Djilas is one of the most prominent, though not the
only, representatives of the current advocating for a genuine revision of
communist doctrine.
This undeniable shift of the Yugoslav communist leaders
toward Moscow, coinciding with the worsening of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
inevitably influenced the position of Congress when the foreign aid program was
being debated. However, this was neither the only nor perhaps the main reason
for the different approach to aid for Yugoslavia. This can be inferred from the
attitude adopted by the proponents of aid to Tito's regime: Unlike previous
debates, this time no one emphasized that American aid fostered the evolution
of Titoism, which would supposedly lead to a new type of communism, more
aligned with Western humanist conceptions, akin to democratic socialism or
laborism.
Such illusions could not withstand the test of time,
so the supporters of the White House proposal deemed it appropriate to stress
that Tito was as communist as Khrushchev. "It is the plain truth that
Yugoslavia is a communist country," Secretary of State Dean Rusk
emphasized. Vermont Republican Senator George Alken, advocating for
"minimal" aid to Yugoslavia during a Senate session (June 6, 1962),
emphasized that "no senator has any sympathy for Tito, Gomulka, or any
other communist leader of the satellite states." The last Secretary of
State in the Eisenhower administration also warned that Tito would not abandon
communism. Christian A. Herter, intervening in the ensuing controversy, noted
in an article that Tito would like to return to the communist bloc. Clearly, by
emphasizing Tito's communism, he sought, as we shall see later, to corroborate
arguments about the danger of his return to Moscow.
A certain moderation of the terror measures in
Yugoslavia is no longer taken as evidence of a trend toward liberalization.
Such a development is not only occurring in Yugoslavia, but also, and on a
larger scale, in its satellite states like Poland. But, unfortunately, this is
not about the evolution of the respective regimes, which would be plausible
from a human perspective. Communism does not retreat in the face of the
momentum of popular aspirations for freedom, which would prove how weak communist
governments are; on the contrary, it is about the disturbing consolidation of
these regimes. The measures of mass terror and rigid control eliminated all
organized democratic opposition.
Consequently, the absence of such measures is
symptomatic and does not favor the West. This does not mean that the oppressed
countries are now any less anti-communist. They have, however, lost hope in the
possibility of a successful resistance like those in Poznan and Budapest. It is
not that the captive peoples do not wish to free themselves from the communist
yoke, but rather that Western governments failed to capitalize on the
revolutionary movements that arose under the influence of their own propaganda
and their solemn pronouncements about the imperative need to liberate the
peoples of Central Europe. When hopes for Western aid were dashed, the adverse
consequences were inevitable. Even in an unofficial American publication, we
read that the last five years have meant years of lost hope for the subjugated
peoples of Europe, while in "non-committed" countries outside Europe,
they are seen as a period of Western decline. At the same time, the Bay of Pigs
invasion was a tremendous moral blow to all those who believed in the
liberating vocation of the United States.
The prestige of the United States and the entire West
was thus affected. The prospects for neutrality increased, even in the Latin
American republics, where until then, due to distance, events in Central Europe
had not resonated as strongly as the Hungarian rebellion and later the Cuban
revolution. American policy toward the Tito regime, although with negative
consequences for the overall situation, could eventually be justified, and in
part, before October 1956, even though, in our opinion, it was based from the
outset on insufficient knowledge of the true situation in southeastern Europe.
However, Tito's insistence "that different paths lead to socialism"
could be considered a divisive factor within the "monolithic"
communist bloc, especially since Khrushchev initiated the political course of
de-Stalinization, at least in theory, and showed himself willing to tolerate
Tito's position. It turned out, however, that the hopes raised were not
well-founded. Khrushchev neither wanted nor could allow theory to be put into
practice, so he brutally crushed the Hungarian revolution. With hopes dashed
for active Western support, neither "national communism" nor the
rebellions of the captive nations had any prospect of success in the face of
the enormous Soviet repressive power, since these nations were, in fact, under
Soviet occupation, disguised as the Warsaw Pact.
The repression in Hungary, the capitulation of
national communism in Poland, and the unequivocal solidarity of the Yugoslav
communist dictator with the brutal crushing of the Budapest rebellion, which
culminated in the extradition of Imre Nagy and his certain death, dashed the
hopes of the democratic left. This left believed in "the evolution of
Titoism, without justifying its indignation, since this indignation is merely a
reflection of vanished illusions about Tito as the architect of national
communism, which he, a committed international communist, always abhorred. The
American policy of aiding Tito, later extended to
Gomulka," proved not only unrealistic under the circumstances but also
harmful. It was as if, with this aid, they wanted to tell the subjugated
peoples of Central Europe that they should no longer harbor any hope of
liberation from communism and that regimes like those of Gomulka and Tito
constituted the only alternative to communism.
Faced with such facts, Congress could not take into
consideration the arguments of those who advocated the policy of aid to Tito,
as practiced by three administrations, two Democrats (Truman and Kennedy) and
one Republican (Eisenhower).
Arguments of those who
advocate for political realism regarding Yugoslavia
The future will tell how the
Kennedy administration will take advantage of the authorization granted by
Congress. It is reasonable to expect that Yugoslavia, given its large balance
of payments deficit, amounting to almost one billion pesos, which threatens to
paralyze most of its industrial production, will spare no effort to ensure the
continuation of American aid. The narrative launched and promoted by Tito, that
there is a danger of Yugoslavia's total alignment with the Soviet bloc, could
serve as a tool for further extortion.
Therefore, for the
international good, it is worth examining whether or not the premises of those
who defend American Realpolitik are justified in this eventuality. Our clear
and unequivocal position against a return to the pre-war situation in Central
Europe—which enabled the invasion by the Third Reich and then by the Soviet
Union—leads us to believe that our opinions will not be rejected or considered
the rancor of displaced politicians. Despite the serious efforts of American
internationalists to understand the reality of communist Yugoslavia, and
despite numerous studies on the subject, the observations and judgments of
those with direct knowledge and extensive experience regarding Southeast Europe
and the still little-known Balkans are neither idle nor useless. Seeking to
present more objectively the arguments put forward by proponents of the
"realist position" toward Tito's regime, we will analyze in detail
the thinking of C. A. Herter, summarized in the article cited above. It seems
to us that the main arguments of this political realism regarding Yugoslavia, formulated by highly qualified exponents of this
position—freer, of course, to express their personal opinions than officials of
the current administration—are synthesized therein.
Herter insists excessively
that opposing arguments are the product of emotions and anger, poor advisors in
political decisions. "Among the many global problems we face, few generate
more frustration or controversy" than the United States' relationship with
the problems of Central and Eastern Europe. He points out that many Americans
are originally from this region, which could be interpreted as a subtle
allusion to the electoral motives of certain members of Congress. "It
pains us when we learn that the majority of the people now living in those
countries are governed by regimes that the people neither approve of nor
respect. We blame ourselves, in part, for not having successfully opposed their
absorption by the Muscovite empire. This sentiment was reflected very recently
in the Senate's action in voting to prohibit all aid to countries 'that are
notoriously dominated by communism or Marxism,'"
Only after interpreting Congress's opposition to the
"realist position" as emotion, frustration, solidarity with the
countries in question, guilt, or powerlessness, does Herter consider the
reasons for this opposition. He does so with particular stylization, always
emphasizing the emotional aspects. These motives would be the displeasure
"at the bias of the assisted governments in favor of the Soviet
Union" and "also... the feeling that the aid given to Yugoslavia and
Poland did not yield tangible results from the standpoint of our
interests," so that many American citizens were asking themselves: What is
the point of alleviating the difficulties of communist regimes? Herter replies
"that our policy is not primarily intended to help the governments, but the
unfortunate people of the countries in question. We recognize, of course, that
this helps the governments. But, for a realistic judgment, we must consider the
overall effect, and not just the most obvious one; the subtle and indirect
consequences are often more important than those discernible at first
glance."
Herter then recounts Tito's "turn to
nationalism." "Yugoslavia," he says, "in the first years
after the Second World War was probably the most combative and extremist
satellite that Moscow had recently gained. This extreme extremism created
problems. Tito, in those days, was at least more Stalinist than Stalin himself,
and his militancy created problems of discipline and control within the bloc.
Stalin tried to seize control of the Yugoslav Party from within. When that
attempt failed, he orchestrated the exclusion of Tito and his followers from
the Cominform. The Soviet dictator calculated that without their support, the
Yugoslav communists would soon submit. He was wrong, and this turned out to be
his most serious mistake. For Tito shattered the "monolithic unity"
of the communist bloc, and the winds of nationalism
and independence began to blow, their corrosive effects on Moscow's control
becoming more and more evident."
"The break of Yugoslavia with Moscow," Herter
continues, "and its pursuit of an independent course provided significant
political and strategic advantages to the United States and the rest of the
non-communist world. Soviet power was repelled from the Adriatic and Italy's
northeastern border. Austria's southern border was freed from Moscow's control.
The closing of Yugoslavia's border to the Greek communists was the final blow
to their efforts to seize Greece.".
Only after interpreting Congress's opposition to the
"realist position" as emotion, frustration, solidarity with the
countries in question, guilt, or powerlessness, does Herter consider the
reasons for this opposition. He does so with particular stylization, always
emphasizing the emotional aspects. These motives would be the displeasure
"at the bias of the assisted governments in favor of the Soviet
Union" and "also... the feeling that the aid given to Yugoslavia and
Poland did not yield tangible results from the standpoint of our
interests," so that many American citizens were asking themselves: What is
the point of alleviating the difficulties of communist regimes? Herter replies
"that our policy is not primarily intended to help the governments, but
the unfortunate people of the countries in question. We recognize, of course,
that this helps the governments. But, for a realistic judgment, we must
consider the overall effect, and not just the most obvious one; the subtle and
indirect consequences are often more important than those discernible at first
glance."
Herter then recounts Tito's "turn to
nationalism." "Yugoslavia," he says, "in the first years
after the Second World War was probably the most combative and extremist
satellite that Moscow had recently gained. This extreme extremism created
problems. Tito, in those days, was at least more Stalinist than Stalin himself,
and his militancy created problems of discipline and control within the bloc.
Stalin tried to seize control of the Yugoslav Party from within. When that
attempt failed, he orchestrated the exclusion of Tito and his followers from
the Cominform. The Soviet dictator calculated that without their support, the
Yugoslav communists would soon submit. He was wrong, and this turned out to be
his most serious mistake. For Tito shattered the "monolithic unity"
of the communist bloc, and the winds of nationalism
and independence began to blow, their corrosive effects on Moscow's control
becoming more and more evident."
"The break of Yugoslavia with Moscow,"
Herter continues, "and its pursuit of an independent course provided significant
political and strategic advantages to the United States and the rest of the
non-communist world. Soviet power was repelled from the Adriatic and Italy's
northeastern border. Austria's southern border was freed from Moscow's control.
The closing of Yugoslavia's border to the Greek communists was the final blow
to their efforts to seize Greece."
If these premises are untenable, then the conclusion
that Tito has only one path left—a return to Moscow—if the current policy of
assistance to Yugoslavia is modified, cannot be correct either. The dilemma
posed in these terms, strictly speaking, reflects Tito's wishes, as it allows
him to continue extorting the West and avoid facing the choice between
accepting the West's political conditions or unconditional capitulation to
Moscow.
We will now demonstrate that the only realistic policy
toward communist Yugoslavia is to make economic aid contingent upon political
and moral concessions and guarantees that the West will not one day lose all
its advantages in southeastern Europe.
Exaggerations by Specialists Regarding Tito as the
Architect of "National Communism"
Before analyzing the premises of those who advocate
for the policy of aid to Yugoslavia, it is worth noting that despite the
much-lauded empiricism and pragmatism regarding Tito's regime, Washington
conceived and practiced a policy determined by prejudices and emotions, more so
than its self-proclaimed realists are willing to admit.
This phenomenon is undoubtedly related to the
interesting and complex process of social psychology, to which Herter alludes
when he emphasizes the feelings of frustration with US policy toward the Soviet
Union. Herter, it is true, is referring to the opponents of aid to Yugoslavia,
but, strictly speaking, it would be difficult to exclude its defenders. The
political realism so often invoked by the proponents of such a policy was
conceived under the influence of public accusations, which sought to blame for
this failure among the intellectuals now deluded by national communism. Therefore,
seeing emotions only in one sector, they seem to forget the warnings of an
eminent exponent of political science, who says:
"It would undoubtedly be entirely unscientific
for the political scientist to deceive himself about his personal prejudices, as
unscientific as it would be for the naturalist to disregard the possibility of
error resulting from the interference of uncontrollable factors such as
gravitation and weather, as well as the psychological inaccuracies of his
observation. Moreover, the first task of anyone wishing to undertake scientific
work in the sciences that deal with humankind is to become aware of their own
tendencies, so as to be able to take them into account when evaluating their
findings."
These studious intellectuals, recruited mostly from
progressive ranks, who call themselves "liberals" while their
adversaries mockingly label them "Eggheads," were accused of having
abandoned the authentic ideals of the American liberal tradition, deemed too
susceptible to communism under the influence of Central European liberalism and
socialism. The well-known survey conducted by Partisan Review of American
intellectuals revealed that progressive intellectuals, under this social
pressure, are embracing "Great American patriotism." James Burnham, a
member of the Partisan Review circle, declares himself a staunch advocate of
"modern Machiavellianism." The views of political science must be
"completely independent of adherence to any particular ideal or moral
purpose."
"The United States was called to the stage before
the rehearsals were over. Its strength and potential have not matured with the
wisdom of time and suffering. Destiny
has made it master of the world."
Despite the progressives' conversion to "Great
American patriotism," a latent animosity toward intellectuals is evident
among the majority. These intellectuals, moreover, act—as Aron states in the
aforementioned book—"with a vague sense of guilt for their past alliance
with communism." Hence, on the one hand, the tendency to find in "Titoism"
a retrospective justification for their vanished illusions about the
evolutionary capacity of communism, illusions that Stalin deliberately nurtured
during the last war; on the other hand, the need to explain that aid to
Yugoslavia is a realpolitik in the interest of the United States. Moreover,
even European progressives, more aligned with communists than their American
counterparts, are increasingly defending nationalist principles, acting as
fellow travelers at a time when the Soviets view European and Western
integration with alarm, overcoming old rivalries and national enmities.
Strictly speaking, both the American intellectual left
and the majority of the US population made the same mistake regarding the
Soviets. The difference is only one of degree. Americans, due to their
fundamentally idealistic approach to foreign policy, were unprepared to adopt a
realistic stance toward the Soviet Union when, by a confluence of
circumstances, they became allies during the last war with the country that is
the world center of communist subversion.
Instead of considering the Soviet Union as a
circumstantial ally in the war, where there was no choice, in order to assuage
their own consciences for the aid given to an unholy communist regime, they
tried to reconcile the harsh reality of that alliance with their own ideals,
and they deluded themselves about the possible evolution of Bolshevism. This
was also aided by the innate American tendency to view, with 18th-century
European optimism, the potential of countries whose cultural and political
processes differed greatly from those of Western Europe to spontaneously
establish a system of political and individual freedoms similar to those found
in the West, as a result of a specific socio-political evolution. Illusions
about a favorable evolution of communism, previously confined to the narrow
circle of progressive intellectuals, were shared by an overwhelming majority.
Stalin skillfully exploited this disposition and dissolved the Comintern as
proof that the communists had renounced world domination. After the war, the
average American, confronted with the reality of Soviet expansionism, sought to
forget their illusions, washed their hands of the matter, and looked for the
sole culprits among intellectuals, disregarding the scale of the problem and
the circumstantial alliance with Moscow.
There is no doubt that the American intellectual left
exerted some influence on the conception of politics practiced in relation to
Tito's regime. It is difficult, however, to verify whether that influence was
decisive. Even staunchly anti-communist authors like James Burnham, in their
books and studies, omit Yugoslavia from the list of European countries
subjugated by communists.
Both the Democratic and Republican administrations, without
exception, consider communism as an ideology less dangerous than as a global
subversion directed by a great power. Therefore, communist parties would be
less dangerous in their role as catalysts of popular discontent than as fifth
columns of the communist bloc. Consequently, Tito's non-integration into the
communist bloc, far from being dangerous, would offer certain advantages, as it
would affect the monolithic character of the communist world. Following the
traditions of English empiricism and American pragmatism, the historical and
philosophical aspects of the problem are underestimated.
Thus, it is considered an indisputable truth that in
Russia there is the same opposition to communist totalitarianism as in the
West, and that, in the long run, it will be defeated. These beliefs were
expressed in solemn pronouncements such as President Eisenhower's messages to
Congress. With this way of thinking, it is difficult to differentiate the
specific features between Russian and Yugoslav communism and their basic
solidarity, despite internal squabbles. Communism, as it took shape in Russia,
is not authentic Marxism, a faithful application of the theory that arose and
developed in the West during the Industrial Revolution, but rather a
specifically Russian version of Marxism, realized within the cultural and
political traditions of Byzantine-Russian totalitarianism. For this reason,
resistance to communism in Hungary and Poland—countries with Western cultures
and political traditions different from Russia's—is stronger and deeper than
the opposition in Yugoslavia, even though Tito achieved what Nagy and Gomulka
could not due to the absence of the Red Army. Despite all the controversies
surrounding the revisionism of the Yugoslav communists and the speculation about
the liberalization of Titoism, Tito and the majority of Yugoslav communists
yearn for a return to the heart of world communism. This must be attributed to
Serbia's national political and cultural tradition, rooted in the same
foundation as Russia's, and to the fact that Serbia exercises its dominance in
Yugoslavia, a country as culturally and nationally heterogeneous as Russia was
in the Soviet Union.
"National communism" in Yugoslavia presents
different characteristics than in Poland or Hungary. These countries are
Western-style nation-states, while Yugoslavia is a multinational conglomerate,
much like the Soviet Union, of which it is a minuscule and deteriorated
version. Just as the Soviet Union is, in a national sense, the heir to the
Tsarist empire, so communist Yugoslavia is the
political continuation of the aggrandized Serbia of the dictatorial king
Alexander Karageorgević.
Therefore, C. A. Herter's judgment on Tito's
"patriotism" should be taken with due caution, if it refers to the
national patriotism that motivated Nagy and Gomulka. Not only did Tito, like
all communists, consider nationalism an emanation of bourgeois society, but he
never demonstrated any feeling of loyalty toward the Croatian people, from
whose ranks he came, according to his official biography. Tito's
"patriotism" was reduced to defending the interests of the dominant
group in the multinational state of Yugoslavia, with Serbia as its hegemon,
even though the constitution recognized five nationalities: Serbian, Croatian,
Slovenian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian. Tito, as an exponent of the hegemonic
group, did not champion Croatian national interests. On the contrary, in the
last war, he fought for the liquidation of the Croatian nation-state and for
the restoration of Yugoslavia as an enlarged Serbia.
