works, was a
patron of the young El Greco. Beethoven's teacher was Franz Haydn, whom not
only the Croats but also Hadow, the renowned Oxford music professor, claim was
descended from Croatian refugees in Burgenland (Austria).
Before the Second World War, "Illustration Française" had
published, as a "scandalous chronicle," that the last king and
apostolic emperor of Austria was the illegitimate son of General and Viceroy of
Croatia, Joseph Jelačić, and that in 1848, Jelačić saved
him from the throne following the rebellion of Hungarian patriots instead of
proclaiming himself King of Croatia, as his supporters, including those in
Bosnia (then under Turkish rule), had demanded and expected. As a reward, the
Croatians received what the Hungarians received as punishment: the absolutism
of the Viennese clique.
It is no wonder, then, that a Croatian poet concluded that "sors
boni Croatae emigrare domo" (the destiny of a good Croatian patriot is to
emigrate from his homeland).
The Croatian people, possessors of the most beautiful coastline in
Europe, fringed by nearly a thousand islands, some of which can be crossed by
swimming, have been among the finest maritime peoples since 852, when they
fought against the Saracens in Italy, saving Byzantium, and continue to be so
today. Like the Phoenicians, Greeks, Venetians, English, Portuguese, and
Spanish, the Croatians sailed the seas in their ships, both small and large.
The Argosy is the name of the most elegant ship built in Croatian shipyards.
Michael Pracat, merchant and shipowner, a distinguished son of the
city-state of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), whose motto was "Parva sed nostra"
(Small but ours), lent ducats to Charles V. The Croatians' fervent love for
their homeland sustained them through centuries of struggle. While the Goths
and Lombards became Italian, and the Franks and Croats French, the Croats, as
early as the 9th century, were fighting with Rome to safeguard their right to
use their national language in liturgical services.
Being staunch Catholics, they have not relinquished this right to this
day on the Adriatic coast, and especially on the island of Krk, the ancestral
home of Francisco Orlich, the first American president of Croatian descent. The
Popes granted the Croats this right after, according to the mischievous
anecdote of the Croatian chronicler and Latinist Thomas the Archdeacon, the
Pope himself shaved the beard of the monk Zdeda, who, in his naiveté, believed
that this act consecrated him a bishop.
"Parva sed nostra" is small but noble Costa Rica, small like
the independent and most advanced republics of the world: Athens, Florence,
Venice, and Dubrovnik, since paleontology teaches us that the dinosaurs have
disappeared and humans survived the Ice Age, as will happen in future
federations of the globe, when the diseases of contemporary gigantism disappear
and when humanity begins the new humanitarian era, overcoming "hominem
lupum" (man is wolf).
A few years before the outbreak of the Second World War, Francisco
Orlich, grandfather of the current president of Costa Rica, told me his life
story. He began as a cabin boy on a small sailboat, at the time the only means
of communication between our island and the mainland. He won the favor of a
fellow countryman who had come from Costa Rica, driven by the desire to see his
home once more. Of small stature, but singularly vigorous and dynamic, Frane
Orlich, as he was then called, ended up as a patrician in his new homeland. He
told me he had promised to donate an altar to the parish church if his first
banana and coffee export business was successful.
A devout believer in God, like his ancestors who for nearly ten
centuries had cultivated grapevines, fig trees, and olive groves, and sown
wheat in the same land, carrying images of Our Lady and the Miraculous
Crucifixes in processions, Francisco Orlich brought with him to the New World
the energy of his island and his forebears. Enterprising and diligent,
everything he touched flourished. His sons became ministers and members of
parliament in the free republic of Costa Rica, married descendants of women
from other coastal cities from Genoa to Cres, and his offspring adapted
perfectly to their homeland after studying in Europe.
Although the inhabitants of Krk were citizens of Venice for four
centuries, a century and a half ago Ivan Orlic, a popular poet from Punat,
wrote:
"And now that you all know the valiant lad,
I would rather stroll, fresh and healthy, through Punat
Than nibble on biscuits in the streets of
Venice."
Likewise, Frane Orlich never forgot his birthplace. "We share the
same great-great-grandfather, and in him I saw something of that mythical
ancestor, who, like my grandfather and great-grandfather, drew bread, wine, and
gold from stone." When a group of Hungarian and Italian financiers tried
to seize control of the sea around our island, the young cabin boy on the
sailing ship from Punat founded the "Austro-Croatian" company,
perhaps the first democratic shipping society in Europe. On October 18, 1905,
the first meeting of the farmers of the island of Krk took place with the
purpose of founding their own shipping society.
They decided to pool half a million Austro-Hungarian crowns (US$100,000)
to become masters of their sea. Each person could own only two shares, and only
those born on one of the islands of Quarnero, which, according to an ancient
legend, are the scattered bones of the young Absirto from the time the Argonauts
sought the Golden Fleece. The aim was for the company to remain in the hands of
the people, not speculators. Frane Orlic, already considered a millionaire,
spearheaded this endeavor, just as his grandson now refuses to represent the
Central American banana and coffee magnates, instead striving to elevate his
entire nation to the status of free and independent citizens of a free and
independent republic.
He himself, more than likely, is unaware of the extent to which he is,
in this respect, the grandson of the founder of the Orlich family in Costa
Rica. But so that his relatives (in my village there are more than a thousand
Orlics) would know how much he loved his adopted homeland, he built a beautiful
chalet called Costa Rica. Standing as children before the iron gates of its
garden, we learned our first Spanish words from the beak of a famous Costa
Rican parrot. Besides building a beautiful, modern mill, a macaroni factory,
and the first ice factory on the island, Frane Orlich was, in his homeland, not
only the first president of the first peasant navigation society in Europe, but
also a pioneer of contemporary progress and technology.
His closest friend was Antonio Mahnic, one of the greatest bishops on
the island in fourteen centuries. In his small citadel in Krk, Mahnic had
established a printing press and founded the Old Slavic Academy, with the aim
of defending the right of his flock to hear the services of the Roman Catholic
Church in their own language. And in his profound writings, he reveals to the
entire Croatian people the horrors of vice and disorder, which from then on
undermined not only the decadent Habsburg empire but also led the people to
concentration camps and the monolithic unity of the communist adventurers of
the New Class.
The Croats paid more dearly than any other people for their love of
freedom and independence. The West's blindness made them Tito's slaves, and for
several years now they have witnessed their extradition from the refugee camps
in Italy and Austria to Tito's executioners without anyone saying a word,
unlike what is happening now when the British return the Chinese from Hong
Kong. Nevertheless, the Croats, in a single generation, were eyewitnesses to
the collapse of several empires and kingdoms, and, with the perseverance of
their ancestors, they await freedom to build in their independent state a
flourishing republic of liberty, progress, well-being, arts, and letters.
The new president of Costa Rica follows in his grandfather's footsteps
in the fight for the rights of the most vulnerable, and on his first visit to
the homeland of his ancestors and of Francisco Orlic I, he saw that
"everything his grandfather bequeathed was stolen by the communists."
Accustomed to propaganda tricks, although he traveled on the ship provided by
the communist regime, he knew that the ship did not belong to the people who
built it and that the crew earned less than $30 a month, the same amount his
brothers receive weekly in the United States as "allowance when they are
not working."
Croatians scattered throughout the world eagerly await
the day their compatriot in Central America becomes the champion of their
age-old virtues: the captain of the free world, the fighter for the freedom of
all the oppressed, the believer in eternal justice and in God, who gives
meaning and purpose to everything. In this belief, they are convinced that the
free American republics now have within their ranks a remarkable president, a
champion of liberty and true democracy.
For the Liberation of
Croatia from Dual Imperialism
Michael A. Feighan, House of Representatives, Washington
Below is the Spanish translation of the address delivered by the
Honorable Michael A. Feighan, Member of the U.S. Congress, from Ohio, on May 6,
1962, in Cleveland, regarding the struggle and aspirations of the Croatian
people for their national independence. At the request of the Honorable
Feighan, his address was inserted in the Congressional Record (Thursday, May
10, 1962, pp. A 2564-3566).
We have gathered here today to celebrate Croatia's Independence Day and
thus pay tribute to the once civilized nation submerged by dual imperialism.
This dual imperialism tends to exaggerate all the negative aspects of Croatia's
long history, distorting our knowledge of history and our understanding of
contemporary international affairs. But this dual imperialism cannot expel the
Croatian nation from the world stage. The spirit of national independence is
very strong in Croatia and in the hearts of Croatians living in the free world.
Let us pause for a moment to examine this dual imperialism I am speaking
of. Its first aspect originates in Moscow, and it is responsible for the
imposition of the regime currently in power in Yugoslavia. Some call it
communist imperialism. I call it Russian imperialism, which is what it truly
is. In the Second World War, Yugoslavia collapsed because it was a
multinational state dictated at the conference table at the end of the First
World War. The nations involved did not approve of this arrangement. Between
the two world wars, Croatian national interests were undermined within this
multinational state.
The Croatian people were exploited and persecuted because of their
devotion to the ideals of national independence. It was logical, then, that in
the circumstances created by the war, Croatia should declare its national
independence. Croatia fought for its national independence on two fronts:
against the new Muscovite imperialism and the old imperialism of the Yugoslav
multinational state. This was a costly war for the Croatian people, who paid
dearly for their efforts to emulate the Founding Fathers of the United States.
The Croats knew the price they would have to pay in human sacrifices to
achieve national independence and were prepared to pay it. But the superiority
of dual imperialism was overwhelming. Croatia's national independence was lost
in the global war, sacrificed to the independence of all nations and the
freedom of all people. This is one of the great tragedies in an era of
tragedies, during and after the Second World War. Russian cunning and Stalin
prevailed over Churchill and Roosevelt; Tito was enthroned in the reconstructed
multinational state of Yugoslavia, which became a vassal state of Russia.
The second aspect of this dual imperialism stems from the forced
confinement of the Croatian nation within the Yugoslav Empire. Tito fulfilled
Moscow's mandate, destroying Croatia's national independence and concealing
this nation under the mantle of Yugoslavia. The old imperial system of
Yugoslavia was restored and perfected, closely linked by the dictator Tito to
Russian imperialism. Thus we see that Croatia, as a nation, and Croatian
national independence are submerged by two allied imperialisms—that of the
Yugoslav state and that of Russian imperialism, the guarantor of Yugoslav
imperialism.
Planned efforts have been made in the United States to conceal the
realities of this dual imperialism. Tito is presented as a kind of
"national communist" despite the fact that he rules over the
multinational empire of Yugoslavia. How nationalism can be equated with
imperialism is one of the great fallacies of our time. Yugoslavia is not a
nation, but a conglomerate composed of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and
Montenegro; all of them unique and distinct nations. We know that Tito's
communism does not differ from the communism of Khrushchev's regime.
The supporters of Tito's regime in the United States suffered two major
blows in recent months. The first was the conference of so-called non-committal
nations, held in Belgrade at Tito's invitation. The participants were supposed
to develop a program of principles and actions for the "third force"
of neutrality. The Russians decided to resume atomic weapons testing while the
Belgrade conference was in session. Tito led the parade of Russian apologists,
concocting every imaginable excuse for the resumption of atomic tests. This
should have proven Tito to be as neutral as Khrushchev and made his alignment
with Moscow crystal clear. But it didn't. His apologists in the U.S. State
Department found him innocent and, worse, deserving of renewed American
support.
At the May Day parade in Belgrade, Tito once again revealed his true
colours. The press reports indicated that the most interesting feature of that
parade was the brand-new Russian T-54 medium tanks, manufactured in the USSR
and delivered to Tito by his dear Russian friends. These tanks were not the
result of any agreement stipulated by Gromyko, who had visited Tito just a few
days earlier. They arrived in Titoland by virtue of a secret, long-term
agreement signed between Tito and his Russian protectors. Now the question
arises: Against whom will these tanks be used? Against the
Russians? There is not the slightest possibility of that happening,
since Tito always publicly proclaimed that he would march shoulder to shoulder
with his Russian comrades in the event of a conflict between East and West.
I am interested in what new excuses those within our government who
advocate for the continued shipments of wheat to Tito will now invent. I wouldn't
be surprised if they urged the shipment of an Atlas missile to Tito, simply to
show him that we can outshine the Russians. The timing is certainly opportune
for international blackmailers.
One of the reasons Tito still heads the communist state of Yugoslavia is
our support. Our domestic policy toward Yugoslavia has been weak, aimless, and
misguided. Just a few months ago, the Secretary of State declared "that
Yugoslavia, by virtue of our current Public Law 480, is considered a friendly
state." I reject the declaration that the Yugoslav government is a
friendly government. I agree that the people are mostly friendly, but not
Tito's communists.
American aid contributed to the consolidation of the communist regime.
Few crumbs reached the people. The Secretary of State admitted that we have no
means of ascertaining how this aid is being used or whether it has been
transferred to other satellite nations or to the Soviet Union.
Recently, our newspapers reported that "Gromyko ended his visit to
Yugoslavia; relations improved markedly." I have seen enough evidence to
be convinced that, since 1950, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were never strained.
Let me give another example, besides tanks.
In 1959, the Russians completed a nuclear reactor for Yugoslavia,
installed at the Boris Kidric Nuclear Institute in Vinica. A large number of
Russian technicians have reappeared in the last two years. Scientific,
technical, and cultural delegations have multiplied. Tito has been working in
close coordination with the Russian intelligence system. He is exporting the
Russian-style revolution from 70 Yugoslav embassies and legations around the
world. They export Russian-style Marxism to Latin American countries. Popovic,
the Yugoslav foreign minister, will visit Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and other
Latin American countries to make contact with active communist groups and
cells.
These are not the actions of two hostile powers. Despite this
cooperation and large-scale U.S. aid, the Yugoslav communist government is in
dire straits. It is behind on debt payments and short-term commercial payments
to other nations through the National Bank of Yugoslavia. They need $200
million a year to clear their debts. The situation is very serious unless they
receive help, even with U.S. aid amounting to almost $4 billion.
Our State Department, guided by the policy that we must support
so-called independent regimes that show a tendency to break with Moscow, will
certainly come to the aid of the Yugoslav regime. On the same day that Gromyko
emphasized the improvement in relations with Yugoslavia, our State Department
signed an agreement to provide Tito with $24 million worth of food aid.
Fourteen million dollars of that sum would be "repaid in dinars, the
communist currency, which is printed at the whim of the Marxist regime that
mocks our system. Even so, we grant them loans.
Not long ago, our ambassador to Yugoslavia, George Kennan, was in the
United States and strongly advocated for increased aid to Tito.
It is understood that he would align himself with Gromyko, since both
believe in state welfare. George Kennan once said "that communism contains
the seeds of its own destruction." It seems he is not practicing what he
preaches.
We must modify this policy of supporting so-called independent communist
regimes or communist-type regimes of any kind. This change can only be effected
by people who speak out directly or by their duly elected representatives.
I would like to cite an example of this one-sided presentation of facts
and how our State Department hesitates to justify its position. I will quote a
letter from the Secretary of State to the House Select Committee on Export
Controls:
"We know very well that Yugoslavia is a communist country and has
been since the end of the Second World War. President Tito and the other
high-ranking officials of the Yugoslav government have, of course, been
communists for most of their lives. The most important consideration from the
standpoint of our security, however, is that since 1948 Yugoslavia has not been
part of the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, Yugoslav policy has been a cause of
resentment and dissension within the communist bloc."
I challenge the Secretary of State to prove that Yugoslav policy was
ever a cause of resentment and dissension within the communist bloc.
I will quote another paragraph from that astonishing letter:
"Our policy toward Yugoslavia, therefore, is long-lasting and
well-tested. It has been successful. Many of the criticisms that this policy
has aroused are the result of public disappointment that our aid to Yugoslavia
did not bring Yugoslavia into complete alignment with our foreign policy. Some
of these disagreements stem directly from the Conference of Neutral Nations
held in Belgrade. Public disappointment with the outcome of that meeting cannot,
however, be based on any alignment of the Conference with the Soviet Union. No
such alignment occurred. Our public disappointment is based on the failure of
the neutral nations to adopt a position closer to that of the Western
world."
The letter ends with the following sentence: "A full review of the
facts leads us to the conclusion that the sale of jet aircraft and the training
(of Yugoslav pilots in the U.S.) that was part of the sales agreement were
fully justified."
This is yet another example of the one-sided and unrealistic approach
the State Department presented to the American people. Our policy toward
Yugoslavia has not been a success. It has been a disastrous failure, insofar as
it perpetuated an atheistic communist regime, a regime that cruelly exploits
the nations and peoples of Yugoslavia.
Let us now examine the view that our disappointment stems from the fact
that our aid to Yugoslavia did not achieve Yugoslavia's full agreement with our
foreign policy. That is not the real point of contention, for the main problem
is that Yugoslav foreign policy is directed entirely against our system of
government and our way of life. The American public is not only disappointed,
we are outraged.
How can the State Department fully justify selling jet aircraft to Tito
at a bargain price, to a government dedicated to the destruction of our system
of government?
All of this necessarily does not stem from stupidity or a lack of
knowledge of the facts. I would be very naive to think that there is not some
element of collusion there. A few years ago, a high-ranking official told me
something that corroborates my view. He had been shown a letter from Tito
addressed to the President of the United States. He began to laugh when he read
the letter. To the question, "What's so funny about it?" he replied,
"If it weren't so tragic, it would be amusing. Titus's reasons for asking
for help are almost identical to our political documents. In fact, the wording
is so similar that they could have been written by the same person." As I
said before, one of the viewpoints held by many high-ranking people in
government circles deliberately avoids public examination of other courses of
action that might better serve our national needs and interests.
It is not so much the elected officials in our
government who approach political problems with such rigidity as the unelected
ones. They presume to know what is best for the people, as if they worked in
the offices of monarchies, and very often they feel above the electorate, their
errors being more frequent than their successes.
Those who plan policy at the State Department imposed
on our elected leaders the idea that we should help Tito. They imposed on our
leaders the policy that we should help the so-called independent communist
regimes. I have fought that policy in Congress, and I will continue to do so.
There are many indications that the covert thinking of
the State Department policy planners has been influenced by the proponents of
accommodation, infiltrated into high government positions. This has been
happening without interruption since 1955.
A massive effort is being made to neutralize the
American approach to the Russian and Yugoslav problem. This effort is directed
by thought manipulators in the Kremlin and Belgrade, and supported by their
agents and propaganda organs in the United States. They try to confuse, delay,
and falsify the truth. With this, they hope to create a degree of apathy, thus
ensuring the continuation of the monopoly of a privileged few in political
leadership.
In this case, knowledge is power. You know the truth.
Make your feelings and thoughts known to your neighbors and to the government.
Working together, we can contribute to the destruction of militant atheistic
communism, break Tito's tyrannical regime, and grant the people of Croatia the
right to national self-determination. We must commit ourselves to a positive
and assertive foreign policy program. We must:
1. Firmly support Berlin, which is an island of
freedom, prosperity, and the promise of liberation for peoples oppressed and
enslaved by the Russian empire.
2. Reject any Russian proposal that might suggest the
United States is prepared to endorse the status quo with respect to the current
Russian empire.
3. Courageously and vigorously support the political
principle of national self-determination as a peaceful solution to the Berlin
Crisis in Russian-occupied Germany.
4. Seek solutions to all outstanding issues with the
Russians in Central and Eastern Europe, insisting on the right to
self-determination of all nations involved.
5. Prepare for victory in the Cold War, for it will be
so if we persistently support these lines of political action.
Croatia will one day regain its freedom and national
independence. We must work together to hasten that happy day. I pledge my
unwavering support for the success of this cause.
Despite the beautiful rhetoric, the Communist Party continues to
scrupulously monopolize all sectors of production, administration, and
education. However, the contrast between words and deeds becomes provocative,
as serious issues have never been superficially resolved. Self-criticism,
criticism, and countless new plans demonstrate the impracticality of
state-imposed Marxism, which, moreover, succumbed from its inception to the
infiltration of bourgeois taste, the boulevard press, sensationalism, and
advertising, not to mention economic crimes, scams, embezzlement,
misappropriation, and the moral decay that even worries official circles.
The resulting disappointments are directly related to the hopes placed
in it, the most bitter being that concerning the productivity of socialism.
Bakaric repeatedly acknowledged the system's failure. He later stated that
Marxism was applied among us "to the extent possible," which is not
to say that things would have gone better had it been explained more extensively.
Modesty turns to doubt when Bakaric asserts that "experience constantly
raises new problems (...)" regarding all forms of political organization;
that there is a lack of "incentives" in production; that "the
distribution system" has not been found; in short, that "we must now
seek and find the paths for the further development of the political system in
this direction."
As an example of the disproportion between the theory and practice of
"decentralization" (to which, in fact, his critique refers), Bakaric
offers the "commune," its most touted aspect. "Its economic
base—as declared at the Fifth Meeting of the Socialist League of Croatia—was
not growing in parallel with this role," alluding
to the role of workers' self-government. "The commune, even by its very
system, did not tend to stimulate the productivity of its enterprises."
This open critique of "centralist practice" as "irrational"
takes on greater significance because a decade of "decentralization"
has just been celebrated.
By establishing the principle of "performance-based bonuses"
in production, including jobs where output, logically speaking, does not depend
on the worker, the regime, "de facto," capitulated ideologically to
the mechanisms of economic law. "Our criteria and our motives must be,
above all, economic in nature," declared one of Tito's most prominent
economic planners, M. Todorovic, in the National Assembly, as if quoting J. B.
Say or some other liberal economist.
Even this brand-new reform, accompanied by currency devaluation, rising
prices, and worsening working conditions, is presented as a fight against
"bureaucratic interference in the production and distribution
process." If it is sincere, it amounts to a concession to liberal
economics, something even the capitalist system must limit. However, the
contrast lies in the fact that "economic laws" apply to everyone,
with the exception of the State, which sets "its expenses" in
advance, disregarding the "net income" of the company and the
workers. Efforts to align these measures with classical Marxism are largely
disingenuous.
Marx, it is true, foresaw the "social contributions" of the
workers, but, being a poor psychologist, he failed to foresee that performing
physical labor for ten thousand dinars a month is not the same as managing for fifty
thousand. The only, or perhaps the most characteristic, link between the
socialist economic derailment and Marxism is the inherited conflict between
centralism (in the sense of economic planning), imposed by modern production,
and the individual labor that, in the Marxist conception, should not be denied
to the worker. Marx, as an economist, recognized this dilemma and opted for
centralism when he analyzed the Paris Commune, known for its tendency to
abolish central power. He considered his "federalism" to be
transitory, since his objective should have been "la régénération de la
France", that is, the renewal of the State.
When Yugoslav communists reduce their "decentralization" to
the concept of the withering away of the bureaucracy they themselves created,
they are merely promising something they neither actually admit nor, as a
whole, can admit, "since there always remains
something that inherently belongs to everyone and must be resolved at the level
of the general community or its organs." Between administration,
which is a social necessity, and society, which should not be an instrument of
bureaucracy, lies the chasm never bridged by Marx and Engels, for they
maintained a priori that only class struggle was capable of regulating
relations between people. They did not provide a clear picture of how society
would function without the state, nor did they justify why the new "social
organs" would not become the seeds of a new class, when, in their view,
the beginning of class differences must be attributed precisely to the
phenomenon of administration. The normal path to "decentralization"
would be to allow people to express their opinions and propose what they want,
to control the administration they pay for. Since this is not acknowledged, and
the illusory and fallacious identification of the individual with
"society" persists, every social environment is characterized not
only by constant distrust and friction between the individual and society, but
also by an uninterrupted "transitional phase," where it becomes
difficult to develop a genuine economic plan, express consistent political
thought, or even create a valuable literary work. Krleza also left his
pessimistic mark here.
"To live in the 'transitional phases' means to live 'the transitory
life of man' and nothing more... To this we must resign ourselves." But
the life that is fading away cannot be compared to the life that is beginning.
If Krleza resigned himself to the "transitional phases," young people
want to be able to decide about them. The sheer tension that reigns is clearly
demonstrated by the hurried efforts to "ideologically" educate young
people. It is perfectly normal, then, to seek a theoretical foundation for this
transitional social environment as well.
When discussing the theory of Yugoslav socialism, the Slovenian
communist leader Eduardo Kardelj, as the official ideologue, has the floor
first, although much is gleaned from ideological articles and, of course, from
official responses to Russian and Chinese criticisms. We will obtain a more
complete picture if we analyze the lecture that Boris Ziherl, a prominent
communist theorist from Belgrade, gave to communist students in Zagreb at the
end of May 1959 to explain the conclusions of the Seventh Party Congress
regarding "decentralization."
There we will find not only the necessary justification for the Yugoslav
"specific path," but also a new interpretation of socialism. At the
beginning of his dissertation, the author acknowledges the evolution of the
workers' movement as a normal phenomenon, which nevertheless degenerated into
two opposing revisionist tendencies: the "liberal-bourgeois" tendency
and the "statist-pragmatic," that is, Stalinist, tendency. Ziherl
condemns both. He condemns the first for having allowed bourgeois ideas to
penetrate the workers' movement without considering certain fundamental Marxist
positions, such as the doctrine of revolution and class struggle, and for
having degenerated into anarchy. He condemns the second for having degenerated
into bureaucracy.
The error of the "statist-pragmatic" tendency certainly lies
not in having implemented state centralism at the beginning of the revolution,
but in not having relinquished it once it had transformed into bureaucracy. The
duty of those who, in the name of the working class, assumed power,
would therefore be to pave the way for their own liquidation within the
framework of socialist development. What Russia failed to do, Yugoslavia is
supposedly doing through its system of workers' self-management. Ziherl's conclusion
is more emphatic, as he grasps Marx's thesis on the "withering away of the
state."
"The withering away of the state means nothing other than the end
of the function of the particular social stratum whose existence characterizes
the state throughout its historical process. What replaces this particular
class? It can be replaced in such a way that the producers themselves, the
people themselves, assume the direction of public affairs; that is to say, the
process of the withering away of the state is the process by which government
in the name of the people passes into the hands of the people themselves. For the entire history of the state throughout all time (not just
the socialist state) demonstrates that every ruling class represents a
particular class. But each stratum has a certain relative independence
which, at certain historical moments, sets it against the class that granted it
full powers."
This public admission implies that the communist "Layer" is
not necessarily the authentic representative of the workers' or the people's
interests. It suffices to add that this theoretical conclusion lacks practical
value, since party affiliation remains the sole criterion for evaluation and
power. But in this way, the chasm between the ruling "certain class"
and the people widens ever more, with the consequences described so vividly by
Ziherl in the following exposition of the construction of socialism.
The construction of socialism, Ziherl says, "is like building a
house." "The fundamental task and the most difficult work, the one
requiring the most resources, is laying the
foundations. Once the foundations are in place, the building quickly reaches
the roof. But the foundations require enormous effort and vast resources,
without much being visible from the outside. The same thing happens when
building socialism in a backward country. Substantial funds and efforts are
invested in what is essential and without which there can be no socialism
whatsoever. It often happens that people become impatient and begin to doubt
the very nature of socialist construction, the possibility of a beneficial
structuring of the new social relations; moreover, in a relatively backward
country, the retarding factor is the relatively small number of the most
progressive class, the working class. Not only its relative smallness in
number, but also its relative backwardness in terms of its technical and
organizational preparation."
However much the author tries to be specific, it remains unclear whether
the socialism he speaks of so often is a means or an end. Should current
"social relations" be readily accepted for their intrinsic value or
for certain potential outcomes? Who guarantees that these outcomes will be
positive? Uncertainty about the future is accompanied by certain vagueness
about the present. It is unclear, for example, why the "most
progressive" class, even in an underdeveloped country, would have to be
"the least numerous" and backward in terms of its "technical and
organizational" capacity, or, if it suffers from these shortcomings, what
makes it "the most advanced"? Nor is it clear, even when comparisons
are made, why the advanced classes of the most developed countries do not
embrace socialism, or why, in general terms, one should strive for socialism,
if, according to the preceding discussion, it is neither a normal process of
social development, the inescapable conclusion of historical materialism, nor
an easy task where it is practiced violently for unexplained reasons.
To what extent, under the pressure of "inexorable facts," the
Marxist content (which still serves as the main inspiration and justification
for everything that happens) has been distorted in socialist practice,
two recent cases serve as proof. In a speech condemning the Stalinist practice
of collectivization, Yakov Blazevic considers production to be the essence of
socialism. "A country acquires a socialist character through its various
aspects, through the way in which production is carried out, and through the
amount of expenditure on that production." The more we produce in
agriculture (...) the more socialist it will be.” Previously, something else
was expected of socialism, but customs change, and with them, the Marxism that
motivated them also changes. The entire gap between prophetic Marxism and Yugoslav
reality is summed up in a cruel phrase by Kardelj, when he said that, “with the
spread of communist practice in the world, socialism wins and Marxism loses.”
He spoke the truth, whatever meaning he intended to give it. These are the
fundamental characteristics of the social environment about which we will now
give the floor to Croatian Marxist intellectuals.
Intellectual Disquiet and Aspiration
The ease with which the Yugoslav communist
regime broke ideological unity with the Soviet Union in 1958 proves the degree
to which the intellectual disposition for such a rupture was ripe and how real
the aspirations for broader intellectual visions are. It is no longer a secret
that political centralism had a special ministry for the dictatorship of the
spirit. It is entirely logical, therefore, that in
these new conditions the policy of decentralization should also be reflected in
the decentralization of the intellect. However, this is not yet the case. And
while the decentralization of power wavers between promises and deeds, the
decentralization of the intellect becomes a necessity.
Although our subsequent analysis of the
opinions that arose as an echo of the social atmosphere is a continuation of
its theoretical interpretation, we address it in a separate chapter for two
reasons. The first reason is that they transcend the limits of purely political
interpretation and delve into the vast philosophical, literary, and general
problems of human creation. The second reason is that we are almost exclusively
dealing with Croatian authors here.
What is Marxism in their opinion?
In their answer, one will sense, above all, a
desire for what Marxism should be. One will also sense not only the influence
of the Western philosophical conception of Marxism, which made Croatian
communists always leftists within the Yugoslav Communist Party, but also the
inherent Croatian inclination toward reflection rather than action. Croatian
Marxists, including the younger generation, are drawn to philosophical Marxism.
In contrast, official Yugoslav socialism remains fundamentally
Leninist-tactical; in it, to use Kardelj's words, "Marxism is lost."
When, focusing on the contrast between Croatian Marxist philosophers and
Yugoslav reality, we consider the current controversy surrounding the question
of the unity or difference between the "young" (philosophical) and
"old" (political) Marx, Yugoslavia as a whole offers us an
instructive and precise picture of this conflict. Of course, Croatian Marxists
oppose this division, considering it a bourgeois infiltration, and advocate for
an indivisible Marx. But this indivisible Marx is precisely the
"young," philosophical Marx who challenges a specific political
system.
It is quite understandable that a person,
whether a philosopher or not, might revise their previous opinions during the
course of their life and research. In Marx's case, these changes were not
without consequences, perhaps because he always adopted a
"scientific" approach, which would imply absolute certainty. In his
youth, influenced by Hegel and following the practices of the philosophers of
his time, Marx sought above all the philosophical answer to the historical
evolution of humanity, which in his day was characterized by revolt,
counterproposal, and economic division.
What, in fact, determines the course of
history and where it is headed? Analyzing life, which gives the impression of
tense conflicts as well as temporary calms, Marx concluded that Hegelian
dialectics not only closely resembles what happens in the world, but that its
genuine value, unintuited by Hegel, lies in this visible material background.
In Marx's view, Hegel was a victim of tradition, dominated by
"spirit," and in which no one, except the forgotten Epicurus,
believed that the spiritus movens of universal events could be precisely and
solely "matter."
This, then, should be the great philosophical "novelty" that
constitutes the essence of Marxism and for which, as the recent policy of
"peaceful coexistence" demonstrates, a true Marxist would be more
readily reconciled with capitalism than, for example, with religion. Marx's
thought then proceeded without major difficulties. All of life unfolds not by
virtue of an idea or ideas, but on the basis of material conditions, that is,
the "means of production," which, autonomous in their origin (though
the reason for this is unknown), determine the political and cultural
superstructure.
Based on the evolution of these material conditions, always with primacy
over political and legal relations, Marx foresaw the inexorable collapse of
capitalism, although the final blow would be dealt by the revolution. This
would mark the beginning of a new historical era. The order that will be
established will be more democratic than all bourgeois democracies, and will
return to humankind the fruits of its labor, its humanistic value, and all the
earthly happiness and harmony that were so naively attributed to the workers.
Historical materialism, thus defined, is not a movement, but the philosophy of
history—scientific and infallible in its predictions, according to Marx, even
if everyone were to go about with their hands in their pockets. Some of his
early texts could be interpreted to mean that all human intervention is
superfluous since "no social system disappears before all the productive
forces it can contain have been developed."
Consequently, the revolution should erupt first in the most developed
countries and then in the underdeveloped ones, although in the latter the
process could be accelerated. Later, as the workers' movements became a
significant political force, Marx's philosophical conception of history gave
way to political advice, directed primarily at German workers. The most
important change, of course, is the idea of accelerating the
historical process through the revolutionary intervention of the communist
party as the conscious spokesperson for the interests of the workers—that is,
of that "certain class" which currently governs in place of the
workers.
Political Marx, or "the older" Marx, became much more concrete,
although, in the general opinion of critics, this was to the detriment of his
philosophy. For if historical materialism is sacrificed for the sake of
political success, the entire Marxist structure of a new society and humanity,
as well as the Marxist Weltanschauung (worldview), is called into question. It
is natural, then, that Marxists abhor this division. Lenin, whose work
corresponds to political Marx, was the first to reject this distinction,
striving to prove his loyalty to the philosophy. His Russian followers are less
circumspect, and for Stalinist exegetes, the true Marx is found in his later
writings. In contrast, bourgeois revisionists, influenced by the evolution of
capitalism without revolutionary intervention, attribute greater value and a certain predictability to philosophical works.
This family quarrel frequently surfaces in the pages of communist
literature and was a topic of discussion at the meeting of Croatian Marxist
philosophers held in Zagreb at the end of 1959. The topic itself was likely to
elicit observations that, in reality, transcended the limits of a single or
double Marx, giving rise, as we shall see, to a new notion of Marxism. Of all
the observations formulated then or "a posteriori," four tendencies
deserve special attention, namely: 1) That Marxism as a philosophy should be
subordinated to scientific findings and experience, and be independent of any
specific political system; 2) That it should be given a projection toward the
future; 3) That, from their perspective, the void in cultural creation caused
by its hitherto prevailing dogmatism should be condemned. 4) That the ethical
isolation into which communism is throwing the new generation be broken and
that links with the past and the universal values of man be restored.
Marxism, said Maks Bace (a "general" and diplomat under Tito)
at the aforementioned meeting, "is not only not
outside of science, nor is it an anti-scientific worldview, nor is it above
science, but the contrary. Practically speaking, this means that if and when
positive science obtains a proven answer to one or more problems that
contradicts the prevailing Marxist answers, then Marxism changes by virtue of
its internal necessity and its complete concordance.
Marxism, therefore, is no longer science; it is not the teacher, but the
student, whose 'scientism' consists in readily accepting what others tell it.
In the speaker's opinion, it has not yet proven to be the best student, since
it has not gone far enough in its adaptability. 'Perhaps this is the reason why
certain philosophies are more current because they are closer to everyday life
than dogmatized Marxism' (ibid.). Sometimes science, even the socialist
experience itself, surpasses its natural talents, since 'problems arise or The old problems reappear in new forms and with expanded
content, often without us being able to provide an answer" (ibid.). The
flexibility that Bace attributes to Marxism does not, strictly speaking, agree
with either the Marxist tradition or Marx's certainty. Marx wrote—as one of the
meeting participants quoted—"that communism signifies the solved enigma of
history and knows that this is the solution."