After the war, he orchestrated an exceptionally bloody
repression, with all the hallmarks of genocide, against Croatian nationalism.
He acted in this way even though, before the war, the communists called
Yugoslavia a "prison of the people," just as the Bolsheviks had
called Tsarist Russia before coming to power. It has been said that Tito, as
head of a multinational state, follows the example of the Habsburgs, in whose
army, before and during the First World War, he acquired military experience as
a non-commissioned officer. It could be said, with more justification, that
Tito is the Yugoslav Stalin. Stalin, despite being from Georgia, one of the
countries subjugated by the Russian-Soviet empire, was
the political heir of the Russian tsars. Tito, a terrible oppressor of the
Croatian people, is more the political heir of the Karageorgevic dynasty than
of the Habsburgs. The latter were, at least, legitimate rulers in the
culturally homogeneous and economically complementary Danubian community, which
cannot be said of Yugoslavia or the Serbian dynasty of Karageorgevic.
To speak of Titoism as national patriotism is only
possible if, according to the conceptions of the ancien régime, the nation is
defined solely as the ruling group or the head of absolute totalitarian power.
Tito exacts a high price from the West for his
fictitious services.
Yugoslavia was forced, following the Cominform
resolution, to abandon its aggressive policy against the West, in which it had
previously acted as the "most combative and extremist" Soviet
satellite, when Tito was "more Stalinist than Stalin himself." Even
after the resolution passed during the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, held from July 21 to 28, 1948, "the Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, and
Djilas group," the target of the Cominform's attacks, continued to
emphasize its loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union.
Only when the attempt to revoke the Resolution failed
did Tito's regime, going through a difficult period under Soviet pressure and
that of neighboring satellite states, moderate its aggressive policy toward
Western countries. This resulted in some relief on the Yugoslav borders with
Greece, Italy, and Austria. However, to conclude that this relief occurred
solely due to Tito's resistance to Stalin is to apply the post hoc, ergo
propter hoc fallacy, which carries the danger of considering as a cause what is
merely an antecedent.
Indeed, if we look beyond the Cominform Resolution and
examine the past, we will find that Tito's aggressive stance toward Greece,
Italy, and Austria did not align with Moscow's intentions. Soviet leaders
dissuaded Tito from such a policy and, even before the Resolution, acted
against him when they deemed it necessary for the interests of the Soviet Union
and world communism. Consequently, tensions between Yugoslavia and its
neighbors would have eased had Stalin overthrown Tito's group and installed
people he trusted in power.
Tito's official biographer repeatedly emphasizes that
Stalin was displeased with Tito's aggressive foreign policy. Other authors also
confirm these assertions. Milovan Djilas, in his recent book, states that
Stalin demanded an end to the civil war in Greece in 1948. "The Americans
and the British," Stalin declared, "will never allow the sea routes
in the Mediterranean to be cut off." "We can do nothing against that,
since we have no navy." This did not prevent the Cominform from
attributing the communist defeat in Greece to the American exploitation of
Tito's betrayal.
Responding to these accusations, Vukmanovic Tempo, a
prominent Yugoslav communist leader, unequivocally blamed the Soviet leaders
who abandoned "the revolutionary struggle of the Greek people" for not
considering Greece "an area of Soviet interests."
Stalin also did not support Tito's aggressive policy against Austria, which
sought the annexation of part of Carinthia to Yugoslavia. In his letter, dated
May 12, 1945, and addressed to Austrian Chancellor Dr. Karl Renner, he promised
the territorial integrity of Austria. Then, two years later, Molotov declared
to Eduardo Karadlj, then Vice President of the Yugoslav government, that his
claims regarding Carinthia were without merit and that the Soviet government
was still dragging out this issue to obtain a more favorable solution to the
question of the Third Reich's properties in Austria. .
The Soviets were also dissatisfied with Tito's
position in the Trieste dispute. They signed the peace treaty with Italy,
although Trieste was not annexed to Yugoslavia as Tito had demanded. As early
as May 27, 1945, in a speech delivered in Ljubljana, Tito expressed his
displeasure at the lack of Soviet support when the communist partisans were
forced to withdraw from Trieste. Correspondence between the Yugoslav and
Russian communist parties prior to the Cominform Resolution reveals that Moscow
interpreted this protest as an anti-Soviet act aimed at dragging the Soviet
Union into war, under unfavorable conditions, against the Western democracies.
This was one of the main causes of the subsequent conflict.
Furthermore, the Soviets, far from wanting to
strengthen such an ambitious satellite state, believed that the Yugoslav
agitation regarding Trieste was damaging the Italian Communist Party. Indeed,
it is widely believed that the declaration by Western governments on March 20,
1948, regarding the handover of Trieste to Italy, contributed to the defeat of
the Italian communists in that year's elections, when it seemed that, with the
support of the left wing of socialism, they would become a major force in
Italian politics.
It follows, then, that Stalin wanted to do sua sponte
what Tito, after the Cominform resolution, was forced to do due to his
isolation: end Yugoslavia's aggressive policy against Greece, Italy, and
Austria. There is no doubt that the aid provided by Western countries
facilitated Tito's reversal. What is incorrect is to attribute this change to
Tito and present it without reservation as a "surprising result" of
American aid to communist Yugoslavia.
Without Russian support, Yugoslavia could not pursue
an aggressive anti-Western policy, even if Tito had tried. Croatia and
Slovenia, located in the Mediterranean and Central Europe, share long borders
with democratic countries. Yugoslavia's neighboring countries, Greece and
Italy, are members of NATO. Even economic factors, such as Croatia and
Slovenia's growing influence towards Western industrial centers, dictate that
Tito must compromise with Western countries if he does not want to become
entirely dependent on the Soviet bloc.
With the conflict with Stalin, Tito had no choice but
to seek help from the West. In this emergency, the democratic powers had
another alternative: instead of lending political support to a communist
tyranny, they could exploit the impasse of Tito's regime to liberate the
peoples of Yugoslavia from the communist yoke. The communist regime was not yet
consolidated. The resistance of national and anti-communist forces was very
vigorous. The satellite states exerted strong pressure on Belgrade. It is
unlikely that a potential rebellion would have been treated as Hungary's later
rebellion did. Instead, it is very likely that the communist governments of
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania would have taken advantage of the internal
crisis of Tito's regime to claim Vojvodina, Macedonia, and Kosmet,
respectively—contiguous territories densely populated by the nationals of those
countries.
The overthrow of the most aggressive communist regime
would have meant permanent strategic advantages for the West, and, moreover,
the example of the defeat of the clamorous communist tyranny would have
stimulated the resistance forces in the satellite states far more than all the
subtle discussions about Titoism as national communism, which—as we see—cannot
lead to the liberation of oppressed peoples. Instead of yielding ground,
another path was feasible, with serious prospects of pushing the Soviet Union
back to its pre-war borders and then exploiting the latent national antagonisms
there.
Nevertheless, the argument for supporting Tito in his
fight against Stalin prevailed. Now they want to justify it by highlighting his
popularity among the vast anti-communist masses in Yugoslavia. In fact, the
supposed popularity of Tito's foreign policy boils down to the fact that the
oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia, faced with the dilemma of either communist
tyranny under the powerful protection of the Soviet colossus, or a communist
tyranny weakened by the conflict with Moscow and internal divisions, logically
preferred the latter as the lesser evil. However, this evil is so great that
few in Yugoslavia and Central Europe understand how it was possible that the
Western democracies did not try to help the subjugated peoples of Yugoslavia
liberate them from the communist yoke. This omission depressed freedom-loving
people, emboldened the communists, and harmed Western interests in neutralist
countries.
A
Danger That Doesn't Exist
Aside from the question of whether the advantages
derived from the Tito-Stalin conflict resulted from Western aid to communist
Yugoslavia, we will analyze the arguments of those who defend this policy and
maintain that a firmer stance from the Western powers, coupled with
insignificant concessions from Moscow, would inevitably lead to Tito's
readmission into the communist bloc.
First and foremost, it is necessary to thoroughly
examine the causes, nature, and scope of the Belgrade-Moscow conflict. Then, we
can discuss whether this conflict stemmed from the personal reasons of the
actors and other contingent factors, or whether it reflected constant social
and political conditions—that is, determining factors that are difficult to
alter.
If we consider the prevailing relations within the
communist bloc without prejudice, we will see first and foremost that the
Stalin-Tito conflict was perhaps the first, though not the only or the most
important, symptom of the crisis in relations between the Kremlin and the
governments of its satellite states. Therefore, regardless of the scale, it was
not Tito who broke "the monolithic communist unity," as tension
existed between Moscow and both satellite governments, especially between the
Soviet Union and Red China, which refused to accept the role of a Soviet
satellite.
In the new situation that emerged after the Second
World War, such tensions were unavoidable and depended not on individual will,
but on objective factors. Until the end of the last world conflagration, the
Soviet Union was the only communist country. Communist parties outside Russia
operated in a diaspora, in many cases illegally. For all of them, the Soviet
Union was the homeland of the world proletariat, to which they owed loyalty
above their own countries. Under such circumstances, the Moscow headquarters of
international communism was able, in its relations with communist parties
outside the USSR, to practice the Leninist principles related to discipline and
the monolithic unity of the Bolshevik party without major disruptions.
Since the leaders of world communism were
simultaneously the government of a great power with deep-rooted aspirations for
world domination, the various communist parties, mere sections of the
Comintern, aligned their activities with the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union, subordinating their national interests to the interests of "the
homeland of the world proletariat." Thus, in the last war, while the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was still in force, the communist parties opposed the
Western "plutocracies." In the second phase of the war, with the
outbreak of the German-Russian conflict, the communist parties organized
resistance movements to relieve German pressure on the Soviet front and to gain
ground for postwar communist expansion. With the defeat of the Third Reich, the
communists shifted their allegiance once again. They fought against
"Western imperialism," which until then had been a welcome ally.
"Lenin had precedents for his image of Moscow as the ideological and
political headquarters of a universal state.
The idea of Slavophilism, which conceived of Moscow as
the Third Branch, as the center of a universal religion and a world state, was
not foreign to him." The Soviet Union would not have been able to dominate
most of Europe at the end of the war without the monolithic system of the Communist
Party, defined by Stalin as "the total and absolute unity of will and
action." It is the foundation upon which the entire edifice of the
expanding Soviet empire rests. This unity is practiced ruthlessly, despite
declarations about the independence of satellite states. In keeping with
Russian imperialist traditions, the Soviet Union exercises its hegemony in all
spheres—military, political, economic, and even cultural—with evident
tendencies toward Russification. With characteristic Russian arrogance, even
the most moderate criticism of Soviet methods is repressed. "The principal
instrument of America is freedom; that of Russia is slavery," Alexis de
Tocqueville observed long before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime.
This system of total subordination of the interests of
satellite states to those of the Soviet Union—sometimes without distinguishing
whether the interests of the Russian Empire or "the homeland of the Soviet
proletariat" were being defended—inevitably provoked opposition in the subjugated
countries, and not only from anti-communists. Even staunch communists could now
see that the conflicting interests between communist countries did not
automatically disappear under communist internationalism, as many had hoped.
The satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe largely retained their
borders drawn after the First World War, so that territorial claims still
persist within the communist system today. The only territorial changes were
made to the benefit of the Soviet Union, at the expense of Finland, the Baltic states (effectively annexed by Russia), Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Furthermore, countries with a Western cultural and
economic tradition now depend on Russia, a situation justified by Soviet
leaders in the interest of world communism.
For reasons of political expediency, the
"people's democracies" formally behave as sovereign states,
independent of the Soviet Union. The virtual Soviet occupation is disguised by
the Warsaw Pact. Stalin, however, ensured "monolithic unity" through
control of the communist parties, the true power brokers. In this way, the
Soviet government—which is also the party
leadership—maintains complete dependence on the satellite governments. This
control is reinforced and guaranteed by the presence of the Red Army. The
importance of this military control is demonstrated by the fact that only
communist countries where Soviet troops are not stationed, such as Yugoslavia,
Red China, and Albania, were able to oppose the dictates of the Soviet leadership.
In the Soviet satellite system, the suitability and
loyalty of those who control the communist parties, and through them the
governments in the satellite countries, are of paramount importance. Local
leaders must be unconditionally loyal to the Kremlin's directives, always aware
of their dependence. A satellite receives light and heat from the sun, while
gravitational force fixes its orbit. Leaders of satellite countries who, in
contrast to Moscow, seek support within their own nation or rely on their own
merits and popularity, are not true satellites and, therefore, cannot be
tolerated.
This moment took on great significance with the
emergence of the controversial Tito Stalin. The Yugoslav dictator came to power
as a creation of Stalin himself, who installed him in 1937 as General Secretary
of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, replacing Josip Cizinski Gorkic, a native
of Bosnia but of Ukrainian descent. Gorkić was accused of Trotskyist
tendencies and disappeared from Russia during the infamous purges that targeted
most of the former Yugoslav communist leaders. (Tito played a shadowy role in
this, one that remains unclear.)
Stalin, seeing the failure of communist tactics in
Germany, which had actually benefited National Socialism, inaugurated the
Popular Front policy. Instead of continuing to attack socialists, the
democratic center, and the left, it was necessary to infiltrate and win them
over under the guise of fighting a common enemy. The same tactic, albeit
somewhat modified, was applied internationally during the last war, when the
Soviet Union, due to a confluence of special circumstances, allied itself with
the Western democracies. At that time, the "anti-fascist fronts" were
transformed in certain countries into "national liberation movements"
whose primary objective was to seize power.
With the war over, in the new situation and in those
countries where the communists came to power, they rigorously implemented the
system of totalitarian communist government, eliminating their former allies
first. On the international stage, the Western allies were transformed in the
blink of an eye into "imperialist warmongering instigators." This
change of tactic required abandoning slogans about national independence and
achieving "the total and absolute unity of will and action" of the
expanding Soviet empire, adopting an intransigent stance toward both internal
and external adversaries of communism. If some communist leaders felt too
content in their role as rulers of the newly independent countries, the principle
should have been applied: new policies, new executors. It turned out, it is
true, that some communist leaders did not adapt well to the new situation, even
though Stalin, even before the war, tried to hand over the leadership of the
communist parties to absolutely loyal people, eliminating intellectuals and
replacing them with former workers, without formal education, but aware of
their ability, militancy, discipline, dedication to the communist cause, and
above all, personal loyalty to Stalin.
When these subversive
elements, lacking a broad perspective, occupied key positions in the satellite
states, inevitable difficulties arose. The leaders, deprived of the conditions for
independent action, had to act for years and years with a degree of
independence (the dissolution of the Comintern) as defenders of national
interests against the occupation and influence of the Third Reich and Fascist
Italy. They were prone to defend both personal and, in some cases, national
interests. Although they did not openly declare themselves against the Moscow
leadership, antagonisms and rivalries for influence persisted among the
satellite governments. Tito can serve as a typical example. He was a
metalworker who received political training in Russia. As general secretary of the
Yugoslav Communist Party, he resolved internal party conflicts, fueled by
intellectuals, following Stalin's instructions. He achieved some successes
through his independent actions against Stalin's wishes and was the first to
fall with his group when Stalin, for the reasons mentioned above, initiated a
new political course, introducing changes in the communist leadership of the
satellite states.
During the previous war, Tito took advantage of the
inaction and Great Serbian chauvinism of General Draza Mihailovic, thus
bringing him into conflict with the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London,
which was recognized by Moscow. Mihailovic, Tito's rival in Serbia, was
formally the Minister of War in the government-in-exile. Stalin, while needing
the support of the Western democracies, which backed the Yugoslav government in
London, did not want such conflicts. Only in the final phase of the war did
Tito have Moscow's support, and at the end of 1944, the Red Army installed him
as president in Belgrade.
He then had to fight without direct Moscow's backing,
since, under the agreement between Churchill and Stalin, the restored
Yugoslavia was to be a sphere of ambilateral influence, so the Soviets could
not occupy Yugoslav territory and have absolute control of the country. Later,
following the Cominform resolution, the Yugoslav communists bitterly complained
that Stalin, while he needed the Anglo-Saxons, was willing to divide
Yugoslavia. Moreover, as mentioned, even after the war, Stalin did not support
Tito's territorial claims. His opposition to Tito's plans for a Balkan
federation under Belgrade's leadership is well known.
Stalin's position was determined by numerous factors,
the main ones of which have already been mentioned. It should be added that
Stalin disliked an overly powerful and arrogant satellite state that, under the
pretext of defending Serbian interests, had united the resistance forces during
the war. Nevertheless, Tito was able to oppose Stalin precisely because of the
latter's shifting tactics with the Western Allies, which were so heavily
criticized in Belgrade. Stalin did not insist on the occupation of Yugoslavia,
which, moreover, was already a communist country. On the other hand, despite
the similar structure of the Communist Party of Serbia and its traditional
allegiance to Russia, Tito was able to oppose Stalin, also due to the
megalomaniacal mentality of his collaborators, so characteristic of the social
psychology of the Balkan mountain people.
Furthermore, non-Serbian communist leaders from Westernized
countries, such as Croatia and Slovenia, vehemently abhorred Russian-Soviet
concepts and the practice of communist monopoly. Tito had the opportunity to
witness Stalinist methods firsthand during the purges in Russia, in which he
participated. He knew that within the autocratic tradition of Eastern Europe,
the loss of power meant the loss of all privileges, the endangerment of
freedom, and even one's life. The fate of certain communist leaders in Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, eliminated by Stalin during the process of
consolidating "monolithic unity," provides clear evidence of this.
Therefore, Tito, until then "more Stalinist than
Stalin himself," had no choice but to oppose Moscow's dictates.
Capitulation would mean losing the privileges of power, freedom, and life
itself. Opposition was risky, but the only way to save all of that. Cornered,
Tito, though a fanatical communist and impervious to intellectual concerns like
those of Djilas, sought and obtained the support of the capitalist West, which
he so despised, hoping for and anticipating its imminent collapse. Thus, the
communist dictator, backed by the monolithic Communist Party, had to find
ideological justification for his actions when accused of betraying communist
ideals. A long controversy then began regarding relations between communist
countries and the Soviet Union.
Once again, Tito was lucky. As is well known,
relations between the governments of Moscow and Belgrade reached a complete
understanding after Stalin's death and Molotov's withdrawal. Tito's standing
with his fellow communists improved, but this does not mean that the conflict
between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties, which hold power in both
countries, has been resolved. The Yugoslav leaders cannot accept the Soviet
interpretation of unity, which implies the Kremlin's right to completely
control communist parties in satellite states and to eliminate unfavorable and
incompatible leaders.
It is obvious that Tito cannot agree to these
conditions, nor can Moscow renounce its concept of the monolithic unity of
international communism. Profound changes—not just minor concessions—would have
to occur in the Soviet leaders' views for Tito to rejoin the communist bloc
without risking his power, his personal freedom, and his life. What Red China
achieved—that is, the tolerance of certain differences in the interpretation of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine—cannot be expected of Yugoslavia, a weak and small
country dominated by Serbia, which has been considered a sphere of Russian
interests for centuries.
Therefore, all objective factors indicate that Tito
cannot return to the Soviet bloc and that Yugoslavia's questionable
independence would not be jeopardized if the United States were to modify its
aid policy.
The
Real Danger Ignored
The independence of Tito's Yugoslavia, in the opinion
of proponents of the "realist position," would be of such importance
to US interests that even larger contributions and even more detrimental moral
and political concessions would be justified.
Regardless of whether the easing of tensions on
Yugoslavia's borders with Greece, Italy, and Austria served Stalin's purposes,
and setting aside the question of whether such advantages should have been paid
for at such a price, it is undeniable that in the first years following the
Cominform Resolution, there were changes in this sector favorable to the
Western powers. It suffices to mention the Balkan Pact of Friendship and
Cooperation, signed in Ankara on February 28, 1953, by Turkey, Greece, and
Yugoslavia, which a year later, with the additional act signed in Bled on
August 9, 1954, was transformed into a military alliance. Since Greece and
Turkey were members of NATO, and since Yugoslavia was then under pressure from
the Soviet bloc, it was, in effect, a defensive alliance against Soviet
aggression.
However, after Stalin's death, and following the
exchange of visits between Khrushchev and Tito, the Balkan Pact very quickly
became a dead letter. Tito and the Yugoslav communists welcomed the first
opportunity to re-establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union and its
satellites. Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade and a series of pronouncements on
the culpability of Stalin and Molotov for the conflict with Yugoslavia pleased
Tito's vanity and were met with great relief by Yugoslav communists, who were
displeased by the break with the Mecca of world communism. This turn of events
called into question the independence of Yugoslav foreign policy from Moscow.
This did not, however, discourage Western defenders of the policy of assisting
Tito. They interpreted Khrushchev's concession that "various paths lead to
socialism" as a confirmation of their illusions regarding national
communism. Indeed, they could argue that this view had had some impact on the
satellite states during the first phase of de-Stalinization. The Hungarian
rebellion, in its early stages, implied a resistance by the communists
themselves to the Stalinist conception of the methods of communist unity.
However, the brutal suppression of the Hungarian
revolution and Gomulka's opportunistic policies demonstrated that there were no
prospects for the success of national communism in the Warsaw Pact countries,
where Soviet troops were stationed. "The case of Yugoslavia is
particularly significant because the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations
indicates that rebellions against the Russian type of monolithism do not
necessarily negate the imperative need for communist unity in relation to the
non-communist world. Tito did not hesitate to side with Khrushchev against Imre
Nagy as soon as the latter, pressured by the rebels, agreed to introduce a
multi-party system and request aid from the West. If Tito did not fully
integrate into the Soviet bloc, it was not due to US aid, but because
Khrushchev insisted on the Leninist-Stalinist thesis of the unity of world
communism, which implies rigid and total control of state organs in satellite
countries.
In Moscow, theories of communist 'polycentrism' and,
specifically, the creation of a directorate that would govern the policy of the
communist world with the equal participation of the Soviet Union, Red China,
and Yugoslavia in the first phase, could not flourish. If the Soviets had to
tolerate certain Chinese criticisms, a power of First, they are unwilling to tolerate
any such actions from Yugoslavia, a relatively small and weak country, which
they consider to be within their sphere of influence. Furthermore, the Soviet
leadership did not fail to take preventative measures against the perceived
threat of a Chinese candidacy for the leadership of the communist bloc.
On the one hand, they accelerated the Russification of
Central Asia to prevent the danger of Chinese expansion, and on the other, they
intensified their political and economic control over satellite states, with
the aim of consolidating the Soviet empire's positions in Europe, conquered by
Stalin. This prevents Tito from exploiting the tension between Moscow and
Beijing. Nevertheless, the communist headquarters in Moscow is now less
inclined than ever to abandon the principles of communist monolithism, the only
thing that could facilitate Tito's return to the communist bloc without
submitting to Moscow's total control and without risking his removal as leader
of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
Tito's aspirations also face sharp Chinese criticism
regarding Yugoslav "revisionism." Beijing, which has not yet carried
out Its expansionist plans run counter to Khrushchev's
interpretation of "peaceful coexistence." Having already established
its satellite system, Russia needs a pause to consolidate its conquests, gather
new strength to secure its leadership of the communist world, and perhaps
achieve global dominance through extortionate tactics without resorting to war.
Virulent Chinese communism refuses to compromise, and by attacking Tito, it
seeks to undermine Khrushchev. Khrushchev, even if he wished to, avoids
provoking the Chinese by making concessions to Tito that align with the
Yugoslav dictator's desires and ambitions. China's forceful stance on this matter
is evident in its defense of Albania against the alleged agreement between Tito
and Khrushchev to subordinate it to Yugoslavia.
Tito, having reached the sad realization that he could
not occupy a position of influence and personal security within the Soviet
bloc, tried to establish himself as one of the leaders of the Third World, a
position incompatible with the strength and importance of Yugoslavia. We have
already seen that the hopes of certain American circles that the neutrality
propagated by Tito would be equidistant between Moscow and Washington were not
fulfilled. That Tito thought quite the opposite is evident from the program of
the League of Yugoslav Communists, approved at its congress held in Ljubljana
in 1958. This program states that the nationalization practiced by certain
newly independent countries should not be interpreted as the beginning of the
capitalist system, but rather as the first step toward socialism.
This also aligns with communist theories concerning
"national liberation movements," whose independence would be the
first phase of total "liberation," that is, the establishment of the
communist regime. This also aligns with Tito's "positive coexistence"
and Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" (a mere difference in
terminology), which Soviet ideologues define as "the highest form of class
struggle." Neutrality, in Tito's interpretation, would consist of
establishing ties between Soviet communism on the one
hand and the politicians and bureaucrats of underdeveloped countries on the other.
Tito presents the initial industrialization achievements of Yugoslavia to the
Afro-Asian peoples as an attractive example for capital-poor countries.
Industrialization in these countries would be viable only through socialist
methods.
We are thus witnessing the paradoxical phenomenon of
the US, champion of democracy and the free market, financing the campaign of
the Yugoslav communist dictator against the interests and influence of the West
and of themselves. They not only finance Tito's costly economic experiments but
also directly fund the propaganda that Yugoslavia could not afford on its own.
In just over a year, Yugoslavia granted loans totaling more than $100 million,
namely: $40 million to India; $15.4 million to Ceylon; $10 million to Indonesia;
$10 million to Ethiopia; $10 million to the United Arab Republic; $5.5 million
to Sudan; $5 million to Morocco; and a five-year loan to Ghana to finance a
number of industrial plants. It also granted loans to certain Latin American
countries, especially Brazil and Argentina.
All of this should prove the effectiveness of the
Yugoslav communist system. The Tito regime also engaged in intense direct
propaganda. According to official figures, in the period 1950-52 alone, 111
newspapers were printed in Yugoslavia in 17 languages, in addition to large
editions of books and pamphlets in the main languages. This activity increased
over time. Although Tito, in his frequent trips to Asia and Africa, also
visited countries whose governments were closer to Eastern absolutist
monarchies than to "people's democracies," his preferences leaned
toward countries with the potential to quickly transform "aid for national
liberation" into a communist takeover. Yugoslavia systematically defended
the Castro regime at the UN, as well as Gizenga's aspirations in Congo and the
leftist factions in Algeria.
At the same time that the foreign ministers of the 19
Latin American republics unanimously condemned the Soviet intervention in Cuba
at the Washington meeting, considering it a danger to the free institutions of
the Western Hemisphere, Tito, in a joint declaration with Brezhnev, president
of the Soviet Union, released on October 3 of this year, blamed the United
States for the strained relations with Cuba and invited them "to normalize"
their relations with the Cuban communist regime.
"Bearing in mind the strained situation of
relations between the United States and Cuba," the joint statement reads,
"and some of the aggressive and imperialist declarations from extremist
circles in the United States, which are sowing unrest in the world, both sides
declare themselves in favor of the normalization of relations." They
called for "normal relations" to be established on the principles of
"peaceful coexistence," at a time when Russian technicians were
rapidly assembling the bases for their missiles with atomic
warheads, something the Yugoslav dictator was likely aware of.
In the same communiqué, Tito adopted the Soviet
viewpoint on all issues of world politics, even opposing the political and
economic integration of Western Europe.
This coincided with a series of solemn joint
Yugoslav-Soviet declarations and with the recognition, included in the program
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1961), that Yugoslavia
"belongs to the socialist camp" and that it had "wisely adopted
the socialist path."
Yugoslavia's current "independence" from
Moscow lies in its refusal to sign the Warsaw Pact. Tito did not do so for fear
of the presence of Soviet troops in Yugoslavia, which would imply their total
control of the country. His emphatic adherence to "peaceful
coexistence" is also due to Khrushchev's delaying tactics, which buy him
time. An open conflict between the two blocs would force him to take a stand
and allow foreign troops to enter the country, both of which would mean the end
of his power.
Tito's opposition to the stationing of Soviet troops
in Yugoslavia undoubtedly brought certain advantages to the West. However, it
is also necessary to consider that, despite the enormous investments and moral
commitments, the advantages derived from the Balkan Pact disappeared, and Tito
refused all military cooperation with NATO member countries. To avoid certain
Western contacts and controls, Tito renounced new American aid.
The value of such "independence" diminishes
when one considers the very real possibility of Yugoslavia's return to the
Soviet bloc should changes occur in the communist leadership in Belgrade. This
is especially true in the case of Tito's death, an elderly man exhausted by his
turbulent life. His political heirs have been the subject of much discussion in
the European press for some time. Within Yugoslavia, a silent struggle exists
among his presumed successors, related to the planned reform of the Yugoslav
constitution.
The Serbian communists want to strengthen central
power in order to perpetuate Serbia's hegemony over the other peoples of
Yugoslavia. Moscow, in turn, favors this centralist trend, as it traditionally
abhors Western influence through Croatia and Slovenia and hopes that the new
Serbian communist leaders, less involved during the Tito-Stalin conflict, might
accept Soviet conditions. This would align with Serbia's traditional aspiration
to be Russia's proxy in the Balkans, thus facilitating its hegemony in
southeastern Europe. With Russian support, Serbia could oppose the territorial
claims of neighboring countries, particularly Bulgaria, regarding Macedonia,
and Albania, which demands the annexation of adjacent territories
inhabited by 800,000 Albanians and refuses to be a satellite state, a position
assigned to it by both Belgrade and Moscow.
With Russian backing, Serbia could implement measures
of extreme repression against the discontented peoples of Yugoslavia,
especially the Croats and Slovenes, who, during the period 1945-1948, when the
Russian colossus stood behind the Serbian leadership, endured perhaps the most
difficult times in their long history. This repression took the form of a
veritable genocide, about which the free world knows little or nothing. The free
world is only partially familiar with religious persecutions that tended to
exclude not only the social influence of religion, but also the influence of
the West in general.
In favor of Yugoslavia's possible return to the Soviet
bloc, one can also cite the many affinities between Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union. Both are multinational states, dominated by a people: the Soviet Union
by the Russian people; Yugoslavia by the Serbian people. Hence,
a certain analogy in their political and social structures. Yugoslavia's
internal order is a faithful copy of that of the Soviet Union. Yugoslav
communism is closer to Russian-style Marxism than communism in other countries
with a Western tradition. The Serbian communists, when most
dependent on American aid, never ceased to emphasize the "corrosive
nature" of the "rotten West's" influence. Moreover, there is solidarity among the "new"
communist class at the international level.
Although Tito ordered a ruthless crackdown on
Stalinists within the ranks of the Yugoslav Communist Party at the height of
the conflict with the Kremlin, in this struggle he acted in accordance with his
Russian-style political training. He managed to restore Yugoslavia thanks,
first and foremost, to Serbian support. He was tolerated in Belgrade as the
restorer of Yugoslavia based on an expanded Serbia, despite his officially
proclaimed Croatian origins. It is worth noting Tito's complete lack of
patriotic sentiment, given that he is lauded as the creator of national
communism. The multinational Yugoslav state represents for him, first and
foremost, an instrument of power. Raison d'État is the guiding principle of his
policy.
Hence, in the current situation, he strives more for
the favor of Moscow than for that of Washington. In this respect, he acts with
stark realism. The Western powers refrain from exerting pressure on his regime,
so he is careful not to provoke Moscow, the only serious threat. When he cannot
participate on an equal footing in leading world communism, Tito contents
himself with the role of the tolerated schismatic. Khrushchev accepts this
political game and does not jeopardize Tito's communist regime, hoping that
Yugoslavia will eventually rejoin the Soviet bloc. His primary objective, in
the current phase, is to consolidate the Soviet Union and its empire in Europe,
transforming them into a firm foundation, a bastion of the world communist
revolution. Meanwhile, China and Yugoslavia are to fulfill other roles in their
respective spheres within the overall strategy of the world revolution.
Although this state of affairs does not align with
Tito's innermost desires, he accepts it, as it allows him to be tolerated by
the communist countries and to secure the base of his regime, comprised of a
relatively small group of militant communists. Those who reluctantly distanced
themselves from the Soviet bloc now applaud every rapprochement with Moscow,
which for Serbian communists is not only the headquarters of the world
revolution but also the motherland of the Orthodox Slavs, Serbia's natural
protector.
It seems that Tito is not overly concerned with the
question of his political legacy. When he thinks about future relations with
Moscow, his sympathies, those of a committed communist with a Russian
education, lie with those who would like Yugoslavia integrated into the Soviet
bloc. Among them, it is as if there were a tactical agreement:
what Tito cannot achieve, his successors will.
The
Need for a Genuine Policy Toward Communist Yugoslavia
We have been able to outline the main aspects of the
Tito-Stalin conflict. However, it can be concluded that after an objective
study of the nature and scope of this conflict, it is clear that the
assumptions of the proponents of the realist policy towards communist
Yugoslavia are neither accurate nor precise, and therefore cannot serve as a
basis for a successful policy.
First, the abundant aid provided to Tito for over a
decade cannot be considered a trigger for any strategic advantages for Western
democracies. In this case, the post hoc, ergo propter hoc proposition is
worthless, since Tito had to abandon his aggressive policy against the West
before he had requested and received financial, food, and military aid, as well
as some kind of guarantees against attack by the Soviet Union or its satellite states.
He had to abandon this policy, which was senseless and
dangerous without the support of the communist bloc, as soon as his fellow
communists and allies became his adversaries, seeking to bring to power men
unconditionally loyal to Stalin. The continuation of the aggressive policy of
"more Stalinist than Stalin himself" would have led Western
governments to support the resistance of the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia,
doubly dangerous for Tito: as a popular reaction against communist tyranny and
against Serbia's hegemony over the other peoples and numerous national
minorities. In this way, the West would likely have achieved greater strategic
advantages without having to make uncomfortable political and moral
compromises.
These advantages would have been permanent, not
dependent on Tito's oscillating policies between Washington and Moscow. Even if
Stalin had eliminated Tito's group, the aggressive anti-Western policy would
have been mitigated. It is true that in such an emergency, initial successes like
Yugoslavia's accession to the Balkan Pact, ultimately directed against the
Soviet Union, would not have occurred. These would
certainly have been ephemeral successes. They depended more on Moscow than on
Washington, because when Soviet pressure against Tito's regime eased after
Stalin's death, the reversal immediately occurred, calling into question the
aforementioned strategic advantages of the West.
The authors of this Realpolitik regarding communist
Yugoslavia are highly unrealistic in their premises about the scope of the
conflict between the Yugoslav communists and the center of world communism in
Moscow. Judging relations in the Balkans and Eastern Europe according to the
criteria and standards prevalent in Western civilization proves incapable of fully
understanding the relationships prevailing within the age-old autocratic
tradition of the Byzantine and Russian empires and their reflection in the
communist conception of discipline and monolithic unity.
They mistakenly assume that the determining factor in
the Stalin-Tito conflict was the latter's supposed patriotism, while what was
at stake was preserving his own interests and privileges, since, according to
the deeply rooted Byzantine tradition, the loss of power also implies the loss
of life. If national interests were also involved, Tito's group conceived of
them in terms of conquest and the preservation of its absolute power. "La
patrie, c'est moi!" (The homeland, it's me!) It is also necessary to bear
in mind that the defense of "national interests" in a multinational
state like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union signifies the expansionist
nationalism of the dominant ethnic group.
A policy conceived on false premises, insufficient
knowledge of the real situation, and moreover, misinterpreted, could not
provide long-term political advantages. The independence of Yugoslavia, so
highly valued by the State Department, is already proving highly problematic,
as there is a serious danger that, should there be a change in Yugoslavia's
political leadership, all dissension between the Yugoslav and Soviet communist
parties would be eliminated, given the existing agreement between the two
countries on major international issues. In such a case, the West would
definitively lose all its advantages in Southeast Europe. The consequences
would also be felt in the internal relations of the European Union itself.
The United States should take all necessary measures
to prevent such an unfavorable development. It is essential to ensure that so
many material sacrifices, and above all moral ones, are not in vain. To this
end, the State Department should abandon the inconsistent premise that dictator Tito, faced with political conditions, would have
only one alternative: to capitulate to Moscow. From the outset, there has been
another, less drastic alternative: making concessions to the West.
Solely due to the defensive nature of American policy
toward communist expansionism and a naive optimism regarding the spontaneous
evolution of communist regimes, prevalent especially among intellectuals, this
alternative, which corresponds to the true situation within the communist bloc,
was not considered from the beginning. Furthermore, Belgrade is aware that its
return to the Soviet blockade would signify an unconditional capitulation, with
all the inherent dangers for Tito's group, whereas by making significant
concessions to the West, its physical integrity would be safeguarded. This
notion lies at the root of Milovan Djilas's evolution toward Western
conceptions of socialism.
One of the prejudices, perpetuated and disseminated by
the propaganda of the Yugoslav regime, is also the legend of Tito, a proud and
patriotic figure, willing to capitulate to Moscow, with all the dangers that
entails, rather than accept political conditions from the West. Such naiveté is
likely to elicit only humorous comments in a cruel and implacable environment
where the struggle for power is the guiding principle of politics, for it is
the condition for self-preservation of those who hold absolute power.
The legend surrounding Tito's patriotic pride becomes
untenable in light of a critical and objective analysis. For Tito, as for all
genuine communists, the dictatorship of the proletariat takes precedence over
national interests. If Tito, being above all a fanatical communist, could
request and receive aid from the capitalist West he hates and whose downfall he
desires and prepares, he can also sacrifice his patriotic sentiments, if he has
any. Therefore, all his solemn pronouncements that he would never make
political concessions amount to mere Eastern bargaining, at odds with reality.
There is precedent that proves Tito would be capable of repaying Western
assistance with political concessions.