Although Marxism and communism are not identical concepts, their
connection is such that if communism is the "solved enigma," science
should not revoke the Marxism that proclaims it, nor should Bace say that
"the internal logic of socialism has not been sufficiently explained to
date." What best illustrates this situation and greatly affects communism
is the position of Marxist philosophers, that is, professors who compulsively
teach something they doubt. Their position "becomes more difficult every
day," despite the "means placed at their legal and
"freely," and despite the fact that "every day there is a
growing number of students with increasingly less religious, chauvinistic, and
other prejudices."
Their situation is more difficult "because the problems have become
much more complex, because contrasts have arisen within socialism, because the
logic of the socialist society's movement has not been studied, because Marxism
was long dominated by dogmatism and citationism, and this situation becomes
extremely difficult if the professor himself, the philosopher, does not
progress with life, does not know how to discover new laws, if he hides behind
phraseology and is lost to life." The foregoing demonstrates not only the
ideological indifference of professors and students, but also its underlying
causes, against which a Marxist activist does not yet dare to rebel, because
after all that has been said about the insecurity of socialism, he does not
consider that new laws might be found outside of socialism. Let us hope that
this residue of dogmatism will also evolve through further scientific and
socialist experiences.
In his exposition of what It should be Marxism,
but Maks Bace has gone quite far in circumscribing it to a subjective
worldview. "The fundamental thing for me," he said, "is to
remain faithful to materialism, that is, to try to explain everything, to
understand everything with material and materialist elements, with the
dialectical method; I mean to seek and discover both socialist society and the
whole of human history through materialist elements." Marxism, of course,
promised much more, which does not preclude the fact that, after certain
failures, materialism and dialectics are the prevailing worldview and view of
history, at least until science proves that this too was
"dogmatized." But Marxism, reduced to such a philosophical position,
calls into question established communist systems. Relativism regarding social
forms considered Marxist is expressed in the following words: "Attempts to
transform Marx's contributions to science and ideology into religion (...)
exist," but "this phenomenon is analogous to the transformation of
the Christian movement into the "State religion and has no connection
whatsoever with Marx and Marxism."
That statement implies more than a simple critique of Stalinist
dogmatism. It actually separates Marxism as a philosophy and worldview from the
concrete communist system, which nevertheless claims to be a faithful
reflection of that vision and should be, according to historical materialism.
As for historical materialism, no one invalidated it as clearly as Krleza when
he wrote in his Dialogue on Socialism that "history is no guarantee of the
victory of socialism or, what is even more dangerous, of the victory of the
international communist revolution." By questioning the harmony between
philosophical Marxism and the Marxist order, the authenticity of communist
movements in general is also called into question, as well as their government,
which, consequently, may be a vulgar coup d'état or a sham. A mere coincidence,
but such reasoning closely resembles popular experience and conviction.
In addition to the tendency to present Marxism as being above a specific
political system, we encounter another, no less characteristic, tendency: to
present it as a philosophy projected primarily toward the future. The meaning
of "the future" no longer consists, as was once widely believed, in
necessarily embracing Marxism as the only correct philosophy, but rather in
explaining the present from the perspective of the future. The idea becomes
clearer when compared to life, which surely inspired it, and in which all material
sacrifices, all voluntary work, all five-year plans are justified with a view
to a higher social level in the future.
This idea arose from the discussion of a problem, we might say,
metaphysical: the problem of "time." It is significant not only that
this problem was addressed, but that it was defined by the notion of the
future, the only correct conception. However, the opinions of the
"philosophers" were divided on this point, perhaps because, among
other reasons, it is quite obvious that it implies a kind of dynamism that
could go too far. Vanja Sutlic lectured on the problem of time at those
philosophical conferences. “To describe time,” he said, “whether as the ‘past’
or as the ‘present’ is to fall into positivism, which confines us to pragmatism
and practical consequences, the repercussions of which we already know.” From a
supplementary commentary published in Vjesnik by Veljko Cvjticanin under the
title “The Humanist Problem of Marxism,” it becomes clear that the problem of
time was considered from the perspective of the possibilities that must be
constantly offered to humankind. “According to the Marxist view, humankind is
open to the future” and “is never exactly as it should or can be.”
The heart of this seemingly naive debate becomes even clearer when
expressed more directly, as in the following lines by the writer Jure Kastelan:
“To deny the present century in the name of the past is more than useless. But
to deny this century in the name of the future becomes necessary, because in
the negation of what is inhuman, lifeless, and anti-vital, lies the future, or,
more precisely, the path to the future. The future of the hungry man consists
in being satisfied once he has eaten, of the oppressed in liberating
themselves, and of the fearful in ceasing to be afraid.”
This orientation toward the future is perhaps the healthiest and most
positive phenomenon, always plausible, even when attributed, for one reason or
another, to Marxism; it is positive because it breaks with current, concrete
Marxism.
Instead of the hackneyed theme of preserving "the conquests of the
revolution," the theme of permanent revolution is emerging among young
communists. This is the meaning Professor Andrija Kresic gives to the communist
revolution when he says: "True revolutionaries would not be such if, like
passive objects, they submitted to everything that exists and that, by its own
dialectic, should come to pass. They change the existing state of affairs,
knowing, and not merely believing, that their revolutionary action is not in
vain (...). Communists behave as if they were condemned to the communism that
should come about on its own, by the dictates of that abstract dialectic.
Socialism and communism signify conscious historical movement." Ivan Supek
also expresses optimism when speaking about the future of humankind. But, when
asked at a conference how they navigated the chaotic world of diverse fields,
he replied: "Without direction."
The trend toward greater creative freedom is most pronounced in literary
criticism, though always paying due homage to unquestionable Marxism. The
hidden rebellion against the creative void is gradually invading the pages of
the official press as well. In its review of the essays "by fallen and
dead combatant and revolutionary writers" published under the title Time
and Conscience by Kultura Publishers, Belgrade 1960, the newspaper Komunist,
dated November 3, 1960, makes the following observation:
"The fact remains that after Krleza and Cesarec, and a few other names and works of merit, in general nothing
exceptional has been done in the creative practice of so-called socialist
literature. Or rather, this literature, for the most part, fulfilled a positive
function with varying degrees of success: that of pointing out the hardships of
that social situation, the difficult life of the oppressed; it awakened the
consciousness of the masses, invoked the future, and called for the struggle
for a bright and great tomorrow." The "tomorrow" that the
Croatian writers were preparing, judging by the names mentioned, and if it has
already dawned, is neither bright nor grand.
Under the title "Expression, yes, but also message," Marin
Franicevic, a Croatian communist writer, observes that the rise of Croatian
literature has not kept pace with the literacy achieved after the war; on the
contrary, it lags behind, and this "almost exclusively because it has said
very little about contemporary life, that is to say: because it lacks
contemporary content." Franicevic continues: "The problem, then,
arises of the artistic message to the world (I don't understand why we should
shy away from that term), to this present world about its present, to the world
of tomorrow about its past—a message that has always been conveyed in one way
or another in the best works. It answers humanity's questions about itself,
questions that even science, when it is far more powerful than it is today,
will not be able to fully answer.
It is the problem of authentic lived experience and human experience, of
encouragement or critique in time and space." The same writer explains the
basis of this unease and the reason for the void in a later article, in which
he reviews the development of postwar criticism. Until the early 1950s, that
is, before the launch of the "decentralization" policy, criticism...
tried to be consistently revolutionary, although it wasn't always so for
various reasons. The reader found themselves in a new position regarding this
criticism, which was acquiring a new weight outside of literature, a form that
in many cases even the critics themselves had not desired. In certain
approaches, it acquired an air of irrevocability.
Referring to the new phase that began in 1950, Francevic acknowledges
greater possibilities, while still pointing out the limitations, since it involved
seeking "its own platform within the framework of the general platform
that was not being abandoned, forming its own aesthetic based on what was
beyond all discussion." However, it should be noted that there is a
certain cooling even in what is still "beyond all discussion," when,
for example, it is considered that "the historical materialism of Marx and
Engels is only one among the many theories" that, from Aristotle to the
present day, have attempted to discover the paths of artistic development.
There is no doubt that the same sense of discontent permeates even
analyses that, by their very nature, transcend the framework of internal
problems. In the article "Productive Man and Automation," Rudi Supek
does indeed discuss the human condition in the age of automation in general,
but argues that "bureaucracy brings no better consequences, not even in
socialist society." People realize more and more each day "that their
destiny is in the hands of others, that they are someone else's property."
"A malaise is born that spreads, scattering optimistic forces, corroding
youthful energy with its skepticism, fossilizing young minds, and while a
century and a half ago the malaise du sičcle signified the clash of
indeterminate human existence with an open, immense, or impenetrable history,
today this malaise arises from the limitations that humanity encounters at
every turn and cannot overcome."
No one can object if someone seeks the freedom of humanity and its
creations based on their subjective conviction, even if that conviction stems
from Marxism. Marx promised not only the worker but humanity in general the
return of all their alienated values, as he often said, due to the inhumane
capitalist order. According to Supek, this inhumane era was,
nevertheless, open to infinite historical perspectives, where free and
individual messages to the world still had a place, among which Marxism
occupied a prominent position.
Artistic creation is not the isolated field where Marxism, as he
claimed, sowed wheat, while with communism, weeds grow. Where to look for the
cause? The Yugoslav-Soviet conflict also provided an opportunity to publicly
reproach the other for what was silently reproached within oneself. The enemy
of artistic creation is the centralism of the intellect, known as
"Zhdanovism." In the article "Road to the Anthology of
Art," Ivan Focht argues that in art, only "objectivism" has a
defined purpose.
Aesthetics in our times can only operate ontologically. For it is only in this way that modern art acts and fights for its
status. It doesn't matter what criteria the author shares; what matters is what
he condemns, namely, the subordination of art to political ends. Political
power, "seeing art as a force, wishes to subject it to its ends, but, once
subjected to these ends, art loses its vigor." Ivan Supek expressed the
same opinion when he wrote that "conformity is man's surrender to dead
order, the stifling of the creative faculty, a sleeper
car to death." If the situation in Yugoslavia were more favorable in this
respect, it is likely that there would be no need to fight against the
"bureaucracy of cultural and artistic institutions," as is
fortunately the case now.
The critique of spiritual emptiness is also linked to the critique of
the unjustified break with the past, harmful to culture, as well as the
isolation from the rest of the world. Regarding isolation, the solution is
sought in reading foreign literature and in the numerous translations of works,
predominantly of a socialist nature, of course. As for the past, an integral
part of modern man, the situation is more delicate. The break with the past
gave rise, among other things, to the well-known invasion of mediocrity, in
which the gap between authentic human values and the grades on
paper, awarded by "society," plays a significant role.
As an example, we will cite Dusko Car's critique of this situation.
"Often inclined to value a written document (...) we forget that man is
the most essential thing (...) and believing the paper we forget that the paper
often conceals the conceptions repeated throughout the centuries, now only
covered by embers, but not extinguished, about the value of man and his
original place in the list of genuine merits in society." The author's
thought is expressed even more clearly in the following comparison. "It is
impossible to omit from such a reflection the negative consequences of severing
roots planted over centuries—call them what you will, tradition, inertia, it
matters little—but it is impossible not to recognize the results of gradually
overcoming the path we have retraced. Ultimately, we found ourselves in the lap
of that bourgeois intelligentsia; we still draw a great deal of knowledge,
norms, even prejudices from those bourgeois intellectuals, and we must never
forget the word of historical experience that speaks of the plebeian origin of
that intelligentsia and its incredibly rapid demise in the course of
history." (ibid.).
The problem posed is not nostalgia for the past, but rather the feeling
of spiritual and cultural isolation, of intellectual humiliation in the face of
"paper" qualifications. Is it necessary to point out that so many
talented individuals remain silent because they have not shed their
"prejudices"? Socialist practice demonstrated, among many other
things, that history does not begin with communism and that certain human
values must be respected at all times. The past, despite its
flaws, had the advantage that ethical and cultural progress ran parallel to
material achievements, thanks perhaps primarily to the presence of religion in
society.
Communism appropriates material gains but violently destroys the ethical
and moral superstructure. Therein lies its historical
originality and its practical condemnation, for those who live by the sword die
by the sword. Truth, justice, honesty, responsibility, work, marriage,
knowledge, ability, etc., belong neither to the past nor the future, but to
humankind, and all political interference with these universal values
has repercussions on the very being of humanity.
The quoted paragraph does not discuss how the separation of the moral,
the past, and the eternal from concrete life is exacted. The newspapers write
about that. But it speaks to something even more important: that there are
people who simply do not want this separation. After 16 years of ideological
isolation, the young communist generation is searching not only for a path to
the future but also for a path to the past. "Socialist culture is not
created ex nihilo," wrote Vjekoslav Mikecin in his work entitled "The
Young Man Today." However, adopting a definite stance toward tradition in
the cultural sphere, with the utmost care and respect, remains a current
challenge in our country.
This problem may not be what we initially imagined—namely, the danger of
being labeled "chauvinist" if one refers to national heroes. Since
the author makes no secret of being a communist, he rejects "national
romanticism" and even censures the anti-Zhdanovist campaign as
"hypocritical," for he does not accept the separation between the
aesthetic and the social. He is a communist, and that is why it is so
interesting when he says that he lives in "The Time of the Most Total Crisis."
Every generation believes that "with it, true history begins"; his
generation, the communist one, not only believed it but also maintained it. But
"history delivered its verdict. There was too much naiveté and
foolishness."
And now the problem arises for communism, which has not found a
socialist substitute for eternal values, of how to "define itself before
tradition in the ethical sense," but "with a complete and resounding
rejection of all bourgeois ways of life, of opportunism, of class psychology,
of intellectual dullness, of every form of degeneration." Experience,
perhaps, persuaded the author of these interesting reflections that "this
is not a task that can be resolved by unleashing campaigns," but what is
scandalous is to hear from a Marxist that it cannot be resolved "with a
simplified and vulgar materialist formula based on the premise that
automatically modifies the superstructure." Let us add, as a conclusion
and final observation, that this is not only the problem of a young intellectual,
but "an integral part of the problem of our society in general."
Intellect and
Strength
Faced with a host of practical difficulties and the unmet needs of human
aspirations, socialism as a system loses the ideological clarity it possessed
during its "illegality," while simultaneously lacking a stable
economic policy. Ultimately, it is no longer clear whether it is an end in
itself or a means to an end; whether victory has been won or is yet to be won;
whether it will come about through the laws of historical materialism, or
exclusively through harsh sacrifices and vast resources, since history is by no
means the guarantor of its victory.
All these questions are part of the confusion, of "the most total
crisis," which, if it does not directly threaten the power that spends so
much on its security, "corrodes skeptically the young forces and
fossilizes the minds." The "dialectical contrasts" so often
discussed are usually simple logical contradictions, accompanied, if not
caused, by the vital contrast between luxury and poverty, between personal gain
and palatial "social services." This contrast, legitimized by the
system's practices, which preach equality, incites not only materialistic
ambitions, but also, and far worse, moral irresponsibility and ethical uncertainty.
Some, like Ivan Supek, admit this. "We listen to the words of the speakers
without remaining silent about our hidden thoughts; we ourselves offer the
world different signs of our inner perceptions."
The Croatian Marxist intellectuals, the only ones not forbidden
philosophical and literary expression, and about whom we have therefore been
able to speak, would like to move more freely within Marxist frameworks, since
they cannot move freely through the vast field of the human spirit. However,
their undertaking still bears the mark of a fundamental inconsistency, perhaps
understandable under current conditions, given its still-compulsive nature.
For just as political "decentralization" is
practiced only within party discipline, so too is the decentralization of the
intellect operated exclusively within the framework of Marxist materialism. Perhaps here and there a ray of greater freedom shines; perhaps that is
the widespread yearning of hidden thoughts. But, as long as a single
"worldview" has "legal means," it is not permissible to
speak of freedom, nor of the loftiness of that worldview, for praise becomes
meaningless without criticism. Nevertheless, on the platform of what remains
"beyond discussion," greater agitation is noticeable.
Croatian Marxists would like to give Marxism a scientific foundation
once again, subordinate it to the intellect, separate it from a concrete
system, inspire it with humanitarian values, offer it greater possibilities for
literary creation, instill in it greater optimism regarding the future and
greater respect for the past. But, as long as they remain confined to
materialism, they will not be able to give that answer, because Marxism as a
philosophical system, if it ever answers man why he works, will never tell him
why he lives.
Many reflections appearing in the communist press deserve greater
attention, and we could cite many more names, but our purpose is not to provide
an anthology of authors but rather the content of their opinions. What has been
said on this matter is not a concession to any of these authors, whose
"social roles" we are largely unaware of. It would be wrong to
conclude that Croatian Marxist intellectuals have suddenly aligned themselves
with the opposition, but it is certain that Marxism in its concrete form, in
its results, does not satisfy them. They undermine Marxism while believing in
it, for the most significant aspect of this entire process is that the
discontent is not the work of foreign influence, but rather an expression of
internal anxieties; not an isolated voice, but the common denominator of the
intellectual gestation that, according to the inexorable law of nature, returns
from the ruins of the promised paradise to the fundamental humanistic problems
of humankind. With this, not only is dogmatic historical materialism revoked,
but its current socialist form is also threatened.
The extent to which the regime is aware of this is fully reflected in a
speech by the Vice President of the Government, Eduardo Kardelj, who publicly
condemned this new humanism. "Some young intellectuals, faced with various
difficulties in real life—sometimes material, sometimes stemming from
ideological disorientation, insufficient knowledge, an inability to create,
etc.—prefer to seek refuge in certain abstract humanist constructs, believing
themselves to be wise and highly revolutionary, when in fact they are sterile
snobs and impotent charlatans (...) And here, empty words about humanism and
democratism, about good and evil, are not enough to guide them..." This is
further proof that Marxism is no longer an attractive idea, but a regime that
oppresses, since history teaches that whenever force has clashed with
intellect, it was not intellect that succumbed, but force.
They all belonged simultaneously to Western Christian society and to
their homeland, Croatia. This unity was weakened by the radical
differentiations between Western culture and national cultures, the latter
considered definitive and far-reaching cultural units. However, in recent
times, the awareness has grown that the national cultures of European peoples are
merely local expressions, national variants, of the common culture and
civilization of Western Europe.
***
These preliminary remarks will help to understand why the life and work
of Ivan Duknovic, known in general art literature as Giovanni Dalmata, has not
yet been properly clarified and studied, even though he is one of the most
outstanding sculptors of the Roman Quattrocento. Historians have limited
themselves to studying and analyzing his sculptures executed in Rome during the
reigns of Popes Paul II and Sixtus IV. Only recently has light been shed in
Croatia on his origins, youth, and subsequent stay in Rome, as well as on his
works produced there. Also in recent decades, thanks to archaeological
discoveries, it has been possible to complete the information regarding
Duknovic's stay and activities in Hungary, at the court of the
Hungarian-Croatian king Matthias Corvinus.
Based on this material and his own research, Kruno Prijatelj, a Croatian
art historian and director of the Art Gallery in Split, was able to write a
comprehensive monograph on the life, work, and importance of this renowned
Renaissance sculptor. Apart from the brief and incomplete notes found in
certain encyclopedic editions, there is nothing published in Spanish about a
Renaissance sculptor who worked in Italy, Croatia, and Hungary, and whose works
are also held in the Louvre in Paris, the Victoria and Albert Museum in London,
and, according to some specialists, in the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna
and the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard University, USA. We hope that this work will
fill this gap and serve as a source of information for those in the
Spanish-speaking world interested in the study of the European Renaissance.
According to historical data recently published in Croatia, it has been
established that Giovanni Dalmata's real name was Ivan Duknovic and that his
family came from the village of Orahovica near Trogir (Tragurium in Latin, Traú
in Italian). The son of Esteban Duknovic, Ivan was born in or near Trogir
around 1440, acquiring his early knowledge of sculpture and the humanities in
his small homeland, rich in quarries and marble workshops. At that time, the
monumental Trogir Cathedral, perhaps the most beautiful in Croatia, was nearing
completion. While Ivan was young, the master Nicola Fiorentino, a pupil of
Donatello, was working on the Chapel of St. John Orsini in the cathedral, one
of the most beautiful works of the High Renaissance.
Even then, at the dawn of Humanism and the Renaissance, the monuments of
antiquity became a source of inspiration. Duknovio was able to contemplate them
near the city. A stone's throw from Trogir and Split lay
the still well-preserved remains of the great Roman city of Salona. There, the
illustrious humanist and father of Croatian literature, Marko Marulic,
collected Roman coins and noted the Latin inscriptions in the necropolises. In
Split, one could then see the well-preserved remains of the magnificent palace
of the Roman Emperor Diocletian, a masterpiece of ancient Roman art.
Diocletian's mausoleum was converted in the High Middle Ages into the
cathedral of the Archbishop of Split, whose title was Primas Dalmatiae ac
totius Croatiae (Bishop of the First Dalmatia and all Croatia). At that same
time, the master Juraj Dalmatinac (Giorgio Dalmata), builder of the Šibenik
Cathedral, renowned sculptor, and the most prominent representative of the
Flamboyant Gothic style in Dalmatia, worked on the chapel and altar of Saint
Anastasius in the Split Cathedral. And the city of Trogir itself, a former
Greek colony, later a Roman fishing village, housed many fragments of Greek and
Roman art. There, in the home of the humanist Coriolanus Cippico, a beautiful
Kairos relief by an unknown disciple of Lyzippus was preserved, along with the
later published fragments of Petronius's "The Feast of Trimalhio."
With the knowledge acquired in this environment, Duknovic moved to Rome
to perfect his skills in sculpture. He was 20 years old. In Rome, he
collaborated with two first-rate workshops: that of Mino da Fiesole (1431-1484)
and that of Andrea Bregno (1421-1506). "The influence of those two
sculptors," says Kruno Prijatelj, "can be seen in his work, but it
will never overshadow his distinct individual style, which, in terms of
sculptural challenges, was much more vigorous than theirs."
The first known work by the young Duknovic in Rome was the coat of arms
of Pope Pius II above the portal of the Cortile del
Maresciallo in the Vatican. It seems that Pius II, known as the humanist Silvio
Piccolomini, who made Rome the center of Renaissance art by bringing together
the best masters and sculptors there, was the young Duknovic's first patron. He
died in Ancona while preparing to lead the crusade to aid the Christians
threatened on the other side of the Adriatic.
Another work executed by Duknovic in Rome was the coat of arms of Pope
Paul II on the side portal of the Palazzo Venezia in Rome. Of greater
significance was his participation in the execution of the tomb of Cardinal
Giacomo Tebaldi in the Roman church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva, in
collaboration with Andrea Bregno. At the same time, he sculpted several statues
and reliefs for the Tempietto of San Giacomo in Vicovaro, not far from Rome,
built by the Orsini family, notably the lunette above the portal, the angels in
the arch, the pointed arches, and the tympanum.
Prijatelj believes that Duknovic, interrupting his first stay in Rome,
returned to Trogir around 1470, based on certain monuments in Trogir that he
attributes to him. It is very likely that Duknovic collaborated with Nicola
Fiorentino on the Chapel of St. John Ursini and the Sobota family vault in the
Church of St. Dominic. Prijatelj confirms Duknovic's hand in the execution of
ornaments in the chapel and especially in some putti. Later, Duknovic would sculpt
two statues for that chapel.
With convincing arguments, Prijatelj attributes to him two impressive
lions in the Sobota family vault, which have been compared to those of
Donatello. Duknovic's stay in his homeland, following his studies and establishment
in Rome, was not merely an episode in the master's life, but a significant
contribution to the definitive affirmation of Renaissance plastic and
decorative forms in the conservative marble workshops of Dalmatia, which
adhered to the Gothic style under the influence of both Venice and the strong
artistic personality of Juraj Dalmatinac (Giorgio Dalmata).
Duknovic's most fruitful period was his second stay in Rome between 1470
and 1481. During this decade, he defined his style and artistic profile. He gave
his works a new sense of volume and form, a new, vibrant dynamism, greater
refinement, and higher quality, occupying the foremost place in Roman
Quattrocento sculpture. His masterpiece from this period is the tomb of Pope
Paul II, executed in collaboration with Mino da Fiesole. Vasari said of this
monument that it is "the richest tomb that was once adorned with ornaments
and figures for no pontiff." It is a monumental niche, located in the old
St. Peter's Basilica, adorned with numerous statues and reliefs.
Unfortunately, it was dismantled during the construction of the new St.
Peter's Basilica, with most of the fragments being preserved in the Vatican
grottoes. Some fragments are in the Louvre in Paris, and an angel, which some
attribute to Duknovic, is in the Fogg Museum at Harvard University, USA. Mino
da Fiesole played the principal role in the overall design of Paul II's tomb
and its basic architectural lines. However, Duknovic surpassed him in the
sculptural aspects, creating the most beautiful and vigorous sculptures, which
earned him a well-deserved place among the great masters of the Renaissance.
Due to a lack of written documents, several authors who have studied the
tomb of Paul II—especially H. Tschudi, A. Venturi, and L. Donati—are not always
in agreement as to whom to attribute certain sculptures, to Duknovic or to Mino
da Fiesole. K. Prijatelj, starting with those statues and fragments that bear
Duknovic's signature, such as the Hope in the tomb of Paul II and the statue of
Saint John in Trogir, and meticulously analyzing the style and characteristic
features of both artists, concurs with Tschudi's attributions and praises his
sagacity.
According to them, the following works in the aforementioned tomb should
be attributed to Duknovic: the recumbent figure of Pope Paul II in the
sarcophagus; the large relief of the Resurrection, of a vigorous and lyrical
conception; the relief of God the Father with angels, a motif that Duknovic
would repeatedly explore; and the statue of Hope that bears the sculptor's
signature. Statues of the Evangelists Mark and Matthew; the relief of the
Creation of Eve, perhaps the most beautiful composition on the tomb; a relief
with one of the Pope's coats of arms; an angel on the right; three angels to
the right of the group with God the Father; and a fragment of architrave with
cherubs. All these pieces are in the Vatican Grottoes. Prijatelj correctly
attributes to him also the architrave of Leuvre with decorative lion heads in
medallions.
In the final phase of work on Paul II's tomb, Duknovic and Mino da
Fiesole jointly created the tabernacle, a medium-sized work now kept in the
sacristy of the Roman church of St. Mark. Duknovic then undertook two major
projects. First, with Andrea Bregno, he worked on the tomb of Cardinal
Bartolomeo Roverella, and then, almost single-handedly, he executed the
sepulcher for Cardinal Bernardo Eroli in the Old Basilica of St. Peter.
In the monumental tomb of Cardinal Roverella, Duknovic created two
slender and stylized angels beside the sarcophagus, a new type of caryatid, and
a lyrically rendered relief of the Virgin Mary among the angels, in addition to
an enormous and monumental statue of God the Father. Only fragments remain of
what was once the splendid tomb of Cardinal Eroli in the Vatican grottoes. The
recumbent figure in the cardinal's sarcophagus is impressively and vigorously
expressive, imbued with a new lyrical rhythm. It represents the pinnacle of
Duknovic's work with recumbent figures.
The monumental figure of Christ, positioned frontally, is the master's
most accomplished creation, revealing new facets of his artistic personality.
The figures of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, also preserved, are expressive
in their conception and the intensity of their inner lives. From that period
are two reliefs by Duknovic - Virgin between angels and God the Father -
fragments of a tomb now in Grotte Vaticane.
A. Venturi even attributes to Duknovic the tomb of Cardinal Pietro Riari
in the Church of the Holy Apostles, while Prijatelj believes it to be a joint
work by Andrea Bregno and Mino da Fiesole. He also considers other
attributions, such as the chancel and choir stalls of the Sistine Chapel in the
Vatican, and the coat of arms of Pope Alexander VI above the door of the Borgia
Apartments, to be incorrect.
Adolfo Venturi also attributes a number of architectural monuments to
Duknovic. Although he is cited as an architect in a contemporary document,
Venturi's claims lack foundation. However, his attribution to Duknovic of the
expressive statue of Saint John the Evangelist in the Chapel of Saint John
Ursini in Trogir was confirmed by the recent discovery of the signature Ioannis
Dalmatae F., carved at the base of the piece. That statue, a synthesis of the
most characteristic elements of Duknovic's style, in Prijatelj's opinion, was
created during our master's second stay in Rome.
***
In the decade of 1480 to 1490, I. Duknovic resided in Hungary, at the
court of the Hungarian-Croatian king Matthias Corvinus, which had become a true
center of humanist culture and Renaissance art. There, in addition to a number
of European writers and visual artists, were several Croatians, including two
sculptors: Jacob Stafileo and Ivan Duknovic, both from Trogir.
Little information exists about Duknovic's life and activities during
that decade. The artworks in the king's residences were partly destroyed and
partly moved by Suleiman II to Istanbul after the defeat of the
Hungarian-Croatian army at Mohács in 1526. Much of Hungary was conquered, and
the royal residences were looted and ransacked. Therefore, only fragments and a
few portraits of Duknovic's work, created in Hungary, survived.
Among other reliable documents that confirm Duknovic's presence in
Hungary are two donations. In the first, dated in Vienna on July 25, 1488, King
Matthias, in agreement with his wife Beatrice of Aragon—called Diva Beatrix by
the humanists—donates "magistri Ioannis Duknovich de Tragurio, statuarii
sive marmorum sculptoris... castellum Maykovez vocatum in comitatu Crisiensi
habitum," Maykovez Castle in Croatia, in the Krizevci district, to reward
him for his extraordinary works and spread his glory for all time. A
contemporary of Duknovic, the Croatian humanist writer Ludovicus
Tubero-Crijevic of Dubrovnik, refers to him in the same document, calling him
Ioannes Dalmata illustris sua aetate scultor.
Duknovic, incidentally, is the artist behind the badly damaged relief of
the Virgin of Diosgyötir, now housed in the National Museum of Budapest. There
is no consensus on attributing to him the richly decorated fountain with a
torso of the small Heracles in colored marble, decorative festoons of flowers
and fruit, a coat of arms, and heraldic symbols. This fountain was located at
the summer residence of King Matthias Corvinus in Visegrad. Its remains were
only discovered in 1941-42.
P. Meller presented compelling arguments for attributing the fountain to
Duknovic, an opinion shared by K. Prijatelj, as well as A. Venturi's opinion
regarding the two portrait reliefs in the National Museum of Budapest,
depicting King Matthias and Queen Beatrice. However, it is doubtful that the
relief of King Matthias in the Vienna Museum of Fine Arts is the work of
Duknovic. From approximately the same period and cycle belong a portrait of a
humanist, now housed in the Cippico Palace in Trogir, and the most accomplished
portrait in that series, depicting the Italian poet and humanist Francesco
Cinti, now in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London.
Duknovic is also credited with other works and fragments, some of which
are preserved in Hungary. Prijatelj does not deny his influence on some of
these works, but maintains that by limiting Duknovic's work in Hungary to the
fountain in Visegrad, the Madonna of Diósgyör, and the portrait reliefs, the
master's personality acquires coherence and unity. This body of work reflects
new phases and changes in his style, the modeling of materials, and the
treatment of volumes, while also testifying to his remarkable importance in
introducing Renaissance forms to Hungary.
After King Matthias's death in 1490, Duknovic left Hungary and for the
next twenty years lived and worked successively in Trogir, then Venice, Ancona,
and probably Zagreb around 1510. The exact date and place of his death are
unknown, though it is presumed to have occurred around 1510. During these last
twenty years, marked by a clear and understandable decline, Duknovic sculpted
some significant works, such as the relief of the Virgin, now in the Civic
Museum of Padua, and the bust of Carlo Zeno (now in the Correr Museum in
Venice). For its refinement, extraordinary freshness, grace, and spontaneity,
and for its superb execution, this relief is one of Duknovic's masterpieces.
The portrait of Carlo Zeno, also attributed to Duknovic by A. Venturi,
is very evocative and expressive. For the Chapel of St. John Ursini in Trogir,
Duknovic created the statue of St. Thomas the Apostle during this period, and
for Ancona Cathedral—where the master builder Juraj Dalmatinac (Giorgio da
Sebenico) had previously achieved fame—he crafted a relief tombstone of Blessed
Girolamo Gianelli. In Venice, he did not complete the large altarpiece for the
Scuola di San Marco. Duknovic is also credited with the tombstone of the Bishop
of Zagreb, Lucas Baratin, fragments of which are housed in the Croatian
Historical Museum in Zagreb. One of these fragments bears the sculptor's
signature: Ioannis...
In Duknovic's extensive and prolific body of work, one can discern
certain influences of the Roman Quattrocento, followed by purely classical
elements, particularly in his treatment of marble. In the statues executed
during the master's second stay in Rome, his tendency towards pure volumes
crystallized under the influence of Piero della
Francesca and Francesco Laurana (Franjo Vranjanin). In his Hungarian phase,
certain Nordic influences become visible.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned influences did not overshadow
Duknovic's vigorous artistic personality; rather, they enriched it, as is often
the case with true geniuses.
Kruno Prijatelj considers the characteristic features of Duknovic's work
to be: his overall conceptions of sculptures, where delicate lyricism and
restless dynamism merge; specific calligraphic details; his chiseling
technique; the treatment of hair; the figures' posture; the typical expression
of their faces; their highly distinctive eyes and lips; the soft, wax-like
flesh tones; and the interplay of garments with triangular folds so
characteristic of the master. His true originality is reflected in the overall
unity of his sculptures and compositions, imbued with a profound lyricism and a
restless dynamism that harks back to the late Gothic period, although in
certain works, forms foreshadowing the Baroque emerge.
The crowning achievements of Duknovic's art include the Creation of Eve,
the Resurrection, Hope, and God the Father on the tomb of Pope Paul II; the
Virgin on the tomb of Cardinal Roverella; the statue of Saint John in Trogir;
the figures of the Cardinal and Christ on the tomb in Eroli; the Virgin in
Padua; and certain portraits already mentioned. Duknovic's works in Trogir are
of paramount importance to Croatia.
While other great Croatian masters such as Culinovic (Giorgio
Schiavone), Medulic (Andrea Meldolla Schiavone), the miniaturist Klovic (Julius
Clovius), Benkovic, and both Laurana worked almost exclusively abroad, where
they left their works, Ivan Duknovic executed a portion of his work in Croatia,
playing a significant role in the artistic movement in Dalmatia through his
sculptures in Trogir, and especially through his statue of Saint John, the
beautiful sculpture that adorns the extraordinary chapel of Nicholas of
Florence. In the marble workshops and botteghe of early Dalmatian 16th century,
we find repercussions and forms inexplicable without the presence and teachings
of Duknovic. He introduced mature forms of Renaissance art to Croatia during a
very difficult time, when Turkish attacks reached the gates of Split and
Trogir. Bernardo Zane, Archbishop of Split, movingly describing the sufferings
of the Croatian people before the Lateran Council, said: "I did not hear
about it, I did not read about it, but I saw it, as did my twelve suffragan
bishops in their cities. Often, woe is me, while officiating, I was forced to
cast off my clerical garb, take up arms, and rush to the city gates to
encourage the distraught people and console the afflicted so that they might
bravely resist the merciless and bloodthirsty enemy." Another bishop, who
was also banus (viceroy) of Croatia, Petar Berislavich, originally from Trogir
like Duknovic, fell fighting against the Ottomans while leading as supreme
commander of the Croatian army, his soldiers who considered him, according to
the chronicles of that time, "more like their father than the
viceroy".