This is unequivocally proven by their withdrawal from
the Trieste dispute in 1954. At that time, they repeatedly threatened to
unleash war if Trieste were incorporated into Italy under the 1948 declaration
by the Western governments. That withdrawal—as Sir Anthony Eden, an active
participant in the negotiations and the settlement regarding Trieste, concluded
in 1956, notes—"had cost the Allies dearly in men, money, and ill humor.
It took considerable effort to convince the Yugoslavs, but we were able to
sweeten the pill. One of the sweeteners was financial, and in this respect, the
United States government was generous and prudent. It offered twenty million
dollars, to which our Chancellor of the Exchequer added two million pounds to
help defray the construction of a new port in Area B and for other needs."
This single instance of eliminating one of the most
virulent hotspots of the Cold War with a paltry compensation would be enough to
dispel the myth that Tito is unwilling to make political concessions, were it
not for the deeply ingrained prejudices among Western experts.
There is no doubt that any proposal of political
conditions to Tito's regime would currently encounter certain difficulties.
Belgrade is already accustomed to receiving abundant aid without any
reciprocation. Moreover, in the event of Western pressure with potential
support for the resistance of the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia, Tito could
count on some Soviet backing. In any case, he would think twice before
requesting Soviet military intervention, as that would amount to unconditional
surrender to Moscow.
For Tito, Yugoslavia's "independence" from
the Soviet Union matters more than it does to the United States. His continued
hold on power depends on it, and that is what Tito values most. Given the
evident alignment of Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policy, Yugoslavian
independence loses its value for the United States. In the current situation,
Washington, even if it did not obtain the desired guarantees through economic
and political pressure, would not lose much; on the other hand, if it did obtain
them, their value would be such that they would justify a certain risk.
The question of political concessions in Yugoslavia's
internal affairs requires careful examination, unlike the problem of Tito's
foreign policy. Regardless of the controversy over whether Tito is merely
seeking self-affirmation in the "Third World" or is cooperating with
the Soviet Union, US funding of Tito's agitation in Afro-Asian and even Latin
American countries makes no sense. What is the point of demanding that South American
governments isolate themselves from Castro's Cuba with a Great Wall of China,
while simultaneously funding a regime that aligns itself with Fidel Castro's
regime in its role as a Soviet proxy?
As relations between Moscow and Belgrade improve, it
becomes increasingly clear that, despite the disagreements between Moscow,
Beijing, and Belgrade, basic solidarity exists toward non-communist countries.
There is a striking similarity between Tito's position regarding underdeveloped
countries, as expressed in the 1958 program of the Yugoslav Communist Party,
and the statements made by his bitter critic, Zhou Enlai, in his speech of
August 20 of the same year, in which he advocated for the transfer of
anti-Western agitation from Asia and Africa to Latin American countries.
The Chinese communist ideologue maintained:
"...that the peoples of Latin American countries have something in common
with the peoples of Asia and Africa. They have common goals: to oppose
colonialism, to oppose aggression and imperialist intervention, to demand
peace, to oppose war, to press for independent development of the national
economy and to emerge from underdevelopment; in other words..., the peoples of
Latin American, Asian, and African countries have common aspirations and
demands." If Tito wants to trade with the Western Hemisphere, fine, but
what benefit can his announced visit to several Latin American countries bring?
From this necessarily incomplete analysis of such a complex problem, it follows
that the current policy of "calculated risk" of aid to Tito's regime
was not properly adapted to the real situation.
We are not among those who deny all value of this
policy. We agree with them when they emphasize the moral factors inherent in
the policy of aid to a communist dictatorship by the democratic powers of the
Christian West. But we believe that simply denying the efforts made, without
offering an alternative to current policy, means abandoning the oppressed
peoples of Central and Eastern Europe to their sad fate. An imperfect, activist
policy is always better than total abstention.
What we consider untenable in current politics are the
unfounded assessments of relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Because of
petty squabbles, the proponents of so-called Realpolitik failed to consider that
the liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia could serve as a powerful
instrument of political and economic pressure, which was within their reach.
Nor did they attempt to secure guarantees that the provisional and limited
strategic advantages of the West, resulting from the Moscow-Belgrade
antagonism, would not be lost in the event of political changes in Belgrade.
After so many missed opportunities—the last being the
Hungarian Revolution—the current possibilities are quite limited. Nevertheless,
given the evident danger of Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet bloc, the only
remaining option, albeit belated and in a less than favorable situation, is to
prevent another defeat for the democratic countries in their struggle with the
Soviet bloc. It is less risky to risk failure than to passively await an
unfavorable, seemingly inevitable, turn of events. Even if the desired success
is not achieved, the attempt to prevent Soviet control in the
Adriatic-Danubian-Balkan region would have positive moral consequences that
should not be disregarded, even by those who subscribe to political realism,
unless they believe, in the traditional spirit of realpolitik, that moral
values are irrelevant in political affairs.
An attempt, however belated and unproductive, to influence
the situation in southeastern Europe would rekindle the hopes of oppressed
peoples and would be interpreted worldwide as proof that the United States and
other Western democratic powers are not abandoning their commitment to
liberation. The repercussions within the United States itself would be
favorable, as it would invalidate accusations of betrayal, such as those
leveled after the last world war when disillusionment with the Soviet ally was
widespread. The first victims of public disappointment would be the academic
specialists, current supporters of the policy of aid to Tito's regime, stripped
of any political conditions or guarantees.
"Freedom cannot be upheld in one place by
surrendering it in another," declared Secretary of State Dean Rusk on September
30, explaining why concessions in Berlin could not be made in exchange for
advantages in Cuba. The principle of the indivisibility of freedom and the
liberating vocation of the United States, summarized in those words of Rusk,
should not be systematically forgotten when it comes to the hopes of the
oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia.
One of the clearest symptoms of such an attitude, and
therefore of the propagandistic success of Titoism in Western democratic
circles, is the systematic omission of any mention of Yugoslav communism when
discussing the need to liberate the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe from
the communist yoke. To cite just one example, the representatives of the
subjugated peoples of Yugoslavia are not included in the unofficial organization
of the Assembly of Captive Nations of Europe, even though they are victims of
communist tyranny like the other peoples of that region.
Moreover, certain peoples of Yugoslavia suffer double
oppression: that of the communist regime and that of their own nation, since
they are deprived of the right to national self-determination, that is, to have
their own nation-state. The same is true in the Soviet empire, where the
peoples, with the exception of the Russians, lack true national freedom. By silencing
or embellishing the bitter truth about Yugoslavia, ignoring the fundamental
rights of its peoples in order not to offend a cruel dictatorship, no political
advantages are gained; rather, the sincerity of Western governments in
defending the principles of our culture is called into question. At the same
time, the neutralist propaganda of the "third position" is fueled,
which presents the conflict between two blocs as a mere struggle between two
imperialisms. Consequently, the other peoples - according to Tito's propaganda
- should adhere to the policy of "non-committed nations", as useful
as it is supposedly morally justified.
Only by upholding the right to freedom of all
countries under communist captivity can the moral authority of the leading
powers of the West be affirmed, giving deeper meaning and justification to the
sacrifices essential in the defense of freedom threatened by international
communism.
Francisco
J. Orlich, first American president of Croatian origin
Ante Bonifacic, Chicago
Croats learn from their national history that there
were 27 grand viziers in the Ottoman Empire during its height, of Croatian
origin and lineage, and that Croatian was the diplomatic language at the court
of Istanbul. At the same time, all of Europe followed with admiration and trembling the struggle of the peoples of the Danube basin
against Turkish penetration into Europe, and Pope Leo X also conferred upon the
Croats the title of "Antemurale Christianitatis" (Blanket of
Christendom).
This psychological trait of dynamism, impetuosity,
unwavering loyalty, and adherence to ideals also entails the tragedy of the
Croats since their arrival in the Mediterranean in the early Middle
Ages. Politically fragmented and divided religiously, the Croats gave their
neighbors some of their most illustrious geniuses. Laurana was Bramante's
teacher, and Julio Klovic, "Croat of Croatia," as he often signed his
works, was a patron of the young El Greco. Beethoven's teacher was Franz Haydn,
whom not only the Croats but also Hadow, the renowned Oxford music professor,
claim was descended from Croatian refugees in Burgenland (Austria).
Before the Second World War, "Illustration
Française" had published, as a "scandalous chronicle," that the
last king and apostolic emperor of Austria was the illegitimate son of General
and Viceroy of Croatia, Joseph Jelačić, and that in 1848,
Jelačić saved him from the throne following the rebellion of
Hungarian patriots instead of proclaiming himself King of Croatia, as his
supporters, including those in Bosnia (then under Turkish rule), had demanded
and expected. As a reward, the Croatians received what the Hungarians received
as punishment: the absolutism of the Viennese clique.
It is no wonder, then, that a Croatian poet concluded
that "sors boni Croatae emigrare domo" (the destiny of a good
Croatian patriot is to emigrate from his homeland).
The Croatian people, possessors of the most beautiful
coastline in Europe, fringed by nearly a thousand islands, some of which can be
crossed by swimming, have been among the finest maritime peoples since 852,
when they fought against the Saracens in Italy, saving Byzantium, and continue
to be so today. Like the Phoenicians, Greeks, Venetians, English, Portuguese,
and Spanish, the Croatians sailed the seas in their ships, both small and
large. The Argosy is the name of the most elegant ship built in Croatian
shipyards.
Michael Pracat, merchant and shipowner, a
distinguished son of the city-state of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), whose motto was
"Parva sed nostra" (Small but ours), lent ducats to Charles V. The
Croatians' fervent love for their homeland sustained them through centuries of
struggle. While the Goths and Lombards became Italian, and the Franks and
Croats French, the Croats, as early as the 9th century, were fighting with Rome
to safeguard their right to use their national language in liturgical services.
Being staunch Catholics, they have not relinquished
this right to this day on the Adriatic coast, and especially on the island of
Krk, the ancestral home of Francisco Orlich, the first American president of
Croatian descent. The Popes granted the Croats this right after, according to
the mischievous anecdote of the Croatian chronicler and Latinist Thomas the
Archdeacon, the Pope himself shaved the beard of the monk Zdeda, who, in his
naiveté, believed that this act consecrated him a bishop.
"Parva sed nostra" is small but noble Costa
Rica, small like the independent and most advanced republics of the world:
Athens, Florence, Venice, and Dubrovnik, since paleontology teaches us that the
dinosaurs have disappeared and humans survived the Ice Age, as will happen in
future federations of the globe, when the diseases of contemporary gigantism
disappear and when humanity begins the new humanitarian era, overcoming "hominem
lupum" (man is wolf).
A few years before the outbreak of the Second World
War, Francisco Orlich, grandfather of the current president of Costa Rica, told
me his life story. He began as a cabin boy on a small sailboat, at the time the
only means of communication between our island and the mainland. He won the
favor of a fellow countryman who had come from Costa Rica, driven by the desire
to see his home once more. Of small stature, but singularly vigorous and
dynamic, Frane Orlich, as he was then called, ended up as a patrician in his
new homeland. He told me he had promised to donate an altar to the parish
church if his first banana and coffee export business was successful.
A devout believer in God, like his ancestors who for
nearly ten centuries had cultivated grapevines, fig trees, and olive groves,
and sown wheat in the same land, carrying images of Our Lady and the Miraculous
Crucifixes in processions, Francisco Orlich brought with him to the New World
the energy of his island and his forebears. Enterprising and diligent,
everything he touched flourished. His sons became ministers and members of
parliament in the free republic of Costa Rica, married descendants of women
from other coastal cities from Genoa to Cres, and his offspring adapted
perfectly to their homeland after studying in Europe.
Although the inhabitants of Krk were citizens of
Venice for four centuries, a century and a half ago Ivan Orlic, a popular poet
from Punat, wrote:
"And now that you all know the valiant lad,
I would rather stroll, fresh and healthy, through
Punat
Than nibble on
biscuits in the streets of Venice."
Likewise, Frane Orlich never forgot his birthplace.
"We share the same great-great-grandfather, and in him I saw something of
that mythical ancestor, who, like my grandfather and great-grandfather, drew
bread, wine, and gold from stone." When a group of Hungarian and Italian
financiers tried to seize control of the sea around our island, the young cabin
boy on the sailing ship from Punat founded the "Austro-Croatian"
company, perhaps the first democratic shipping society in Europe. On October
18, 1905, the first meeting of the farmers of the island of Krk took place with
the purpose of founding their own shipping society.
They decided to pool half a million Austro-Hungarian
crowns (US$100,000) to become masters of their sea. Each person could own only
two shares, and only those born on one of the islands of Quarnero, which,
according to an ancient legend, are the scattered bones of the young Absirto
from the time the Argonauts sought the Golden Fleece. The aim was for the
company to remain in the hands of the people, not speculators. Frane Orlic,
already considered a millionaire, spearheaded this endeavor, just as his
grandson now refuses to represent the Central American banana and coffee
magnates, instead striving to elevate his entire nation to the status of free
and independent citizens of a free and independent republic.
He himself, more than likely, is unaware of the extent
to which he is, in this respect, the grandson of the founder of the Orlich
family in Costa Rica. But so that his relatives (in my village there are more
than a thousand Orlics) would know how much he loved his adopted homeland, he
built a beautiful chalet called Costa Rica. Standing as children before the
iron gates of its garden, we learned our first Spanish words from the beak of a
famous Costa Rican parrot. Besides building a beautiful, modern mill, a
macaroni factory, and the first ice factory on the island, Frane Orlich was, in
his homeland, not only the first president of the first peasant navigation
society in Europe, but also a pioneer of contemporary progress and technology.
His closest friend was Antonio Mahnic, one of the
greatest bishops on the island in fourteen centuries. In his small citadel in
Krk, Mahnic had established a printing press and founded the Old Slavic
Academy, with the aim of defending the right of his flock to hear the services
of the Roman Catholic Church in their own language. And in his profound
writings, he reveals to the entire Croatian people the horrors of vice and
disorder, which from then on undermined not only the decadent Habsburg empire
but also led the people to concentration camps and the monolithic unity of the
communist adventurers of the New Class.
The Croats paid more dearly than any other people for
their love of freedom and independence. The West's blindness made them Tito's
slaves, and for several years now they have witnessed their extradition from
the refugee camps in Italy and Austria to Tito's executioners without anyone
saying a word, unlike what is happening now when the British return the Chinese
from Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the Croats, in a single generation, were
eyewitnesses to the collapse of several empires and kingdoms, and, with the
perseverance of their ancestors, they await freedom to build in their
independent state a flourishing republic of liberty, progress, well-being,
arts, and letters.
The new president of Costa Rica follows in his
grandfather's footsteps in the fight for the rights of the most vulnerable, and
on his first visit to the homeland of his ancestors and of Francisco Orlic I,
he saw that "everything his grandfather bequeathed was stolen by the
communists." Accustomed to propaganda tricks, although he traveled on the
ship provided by the communist regime, he knew that the ship did not belong to
the people who built it and that the crew earned less than $30 a month, the
same amount his brothers receive weekly in the United States as "allowance
when they are not working."
Croatians scattered throughout the world eagerly await the day their compatriot in Central America becomes
the champion of their age-old virtues: the captain of the free world, the
fighter for the freedom of all the oppressed, the believer in eternal justice and
in God, who gives meaning and purpose to everything. In this belief, they are
convinced that the free American republics now have within their ranks a
remarkable president, a champion of liberty and true democracy.
For
the Liberation of Croatia from Dual Imperialism
Michael A. Feighan, House of Representatives,
Washington
Below is the Spanish translation of the address
delivered by the Honorable Michael A. Feighan, Member of the U.S. Congress,
from Ohio, on May 6, 1962, in Cleveland, regarding the struggle and aspirations
of the Croatian people for their national independence. At the request of the
Honorable Feighan, his address was inserted in the Congressional Record
(Thursday, May 10, 1962, pp. A 2564-3566).
We have gathered here today to celebrate Croatia's
Independence Day and thus pay tribute to the once civilized nation submerged by
dual imperialism. This dual imperialism tends to exaggerate all the negative
aspects of Croatia's long history, distorting our knowledge of history and our
understanding of contemporary international affairs. But this dual imperialism
cannot expel the Croatian nation from the world stage. The spirit of national
independence is very strong in Croatia and in the hearts of Croatians living in
the free world.
Let us pause for a moment to examine this dual
imperialism I am speaking of. Its first aspect originates in Moscow, and it is
responsible for the imposition of the regime currently in power in Yugoslavia.
Some call it communist imperialism. I call it Russian imperialism, which is
what it truly is. In the Second World War, Yugoslavia collapsed because it was
a multinational state dictated at the conference table at the end of the First
World War. The nations involved did not approve of this arrangement. Between
the two world wars, Croatian national interests were undermined within this
multinational state.
The Croatian people were exploited and persecuted
because of their devotion to the ideals of national independence. It was
logical, then, that in the circumstances created by the war, Croatia should
declare its national independence. Croatia fought for its national independence
on two fronts: against the new Muscovite imperialism and the old imperialism of
the Yugoslav multinational state. This was a costly war for the Croatian
people, who paid dearly for their efforts to emulate the Founding Fathers of
the United States.
The Croats knew the price they would have to pay in
human sacrifices to achieve national independence and were prepared to pay it.
But the superiority of dual imperialism was overwhelming. Croatia's national
independence was lost in the global war, sacrificed to the independence of all
nations and the freedom of all people. This is one of the great tragedies in an
era of tragedies, during and after the Second World War. Russian cunning and
Stalin prevailed over Churchill and Roosevelt; Tito was enthroned in the
reconstructed multinational state of Yugoslavia, which became a vassal state of
Russia.
The second aspect of this dual imperialism stems from
the forced confinement of the Croatian nation within the Yugoslav Empire. Tito
fulfilled Moscow's mandate, destroying Croatia's national independence and
concealing this nation under the mantle of Yugoslavia. The old imperial system
of Yugoslavia was restored and perfected, closely linked by the dictator Tito
to Russian imperialism. Thus we see that Croatia, as a nation, and Croatian
national independence are submerged by two allied imperialisms—that of the
Yugoslav state and that of Russian imperialism, the guarantor of Yugoslav
imperialism.
Planned efforts have been made in the United States to
conceal the realities of this dual imperialism. Tito is presented as a kind of
"national communist" despite the fact that he rules over the
multinational empire of Yugoslavia. How nationalism can be equated with
imperialism is one of the great fallacies of our time. Yugoslavia is not a
nation, but a conglomerate composed of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and
Montenegro; all of them unique and distinct nations. We know that Tito's
communism does not differ from the communism of Khrushchev's regime.
The supporters of Tito's regime in the United States
suffered two major blows in recent months. The first was the conference of
so-called non-committal nations, held in Belgrade at Tito's invitation. The
participants were supposed to develop a program of principles and actions for
the "third force" of neutrality. The Russians decided to resume
atomic weapons testing while the Belgrade conference was in session. Tito led
the parade of Russian apologists, concocting every imaginable excuse for the
resumption of atomic tests. This should have proven Tito to be as neutral as
Khrushchev and made his alignment with Moscow crystal clear. But it didn't. His
apologists in the U.S. State Department found him innocent and, worse,
deserving of renewed American support.
At the May Day parade in Belgrade, Tito once again
revealed his true colours. The press reports indicated that the most
interesting feature of that parade was the brand-new Russian T-54 medium tanks,
manufactured in the USSR and delivered to Tito by his dear Russian friends.
These tanks were not the result of any agreement stipulated by Gromyko, who had
visited Tito just a few days earlier. They arrived in Titoland by virtue of a
secret, long-term agreement signed between Tito and his Russian protectors. Now
the question arises: Against whom will these tanks be used? Against
the Russians? There is not the slightest possibility of that happening,
since Tito always publicly proclaimed that he would march shoulder to shoulder
with his Russian comrades in the event of a conflict between East and West.
I am interested in what new excuses those within our
government who advocate for the continued shipments of wheat to Tito will now
invent. I wouldn't be surprised if they urged the shipment of an Atlas missile
to Tito, simply to show him that we can outshine the Russians. The timing is
certainly opportune for international blackmailers.
One of the reasons Tito still heads the communist
state of Yugoslavia is our support. Our domestic policy toward Yugoslavia has
been weak, aimless, and misguided. Just a few months ago, the Secretary of
State declared "that Yugoslavia, by virtue of our current Public Law 480,
is considered a friendly state." I reject the declaration that the
Yugoslav government is a friendly government. I agree that the people are
mostly friendly, but not Tito's communists.
American aid contributed to the consolidation of the
communist regime. Few crumbs reached the people. The Secretary of State
admitted that we have no means of ascertaining how this aid is being used or
whether it has been transferred to other satellite nations or to the Soviet
Union.
Recently, our newspapers reported that "Gromyko
ended his visit to Yugoslavia; relations improved markedly." I have seen
enough evidence to be convinced that, since 1950, Soviet-Yugoslav relations
were never strained. Let me give another example, besides tanks.
In 1959, the Russians completed a nuclear reactor for
Yugoslavia, installed at the Boris Kidric Nuclear Institute in Vinica. A large
number of Russian technicians have reappeared in the last two years.
Scientific, technical, and cultural delegations have multiplied. Tito has been
working in close coordination with the Russian intelligence system. He is
exporting the Russian-style revolution from 70 Yugoslav embassies and legations
around the world. They export Russian-style Marxism to Latin American
countries. Popovic, the Yugoslav foreign minister, will visit Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, and other Latin American countries to make contact with active communist
groups and cells.
These are not the actions of two hostile powers.
Despite this cooperation and large-scale U.S. aid, the Yugoslav communist
government is in dire straits. It is behind on debt payments and short-term
commercial payments to other nations through the National Bank of Yugoslavia.
They need $200 million a year to clear their debts. The situation is very
serious unless they receive help, even with U.S. aid amounting to almost $4
billion.
Our State Department, guided by the policy that we
must support so-called independent regimes that show a tendency to break with
Moscow, will certainly come to the aid of the Yugoslav regime. On the same day
that Gromyko emphasized the improvement in relations with Yugoslavia, our State
Department signed an agreement to provide Tito with $24 million worth of food
aid. Fourteen million dollars of that sum would be "repaid in dinars, the
communist currency, which is printed at the whim of the Marxist regime that
mocks our system. Even so, we grant them loans.
Not long ago, our ambassador to Yugoslavia, George
Kennan, was in the United States and strongly advocated for increased aid to
Tito.
It is understood that he would align himself with
Gromyko, since both believe in state welfare. George Kennan once said
"that communism contains the seeds of its own destruction." It seems
he is not practicing what he preaches.
We must modify this policy of supporting so-called
independent communist regimes or communist-type regimes of any kind. This
change can only be effected by people who speak out directly or by their duly
elected representatives.
I would like to cite an example of this one-sided
presentation of facts and how our State Department hesitates to justify its
position. I will quote a letter from the Secretary of State to the House Select
Committee on Export Controls:
"We know very well that Yugoslavia is a communist
country and has been since the end of the Second World War. President Tito and
the other high-ranking officials of the Yugoslav government have, of course,
been communists for most of their lives. The most important consideration from
the standpoint of our security, however, is that since 1948 Yugoslavia has not
been part of the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, Yugoslav policy has been a cause
of resentment and dissension within the communist bloc."
I challenge the Secretary of State to prove that
Yugoslav policy was ever a cause of resentment and dissension within the
communist bloc.
I will quote another paragraph from that astonishing
letter:
"Our policy toward Yugoslavia, therefore, is
long-lasting and well-tested. It has been successful. Many of the criticisms
that this policy has aroused are the result of public disappointment that our
aid to Yugoslavia did not bring Yugoslavia into complete alignment with our
foreign policy. Some of these disagreements stem directly from the Conference
of Neutral Nations held in Belgrade. Public disappointment with the outcome of
that meeting cannot, however, be based on any alignment of the Conference with
the Soviet Union. No such alignment occurred. Our public disappointment is
based on the failure of the neutral nations to adopt a position closer to that
of the Western world."
The letter ends with the following sentence: "A
full review of the facts leads us to the conclusion that the sale of jet
aircraft and the training (of Yugoslav pilots in the U.S.) that was part of the
sales agreement were fully justified."
This is yet another example of the one-sided and
unrealistic approach the State Department presented to the American people. Our
policy toward Yugoslavia has not been a success. It has been a disastrous
failure, insofar as it perpetuated an atheistic communist regime, a regime that
cruelly exploits the nations and peoples of Yugoslavia.
Let us now examine the view that our disappointment
stems from the fact that our aid to Yugoslavia did not achieve Yugoslavia's
full agreement with our foreign policy. That is not the real point of contention,
for the main problem is that Yugoslav foreign policy is directed entirely
against our system of government and our way of life. The American public is
not only disappointed, we are outraged.
How can the State Department fully justify selling jet
aircraft to Tito at a bargain price, to a government dedicated to the
destruction of our system of government?
All of this necessarily does not stem from stupidity
or a lack of knowledge of the facts. I would be very naive to think that there
is not some element of collusion there. A few years ago, a high-ranking
official told me something that corroborates my view. He had been shown a
letter from Tito addressed to the President of the United States. He began to
laugh when he read the letter. To the question, "What's so funny about
it?" he replied, "If it weren't so tragic, it would be amusing.
Titus's reasons for asking for help are almost identical to our political
documents. In fact, the wording is so similar that they could have been written
by the same person." As I said before, one of the viewpoints held by many
high-ranking people in government circles deliberately avoids public
examination of other courses of action that might better serve our national
needs and interests.
It is not so much the elected officials in our
government who approach political problems with such rigidity as the unelected
ones. They presume to know what is best for the people, as if they worked in
the offices of monarchies, and very often they feel above the electorate, their
errors being more frequent than their successes.
Those who plan policy at the State Department imposed
on our elected leaders the idea that we should help Tito. They imposed on our
leaders the policy that we should help the so-called independent communist
regimes. I have fought that policy in Congress, and I will continue to do so.
There are many indications that the covert thinking of
the State Department policy planners has been influenced by the proponents of
accommodation, infiltrated into high government positions. This has been
happening without interruption since 1955.
A massive effort is being made to neutralize the
American approach to the Russian and Yugoslav problem. This effort is directed
by thought manipulators in the Kremlin and Belgrade, and supported by their
agents and propaganda organs in the United States. They try to confuse, delay,
and falsify the truth. With this, they hope to create a degree of apathy, thus
ensuring the continuation of the monopoly of a privileged few in political
leadership.
In this case, knowledge is power. You know the truth.
Make your feelings and thoughts known to your neighbors and to the government.
Working together, we can contribute to the destruction of militant atheistic
communism, break Tito's tyrannical regime, and grant the people of Croatia the
right to national self-determination. We must commit ourselves to a positive
and assertive foreign policy program. We must:
1. Firmly support Berlin, which is an island of
freedom, prosperity, and the promise of liberation for peoples oppressed and
enslaved by the Russian empire.
2. Reject any Russian proposal that might suggest the
United States is prepared to endorse the status quo with respect to the current
Russian empire.
3. Courageously and vigorously support the political
principle of national self-determination as a peaceful solution to the Berlin
Crisis in Russian-occupied Germany.
4. Seek solutions to all outstanding issues with the
Russians in Central and Eastern Europe, insisting on the right to
self-determination of all nations involved.
5. Prepare for victory in the Cold War, for it will be
so if we persistently support these lines of political action.
Croatia will one day regain its freedom and national
independence. We must work together to hasten that happy day. I pledge my
unwavering support for the success of this cause.
Despite the beautiful rhetoric, the Communist Party
continues to scrupulously monopolize all sectors of production, administration,
and education. However, the contrast between words and deeds becomes
provocative, as serious issues have never been superficially resolved.
Self-criticism, criticism, and countless new plans demonstrate the
impracticality of state-imposed Marxism, which, moreover, succumbed from its
inception to the infiltration of bourgeois taste, the boulevard press,
sensationalism, and advertising, not to mention economic crimes, scams,
embezzlement, misappropriation, and the moral decay that even worries official
circles.
The resulting disappointments are directly related to
the hopes placed in it, the most bitter being that concerning the productivity
of socialism. Bakaric repeatedly acknowledged the system's failure. He later
stated that Marxism was applied among us "to the extent possible,"
which is not to say that things would have gone better had it been explained
more extensively. Modesty turns to doubt when Bakaric asserts that
"experience constantly raises new problems (...)" regarding all forms
of political organization; that there is a lack of "incentives" in
production; that "the distribution system" has not been found; in
short, that "we must now seek and find the paths for the further
development of the political system in this direction."
As an example of the disproportion between the theory
and practice of "decentralization" (to which, in fact, his critique
refers), Bakaric offers the "commune," its most touted aspect.
"Its economic base—as declared at the Fifth Meeting of the Socialist
League of Croatia—was not growing in parallel with this role,"
alluding to the role of workers' self-government. "The commune,
even by its very system, did not tend to stimulate the productivity of its
enterprises." This open critique of "centralist practice" as
"irrational" takes on greater significance because a decade of
"decentralization" has just been celebrated.
By establishing the principle of
"performance-based bonuses" in production, including jobs where
output, logically speaking, does not depend on the worker, the regime, "de
facto," capitulated ideologically to the mechanisms of economic law.
"Our criteria and our motives must be, above all, economic in
nature," declared one of Tito's most prominent economic planners, M.
Todorovic, in the National Assembly, as if quoting J. B. Say or some other
liberal economist.
Even this brand-new reform, accompanied by currency
devaluation, rising prices, and worsening working conditions, is presented as a
fight against "bureaucratic interference in the production and
distribution process." If it is sincere, it amounts to a concession to
liberal economics, something even the capitalist system must limit. However,
the contrast lies in the fact that "economic laws" apply to everyone,
with the exception of the State, which sets "its expenses" in
advance, disregarding the "net income" of the company and the
workers. Efforts to align these measures with classical Marxism are largely
disingenuous.
Marx, it is true, foresaw the "social
contributions" of the workers, but, being a poor psychologist, he failed
to foresee that performing physical labor for ten thousand dinars a month is
not the same as managing for fifty thousand. The only, or perhaps the most
characteristic, link between the socialist economic derailment and Marxism is
the inherited conflict between centralism (in the sense of economic planning),
imposed by modern production, and the individual labor that, in the Marxist
conception, should not be denied to the worker. Marx, as an economist,
recognized this dilemma and opted for centralism when he analyzed the Paris
Commune, known for its tendency to abolish central power. He considered his
"federalism" to be transitory, since his objective should have been
"la régénération de la France", that is, the renewal of the State.
When Yugoslav communists reduce their
"decentralization" to the concept of the withering away of the
bureaucracy they themselves created, they are merely promising something they
neither actually admit nor, as a whole, can admit, "since
there always remains something that inherently belongs to everyone and must be
resolved at the level of the general community or its organs." Between administration, which is a social necessity, and society,
which should not be an instrument of bureaucracy, lies the chasm never bridged
by Marx and Engels, for they maintained a priori that only class struggle was
capable of regulating relations between people. They did not provide a clear
picture of how society would function without the state, nor did they justify
why the new "social organs" would not become the seeds of a new
class, when, in their view, the beginning of class differences must be attributed
precisely to the phenomenon of administration. The normal path to
"decentralization" would be to allow people to express their opinions
and propose what they want, to control the administration they pay for. Since
this is not acknowledged, and the illusory and fallacious identification of the
individual with "society" persists, every social environment is
characterized not only by constant distrust and friction between the individual
and society, but also by an uninterrupted "transitional phase," where
it becomes difficult to develop a genuine economic plan, express consistent
political thought, or even create a valuable literary work. Krleza also left
his pessimistic mark here.
"To live in the 'transitional phases' means to
live 'the transitory life of man' and nothing more... To this we must resign
ourselves." But the life that is fading away cannot be compared to the
life that is beginning. If Krleza resigned himself to the "transitional
phases," young people want to be able to decide about them. The sheer
tension that reigns is clearly demonstrated by the hurried efforts to
"ideologically" educate young people. It is perfectly normal, then,
to seek a theoretical foundation for this transitional social environment as
well.
When discussing the theory of Yugoslav socialism, the
Slovenian communist leader Eduardo Kardelj, as the official ideologue, has the
floor first, although much is gleaned from ideological articles and, of course,
from official responses to Russian and Chinese criticisms. We will obtain a
more complete picture if we analyze the lecture that Boris Ziherl, a prominent
communist theorist from Belgrade, gave to communist students in Zagreb at the
end of May 1959 to explain the conclusions of the Seventh Party Congress
regarding "decentralization."
There we will find not only the necessary
justification for the Yugoslav "specific path," but also a new
interpretation of socialism. At the beginning of his dissertation, the author
acknowledges the evolution of the workers' movement as a normal phenomenon,
which nevertheless degenerated into two opposing revisionist tendencies: the
"liberal-bourgeois" tendency and the "statist-pragmatic,"
that is, Stalinist, tendency. Ziherl condemns both. He condemns the first for
having allowed bourgeois ideas to penetrate the workers' movement without
considering certain fundamental Marxist positions, such as the doctrine of
revolution and class struggle, and for having degenerated into anarchy. He
condemns the second for having degenerated into bureaucracy.
The error of the "statist-pragmatic"
tendency certainly lies not in having implemented state centralism at the
beginning of the revolution, but in not having relinquished it once it had
transformed into bureaucracy. The duty of those who, in the name of the working
class, assumed power, would therefore be to pave the
way for their own liquidation within the framework of socialist development.
What Russia failed to do, Yugoslavia is supposedly doing through its system of
workers' self-management. Ziherl's conclusion is more emphatic, as he grasps
Marx's thesis on the "withering away of the state."
"The withering away of the state means nothing
other than the end of the function of the particular social stratum whose
existence characterizes the state throughout its historical process. What
replaces this particular class? It can be replaced in such a way that the
producers themselves, the people themselves, assume the direction of public
affairs; that is to say, the process of the withering away of the state is the
process by which government in the name of the people passes into the hands of
the people themselves. For the entire history of the state
throughout all time (not just the socialist state) demonstrates that every
ruling class represents a particular class. But each stratum has a
certain relative independence which, at certain historical moments, sets it
against the class that granted it full powers."
This public admission implies that the communist
"Layer" is not necessarily the authentic representative of the
workers' or the people's interests. It suffices to add that this theoretical
conclusion lacks practical value, since party affiliation remains the sole
criterion for evaluation and power. But in this way, the chasm between the
ruling "certain class" and the people widens ever more, with the
consequences described so vividly by Ziherl in the following exposition of the
construction of socialism.
The construction of socialism, Ziherl says, "is
like building a house." "The fundamental task and the most difficult
work, the one requiring the most resources, is laying
the foundations. Once the foundations are in place, the building quickly
reaches the roof. But the foundations require enormous effort and vast
resources, without much being visible from the outside. The same thing happens
when building socialism in a backward country. Substantial funds and efforts
are invested in what is essential and without which there can be no socialism
whatsoever. It often happens that people become impatient and begin to doubt
the very nature of socialist construction, the possibility of a beneficial
structuring of the new social relations; moreover, in a relatively backward
country, the retarding factor is the relatively small number of the most
progressive class, the working class. Not only its relative smallness in
number, but also its relative backwardness in terms of its technical and
organizational preparation."
However much the author tries to be specific, it
remains unclear whether the socialism he speaks of so often is a means or an
end. Should current "social relations" be readily accepted for their
intrinsic value or for certain potential outcomes? Who guarantees that these
outcomes will be positive? Uncertainty about the future is accompanied by certain
vagueness about the present. It is unclear, for example, why the "most
progressive" class, even in an underdeveloped country, would have to be
"the least numerous" and backward in terms of its "technical and
organizational" capacity, or, if it suffers from these shortcomings, what
makes it "the most advanced"? Nor is it clear, even when comparisons
are made, why the advanced classes of the most developed countries do not
embrace socialism, or why, in general terms, one should strive for socialism,
if, according to the preceding discussion, it is neither a normal process of
social development, the inescapable conclusion of historical materialism, nor
an easy task where it is practiced violently for unexplained reasons.
To what extent, under the pressure of "inexorable
facts," the Marxist content (which still serves as the main inspiration
and justification for everything that happens) has been distorted in socialist practice, two recent cases serve as proof. In a speech
condemning the Stalinist practice of collectivization, Yakov Blazevic considers
production to be the essence of socialism. "A country acquires a socialist
character through its various aspects, through the way in which production is
carried out, and through the amount of expenditure on that production."
The more we produce in agriculture (...) the more socialist it will be.”
Previously, something else was expected of socialism, but customs change, and
with them, the Marxism that motivated them also changes. The entire gap between
prophetic Marxism and Yugoslav reality is summed up in a cruel phrase by
Kardelj, when he said that, “with the spread of communist practice in the
world, socialism wins and Marxism loses.” He spoke the truth, whatever meaning
he intended to give it. These are the fundamental characteristics of the social
environment about which we will now give the floor to Croatian Marxist
intellectuals.
Intellectual Disquiet and Aspiration
The ease with which the
Yugoslav communist regime broke ideological unity with the Soviet Union in 1958
proves the degree to which the intellectual disposition for such a rupture was
ripe and how real the aspirations for broader intellectual visions are. It is
no longer a secret that political centralism had a special ministry for the
dictatorship of the spirit. It is entirely logical,
therefore, that in these new conditions the policy of decentralization should
also be reflected in the decentralization of the intellect. However, this is
not yet the case. And while the decentralization of power wavers between promises
and deeds, the decentralization of the intellect becomes a necessity.