However, the internal organization of the
Croatian kingdom was modeled on the traditional Croatian tribal system, the
center of whose power resided in a few powerful clans and in the hands of the
most prominent families within those clans. This system significantly limited
the centralizing tendencies of the kings, while simultaneously exposing the
kingdom to open rivalries between clans and tribes, the intrigues of foreign
powers, and civil wars. These conditions also hindered the development of the
feudal system, as well as the growth of intensive agriculture, industry, and
trade. The tribes in the mountains continued their semi-nomadic extensive
sheep-herding economy, and the peasants in the lowlands maintained a
self-sufficient economic system organized for household consumption rather than
for the markets.
Therefore, the Croatian princes and kings
relied primarily on the taxes collected from the Romance-speaking cities along
the coast for their income. On the other hand, the Romance-speaking population
in the cities and mountains (descendants of the Romanized Thracians and
Illyrians) successfully resisted and refused to be assimilated by the tribal
system, which was organized on the exclusivist principles of ethnic identity
and culture. Their loyalty to the Croatian rulers was not unwavering.
Consequently, both the kingdom's internal unity and its once considerable
military power gradually declined. Meanwhile, some Croatian leaders
intermarried with the Magyars, another people who had invaded the Pannonian
region. This course of events gradually facilitated the union of Croatia and
Hungary under a common king in the early 12th century.
The warlike Magyar tribes, established in the
9th century in the Danube and Tisza river basins, subjugated the native
population and founded a powerful kingdom. They had already established a
centralized political power and a feudal system. In the negotiations for union
with Hungary under a common king, the Croatian chieftains retained their
exclusive rights to rule over the historical territories of the Kingdom of
Croatia. The Hungarian king was crowned King of Croatia in separate ceremonies.
However, influenced by the Hungarian example,
the chieftains of the main Croatian clans, through the forced appropriation of
tribal and other lands, as well as through land grants from kings, transformed
themselves into feudal lords. Even so, the collective memory of the Croatian
people continued to dream of the power and glory of the ancient Kingdom of
Croatia, a yearning that grew stronger with time. It was precisely on the basis
of these historical aspirations that the Croatian nobility always emphasized
their independence.
They defended their ancient privileges,
jealously preserving Croatia's self-government and its right to
self-determination against the abuses of the Hungarian kings and estates. Now
the center of power for the Croatian nobility shifted northwest to the
Pannonian Plains of Croatia, where the feudal system was able to thrive thanks
to the productive labor of the peasants and where towns flourished, populated
by German, Italian, and native artisans and merchants.
However, as they faced the threat of the
Magyar clergy and feudal nobility and the centralizing tendencies of the
Hungarian kings, the Croatian grandees and clergy strove to assert their
independence from Hungary whenever circumstances demanded it.
Thus, for example, as early as the 13th century, the Croatian feudal
nobility in Bosnia and Herzegovina began to govern that territory
independently. Due to favorable international circumstances, Bosnia gradually
became a separate kingdom in the 14th century. In the other Croatian provinces,
the struggle continued between the centralizing tendencies of the Hungarian
kings and the separatist tendencies of the Croatian nobility. Meanwhile, the
pressure exerted by the Ottoman Turks on Croatian lands intensified during the
15th and early 16th centuries, and Croatian resistance diminished due to the
loss of territory and manpower. Under these circumstances, the Croatians turned
to Archduke Ferdinand of neighboring Austria and elected him, independently of
Hungary, as King of Croatia in 1527, with him pledging to defend Croatian lands
with an agreed-upon number of troops.
The Croatian experience under the Habsburgs was even more disappointing
than that under the Hungarian kings. Not only did the Austrian rulers fail to
honor their commitments, but they also divided the territory of historical
Croatia, creating, within Croatian territory, a separate administrative unit
called the Military Frontier, governed by Austrian officers. Here, a system of
constant military training prevailed, designed to perpetuate warrior traits
among a population that was forced to engage in incessant guerrilla warfare
with the Turks. Thus, the Croatian nobility lost most of their territory, just
as, in the 15th century, under the Hungarian kings,
the Adriatic coast had been lost to Venice.
Feudal Croatia, reduced to such a state, nevertheless offered resistance
to foreign rulers in the 17th century through the conspiracy of the Croatian
counts Zrinski and Frankopan. The conspirators' aim was to separate Croatia and
Hungary from Austria and establish a Croatian-Hungarian kingdom, with Zrinski
as king, under the suzerainty of the Turkish sultan. The plan failed, and the
power of the Croatian nobles was finally broken. Their role as holders of
national sovereignty was assumed by the peasants of the Pannonian Plain and by
the emerging intelligentsia in Croatia's coastal and inland cities.
The Peasants of the
Pannonian Plain
Vvvvvvv
Until the beginning
of the 20th century, the basic unit of social organization for the peasantry in
the Sava and Drava river basins was the land and housing community (zadruga),
composed of several families and governed by the principles of economic and
political democracy. It was a unit that was both territorial and familial, in
which territorial ties prevailed over blood relations. The families that formed
a community (zadruga) did not necessarily have to be related, and their
children often married among themselves. Nor was the unit governed by the
Father or the Elder, but by two elected officials, a man and a woman. Their
powers were delegated to them by the assembly of all active members, men and
women, and could be revoked at any time. Fields, water, mills, forests, houses,
stables, and agricultural implements were collectively owned and used for
household consumption, not for the market or trade.
This self-sustaining, autarkic economic system, designed to provide
economic security and general well-being, was equal for all its members. In
addition to economic and social equality, the community, due to its size
(averaging 20 to 40 members or more), was able to provide entertainment,
recreation, and emotional fulfillment for everyone. Furthermore, each
individual family in this community could own a plot of land, as well as other
individual properties. While all families ate together in the communal house,
each had separate living quarters where its members slept, rested, and
socialized, along with their friends, whenever they sought privacy. Thus,
besides economic security and social equality, this system of organization also
provided personal independence and human dignity, discouraged those who craved
power, minimized conflict, and fostered adaptability, compromise, and mutual
support. It also encouraged rapid population growth.
Such a social system
prevailed among the ancient Slavic farmers, who populated the Pannonian and
Balkan plains and river valleys in stages from the early centuries of the
Christian era until the High Middle Ages. At that time, in addition to the
local village, composed of several land and housing communities (zadruga),
these people were organized into larger territorial units made up of several
villages called "zupa" for common affairs. These units were also
governed according to the principles of political democracy.
This system of economic, territorial, and political organization
prevented both sharp social differentiation and the concentration of power in
the hands of a single class or individual. Such a social structure, therefore,
did not favor the formation of "states." Moreover, having dedicated
all their energy to production and lacking warrior characteristics, these
people did not advance much in military techniques and skill. Consequently,
they were often defenseless against predatory tribes or professional soldiers.
The strategy of these peasants was to settle in swamps or in the middle of
forests and other places, far from the main transit routes. If their lands were
conquered, these peasants adapted to the conquerors on the condition that the
new masters allowed them to keep their lands and respected their traditional
customs.
Without being
aggressive or threatening anyone, and being valuable as agricultural producers,
the Slavs were left undisturbed as they migrated in search of more arable land,
required by their rapidly growing population and self-sufficient economy. They
often found this land in areas devastated by the warlike tribes and hordes from
the East, which had been invading Eastern and Central Europe until the late Middle Ages. These migrations, accompanied by the
cultivation of the land, occurred at a rather slow pace and over short
distances, always maintaining a close connection with their place of origin.
This type of migration explains the extent of the area populated by these
farmers, as well as the great similarity in languages and folk
customs that they preserved. It also explains the Slavic farmers' ability to
assimilate the conquerors, whose numbers were smaller.
When Croatian warrior tribes invaded the Pannonian Plain and the Dinaric
Alps in the 7th century AD, the Slavic farmers who had previously inhabited
these areas provided the economic foundation for the Croatian state. Within
this state, the two contrasting societies—that of the farmers and that of the
warriors—established a symbiotic relationship. Some warriors and herders from
the mountains began to settle in the lowlands, turning to agriculture. Others
preferred to continue with horse breeding, semi-nomadic sheep herding, and
warrior occupations.
However, over the
following centuries, as the tribal organization of Croatian warriors
disintegrated and gave way to the feudal system, the peasants resisted the
dispossession of their lands and fought for their rights through legal means
and frequent local revolts. These culminated in the general uprising of the
peasants of the northern Croatian plain in the 16th century. The Croatian
peasants were defeated by the superior army of the estates.
Nevertheless, some peasants managed to retain their lands and their
freedom. They organized themselves into free agricultural communities that
enjoyed the privileges of the nobility. It was precisely this peasant nobility,
administratively organized into larger territorial units called zupanias
(comitatus), that became the focus of constitutional
and democratic ideas, forming the last bastion of resistance to the centralist
policies and absolutist regimes of the Austrian monarchs. The Zupanias, by their
constitution, were autonomous units, and no law passed by the highest
authorities was valid without the prior approval of the Zupania assembly. The
Zupanias controlled the recruitment of soldiers and the war budget; therefore,
they could offer effective resistance to the rulers. Thus, they opposed
Habsburg absolutism and its centralizing policies under the reign of Maria
Theresa, so effectively that her son, Joseph II (1780-1790), abolished the
Zupanias as administrative and legislative units. However, faced with setbacks
in the war with Turkey (1787-1791), he was forced to restore them with all
their privileges and autonomy.
In the mid-19th
century, the feudal system was abolished throughout Croatia, and the peasants
finally gained their legal freedom. However, the peasants' interests and their
yearning for "old rights" were curtailed by the Hungarian rulers, who
sought to bring Croatia under their control. The leaders of the resurgent
Hungarian nationalism had decided to subjugate and Magyarize Croatia, aiming to
realize their long-held dream of a unified Hungarian state stretching from the
Carpathians to the Adriatic. They had agreed with the Austrian monarchs to
reorganize the monarchy into a dual empire, with Croatia being arbitrarily
assigned to Hungary. To subdue Croatia, they had to restrict political rights,
because if universal and secret suffrage were granted to the peasants in
Croatia, who then comprised almost 90% of the total population, they would
control local government and thus become an insurmountable obstacle to
Hungarian objectives. Overconfident in their superior position and strength,
the Magyars chose to govern Croatia through a sham parliament and with the help
of the ethnic Serbian minority, to whom they granted special favors.
After the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,
universal suffrage gave the Croatian peasant movement a dominant role in local
politics and significant influence on the events of that kingdom. Previously,
under Hungarian rule, peasant resistance had been rather spontaneous and poorly
organized. But by the time of the creation of Yugoslavia, the Croatian peasants
had forged a powerful instrument of their struggle: a well-organized political
party skillfully led by a select few intellectuals of peasant origin.
The Croatian Peasant
Party had formulated a platform that included not only social but also national
demands. Consequently, in the subsequent struggle against the centralizing
policies of the Belgrade regimes, all strata of Croatian society, comprising
the vast majority of the Croatian people, eventually united under the aegis of
the Croatian Peasant Party, demanding recognition of Croatian national identity
and the right to national self-determination. In its program, as recorded in the
draft "Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia,"
adopted in 1921 by its parliamentary representatives, the Croatian Peasant
Party articulated its call for a sovereign Croatian state, organized on the
principles of social democracy within a parliamentary and republican system of
government.
In Yugoslavia, as earlier in Austria and Hungary, the centralizing
tendencies of the rulers and the brutality of their police forces provoked
massive resistance from Croatian peasants. This, in turn, prompted
countermeasures from the rulers, culminating in the 1928 assassination of Radic
and two other leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party in the Belgrade parliament.
When the looming Second World War threatened the very existence of Yugoslavia
as a unified state, the country's rulers reached an agreement with the leaders
of the Croatian Peasant Party to avert its inevitable collapse. Under this
agreement, Croatian sovereignty was restored in the form of a separate
political territory encompassing most of the Croatian provinces and enjoying
internal autonomy within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
vvvvvvvvvvvvvv
The
"intelligentsia" of the urban centers
Shortly after settling in the area disputed by Rome and Byzantium, the
Croatian tribes were exposed to the antagonistic influences of Western and
Eastern civilizations. Thus, while the cities on the eastern Adriatic coast and
their clergy were under Byzantine control, the clergy in the Croatian
"states" were oriented toward Rome, despite having adopted certain
Byzantine practices, such as the marriage of priests. With one exception, the
Croatian princes and kings gravitated toward Rome. Orienting themselves toward
Byzantium implied political submission, while Rome offered political freedom.
However, by the end of the 9th century, the Croats had adopted Old
Church Slavonic instead of Latin in their liturgical rites and were in the
process of establishing a kind of national church. This situation, which
clashed with the trends of papal Rome, was tolerated until the strained
relations between the Byzantine and Roman Churches were on the verge of
collapse and the Popes assumed an increasingly militant role in secular
affairs. At this juncture, the Popes insisted on the Latinization of the
Croatian clergy and the political subservience of the Croatian kings. The
Croatian kings were inclined to accept these conditions in exchange for control
of the coastal cities from which they derived their main revenue and which, to
a large extent, contributed to the power and position of the kingdom. With the
incorporation of these economically prosperous and culturally advanced Romance
cities, the influence of Western civilization on the ruling class, including
the clergy, was strengthened. These influences manifested themselves in improved
agricultural techniques, educational advancements, and a higher standard of
living for the population compared to the warlike tribes in the mountains.
However, not all tribes, nor all the clergy, accepted this state of
affairs, resenting the Latinization of the Church and the influence of the
Roman clergy at the royal court. This situation exacerbated internal tensions
within the kingdom and weakened its military power to such an extent that Rome
shifted its main support in the region to the Magyars, who had established a
strongly centralized power structure and were not tainted by Byzantine
influences. In this way, Rome backed the union of the Croatian kingdom with the
Hungarian kingdom.
As the center of Croatian political power moved to the Pannonian Plain
along the Drava and Sava rivers, a new bishopric, Zagreb, was founded there,
becoming a new center of Latinization in Croatia. Eastern influences in the
Church gradually disappeared, although vestiges of them persist to the present
day in liturgical rites celebrated in Old Slavic in some dioceses along the
Adriatic coast. The Latin alphabet was also adopted, and Latin became the
official language of administration. With it, Western knowledge—science,
philosophy, arts, and literature—penetrated Croatia. Later, in the 18th and
19th centuries, Latin was used as a defense against Magyar attempts to impose
Magyar as the official language of Croatia.
However, the course of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina was quite
different. There, several Croatian nobles, in order to preserve their
independence from both Hungary and Byzantium, established their own state
church in the form of Bogomilism, a Patarene sect. Because of the simplicity of
its rites and hierarchy, as well as its close connection with the common people,
this sect also attracted many peasants in the region. The Bosnian Church and
its followers fostered a sharp antagonism against both Eastern Orthodoxy and
Roman Catholicism, and both persecuted the Bogomils with inquisitorial methods.
This situation weakened Bosnian resistance to Islamization.
Therefore, when the Ottoman invaders offered the Bosnian nobility
hereditary rights to their lands and freedom from serfdom to those peasants who
embraced Islam, the Bogomils were easily persuaded. Bosnia and Herzegovina fell
to the Turkish conquerors in the latter half of the 15th century with little or
no resistance. However, the Islamization of Bosnia did not destroy the
indigenous culture of its agricultural population, nor
that of its warrior nobility or mountain clans. The Croatian nobility, of the
Muslim faith, continued to rule in the region, and their warlike mountain
warriors distinguished themselves in the battles under the Croatian Crescent.
But later, in the 19th century, with the rise of nationalism, the Muslim
intelligentsia in Bosnia and Herzegovina identified (with very few exceptions)
with Croatian national ideals.
In the cities along the Adriatic coast, events took a different course.
This region (Dalmatia) was under Venetian control from the early 15th century
until the late 18th century, with the exception of Dubrovnik, which became an
independent republic. These urban centers, originally populated by the
Romance-speaking population, gradually became Croatianized through the constant
influx of Croatian shepherds from the nearby Dinaric Mountains and rural people
from the coast and islands. These immigrants settled in the cities as
merchants, artisans, laborers, and landowners.
Some, over time, rose to become patricians and nobles. At the same time,
many Italians also arrived in these cities as artists, clergymen, teachers,
doctors, scribes, and chancellors. Very soon, young Croatians were encouraged
to study abroad, particularly in Italy. And already in the first part of the
13th century some outstanding artistic and architectural works in these cities
were carried out by masters with Croatian names. From the 15th century until
the end of the 17th century, in some coastal cities (especially in Split, Hvar,
Dubrovnik) there was an extraordinary flourishing of Croatian science, arts and
letters, both in Latin and in Croatian, following the general lines of the
Renaissance and Humanism, as well as the Counter-Reformation.
The Counter-Reformation, however, was very active in the urban centers
of northern Croatia, which, as part of the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom, was
particularly exposed to the ideas of the Reformation due to the rise of
Protestantism in Hungary. For this reason, the Jesuit Order established the
first schools and academies of higher learning in Croatian lands in the 16th
century. At the same time, the Catholic hierarchy of Croatia, in conjunction
with the high nobility, taking advantage of Croatia's existing autonomy,
prevented the spread of Protestantism within its territory, especially since
Protestantism was seen as a new instrument of Hungarian domination.
Later, under the absolutism of the Austrian monarchs, particularly Maria
Theresa, Joseph II, and Francis I, Croatian cities had to endure a strong
German influence; liberal philosophy seeped in, especially among the nobility
and the upper classes of the urban population, disseminated by German-speaking
Austrian civil and military officials. These influences manifested themselves
in social customs, lifestyles, education, the arts, and literature, as well as
in governmental and administrative structures. The children of the high
nobility were educated at the Theresianum in Vienna, while the children of the
middle class enrolled in universities in Austria and Germany.
Although some of these newly educated individuals became Germanized, the
majority received Western culture through German schools, thus resisting
denationalization. The position of the latter was reinforced by the ideas of
the French Revolution, which had penetrated Croatia since the late 18th
century, particularly as a consequence of the reforms promoted by the French
administration in Dalmatia and in the Napoleonic state of Illyria at the
beginning of the 19th century. The use of the Croatian language was encouraged
in schools, the press, and public offices. In this way, most of the foreign
residents educated in the Croatian provinces, with the exception of the Serbian
minority, were gradually Croatianized.
Meanwhile, these Westernizing influences on the Croatian urban population
were, to some extent, counterbalanced by the Eastern pull of Slavophilism and
Pan-Slavism. The first known written formulation of Pan-Slavism was published
in a book, printed in Vienna, by the Croatian Dominican friar Vinko Pribojevic,
originally from the island of Hvar, in the early 15th century. He was followed
by the Croatian priest Juraj Krizanic in the 17th century. Originally,
Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism identified with the numerical strength of the
Slavic peoples and their achievements, which provided a sense of power and
pride in comparison with other large peoples, such as the Germanic, Latin, and
Anglo-Saxon, who often looked down upon the Slavs. Pan-Slavism was also
supported by some enlightened minds of the Counter-Reformation who saw in the
union of the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church a
counterweight to the growing vigor of Protestantism.
As a consequence of these currents in Croatian thought, when Croatian
nationalism developed in the 19th century under the impact of the French
Revolution, its ideology continued to exhibit a dual orientation: pro-Western
and pro-Slavic. The pro-Slavic orientation of Croatian nationalists in the last
century was also influenced by the philosophical and literary romanticism of
some German thinkers and writers, primarily the works of Johann Gottfried, as
well as by Czech and Slovak scholars and Slavophile writers. One of the main
exponents of the pro-Slavic orientation in Croatia at that time was the
Catholic bishop Joseph Georg Strossmayer, a Croatian statesman of German
descent. He also cherished the desire for the union of the Western and Eastern
Churches, which is why he opposed the dogma of papal infallibility at the
Second Vatican Council of 1869-70.
As an outgrowth of Slavophile Romanticism, a group of young Croatian
secular intellectuals in the early decades of the 19th century, most of whom studied at the University of Graz, Austria, developed
ideas regarding the political union of all South Slavs. The formulation of this
"Yugoslav (South Slavic) idea constituted the ideological birth of the
future state of Yugoslavia. However, the Yugoslav idea soon experienced
setbacks due to the political activities of the ethnic Serbian minority in
Croatia during the second half of the 19th century. At that time, Hungarian
nationalists, pursuing a policy of centralism and Magyarization, found their
strongest support in Croatia among adherents of the Eastern Orthodox Church.
These people settled in Croatia, on the lands of the Croatian nobility, during
the Turkish invasions of the Balkans. A considerable number were originally
Romance-speaking shepherd warriors who embraced Eastern Orthodoxy under Turkish
rule, which favored it over Roman Catholicism.
The Austrian authorities, in turn, had invited them to settle in the
Military Frontier because of their warrior qualities. But, unlike German and
other immigrants in Croatia, these Orthodox shepherds and warriors resisted
assimilation.
In Eastern Orthodoxy, the traditional identification of Church and State
persists, along with the Church's role as an instrument of national politics.
Therefore, the Orthodox clergy of Serbian ethnic background had identified with
the medieval Kingdom of Serbia, which had promoted the formation of the
autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, and dedicated all their efforts to
restoring that kingdom from the moment of its fall. They practiced this policy
in the Ottoman Empire, in Austria, and in Hungary after Eastern Orthodox
immigrants settled there. And when the Serbian state was finally established in
the last century, the Serbian Orthodox clergy and intelligentsia continued to
pursue in Austria-Hungary the policy that best suited the current interests of
the Kingdom of Serbia at that time. Thus, while the Serbian kings were allied
with Austria-Hungary, the Serbian leaders in the Danubian Monarchy supported
the policies of the Austrian and Hungarian authorities.
In Dalmatia, for example, which became an Austrian province after
Napoleon's defeat, the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox minority, in association
with the ethnic Italian minority, opposed the demands of the Croatian
population in Dalmatia for union with Croatia. In Croatia itself, Serbian
leaders supported the dictatorial and police-state government of the Hungarian representatives,
receiving special favors and privileges in return.
A radical shift occurred in the politics of the Serbian minority in
Croatia when the Serbian military, backed by Tsarist Russia, embarked on an
aggressive policy of territorial expansion in the Balkans through military
conquests from the beginning of the 20th century. Austria-Hungary was the main
obstacle to these plans. Therefore, it was necessary to weaken it on the
domestic front and eventually dismember it.
The most effective strategy for achieving this seemed to be a policy of
supporting radical Hungarian nationalism, which sought complete independence
and separation from Austria. In pursuit of these objectives, the leaders of the
Serbian minority in Croatia and Dalmatia strove to reach an understanding with
anti-Austrian, Yugoslav-oriented Croatian political leaders regarding a common
political line toward Austria and Hungary. As a result of this policy, the
Croatian-Serbian political coalition was formed, which, acting in cooperation with
the Hungarians, was able to come to power in Croatia. In this situation, the
Serbian intelligentsia was in a favorable position to disseminate anti-Austrian
and pro-Serbian propaganda, which intensified particularly following Serbian
victories in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.
It was precisely this pro-Serbian climate, coupled with the
long-standing resentment of the Croats against the hegemonic policies of
Austria and Hungary and the fear of Italian claims on Croatian territory, that contributed to the formation of the common state of
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, under the King of Serbia, at the end of the First
World War. This union was consummated before the legitimate
representatives of the Croatian people had agreed upon and stipulated the
necessary conditions regarding its form and content.
Therefore, as soon as the new state was created, two irreconcilable
state and national ideologies immediately clashed. The Serbian leaders, who had
been relentlessly expanding their state's borders through successive military
conquests since the mid-19th century, were inclined to view Croatia simply as
another region they had conquered, one that, like other regions, would
eventually be subjugated and Serbized.
On the other hand, the Croats, who throughout the centuries had managed,
through tenacious struggle against superior forces, to preserve their ethnic
identity, continued to defend their national individuality, claiming the right
to self-determination. They were resolved to achieve this right both through
parliamentary struggle and through mass resistance against the military and
police regimes in Belgrade. That clash with Belgrade
led to a series of assassinations, executions, and mass killings, directed by
the Belgrade police.
In this atmosphere of persecution and terror, an intensely nationalist
movement, known as the Ustaše, was organized in Croatia. Its radical militancy
attracted combative elements, especially among the Croatian population of the
Dinaric regions. The population of these regions had preserved the essential
foundations of their original patriarchal social organization, which fostered
deep feelings of kinship and friendship while simultaneously instigating
intense conflicts and violent, uncompromising actions, thus perpetuating the
age-old warlike characteristics of the area.
The Ustaše turned their attention to Italy and Germany, orchestrated the
assassination of King Alexander in 1934, and re-established the Independent
State of Croatia at the beginning of World War II. This Croatian state included
a large ethnic Serbian minority, many of whose members retained warrior
traditions and positions and harbored deep resentment toward the new
authorities. They were inclined to join Serbian guerrilla groups (Chetniks),
whose objective was to fight against the newly established authorities in the
former territory of Yugoslavia. Thus, clashes between the Chetnik groups and
the Croatian authorities soon intensified, leading to full-blown civil war.
This civil war was exacerbated by communist activities, the majority of
which, especially the militant activists, came from traditionally warlike
regions, and particularly from the Serbian and Montenegrin ethnic groups of the
Dinaric territories (the partisan guerrillas). Following Lenin's precepts to
seize power under conditions of disorientation and discrediting of the rulers,
and Stalin's instructions to transform the Second World War into a civil war,
the communists made every effort, resorting to all means, to incite the warring
and extremely nationalistic Serbian and Croatian groups against each other and
to prolong and intensify their mutual struggles. With this strategy, the
communists ultimately seized power throughout Yugoslavia with the active
support of the Western Allies.
Before delving into the subject, it is worth highlighting another
problem that Tito addressed: the still unresolved national question within the
multinational Yugoslav state. Tito speaks of political discontent, of
"national chauvinism," that is, of national divisions in all spheres
of public life: in the economy, in literature, in family education, and in the
communist education of youth in general. He refers to the chauvinistic behavior
of members of the Communist Party and to attempts to undermine from within the "brotherhood
and unity" of the peoples of Yugoslavia.
He is astonished that 17 years after the war he
still has to insist on "brotherhood and unity" and threatens that he
will not allow anyone to undermine it from within. Here, the comparison with
the dictatorial King Alexander Karageorgevic and his Great Serbian policy
directed against Croats, Macedonians, and Slovenes under the pretext of
preserving national unity naturally arises. King Alexander also sought to
suppress, through brute force, the justified aspirations of non-Servian peoples
to enjoy the right to self-determination, but he ultimately became a victim of
his own policies and accelerated the collapse and disintegration of monarchical
Yugoslavia.
Tito's desperate cry for the unattainable "brotherhood and
unity" of the peoples of Yugoslavia and his threat against those who dared
to destroy them are strikingly reminiscent of the
supposed last words of the dictator Alexander: "Preserve Yugoslavia."
Shouldn't Tito's words, in the face of these insurmountable national
antagonisms, be interpreted as a confession of communist impotence in the face
of a historical factor that transcends the framework of communist doctrine and
proves insoluble with the resources and methods of communist politics? A careful
analysis of Tito's speech will, here too, provide a valid answer.
The Economic and
Social State
Alluding to the deficiencies in the economic sector, Tito speaks of
investments, noting, among other things, this disastrous fact:
"Today we have here and there one or two companies that tomorrow
will have to be closed, given that their excessive products have no market.
There can't be many similar establishments left, and you know that each
commune, each municipality often wanted to have its own company, and when
building them, responsibility wasn't taken into account, nor was thought given
to what would happen tomorrow with their products when saturation was reached
in that and other branches of our industry and our economy in general..."
"Moreover, errors were made in planning. For example, the construction of
large establishments began before the plans were drawn up, and it's logical
that the cost was then double what was anticipated. All of which affected our
workers, who had to tighten their belts." The communist leadership, due to
its megalomania in the area of industrialization, its
incompetence, and the lack of popular control, draws up unrealistic plans and It makes investments that often fail to meet needs or
contradict reality.
Sometimes the actual market demand is disregarded, or the transport of
raw materials proves uneconomical, or there is a lack of skilled labor, so
that, ultimately, new industrial plants fail and are often left unfinished. All
of this represents a pointless waste of vast sums. Of course, such practices
are not unique to Titoism, but a common phenomenon in the Soviet Union and Red
China, as well as in all the satellite communist countries. Erroneous and
uneconomical investments are inherent to the communist economic system. Despite
the promises of the communist leaders, the same mistakes are repeated. It is
necessary to mention here the methods of economic development in this communist
country. Plans cannot be implemented without the approval of the central
planning commissions and the Communist Party.
Once approved, an intense official propaganda campaign begins, demanding
sacrifices from the people in the form of "voluntary labor." This is
how low wages are justified. These plans partially absorb American aid. It is
well known that many economic projects were built using forced labor and that
young people must participate in so-called voluntary youth brigades if they
wish to advance later in life. After so much effort and sacrifice, many
industrial establishments turn out to be counterproductive or superfluous.
Tito, speaking about investment policy, also alludes to the distribution
of accumulated funds and admits that it is not always equitable. Regarding the
banking system in relation to this distribution, he states explicitly:
"Our banking system has many weaknesses. There have been cases
where those who could have used certain funds more profitably did not obtain
them, while others obtained them through bribery or other means, although they
could not guarantee their profitability. Therefore, we will try to correct this
banking system somewhat."
It is well known that common investment funds are distributed
arbitrarily and that protectionism and corruption play a leading role in this.
Tito himself acknowledges that funds for unproductive businesses can be
obtained through bribery. It is worth noting that those who receive the bribes
are the directors and other managers, generally members of the Communist Party.
These should be the exemplary communist elite, yet instead they live off corruption
and bribes.
Tito then addresses the painful problem of workers' wages in Yugoslavia.
It is no secret that neither workers nor employees can live on their wages but
must find additional work or live within a family with many working members to
cover basic needs. The very frequent consequence of low wages is embezzlement
and fraud in companies, so often prosecuted but always recurring.
"Economic crime" is also an inherent part of the communist system.
This criminality first infected those at the top of the economic structure who
possess vast funds and commit irregularities, fraud, embezzlement, and
misappropriation, while also awarding themselves disproportionately high
salaries and other benefits. Here are Tito's words on the matter:
"The problem of wage inequality in our country is a significant
one. There are cases where the highest salary exceeds the lowest by twenty
times in the same establishment. It is simply incomprehensible how such a thing
could have happened and how unfortunately it came about... As for the internal
distribution of profits in companies, there were also various irregularities.
It happened that a worker received, let's say, 2,000 dinars as a share of the
surplus, and someone else received 80,000 dinars."
Tito blames the workers' "collectives," admitting that the
communists, that is, the regime, are partly to blame for having allowed such
injustices. He acknowledges that the communist leaders are arrogating greater
rights. He initially speaks of sporadic cases, but later admits that such
anomalies occur "almost every day," that these errors take on a
political character, and that general discontent is spreading. Tito promises
"to take measures to rectify these things and prevent them from happening
again."
Tito's admission that the corruption of communist leaders has political
consequences is interesting; that is, it provokes discontent among the masses,
who blame the entire Communist Party and the regime, not just any individual.
This is one of the reasons that led Tito to address this problem publicly. It
is also revealing to observe that the workers' situation is miserable compared
to that of their employers and that they are exploited worse than in the early
stages of capitalism. It seems paradoxical that the communist system has
created greater injustices and social inequalities than the worst forms of
capitalist exploitation.
Tito promised to take measures to clean things up. Purges and the
imprisonment of certain leaders are underway. These purges, however, do not
affect the highest-ranking officials, who are bribable and corrupt to a fault
and enjoy the greatest privileges. The prime example is Tito himself, whose
lavish lifestyle sets a very poor example for a communist leader. He owns
numerous castles and hunting estates, has access to luxurious trains, boats,
and special yachts, his entourage is very large, and his expenses are
disproportionate to the population's standard of living. In the current
"purge," minor bosses and leaders will certainly fall, but the top
brass will remain untouched. Otherwise, the communist leadership would have to
eliminate itself, which, of course, it does not want to do despite the people's
discontent and exasperation.
Besides villas with luxurious furnishings and high salaries, the
communist leaders are fond of cars and trips abroad. They squander their main
energies in the silent internal struggles for privileges. Trips abroad,
especially to Western countries, are preferred since, in addition to
contributing to "social prestige," they mean foreign currency,
refrigerators, cachets, and other luxury items. Tito stated the following:
"I would like to address the issue of trips abroad and the waste of
foreign currency they entail. Many travel abroad unnecessarily, at the expense
of the collectives, that is, at the expense of our entire community. Many stay away for months on end, squandering money..."
"Regarding these trips, I would like to add a few more words. It so
happens that these travelers often end up with a car. I ask how this is
possible. Well, there are a few cases where they can buy a car, which costs
less abroad than here, but I don't believe that so many cars can be bought with
the travel allowances received. It's obvious that something else is going on.
Abroad, our representatives are frequently bribed and then sent gifts,
etc."
I mean, some concessions were made, of course. But those concessions
came at the expense of our community, since something was either paid for more
than necessary or sold at a lower price. There are cases of secret deposits in
foreign banks that are difficult to verify...
"In our country, there is often a lot of talk, and in this way,
through contact with foreigners, our economic secrets are revealed..."
Consequently, the Supreme Leader of the Communist Party acknowledges
that communist leaders squander state funds, allow themselves to be corrupted
abroad, make deposits in foreign banks, and sell economic secrets to
foreigners. Such infractions are common among communists and demonstrate
extreme corruption and demoralization. Such leadership cannot promote or manage
a healthy economy, nor deserve the prestige and respect of the workers. These
individuals and these phenomena are a normal consequence of the communist
socioeconomic system and cannot be remedied by the administrative measures
advocated by Tito.
It is known that in Yugoslavia, prices are constantly rising and that
the ratio between the cost of living and wages is worsening daily for workers.
The main cause of this grave situation must be sought in the centrally planned
economy, the suppression of private initiative, and the lack of
self-interest—the main levers of this system. These are the factors
contributing to economic progress. It should also be added that there is a lack
of popular control, the squandering of public funds through uneconomical
investments, corruption, and the subjugation of national assets to the service
of communist leaders capable of managing the economy. Tito acknowledges and
confirms all of this.
It goes without saying that trade cannot function well or benefit the
people under such a system either. Tito points out in this regard:
"Allow me now, comrades, to turn to trade, to address certain
problems in this sector of our economy. In Yugoslavia, we constantly feel—not
only feel, but see—how the prices of many goods are rising. The prices of many
products rise steadily even when a good harvest is on the horizon, from which
we expect price stabilization. One must ask, what is the cause of this price
increase? What is the crux of this problem? The crux lies, first and foremost,
in the poor organization of supplies."
"We know this very well. Nevertheless, we allow those involved to
raise prices as they please." Even in capitalist countries, there are
certain regulators that prevent excessive price increases, and here our
merchant raises prices so quickly and rapidly as soon as a shortage of certain
products is noticed that, in my opinion, he is not a capitalist merchant at
all. There were numerous cases in which our merchants withheld stored
merchandise to create shortages in the market and maintain high prices. Hence,
we now have so much merchandise piled up in warehouses that merchants refused
to sell at lower prices. Hence, we currently have to sell certain stored items
at perhaps half price.
"This merchandise is not only stored but also deteriorates. Much is
lost in this way for merchants to achieve a large profit margin... Therefore,
the deficient system of supply and organization of our merchants constitutes a
serious problem."
"Since we're talking about our domestic trade, I must say that we
suffer from a certain incapacity not only in terms of
organization but also in the preparation and preservation of products."
"Until now, the situation has been that the agricultural producer
harvests, let's say, a lot of tomatoes and other vegetables and fruits, and if
the buyer—that is, the company involved—doesn't purchase that harvest, the
producer has no incentive to produce more. They don't want to risk their
vegetables and fruits spoiling again, so the market often experiences shortages
of certain agricultural products. Garlic, for example, is currently extremely
expensive. The same is true for other products... The purchasing companies also
have to take some risks. Today in Yugoslavia, we have cold storage facilities
where large quantities of agricultural products can be stored, where they won't
spoil. However, they are empty, and the markets lack products that could have
been preserved."
" Tito blames all of this on the supposed democracy introduced into the
economy, which he claims caused such a worsening of the situation compared to
previous years. He also blames "national chauvinism" in the economy,
the creation of closed local markets, etc. The fundamental point is that the
economy in communist Yugoslavia did not fulfill its primary function as an
intermediary for goods but became an end in itself; speculation was its main
concern; it ruined large assets and was parasitic at the expense of the
consuming masses and the entire economy.
No less disastrous is the picture Tito painted of Yugoslavia's foreign
trade. One of the arguments put forward by the communists regarding rapid
industrialization was the increase in the export of industrial products in
order to obtain the foreign currency needed for imports. In this way, Tito's
regime sought to overcome the difficulties in importing foodstuffs during the
"transition phase" of the socialist transformation of agriculture,
until domestic needs were met. Similarly, there was an attempt to import other
essential goods for the consumer and manufacturing industries. However, actual
development took the opposite course; instead of generating foreign exchange
through the export of industrial products, the balance of payments deficit
steadily increased. Tito summarizes this development as
follows:
"Allow me now, comrades, to address our foreign trade. It is not
entirely successful, partly because we had to contend with the old merchants,
some of whom were good, but also some unprofitable ones, who introduced several
negative and detrimental elements into our foreign trade. At this time, we have
more than 500, that is, 540 import and export firms... A small company is like
a traveling salesman when it sells its goods abroad. The merchant must always
maintain a certain stock, while the small salesman makes one transaction and
then has no more goods.
The consequence is that we are losing market share. That is why I said
two years ago that 540 import and export firms are too many and that we should
reduce them by half, but now there are even more than before... You see,
comrades, that these firms commit irregularities and sometimes have a negative
impact, so we lose markets abroad and appear unprofessional. Because of such
practices, for example, several products are returned to us." Such an
unscrupulous merchant believes it is lawful to deceive the foreign buyer and
sell him overripe apples or cherries, for which reason the foreign customer
returns the entire shipment."
"Since I'm talking about foreign trade companies, I should also
mention their representatives in other countries. I've traveled to several
Afro-Asian countries and found many of our merchants spending months and months
in bars and cafes without finding a single customer. They waste time and squander
foreign currency they receive from their country without finding a buyer,
because they don't know the market, nor have they worked on it or studied it
enough to know what could be sold and what would be needed. Strange things
happen, like, for example, sending clogs to warm Africa that have been stored
for a long time, clogs that nobody wears here, nor can they be used there. It
goes without saying that the merchandise then spoils, and the same thing
happens with other products from our country. All of this damages our
reputation abroad."
" "It is true that we constantly import more than we export, but we have
also lost a great deal due to a lack of integrity, or rather, due to the
impropriety of our export companies. Today we import just about anything, even
though our industry is not bad. The assortment is vast, and in our country we
can find almost everything. But, due to inertia, people prefer to buy abroad.
It is not merely a matter of inertia, but, in fact, of seeking some personal
gain or profit. They go abroad and often buy what we don't need, saying that it
costs less there. Yes, but we profit with foreign currency that we lack. We owe
foreign countries around 800 million dollars, and our deficit is growing
unnecessarily. In such a situation, we must rely on our own internal strength;
we must decrease imports and increase exports."
From the above, a simple and logical conclusion can be drawn. The large
deficit in Yugoslavia's foreign trade should not be attributed primarily to
improper practices, as Tito does. The causes lie in megalomaniacal
industrialization, which absorbs all available resources, on the one hand, and
in the irresponsible management of national assets and unrealistic economic
plans, on the other. The same occurs with family budgets or those of private
companies, where spending, waste, or irrational investment exceeds income. This
creates a permanent imbalance that jeopardizes the company if its expenditures
and investments are not fundamentally changed. The same applies to the national
economy. Yugoslavia's current external deficit of 800 million dollars is an
enormous sum and a heavy burden for Yugoslavia, which will be felt for years to
come. According to Tito, this deficit is constantly increasing. It should also
be remembered that this deficit occurred despite substantial American aid. What
will happen if this source of subsidies dries up, as suggested by the latest
resolutions of the Washington Congress?
In the analysis of prices and wages, we have already seen that the cost
of living is rising, that there are shortages of many goods in the market, and
that the purchasing power of wages is decreasing. These would be the outward
signs of a long-standing and recently accelerating acute inflation. This means
there is no equilibrium in the Yugoslav economy: the money supply exceeds the
supply of goods, so the state covers the excess expenditures by printing more
paper money. This is also reflected negatively in the balance of payments and
in foreign trade. In addition to the aforementioned deficit, agricultural
inflation makes it impossible to restore equilibrium in the balance of
payments.
Mentioning once again the importation of cars and the worsening balance
of payments deficit, Tito tried to blame the critical economic situation and irregularities
on the workers' collectives, alluding to the problem of the strike. He
attributed some of the responsibility to the directors, protecting them,
however, because most of them were members of the Communist Party. Tito said on
the matter:
"What, for example, constitutes the shortcomings of our workers'
collectives? Their failure to exercise their rights.
If the workers' collective governs through its governing bodies, then it is
responsible and must not allow such things to happen. It is understood,
moreover, that we cannot hold only the directors responsible, nor make them the
target of a general campaign. We have very good directors, excellent men,
outstanding comrades who never uttered a word to ask for a higher salary than
the one assigned to them by the workers' collectives. But there were also
directors who tried to extract the greatest possible benefit without adhering
to the decisions of the workers' collective. These directors colluded with
certain local leaders and made and broke everything in their respective
companies. This must stop. Ensuring normal production and equitable
distribution within each company—that is, the allocation of wages—is the task
of the workers' collectives. It sounds ridiculous when some say that, if the
situation does not improve, we will go to the..." "Strike."
"Against whom should they strike? Against themselves! Such things
should not be allowed, and if someone is useless, they should be
dismissed..." It is evident that the power of workers' collectives is merely
theoretical and that the main decisions are made by the Communist Party and the
company directors. It is logical, then, that the workers are discontented and
publicly threaten to strike. It is precisely at this point that the Communist
Party and Tito reveal their true colors as violators of fundamental workers'
rights. They do not allow strikes even though the workers' economic situation
is desperate. They deny the right to strike that they proclaimed before coming
to power, a right guaranteed in all democratic countries. They resort to the
tired argument that the workers would strike against their vital rights, even
though Tito's speeches reveal that they are ruthlessly exploited. Titus
reaffirms this in another paragraph of his speech:
"On the other hand, precisely because of these shortcomings I have
just mentioned, the standard of living of the workers hardly increases,
although much more can be done in this respect. The worker has the right to
receive a share of the surplus value he has created. We cannot deny him this
right. The insufficient rise in the productivity index is also due to a certain apathy, a certain distrust that the worker will
not receive a share of what he is creating... The workers must strive to create
surplus value, that is, profits that they can share among themselves. It is
logical that the question of how to distribute it should arise. If it continues
to be distributed as it has been until now, then the workers will lose all
motivation and incentive."
Therefore, Tito admits that the current system for allocating wages and
distributing profits is not motivating for the workers. The workers are
apathetic and disinterested in their workplace; their wages are insufficient to
cover basic needs, and they think only of how to earn extra money outside of
work hours to survive. And seeing the corruption, unfair wages, and luxurious
lifestyles of the directors and party leaders, they become desperate and
politically content. Hence the rumors favoring a strike, which Tito forcibly
suppresses.
Since food supplies and the low rate of agricultural production
constitute a pressing problem in the Yugoslav economy, Tito could not avoid
addressing it in his speech. He acknowledges that subjective shortcomings, that
is, political and agricultural measures, outweigh difficulties such as adverse
weather conditions. Although it is obvious that the agrarian crisis stems from
the suppression and marginalization of individual peasant holdings, Tito
insists on promoting the socialist sector of agriculture. Pressure will
intensify against the peasants and in favor of the socialist sector, which, due
to its small size, cannot meet market demand, instead absorbing
disproportionately high funds compared to its uneconomical output. Tito
addresses this problem as follows:
"...We have achieved great successes with socialist cooperative
farms worked collectively using modern technical means that can produce high
yields. This high level is not achieved across all of agriculture, since the
socialist sector comprises only about 12%, insufficient to feed all of
Yugoslavia and its cities. Therefore, we must
expand the socialist sector."
"... "To achieve this, we resorted to various methods: we
bought land, contracted with individual farmers, etc. But we must accelerate
the pace to achieve self-sufficient production, not just for one year, but to
create reserves. We cannot depend on wheat imported from the United States and
other countries; we must secure it with our own resources. In this respect, we must move forward more boldly..."
The "bolder" path leads to socialism, that
is, to communism in agriculture, and is regressive. Tito's regime expected that the peasants, with the collective farms
dissolved, would voluntarily take this path.
However, since these hopes were not fulfilled, Tito's agricultural
policy faced this dilemma: 1) strengthening the socialist sector and completely
eliminating private land ownership; 2) promoting the private sector in
agriculture. The Tito regime apparently opted definitively for the first solution.
It is already reasonable to predict, based on past experience,
that this new experiment will also fail to solve the food production
problem, much less satisfy the needs of agricultural workers. The errors in the
previous agricultural policy were remedied by American aid in the form of food
supplies. Tito deluded himself into thinking he could get rid of this aid by
strengthening the socialist sector. The course of events could be different,
according to current indications. The renewed strengthening of the socialist
agricultural sector will lead to greater food production deficits, while new
shipments of American food supplies are provoking growing opposition in
Congress, so they may one day cease.
The National Problem
Speaking of economic difficulties, Tito also addressed the obstacles to
the economy caused by antagonisms between peoples and "republics." He
mentions closed local markets, specifically cites the "people's
republics" of Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia, and speaks of political
discontent and national chauvinism. Here are his exact
words:
"In this respect, such anomalies exist that, due to these
weaknesses in the general Yugoslav market, local isolationism and the creation
of local markets are employed. Thus, certain products cannot be bought or sold
from some republics, such as Slovenia, Serbia, or Croatia. This, comrades, must
not happen in our socialist communities. We must, disregarding the republics as
parts of our federal community, have a single market. In this matter,
speculation is neither possible nor necessary, as it stirs up political
discontent and, step by step, national chauvinism. Such phenomena are appearing
here and there, and we must attack them at their root."
That unresolved national problems have repercussions on the economic
life of Yugoslavia is a normal and well-known fact. It is known that discontent
is widespread in Croatia and, more recently, in Slovenia, due to investment
policies at the expense of these two republics, Serbia's privileged position,
and the fact that Serbs have been occupying key positions in the other
republics. The reason for this lies in the Greater Serbian character of
communist Yugoslavia and in the latent national question. The causes are the
opposite of those cited by Tito. The economy facilitates the manifestation of
these phenomena, while their true causes lie in the very organization of the
state.
It is interesting to note that these phenomena have reached such a scale
that they have forced the government to acknowledge them and to issue threats
against political discontent and so-called national chauvinism. This is a
revealing indication of the profound crisis of the state order and of the
reciprocal relations between the peoples that make up Yugoslavia. The economy
also suggests that "brotherhood and unity" are merely a slogan and a
disguise for the Great Serbian regime in Yugoslavia, as was recently confirmed
by the favorable report of the Commission for the Exchange of the investment
program for the construction of the Belgrade-Bar railway branch line. It is
highly likely that the central government will issue a resolution approving
this costly, uneconomical, and harmful project for the Croatian Adriatic coast,
for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for the other Croatian provinces, a project that
serves the Great Serbian policy of exploitation and neglect of non-Serbian
regions.
When Tito criticized "national chauvinism," his attack was
primarily directed at the Croats, who have been deeply discontented from the
outset for nationalistic reasons. It is also curious that Tito addressed
national problems at length in his speech, which was primarily focused on
economic issues, separate from the economy. His observations reveal the crisis
of the state itself and the concern of the communist leaders regarding national
problems. Tito lays bare the harsh reality and acknowledges that his policy of
"brotherhood and unity" lacks a firm foundation, and that many
communists are even imbued with "chauvinism," that "the
bourgeoisie" are poisoning the youth with their chauvinistic tendencies
and endangering the state. This amounts to a rebuttal of his earlier
assertions, as he admits that the national question is threatening the very
existence of Yugoslavia. We will quote his exact words:
"Allow me, comrades, to say a few words also about the shortcomings
in our political life. I have already mentioned some of them. Lately, quite a
few phenomena have appeared, such as localism and chauvinism, attributable to
material reasons and a lack of vigilance on the part of the communists. Some
communists have forgotten the overall interests of the community and are
limiting themselves to their own narrow circle, resulting in political
discontent and irregularities in some republics. We have shed rivers of blood
for the fraternity and unity of our peoples, and we will not allow anyone to
undermine them from within."
"These weaknesses and political anomalies are the result of the
cultural process in our country. In some republics, bourgeois writers write
things unimaginable in a socialist country. They return to their history, delve
into it, and forget about the future development of our socialist community as
a unified whole. None of our republics, if not united, would have the slightest
importance. We must create our history, our Yugoslav socialist history, united
also in the future, without undermining the national rights of the republics or
the cultivation of their traditions, but not to the detriment of, rather to the
benefit of, the entire community, so that we may complement each other. This is
our path and what we want, not the disintegration of our unity for any reason.
We do not share the opinion of various bourgeois elements, impervious to
socialist thought regarding our development, that we
must return to the old path. These elements also influence certain
communists."
" "We have allowed anything to be written in our press. Look at certain
publications and articles and you will realize their destructive impact. They
are poisoning even our youth. It is distressing to see how this chauvinism is
winning over our young people. I think it doesn't come from the clouds, but
from the home, from the elders. We must safeguard our greatest achievement, the
fraternity and unity of our peoples, for only these will facilitate our
progress forward in creating and building a thriving socialist community and a
happier life for our population. Even today, 15 years and more after the war,
we still have to talk about fraternity and unity, even though they should
already be in the very blood and flesh of every citizen of Yugoslavia."
Tito and his supporters either cannot or will not understand that the
communist regime did not resolve the national question. Their
"solution" in Yugoslavia consists of administrative division into
so-called "people's republics," with all power centralized in
Belgrade. Both the Communist Party and state power serve to ensure Serbia's
dominant position, while the few high-ranking positions held by non-Serbs are
of no real importance. The fact is that the peoples comprising Yugoslavia
cannot decide on the organization of their country and are deprived of the
right to self-determination. The communist elections for constituent assembly
members and deputies are not an expression of the people's genuine will. The
national question persists and plays a crucial role in foreign policy. Tito's
assertion that today, 17 years after the war, he must insist on the need to
maintain "brotherhood and unity" is disastrous for the regime.
Therein lies the crux of the problem. National consciousness
and the aspirations of peoples to establish their own state are factors that,
in the modern historical process, play a role comparable to that of religions
in the formation and preservation of culture, or to the national question, upon
whose successful resolution the undisturbed and lasting functioning of society
also depends. Economic interest and technology are not the only driving forces
of historical development, as the communists maintain.
The national question, therefore, occupies the forefront in Yugoslavia.
The communist leadership knows this, despite its interpretation of it. The
center of gravity lies in Croatia and its relationship with Serbia, since the
Croats are the most numerous people in Yugoslavia after the Serbs,
and the Croatian problem was also the chronic ailment of monarchical
Yugoslavia, which could not consolidate and disintegrated due to this pressing
and unresolved issue. The national question takes on even greater importance
when one considers that not only Croats but also Macedonians and Albanians do
not consider it resolved, that national discontent is growing in Slovenia in
the face of Gran Serbian policy, and that repressed national tendencies are
resurfacing in Montenegro.
In the postwar tension between Yugoslavia and Albania, Albanian national
demands are more important than ideological disputes, and from this
perspective, a greater danger looms over Yugoslavia than that caused by the
ideological conflict. The large Hungarian minority (more than half a million)
resides mostly in Vojvodina, incorporated into the People's Republic of Serbia.
Due to its traditions and current situation, it would turn against Gran Serbian
policy should a state crisis occur. The population of Serbia,
plus the Serbian minorities in other republics, constituted, according to the
1953 census, 42% of the total population. Serbs are, therefore, the
minority. If we add that these Serbian minorities almost entirely disagree with
Serbia's imperialist policies and are willing to make peace with the Croats,
then Serbia's position becomes even more vulnerable. Should major political
upheavals occur in Yugoslavia and Southeast Europe, the other peoples
comprising this heterogeneous conglomerate would rise up against Belgrade and
Serbia if the Serbian leaders do not avert this danger by agreeing to a
peaceful separation from Croatia and other oppressed nations.
The Crisis of Titoism and the Yugoslav State
After the break with Moscow in 1948, Tito
embarked on a path independent of Soviet policy, both domestically and
foreignly. Without altering the basic communist character of his regime, he
pursued a neutralist course in foreign relations, relying on the so-called
non-committal countries of Asia and Africa. In domestic policy, the radical
measures were gradually softened. Without modifying the communist objective,
the methods applied in the economy and administration became somewhat flexible,
which manifested itself in the dissolution of the collective farms (kolkhozes)
and the establishment of closer relations with non-communist countries. The
main feature of Titoism on the international stage was its constant
oscillation, leaning primarily toward Soviet international policy and
frequently supporting it. Another characteristic of Titoism, as a peculiar
variant of communism, was that it received abundant financial and material aid
from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from other Western countries.
Titoism is, in fact, a tactic, not an ideology
or a system. Lately, the regime and the state have been going through a
profound crisis whose multiple repercussions threaten Titoism itself.
On the international stage, a gradual shift
toward Moscow has been underway for some time. This new course was clearly
manifested in Tito's attitude during the conference of non-committal countries
held in Belgrade last year. This alignment with Moscow is evident not only in
the support for Soviet policy at the United Nations and in relations with
Western democratic powers, but also in the re-establishment of close and direct
ties between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and between the two communist
parties. It is clear that political coordination between Moscow and Belgrade is
progressing and that there are no fundamental disagreements in their actions on
the international stage. Given Yugoslavia's stance at the Belgrade Conference,
Titoism ceased to exist internationally as an
independent form of communism, since Yugoslavia's views on disarmament, nuclear
testing, the German and Berlin questions, and colonialism were identical to
those of the Soviet Union. In recent times, Tito's hostile attitude toward the
European Common Market, mirroring Moscow's position, must also be considered.
The recent, hasty rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade, coupled with their
reciprocal efforts to resolve remaining differences, led to the demise of
Titoism as a phenomenon separate from communism in international relations.
Added to this are the resounding failures of Titoism
in domestic policy. The experiments to
"liberalize" the economy failed, according to the unanimous opinion
of impartial foreign observers. Despite substantial US aid amounting to $3.5
billion since the break with Moscow, despite the special loan granted last year
by the US and some European countries totaling $212 million, and the $75
million credit provided by the International Monetary Fund—a total of $287
million—aimed at liberalizing foreign trade and adjusting the dinar's exchange
rate to its true purchasing power in international trade, and despite abundant
US subsidies in food, the state of Yugoslavia's economy is catastrophic.
The foreign trade deficit has grown steadily to $800 million. Exports of
manufactured goods have collapsed. Prices are rising rapidly. The cost of
living is constantly rising, while the real purchasing power of wages is
falling and workers are discontented. Agriculture is mired in a perpetual
crisis, unable to meet the needs of the domestic market, so consumers are no
less desperate than the farmers. Continuing the current economic policy promises
not better results but further deterioration, making new measures necessary.
Given that the insignificant liberal-leaning corrections in the economic
sector, despite injections of dollars, have not been fruitful, two alternatives
are imperative: 1) To abandon the generalist and
bureaucratic communist economy and introduce greater freedoms in the
organization of businesses and the market; to reduce taxes on peasant
landholdings and to abandon discriminatory agricultural policies. To allow free competition between the socialist and private sectors
in all economic sectors. 2) A return to the economic state prior to 1952
and 1958, respectively, and the implementation of rigid centralism, planning,
and bureaucracy; That is, the application of the Soviet system to the economy
and close ties with the Soviet bloc.
The first solution would benefit the workers and the masses, but it
would contradict communist policy and program. The second solution would be
more in line with the current rapprochement between Tito and Moscow on the
international stage. By adopting Soviet economic methods, Titoism would also
cease to exist in economic policy and would become synonymous with its Moscow
model.
The second alternative seems logical, given that continuing the current
"liberal" policy without abandoning the communist economic system
would create greater difficulties, while an economic orientation toward the
Soviet Union would be facilitated by the pro-Soviet political course. Finally,
with the integration of Western Europe, Yugoslavia becomes isolated,
considerably diminishing its competitiveness in the European market. Overcoming
these difficulties will not be a difficult task at all if Yugoslavia were to
orient itself toward Moscow. The entire Soviet bloc is struggling with similar
or even greater difficulties than Yugoslavia.
The economic situation in these countries is unsatisfactory; food
production is very low, so Moscow has significant obligations to its allies in
the Eastern European Economic Bloc (COMECON), and there is little left to help
Tito. However, by increasing foreign trade with the Eastern bloc and decreasing
it with the West, the balance of payments deficit could be reduced. But to
eliminate the existing deficit, large loans would be needed, which Tito is unlikely
to obtain from Moscow. At best, it will be aid to plug the biggest holes.
Needless to say, in that event, the standard of living for the masses would
fall.
Tito listed the measures he intends to adopt to resolve the economic
crisis. He promises new laws and new administrative measures aimed at
eliminating anomalies and correcting errors. The system itself will not be
modified. Since these are superficial administrative measures that do not
address the root of the problem, no significant changes or economic recovery
can be expected. Foreign observers and those familiar with Yugoslavia's
problems do not believe in the effectiveness of these measures, to which the
affected population attaches no importance whatsoever. Similar measures were
adopted on previous occasions, without producing any improvement. Thus, economic crimes are a constant theme for the communist leaders;
severe laws and sentences were handed down, and Tito, after all, had to admit
that this criminality reached such proportions that corruption and embezzlement
are key elements in his economic system.
In order to improve the economic situation, Tito promised: a law on
social surveillance and control; a law on internal trade; a law on price
controls; an amendment to the penal code; new provisions regarding economic
crimes; a revision of pension laws; a law on social accounting; and, finally, a
draft of a new constitution. As is evident, these formal measures and
prescriptions could not cure the chronic and fundamental illness of the Yugoslav
economy.
Titoism, therefore, as a new form of economic communism, suffered a
major crisis and was on the verge of collapse and liquidation. To this must be
added the national question. Tito himself had to acknowledge that the
fundamental national and political problems remained unresolved, that the
so-called policy of "brotherhood and unity" had failed, and that
Yugoslavia as a state was threatened at its very foundations. This threat was
posed by the Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, and Macedonians—although Tito
refrained from mentioning them explicitly—who opposed Yugoslavia and its Great
Serbian regime.
Thus, Tito and his regime face a state crisis whose scope extends beyond
the country's borders and acquires significant international repercussions. The
discontent of the Croats, given their numbers, geographic location, and
economic power, has a reach that transcends the boundaries of Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, the direct interest of some neighboring countries in the national
question within Yugoslavia must be considered. The fate of nearly a million
Albanians along the Albanian border concerns the entire Albanian people and
largely determines Albania's foreign policy, regardless of its internal
political regime.
Moreover, Bulgaria has always been interested in the Macedonians in
Yugoslavia, irrespective of whether the Macedonians desire their own state or
the resolution of their national question within a federation or confederation
supported by Serbia or Bulgaria. The essential point is that the Macedonian and
Albanian problems remain unresolved, and that in the next crisis of Yugoslavia
as a state, international complications will arise in this area. It is logical
that Moscow would also be interested in these problems of great importance in
its relations with Bulgaria and Albania. Moscow can, in this regard, give Tito
some support, at least provisionally, but it can also harm him. Its recent
tension with Albania facilitated Tito's rapprochement with Moscow. But Titoism
is stumbling over the national question, which for his regime and Yugoslavia,
located predominantly in the turbulent Balkans, could have more sinister
consequences than the economic crisis.
Tito's rapprochement with Moscow and his alignment
with Soviet anti-Western policies have already caused him difficulties in the
West. These include the severing of diplomatic relations with West Germany, the
withdrawal of the French ambassador from Belgrade, and the expulsion of the
Yugoslav ambassador from Paris; difficulties with Greece; and the recent reduction
of US aid, which could be entirely suspended. A closer relationship between
Moscow and Belgrade will exacerbate current difficulties with the countries of
the European Common Market, which remain major importers of Yugoslav products.
In time, Western foreign ministries may revisit the
issue of the right to self-determination of oppressed peoples within a state
whose regime promotes that very right where it might cause problems for Western
democracies, which certainly need neither advice nor interference from a
full-fledged dictatorship, especially when it comes to applying the principle
of self-determination. On the other hand, the economic and political
integration of Europe is attractive to peoples with European traditions and
orientations, such as the Croatians and the Slovenians. European integration
invalidates the argument put forward by Tito's propaganda during the last war
against the formation of small nation-states in the Danubian-Balkan region.
From the moment these countries can integrate economically, politically, and
militarily into the Western European community, the main argument in favor of
maintaining the forced community of the peoples of Yugoslavia will be
discarded.
The staunchly anti-Western group—known as
Slavophiles—opposed by the pro-Western Zapadniks, who advocated for cultural
integration with Europe and questioned Russia's cultural maturity, believed in
their country's global mission, emphasizing Russia's unique social order. The
Slavophiles attacked Peter the Great, portrayed in a widespread popular legend
as the Antichrist; they criticized his reforms and Western culture, contrasting
them with the Russian spirit and culture. Based on their negative assessment of
European cultural influence on Russia, the Slavophiles emphasized autocracy,
Orthodoxy, and national identity—that is, a Tsar, a religion, and a people—as
the foundations of true Russian politics, encompassing state, national,
cultural, and ecclesiastical matters. These foundations are once again in the
spotlight today, with the difference that now the State and its Party occupy
the place of God and the Tsar, while so-called traditional vernacular culture,
as well as Orthodoxy with its representative, the Patriarch of Moscow, continue
to play an important role alongside Marxism.
II. Separation from Europe
Russians disagree on the dilemma of accepting
or rejecting European culture. It should not be forgotten that European
influence on Russia has, in fact, always been very strong and, in certain
respects, even detrimental.
Until the Tatar conquest, Russia, in its way of
life, was closer to Western Europe than to the Byzantine Empire. The
consequence of Byzantine influence, later exerted with the Christianization of
the Russian people, did not exclude ancient Russia from the community of
European nations. On the contrary, Russia was admitted into the spiritual life
of that community. In the 11th and 12th centuries, the first Russian dynasty
became linked by marriage ties with the French royal house and with several
German princely families, which brought with it an essential influence on
Russia.
Only in the 13th century, when the Tatar yoke severed the ties that
bound Russia to the West, did Russian life, under the pressure of the Asian conquerors, take on forms foreign to the West. It can
rightly be argued that the character and, in general, the entire life of the Russians until 1917 were determined by these
three factors: 1) the aforementioned Tatar yoke (1237-1480); 2) the serfdom of
the peasantry (1586-1861); and 3) the autocratic rule of the Tsars until 1917.
In historical perspective, Russia was set back centuries in its normal
development because of Tatar domination. It was violently separated from
Europe. Only Peter the Great turned his attention back to it. There is no doubt
that Russia, particularly the Russian soul and national character, would have
developed differently without Tatar despotism.
A pivotal event in the history of the Russian soul was the Germanic
invasion of the 13th century. Swedes, Danes, and Germans invaded Russian lands
via the Baltic Sea, founding Riga and Reval and reaching as far as Novgorod.
Unfortunately, this was a response to the Russians' pleas to the Christian West
for help against the Tatar assault.
This was Russia's first experience of direct contact with Western
Europeans. An aversion to the West took root then. From these Baltic struggles
between the Russians and the Germanic peoples arose
the historical conflict. But the strong Asian influence only began in the late
16th and 17th centuries (and continues to this day), when Russia maintained
very active relations with Persia, India, and China. It was then that Russia
distanced itself most from the Western peoples.
The establishment of serfdom was crucial for the further formation of
the Russian national spirit and character. It began a century after the end of
Tatar rule, as in 1586 the Russian peasant was bound to the land. Until then,
despite all the abuses, the peasant had the possibility of changing his place
of residence. Now he became the property of the landowner, exploited at the
owner's whim. The lord had the right to whip him, sell him, and forbid his
marriage.
III. The Europeanization of Russia
The impact of Western influences on Russia
under Peter the Great and his successors must be considered a historical event
of paramount importance, comparable to the influence of classical Latin culture
on Germanic countries during the Middle Ages,
especially Germany.
In Russia, Peter the Great imposed the
conquests of Western civilization by decree. Old customs and cultural forms
were abolished and new ones introduced, such as the Christmas tree, a custom of
German origin. The Tsar personally plucked out the long, patriarchal beards of
his courtiers. He ordered that all his subjects, except priests and peasants,
should shave their beards and dress in European fashion. It is worth noting
that before this decree, cutting one's beard risked excommunication.
When Tsar Peter tried to extend his
innovations to the beards of the Russian Old Believers (raskolniki), many of
them chose death. Some were burned alive when forced to cross themselves with
two instead of three fingers. The peasants did not understand the meaning of
the new cultural values introduced by the upper classes: they
were disoriented and bewildered.
Peter, called the "first German,
Russian," took Prussia as his model. He unleashed the first Europeanizing
revolution, determined to make Russia the second Prussia. From a country that
was difficult to access, seemingly with more Asian than European features, he
forged a powerful empire, structured in the Western manner.
But the revolutionary tsar failed to make Russia
a modern European state, since he did not address the fundamental problem:
serfdom. Also under strong Western influence was Alexander I (1777-1825), who
dreamed of an international system that would guarantee lasting peace for
Europe. His successor, Nicholas I, also tried to uphold Alexander I's European
policy by all means, but in doing so, he unwittingly played the role of a
police commissioner in Europe. Thanks to his intervention, the Hungarian
Revolution of 1848 was crushed. Approximately 100 years later—in the autumn of
1956—Russian-Soviet military power again crushed the Hungarian people's
rebellion. Nicholas I was the epitome of a Prussian officer and governed his
empire strictly according to the Prussian model. The famous anarchist Bakunin
described Russia at that time as "the German Empire under the Knut."
Indeed, under Nicholas I, the prevailing motto was: Russia must be a good
Prussia, an idealized Prussia.
The Germans of the Baltic and other regions
exerted an enormous influence in the last century, to such an extent that the
Russian general Yermolov, hero of the year 1812 and viceroy of the Caucasus,
once said that he would ask the tsar to "promote the German."
In general, it can be said that the educated classes of that era were
very receptive to French political ideas. Civil servants, on the other hand,
preferred to imitate German methods and, prone to exaggeration, made Russia the
homeland of bureaucracy.
It was precisely in this important arena of political ideas and state
structures that French influence clashed with the discordant German
influence—that is, the influence of Frederick the Great's Prussia.
Indeed, French and German influences were two of the strongest and most
contradictory currents. The assimilation of this new Western spirit led many
prominent Russians to doubt the value of Russia's vernacular culture. Thus, the
poet Pushkin complained: "To hell with it! Why did I, with the talent and
spirit I possess, have to be born in Russia?"
Under Alexander III (1845–94), ties with the West weakened, only to
deepen and strengthen under the last Tsar, Nicholas II. Never before had a
cultured Russian felt so naturally European, a member of a nation that occupied
its natural place among the other peoples of Europe.
Nor were concerns for peace in Europe foreign to the last Tsar. It was
at his urging that the first Hague Conference was convened on May 18, 1899,
resulting in the formation of the International Court of Justice, which already
contained the seeds of the League of Nations.
Unfortunately, it was precisely under this last Romanov that Russia
regressed to the Byzantine Middle Ages. Above all, the imperial court sank into
superstition, mysticism, and corruption.
In conclusion, one could say: Russia developed on its own, mirroring the
Western peoples. Later, Christianization laid similar foundations, capable of
developing in Russia ideas and institutions similar to those of Byzantium and
the West. The same can be said of subsequent Europeanization and Western
influence.
IV. The Destructive Impact of Western European Ideas
The process of Europeanization in Russia did not occur suddenly or
abruptly, but it nonetheless arrived unprepared, since the Russian Church,
which exercised spiritual leadership over the people, lacked its own theology.
In Constantinople, Rome, and even in Germany and England, there was a
philosophy and a theology. Scholasticism had prepared Western Christians for
centuries for scientific and critical thinking. In the West, the great
spiritual movement of the Renaissance and Humanism took place. The new
philosophy and science, moreover, had a clear path thanks to the Reformation
and the gradual evolution of Protestantism. Great thinkers like Voltaire, Kant,
Hegel, and others constituted an organic link in the revolution in Europe,
while in Russia they represented a radical revolution of the spirit. Orthodox
Russia, spiritually stagnant, was easy prey, first for French rationalism,
which was anti-ecclesiastical and anti-religious. Voltaire, Rousseau, and
others were secretly disseminated within the imperial court and high society.
For example, Voltaire's works were printed at a printing press located in a
village. But Voltaireanism was merely a harmless teaching, incomparable to the
poison that Kant was for the Russians.
As mentioned earlier, German influence was added to French influence:
German culture in general, science, and philosophy penetrated Russia as early
as the time of Peter the Great, but on a larger scale under Alexander I and
even more so during the reign of Nicholas I.
Hegel and the radical Hegelian left, in particular, exerted a profound
influence on the minds of the Russian intelligentsia. It was the European
philosophers, and Kant above all, through whom the new Europe awakened the
Russians from their Orthodox slumber and dogmatic lethargy. Figuratively
speaking, Peter the Great opened Russia's windows to Europe; then Voltaire
brought in European air; and finally, Kant and German philosophy shook the
foundations of the Russian cloister and absolutist Tsarism.
For understanding relations in Russia at that time, the description
given by a cultured Russian of his encounter with Büchner's work, *Force and
Matter*, is highly significant: "But look, one fine day Büchner's book
arrived like a bombshell in a lithographic translation. Everyone has read this
work with great enthusiasm, and in everyone, the remnants of traditional
beliefs have suddenly vanished..." Oswald Spengler aptly characterized the
spiritual situation of Russia in the last century when he said: "Above
were the intelligentsia with their well-read problems and conflicts, and below
were the uprooted peasants with all their misery and primitivism... Society was
permeated with a Western spirit, and the people carried within them the soul of
the country."
Russia had two faces. Through its aristocracy, it appeared to be a
cultured country, but without a genuine inner life. The people, on the other
hand, remained barbaric, backward, and enslaved by the upper classes.
Faced with such a situation, it was natural that European ideas,
European spiritual life, which the government prohibited and repressed, would
have a revolutionary impact. Thus, for example, Tsar Nicholas I forbade the
study of philosophy in Russian universities. He promulgated a decree prohibiting
the teaching of the discoveries of Copernicus and Newton in Russian schools, as
they contradicted the doctrine of orthodoxy.
But, precisely, the forbidden fruits of Western civilization were
harvested with even greater avidity. Philosophy and science, the arts and
technologies in Russia were transformed into revolutionary weapons. Literature
was a social and political vehicle, but at the same time an index of the
banished, the imprisoned, and the exiled, for those who followed Western
philosophers and scientists, for example, the followers of Darwin, were
imprisoned or exiled to Siberia (Chernyshevsky), while in England this thinker
was buried in Westminster Abbey.