Although our subsequent
analysis of the opinions that arose as an echo of the social atmosphere is a
continuation of its theoretical interpretation, we address it in a separate chapter
for two reasons. The first reason is that they transcend the limits of purely
political interpretation and delve into the vast philosophical, literary, and
general problems of human creation. The second reason is that we are almost
exclusively dealing with Croatian authors here.
What is Marxism in their opinion?
In their answer, one will
sense, above all, a desire for what Marxism should be. One will also sense not
only the influence of the Western philosophical conception of Marxism, which
made Croatian communists always leftists within the Yugoslav Communist Party,
but also the inherent Croatian inclination toward reflection rather than
action. Croatian Marxists, including the younger generation, are drawn to
philosophical Marxism. In contrast, official Yugoslav socialism remains
fundamentally Leninist-tactical; in it, to use Kardelj's words, "Marxism
is lost." When, focusing on the contrast between Croatian Marxist
philosophers and Yugoslav reality, we consider the current controversy surrounding
the question of the unity or difference between the "young"
(philosophical) and "old" (political) Marx, Yugoslavia as a whole
offers us an instructive and precise picture of this conflict. Of course,
Croatian Marxists oppose this division, considering it a bourgeois
infiltration, and advocate for an indivisible Marx. But this indivisible Marx
is precisely the "young," philosophical Marx who challenges a
specific political system.
It is quite understandable
that a person, whether a philosopher or not, might revise their previous
opinions during the course of their life and research. In Marx's case, these
changes were not without consequences, perhaps because he always adopted a
"scientific" approach, which would imply absolute certainty. In his
youth, influenced by Hegel and following the practices of the philosophers of
his time, Marx sought above all the philosophical answer to the historical
evolution of humanity, which in his day was characterized by revolt,
counterproposal, and economic division.
What, in fact, determines
the course of history and where it is headed? Analyzing life, which gives the
impression of tense conflicts as well as temporary calms, Marx concluded that
Hegelian dialectics not only closely resembles what happens in the world, but
that its genuine value, unintuited by Hegel, lies in this visible material
background. In Marx's view, Hegel was a victim of tradition, dominated by
"spirit," and in which no one, except the forgotten Epicurus,
believed that the spiritus movens of universal events could be precisely and
solely "matter."
This, then, should be the great philosophical
"novelty" that constitutes the essence of Marxism and for which, as
the recent policy of "peaceful coexistence" demonstrates, a true
Marxist would be more readily reconciled with capitalism than, for example,
with religion. Marx's thought then proceeded without major difficulties. All of
life unfolds not by virtue of an idea or ideas, but on the basis of material
conditions, that is, the "means of production," which, autonomous in
their origin (though the reason for this is unknown), determine the political
and cultural superstructure.
Based on the evolution of these material conditions,
always with primacy over political and legal relations, Marx foresaw the
inexorable collapse of capitalism, although the final blow would be dealt by
the revolution. This would mark the beginning of a new historical era. The
order that will be established will be more democratic than all bourgeois
democracies, and will return to humankind the fruits of its labor, its
humanistic value, and all the earthly happiness and harmony that were so
naively attributed to the workers. Historical materialism, thus defined, is not
a movement, but the philosophy of history—scientific and infallible in its
predictions, according to Marx, even if everyone were to go about with their
hands in their pockets. Some of his early texts could be interpreted to mean
that all human intervention is superfluous since "no social system
disappears before all the productive forces it can contain have been
developed."
Consequently, the revolution should erupt first in the
most developed countries and then in the underdeveloped ones, although in the
latter the process could be accelerated. Later, as the workers' movements
became a significant political force, Marx's philosophical conception of
history gave way to political advice, directed primarily at German workers. The
most important change, of course, is the idea of accelerating the
historical process through the revolutionary intervention of the communist
party as the conscious spokesperson for the interests of the workers—that is,
of that "certain class" which currently governs in place of the
workers.
Political Marx, or "the older" Marx, became
much more concrete, although, in the general opinion of critics, this was to
the detriment of his philosophy. For if historical materialism is sacrificed
for the sake of political success, the entire Marxist structure of a new
society and humanity, as well as the Marxist Weltanschauung (worldview), is
called into question. It is natural, then, that Marxists abhor this division.
Lenin, whose work corresponds to political Marx, was the first to reject this
distinction, striving to prove his loyalty to the philosophy. His Russian
followers are less circumspect, and for Stalinist exegetes, the true Marx is
found in his later writings. In contrast, bourgeois revisionists, influenced by
the evolution of capitalism without revolutionary intervention, attribute
greater value and a certain predictability to
philosophical works.
This family quarrel frequently surfaces in the pages
of communist literature and was a topic of discussion at the meeting of
Croatian Marxist philosophers held in Zagreb at the end of 1959. The topic
itself was likely to elicit observations that, in reality, transcended the
limits of a single or double Marx, giving rise, as we shall see, to a new
notion of Marxism. Of all the observations formulated then or "a
posteriori," four tendencies deserve special attention, namely: 1) That
Marxism as a philosophy should be subordinated to scientific findings and
experience, and be independent of any specific political system; 2) That it
should be given a projection toward the future; 3) That, from their
perspective, the void in cultural creation caused by its hitherto prevailing
dogmatism should be condemned. 4) That the ethical isolation into which
communism is throwing the new generation be broken and that links with the past
and the universal values of man be restored.
Marxism, said Maks Bace (a "general" and
diplomat under Tito) at the aforementioned meeting, "is not
only not outside of science, nor is it an anti-scientific worldview, nor
is it above science, but the contrary. Practically speaking, this means that if
and when positive science obtains a proven answer to one or more problems that
contradicts the prevailing Marxist answers, then Marxism changes by virtue of
its internal necessity and its complete concordance.
Marxism, therefore, is no longer science; it is not
the teacher, but the student, whose 'scientism' consists in readily accepting
what others tell it. In the speaker's opinion, it has not yet proven to be the
best student, since it has not gone far enough in its adaptability. 'Perhaps
this is the reason why certain philosophies are more current because they are
closer to everyday life than dogmatized Marxism' (ibid.). Sometimes science,
even the socialist experience itself, surpasses its natural talents, since
'problems arise or The old problems reappear in new
forms and with expanded content, often without us being able to provide an
answer" (ibid.). The flexibility that Bace attributes to Marxism does not,
strictly speaking, agree with either the Marxist tradition or Marx's certainty.
Marx wrote—as one of the meeting participants quoted—"that communism
signifies the solved enigma of history and knows that this is the
solution."
Although Marxism and communism are not identical
concepts, their connection is such that if communism is the "solved
enigma," science should not revoke the Marxism that proclaims it, nor
should Bace say that "the internal logic of socialism has not been
sufficiently explained to date." What best illustrates this situation and
greatly affects communism is the position of Marxist philosophers, that is,
professors who compulsively teach something they doubt. Their position
"becomes more difficult every day," despite the "means placed at
their legal and "freely," and despite the fact that "every day
there is a growing number of students with increasingly less religious,
chauvinistic, and other prejudices."
Their situation is more difficult "because the
problems have become much more complex, because contrasts have arisen within
socialism, because the logic of the socialist society's movement has not been
studied, because Marxism was long dominated by dogmatism and citationism, and
this situation becomes extremely difficult if the professor himself, the
philosopher, does not progress with life, does not know how to discover new
laws, if he hides behind phraseology and is lost to life." The foregoing
demonstrates not only the ideological indifference of professors and students,
but also its underlying causes, against which a Marxist activist does not yet
dare to rebel, because after all that has been said about the insecurity of
socialism, he does not consider that new laws might be found outside of
socialism. Let us hope that this residue of dogmatism will also evolve through
further scientific and socialist experiences.
In his exposition of what It
should be Marxism, but Maks Bace has gone quite far in circumscribing it to a
subjective worldview. "The fundamental thing for me," he said,
"is to remain faithful to materialism, that is, to try to explain
everything, to understand everything with material and materialist elements,
with the dialectical method; I mean to seek and discover both socialist society
and the whole of human history through materialist elements." Marxism, of
course, promised much more, which does not preclude the fact that, after
certain failures, materialism and dialectics are the prevailing worldview and
view of history, at least until science proves that this too was
"dogmatized." But Marxism, reduced to such a philosophical position,
calls into question established communist systems. Relativism regarding social
forms considered Marxist is expressed in the following words: "Attempts to
transform Marx's contributions to science and ideology into religion (...)
exist," but "this phenomenon is analogous to the transformation of
the Christian movement into the "State religion and has no connection
whatsoever with Marx and Marxism."
That statement implies more than a simple critique of
Stalinist dogmatism. It actually separates Marxism as a philosophy and
worldview from the concrete communist system, which nevertheless claims to be a
faithful reflection of that vision and should be, according to historical
materialism. As for historical materialism, no one invalidated it as clearly as
Krleza when he wrote in his Dialogue on Socialism that "history is no
guarantee of the victory of socialism or, what is even more dangerous, of the
victory of the international communist revolution." By questioning the
harmony between philosophical Marxism and the Marxist order, the authenticity of
communist movements in general is also called into question, as well as their
government, which, consequently, may be a vulgar coup d'état or a sham. A mere
coincidence, but such reasoning closely resembles popular experience and
conviction.
In addition to the tendency to present Marxism as
being above a specific political system, we encounter another, no less
characteristic, tendency: to present it as a philosophy projected primarily
toward the future. The meaning of "the future" no longer consists, as
was once widely believed, in necessarily embracing Marxism as the only correct
philosophy, but rather in explaining the present from the perspective of the
future. The idea becomes clearer when compared to life, which surely inspired
it, and in which all material sacrifices, all voluntary work, all five-year
plans are justified with a view to a higher social level in the future.
This idea arose from the discussion of a problem, we
might say, metaphysical: the problem of "time." It is significant not
only that this problem was addressed, but that it was defined by the notion of
the future, the only correct conception. However, the opinions of the
"philosophers" were divided on this point, perhaps because, among
other reasons, it is quite obvious that it implies a kind of dynamism that
could go too far. Vanja Sutlic lectured on the problem of time at those
philosophical conferences. “To describe time,” he said, “whether as the ‘past’
or as the ‘present’ is to fall into positivism, which confines us to pragmatism
and practical consequences, the repercussions of which we already know.” From a
supplementary commentary published in Vjesnik by Veljko Cvjticanin under the
title “The Humanist Problem of Marxism,” it becomes clear that the problem of
time was considered from the perspective of the possibilities that must be
constantly offered to humankind. “According to the Marxist view, humankind is
open to the future” and “is never exactly as it should or can be.”
The heart of this seemingly naive debate becomes even clearer
when expressed more directly, as in the following lines by the writer Jure
Kastelan: “To deny the present century in the name of the past is more than
useless. But to deny this century in the name of the future becomes necessary,
because in the negation of what is inhuman, lifeless, and anti-vital, lies the
future, or, more precisely, the path to the future. The future of the hungry
man consists in being satisfied once he has eaten, of the oppressed in
liberating themselves, and of the fearful in ceasing to be afraid.”
This orientation toward the future is perhaps the
healthiest and most positive phenomenon, always plausible, even when
attributed, for one reason or another, to Marxism; it is positive because it
breaks with current, concrete Marxism.
Instead of the hackneyed theme of preserving "the
conquests of the revolution," the theme of permanent revolution is
emerging among young communists. This is the meaning Professor Andrija Kresic
gives to the communist revolution when he says: "True revolutionaries
would not be such if, like passive objects, they submitted to everything that
exists and that, by its own dialectic, should come to pass. They change the
existing state of affairs, knowing, and not merely believing, that their
revolutionary action is not in vain (...). Communists behave as if they were
condemned to the communism that should come about on its own, by the dictates
of that abstract dialectic. Socialism and communism signify conscious
historical movement." Ivan Supek also expresses optimism when speaking
about the future of humankind. But, when asked at a conference how they
navigated the chaotic world of diverse fields, he replied: "Without
direction."
The trend toward greater creative freedom is most
pronounced in literary criticism, though always paying due homage to
unquestionable Marxism. The hidden rebellion against the creative void is
gradually invading the pages of the official press as well. In its review of
the essays "by fallen and dead combatant and revolutionary writers"
published under the title Time and Conscience by Kultura Publishers, Belgrade
1960, the newspaper Komunist, dated November 3, 1960, makes the following
observation:
"The fact remains that after Krleza and Cesarec,
and a few other names and works of merit, in general
nothing exceptional has been done in the creative practice of so-called
socialist literature. Or rather, this literature, for the most part, fulfilled
a positive function with varying degrees of success: that of pointing out the
hardships of that social situation, the difficult life of the oppressed; it
awakened the consciousness of the masses, invoked the future, and called for
the struggle for a bright and great tomorrow." The "tomorrow"
that the Croatian writers were preparing, judging by the names mentioned, and
if it has already dawned, is neither bright nor grand.
Under the title "Expression, yes, but also
message," Marin Franicevic, a Croatian communist writer, observes that the
rise of Croatian literature has not kept pace with the literacy achieved after
the war; on the contrary, it lags behind, and this "almost exclusively
because it has said very little about contemporary life, that is to say:
because it lacks contemporary content." Franicevic continues: "The
problem, then, arises of the artistic message to the world (I don't understand
why we should shy away from that term), to this present world about its
present, to the world of tomorrow about its past—a message that has always been
conveyed in one way or another in the best works. It answers humanity's
questions about itself, questions that even science, when it is far more
powerful than it is today, will not be able to fully answer.
It is the problem of authentic lived experience and
human experience, of encouragement or critique in time and space." The
same writer explains the basis of this unease and the reason for the void in a
later article, in which he reviews the development of postwar criticism. Until
the early 1950s, that is, before the launch of the "decentralization"
policy, criticism... tried to be consistently revolutionary, although it wasn't
always so for various reasons. The reader found themselves in a new position
regarding this criticism, which was acquiring a new weight outside of
literature, a form that in many cases even the critics themselves had not
desired. In certain approaches, it acquired an air of irrevocability.
Referring to the new phase that began in 1950,
Francevic acknowledges greater possibilities, while still pointing out the
limitations, since it involved seeking "its own platform within the
framework of the general platform that was not being abandoned, forming its own
aesthetic based on what was beyond all discussion." However, it should be
noted that there is a certain cooling even in what is still "beyond all
discussion," when, for example, it is considered that "the historical
materialism of Marx and Engels is only one among the many theories" that,
from Aristotle to the present day, have attempted to discover the paths of artistic
development.
There is no doubt that the same sense of discontent
permeates even analyses that, by their very nature, transcend the framework of
internal problems. In the article "Productive Man and Automation,"
Rudi Supek does indeed discuss the human condition in the age of automation in
general, but argues that "bureaucracy brings no better consequences, not
even in socialist society." People realize more and more each day
"that their destiny is in the hands of others, that they are someone
else's property." "A malaise is born that spreads, scattering
optimistic forces, corroding youthful energy with its skepticism, fossilizing
young minds, and while a century and a half ago the malaise du sičcle signified
the clash of indeterminate human existence with an open, immense, or
impenetrable history, today this malaise arises from the limitations that
humanity encounters at every turn and cannot overcome."
No one can object if someone seeks the freedom of
humanity and its creations based on their subjective conviction, even if that
conviction stems from Marxism. Marx promised not only the worker but humanity
in general the return of all their alienated values, as he often said, due to
the inhumane capitalist order. According to Supek, this inhumane era was, nevertheless, open to infinite historical perspectives,
where free and individual messages to the world still had a place, among which
Marxism occupied a prominent position.
Artistic creation is not the isolated field where
Marxism, as he claimed, sowed wheat, while with communism, weeds grow. Where to
look for the cause? The Yugoslav-Soviet conflict also provided an opportunity
to publicly reproach the other for what was silently reproached within oneself.
The enemy of artistic creation is the centralism of the intellect, known as
"Zhdanovism." In the article "Road to the Anthology of
Art," Ivan Focht argues that in art, only "objectivism" has a
defined purpose.
Aesthetics in our times can only operate
ontologically. For it is only in this way that modern art
acts and fights for its status. It doesn't matter what criteria the
author shares; what matters is what he condemns, namely, the subordination of
art to political ends. Political power, "seeing art as a force, wishes to
subject it to its ends, but, once subjected to these ends, art loses its
vigor." Ivan Supek expressed the same opinion when he wrote that
"conformity is man's surrender to dead order, the stifling of the creative
faculty, a sleeper car to death." If the
situation in Yugoslavia were more favorable in this respect, it is likely that
there would be no need to fight against the "bureaucracy of cultural and
artistic institutions," as is fortunately the case now.
The critique of spiritual emptiness is also linked to
the critique of the unjustified break with the past, harmful to culture, as
well as the isolation from the rest of the world. Regarding isolation, the
solution is sought in reading foreign literature and in the numerous
translations of works, predominantly of a socialist nature, of course. As for
the past, an integral part of modern man, the situation is more delicate. The
break with the past gave rise, among other things, to the well-known invasion
of mediocrity, in which the gap between authentic human values
and the grades on paper, awarded by "society," plays a
significant role.
As an example, we will cite Dusko Car's critique of
this situation. "Often inclined to value a written document (...) we
forget that man is the most essential thing (...) and believing the paper we
forget that the paper often conceals the conceptions repeated throughout the
centuries, now only covered by embers, but not extinguished, about the value of
man and his original place in the list of genuine merits in society." The
author's thought is expressed even more clearly in the following comparison.
"It is impossible to omit from such a reflection the negative consequences
of severing roots planted over centuries—call them what you will, tradition,
inertia, it matters little—but it is impossible not to recognize the results of
gradually overcoming the path we have retraced. Ultimately, we found ourselves
in the lap of that bourgeois intelligentsia; we still draw a great deal of
knowledge, norms, even prejudices from those bourgeois intellectuals, and we
must never forget the word of historical experience that speaks of the plebeian
origin of that intelligentsia and its incredibly rapid demise in the course of
history." (ibid.).
The problem posed is not nostalgia for the past, but
rather the feeling of spiritual and cultural isolation, of intellectual
humiliation in the face of "paper" qualifications. Is it necessary to
point out that so many talented individuals remain silent because they have not
shed their "prejudices"? Socialist practice demonstrated, among many
other things, that history does not begin with communism and that certain human
values must be respected at all times. The past, despite its
flaws, had the advantage that ethical and cultural progress ran parallel to
material achievements, thanks perhaps primarily to the presence of religion in
society.
Communism appropriates material gains but violently
destroys the ethical and moral superstructure. Therein lies
its historical originality and its practical condemnation, for those who live
by the sword die by the sword. Truth, justice, honesty, responsibility, work,
marriage, knowledge, ability, etc., belong neither to the past nor the future,
but to humankind, and all political interference with these universal values
has repercussions on the very being of humanity.
The quoted paragraph does not discuss how the
separation of the moral, the past, and the eternal from concrete life is
exacted. The newspapers write about that. But it speaks to something even more
important: that there are people who simply do not want this separation. After
16 years of ideological isolation, the young communist generation is searching
not only for a path to the future but also for a path to the past.