Now, let's imagine the situation clearly: the international communism of
a Karl Marx had to disrupt and replace the medieval agrarian economy of
Caesaropapist Russia.
In Leo Tolstoy's "Confessions," we can observe how a Russian
underwent an internal revolution when he learned, for example, of the great
novelty that God supposedly does not exist. This novelty, the teaching of God's
nonexistence, had been preached in Europe for several centuries, and the
medieval worldview as a theocentric organization was gradually, step by step,
transforming. However, Europe itself was neither always nor could it always be
fully prepared for this novelty.
Now let us imagine Russia, transporting ourselves to the spiritual world
of a Russian educated by his Church. Suddenly, like a lightning bolt from the
clear sky, this devout Russian hears the message of Western thinkers. How would
such an atheistic doctrine have affected a country where the Church and its
monks had been, until then, the supreme intellectual authority, recognized by
all, and where the State was the right and left hand of this authority? The
Russian Church, whose foundations are Greco-Byzantine, was more important to
the Russian power structure than Catholicism was to France or Spain, or
Protestantism to Germany; it was the people, the Russian Empire—in short, the
Church was Russia.
The Russian Church and Orthodoxy, in their historical role as heirs to
Byzantinism, were far more static than the Roman Church. The Church and
religion in Russia are, in principle, reactionary. They remained, broadly
speaking, attached to the teachings and practices established in the 3rd
century by the great Greco-Alexandrian dogmatic theorists.
The Greeks were exposed to Asian influences from very early on; by the
time Christianity began to develop, the influence of religious Asia was not
limited to the Old and New Testaments. As Byzantium became politically and
culturally isolated from the West, becoming an oasis of civilization due to the
onslaught of barbarian peoples from Asia and Eastern Europe, and later
especially from Muslims, its religious and cultural stagnation became
self-sustaining.
The Russians did, it is true, receive a fully formed religion from
Byzantium—but not Hellenism, or its presence in theology was only occasionally
noticeable. The Greek language did not play the same role in Russia as Latin
did in the West. Moreover, Russia lacked humanism and the Renaissance, as well
as the advancement of science, independent philosophy, and above all, the
Reformation, both Protestant and Catholic.
The Russians were no less isolated than the Byzantines, and for this reason,
they adhered, just as the Byzantines did, to religious and ecclesiastical
traditions. During the period of Kievan Rus's dominance, a degree of cultural
communion with the West existed, but this was soon disrupted. Russia became
isolated from the West and very soon from the East, which explains its cultural
and religious stagnation. Furthermore, the constant defense of the state
against numerous hostile neighbors inevitably contributed to a predominantly
state-driven and military-led, unilateral development.
V. The Russian Church and Tsarism
The Russian Church often recognized and
utilized the state as its helper and protector. The same was true, as a
national necessity, in Byzantium, as a consequence of the attacks against the
Byzantine Empire from Asia and Europe. Because of this state and national
isolation, the Church could not develop in the universal sense as the Western
Church did.
In Western Europe, the Roman Empire collapsed
a thousand years earlier than in the Byzantine East. After several centuries,
the Western Empire was, to some extent, restored by its past, which in turn
invigorated and organized it as a state in its own right, following the Eastern
model.
In Russia, too, the Church became more
national than the international Western Church, primarily due to its struggle
against Muslims, the Catholic West, and later, the Protestants.
The defining characteristic of both Byzantium
and Moscow was that, unlike the West, they lacked a Saint Augustine, a Gregory
VII, a Saint Thomas Aquinas and his followers, or a Boniface VIII in terms of
valuing the Church over the state. Medieval Russia had no Saint Bernard, the
Divine Comedy, or cathedrals, and had to do without great theologians, mystics,
and distinguished monastic orders. Neither Byzantium nor Moscow produced
monarchomaniacs who would defend the right to kill a tyrant.
Theologians, defenders of the primacy of the
Church, who considered temporal power and rulers inferior, even morally
worthless, promoted the democratic principles of popular sovereignty while
simultaneously upholding the right to eliminate a tyrant. According to these
doctrines, the people had the right to elect their ruler, to depose him, and to
punish him. We find nothing similar in either Byzantium or Moscow. There wasn't
even a struggle there between the Patriarchs and the Emperor, a struggle
comparable to that of the Popes in the West.
It is true that in Byzantium and Moscow there
were also defenders of the primacy of the Church, of the Priesthood over the
State and temporal power, but this antagonism never amounted to the
condemnation of the prince in the sense of Gregory VII. Despots and criminal
rulers like Ivan the Terrible were not deposed. The boyars fought against him,
but only to safeguard their caste rights, without questioning his right to
rule. Thus, in both Moscow and Byzantium, the emperor was recognized as head of
the Church. The Church recognized the tsar's autocracy as a holy institution,
and in return, the Church was protected by the means available to this sanctified
absolutism.
The emperor did not dare to promulgate new
dogmas, for according to the Eastern conception, these were defined once and
for all. It is now clear why the vast majority of Russian thinkers opposed
Christianity. It is clear why, for example, Belinsky linked the idea of
God with the knut. This also explains
Russian nihilism, which was atheistic and materialistic. Nihilism, as a
response to Christianity's betrayal of its own being, as a symptom of despair
over this betrayal, arose in the same form in Russia as in Europe, with the
difference that, because Russian Orthodoxy was so closely tied to Tsarism, the
political character of Russian nihilism was strongly accentuated.
It is characteristic that the leaders of
Russian nihilism, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, were, like Nietzsche, sons of
priests or seminarians.
The Church itself demanded protection from the Tsar against all
innovation, and in turn, lent the autocrat its support against every attempt at
reform. The Russian Orthodox Church never raised its voice in protest against
serfdom, Tsarist terror, censorship, and other reactionary measures and
institutions; rather, it went so far as to defend them throughout the
centuries. The official Church was a servant or auxiliary of Tsarism, and today
it is a docile instrument of the Soviet regime. In contrast to the papacy, it
never aspired to the supremacy of spiritual power over temporal power.
VI. Subversive
Movements, a Consequence of Sudden Europeanization
The consequence of the sudden Enlightenment in Russia was a spiritual
and political revolution against the existing system. Negation, pessimism, and
nihilism were now the natural consequences of this direct transition from
Orthodoxy to atheism, materialism, and positivism, given that the Russians,
thanks to their predisposition to radicalism, took these ideologies to
extremes. The Russian completely lacks a sense of evolution, of cultural
continuity, and instead possesses a highly developed sense of crisis. He
prefers declines to transitions.
The European, for example, the German, has grown accustomed over
centuries to self-reliance; the European lived through the Renaissance,
Humanism, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the Enlightenment. The
German was led to Feuerbach successively through many transitions, which
explains why, for example, Stirner, Nietzsche, or Schopenhauer did not cause
such havoc in the West as they did in Russia. The German or the French were
exposed to other thinkers and became accustomed to other arguments for and
against. The Russian embraced modern Western thinkers as the sole and ultimate
authority. The consequence was the rejection of the entire past, which was
bound to lead, ultimately, to social and political revolution.
This struggle of philosophy against theology and autocracy in Russia
claimed its victims. It demonstrated above all that characteristic inadequacy
that always arises when an ancient civilization comes into contact with a
younger one. This inadequacy is equivalent to a general process of decay with
all its accompanying effects. The Russians consoled themselves for this
inadequacy by arguing that they didn't need to expend their energies on
experimentation and research, nor waste their inventive forces on difficult
tasks. That is why Byelinsky believed that in Russia, what took fifty years in
the West was often accomplished in five. The development that took so many
centuries in Europe, the Russian colossus achieved in the same number of
decades. The consequence of this rapid, even precipitous, achievement is
evident in a dangerous inadequacy that, of course, does not necessarily
manifest itself in all spheres. It should not be
forgotten that the 1917 revolution was the work of semi-educated people.
In the last century, the Russian man awoke from his mystical orthodoxy,
and Merezhkovsky aptly said: "We have slept for 800 years, and in the
century between Tsar Peter and Pushkin we awoke. In the decades between Pushkin
and Tolstoy, we lived through three centuries. Precisely for these reasons, Russia
is young, for the centuries before Peter the Great do not count." The
beginning of Russia's political organization dates back to 882; but Russian
participation in cultural development did not begin before the 19th century.
Dostoevsky expressed the truth when he said: "We Russians are a young
people; "We are only now beginning to live, even though we have already
lived for 1,000 years."
Analyzing the works of certain Russian writers, we can clearly see this
sudden leap across centuries. Thus, we can consider Dostoevsky a spiritual
contemporary of Shakespeare, as well as of Dickens or Baudelaire. In turn, we
can consider Pushkin's work a summary of medieval and modern Europe. We must
vividly imagine how a Russian, accustomed to the passive acceptance of Christian
revelation, was suddenly confronted with the results of progressive European
thought. Until then, he had lived in an objectivist manner, believing in the
supreme authority of the Church and the State. Suddenly, he had to rely on
himself and his inherent spiritual strength. Kant and his followers came to
tell him: "The content of science, philosophy, and religion is the fruit
of the activity of your intellect and not of Revelation; "Not God, but man
is the creator of all life in human society."
This crisis was suffered by Russia and continues to be suffered by it
today. The crisis caused by the importation of European cultural goods is
comparable to the process of disintegration and decomposition that the peoples
of Asia and Africa are currently undergoing in contact with Western
civilization. Russia, still medieval, was directly incorporated into the
European evolutionary process of the 18th and subsequent centuries. In the last
century, Slavophiles sought to oppose this disintegrating influence from
Western Europe with the Russian spirit and vernacular Russian culture,
advocating for an almost total separation from Europe.
Dostoevsky declared himself in this vein in 1860 when he wrote:
"The first condition for the resurgence of our national sentiment is to
hate St. Petersburg with all our strength and all our soul." From this
preaching—to reject everything of European origin, and St. Petersburg as the
visible symbol of modern Russia—stems a hatred of the West, a frankly
apocalyptic hatred. which was turning – Spengler
observed – against Europe. Spengler saw in the burning of Moscow, with which
the Russians thought to prevent the Napoleonic conquest, a grand symbolic act
of a primitive people, the hatred, in fact, of the Maccabees against everything
that comes from a different creed, against everything foreign.
But none of the capitals Napoleon conquered gave him such a reception as
Moscow. The Russians burned their former capital and left. It must be
remembered that for no other people does their capital mean what Moscow means
to the Russians. Napoleon realized at once that he was witnessing the most
extraordinary event a European could ever encounter: the almost demonic
eruption of feeling in a world so strangely formed. Napoleon was never again
able to shake this feeling.
VII. The Russian and
the European
a) The Russian and Earthly Goods
Indeed, nowhere are earthly goods so easily renounced, nowhere is their
lack so readily forgiven, nor is what is lost so easily forgotten and borne
forever as in Russia. The Russian enjoys material goods as long as they are
offered to him, but he will not feel wounded in the depths of his being if he
has to sacrifice them or if he lacks them.
On the other hand, how difficult it is for a European to bear material
losses! It is significant that Russians have a less rigid notion of private
property than Europeans, and that they do not define the boundary between mine
and yours as precisely as Europeans do. Among Europeans, the poor person never
looks at a rich person without envy, whereas among Russians, the rich person
looks at the poor person with shame. They possess a very deep sense of what
wealth is, that it possesses us rather than us
possessing it.
If a European falls on hard times, he will despair more easily, but he
will also recover more quickly. The European enjoys the world. He settles into
it as if it were his own home and clings to material possessions. He is a
realist. On the contrary, the Russian is not very concerned with the world. He
is not attached to anything or anyone. He does not hold onto anything firmly
and permanently. The Russian is more excited by the prospect of cataclysms than
by the pursuit of traditionalism.
b) Lack of Moderation
The fundamental spiritual disposition of Russians is not proportion, but
a tendency toward extremism, toward the extreme. In Russia, feelings clash. The
alternation of extremes makes the Russian character somewhat capricious. The
character of the Russian people has been shaped not only by the long history of
serfdom and despotism, but also by the gloomy forests, the harsh soil, the
rough climate, and especially by the forced inactivity during long winters.
In Russia, everything is boundless and excessive. People have no measure
or goal; they don't know how to limit themselves, whether in good or bad. They
cannot maintain moderation in anything. The potential for tension in the
Russian soul is enormously great. The breadth of the Russian character is often
compared to the vastness of their land.
The Russian is either a fervent believer or a recalcitrant atheist; a
passionate adherent of the West or a rabid anti-European. For Russians,
changing their personal convictions means a complete change in their lives.
Tolstoy once said: "If anyone among us converts to Catholicism, he will
inevitably become a Jesuit. If one embraces atheism, he will categorically and
imperiously demand that faith in God be uprooted by fire and steel, if
necessary."
What in the West was merely a hypothesis, in Russia became dogma, and
any other supposition was considered heresy. Russians are captivated by a grand
idea as if they were literally crushed by it. In such cases, they lack the
strength to adapt it properly, and so they believe in it to the point of
fanaticism. They always gravitate toward extremes, are
nihilistic or apocalyptic; they disintegrate everything: themselves and others.
c) Propensity for
Extremes
Russians are defined by their tendency to rush headlong toward the
opposite pole. Without this innate trait, Bolshevism would not have been
possible, since it constitutes, in all essential matters, the opposite pole to
everything that until then had been sacred to Russians. A Russian is always in
search of the opposite, of the contradictory. Berdyaev, a former Marxist
philosopher, became a profoundly Christian philosopher; Bulgakov, a former
socialist economist, was ordained an Orthodox priest; Leontiev—the Russian
Nietzsche—a staunch hedonist, took the habit of a monk in the Eastern Church.
The Russian man delights in abandoning himself to the point of
indolence; in reality, it is a state of disarray bordering on anarchy. If the
fundamental characteristics of the Russian people are wisdom, kindness, zest
for life, and patience, then indolence and a lack of energy are no less so. A
lack of opposition, a distinctly passive, Eastern, fatalistic humility, and
submission to the Tsar as well as to current rulers, are unmistakable traits of
their character.
When Ivan the Terrible retired to the monastery, the people begged him
to return to the throne. Maxim Gorky himself emphasized that the people kneel
before their God at night and by day ruthlessly trample upon the bodies of
their fellow human beings. The Russian is the most obedient people when
governed severely, but incapable of governing themselves. As soon as the reins
are loosened, it descends into anarchy.
d) Cruelty
The Russian mood changes suddenly and for no apparent reason, swinging
from one extreme to the other. Thus, for example, in Russian songs and dances,
the abrupt transition from joy to melancholy is common.
Ivan IV killed during the day, and at nightfall, he would bang his head
against the floor of his chapel until it bled as a sign of repentance. Without
blinking, he had 60,000 citizens of Nizhny Novgorod killed for making a pact with
the Lithuanians. In 1571, he ordered the execution of more than 3,000 noble
rebels in Moscow's Red Square. While the heads of these aristocrats hung in
Moscow's Red Square, Ivan the Terrible had a mass celebrated for the souls of
his victims.
Stalin, in turn, ordered the liquidation of more than 5,000 officers in
1937, led by Marshal Tukhachevsky.
To be impartial, we must say that atrocities were also committed outside
of Russia during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. For example, in 1572, under
the regency of Catherine de Medici, the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre was
staged in France as a blood wedding for her daughter. Philip II, for his part,
had those condemned by the Inquisition burned at the stake.
Peter the Great, the most progressive of the Russian tsars, also appears
on the list of cruelties committed by rulers: he beat his friend Maria Danilova
Hamilton for speaking unfavorably about the dubious origins of his future wife,
later Empress Catherine I. He later had her publicly beheaded as a suspected
infanticide. He attended her execution, explaining to those present, like a
modern anatomist, the veins in the victim's head, and finally kissed the lips
of his decapitated friend.
Maxim Gorky believes that the Russian people exhibit a propensity for a particular
kind of atrocities and harshness, which reveal the limits of human suffering,
endurance, and the human capacity to withstand torture.
It is debatable whether Russian cruelty can be explained as a
consequence of centuries of slavery. The cruel treatment that Russians had to
endure for 1,000 years undoubtedly contributed to the brutalization of their
character. If it was already fierce and savage from its origins, it is
difficult to avoid it today. In any case, one cannot speak of the good-natured Russian
as if this were one of his inherent qualities. Excessive heat and cold drive
man to extremes. Just like heat and cold, so do unbridled passion and
restraint. Unrestrained excesses are suddenly followed by remorse and penance.
After committing atrocities, Russians almost always feel the need for public
repentance. Confessions of guilt and self-criticism are not solely a
consequence of Soviet education, as Russian history provides numerous examples.
e) Lying and
Alcoholism
Turgenev believes that lying is one of the greatest vices of the Russian
people. In his view, Russians are the most deceitful people in the world, and,
on the other hand, they value and love nothing as much as the truth.
Michelet agrees with Turgenev on this point, asserting that Russians are
good-natured but completely lack a sense of rectitude and morality. Michelet
concludes: Since Russia is essentially lying, its
foreign policy and its weapons against Europe must necessarily be lies.
Bakunin shares this opinion, stating: The Russian government lies about
everything. This is its strength, its life, the secret of its existence. Lying
has become a system.
For Legras, the fundamental reason for insincerity, besides the system
of serfdom, lies in the immense size of the country, which makes evidence
difficult. To this must be added the low level of education. Lying is the
natural weapon of children, the dispossessed, and the subjugated.
It would be wise to make the following observation: if Russians assert
or feel today that there is a certain degree of freedom in their country, this
is true in comparison to their past, and therefore they are not lying. The
Russian people have never known true freedom in history, whether under the
sovereigns of the Rurik dynasty, under Tatar rule, or later under the Romanovs.
The current government replaced the rule of the tsars; in place of the
tsar came another autocrat, who granted certain rights to the peasants and
workers, making everyone, without exception, a slave of the state. In reality,
the same slavery has always existed for all classes, for all social strata.
A Russian cannot conceive of freedom in the Western European sense, nor
draw comparisons with freedom as Europeans or Americans do, since Russians have
never enjoyed complete freedom.
Besides vices of all kinds, alcoholism was also widespread. The Tsarist
regime treated this vice among students with a certain degree of complacency,
since drunkenness distracted them from revolutionary thought. Russians drank
not only to warm up and liven up, but also to forget the gloomy monotony of
everyday life. The Soviet government had to take measures against drunkenness
despite the revenue generated by taxes levied on the state alcohol monopoly.
f) Lack of a sense of
order and time
By nature, the Russian is optimistic. This optimism and the pessimistic
view of culture that also characterizes the Russian are not mutually exclusive,
as they are two aspects of the same psychic constitution. The predominant
psychic predisposition of Western man is primary anxiety. The European is a
metaphysical pessimist insofar as he tends to be content with empirical
reality; he experiences the world as chaos, to which only man gives meaning and
justification. He is always tormented by the anxiety that the world will go off
the rails as soon as he removes his ordering hand. Order is the meaning of
Western life.
Europeans and Americans seek order within themselves in the form of
self-discipline and the dominance of reason over instincts; they also seek it
in their surroundings in the form of political order and the dominance of
authority over the citizen. What most distinguishes the Russian from the West
is his deficient sense of an inner necessity that impels him to seek form in
all areas of life. Western man often seems to Russians as if he possessed a
perfectly functioning clock instead of a soul. This is why over-organization,
psychological stagnation, and the suffocating effects of a life regimented by
rules constitute a danger to Western man. Social anarchy, psychological hysteria,
and the over-extension of life, beyond all norms, in turn threaten Russian man.
Russians and other peoples have a completely different sense of time:
"Time is money," goes a German and Anglo-Saxon proverb. The Turks
say: "Haste makes waste." And the Russian proverb expresses:
"Right away," meaning within the hour. Punctuality is certainly not a
Russian virtue, and a good Russian says: "Thank God we're not
German!"
The Russian has time to spare. This lack of appreciation for time
implies a lack of a sense of proportion. If man has no measure for anything, he
also has none for time, which is perhaps related to the vast geographical
expanse of Russia. The Russian never experiences the agonizing feeling of
having omitted something or of having to perform a certain daily task.
A German proverb says: What you can do in the morning, don't leave for
the evening. That is the pessimism of time. A Russian, like an Englishman,
thinks the opposite: What you shouldn't do in the morning, leave it; perhaps it
will get done by itself.
g) Vanity and Envy of
Western Man
Not infrequently, in the Russian's opinion, Western man is dominated by
vanity and envy. Western vanity constitutes the Roman inheritance. With it,
Westerners became directly linked to the Latin cult of conceit, to the
civilization of actors and poseurs. If they cannot display some personal
quality or achievement, then they put on airs by invoking their origin, their
profession, the location of their house, their political party, their friends,
their travels and adventures; If they do this in front of foreigners, then they
boast of their nation and its leading figures. What they find most pleasing is
to be envied, and what they find most painful is to be pitied, for the envy of
their neighbor reveals their poverty, while the pity of their neighbor
demonstrates the destitution of the one being pitied. Hence, European public
and social life is tinged with pretense.
It is interesting to note that Russians are bound together, deep down,
by mysterious ties. Barely having met, they immediately become friends. After
an hour, it seems as if they have known each other all their lives. In Europe,
especially in Germanic countries, the opposite is true: people may know each
other their whole lives, but it very rarely happens that one opens their heart
completely to a friend.
***
Today, Bolshevism is in the process of fundamentally changing the
Russian national character. Bolshevism makes Russians realists who only accept
their own precise knowledge. In the ranking of spiritual gifts, technical
ability currently occupies the highest place. Art lags behind, philosophy and
religion neglected. The artist must create only on commission and for
predetermined purposes. They fulfill assigned social mandates. The absolute
conviction of Bolshevism is that communist literature cannot exist without a
social mission.
Of course, the Bolsheviks wanted not only to imitate, but to surpass,
the materialistic, technocratic, and agnostic West. Bukharin expressed this
quite clearly when he said: "We need Marxism and Americanism. Individual
life, which separates man from the collective process of production, must be
abolished to make way for the collectivist man-machine: the tradition of
contemplative spirit that preceded Bolshevism must be overcome by Americanism.
A pair of boots, after all, is more important," Bukharin maintained,
"than all of Shakespeare's work."
The recent successes in rocket production and space exploration
irrefutably prove this.
What is being put into practice in Russia are,
in fact, Western principles, but the way in which they are applied is Russian.
Hence the national pride in having applied them in this way and for the first
time. In reality, the ideas that were at the origin of the Russian Revolution
are all, without exception, borrowed from the West. Russia eagerly embraced
modern European ideas and, due to Russian excess, carried them to their
ultimate consequences in the Soviet Union.
In its integral development, Bolshevism is not simply Marxism
implemented elsewhere, but an event that could only have developed in such a
way on Russian soil. Therefore, it cannot be understood based on the tenets of
Marxist doctrine, but primarily on the depths of the Russian character.
If Russia ever breaks this intimate bond with its past and definitively
renounces its former thinkers, poets, and artists, then it could become an
America, but a North America that we would have to imagine without freedom,
without union with Europe, and without continuity with Western and Anglo-Saxon
civilization, because in the new Eastern Empire, Europe and Christianity mean
nothing; for the Bolsheviks, they are ridiculous trinkets. Western values
are nothing more to them than paper money out of circulation. As
Tocqueville said, Russia has in common with the United States of America the
fact that it inaugurated a new cycle in world history, in which the roles of
Western Europe and China take on decisive importance corresponding to their
strength.
Some Aspects of the Yugoslav Economy in Mid-1962
Tihomil Radja, Fribourg, Switzerland
"We have piles of various high-value
goods in warehouses that have no outlet. These goods have cost us, and continue
to cost us, and yet they are included in the national income," Tito told
political science students.
The Five-Year Plan 1957-61 was completed at
the end of 1960, a year ahead of schedule. The new five-year period 1961-65
began in 1961, with the aim of placing the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia among the moderately developed countries by the end of 1965, with a
national income of approximately $600 per capita.
Such is the purpose of the plan currently
being implemented. Time will tell to what extent it will be fulfilled. In
contrast to the previous plan (1957-61), its completion by the end of 1960 proved
quite problematic. If everything is measured according to the increase in
national income, then it could almost be said that it was achieved, according
to the data presented below:
National income - in billions of dinars, 1956
prices
|
|
|
|
|
Ańo |
|
Plan |
|
Realización |
|
% |
||||
|
|
|
|
1961 |
|
2275 |
|
2247 |
98,8 |
|
|
||||
However, in many
branches and industrial sectors, the plan was not implemented by the end of
1960, as can be deduced from the following figures: Implementation of the
1957-1961 plan
(in
some branches and sectors)
|
|
Sector |
|
Plan 1956-61 |
|
Realización 1960 |
||||||
|
|
Cobre |
|
136 |
|
119 |
||||||
|
|
Carbón |
|
148 |
|
127 |
||||||
|
|
Energía
eléctrica |
|
184 |
|
176 |
||||||
|
|
Aluminio |
|
239 |
|
171 |
||||||
|
|
Fertilizantes |
|
401 |
|
143 |
||||||
|
|
Máquinas
agrícolas |
|
260 |
|
171 |
||||||
|
|
Camiones |
|
217 |
|
166 |
||||||
|
|
Máquinas de
construcción |
|
498 |
|
136 |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Azúcar
(toneladas) |
|
331.000 |
|
264.000 |
||||||
|
|
Tabaco
(toneladas) |
|
54.000 |
|
35.000 |
||||||
In other sectors as well, such as footwear, radio, and furniture
production, the Plan was not implemented, while in other sectors, the
production projected for 1961 was largely achieved by the end of 1960. However,
in general, the pronounced imbalance between capital goods on the one hand and
raw materials and consumer goods on the other was not overcome in industrial
production:
Industrial Production
(indices)
|
|
Grupos de productos |
|
1956 |
|
1960 |
|
1946 |
|
1956 |
|
|
Bienes de
capital |
|
100 |
|
184 |
|
100 |
|
802 |
|
|
Materias primas
|
|
100 |
|
159 |
|
100 |
|
334 |
|
|
Artículos de
consumo |
|
100 |
|
178 |
|
100 |
|
278 |
Such a
disproportionate fluctuation in industrial production—coupled with agricultural
stagnation from 1960 onward—had a negative impact on the foreign trade balance,
whose growing deficit constitutes a major obstacle to normal economic
development.
II
"Our foreign
debt has reached 800 million dollars, and our deficit is constantly
growing," Tito declared in Split. Indeed, one of the primary objectives of the 1956-61 Five-Year Plan was to increase imports and
exports, by importing much less in order to mitigate the foreign trade deficit
in goods and services. However, the trade deficit increased
significantly:
The trade balance
(in
millions of dollars)
|
|
|
|
Promedio 1952-56 |
|
1957-61 |
|
|
Exportación
(F.O.B.) |
|
276 |
|
556 |
|
|
Importación
(C.I.F.) |
|
429 |
|
768 |
|
|
Déficit |
|
153 |
|
212 |
The average deficit in the period 1957-61 was covered with these
resources:
|
|
Remesas particulares |
|
42 millones de dólares |
|
|
Reparaciones |
|
32 "
" |
|
|
Obras Públicas |
|
7 " "
|
|
|
Excedente
productos agrícolas EE.UU. |
|
70 "
" |
|
|
Préstamos Fondo
Monet. Internac. |
|
14 "
" |
|
|
Créditos
públicos a largo plazo |
|
8 " " |
|
|
Créditos
públicos a corto plazo |
|
33 "
" |
|
|
Varios |
|
6 " " |
|
|
|
|
212 millones de
dólares |
The considerable
amount of US agricultural surpluses, caused by the stagnation of agricultural
production in communist Yugoslavia from 1960 onward, is particularly striking,
as can be seen from the data cited:
Wheat and corn
production
(in
millions of tons)
|
|
|
1957 |
|
1958 |
|
1959 |
|
1960 |
|
1961 |
|
promedio |
|||||||
|
|
Trigo |
|
3,1 |
|
2,5 |
|
4,1 |
|
3,6 |
|
3,2 |
|
3,3 |
||||||
|
|
Maíz |
|
5,6 |
|
4,0 |
|
6,7 |
|
6,2 |
|
4,7 |
|
5,4 |
||||||
According to the
estimate of Yugoslav Minister and Economic Planner Todorovic (see: Vjesnik,
April 8, 1962), the losses resulting from the decline in agricultural
production in 1960 and 1961 amounted to approximately $100 million annually.
This was reflected primarily in the growing foreign trade deficit and,
consequently, in the increase in foreign debt, which stood at $476 million at
the end of 1960 and $681 million at the end of 1961. Interest and annuities
exceeded $70 million per year, while the debt represented 20-25% of national
income.
III
"The social and
material conditions make it easier for us to successfully achieve the high rate
of economic growth and the other objectives set out in the presented
plan," declared Tito on December 26, 1960, in the National Assembly.
Apart from the
pronounced imbalance in industrial production, including the artificial
maintenance of many sectors through state subsidies; apart from the decline in
agricultural production and the lack of prospects for its increase while
collectivist tendencies prevailed; apart from the catastrophic state of foreign
trade, the new Five-Year Plan set itself extremely ambitious goals. However, in
the very first year of its implementation, all the contradictions and anomalies
of the Yugoslav economy became fully apparent and, of course, disproved the
Plan's objectives and forecasts.
Production (percentage
growth)
|
Sector |
Incremento |
1961 |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Industria |
13,0 |
7,0 |
4,0 |
|
Agricultura |
7,2 |
-6,0 |
- |
|
Demás sectores |
12,3 |
6,0 |
0,0 |
|
Total |
11,4 |
3,6 |
- |
During 1962, in some key industries the downward trend continued, namely:
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Carbón |
100 |
97 |
|
No metales |
100 |
99 |
|
Industria
metalúrgica |
100 |
98 |
|
Materiales de
construcción |
100 |
80 |
|
Industria del
caucho |
100 |
93 |
|
Indust. de
alimentación |
100 |
96 |
|
Tabaco |
100 |
72 |
Other sectors are
also barely maintaining their production at 1961 levels, which is well below
the original targets. At the same time, the rate of job creation is slowing,
even in industry. According to the Plan, 74,000 more workers should have been
employed in 1961, but only 56,000 were hired, while registered unemployment
shows a rapid upward trend:
Unemployment (in 000)
|
1958 |
132,0 |
|
1959 |
161,6 |
|
1960 |
159,2 |
|
1961 |
191,3 |
|
1962
(enero-febrero) |
281,3 (en 1961
enero-febrero 240,5) |
Regarding foreign
trade, the situation worsened compared to last year:
Exports and imports
(in
billions of dinars)
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Exportación |
51,3 |
53,1 |
|
Importación |
79,2 |
87,9 |
|
Déficit |
27,9 |
34,8 |
Regarding agricultural production, no increase is expected compared to
1961, according to Todorovic's forecast.
IV
"We have frequently pointed out the excessive investments, the
phenomenon where everyone builds what they want and how they want. Now we are
paying the consequences. Many companies will have to close," Tito declared
in Split on May 6th.
While in recent years there has been stagnation and even a decrease in
production in all sectors, the rate of investment has not increased:
Investment (indices in current prices)
1961/1962 = 121
1960/1961 = 112
The relative decrease in investment in 1962 is an unavoidable consequence
of the low production in 1961 and the increase in the foreign trade deficit.
This decline will undoubtedly continue in the coming years until the essential
balance is established between the production, consumption, and balance of
payments sectors. Due to excessive investment, a stockpile of industrial and
consumer goods has accumulated in recent years. The domestic market cannot
absorb these stockpiles precisely because of insufficient purchasing funds.
Companies cannot sell their products below cost. The only way to lower prices
is to reduce taxes on consumer goods.
It is logical that such a reduction would automatically limit investment
resources and other state needs. As for the foreign market, it is even more
difficult to place industrial goods there due to strong competition and various
integration movements.
"Garlic costs more than gold today," Tito declared in his
speech in Split. The accumulation of industrial and consumer goods is partly
due to the rise in agricultural prices.
Consumer Goods Price Index
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Productos
agrícolas |
100 |
123 |
|
Artículos ind.
de consumo |
100 |
106 |
|
Servicios |
100 |
110 |
Since food items still represent 45-50% of the consumption structure,
it's worth noting that the price increase of agricultural products
significantly reduces the consumption of industrial products, whose demand is
more elastic. Hence the reduction in overall consumption, which in turn affects
both agricultural and industrial production, thus
perpetuating the classic vicious cycle of depression. While investment, as we
have seen, increased, consumption declined, and consequently, real wages fell:
Nominal and real wages in industry and mining (indices)
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Salarios
nominales |
100 |
111 |
|
Salarios reales
|
100 |
98 |
DOCUMENTS
Memorandum
Latin American Croatian Institute of Culture
On the Policy of National Oppression and
Colonial Exploitation in Communist Yugoslavia, on the Occasion of the Speech
Delivered in Toronto on November 22, 1961, by the Prime Minister of Canada,
H.E. John G. Diefenbaker, to Ethnic Groups
In his speech, delivered on November 22, 1961,
in Toronto to ethnic groups, Canadian Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker
announced that Canada intended to place the problem of Soviet imperialism and
colonialism on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly during its
regular sessions this year. On this occasion, the Latin American Croatian
Institute of Culture, based in Buenos Aires, prepared this Memorandum, which
was delivered to H.E. the Canadian Prime Minister by representatives of the
Canadian Croatian Federation.
Mr. Prime Minister:
All that H.E. The points made in his
now-famous speech on Russian-Soviet imperialism and colonialism can be fully
applied to the situation prevailing in Yugoslavia, which, due to its structure
and Serbia's dominance over most of the population, is, in fact, a small and
deteriorated version of the Soviet Union. This is a case of imperialism by a
small, relatively backward Balkan country, to the detriment of other, more
developed nations with a millennia-old Western cultural tradition.
The Soviet Union, His Excellency said in his
speech, dominates, subjugates, and exploits vast areas of Asia and the
Caucasus... employing them as a source of cheap raw materials, cheap labor, and
a captive market. The Soviet Union, by force of arms, has deprived highly
developed countries of their independence, driven tens of thousands of their
citizens into misery and death, exploited their resources, and ruthlessly
stifled any attempt by these peoples to maintain even a semblance of national
identity. Everything said above applies to the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia, in which, according to the official census, Serbia represents 26% of
the total population, dominates, subjugates, and economically exploits Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and areas inhabited by small national
minorities from neighboring countries.
The federal character of Yugoslavia is merely
theoretical, as in the USSR. The all-powerful Communist Party,
dominated and directed by its Serbian members in the Serbian capital, Belgrade,
which is also the capital of the entire Yugoslav federation, is in power.
Due to its constitution in 1918 and its
reestablishment in 1945, Yugoslavia is nothing more than an enlarged Serbia,
similar to the Soviet Union, in which the attributes of Tsarist Russia
predominate. Because of exceptional circumstances arising from the crisis of
the two world wars, as well as the protection and support of first Tsarist
Russia, then Soviet Russia, small Balkan Serbia managed to realize its
imperialist dream and impose its dominance over the other five "people's
republics": Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro.
It is no mere coincidence that in both world wars Russia protected Serbia, its
agent in the Danubian, Adriatic, and Balkan regions.
The First World War was partly motivated by
Serbia's subversive and expansionist actions, which culminated in the
assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, and his wife, perpetrated in 1914 in Sarajevo, the capital of the
Croatian province of Bosnia. The assassination, orchestrated to prevent the
consolidation of power in the southern part of the Danubian Monarchy, was
carried out by a young Serbian revolutionary, a socialist, and a supporter of
Serbian expansionism backed by Russia. Through Serbia, Russia aimed to
establish its dominance in the Balkans and control the trade routes between Europe
and Asia Minor. Both monarchist and communist Yugoslavia glorify
this assassination; the site of the murder bears his name, as indicated by a
commemorative plaque.
In the war sparked by this assassination,
Serbia was defeated. The king, his government, and part of the army fled
abroad, awaiting the Allied victory. Upon their return, they invaded Croatia
and other southern provinces of Austria-Hungary. Thus, Serbia, with the help of
the Allies, was able to annex these regions, feigning the "liberation"
and "unification" of the "South Slavic" peoples, assuming
the role of Piedmont. Tsarist Russia planned to create Greater Serbia, but when
the Bolshevik Revolution broke out, Serbia, needing the support of the Western
Allies, accepted the formula of "national union," calculating that it
would undermine the principle of national self-determination championed by
President Wilson, which it did.
The Second World War caused such a crisis in
Europe that Serbia, through the active intervention of the Soviet Union, managed
to retain the territorial status established in the 1919 peace treaties. The
coup d'état of March 27, 1941, carried out by a group of Serbian military
officers, aimed to secure Serbian hegemony over Croatia, which, on the eve of
the Second World War, had obtained limited autonomy over a small territory.
This coup, also influenced by the Kremlin and cheered on by the communists in
Belgrade, prompted the Axis powers' aggression against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav
army, under the almost exclusive command of Serbian officers, disintegrated in
a few days without offering any noteworthy resistance. Likewise, the
Serbian-Yugoslav state collapsed and disintegrated, which was inevitable since
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not a national state but a multinational one,
dominated by Serbia so brutally that most of its subjects felt like true
prisoners.
King Peter Karageorgevic and his government,
this time without the army, fled. Serbia was occupied by the German army. The
border areas of Serbia, inhabited by national minorities, were annexed to
Romania, Albania, and Hungary, respectively. The Croats established their own national state,
which was dissolved in 1918 and incorporated as a province into the Yugoslav
state.
The Serbian nationalist Chetnik guerrillas under Draza Mihailovic, who were presented as fighting against the German-Italian
occupation, actually fought against the Croats and even against Serbs who
opposed the restoration of a militaristic dictatorship, promoted by the exiled
government. This is irrefutably proven by Allied documents, such as Foreign
Office note F 2538/2G, dated March 23, 1943, signed by Prime Minister Winston
Churchill in the absence of Sir Anthony Eden. "This note, addressed to the
president of the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, protests against the
policies of General Draza Mihailovic, leader of the Chetnik guerrillas and
Minister of War in the government-in-exile. The note expressly states that
Mihailovic 'does not hesitate to declare publicly (in the presence of members
of the British military delegation) that his enemies are not Germans or
Italians, invaders of his country, but his fellow Yugoslav citizens...
partisans, Ustaše, Muslims, and Croats.'"
The Yugoslav Communist Party organized its guerrilla forces after the
Third Reich's attack on Russia with the primary goal of seizing power after the
war. To this end, the communists also exploited the Serbian nationalist masses,
promising them the restoration of Yugoslavia, that is, Greater Serbia, with the
help of Soviet Russia. The Serbs consider Russia their traditional protector.
Thus, the Serbian communists, like the Russians before them, abandoned their
previous program regarding The dismemberment of
Yugoslavia or Russia, respectively, stemmed from the realization that it would
be easier for them to seize power by relying on Serbian or Russian expansionist
imperialism.
The communist guerrillas benefited when the Western Allies withdrew
their support for the government of King Peter Karageorgevic due to his
pan-Serbian chauvinism. By the end of 1945, the Red Army had advanced as far as
Belgrade, where it installed a communist government that gradually occupied
Croatia and Slovenia, taking advantage of the Allied victory. Thus, under
Soviet protection, a new Serbian colonialism, this time with a communist bent,
was established.
Servia, finding itself on the side of the Allies in both world wars due
to a confluence of circumstances, managed to create and then restore Yugoslavia
as its colonial domain. Yugoslavia was presented as a nation-state, when in
fact it was Serbia's empire; as a nation that, after centuries of effort, had
achieved its mission, even though it involved forced unification with flagrant
violations of national principles and the right to self-determination. Self-determination.
While the communists recognized the multinational character of
Yugoslavia, they continued to incorporate foreign territories into Yugoslavia,
such as Macedonia, a territory claimed by Bulgaria and which is by no means
Serbian. In Kosmet, an autonomous territory within the "People's Republic
of Serbia," nearly a million Albanians live in densely populated areas
contiguous with Albania, and according to national principles, they should be
integrated into their homeland. In the "autonomous province" of
Vojvodina, also within the People's Republic of Serbia, several hundred
thousand Hungarians live along the Hungarian border. Nearly half a million
Germans from the same province were exterminated or expelled.
The communists theoretically uphold the principle of national
self-determination, but in practice maintain a forced unity between Serbia on
one side, and Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia on the other, even though these
are distinct ethnic groups with different political, cultural, and religious
traditions. Croatia and Slovenia are Central European countries due to their
historical, cultural, and political development, as well as their economic
importance, while Serbia is entirely Balkan. Croatia, a kingdom since the early
Middle Ages, maintained its own deeply rooted
political traditions for 1200 years, until 1918, while Serbia's political
development was very different.
To justify Serbia's dominance over Croatia and Slovenia in monarchical
Yugoslavia, it was argued that these were, in reality, three ethnic groups so
closely related that they constituted a single people with three names. Today,
five nationalities are officially recognized in Yugoslavia: Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins.
Now they try to justify the forced union by resorting to the well-known
Soviet theories of "brotherhood and unity," socialist theories, and
by emphasizing the Slavic linguistic group's shared identity with a mixture of
racism and interpreting Slavism in terms of irreconcilable antagonism toward
the peoples of Western Europe, particularly their neighboring peoples: Italian,
Hungarian, and German.
It is true, however, that the basic conditions indispensable for a state
community among Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs do not exist, since while Croatia and
Slovenia belong to the sphere of Western culture, Serbia developed within the
Byzantine-Russian cultural tradition. Therefore, the English historian A. J.
Toynbee, analyzing the creation of the Yugoslav conglomerate in 1918, rightly
wrote in his great work "A Study of History" that "the fusion of
the population, hitherto nurtured by two different civilizations... constitutes
a daring experiment in political alchemy."
The dividing line between Western and Eastern European civilization,
according to the same author, runs from Finland in the north to Croatia in the
south, coinciding with the Serbian-Croatian border, the boundary between the
Western and Eastern Christian worlds, and was already drawn in 396 by the Roman
Emperor Theodosius as the boundary between the Western and Eastern Roman
Empires.
Until 1918, Croatia and Serbia, although contiguous
and neighbouring countries, were never united within a single state. During the Migration Period, the Croats settled in the area between the
Danube and the Adriatic, where they were formed and developed within the
society we now call the world of Western civilization and culture. They
assimilated its distinctive features and contributed to its enrichment and
defense. They received Christianity via Rome. Their sociopolitical structure
resembled that established by Charlemagne in his empire, whose sovereignty
Croatia recognized, becoming an independent kingdom in the 9th century under
the rule of a national dynasty. Western-style feudalism was gradually
implemented in Croatia, and the free cities also flourished. Romanesque,
Gothic, Renaissance, and Baroque architectural styles also flourished in
Croatia.
The Croats contributed to European culture with a number of Renaissance
humanists, sculptors, and painters, who worked both in Croatia and in the major
European centers. In Croatia, both the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic
Counter-Reformation manifested themselves. Shortly after the invention of the
printing press, books were printed in the national language and in Latin, then
the language of the educated classes. In the multinational Danubian monarchy,
political leaders communicated in Latin, and in Croatia, until 1848, Latin was
spoken in the Diet of the Estates (Sabor). At the same time, since the early Middle Ages, the Old Croatian language (Old Slavic) has been
used in the Roman liturgy on the Croatian coast by special privilege of the
Holy See.
With the extinction of the national dynasty that ruled between the 9th
and 11th centuries, Croatia entered into a Personal Union with Hungary. Then,
faced with the growing threat of the Ottoman Empire, the Croats, seeking the
support of Western Europe, elected Ferdinand of Habsburg, Archduke of Austria,
King of Bohemia and later of Hungary, brother of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor
and King of Spain, as their king in 1527. Within this defensive community of
the Danubian peoples, Croatia remained until the end of the First World War.
Croatia's political status within the Danubian community was defined by
the words of Ban Count Tomáš Erdedi (who ruled from 1583-95): "Regnum
regni no prescriptit leges" (Reign of kings does not prescribe laws). This
was the response to the imposition of Hungarian laws on Croatia, which was
governed by the bans (viceroys) as heads of the executive branch and the army,
while laws were promulgated by the Sabor, a system dating back to the Middle
Ages. Even during the Austro-Hungarian dualist rule (1867-1918), Croatia,
Slavonia, and Dalmatia were an associated kingdom with full sovereignty in internal
affairs and justice, and limited sovereignty in matters shared with Hungary and
Austria.
In Bosnia, a Croatian province by virtue of its location, history, and
ethnic composition, even while part of the Ottoman Empire (1463-1878), its
Islamic nobility was the only territorial nobility within the Empire, wielding
considerable political influence in the Sublime Porte, so much so that Croatian
was one of the diplomatic languages in Constantinople.
In modern times, Croatia experienced constant economic and industrial
progress. Thanks to its favorable geographical location in the Danubian and
Adriatic region, it gravitated economically primarily toward Central Europe.
Even before the First World War, Croatia had established a solid foundation for
agriculture, forestry, mining, land, river, and sea transport, trade, tourism,
industry, and banking.
The historical, political, and social process in Serbia was entirely
different. The Serbs fell under the influence of the Byzantine Empire after
settling in the heart of the Balkans. Under the impact of the Ottoman Turkish
invasion, both Byzantium and Serbia were soon absorbed by the Ottoman Empire.
For five long centuries, the political and social status of the Serbs was that
of the rayah (a term referring to a specific region or territory). Only during
the decline of the Ottoman Empire, in the mid-19th century, did Serbia achieve
independence, and in 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, it was recognized as an
independent kingdom.
During the Turkish occupation, the only Serbs who could read and write
were the monks, who preserved the traditions of the Serbian state and national
church modeled on the Byzantine system. This tradition, reinforced by the
influence of Tsarist Russia, characterizes the modern Serbian state. Russia
exerted a powerful influence as the presumed heir to the Byzantine Empire, as
the largest Orthodox nation, and as the center of Pan-Islamism in its Russian
form. Therefore, modern Serbia is not a Western-style nation-state. Its basic
institutions are autocratic power and the national church, identified with the
nation. Hence the insurmountable difficulties in consolidating the new state, formed in 1918, which was only possible with the
granting of democratic freedoms, national equality, and religious tolerance—all
unknown in Serbia and demanded by Croatia and Slovenia.
The role of modern Serbia in European history, faithful to these deeply
rooted traditions, was that of an exponent of Russian imperialism in the
Balkans. Popular sentiment remained unchanged even after the fall of Tsarist
Russia and the subsequent reliance on Western democracies for support. Serbia's
nationalist newspaper, "Balkan" (Belgrade, July 26, 1922), defined
its solidarity with Russia: "Whether Tsarist or Bolshevik, Russia is 'Holy
Russia' for the Serbian people, our Slavic mother. Can a single Serb raise a
hand against a Russian soldier?"
Modern Serbia, despite its imperialist ambitions, was a poorly managed
country, lacking a stable economy, characterized by patriarchal social
relations, and without properly developed social structures. This can be
attributed to Serbia's isolated location in the heart of the Balkans, as well
as its centuries-long dependence on Turkish rule. On the other hand, Serbia's
geographical position favored its expansionism, which claimed Macedonia as its
victim in 1912, and later, in 1918 and 1945, more advanced nations such as
Croatia and Slovenia. This petty imperialism took on the character of a hateful
domination and brutal economic exploitation by a relatively backward country
over more developed nations.
The new South Slavic state, "that audacious experiment in political
alchemy," was bound to produce sinister results. The linguistic similarity
between Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes could not erase their differing
mentalities, much like the differences between Russia and Poland. The name of
the new state created in 1918 was: "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes," declaring that Montenegrins and Macedonians were Serbs. The new
state was, in reality, an enlarged Serbia, and Serbs still feel and perceive it
as such today. The Serbian army entered Croatia at the end of the First World
War as a victor, considering it its spoils of war, although it was claimed
then, as in 1945, that it was a matter of "liberation."
The Serbs, like the Russians, when they impose their domination, claim
it is a matter of "liberation." Days after the Act of
"union," the Serbian army murdered Croatian youth in Zagreb, who were protesting against the liquidation of Croatia's millennia-old
sovereignty. The first task of the new government was to abolish the
centuries-old Croatian political institutions, namely the ban and the
parliament, by implementing a policy of Balkan terror. Political freedoms were
not respected.
Nor was human dignity respected. Instead of the exemplary administration
of the Austro-Hungarian era, corruption, incompetence, and the ignorance of the
new, semi-literate officials prevailed. The press, the right to assembly,
discussion, and association were all subject to their control. Croatian
schoolchildren were forced to study Serbian national history and the
Serbian-Russian alphabet, known as Cyrillic. They were taught that Croats were
not a people in a political or ethnic sense, while Croatian history was falsified.
There was religious discrimination in favor of Orthodox proselytism, while the
Catholic Church was considered an anti-national institution and Islam the
harmful remnant of Turkish rule.
Economic measures that amounted to plunder were implemented. The
agrarian reform consisted of dispossessing the Croatian landowners—for there
were very few large landowners—of their lands, which were then given to Serbs
from Serbia. With these new settlers, the Serbian minority in Croatia
increased, while in Bosnia, the old Islamic nobility was literally dispossessed
of their ancestral holdings, which passed into the hands of the Serbian
Orthodox population. The monetary change—the Serbian dinar was established in
place of the koruna, at a rate of four korunas to one dinar—was implemented in
such a way that Croatia and Slovenia were left without
capital. Taxes in Croatia and Slovenia were four times higher than in Serbia.
They had to contribute to the payment of Serbia's war debts, while German war
reparations benefited Serbia exclusively. Most of the national revenue was
invested in Serbia. Belgrade, until then a backward Balkan town, was rapidly
becoming a modern metropolis.
King Alexander, of the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty, established his
autocratic system supported by an army in which there were no Croatian senior
officers. (In Austria-Hungary, there were more than 80 Croatian generals and
admirals.) The pseudo-democratic and centralist constitution of 1922 was
promulgated based on fraudulent and biased elections. In many provinces, the
deputies were appointed by the government. The constitution was proclaimed by a
simple majority and in the absence of the Croatian deputies. The Croatian
Republican Peasant Party, the majority party in Croatia, and other Croatian democratic
politicians fought for a Croatian Republic, always resorting to democratic and
peaceful means. Radic, leader of the Croatian Peasant Republican Party, was
imprisoned several times. Although his struggle found understanding and
sympathy in international public opinion, he was advised in Paris and London to
take the fight to the Belgrade parliament, as there was no possibility of
revising the peace treaties.
Radic, head of the opposition to Serbian centralism, domination, and
economic exploitation, supported even by representatives of the Serbian
minority in Croatia, was shot on June 20, 1928, during a parliamentary session
by a pro-government deputy, a friend of the king. Two Croatian deputies were
killed instantly and three were seriously wounded, among them Esteban Radic,
who succumbed to his injuries shortly afterward.
This treacherous crime shocked the civilized world. Public opinion
pointed to the Serbian dynasty as complicit. Instead of granting Croatia, as
expected, democratic freedoms and autonomy in the form of a federation, King
Alexander repealed the constitution, banned political parties, and established
a rigid personal dictatorship. It was decreed that Croatian nationality did not
exist, not only in the political but also the ethnic sense; even Croatian
national symbols—the flag, coat of arms, and anthem—were abolished. The system
became an autocratic tyranny, accompanied by brutal police measures, the
imprisonment and internment of prominent politicians, torture, and murder
without trial or due process.
In response to the assassination of prominent Croatian cultural and
scientific figures in broad daylight, the International League for Human Rights
raised its voice in protest. Among others, Albert Einstein and Heinrich Mann
called for "all those who value freedom and human rights to raise their
strongest protest against the reigning terror in Croatia. All nations where
branches of the International League for Human Rights exist must offer
protection to this small but enlightened and peaceful people."
Among the many protests, we will cite the manifesto published in
"The Manchester Guardian" on December 24, 1929, and signed by
Englishmen familiar with and sympathetic to Yugoslavia, whose list is as
follows: James Berry, Edward Boyle, Roland Bryce, Victor Cazalet, Cushendun,
Arthur Evans, H. A. L. Fisher, G. P. Gooch, Ellinor F. C. Grogan, Harry Lamb,
Gilbert Murray, H. W. Nevinson, Noel-Buxton, Ben Riley, R. W. Seton Watson,
Wickham Steed, and Gertrude F. Wilde. The signatories pointed out, first and
foremost, "the difficulties arising from history."
"Our brave Serbian allies," they continued, "were raised
in a more primitive world. Their religion was the 'Orthodox' faith." But
the traditions of the Adriatic and Transdanubian provinces are linked, to a
great extent, to European civilization due to contacts with the Venetian,
Austrian, and Hungarian regimes. Their religion is, to a large degree,
Catholicism.
The situation between these two groups worsened because many members of
the second group actually fought against the Allies, having been compelled to
seek relief from Austria due to the secret London pact that ceded a large
swathe of their homeland to Italy.
"Belgrade's military dominance was in itself a temptation that
encouraged its use to impose premature centralization. Examples of the means
adapted to this end include not only the almost exclusive allocation of
administrative posts, even in the smallest localities, to agents of the central
government, but also the falsification of election results in entire provinces,
thus dividing the country once again into artificial territorial units,
disregarding traditional historical borders, especially in the cases of Bosnia
and Montenegro. It is as if, immediately after the union of the English and
Scottish crowns, a government in London had separated the Lothians from
Scotland and incorporated them into Northumberland."
"The press is muzzled. Official espionage is rampant. Police
methods have reached the point where, as a consequence of a series of
assassinations or attempted assassinations, whose victims were prominent
leaders of opposition parties, the belief has prevailed throughout most of the
country—rightly or wrongly, and it is necessarily difficult to verify its
basis—that the guardians of public order were in league with the murderers.
The signatories of this declaration, having recently returned from the
western provinces of Yugoslavia where they undertook separate, extensive
journeys, can attest to the fact that the despair and resentment provoked by
the dictatorship are shared by all segments of the population. One of us has
received personal assurances from the Muslim leaders of Bosnia, who consider
the current situation intolerable and who are in complete agreement with their
Croat neighbors." "And what is of particular interest is that this
attitude of inflexible opposition is also shared by the Serbs of the former
Hungarian Banat north of the Danube... and in the districts of Lika, the old
military district."
"Unfortunately, as far as we could ascertain, the government in
Belgrade cannot be counted on to offer any remedy to this state of affairs.
"Given the persistent and virtually unanimous opposition of the
western provinces of Yugoslavia to the Belgrade dictatorship, we find ourselves
in such a situation that, if allowed to continue, it will inevitably constitute
a constant temptation for neighboring governments hostile to the unity of the
South Slavs, which is a permanent danger to the peace of Europe. The
circumstances require a thorough review of the entire constitution of the new
state." If an "absolute" dislocation is to be avoided, it will
be necessary to establish, in one form or another, a federation "that
guarantees the broadest possible provincial autonomy" to its various constituent
elements.
The signatories of this manifesto, which we have quoted at length
because they were friends of Yugoslavia, conclude by appealing to Her Britannic
Majesty's Government to, in conjunction with the French government and in
agreement with the governments of Prague and Bucharest, exert appropriate
pressure on Belgrade and, if necessary, withhold any further financial
assistance from the Yugoslav government.
All these warnings proved fruitless, and this was inevitable, since many
Western friends and sympathizers of Yugoslavia failed to understand that
Serbia, due to its autocratic tradition, its Caesaropapist conception of the
state, and its imperialist ambitions, cannot coexist in a free community of
South Slavic nations, and that the Yugoslavia desired by Serbian chauvinists
can only exist under a dictatorial regime.
When the war spread to the Balkans in 1941, the oppressed peoples could
neither defend nor defend Yugoslavia, which, de facto, was their national
prison. The Croats established their own state, confident that, once
hostilities ended, they could count, according to the letter and spirit of the
Atlantic Charter, on the support of the Allies to consolidate and organize it
democratically, respecting the right to self-determination.
Even during the war, public opinion in democratic countries clearly saw
that the main cause of Yugoslavia's total military and political collapse was
Great Serbian imperialism. The Allied governments ceased their support for the
governments of King Peter and their representative in the country, General
Draža Mihailović, leader of the Serbian nationalist Chetnik guerrillas. It
is only regrettable that, under pressure from the Soviet Union, the Allies
provided substantial support to Tito's communist guerrillas, who skillfully
concealed their true intentions and character, presenting themselves as
democrats and opponents of the policy of national oppression in Yugoslavia,
which they described as a "prison of peoples," and pretending to
recognize the right of all its constituent nations to secession. The Croats,
directly affected, saw that this was merely propaganda camouflage and, with
enormous sacrifice in lives and property, opposed the communist designs to
impose a dictatorship and domination even more brutal than before, until the
very last moment.
Therefore, what H.E. He aptly observed regarding the Soviet Union:
"While the new Bolshevik government of Russia in 1919 declared that
each part of the former Russian Empire could go its own way, the Red Army
trampled on the newly won independence of Ukraine. The same can be said of
Transcaucasus and Central Asia.
"Soviet representatives will tell us that the people of these
subjugated countries invited the Soviet army to invade them, since what they
most desired was to be part of the Soviet Union.
Is there any sovereign state in the world—independent, democratic,
economically vigorous, and enjoying a high standard of living—that would
willingly invite its powerful neighbor to occupy it militarily and subjugate it
politically? Would such subjugation be welcomed if that neighbor had the lowest
standard of living, lacked democratic institutions, and was under a
dictatorship?" "No free country would desire such invasion and
subjugation. The peoples of Ukraine, the Baltic states,
and other countries of Eastern Europe, Transcaucasus, and Central Asia did not
extend this invitation. It was imposed upon them. They never had the
opportunity to choose freedom. The USSR continues to deprive them of the very
right it proclaims for all peoples."
Like the Soviets, the Yugoslav communist leaders enshrined in the 1946
constitution—a faithful copy of Stalin's 1936 constitution—the right of each
Yugoslav people to secession. However, in practice, this is impossible, just as
it was in the Soviet Union. Anyone who invoked this paragraph of the
constitution was considered a traitor. Given the obvious contradiction between
the right recognized by the constitution and the reality in a heterogeneous,
multinational country with diverse cultural and religious backgrounds, the
right was subsequently repealed. Thus, the peoples of Yugoslavia are deprived,
even formally, of this fundamental right, recognized in the Atlantic Charter
and by the United Nations. Lately, centralism has intensified, and a constitutional
reform is being considered to revive the theory of dictator
Alexander I, according to which Croatian and Slovenian nations do not exist.
Just as in the Soviet Union, in Yugoslavia the theory persists that the
Croats invited Serbia to "liberate" them, a claim that is completely
unfounded in both monarchical and communist Yugoslavia.
Croatia, an associated kingdom with sovereign attributes until 1918,
sought independence from Austria-Hungary, and the Croatian Parliament
promulgated national independence on November 29, 1918. This was recognized by
Serbia until December 1, 1918, when the Regent of the Serbian throne proclaimed
the "union" of Croatia with Serbia. This act was not sanctioned by
either the Parliament or the Croatian people, who in subsequent elections voted
overwhelmingly for a Croatian republic.
The few Croatian politicians who believed that a Serbian-Croatian state
community would be mutually beneficial were soon disappointed to see that the
Serbs did not respect previous agreements and pursued a hegemonic policy, and
subsequently went into opposition. Thus, the Croatian politician Dr. Ante
Trumbic, former president of the "Yugoslav Committee" in London and
first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, declared to a French publicist
during the monarchical dictatorship: "The The "Yugoslav" union
never existed and never will. Serbia exists; it has occupied Croatia, Slovenia,
Banat, Montenegro, etc., and is simply trying to transform them into Serbian
provinces, mere and ordinary colonies in order to "exploit" them. The
term Yugoslavia represents nothing but suffering, persecution, and moral and
intellectual ruin."
Svetozar Pribicevic, leader of the Serbian minority in Croatia and one
of the principal architects of Yugoslavia, a proponent of centralism and
unitarianism, concluded that freedom and democracy were impossible in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He demanded the establishment of a republican regime
and, if necessary, the separation of Croatia. In his opinion, the Serbian
minority in Croatia would live better and with greater freedom in an
independent Croatia than they did now that Croatia was under Serbian
domination. (Ivan Mestrovic: "Memories of Men and
Political Events," Buenos Aires 1961, pp. 233-34.)
The Croatian Republican Peasant Party, which between the two world wars
garnered almost all Croatian votes in elections, issued a significant
declaration on March 8, 1919, protesting against foreign tyranny in Croatia and
challenging the legitimacy of the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes" under the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty, arguing that this state
had been established without the consent of the Croatian parliament and people.
Similarly, a memorandum endorsed by 180,000 signatories was presented to the
Paris Peace Conference demanding the application of the right to
self-determination in Croatia, whose aspiration was to become a pacifist and
neutral republic.
Violating the express will of the Croatian people, who had fought
heroically during the last war to preserve their nation-state, Yugoslavia was
restored in 1945 under communist leadership and with the direct support of the
Red Army. The Metropolitan of Croatia, Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, declared on
October 3, 1946, during the trial brought against him by the communists:
"that the Croatian people had expressed themselves in a plebiscite in
favor of a Croatian state and that the right of the Croatian people to freedom
and independence was entirely in accordance with the principles of the Allies
as set forth at Yalta and in the Atlantic Charter. If, according to these
principles, all peoples have the right to independence, why deny it to the
Croatian people?"
In view of the Croatian people's firm resolve against the restoration of
Yugoslavia, President Franklin D. Roosevelt repeatedly argued in his
deliberations with Sir Anthony Eden in 1943: "that the Croats and Serbs
have nothing in common and that it is ridiculous to force two such antagonistic
peoples to live under a joint government." (E. Sherwood: Roosevelt and
Hopkins, An Intimate History, vol. 1, p. 318. Banton Books, New York). The Soviet leaders described the
military occupation, political subjugation, and colonial exploitation of so
many peoples as "liberation." The Yugoslav communist leaders used
identical terms, although they acknowledged that the Croatians put up a
tenacious resistance and that in Sriem alone, in a small border area between
Croatia and Serbia, more than 100,000 soldiers fell in these struggles within a
few months.
Before the end of hostilities, some 200,000 Croatian soldiers retreated
to the Austrian border, where, disarmed by the British, they were handed over
to the Yugoslav communist authorities, with assurances that they would be
treated according to international conventions. However, the communists
committed a crime unparalleled in history, a true genocide, perpetrating the
mass killing of these prisoners of war and even of the civilian population.
Furthermore, the communists exterminated hundreds of thousands of Croats during
the guerrilla war, and once in power, countless others passed through their
concentration camps and prisons.
The unwavering will of the Croatian people to be independent is also
evidenced by numerous Croatian anti-communist political exiles. Among the tens
of thousands of refugees were politicians and military personnel,
intellectuals, professionals, priests, industrialists, merchants, artisans,
laborers, and peasants. All preferred to live free abroad than as slaves in
their captive homeland. Lately, beginning in 1947, new waves of refugees
escaped from Yugoslavia, to such an extent that, with the exception of East
Germany, Yugoslavia was the country from which the largest number of
anti-communist refugees in Europe originated.
It is worth noting that many Serbian patriots opposed a forced state
union between Croatia and Serbia, as they believed that the violent conflict
between the two nationalisms would benefit the communists and ultimately harm
Serbia.
As for the Croatian communists, their role is comparable to that of the
communists in Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, and other countries of the Soviet
Union who meekly accepted Russian rule. Due to their small numbers and without
the support of the Serbian communists, they would never have come to power in
Croatia. They did not fight for the independence of their homeland and behaved
like true quislings by not demanding that Croatia be, at the very least, a
separate state, even if a satellite state like
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and tiny Albania. The few among them who raised their voices in favor of a Croatian state,
albeit with a communist regime and ideology, were silenced and exterminated,
like Andrija Hebrang, former general secretary of the Communist Party in
Croatia.
To the national oppression of Croatia and Slovenia within Yugoslavia, it
is necessary to add their economic exploitation as if they were colonies.
Applying Marxist theory on economic equality, the Yugoslav communist leaders
are attempting, at an accelerated pace, to bring the economic level of Croatia
and Slovenia, the industrialized and advanced "people's republics,"
in line with that of the remaining backward and underdeveloped republics. To
this end, unproductive industries are being built in Serbia and Montenegro with
funds extracted from Croatian and Slovenian workers, whose productivity is far
higher. Such colonial exploitation provokes opposition even within the ranks of
the communist leaders themselves in Slovenia and Croatia. This opposition to
the central government's investment policy is labeled as chauvinistic,
nationalistic, localist, and particularistic behavior on the part of the
Croatian and Slovenian communists.
To avoid elaborating further on arguments and evidence, we believe, Mr.
Prime Minister. His conclusion regarding Soviet colonialism extends to
Yugoslavia as well:
"Is the Soviet Union the only remaining colonial power in the
world? Why should the Soviet empire be more sacrosanct than any other?
Different standards neither apply nor should apply to the Soviet imperialists.
There should be no double standards at the United Nations.
"The United Nations Declaration makes no distinction as to the
color or race of the people subjected to foreign domination and exploitation.
It uses the inclusive word 'all' in its preamble, stating that all peoples have
the inalienable right to their complete freedom, the exercise of their
sovereignty, and the integrity of their national territory."
Nor does Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, have the
right to be an exception in the concert of nations, since it adhered to the
principle that all peoples have the right to be free. Furthermore, the Yugoslav
communist leaders seized every opportunity to advocate for the independence and
decolonization of Afro-Asian peoples, attempting to impose themselves as their
mentors. They cannot deny that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a
multinational state, a reduced and deteriorated version of the Soviet Union.
They must, therefore, recognize the right to self-determination of the peoples
that comprise it, since, as a member of the UN, Yugoslavia committed itself to
respecting the two main foundations of its constitution:
(1) The principle of
equal rights to self-determination of peoples (Art. 1, para. 2).
(2) Respect for human rights and freedoms without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Art. 1, para. 3).
Yugoslavia insistently demands that the Western colonial powers respect these
principles, yet it does not. Ruled by a totalitarian regime, it violates and
infringes upon fundamental human rights and freedoms, and as a multinational
state, created and maintained by force, it violates the primary and fundamental
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
The principles contained in the Charter of the United
Nations are legal principles, and member nations must respect them as if they
were international law, ensuring their effective application throughout the
world.
The Croatian people expect the United Nations to apply
these principles and to assist in achieving Croatia's independence. Of course,
this would mean the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, which, incidentally, would
benefit the Western world. The Croatian people want to live under a democratic
regime and integrate into Western Europe. The consolidation of relations in the
Adriatic-Danubian region, with the freedom of all peoples, would contribute to
world peace. For over a thousand years, Croatia has legitimately possessed the
eastern coast of the Adriatic.
Croatia and Slovenia border Italy, Austria, and Hungary,
so with the re-establishment of the Croatian state, this entire region would be
reintegrated into the Western bloc. As long as Yugoslavia remains under Serbian
domination, there is a potential danger that it will become a linchpin of
Russian imperialism. By virtue of their tradition, culture, and religion, the
Croatian and Slovenian peoples are an integral part of the West, and in any
emergency that threatens Western interests, their position is already fixed and
defined.
From all of the above, it follows that the United
Nations' measures against Russian-Soviet colonialism must also extend to
Serbian-Yugoslav imperialism and colonialism. Both violate the fundamental
principles of the United Nations and, as such, pose a danger to world peace and
the freedom of all peoples without discrimination, including the Russian and
Serbian peoples.
CHRONICLES AND COMMENTS
"Declaration of Principles" of the Congress of Croatian Exiles
in New York
From August 29 to September 2 of this year,
the Congress of delegates from numerous associations and institutions of
Croatian exiles from the United States, Canada, Europe, Latin America, and
Australia was held at the Commodore Hotel in New York. The Congress, chaired by
Dr. Ibrahim Bey Dzinic, was convened with the purpose of forming an
organization of all Croatian exiles to assist and represent before the free
world the struggle of the oppressed Croatian people for liberation from
communist tyranny and for the restoration of the Croatian state.
The participants of the Congress examined the
current situation of the Croatian people and Croatian exiles. An executive
committee was elected to act in accordance with the Declaration of Principles
and to strive to ensure that delegates from those organizations and groups not
represented at this Congress are present, thereby potentially forming a unified
body of all Croatian exiles and emigrants. At the Congress, several resolutions
were adopted, along with the Declaration of Principles, which serves as a
platform to unite all Croatian groups, associations, and institutions in exile
around shared objectives.
The preface to the Declaration, which we
summarize below, states that in communist Yugoslavia the Croatian people have
no possibility of freely expressing their will. Therefore, it is necessary for
Croatian exiles to make the truth about the situation in Croatia and the
aspirations of the Croatian people known to the free world.
The first point of the Declaration states that
the Croatian people exist as a distinct ethnic unit with their own national
consciousness and that, by virtue of their millennia-long state
continuity—interrupted only in 1918—they have the right, according to the
principle of national self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations, to demand and re-establish their nation-state in their historical
territory, inhabited by the ethnic Croatian majority.
The second point states: "In the
re-established Croatian state, all fundamental human rights will be guaranteed.
All citizens, without distinction of origin, national sentiment, or religious
creed, will be completely equal." The third point states: "The
internal order of the re-established Croatian state will conform to the
principles of Western democracy." Croatia will be a state governed by the
rule of law, with a multi-party system, separation of powers, and equal rights
and duties for all citizens.
Regarding the economic system imposed by the
communists, point four specifies that in the re-established Croatian state, all
social classes will be guaranteed equal participation in the national income in
proportion to their contributions, so that everyone is guaranteed a standard of
living worthy of human dignity. The free economy must be "the main driving
force of economic progress and democracy."
Point five deals with the relations of the re-established State of
Croatia and European integration. "Croatia, due to its ideological,
political, and economic orientation towards Western Europe, should join the
community of free European states..." "Croatia's participation in the
European Common Market is perfectly aligned with Croatian national interests
and the general interests of a free Europe. The Congress considers that 'the
natural path to forming large political and economic communities' is through nation-states,"
emphasizing that "on these, as on all other fundamental issues, the final
decision will be made by the Croatian people through their freely elected
parliament (Sabor)."
The sixth and final point of the Declaration refers to the attitude of
exiles towards Croats who collaborate with the current Yugoslav communist
regime. It is emphasized that "no motive of revenge guides the exiles, nor
will it guide the Croatian people in the future, but rather love for freedom
and for the homeland"... "To those who, out of necessity, weakness,
or disorientation, collaborate directly or indirectly with the communist party
or regime, we say the following: the Croatian people will be very considerate
in condoning such collaboration on the condition that everyone loyally and
actively defends the vital interests of the Croatian people expressed in this
Declaration, according to the circumstances and capabilities of each
individual."
The Croatian-Latin American Institute of Culture, which sponsors this
journal, was represented at this Congress by its president, Dr. Milan
Blazekovic, who was elected to the executive committee.