"Socialist culture is not created ex nihilo," wrote Vjekoslav Mikecin
in his work entitled "The Young Man Today." However, adopting a
definite stance toward tradition in the cultural sphere, with the utmost care
and respect, remains a current challenge in our country.
This problem may not be what we initially
imagined—namely, the danger of being labeled "chauvinist" if one
refers to national heroes. Since the author makes no secret of being a
communist, he rejects "national romanticism" and even censures the
anti-Zhdanovist campaign as "hypocritical," for he does not accept
the separation between the aesthetic and the social. He is a communist, and
that is why it is so interesting when he says that he lives in "The Time
of the Most Total Crisis." Every generation believes that "with it,
true history begins"; his generation, the communist one, not only believed
it but also maintained it. But "history delivered its verdict. There was
too much naiveté and foolishness."
And now the problem arises for communism, which has
not found a socialist substitute for eternal values, of how to "define
itself before tradition in the ethical sense," but "with a complete
and resounding rejection of all bourgeois ways of life, of opportunism, of class
psychology, of intellectual dullness, of every form of degeneration."
Experience, perhaps, persuaded the author of these interesting reflections that
"this is not a task that can be resolved by unleashing campaigns,"
but what is scandalous is to hear from a Marxist that it cannot be resolved
"with a simplified and vulgar materialist formula based on the premise
that automatically modifies the superstructure." Let us add, as a
conclusion and final observation, that this is not only the problem of a young
intellectual, but "an integral part of the problem of our society in
general."
Intellect
and Strength
Faced with a host of practical difficulties and the
unmet needs of human aspirations, socialism as a system loses the ideological
clarity it possessed during its "illegality," while simultaneously
lacking a stable economic policy. Ultimately, it is no longer clear whether it
is an end in itself or a means to an end; whether victory has been won or is
yet to be won; whether it will come about through the laws of historical
materialism, or exclusively through harsh sacrifices and vast resources, since
history is by no means the guarantor of its victory.
All these questions are part of the confusion, of
"the most total crisis," which, if it does not directly threaten the
power that spends so much on its security, "corrodes skeptically the young
forces and fossilizes the minds." The "dialectical contrasts" so
often discussed are usually simple logical contradictions, accompanied, if not
caused, by the vital contrast between luxury and poverty, between personal gain
and palatial "social services." This contrast, legitimized by the
system's practices, which preach equality, incites not only materialistic
ambitions, but also, and far worse, moral irresponsibility and ethical uncertainty.
Some, like Ivan Supek, admit this. "We listen to the words of the speakers
without remaining silent about our hidden thoughts; we ourselves offer the
world different signs of our inner perceptions."
The Croatian Marxist intellectuals, the only ones not
forbidden philosophical and literary expression, and about whom we have
therefore been able to speak, would like to move more freely within Marxist
frameworks, since they cannot move freely through the vast field of the human
spirit. However, their undertaking still bears the mark of a fundamental
inconsistency, perhaps understandable under current conditions, given its
still-compulsive nature.
For just as political
"decentralization" is practiced only within party discipline, so too
is the decentralization of the intellect operated exclusively within the
framework of Marxist materialism. Perhaps here and there a ray of greater freedom
shines; perhaps that is the widespread yearning of hidden thoughts. But, as
long as a single "worldview" has "legal means," it is not
permissible to speak of freedom, nor of the loftiness of that worldview, for
praise becomes meaningless without criticism. Nevertheless, on the platform of
what remains "beyond discussion," greater agitation is noticeable.
Croatian Marxists would like to give Marxism a
scientific foundation once again, subordinate it to the intellect, separate it
from a concrete system, inspire it with humanitarian values, offer it greater
possibilities for literary creation, instill in it greater optimism regarding
the future and greater respect for the past. But, as long as they remain
confined to materialism, they will not be able to give that answer, because
Marxism as a philosophical system, if it ever answers man why he works, will
never tell him why he lives.
Many reflections appearing in the communist press
deserve greater attention, and we could cite many more names, but our purpose
is not to provide an anthology of authors but rather the content of their
opinions. What has been said on this matter is not a concession to any of these
authors, whose "social roles" we are largely unaware of. It would be
wrong to conclude that Croatian Marxist intellectuals have suddenly aligned
themselves with the opposition, but it is certain that Marxism in its concrete
form, in its results, does not satisfy them. They undermine Marxism while
believing in it, for the most significant aspect of this entire process is that
the discontent is not the work of foreign influence, but rather an expression
of internal anxieties; not an isolated voice, but the common denominator of the
intellectual gestation that, according to the inexorable law of nature, returns
from the ruins of the promised paradise to the fundamental humanistic problems
of humankind. With this, not only is dogmatic historical materialism revoked,
but its current socialist form is also threatened.
The extent to which the regime is aware of this is
fully reflected in a speech by the Vice President of the Government, Eduardo
Kardelj, who publicly condemned this new humanism. "Some young
intellectuals, faced with various difficulties in real life—sometimes material,
sometimes stemming from ideological disorientation, insufficient knowledge, an
inability to create, etc.—prefer to seek refuge in certain abstract humanist
constructs, believing themselves to be wise and highly revolutionary, when in
fact they are sterile snobs and impotent charlatans (...) And here, empty words
about humanism and democratism, about good and evil, are not enough to guide
them..." This is further proof that Marxism is no longer an attractive
idea, but a regime that oppresses, since history teaches that whenever force
has clashed with intellect, it was not intellect that succumbed, but force.
They all belonged simultaneously to Western Christian
society and to their homeland, Croatia. This unity was weakened by the radical
differentiations between Western culture and national cultures, the latter
considered definitive and far-reaching cultural units. However, in recent
times, the awareness has grown that the national cultures of European peoples are
merely local expressions, national variants, of the common culture and
civilization of Western Europe.
***
These preliminary remarks will help to understand why
the life and work of Ivan Duknovic, known in general art literature as Giovanni
Dalmata, has not yet been properly clarified and studied, even though he is one
of the most outstanding sculptors of the Roman Quattrocento. Historians have
limited themselves to studying and analyzing his sculptures executed in Rome
during the reigns of Popes Paul II and Sixtus IV. Only recently has light been
shed in Croatia on his origins, youth, and subsequent stay in Rome, as well as
on his works produced there. Also in recent decades, thanks to archaeological
discoveries, it has been possible to complete the information regarding
Duknovic's stay and activities in Hungary, at the court of the
Hungarian-Croatian king Matthias Corvinus.
Based on this material and his own research, Kruno
Prijatelj, a Croatian art historian and director of the Art Gallery in Split, was
able to write a comprehensive monograph on the life, work, and importance of
this renowned Renaissance sculptor. Apart from the brief and incomplete notes
found in certain encyclopedic editions, there is nothing published in Spanish
about a Renaissance sculptor who worked in Italy, Croatia, and Hungary, and
whose works are also held in the Louvre in Paris, the Victoria and Albert
Museum in London, and, according to some specialists, in the Kunsthistorisches
Museum in Vienna and the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard University, USA. We hope
that this work will fill this gap and serve as a source of information for
those in the Spanish-speaking world interested in the study of the European
Renaissance.
According to historical data recently published in
Croatia, it has been established that Giovanni Dalmata's real name was Ivan
Duknovic and that his family came from the village of Orahovica near Trogir
(Tragurium in Latin, Traú in Italian). The son of Esteban Duknovic, Ivan was
born in or near Trogir around 1440, acquiring his early knowledge of sculpture
and the humanities in his small homeland, rich in quarries and marble
workshops. At that time, the monumental Trogir Cathedral, perhaps the most
beautiful in Croatia, was nearing completion. While Ivan was young, the master
Nicola Fiorentino, a pupil of Donatello, was working on the Chapel of St. John
Orsini in the cathedral, one of the most beautiful works of the High
Renaissance.
Even then, at the dawn of Humanism and the
Renaissance, the monuments of antiquity became a source of inspiration.
Duknovio was able to contemplate them near the city. A stone's throw from
Trogir and Split lay the still well-preserved remains
of the great Roman city of Salona. There, the illustrious humanist and father
of Croatian literature, Marko Marulic, collected Roman coins and noted the
Latin inscriptions in the necropolises. In Split, one could then see the
well-preserved remains of the magnificent palace of the Roman Emperor
Diocletian, a masterpiece of ancient Roman art.
Diocletian's mausoleum was converted in the High
Middle Ages into the cathedral of the Archbishop of Split, whose title was
Primas Dalmatiae ac totius Croatiae (Bishop of the First Dalmatia and all
Croatia). At that same time, the master Juraj Dalmatinac (Giorgio Dalmata),
builder of the Šibenik Cathedral, renowned sculptor, and the most prominent
representative of the Flamboyant Gothic style in Dalmatia, worked on the chapel
and altar of Saint Anastasius in the Split Cathedral. And the city of Trogir
itself, a former Greek colony, later a Roman fishing village, housed many
fragments of Greek and Roman art. There, in the home of the humanist Coriolanus
Cippico, a beautiful Kairos relief by an unknown disciple of Lyzippus was
preserved, along with the later published fragments of Petronius's "The
Feast of Trimalhio."
With the knowledge acquired in this environment,
Duknovic moved to Rome to perfect his skills in sculpture. He was 20 years old.
In Rome, he collaborated with two first-rate workshops: that of Mino da Fiesole
(1431-1484) and that of Andrea Bregno (1421-1506). "The influence of those
two sculptors," says Kruno Prijatelj, "can be seen in his work, but
it will never overshadow his distinct individual style, which, in terms of
sculptural challenges, was much more vigorous than theirs."
The first known work by the young Duknovic in Rome was
the coat of arms of Pope Pius II above the portal of the Cortile del
Maresciallo in the Vatican. It seems that Pius II, known as the humanist Silvio
Piccolomini, who made Rome the center of Renaissance art by bringing together
the best masters and sculptors there, was the young Duknovic's first patron. He
died in Ancona while preparing to lead the crusade to aid the Christians
threatened on the other side of the Adriatic.
Another work executed by Duknovic in Rome was the coat
of arms of Pope Paul II on the side portal of the Palazzo Venezia in Rome. Of
greater significance was his participation in the execution of the tomb of
Cardinal Giacomo Tebaldi in the Roman church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva, in
collaboration with Andrea Bregno. At the same time, he sculpted several statues
and reliefs for the Tempietto of San Giacomo in Vicovaro, not far from Rome,
built by the Orsini family, notably the lunette above the portal, the angels in
the arch, the pointed arches, and the tympanum.
Prijatelj believes that Duknovic, interrupting his
first stay in Rome, returned to Trogir around 1470, based on certain monuments
in Trogir that he attributes to him. It is very likely that Duknovic collaborated
with Nicola Fiorentino on the Chapel of St. John Ursini and the Sobota family
vault in the Church of St. Dominic. Prijatelj confirms Duknovic's hand in the
execution of ornaments in the chapel and especially in some putti. Later,
Duknovic would sculpt two statues for that chapel.
With convincing arguments, Prijatelj attributes to him
two impressive lions in the Sobota family vault, which have been compared to
those of Donatello. Duknovic's stay in his homeland, following his studies and
establishment in Rome, was not merely an episode in the master's life, but a
significant contribution to the definitive affirmation of Renaissance plastic
and decorative forms in the conservative marble workshops of Dalmatia, which
adhered to the Gothic style under the influence of both Venice and the strong
artistic personality of Juraj Dalmatinac (Giorgio Dalmata).
Duknovic's most fruitful period was his second stay in
Rome between 1470 and 1481. During this decade, he defined his style and
artistic profile. He gave his works a new sense of volume and form, a new,
vibrant dynamism, greater refinement, and higher quality, occupying the
foremost place in Roman Quattrocento sculpture. His masterpiece from this
period is the tomb of Pope Paul II, executed in collaboration with Mino da
Fiesole. Vasari said of this monument that it is "the richest tomb that
was once adorned with ornaments and figures for no pontiff." It is a
monumental niche, located in the old St. Peter's Basilica, adorned with
numerous statues and reliefs.
Unfortunately, it was dismantled during the
construction of the new St. Peter's Basilica, with most of the fragments being
preserved in the Vatican grottoes. Some fragments are in the Louvre in Paris,
and an angel, which some attribute to Duknovic, is in the Fogg Museum at
Harvard University, USA. Mino da Fiesole played the principal role in the
overall design of Paul II's tomb and its basic architectural lines. However,
Duknovic surpassed him in the sculptural aspects, creating the most beautiful
and vigorous sculptures, which earned him a well-deserved place among the great
masters of the Renaissance.
Due to a lack of written documents, several authors
who have studied the tomb of Paul II—especially H. Tschudi, A. Venturi, and L.
Donati—are not always in agreement as to whom to attribute certain sculptures,
to Duknovic or to Mino da Fiesole. K. Prijatelj, starting with those statues
and fragments that bear Duknovic's signature, such as the Hope in the tomb of
Paul II and the statue of Saint John in Trogir, and meticulously analyzing the
style and characteristic features of both artists, concurs with Tschudi's
attributions and praises his sagacity.
According to them, the following works in the
aforementioned tomb should be attributed to Duknovic: the recumbent figure of
Pope Paul II in the sarcophagus; the large relief of the Resurrection, of a
vigorous and lyrical conception; the relief of God the Father with angels, a
motif that Duknovic would repeatedly explore; and the statue of Hope that bears
the sculptor's signature. Statues of the Evangelists Mark and Matthew; the
relief of the Creation of Eve, perhaps the most beautiful composition on the
tomb; a relief with one of the Pope's coats of arms; an angel on the right;
three angels to the right of the group with God the Father; and a fragment of
architrave with cherubs. All these pieces are in the Vatican Grottoes.
Prijatelj correctly attributes to him also the architrave of Leuvre with
decorative lion heads in medallions.
In the final phase of work on Paul II's tomb, Duknovic
and Mino da Fiesole jointly created the tabernacle, a medium-sized work now
kept in the sacristy of the Roman church of St. Mark. Duknovic then undertook
two major projects. First, with Andrea Bregno, he worked on the tomb of Cardinal
Bartolomeo Roverella, and then, almost single-handedly, he executed the
sepulcher for Cardinal Bernardo Eroli in the Old Basilica of St. Peter.
In the monumental tomb of Cardinal Roverella, Duknovic
created two slender and stylized angels beside the sarcophagus, a new type of
caryatid, and a lyrically rendered relief of the Virgin Mary among the angels,
in addition to an enormous and monumental statue of God the Father. Only
fragments remain of what was once the splendid tomb of Cardinal Eroli in the Vatican
grottoes. The recumbent figure in the cardinal's sarcophagus is impressively
and vigorously expressive, imbued with a new lyrical rhythm. It represents the
pinnacle of Duknovic's work with recumbent figures.
The monumental figure of Christ, positioned frontally,
is the master's most accomplished creation, revealing new facets of his
artistic personality. The figures of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, also
preserved, are expressive in their conception and the intensity of their inner
lives. From that period are two reliefs by Duknovic - Virgin between angels and
God the Father - fragments of a tomb now in Grotte Vaticane.
A. Venturi even attributes to Duknovic the tomb of
Cardinal Pietro Riari in the Church of the Holy Apostles, while Prijatelj believes
it to be a joint work by Andrea Bregno and Mino da Fiesole. He also considers
other attributions, such as the chancel and choir stalls of the Sistine Chapel
in the Vatican, and the coat of arms of Pope Alexander VI above the door of the
Borgia Apartments, to be incorrect.
Adolfo Venturi also attributes a number of
architectural monuments to Duknovic. Although he is cited as an architect in a
contemporary document, Venturi's claims lack foundation. However, his
attribution to Duknovic of the expressive statue of Saint John the Evangelist
in the Chapel of Saint John Ursini in Trogir was confirmed by the recent
discovery of the signature Ioannis Dalmatae F., carved at the base of the
piece. That statue, a synthesis of the most characteristic elements of Duknovic's
style, in Prijatelj's opinion, was created during our master's second stay in
Rome.
***
In the decade of 1480 to 1490, I. Duknovic resided in
Hungary, at the court of the Hungarian-Croatian king Matthias Corvinus, which
had become a true center of humanist culture and Renaissance art. There, in
addition to a number of European writers and visual artists, were several
Croatians, including two sculptors: Jacob Stafileo and Ivan Duknovic, both from
Trogir.
Little information exists about Duknovic's life and
activities during that decade. The artworks in the king's residences were
partly destroyed and partly moved by Suleiman II to Istanbul after the defeat
of the Hungarian-Croatian army at Mohács in 1526. Much of Hungary was
conquered, and the royal residences were looted and ransacked. Therefore, only
fragments and a few portraits of Duknovic's work, created in Hungary, survived.
Among other reliable documents that confirm Duknovic's
presence in Hungary are two donations. In the first, dated in Vienna on July
25, 1488, King Matthias, in agreement with his wife Beatrice of Aragon—called
Diva Beatrix by the humanists—donates "magistri Ioannis Duknovich de
Tragurio, statuarii sive marmorum sculptoris... castellum Maykovez vocatum in
comitatu Crisiensi habitum," Maykovez Castle in Croatia, in the Krizevci
district, to reward him for his extraordinary works and spread his glory for
all time. A contemporary of Duknovic, the Croatian humanist writer Ludovicus
Tubero-Crijevic of Dubrovnik, refers to him in the same document, calling him
Ioannes Dalmata illustris sua aetate scultor.
Duknovic, incidentally, is the artist behind the badly
damaged relief of the Virgin of Diosgyötir, now housed in the National Museum
of Budapest. There is no consensus on attributing to him the richly decorated
fountain with a torso of the small Heracles in colored marble, decorative
festoons of flowers and fruit, a coat of arms, and heraldic symbols. This
fountain was located at the summer residence of King Matthias Corvinus in Visegrad.
Its remains were only discovered in 1941-42.
P. Meller presented compelling arguments for
attributing the fountain to Duknovic, an opinion shared by K. Prijatelj, as
well as A. Venturi's opinion regarding the two portrait reliefs in the National
Museum of Budapest, depicting King Matthias and Queen Beatrice. However, it is
doubtful that the relief of King Matthias in the Vienna Museum of Fine Arts is
the work of Duknovic. From approximately the same period and cycle belong a
portrait of a humanist, now housed in the Cippico Palace in Trogir, and the
most accomplished portrait in that series, depicting the Italian poet and
humanist Francesco Cinti, now in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London.
Duknovic is also credited with other works and
fragments, some of which are preserved in Hungary. Prijatelj does not deny his
influence on some of these works, but maintains that by limiting Duknovic's
work in Hungary to the fountain in Visegrad, the Madonna of Diósgyör, and the
portrait reliefs, the master's personality acquires coherence and unity. This
body of work reflects new phases and changes in his style, the modeling of
materials, and the treatment of volumes, while also testifying to his
remarkable importance in introducing Renaissance forms to Hungary.