Surprising Inconsistencies of an American Magazine
The American publication Reader's Digest, widely distributed throughout
the free world, is a publication with a clear and resolute anti-communist
stance, consistent with the policies of its country. The fact that Robert
Littell's report, originally published in Nouveau Candile of Paris (Reader's
Digest Selections, March 1962: "Success of the Yugoslav Schism," pp.
122-30), was published in a condensed form in that magazine, with its subtitle
already highlighting the "surprising prosperity" of communist
Yugoslavia, strikes us as a truly remarkable inconsistency. This fact deserves
special attention given our commitment to clarifying all aspects of so-called
Titoism, especially since this is not the first time that prestigious
anti-communist publications have featured reviews, notes, and commentaries
consistent with the intentions and suggestions of the Yugoslav communist
tyranny.
Reader's Digest's motives are understandable, but not acceptable. They
seek to satisfy the psychological need of Americans by finding moral
justification for aiding the communist regime in Belgrade after the 1948
Cominform resolution against the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Since
then, the Washington government, along with those of Paris and London, has
provided substantial economic, military, and political support to the Yugoslav
communist dictatorship. This policy of subsidies was termed "calculated
risk," and its aim was to gain certain advantages in the struggle against
another, more powerful and dangerous communist country: the Soviet Union.
However, when this political realism failed to yield the expected results, the
aid provided to a communist tyranny for years, which requires enormous material
resources and is morally detrimental to Western democracies, provoked harsh
criticism and censure from a public that does not understand this policy. To
counter these criticisms and censures, the Yugoslav dictatorship tends to be
portrayed as a kind of "Western-style communism," not as rigid or
abominable as Russian Bolshevik communism.
The inaccurate account of relations within Yugoslavia, published in the
aforementioned French weekly, was likely exacerbated by the fact—skillfully
exploited by the Yugoslav communist leaders—that deep-seated prejudices persist
in France in favor of Yugoslavia, or rather, of the enlarged Serbia, France's
small ally in the First World War. Perhaps due to this underlying bias, Littell
failed to see that pronounced national antagonisms existed within communist
Yugoslavia, manifesting themselves primarily in the
economic sphere, which he addresses.
But when avowedly anti-communist American circles so surprisingly
inconsistency praise the supposed prosperity of a communist country, we see a
repeat—if small matters are compared to great ones—of the incoherent policy
practiced during the war with the Soviet Union, when, within the framework of
wartime propaganda, the political and economic situation in Russia was
romanticized. It is well known that such a policy had unpleasant repercussions
on political developments in North America itself, when a disillusioned public
began to question who was to blame for the current state of affairs in a
divided world. We discuss the danger of illusions regarding Yugoslavia
elsewhere (see our editorial).
Here we will limit ourselves to subjecting to objective analysis the
assertions concerning communist Yugoslavia contained in the Reader's Digest
article, which attempt to convince public opinion: 1) that "Tito was
astute in breaking with the communist economy and with the USSR"; 2) that
"Western observers have watched with amazement this dynamic, fruitful type
of socialism" with attributes "of the free market," in which
initiative and creative drive come from the lowest rungs of the economic
ladder"; 3) that "this has earned it surprising prosperity... which
will continue to develop vigorously"; that for all these reasons it is
"unlikely that Yugoslavia will return to the Soviet bloc, at least while
Tito, who is 69 years old, remains alive...".
I
The first premise, that the differences between
Moscow and Belgrade were due to Tito's will and shrewdness, is simply not true,
a fact easily proven.
After the collapse of the Third Reich, the sole common goal of the
Soviets and their Western Allies, Stalin strove to organize a cohesive Soviet
bloc against his former allies. To achieve this, he had to impose the most
complete control possible over the satellite states, and adhering to the
principle that new policies require new executors, he proceeded with purges in
the respective communist parties.
Stalin was able to implement this policy without major difficulties in
the satellite states under Soviet occupation, but not in Yugoslavia, from which
the Red Army withdrew at the end of the war following the vigorous demands of
the Western democracies. The Soviets had invaded Yugoslav territory north of
the Danube, part of Serbia with its capital, Belgrade. There, they installed
Tito's communist government. They withdrew, convinced they had done enough to
communize the country and fearful that otherwise the Western Allies might land
on the Croatian Adriatic coast and thus prevent Soviet control over the
strategically vital Danubian-Adriatic region of Croatia and Slovenia.
This was happening at the same time that Churchill, defending the
imperial route to India, was using the British Navy's guns to clear Greece of
communist guerrillas. At that time, Tito and his group were staunch enemies of
this Western policy. Nevertheless, in 1948, precisely because of this Western
policy that prevented the Soviet occupation of Yugoslavia, they were able to
resist the formidable Stalin without needing any special political acumen,
defending their power and their lives. They were luckier, not more intelligent,
than the communist leaders of the occupied countries: Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, who lost their lives.
If a small, weak country like Albania, not occupied by the Soviets, is
currently opposing Khrushchev, how could a much more powerful country like
Yugoslavia not do the same?
Furthermore, it should be noted that Stalin did not exhaust all his
resources to eliminate Tito and his group. Perhaps he did not want to risk the
potential collapse of the communist regime in Yugoslavia, which in turn would
diminish the possibility of future control over the Balkans, the Danube basin,
the Adriatic, and land access to Italy via Slovenia from the Croatian province
of Istria. Stalin could have broken Finland's resistance in 1940, but he did
not. In Tito's case, he did not employ Russia's enormous power for specific
reasons.
Tito, in essence, is as much a communist as Stalin and Khrushchev.
Moreover, he is more a product of circumstance than a shrewd politician.
II
The premise that Tito has broken with "orthodox communist
economics" is erroneous, for the simple reason that, strictly speaking,
there is no economic doctrine of communism. There are only the theories of Karl
Marx, conceived during the Western industrial revolution, and subsequently
disproven by experience. Hence the need for experimentation by communist
leaders, who, faced with reality, often have to change course, so that their
vacillations sometimes lead to premature conclusions that the supposed
evolution of communism toward Western humanism is underway.
When Tito, expelled from the Soviet bloc, depended on aid from
capitalist countries, he began with economic experiments somewhat different
from those of the Soviets. In this respect, he was not original, since he acted
in the same way as the communists of other satellite states facing
insurmountable difficulties. As a committed communist, he continued to cling to
the fiction of a communist economic system that, from the perspective of
contemporary economic science, does not exist.
The only difference is that Tito could no longer, as he had until 1948,
blindly follow Soviet "orthodoxy" in every way, and was compelled to
experiment on his own. In doing so, he vehemently rejected any insinuations
that he had strayed from Leninist ideology and affirmed that he would never
accept Western aid at the price of ideological concessions. Moreover, he
maintained, and continues to maintain, that Yugoslav communism, not Russian
communism, faithfully interprets and implements communist theories, applied to
the specific situation in Yugoslavia.
Therefore, Khrushchev, during his visit to Belgrade in 1956, while
attempting to reconcile with the Yugoslav communists, was able to accept Tito's
thesis that socialism can be reached by different paths. With this, Khrushchev
effectively acknowledged that there is no single orthodox communist doctrine,
for if one existed, it would have to be singular and equally binding for all
communists. After this recognition by the leader of world communism, the
leaders of Red China, Yugoslavia, and even Albania could rightly maintain that
their specific path to socialism was the best, or at least as orthodox, as the
Soviet one.
Therefore, if one cannot speak of Tito's break with "orthodox
communist economics," it remains to be clarified whether the Yugoslav type
of communism, as some Western observers maintain, differs fundamentally from
the Russian one, and whether Tito is implementing this supposed Western type of
communism, which is somewhat akin to the traditional humanist ideals of
democratic countries.
Without overestimating the importance and significance of the Milovan
Djilas case, so prominent in the West, the official reactions against his
rather vague suggestions regarding the necessary evolution of Yugoslav
communism toward Western socialism prove that the Yugoslav communist leaders do
not wish to depart from their Soviet model, even though the reasons of
political opportunism, certainly considered by Djilas, would advise different
approaches.
This persistent approach of the Tito regime, in accordance with the
Russian form of Marxism, has its historical and scientific explanation.
Russia and Yugoslavia (in its capacity as an aggrandized Serbia) share
the same Byzantine cultural and political tradition. Autocracy and
Caesaropapism, Russia's Byzantine legacy, determined that Lenin would become
the contemporary father of totalitarianism; they also explain the failure of
the attempt to introduce democracy after the collapse of Tsarism. Serbia's
dominance in communist Yugoslavia determined the Russian type of Marxism.
Therefore, as long as the basic Serbian tradition remains in force in
Yugoslavia, the speculations that the Yugoslav regime, with North American
support, could move closer to laborism and serve as an attractive example to
Hungarian, Polish, and other parties in Central and Eastern Europe are entirely
unfounded.
If anyone believed that the well-known events in Hungary and Poland were
influenced by the Yugoslav example, they were deluded, and Tito very quickly
hastened to refute that belief with his conduct during the Hungarian rebellion,
which Western Marxists labeled vile. The Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries
had no need to draw inspiration from Tito's Balkan tyranny, given their
glorious tradition of fighting for the freedom of their own peoples.
A certain distancing of the Yugoslav communist regime from Soviet
orthodoxy, and only on secondary issues, cannot be interpreted as a symptom of
evolution toward democratic socialism (the question of whether democracy is
possible in a system of a fully state-controlled economy is another matter),
since it represents a temporary abandonment of measures that were orthodox from
an ideological standpoint but economically ineffective. Officially, this
distancing is justified as a necessary step in the transition from the
capitalist or "semi-feudal" system to socialism in underdeveloped
countries, which, strictly speaking, never experienced either a capitalist
economy or feudalism. For communists, all private property signifies
capitalism, and all large landholdings, feudalism.
Even in the Soviet Union, we find precedents for this distancing, such
as Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), meaning that Tito is not original in this
regard. Nor does Khrushchev cling today to an inflexible system of central
planning. Consequently, Littell is mistaken in seeing in the insignificant
decentralization of the Yugoslav economy the beginning of a new socialist
economy with elements of free enterprise. However, while the editors of
Reader's Digest were "condensing" Littell's report, in Yugoslavia
serious economic stagnation was being denounced and the official campaign in
favor of greater controls and a more rigid centralization was beginning.
This means that the relevant authorities in communist Yugoslavia did not
tolerate even the slightest deviations from economic centralism, since the
governing bodies in enterprises were imposed or closely controlled by the
Communist Party, despite all the propaganda about workers' self-management and
self-governance.
In acting in this way, the communist leaders were guided, on the one
hand, by their ideological conceptions regarding the necessity of centralized
socialist planning, and on the other, by the policy of Serbian hegemony.
This becomes clearer when we consider that Littell could only cite
sporadic examples, seeking evidence of grassroots initiative, such as the
establishment of a radio and television factory in Zagreb, competing with a
similar company in Belgrade; the success of the Zagreb optical factory; and the
maintenance of six independent film studios in six different republics.
Littell, unwittingly, came close to the truth when he attributed this
competition to patriotic motives. He simply failed to grasp that this is not
about Yugoslav patriotism, nor even local patriotism, but national patriotism,
as a sign of resistance by oppressed peoples to centralism, which favors
Serbian national interests. This partial decentralization of the economy was
exploited by Croatian and Slovenian experts in defense of their national
economies.
In contrast, Serbian sectors (including anti-communist exiles)
unabashedly advocate for economic centralism. To justify this, they invented a
theory according to which the principle of economic equality should apply not
only to individuals but also to the peoples that comprise the multinational
Yugoslav state. According to this monstrous theory of reverse colonialism,
investment policy should be directed from Belgrade, so that with funds
extracted from Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina—far more advanced
regions—industry would be fostered in Serbia and Montenegro. In other words, it
is necessary to slow the progress of Croatia and Slovenia and further reduce
the already meager wages of workers in the western parts of Yugoslavia in order
to raise the standard of living of a population still incapable of developing
an industry that operates at enormous losses.
Littell, like many other Western observers, fails to recognize that in a
communist dictatorship, where fundamental human and political freedoms are
absent, national resistance manifests itself in disguised forms and, in this
specific case, in the struggle for investment. The example of the uneconomical
promotion of film studios in each people's republic
demonstrates the desire to assert their respective national cultures.
III
The "surprising prosperity" of the "Yugoslav
schismatics" should demonstrate the shrewdness of those who deviated from
Soviet communist orthodoxy. The author, however, remains cautious. It is
described as "relative prosperity." Of course, this reservation is
not reflected in the subtitle, which simply proclaims "surprising
prosperity."
To assume that certain elements of a free market economy exist within
the totalitarian communist system is not only inconsistent but absurd from the
standpoint of economic science. The unidealized reality of communist Yugoslavia
refutes all assertions about surprising or relative prosperity. The ambiguous
term "relative prosperity," discreetly inserted into a mass of data
intended to prove surprising prosperity, would imply that communist Yugoslavia
achieved greater prosperity than other communist-governed countries, and that
it represents remarkable progress compared to the situation under the pre-war
monarchical dictatorship.
However, those familiar with the situation in Yugoslavia and Central and
Eastern Europe would not agree with this cautious reservation. The Yugoslav
economy shows no special progress whatsoever compared to the communist
countries of Central Europe, since the standard of living in some of them is
higher than in Yugoslavia. Nor Nor are the results
significantly better than the previous situation.
While maintaining objective criticism of both present-day Yugoslavia and
the monarchical Yugoslavia, we insist that the communist dictatorship does not
represent economic progress compared to the frankly disastrous previous
situation, in which, despite everything, the economy managed to avoid total
interference from dictatorial governments. This issue is of particular
importance from a principled standpoint, as there is a desire to convince the
new states in Asia and Africa, as well as the Latin American nations, that
rapid industrialization can be achieved through nationalization and planning,
without resorting to any kind of "imperialism." Yugoslavia should be
the attractive example.
Of course, the fact that the Yugoslav communists squandered enormous aid
amounting to several billion dollars is conveniently overlooked. Similarly, the
nationalist monarchical dictatorship had squandered billions of good pre-war
French francs, large sums received from Germany as war reparations, and various
foreign loans. Then, as now, the talk was... Regarding the supposed prosperity
in Croatia and Slovenia—which until 1918 developed within the Danubian
Community—which resulted in their incorporation into a Balkan state under the
supremacy of Serbia, a relatively backward country.
If Croatia and Slovenia did experience some economic progress, even in
this unfavorable situation, it was more a matter of the natural growth of their
economies, which benefited from favorable conditions: raw materials, especially
iron, coal, and hydroelectric power; a favorable location in the
Danubian-Adriatic region; crafts, industry, commerce, banking and credit
institutions; and subsequently, well-developed agriculture, livestock, and
forestry, as well as great potential for international tourism. Thus, their
economic progress could not be completely halted by either the corrupt and
incapable pre-war centralist governments or the inhumane post-war communist
experiments. The solid foundations of the modern economy in Croatia and Slovenia
had already been laid during the Austrian-Hungarian period. While the Croats,
and even less so the Slovenes,
They were not entirely satisfied with the political relations of the
time. Austria-Hungary was a large, balanced economic unit, governed by a free
market system. Even the most inept democratic government would have facilitated
greater economic progress for Croatia and Slovenia than the monarchical or
communist dictatorships in Yugoslavia, which, moreover, favored the Serbian
regions, practicing a policy of colonial exploitation of Croatia, Slovenia, and
Vojvodina. It is not widely known that the electrification so touted by the
communists was partly implemented according to plans drawn up before the First
World War, and that the shipbuilding industry, so often mentioned, was more
developed during the time of the Danubian monarchy.
True economic progress is not manifested in certain spectacular
industries but, first and foremost, in the standard of living of the
population. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia's standard of living is one of the lowest
in the world and even lower than before the last war. This is evident from
official statistics. According to the Statistical Yearbook of the People's
Republic of Yugoslavia for 1961, pp. 436-440, the average wage of workers and
employees last year ranged from 13,000 to 19,000 dinars. At the official
exchange rate, this amounted to between $17.35 and $25.35. It should be noted
that the socialist principle, according to which each person should earn
according to their needs, was applied in communist Yugoslavia in such a way
that a system of incentives based on production levels was implemented—the very
system against which trade unionists in free countries are desperately
fighting.
In light of these facts, Littel's account of the construction of houses
worth $25,000 and the purchase of cars that, at the official exchange rate,
amount to around $1,500, borders on black humor, much like the joke circulating
in Yugoslavia that goes: "All unskilled workers (earning less than $20 a
month) should be shot on the spot. And why? So they
don't steal."
Of course, Littel himself writes that in the land of "surprising
prosperity," the indispensable source of sustenance is "theft, now
widespread."
Sacha Simon, a contributor to another French newspaper (Le Figaro,
Séléction Hebdomadaire No. 433, Paris 1962), expelled from the Soviet Union
despite his sympathies for communist countries, refers at length to the
scandalous cases of corruption in Yugoslavia. He cites official data showing that
27,000 people were punished for economic crimes in Yugoslavia in 1956, and around 14,500 in 1961. While the number of proven
offenses decreased, the average amount defrauded increased, from 83,000 dinars
in 1956 to 166,000 in 1961. It is worth remembering that the main beneficiaries
of embezzlement and fraud are beyond the reach of the law, as depicted by the
Russian writer Nikolai Gogol in his comedy "The Auditor."
Littell is right about the recent increase in workers' and employees'
wages. However, since Yugoslavia is experiencing inflation, these increases are
nominal and bear no relation to rising prices. The Belgrade newspaper
"Politika" (December 16, 1961) reported that "real income across
the economy increased by 4.4% during the first ten months of 1961 compared to
the 1960 average, but according to statistical estimates, the cost of living
during the same period increased by 8%." The Federal Statistical Institute
reported that during the first two months of 1962, the cost of living, compared
to the previous year, increased by 11%.
Inflation could not prevent a decline in industrial production. The
Federal Statistical Institute reported that in the first two months of the
current year, production suffered "a significant decrease in most
industrial sectors." Mihajlo Todorovic, Vice President of the Federal
Executive Council (government), noted in his report to the Federal People's
Assembly on July 14, 1961, "the serious setback in 1961 in industry and
the two-year stagnation even in agricultural production in 1961,"
emphasizing that "personal incomes should be adjusted to labor
productivity."
These official admissions are highly significant, given that the
Yugoslav communists, interpreting statistical data in their own way, boasted
that their industrial production growth was among the highest in Europe.
At the same time, the specter of unemployment looms under a regime that
used to highlight as the main advantage of the communist system the absence of
the danger of unemployment - which inevitably looms over capitalist countries
as a consequence of the supposedly inevitable cyclical crises in the economy:
the London "Times" published on 1/3/1962 that an agreement had just
been signed in Vienna regarding the employment of 10,000 Yugoslav workers in
Austria.
The Times emphasizes that the Yugoslav government "finds it
difficult to admit that unemployment exists within the communist system."
The Yugoslav government "was for years blind and deaf to unofficial
emigrants." According to reliable data, 23,000 workers from Yugoslavia are
currently employed in West Germany. These figures should not be confused with
the tens of thousands of anti-communist refugees, which puts Yugoslavia second
in the ranking and East Germany first in that respect.
The Times even predicted that unemployment would reach such proportions
that the press would be forced to explain it as a consequence of readjustment,
resulting from ongoing economic reforms and, in part, from the nascent
automation in Yugoslavia. Communist propaganda makes no mention of the export
of labor to capitalist countries, even though before coming to power it
condemned it as white slavery.
Beyond the industrial stagnation, so induced to the detriment of the
agricultural economy, which continues to rely on peasant land ownership despite
forced collectivization, the problems of housing and transportation arise
acutely. Littell points out that "transportation is one of Yugoslavia's
weak points, and housing a gigantic and perpetual problem." Due to the
nationalization of houses, with the exception of privately owned homes, the
situation is such that few people have a room of their own.
Sacha Simon states in the aforementioned article that one in two
inhabitants of Yugoslavia is forced to work in the private sector to secure a
minimum income. After working 7 to 14 hours a day in nationalized companies or
offices, they take on other private jobs. "Private initiative, whether
permitted, tolerated, or illegal, gives impetus to the family economy, but it
is not certain that it does not harm the state economy." Outside of
nationalization, only small peasant farms burdened with excessive taxes,
cottage industries, and, to some extent, freelance professions remain. Starting
this year, medical services are nationalized, leaving only the legal profession
free for the time being.
In the country of "surprising prosperity," the concern for
securing a basic standard of living leads to certain phenomena detrimental to
family and individual life. The struggle for survival distorts character and
leads to physical exhaustion. The official newspaper Borba (February 27, 1962,
Belgrade) reports on working conditions at the iron foundry in Jesenice,
Slovenia, one of the largest and best-organized companies in Yugoslavia,
founded in 1869 and employing around 8,000 workers. Last year, six workers died
in workplace accidents and 1,250 were injured. The company clinic recorded more
than 20,000 minor injuries. 17.8% of all workers were injured, and sick leave
accounted for 7%. The Communist Party organ maintains that the primary cause of
this situation lies in the fact that workers arrive at work exhausted, as they
must work elsewhere to earn a living.
Such would be the true picture of the "surprising prosperity"
in communist Yugoslavia, despite the substantial aid received from the US and
other democratic countries, amounting to between three and four billion
dollars.
IV.
From the foregoing, Littel's conclusion that Yugoslavia is unlikely to
return to the Soviet bloc due to changes in its economic system is unfounded,
since these changes did not occur. The disagreements between Moscow and
Belgrade are not economic but political, or rather, personal. Personal conflicts prevail, considering, of course, that Tito and Stalin
are not the only protagonists.
The conflict was inevitable from the moment Stalin decided that changes
at the top of the regime were necessary in Yugoslavia, as in its satellite
states. Even after Stalin's death, Moscow did not relinquish this right to
interfere in the internal affairs of its satellite states. Therefore, despite
Khrushchev's declarations in Belgrade in 1956, in which he blamed Stalin for
the Moscow-Belgrade dispute, and despite the increasingly evident convergence
between Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policy, especially regarding Germany and
Europe in general, a return to the previous situation is impossible as long as
Tito and his group remain in power in Yugoslavia.
For example, for reasons of personal security, they cannot accept the
Kremlin's control over the political repression apparatus, such as that which
exists in the satellite states occupied by the Red Army. On the other hand, it
seems unlikely that the Russians will relinquish their traditional concessions
regarding inter-Allied relations, which entail total control over the weaker
partner. Even less likely would the Soviets relinquish their conception of
"communist internationalism."
Despite all these differences, a close bond of solidarity exists between
these two affinity communist regimes. The communists in Belgrade are aware that
the collapse of Bolshevism would simultaneously entail the end of the Yugoslav
communist regime and, of course, the end of the forced unity of Yugoslavia. It
is for this reason that the concessions made by communist Yugoslavia to the Western
democracies, in exchange for its abundant economic, military, and political
aid, can only be verbal and superficial. A democratic evolution is ruled out
not only by the personal disposition and inclination of the ruling group, but
also by deeper causes beyond its control.
Given Serbia's centuries-old traditions, Yugoslav communism is bound by
unbreakable ties to Russian communism. Even if Tito, Kardelj, and other lesser
communist leaders, born and raised in what was Austria-Hungary, were to
subscribe to Milovan Djilas's well-known suggestions, they could not accept
them, since they depend on the party forces, predominantly Serbian, which would
violently oppose any radical deviation from the Bolshevik and Russian models. A
retreat is impossible due to the very characteristics of Yugoslavia, which were
favorable to their seizure of power.
Yugoslavia is a heterogeneous country from a national and cultural
perspective, torn apart by deep national contrasts. Exploiting these national
contrasts in monarchical Yugoslavia, the communists managed to seize power.
However, from the moment they took power, what was once an advantage became a
weakness for the regime. All of Yugoslavia's external adversaries can take
advantage of these national antagonisms, fostering its dismemberment along
national lines, which, in theory, were recognized by the 1946 Yugoslav
Constitution. Furthermore, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania can raise justifiable
claims, given the latent and acute problem of national minorities.
Because of these internal weaknesses in Yugoslavia, any serious attempt
by its communist leaders to bring it closer to the West would be met with
Soviet pressure aimed at exploiting national conflicts and contrasts. In this
game, the Soviets are consummate and experienced masters. The raison d'état of
a country that arose from and operates as an aggrandized Serbia, the
traditional exponent of Russian imperialism in the Balkan-Danubian-Adriatic
region, advises Tito against deepening the conflict with the Kremlin.
Tito manages to maintain an apparent neutrality, not only due to the
vain illusions of Western observers regarding a new kind of national communism
in Yugoslavia—which, in essence, constitutes a permanent and blatant challenge
to the right to political and national self-determination—but also because of
the inability of Western democracies to exploit the internal weaknesses of
communist Yugoslavia in order to counter Soviet influence.
Instead, investing enormous sums and under threat of moral and political
repercussions, they continue to support Tito and his group, mostly aging
communist adventurers who will soon be replaced by younger leaders, perhaps
more amenable to Moscow's efforts to fully integrate Yugoslavia into the Soviet
bloc. Western strategists who rely on Yugoslavia's geographical position will
experience bitter disappointment. The only certainty is that the Croats and
Slovenes do not want to fight against the West, and that the Serbs and most
Montenegrins do not wish to fight against Russia.
It is possible that a new McCarthy will emerge in the US and investigate
who is responsible for letting slip a propitious opportunity to strike a
serious blow against world communism in Yugoslavia after 1948, a blow with
repercussions throughout Central and Eastern Europe, thereby creating the
conditions to push Russia back to its natural borders.
The Farce of Political Amnesty in Yugoslavia
On March 12, the Federal People's Assembly in
Belgrade passed the "Amnesty Law," pardoning certain acts stipulated
in the penal code of communist Yugoslavia. The amnesty was presented to foreign
correspondents as proof of liberalization and consolidation of Tito's regime.
Belgrade sought to curry favor with Western public opinion at a time when
Washington was deciding whether to continue providing much-needed aid to Tito's
regime after the resounding failure of its much-touted and praised economic
reforms. At the same time, Belgrade aimed to harm the exiles, who, according to official figures, number over 150,000.
It is regrettable that many prestigious voices
in international public opinion disseminated, without reservation, news and
commentary that aligned with the intentions of the Belgrade regime. Foreign
correspondents in Belgrade are not entirely free in their reporting, and when
writing their dispatches, they have access only to official, one-sided, and
biased information. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to present a complete
picture regarding this "magnanimous" measure by the communist regime.
The text of the amnesty law is rather vague,
as it does not detail the pardoned offenses, citing only the relevant
paragraphs of the Penal Code, which, it should be noted, are not found in the
penal codes of Western countries. These are political offenses, many of which
are not punishable in free countries and, in fact, constitute activities
protected by law.
Those covered by the amnesty are categorized
into three groups according to the respective law of March 13.
The first group involves "criminal acts" committed
"during the war and enemy occupation." (It goes without saying that
the communist regime also considers the Independent State of Croatia,
recognized by several powers between 1941 and 1995 and which, in fact, had the
status of a sovereign state, as occupied territory.) These acts, included in
paragraphs 125, 126, 127, 129, 129a, 130, 131, and 133 of the Yugoslav Penal
Code, are generally defined in international public law as war crimes.
Therefore, there would be no grounds for objection were it not for such
a peculiar, one-sided criterion of justice as that of the communists. For the
communist regime, anything that can seemingly be attributed to its adversaries
and serves the purposes of propaganda is considered a crime and an offense. If
these same crimes were committed by the communists themselves, they are
disregarded and even considered great merits. Therefore, as the Croatian exile
press has already pointed out, wouldn't it be fairer and more logical for the
communist leaders, directly responsible for so many horrendous crimes, instead
of presenting themselves as generous accusers and judges, to consider amnesty
when the legitimate representatives of the people come to power?
These are not exaggerations often attributed to political exiles. It
suffices to cite some of the criminal acts stipulated in the aforementioned
paragraphs of the Yugoslav Penal Code. It states that anyone who, "in
violation of the norms of international law during war... orders or carries out
murder, torture, or inhuman treatment of the civilian population, including
acts that inflict great suffering or injury to body or health; illegal
dispersal or displacement...; the application of intimidating and terroristic
measures...; collective punishment and arbitrary confinement in concentration
camps... deprivation of the right to a fair and impartial trial" (para.
125) will be punished. "Whoever orders or carries out torture or inhuman
treatment on the wounded" (para. 126);
"Whoever orders or carries out murder, torture, or inhuman treatment
on prisoners of war... inflicting great suffering or injury to their physical
integrity or health..." (para. 127); "Whoever kills or wounds an
enemy who has laid down their arms or surrendered unconditionally or is without
means of defense" (para. 129); "Whoever brutally treats the wounded,
sick, or prisoners of war, or prevents them from enjoying the rights to which
they are entitled under the norms (of international law)..." (para. 131).
It is public knowledge that all these crimes were committed, in many
cases, by the very authors of the new amnesty law. The communist guerrillas,
both before and after seizing power—which they unfortunately achieved thanks in
part to Western aid—took out their political adversaries, subjecting them to
bloody reprisals and committing all manner of horrific crimes. While world public opinion is not sufficiently aware of these crimes, which
even Western governments tried to conceal so as not to tarnish their former
allies and current protégés (moral, political, and material support continues
to be given to Tito's communist regime), there are irrefutable documents and
facts, of which, for the sake of brevity, we will cite a few.
Last year, the West German federal government published Volume V, titled
"The Fate of the Germans in Yugoslavia," in the "Documentation
der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa" (Documentation on the
Persecution of Germans from Eastern and Central Europe) series. This volume
contains 500 classified and verified documents detailing the tragic fate of
500,000 Germans residing in Yugoslavia, some of whom fled the communist
invasion, while others were exterminated or expelled. Most of them came from
Vojvodina, where their ancestors had lived for centuries.
Many were killed in concentration camps or prisons, subjected to
torture, disease, and all manner of hardship. The Federation of Slovenian
Anti-Communist Fighters published the book "The Tragedy of Vetrinje"
in Cleveland, USA, in 1960. This book contains documents relating to the
massacre of 11,000 members of the anti-communist National Guard in 1945. At the
end of the war, these soldiers had retreated to the British-occupied zone of
Austria, where they were handed over to Tito's partisans and murdered without
trial (See: Studia Croatica, Year II, 4, p. 322). In 1959, the Serbian exile B.
M. Karapandzic published the pamphlet "Kocevlje - Tito's Bloodiest
Crime" in Cleveland. In it, he recounts not only the massacre of the
Slovenians but also the murder of 4,000 Serbian nationalist Chetnik guerrillas
and 2,500 "Croatian soldiers," who were also returned by the British
military authorities.
The number of Croatian soldiers and civilians, including women and
children, the sick and wounded, murdered by the communists after the end of
hostilities exceeds 100,000. The Austrian historian Rudolf Kiszling, in his
work "Die Kroaten" (Ed. Hermann Bölhaus Naohf. Graz-Cologne, 1956),
cites that in May 1945, in the vicinity of the Austrian border alone, the
communists killed more than 40,000 Croatian soldiers. These were members of the
Croatian army that, after the war, wanted to surrender to the Western Allies,
but was rejected by the British military authorities and forced to surrender to
the Yugoslav communist army.
Several hundred thousand Croatian soldiers and civilians fleeing toward
the Austrian border fell into the hands of the communists, who organized
massacres and the sinister "death marches" in many neighboring
towns—long columns of prisoners who were killed or succumbed to exhaustion and
relentless torture during grueling, forced marches. Unfortunately, there is
still no comprehensive documentation of these crimes. We hope that it will soon
be made public, although the possibilities for Croatian exiles in this regard
are limited, and democratic governments aid the communists who oppress Croatia.
Nevertheless, a number of documented works have already been published
concerning the massacre of the Croatians, which bears all the hallmarks of
genocide. "La Revista Croata," published in Buenos Aires, released a
Spanish edition in 1955, vol. 17. A study by Dr. Krunoslav Draganovic,
"Tito's Horrid Crimes That Have Not Yet Had Their Nuremberg." In the
book *In Tito's Death Marches* (José Hecimovic: *In Tito's Death Marches*,
Chicago 1961), Dr. Edward Mark O'Connor, former US Commissioner for Displaced
Persons, addresses the massacres committed against the Croats.
It is obvious that the Yugoslav communist leaders are the ones who
should be granted amnesty for their violations of international law of war.
Their amnesty, besides being provocative, is illusory, since in those massacres
they murdered most of the political leaders, especially Croats, who fought
against them during the war, and now they have excluded from the amnesty their
political adversaries who are fighting against them in exile.
The second group included in the amnesty consists of those who, during
and after the war, committed acts covered by the Yugoslav Penal Code,
paragraphs 100 to 121, 174, 292 to 303, 339, and 342. These paragraphs cover
"criminal acts against the people and the State." The fact that the
Yugoslav Penal Code prescribes severe penalties, including death, for a whole
range of political offenses sheds considerable light on the situation in that
multinational state, restored by the communists in 1945. In Yugoslavia, whose
multinational character is officially recognized and emphasized, "any act
that seeks to destroy the unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia will be punished
with severe imprisonment" (para. 100).
Consequently, despite the official recognition that Yugoslavia is a
union of five peoples and numerous national minorities, anything that affects
the "unity" of the Yugoslav people, which, according to official
sources, does not exist, is severely punished. In other words, emphasizing the
national identity of Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia can be classified as a
criminal act against national and state unity, punishable under the penal code.
It is not only national freedom that is curtailed, but also other political
freedoms. Article 100 of the penal code stipulates imprisonment for any act
"aimed at undermining the economic basis of socialist
reconstitution."
This means that mere criticism of Marxist economic theory falls under
the weight of the Penal Code. Paragraph 109 establishes severe imprisonment for
any citizen of Yugoslavia who "comes into contact... with the exiled group
of people or assists them in carrying out their enemy activities."
Therefore, mere association with the democratic opposition to the communist
regime—which, of course, can only operate outside the country—is considered a
criminal act. Paragraph 11 provides for "severe imprisonment of up to 12
years" for anyone who "flees abroad and prepares to flee or remains
abroad without authorization." The meaning of this is clear from the fact
that the largest number of refugees, after East Germany, came from Yugoslavia.
Article 117 stipulates "severe imprisonment of at least five
years" for anyone who forms any group of people for the purpose of
carrying out the "criminal acts" we have just listed. This means that
any participation in the organization of an opposition political group is
punishable. Furthermore, "severe imprisonment of up to 12 years is imposed
on anyone who, in writing, orally, or otherwise, incites or encourages a violent
or unconstitutional change of the social or state system... or who presents,
with malicious intent or falsehood, the prevailing socio-political situation in
the country." Given that Yugoslavia was under a totalitarian regime, which
considered itself the sole possessor of truth and that political action was the
monopoly of the Communist Party,
it is fair to say that the slightest expression of opposition to
communism and its interpretations of reality could be classified as an
invitation or encouragement "to an unconstitutional change of the
(communist) social and state system" or "a malicious or false
presentation of the prevailing socio-political situation in the country."
The criminal act, therefore, is not only any criticism of the communist regime,
but also "of the state system," although for the majority of
Yugoslavia's inhabitants it signifies the violation of national rights for the
benefit of Serbia. For this reason, paragraph 119 stipulates a punishment of
"severe imprisonment for up to 12 years" also for those who "sow
discord among the peoples and nationalities living in Yugoslavia."
As a culmination of all these provisions, paragraph 121, classifying as
criminal acts those activities that in the free world are inherent to political
and national freedom, determines a "severe prison sentence" not only
for those who carry out the criminal acts, but also for those who prepare them
"by providing or facilitating the means for the execution of these
criminal acts, creating conditions for their commission, or those who conspire
with others to commit this criminal act." These provisions of the Penal
Code duly clarify what possibilities exist in communist Yugoslavia regarding
freedom of assembly, association, or any other political activity directed against
the monopoly of the Communist Party.
The other "crimes" included in the amnesty and stipulated in
paragraphs 174 and 292a of the Penal Code are "exposing the State and its
symbols, the supreme organs of power or the representatives of the supreme organs
of power, the armed forces, or their supreme commander to ridicule." In a
state where everything depends on the exclusive judgment of the Communist
Party, any attempt at political criticism can be labeled as
"exposing" the State and its organs to ridicule.
Paragraph 292a further restricts political freedoms by establishing
penalties "for the dissemination of false news." It constitutes a
crime "to invent or transmit false news or statements... with the
intention of preventing the implementation of decisions or measures by state
organs or institutions or of diminishing public confidence in such decisions
and measures." Therefore, when the communist authorities enact measures
against, say, freedom of conscience, family rights, strikes, or religious freedom,
the slightest opposition can be defined as an attempt to "undermine public
confidence in such decisions and measures" and constitutes a criminal act.
The third group covered by the Amnesty Law consists of "persons who
are atoning and who were validly convicted up to the end of 1952 for the
criminal acts" listed in the first two paragraphs.
However, as already stated, this amnesty is illusory, since paragraph 2
excludes those who cannot benefit from their positions. These are the people
who acted "as leaders and organizers" and who, now in exile,
"actively work as instigators and organizers against the constitutional
order of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." This excludes both
prominent figures among the exiles and all those who act in a political
capacity. It turns out, then, that the amnesty was conceived as a measure
against politically active exiles, who, in reality, constitute political
emigration in its truest sense.
The aim is to isolate them from those refugees who attend to their own
affairs and families, and who gradually lose interest in political activities.
It should be added that democratic governments often discriminate against
anti-communist exiles from Yugoslavia. While anti-communist exiles from other
countries receive some support, those from Yugoslavia encounter difficulties,
as they are considered an obstacle to the policy of aiding Tito.
All the opportunities for international cultural exchange, scholarships,
and invitations to participate in international conferences are reserved for
those nominated by the communist regime, while the exiles can only count on the
understanding and assistance of religious organizations, mostly Catholic, which
tend to be charitable in nature. The Yugoslav communist regime, forced to
temporarily abandon its drastic persecution of the Catholic Church, is trying
to extort international Catholic institutions that provide assistance to
exiles, threatening reprisals against six million Croatian and Slovenian
Catholics, veritable hostages in the hands of the communists.
Regarding the number of people granted amnesty, the Vice President of
the Yugoslav government and head of the feared political police, Alexander
Rankovic, stated in his report to the Assembly on March 13 that the amnesty
covered approximately 1,000 people "serving sentences in prisons and
concentration camps" and around 150,000 exiles. This figure should be
taken with a grain of salt, as Rankovic himself, in his statements to the
Belgrade newspaper Politika on July 8, 1986, referred to 200,000 people
"who remained abroad or left their country during and at the end of the
Second World War."
This figure does not include hundreds of thousands of members of
national minorities. On the other hand, it is known for certain that the number
of refugees who fled Yugoslavia after the war was relatively very large; in
1958 alone, more than 20,000 people left Yugoslavia illegally. According to
Rankovic, the hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled Yugoslavia because of
the communist regime are divided into three groups. The first and largest group
consists of political exiles, anti-communists. The second group comprises
prisoners of war who were interned in Germany and refused to return to their
communist-dominated country. These are generally former officers, almost all of
Serbian nationality.
The third group includes young people who left the country illegally in
the last decade, second only in number to those who fled East Germany. The
communists cannot arbitrarily include these very recent exiles among "war
criminals." Therefore, with the deplorable complicity of neighboring
governments, they strive to reduce their numbers, claiming that these are
adventurers or people fleeing for economic rather than political reasons. The
forced repatriations from these countries are based on erroneous assumptions, a
consequence of insufficient knowledge of the reality in those countries.
Communist countries, where the economy is controlled by the state and closely
tied to communist political tyranny.
Otherwise, it would be absurd for thousands upon thousands of young men
to flee their homeland, even risking their lives. Refugees from Yugoslavia have
the same right to seek refuge and protection in free countries as those who
fled East Germany. The latter enjoy the protection of West Germany, while
Croats and other refugees from Yugoslavia do not find the same protection
abroad. Communists exploit this to describe to new generations the disastrous
and grim situation prevailing in free countries, thus trying to dissuade them
from clandestinely leaving their country.
The press in Yugoslavia, where the average monthly salary is less than
$20, brazenly writes that the situation in Western countries is disastrous and
abjectly miserable, that exiles live in slave-like conditions, that their labor
is traded, or that they are forcibly enlisted in the foreign legions to fight
in the wars. rebel colonies. This was the sentiment expressed by the Vice
President of the Yugoslav government, which survives thanks to the copious aid of
these Western countries.
In a statement published in the newspaper Politika, Rankovic used even
more drastic terms. He explicitly stated that refugees in Western countries
"become victims of known war criminals and other enemies of Yugoslavia,
who exploit them for the simple slave trade, smuggling, and crimes of various
kinds. Many of them, without any protection, wander the world forced to accept
the heaviest jobs as cheap labor... This labor force is discriminated against
by being paid much less than the labor of their own citizens." The head of
the Yugoslav political police goes so far in his slander against Western
countries as to claim that in these countries, refugees "are forbidden
from corresponding with their compatriots back home." In other words, he
attributes to democratic governments measures practiced by communists. It is
well known that censorship and the detention of correspondence, particularly
that of exiles, prevail in Yugoslavia.
Paragraph 2 of the Amnesty Law, by making an exception
for "persons who, as initiators and organizers, actively work against the
constitutional order of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia"—that
is, against communism and in favor of democracy—leaves the door open for the
arbitrary application of this law, to the extent that any political exile is
liable to be excluded from the amnesty. Almost all members of national
minorities are excluded. Rankovic specifically mentioned the German national
minority, which affects hundreds of thousands of people, since members of these
minorities (German, Hungarian, Albanian, and Italian) participated in military
units, were forcibly mobilized, or belonged to their respective patriotic
organizations.
From all of the above, it follows that the problem of
political exiles from communist Yugoslavia directly affects the individual and
political rights of hundreds of thousands of people and indirectly affects a
much larger number of their compatriots. The Yugoslav communist regime is
incapable of resolving this problem, as it offers not the slightest guarantee
of political, individual, national, and religious rights and freedoms. The mere
fact that the head of the fearsome political police, responsible for so many
horrific crimes against those he now seeks to grant amnesty for, acted as the
main promoter of the amnesty not only sheds ample light on the Yugoslav
communist regime but also constitutes an insulting challenge to the free world.
The months since the amnesty was proclaimed have
proven that the much-publicized "generous" measure was limited to its
propaganda value for the communist regime in Belgrade. Very few people returned
to Yugoslavia. A handful of Serbian former prisoners of war, who were promised
pensions, did. Given the meager results, Yugoslav diplomatic and consular
missions are trying to dissuade exiles from opting for citizenship in their
host country. They are urging them to accept Yugoslav passports or to visit
their relatives in Yugoslavia, on the condition that they refrain from
political activities. This amounts to a restriction of the freedom and rights
of citizens of free countries by a foreign state.
Regarding Croatian exiles, it is no exaggeration to
say that the amnesty granted by the communist Yugoslav government had no effect
whatsoever, except that a few visited Croatia for family or other reasons. This
aversion of Croatian exiles toward communist Yugoslavia is not only due to
their bitter experience with the communist regime, but also to the fact that
the current regime practices double oppression against Croatia: political and
national oppression.
Message from the Macedonian Patriotic Organizations to the Croats
We have just received the following message from the Central Committee
of the Macedonian Patriotic Organizations, based in Indianapolis, USA:
“To our friends – the Croatian people.
On behalf of North Americans and Canadians of
Macedonian descent, the 41st Annual Convention of the Macedonian Patriotic
Organizations (founded in 1921), held in Buffalo, New York, on September 3,
1962, extends its fraternal greetings to the Croatian people in struggle.
In the past, the monarchical dictatorship in
Belgrade had set as its primary objective the assimilation of Croats and
Macedonian Bulgarians. This common danger to our peoples led to the establishment
of Macedonian-Croatian friendship. This common fraternal front was created to
counter Belgrade’s chauvinistic designs for hegemony and to hasten the
disintegration of Yugoslavia.” Just a faint breath of that memorable wind was
enough to bring it down. The historical events of the Second World War prove
it.
Today, once again, under the Serbian-communist
regime, Croatia and Macedonia face the same identical fate, with one
difference: the Croats, at least on paper, are recognized as a nation, while
the Bulgarian Macedonians have been denied their ethnic identity through the
creation of the so-called "Macedonian nation." The
Serbian-communists' aim, of course, is to assimilate and "Servitize"
the Bulgarian Macedonians so that it will then be easier for the Belgrade
regime to assimilate the Croatian people as well.
Now, as before, fraternal Croatian-Macedonian
friendship is not only important but necessary. Our growing fraternal strength
will ultimately lead to the dissolution of the current Yugoslavia and the
establishment of the free and sovereign states of Croatia and Macedonia.
Long live a free and independent Croatia!
Long live a free and independent Macedonia!
Long live the friendship between Croats and Macedonians!
It is obvious that the Yugoslav state will dissolve sooner or later due
to the insurmountable differences between Croats and Serbs. It is hoped that
this will occur under humane conditions and through democratic means,
respecting the population, their rights, and their history. In the ongoing
dispute, it is essential to reject falsifications and respect the truth about
the lives and history of the troubled provinces.
Croatian exiles can be proud of their contribution to clarifying this
issue, which is represented by the book "Bosnia and Herzegovina" by
Dr. Domingo Mandic, a historian by vocation, also known as a distinguished
researcher of the history of the Franciscan Order. Setting aside the aims of
cheap political propaganda, Dr. Mandic has dedicated 50 years to research and
study in order to write his work. In it, he has poured his enormous erudition.
His work is rich and mature. Anyone wishing to understand the truth about a
problem as painful as the quintessential Serbian-Croatian conflict must study
this monumental work. The presence of the Serbian Orthodox element in Bosnia
and Herzegovina cannot be denied, but they arrived in Croatian lands during the
Ottoman invasion. This conclusion of Mandic is also currently held by the
Serbian historian M. Dinic, a professor of history at the University of
Belgrade.
Dr. Mandic's book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," covers the
following topics: Part One: "The Territorial Development of Bosnia and
Herzegovina," subdivided into ten chapters: The Region of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the Illyrian and Roman Era; The Arrival and Possession of These
Lands by the Slavs; How the Name Bosnia Appeared; The Extent and Boundaries of
Bosnia. Early history - Territorial expansion of Bosnia from the late 12th
century to 1463 - Formation and development of Herzegovina from the 15th
century to the present - Bosnia during the period of Turkish rule (1463-1878) -
Croatian Bosnia and Turkish Croatia - The formation of contemporary Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Part Two, which deals with "Bosnia's Statehood in the Middle
Ages," is divided into the following chapters: Bosnia's Statehood in the
Middle Ages - The belonging of Zahumlia and Travunia until their union with
Bosnia - The emergence and meaning of the title: Romanaeque Rex - Bosnia's
relationship with Hungary - Religious affiliation of medieval Bosnia - Bosnia
and Herzegovina were always within the sphere of the Western Church - Bosnia
and Herzegovina received Christianity from Rome - The Diocese of Bosnia and
Herzegovina recognized the authority of Rome - In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Roman rite was used exclusively. In the 9th century, the Glagolitic-Slavic
liturgy, but of the Roman rite, was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina -
There were no Eastern rite Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the
Turkish conquest.
The author has already published the second volume of his major work,
dealing with the problem of the Patarenes—"Bogomilis," "Bosniak
Christians"—a topic of universal historical interest. The third volume,
which will address the question of national identity for the population of
Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout its long history up to the present day, will
be published shortly. More detailed information on the results of the extensive
research conducted by this distinguished historian will be published in this
journal.
The Croatian Historical Institute in Chicago is directed by Dr. Mandic
himself, who held important positions in the Franciscan Order, first in his
native Herzegovina, and then for several years in Rome, where he managed the
Order's finances for 12 years, including during the most difficult period of
World War II. From this position, he made numerous contributions of enduring
value. His contribution to the construction of the new headquarters of the
Franciscan Order in Rome, with its monumental church, is particularly
noteworthy, as it constitutes a valuable addition to Rome's artistic heritage.
There is no doubt that the work on Bosnia and Herzegovina that Mandic is about
to complete will also represent a significant contribution to historical
scholarship in general, as well as to the future of the Croatian people.
Ilija
Jukic: Tito between East and West
Milan
Blazekovic, Buenos Aires
(Ed. Demos
Publishing Company, London, 1961, p. 99).
The author of the book Tito between East and West belongs ideologically
and politically to the circle of men from the former Yugoslav government exiled
in London during the war, who in 1957 founded The Study Center for Yugoslav
Affairs. The first two chapters of the book in question were published in 1960
under the title Tito's Conflict with Stalin and Khrushchev and the West by the
publication Review, the Center's journal.
In the first eight of the book's thirteen chapters, the author details
the reasons for the Stalin-Tito conflict, Tito's resistance with Western
support, his reconciliation with Khrushchev, the renewed conflict with Moscow
after the Hungarian Revolution, the second Tito-Khrushchev reconciliation, a
new schism, and ideological disagreements between Belgrade and Moscow. The
following two chapters address Yugoslavia's international position and its
internal instability. In the final two chapters—"Warning to the West"
and "Conclusion"—Ilija Jukic offers his recommendations on how to
safeguard Yugoslavia's independence and what the West should do to restore, at
least partially, civil liberties in the country. In the postscript, the author
records the political events from May 1, 1961—the date the manuscript was
completed—to July 17, 1961—the date of its publication.
It is obvious that the author has been dealing with the problems of
Yugoslavia's foreign policy for years and that he knows the subject well enough
to offer his own judgments in cases where, in his opinion, the background and
sources are not sufficiently clear or accessible. The entire work is quite
subjective, due to its partly polemical and didactic nature, on the one hand,
and the sources he frequently uses without specifically citing them, on the
other. Apart from major newspapers and news agencies, his frequent sources are
"the well-informed British source," "member of the Central
Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party," "authoritative source,"
"reliable source," and so on.
This anonymity of sources, while sometimes understandable and justified,
deprives the quotations of their documentary character, leaving an impression
of subjectivity in both the analytical and dispositive sections of the book, if
we may so characterize its critique of the Western position in the Tito-Kremlin
conflict and its suggestions to Western powers regarding the solution to the
fundamental problem, which in his view is: How to save Yugoslavia for the West?
Given the current political tensions between Moscow and Belgrade, the
topic attracts the attention not only of Yugoslav politicians in exile and
within the country, but also of international specialists. This is evidenced by
the extensive international literature on Yugoslavia and its socio-political
system, as well as the recently published books by the schismatic communist
Milovan Djilas. Almost all of this literature approaches the problem of
Yugoslavia from the perspective of the political and territorial status quo
ante, seeking solutions to its ongoing political and economic crisis in
secondary areas within the current state. From this perspective, Jukic's
pamphlet cannot be considered a positive contribution to solving the Yugoslav
problem, which consists of the relationship between Croatia and Serbia within
the common state, regardless of its form or socioeconomic system.
Taking into account the viewpoint of the Croatian Peasant Party, to which
the author belongs, his assertion that the most important question is how to
save Yugoslavia is unacceptable. As a Croat, he should be primarily concerned
with how to save the Croatian people for the West, of which they have always
been a political, historical, cultural, and economic part. If the author of
this political book sees the salvation of the Croatian people for the West as
being tied to the salvation of Yugoslavia, then he should have bravely delved
into the relations between Croats and Serbs within Yugoslavia, instead of
interpreting this instability—to which he dedicates eight pages—as mere tension
and disagreements within the ranks of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
His exposition of the antagonistic currents within the Communist Party
is interesting, though not groundbreaking. These currents are: "the
reformists," who want changes and closer ties with the West; "the
Muscovites," who advocate a return to the Soviet bloc; "the
reactionaries," who fight for the reestablishment of orthodox communism
without completely breaking with Moscow; and finally, "the opportunists,"
willing to support whoever guarantees them power and privileges. In Jukic's
opinion, Tito relies on the last two groups, which constitute the so-called
"red aristocracy."
The author does not specifically identify the "Muscovites,"
who are in fact the opposition, attributing the leadership of the
"reformists" to Kardelj and Bakaric, the formal victors at the Party
Congress held in Ljubljana in April 1958, where they achieved some concessions
regarding the country's internal development. The author argues that the
victory of the "reactionaries" at the end of 1955, led by Rankovic
and other Serbian communist leaders, was responsible for the nationalization of
houses, land, and housing, and in 1959 for the suppression of private
healthcare and the intensification of measures against individual peasant
holdings. The struggle between the "reformists," backed by the
Slovene Croats, and the "reactionaries," supported by the Serbs and
Montenegrins, is linked to the succession of Tito, whose position on this matter
remains enigmatic. However, this struggle also reflects the fundamental
national conflict that the author, instead of clarifying, evades and even
conceals.
We find his thesis that the imprisonment of Archbishop Stepinac could
fall under the same causal chain as Tito's anti-Western actions after his visit
to Moscow in June 1946 quite audacious. The signing of the military alliance
with Albania in July 1946, the downing of American planes at the end of August,
the beginning of the communist uprising in Greece in September, and a British
destroyer being mined in the Corfu Channel in November 1946 are often
interpreted—at the risk of straying from historical truth—as part of the
Stalinist plan against the West, in which Tito had a specific role. However, attributing
the trial of Archbishop Stepinac, which chronologically coincides with these
dates, to external factors rather than to domestic political motives that
ultimately boil down to Croatian-Serbian relations, means evading the crux of
the "Yugoslav problem," which does not support the book's basic
political thesis.
His exposition of the antagonistic currents within the
Communist Party is interesting, though not groundbreaking. These currents are:
"the reformists," who want changes and closer ties with the West;
"the Muscovites," who advocate a return to the Soviet bloc; "the
reactionaries," who fight for the reestablishment of orthodox communism
without completely breaking with Moscow; and finally, "the
opportunists," willing to support whoever guarantees them power and
privileges. In Jukic's opinion, Tito relies on the last two groups, which
constitute the so-called "red aristocracy."
The author does not specifically identify the
"Muscovites," who are in fact the opposition, attributing the
leadership of the "reformists" to Kardelj and Bakaric, the formal
victors at the Party Congress held in Ljubljana in April 1958, where they
achieved some concessions regarding the country's internal development. The
author argues that the victory of the "reactionaries" at the end of
1955, led by Rankovic and other Serbian communist leaders, was responsible for
the nationalization of houses, land, and housing, and in 1959 for the
suppression of private healthcare and the intensification of measures against
individual peasant holdings. The struggle between the "reformists,"
backed by the Slovene Croats, and the "reactionaries," supported by
the Serbs and Montenegrins, is linked to the succession of Tito, whose position
on this matter remains enigmatic. However, this struggle also reflects the
fundamental national conflict that the author, instead of clarifying, evades
and even conceals.
We find his thesis that the imprisonment of Archbishop
Stepinac could fall under the same causal chain as Tito's anti-Western actions
after his visit to Moscow in June 1946 quite audacious. The signing of the
military alliance with Albania in July 1946, the downing of American planes at
the end of August, the beginning of the communist uprising in Greece in
September, and a British destroyer being mined in the Corfu Channel in November
1946 are often interpreted—at the risk of straying from historical truth—as
part of the Stalinist plan against the West, in which Tito had a specific role.
However, attributing the trial of Archbishop Stepinac, which chronologically
coincides with these dates, to external factors rather than to domestic
political motives that ultimately boil down to Croatian-Serbian relations,
means evading the crux of the "Yugoslav problem," which does not
support the book's basic political thesis.
Ivo Andric: It Happened in Bosnia
Ivo Bogdan, Buenos Aires
(Buenos Aires 1961, Editorial Sudamericana, pp. 541.)
In our note on Ivo Andric (Studia Croatica
Year II, No. 4), we analyzed his main work, The Bridge on the Drina River, making
only a brief reference to the Chronicle of Travnik, pending its Spanish
edition. The original title was changed in this edition, following the English
translation (Bosnian Story), probably because Travnik, former seat of the
viziers and capital of Bosnia during the Turkish occupation, is not well known
abroad, while the title It Happened in Bosnia evokes the mysterious and fateful
province, a nerve center of world politics for half a century. In its current
capital, Sarajevo, Serbian nationalists assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand
in 1914, a crime that constituted the prelude to the First World War.
Unlike The Bridge over the Drina River, which
spans five centuries around the bridge of Mohamed Pasha Sokobi (Sokolovic in
Croatian) and depicts human themes and destinies—a whole series of narratives,
a genre highly cultivated in Croatian literature, of which Andrić is an
outstanding representative—the plot of It Happened in Bosnia covers a brief
period, the "consular era" in Travnik, from 1806 to 1914. The central
character is the French consul, along with a whole gallery of human characters,
many of whom form a self-contained unit.
Until the beginning of the 19th century,
Bosnia, the westernmost province of the Ottoman Empire, lived isolated from
Western Europe. The only contacts with the outside world were the occasional
skirmishes on the border with Dalmatia, which was under Venetian control until
its abolition, and on the northern border with Croatia, which had been part of
the Habsburg Monarchy as an associated kingdom since 1527. When Napoleon
conquered Dalmatia in 1797 and, faced with the British naval blockade and the
threat of Russian intervention, established a consulate in Travnik in 1806, the
seat of the Turkish vizier. Bosnia, along with Albania and Thrace, belonged to
the more Islamized European part of the Ottoman Empire. A large indigenous
Muslim population lived there, and still lives there, comprising a third of the
total population, which is made up of Catholics and Orthodox Christians.
The Muslims, formerly known as Bogomils, are as indigenous as the
Catholics, while the Orthodox settled in Bosnia mostly during the Ottoman era.
The Ottoman authorities relied on the Muslim population, which formed the
ruling class, especially the beys, the ancient Bosnian vernacular aristocracy
and the only hereditary landed nobility within the Empire. Titles, similar to
those in the Byzantine Empire, were more closely linked to administrative and
military functions than to territorial inheritance. Thus, the influence of the
indigenous population of the Islamic faith was predominant in Bosnia (Andric
refers to them as "Turks," meaning their religious affiliation rather
than their nationality), while the Ottoman Turks were few, mostly imperial officials
who tended to return to Constantinople, their country of origin.
Bosnian Muslims were always deeply devoted to their religion and, as
such, provided a firm foundation for the Empire, which they considered above
all to be the bearer of Islamic affirmation in Europe. The conservative
provincial atmosphere, the victorious counter-offensive of Western
Christians—during the 17th and 18th centuries the Turks had to retreat from
Hungary, Slavonia, and Dalmatia and concentrate their forces in Bosnia after
the Peace of Pozarevac (1718)—and later the decline of the Empire, accompanied
by uprisings of the previously submissive Orthodox Christians, caused the
Islamic diaspora in Bosnia to react with extreme sensitivity against all
foreign influence, fearing for the future of the Empire and of Islam. Religious
differences in Bosnia, even today, imply different forms of culture and
civilization. In the years described in It Happened in Bosnia, these
differences were even more pronounced. The indigenous Muslims were—as mentioned—the
mainstay of the Empire's political thought and of the Islamic civilization that
predominated in Bosnia at that time.
The Catholics expected support from the neighboring Croatian provinces
that comprised the Danubian Monarchy. They envisioned their liberation as
integration with the other Croatian provinces under the rule of the Habsburgs,
the legitimate kings of Croatia. Moreover, the Habsburgs, until the Napoleonic
era, headed the Holy Roman Empire, which still symbolized Western power and
influence for both supporters and adversaries in southeastern Europe. While
Catholics awaited their liberation from the West, Eastern Christians in the
Ottoman Empire looked to Russia, which they saw as the Third Rome.
Austria soon followed Napoleon's example and established its consulate
in Travnik. There was also talk of establishing a Russian consulate, but this
never materialized. The consulates of the two empires acted in accordance with
the tangled Franco-Austrian relations, sometimes observing a truce, sometimes
resorting to all means, tricks, and intrigues to discredit one another. The
novel's plot unfolds around this struggle. The Austrian consul could count on
the open support of Bosnian Catholics—the majority in Travnik—particularly the
Franciscans, the only Catholic clergy in Bosnia. The French consul benefited
from the generally proper conduct of Turkish officials, since France, allied
with Turkey, posed less of a threat to them than the Habsburg Empire, the
Sublime Porte's main Western adversary. The small Sephardic Jewish community
saw Napoleon's representative as the champion of equality, while the Orthodox
waited in vain for the Russian consul.
Given the presence in Travnik of all Bosnian ethnic and religious
groups, Andrić was able to paint an authentic picture of Bosnia during the
Turkish era, far more complete than in *The Bridge on the Drina*, where he
described the atmosphere of Višegrad, a small town on the Serbian border with
no Catholic population and, consequently, no Western influence. Furthermore,
Travnik is his birthplace, where he spent his youth and acquired his early
humanistic education at the renowned Jesuit school, which the communists
confiscated in 1945. Dolac, a neighborhood of Travnik inhabited exclusively by
Catholics, was the ancestral home of Andrić.
Therefore, his descriptions of the landscapes of the green, shady, and
humid Lasva River valley, the Travnik bazaar, and its people, characters, and
distinctive traits are entirely authentic, except for his tendency to view the
indigenous Muslims with certain prejudices. He uses excessive detail in
recounting the understandable displeasure of that conservative Islamic milieu
at the sudden arrival of the consuls and the suspicious foreigners. He labels
their reactions barbaric, which is inaccurate. Despite the negative aspects of
Islamic society during the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Andric could only
have labeled the Islamic ruling class barbaric under the influence of prejudice
and unease from the Christian Balkan rayeh and, in part, influenced by the
presumption of modern Western man when he considered contemporary Western
technological civilization as the only true culture, and the members of ancient
Eastern civilizations as barbarians.
Andric, unfortunately, does not clearly distinguish between the problems
of culture and civilization, not only Eastern but also Western. Therefore, he
contradicts the ideas of tolerance and progressivism of the French vice-consul,
with whom Andric evidently identifies. As a supporter of the ideals of the
French Revolution, Andric criticizes the influence of the Austrian Empire in
Bosnia, which, under the specific circumstances, was the sole bearer of Western
ideas and practices in southeastern Europe. Sharing the views of Russian
Slavophiles regarding the "rotten West," Andric prefers the influence
of Russia and its Balkan branch, Serbia, to that of Austria.
Nevertheless, the picture of Bosnia painted by Andric is the result of
serious research. The consuls are not fictional figures but historical
individuals, as are certain Ottoman officials. Andric's "chronicle"
is a fictionalized account of the prevailing situation, crafted from historical
material, drawn primarily from the archives of Paris. His doctoral dissertation
at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Graz was on the
topic of "Cultural Relations in Bosnia during the Turkish Rule."
Andric, in monarchical Yugoslavia (1918-1941), served in the diplomatic
corps and was able to recount the concerns, intrigues, and difficulties of the
"Travnik consuls" based on his own experience. When he describes the
doubts and hesitations of the French consul Daville, Andric is clearly alluding
to his own personal drama. Daville, formerly a moderate monarchist and defender
of Louis XVI, becomes an enthusiastic adherent of the ideas of the French
Revolution and, successively, a zealous and loyal servant of Napoleon. Finally,
after Napoleon's fall, he seeks protection from Talleyrand. He is also a
writer, like Andric.
The parallels are evident. In his youth, Andric belonged to those
Croatian intellectual circles that harbored the illusion that Croatia, with the
Danubian community dissolved, would find greater freedom and dignity within the
state community with Serbia. This explains his clash with the Austrian
authorities and his internment during the First World War. In the new state,
all those illusions were abruptly shattered by the harsh reality of Balkan Serbia's
domination, culminating in the dictatorship of King Alexander. Then came the
military and political collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, and finally, the
communist dictatorship. Although Andric, due to his service, lived almost
exclusively abroad until 1941, without participating in the internal political
struggles so dramatic for Croatian intellectuals, he undoubtedly had to defer
to various regimes, concealing his innermost thoughts and feelings, especially
under the communist dictatorship, as one of the few Croatians in the diplomatic
service.
In many parts of his novel, Andric defines and characterizes the
negative traits of the Levantine, a Western man living in the East where he
struggles for self-preservation, which reminds us of the author's own fate.
Reading the deeply felt passages in which he recounts the anxieties and fears
of the French consul in a remote, provincial city at the time of Napoleon's
fall, we inevitably think of Andric during the collapse of Yugoslavia, when he
was its ambassador in Berlin.
"Daville couldn't say when he had begun to get used to thinking
about the events and affairs of the world without Napoleon as a basic
presupposition. At first, it had been hard and painful, a kind of inner loss of
consciousness. Daville had been mentally shaken, like a man who feels the
ground shifting beneath his feet. Then, he had merely felt within himself a
great emptiness, the absence of all emotion and all resistance, a miserable,
stunted existence, without prospects, without any of those distant apparitions
that are perhaps unreal, but which give us strength and dignity in our journey
through life. Finally, he thought about the matter so much and surrendered
himself so completely to his sensations that he came to see everything—the
world, France, his own fate and that of his family—from that perspective."
"In any case, he had long felt prepared for anything, which in
effect meant that he had distanced himself from the regime that was collapsing
in France and was ready to come to terms with whoever succeeded it, whoever
that might be" (pp. 513-14).
"And yet, it was hard not to think, not to remember, not to see. I
had dedicated twenty-five years to the search for the 'golden mean' that would
reconcile everything and provide the individual with the dignity without which
he could not live. Twenty-five years had passed in the search, the exploration,
in advances and setbacks, in the shift from one enthusiasm to another, and he
found himself, exhausted and battered, back where he started, in the place
where he had found himself at eighteen. One simply traveled. The meaning and
dignity of the journey lay in what we found within ourselves along the way, the
extent to which we found it. There was no path, no end to the journey. One
simply traveled. One traveled until utter exhaustion" (pp. 519-20).
While the author accepts the harsh reality with resignation, he does not
lose all hope. His message to his fellow countrymen and those who find
themselves at a dead end appears in the book's final pages: despite all the
hardships, that "right path" he had sought in vain had to exist
somewhere. It had to exist, yes, and one day someone would discover it and open
it to all humankind. Like a new inner melody, this thought made his work
lighter” (p. 537). Andric perhaps answered with this the question posed by
several critics upon his being awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, thanks to
the efforts of a tyrannical communist regime.
The question of whether a writer so subservient to the oppressors is
worthy of such an international award is certainly pertinent after the
Pasternak case. It is illusory to conceal, as happens in the prologue to the
edition under discussion, that Andric was one of the leading figures of the
pre-war Yugoslav dictatorship. In the prologue we read: “Andric had been
Yugoslav ambassador in Berlin when his country broke with the Axis; he became a
prisoner again, though not this time in a cell” (p. 10). From this statement,
one might conclude that Andric was an exponent of the Yugoslav government that
confronted the Third Reich.
Quite the contrary, Andric was appointed to the most important
diplomatic post in monarchical Yugoslavia by Cincar Markovic, the Foreign
Minister and a persona grata to Hitler, negotiated and signed Yugoslavia's
accession to the Tripartite Pact through Andric. When, following the military
coup of March 27, 1941, the German attack on Yugoslavia occurred, leading to
its swift capitulation and disintegration, Andric returned to Belgrade, where
he lived undisturbed under the German occupation, receiving a pension from the
Serbian government appointed by the occupiers. His rapid integration into the
communist regime as a national deputy, unanimously elected on Tito's regime's
single list, presents a far more stark contrast than the French consul's entry
into the service of the new King of France and Talleyrand as soon as Napoleon
fell.
Of course, it's inappropriate to judge the actions of the Levantines
according to the standards of the free West, but neither should we distort
certain unpleasant facts in Andrić's diplomatic career. We can understand,
but not justify, Andrić's tolerance of having his literary talent
exploited to glorify a tyrannical regime and a state that the Croatian people,
from whom he hails, consider their national prison.
However, wishing to be fair to Andrić and to those who, with good
intentions, bestowed this high honor upon him, expressing their desire to pay
tribute to the cultural environment of his country, it should be noted that
Andrić vehemently condemns violence and tyranny in numerous passages of
his literary work. While he lacks the fiery courage to confront the lives of
his contemporaries as Pasternak did, he does so indirectly when he censures the
dark and negative aspects of the autocratic and intolerant rulers during the
decline of the Ottoman Empire. There are many clear allusions to the current
situation. We believe that his readers, victims of communist tyranny in
Yugoslavia, understand it this way, and that the communists tolerate it for
reasons of political opportunism.
Finally, it is regrettable that the Spanish edition of It Happened in
Bosnia was translated from English and not from the original language. This
could have been avoided, given that numerous Croatian intellectuals, political
exiles, live in Spanish-speaking countries. If even one of them had reviewed
the terminology, they would have noticed many errors. Forms like Fra Luka, Fra
Marko, etc., should not have been used; instead, their Spanish equivalents
should have been: Fray Lucas, Fray Marcos, etc. Nor can the affectionate term
"ujak" (maternal uncle), by which Bosnian peasants call the
Franciscans, be translated literally.
Another regrettable flaw in this edition is the omission of many timely
clarifications that would have made Andrić's novel more comprehensible. It
is true that the "Editors' Note" (pp. 7-10) attempted to offer some
clarifications, but it turns out that it contains falsehoods propagated by the
communist regime in Belgrade. At the beginning of the "Note," it
speaks of a "vigorous national personality," a Yugoslav one, only to
assert shortly thereafter that Yugoslavia is a "new state, composed of old
peoples." In fact, even the current communist regime recognizes that there
are five nationalities in Yugoslavia: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian,
and Montenegrin. If we add that these peoples have never before lived in the
same state, that they belong to three religions and three cultural spheres, how
can it be claimed that the multinational Yugoslav state, heterogeneous in
cultural and political terms, constitutes a "vigorous national
personality"?
How can one speak of Yugoslav national literature if there is no
Yugoslav people, but rather peoples of Yugoslavia with their own unique
national traditions and cultures? In Yugoslavia, moreover, three different
languages are officially recognized. The falsehoods contained in
this "Editor's Note" culminate in the assertion that Andric belongs
to the Serbian-Montenegrin tradition of so-called Yugoslav literature. In our
work (Studia Croatica, Year II, No. 4), we demonstrate that Andric cannot be a
Serbian or Yugoslav writer, but rather a Croatian, although he, whether out of
opportunism or coercion, tolerates being called a Yugoslav writer. Perhaps even
in Yugoslavia itself, this is not considered very important, since everyone
knows that there is no such thing as Yugoslav literature, but rather separate
Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian literatures with different readerships and
written in two alphabets (Croats and Slovenes use Latin letters, while Serbs,
like Russians, use Cyrillic letters).
It is obvious that the authors of the "Editors' Note" did not
invent the idea that Andric belongs to the "Serbian-Montenegrin"
literary tradition, but rather accepted the information provided by Belgrade
propaganda, failing to realize that "Yugoslavism" as a cultural unity
is a crude mystification. It is high time that prestigious publishing houses
stopped being deceived by the mystifications of the Yugoslav communist regime.
The fact that the communist leaders in Belgrade, while acknowledging the
multinational character of Yugoslavia, continue to maintain and propagate the
existence of an indivisible Yugoslav culture and a "vigorous Yugoslav
national personality," and that Croatian cultural achievements are
declared Serbian, proves that the new communist Yugoslavia is following in the
footsteps of pre-war Yugoslavia, that is, practicing the expansionist policy of
an enlarged Serbia.