After King Matthias's death in 1490, Duknovic left
Hungary and for the next twenty years lived and worked successively in Trogir,
then Venice, Ancona, and probably Zagreb around 1510. The exact date and place
of his death are unknown, though it is presumed to have occurred around 1510.
During these last twenty years, marked by a clear and understandable decline,
Duknovic sculpted some significant works, such as the relief of the Virgin, now
in the Civic Museum of Padua, and the bust of Carlo Zeno (now in the Correr
Museum in Venice). For its refinement, extraordinary freshness, grace, and
spontaneity, and for its superb execution, this relief is one of Duknovic's
masterpieces.
The portrait of Carlo Zeno, also attributed to
Duknovic by A. Venturi, is very evocative and expressive. For the Chapel of St.
John Ursini in Trogir, Duknovic created the statue of St. Thomas the Apostle
during this period, and for Ancona Cathedral—where the master builder Juraj
Dalmatinac (Giorgio da Sebenico) had previously achieved fame—he crafted a
relief tombstone of Blessed Girolamo Gianelli. In Venice, he did not complete
the large altarpiece for the Scuola di San Marco. Duknovic is also credited
with the tombstone of the Bishop of Zagreb, Lucas Baratin, fragments of which
are housed in the Croatian Historical Museum in Zagreb. One of these fragments
bears the sculptor's signature: Ioannis...
In Duknovic's extensive and prolific body of work, one
can discern certain influences of the Roman Quattrocento, followed by purely
classical elements, particularly in his treatment of marble. In the statues
executed during the master's second stay in Rome, his tendency towards pure
volumes crystallized under the influence of Piero della Francesca and Francesco
Laurana (Franjo Vranjanin). In his Hungarian phase, certain Nordic influences
become visible.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned influences did not
overshadow Duknovic's vigorous artistic personality; rather, they enriched it,
as is often the case with true geniuses.
Kruno Prijatelj considers the characteristic features
of Duknovic's work to be: his overall conceptions of sculptures, where delicate
lyricism and restless dynamism merge; specific calligraphic details; his
chiseling technique; the treatment of hair; the figures' posture; the typical
expression of their faces; their highly distinctive eyes and lips; the soft,
wax-like flesh tones; and the interplay of garments with triangular folds so
characteristic of the master. His true originality is reflected in the overall
unity of his sculptures and compositions, imbued with a profound lyricism and a
restless dynamism that harks back to the late Gothic period, although in
certain works, forms foreshadowing the Baroque emerge.
The crowning achievements of Duknovic's art include
the Creation of Eve, the Resurrection, Hope, and God the Father on the tomb of
Pope Paul II; the Virgin on the tomb of Cardinal Roverella; the statue of Saint
John in Trogir; the figures of the Cardinal and Christ on the tomb in Eroli;
the Virgin in Padua; and certain portraits already mentioned. Duknovic's works
in Trogir are of paramount importance to Croatia.
While other great Croatian masters such as Culinovic
(Giorgio Schiavone), Medulic (Andrea Meldolla Schiavone), the miniaturist
Klovic (Julius Clovius), Benkovic, and both Laurana worked almost exclusively
abroad, where they left their works, Ivan Duknovic executed a portion of his
work in Croatia, playing a significant role in the artistic movement in
Dalmatia through his sculptures in Trogir, and especially through his statue of
Saint John, the beautiful sculpture that adorns the extraordinary chapel of
Nicholas of Florence. In the marble workshops and botteghe of early Dalmatian
16th century, we find repercussions and forms inexplicable without the presence
and teachings of Duknovic. He introduced mature forms of Renaissance art to
Croatia during a very difficult time, when Turkish attacks reached the gates of
Split and Trogir. Bernardo Zane, Archbishop of Split, movingly describing the
sufferings of the Croatian people before the Lateran Council, said: "I did
not hear about it, I did not read about it, but I saw it, as did my twelve
suffragan bishops in their cities. Often, woe is me, while officiating, I was
forced to cast off my clerical garb, take up arms, and rush to the city gates
to encourage the distraught people and console the afflicted so that they might
bravely resist the merciless and bloodthirsty enemy." Another bishop, who
was also banus (viceroy) of Croatia, Petar Berislavich, originally from Trogir
like Duknovic, fell fighting against the Ottomans while leading as supreme
commander of the Croatian army, his soldiers who considered him, according to
the chronicles of that time, "more like their father than the
viceroy".
However, the internal
organization of the Croatian kingdom was modeled on the traditional Croatian
tribal system, the center of whose power resided in a few powerful clans and in
the hands of the most prominent families within those clans. This system
significantly limited the centralizing tendencies of the kings, while
simultaneously exposing the kingdom to open rivalries between clans and tribes,
the intrigues of foreign powers, and civil wars. These conditions also hindered
the development of the feudal system, as well as the growth of intensive
agriculture, industry, and trade. The tribes in the mountains continued their
semi-nomadic extensive sheep-herding economy, and the peasants in the lowlands
maintained a self-sufficient economic system organized for household
consumption rather than for the markets.
Therefore, the Croatian
princes and kings relied primarily on the taxes collected from the
Romance-speaking cities along the coast for their income. On the other hand,
the Romance-speaking population in the cities and mountains (descendants of the
Romanized Thracians and Illyrians) successfully resisted and refused to be
assimilated by the tribal system, which was organized on the exclusivist
principles of ethnic identity and culture. Their loyalty to the Croatian rulers
was not unwavering. Consequently, both the kingdom's internal unity and its
once considerable military power gradually declined. Meanwhile, some Croatian
leaders intermarried with the Magyars, another people who had invaded the
Pannonian region. This course of events gradually facilitated the union of
Croatia and Hungary under a common king in the early 12th century.
The warlike Magyar tribes,
established in the 9th century in the Danube and Tisza river basins, subjugated
the native population and founded a powerful kingdom. They had already
established a centralized political power and a feudal system. In the
negotiations for union with Hungary under a common king, the Croatian
chieftains retained their exclusive rights to rule over the historical territories
of the Kingdom of Croatia. The Hungarian king was crowned King of Croatia in
separate ceremonies.
However, influenced by the
Hungarian example, the chieftains of the main Croatian clans, through the
forced appropriation of tribal and other lands, as well as through land grants
from kings, transformed themselves into feudal lords. Even so, the collective
memory of the Croatian people continued to dream of the power and glory of the
ancient Kingdom of Croatia, a yearning that grew stronger with time. It was
precisely on the basis of these historical aspirations that the Croatian
nobility always emphasized their independence.
They defended their ancient
privileges, jealously preserving Croatia's self-government and its right to
self-determination against the abuses of the Hungarian kings and estates. Now
the center of power for the Croatian nobility shifted northwest to the
Pannonian Plains of Croatia, where the feudal system was able to thrive thanks
to the productive labor of the peasants and where towns flourished, populated
by German, Italian, and native artisans and merchants.
However, as they faced the
threat of the Magyar clergy and feudal nobility and the centralizing tendencies
of the Hungarian kings, the Croatian grandees and clergy strove to assert their
independence from Hungary whenever circumstances demanded it.
Thus, for example, as early as the 13th century, the
Croatian feudal nobility in Bosnia and Herzegovina began to govern that
territory independently. Due to favorable international circumstances, Bosnia
gradually became a separate kingdom in the 14th century. In the other Croatian
provinces, the struggle continued between the centralizing tendencies of the
Hungarian kings and the separatist tendencies of the Croatian nobility. Meanwhile,
the pressure exerted by the Ottoman Turks on Croatian lands intensified during
the 15th and early 16th centuries, and Croatian resistance diminished due to
the loss of territory and manpower. Under these circumstances, the Croatians
turned to Archduke Ferdinand of neighboring Austria and elected him,
independently of Hungary, as King of Croatia in 1527, with him pledging to
defend Croatian lands with an agreed-upon number of troops.
The Croatian experience under the Habsburgs was even
more disappointing than that under the Hungarian kings. Not only did the
Austrian rulers fail to honor their commitments, but they also divided the
territory of historical Croatia, creating, within Croatian territory, a
separate administrative unit called the Military Frontier, governed by Austrian
officers. Here, a system of constant military training prevailed, designed to
perpetuate warrior traits among a population that was forced to engage in
incessant guerrilla warfare with the Turks. Thus, the Croatian nobility lost
most of their territory, just as, in the 15th century, under the Hungarian
kings, the Adriatic coast had been lost to Venice.
Feudal Croatia, reduced to such a state, nevertheless
offered resistance to foreign rulers in the 17th century through the conspiracy
of the Croatian counts Zrinski and Frankopan. The conspirators' aim was to
separate Croatia and Hungary from Austria and establish a Croatian-Hungarian
kingdom, with Zrinski as king, under the suzerainty of the Turkish sultan. The
plan failed, and the power of the Croatian nobles was finally broken. Their
role as holders of national sovereignty was assumed by the peasants of the
Pannonian Plain and by the emerging intelligentsia in Croatia's coastal and
inland cities.
The
Peasants of the Pannonian Plain
Until the beginning of the 20th century, the basic
unit of social organization for the peasantry in the Sava and Drava river
basins was the land and housing community (zadruga), composed of several
families and governed by the principles of economic and political democracy. It
was a unit that was both territorial and familial, in which territorial ties
prevailed over blood relations. The families that formed a community (zadruga)
did not necessarily have to be related, and their children often married among
themselves. Nor was the unit governed by the Father or the Elder, but by two
elected officials, a man and a woman. Their powers were delegated to them by
the assembly of all active members, men and women, and could be revoked at any
time. Fields, water, mills, forests, houses, stables, and agricultural
implements were collectively owned and used for household consumption, not for
the market or trade.
This self-sustaining, autarkic economic system,
designed to provide economic security and general well-being, was equal for all
its members. In addition to economic and social equality, the community, due to
its size (averaging 20 to 40 members or more), was able to provide
entertainment, recreation, and emotional fulfillment for everyone. Furthermore,
each individual family in this community could own a plot of land, as well as
other individual properties. While all families ate together in the communal
house, each had separate living quarters where its members slept, rested, and
socialized, along with their friends, whenever they sought privacy. Thus,
besides economic security and social equality, this system of organization also
provided personal independence and human dignity, discouraged those who craved
power, minimized conflict, and fostered adaptability, compromise, and mutual
support. It also encouraged rapid
population growth.
Such a social system prevailed among the ancient
Slavic farmers, who populated the Pannonian and Balkan plains and river valleys
in stages from the early centuries of the Christian era until the High Middle
Ages. At that time, in addition to the local village, composed of several land
and housing communities (zadruga), these people were organized into larger
territorial units made up of several villages called "zupa" for
common affairs. These units were also governed according to the principles of
political democracy.
This system of economic, territorial, and political
organization prevented both sharp social differentiation and the concentration
of power in the hands of a single class or individual. Such a social structure,
therefore, did not favor the formation of "states." Moreover, having
dedicated all their energy to production and lacking warrior characteristics,
these people did not advance much in military techniques and skill.
Consequently, they were often defenseless against predatory tribes or
professional soldiers. The strategy of these peasants was to settle in swamps
or in the middle of forests and other places, far from the main transit routes.
If their lands were conquered, these peasants adapted to the conquerors on the
condition that the new masters allowed them to keep their lands and respected
their traditional customs.
Without being aggressive or threatening anyone, and
being valuable as agricultural producers, the Slavs were left undisturbed as
they migrated in search of more arable land, required by their rapidly growing
population and self-sufficient economy. They often found this land in areas
devastated by the warlike tribes and hordes from the East, which had been
invading Eastern and Central Europe until the late Middle Ages. These
migrations, accompanied by the cultivation of the land, occurred at a rather
slow pace and over short distances, always maintaining a close connection with
their place of origin. This type of migration explains the extent of the area
populated by these farmers, as well as the great similarity in languages
and folk customs that they preserved. It also explains the Slavic
farmers' ability to assimilate the conquerors, whose numbers were smaller.
When Croatian warrior tribes invaded the Pannonian
Plain and the Dinaric Alps in the 7th century AD, the Slavic farmers who had
previously inhabited these areas provided the economic foundation for the
Croatian state. Within this state, the two contrasting societies—that of the
farmers and that of the warriors—established a symbiotic relationship. Some
warriors and herders from the mountains began to settle in the lowlands,
turning to agriculture. Others preferred to continue with horse breeding,
semi-nomadic sheep herding, and warrior occupations.
However, over the following centuries, as the tribal
organization of Croatian warriors disintegrated and gave way to the feudal
system, the peasants resisted the dispossession of their lands and fought for
their rights through legal means and frequent local revolts. These culminated
in the general uprising of the peasants of the northern Croatian plain in the
16th century. The Croatian peasants were defeated by the superior army of the
estates.
Nevertheless, some peasants managed to retain their
lands and their freedom. They organized themselves into free agricultural
communities that enjoyed the privileges of the nobility. It was precisely this
peasant nobility, administratively organized into larger territorial units
called zupanias (comitatus), that became the focus of constitutional and
democratic ideas, forming the last bastion of resistance to the centralist
policies and absolutist regimes of the Austrian monarchs. The Zupanias, by
their constitution, were autonomous units, and no law passed by the highest
authorities was valid without the prior approval of the Zupania assembly. The
Zupanias controlled the recruitment of soldiers and the war budget; therefore,
they could offer effective resistance to the rulers. Thus, they opposed
Habsburg absolutism and its centralizing policies under the reign of Maria
Theresa, so effectively that her son, Joseph II (1780-1790), abolished the
Zupanias as administrative and legislative units. However, faced with setbacks
in the war with Turkey (1787-1791), he was forced to restore them with all
their privileges and autonomy.
In the mid-19th century, the feudal system was
abolished throughout Croatia, and the peasants finally gained their legal
freedom. However, the peasants' interests and their yearning for "old
rights" were curtailed by the Hungarian rulers, who sought to bring
Croatia under their control. The leaders of the resurgent Hungarian nationalism
had decided to subjugate and Magyarize Croatia, aiming to realize their
long-held dream of a unified Hungarian state stretching from the Carpathians to
the Adriatic. They had agreed with the Austrian monarchs to reorganize the
monarchy into a dual empire, with Croatia being arbitrarily assigned to
Hungary. To subdue Croatia, they had to restrict political rights, because if
universal and secret suffrage were granted to the peasants in Croatia, who then
comprised almost 90% of the total population, they would control local
government and thus become an insurmountable obstacle to Hungarian objectives.
Overconfident in their superior position and strength, the Magyars chose to
govern Croatia through a sham parliament and with the help of the ethnic
Serbian minority, to whom they granted special favors.
After the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes, universal suffrage gave the Croatian peasant movement a dominant
role in local politics and significant influence on the events of that kingdom.
Previously, under Hungarian rule, peasant resistance had been rather
spontaneous and poorly organized. But by the time of the creation of
Yugoslavia, the Croatian peasants had forged a powerful instrument of their
struggle: a well-organized political party skillfully led by a select few
intellectuals of peasant origin.
The Croatian Peasant Party had formulated a platform
that included not only social but also national demands. Consequently, in the
subsequent struggle against the centralizing policies of the Belgrade regimes,
all strata of Croatian society, comprising the vast majority of the Croatian
people, eventually united under the aegis of the Croatian Peasant Party,
demanding recognition of Croatian national identity and the right to national
self-determination. In its program, as recorded in the draft "Constitution
of the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia," adopted in 1921 by its
parliamentary representatives, the Croatian Peasant Party articulated its call
for a sovereign Croatian state, organized on the principles of social democracy
within a parliamentary and republican system of government.
In Yugoslavia, as earlier in Austria and Hungary, the
centralizing tendencies of the rulers and the brutality of their police forces
provoked massive resistance from Croatian peasants. This, in turn, prompted
countermeasures from the rulers, culminating in the 1928 assassination of Radic
and two other leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party in the Belgrade parliament.
When the looming Second World War threatened the very existence of Yugoslavia
as a unified state, the country's rulers reached an agreement with the leaders
of the Croatian Peasant Party to avert its inevitable collapse. Under this
agreement, Croatian sovereignty was restored in the form of a separate
political territory encompassing most of the Croatian provinces and enjoying
internal autonomy within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
The
"intelligentsia" of the urban centers
Shortly after settling in the area disputed by Rome
and Byzantium, the Croatian tribes were exposed to the antagonistic influences
of Western and Eastern civilizations. Thus, while the cities on the eastern
Adriatic coast and their clergy were under Byzantine control, the clergy in the
Croatian "states" were oriented toward Rome, despite having adopted
certain Byzantine practices, such as the marriage of priests. With one
exception, the Croatian princes and kings gravitated toward Rome. Orienting
themselves toward Byzantium implied political submission, while Rome offered
political freedom.
However, by the end of the 9th century, the Croats had
adopted Old Church Slavonic instead of Latin in their liturgical rites and were
in the process of establishing a kind of national church. This situation, which
clashed with the trends of papal Rome, was tolerated until the strained
relations between the Byzantine and Roman Churches were on the verge of
collapse and the Popes assumed an increasingly militant role in secular
affairs. At this juncture, the Popes insisted on the Latinization of the
Croatian clergy and the political subservience of the Croatian kings.
The Croatian kings were inclined to accept these
conditions in exchange for control of the coastal cities from which they
derived their main revenue and which, to a large extent, contributed to the
power and position of the kingdom. With the incorporation of these economically
prosperous and culturally advanced Romance cities, the influence of Western
civilization on the ruling class, including the clergy, was strengthened. These
influences manifested themselves in improved agricultural techniques, educational
advancements, and a higher standard of living for the population compared to
the warlike tribes in the mountains.
However, not all tribes, nor all the clergy, accepted
this state of affairs, resenting the Latinization of the Church and the influence
of the Roman clergy at the royal court. This situation exacerbated internal
tensions within the kingdom and weakened its military power to such an extent
that Rome shifted its main support in the region to the Magyars, who had
established a strongly centralized power structure and were not tainted by
Byzantine influences. In this way, Rome backed the union of the Croatian
kingdom with the Hungarian kingdom.
As the center of Croatian political power moved to the
Pannonian Plain along the Drava and Sava rivers, a new bishopric, Zagreb, was
founded there, becoming a new center of Latinization in Croatia. Eastern
influences in the Church gradually disappeared, although vestiges of them
persist to the present day in liturgical rites celebrated in Old Slavic in some
dioceses along the Adriatic coast. The Latin alphabet was also adopted, and
Latin became the official language of administration. With it, Western
knowledge—science, philosophy, arts, and literature—penetrated Croatia. Later,
in the 18th and 19th centuries, Latin was used as a defense against Magyar
attempts to impose Magyar as the official language of Croatia.
However, the course of events in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was quite different. There, several Croatian nobles, in order to
preserve their independence from both Hungary and Byzantium, established their
own state church in the form of Bogomilism, a Patarene sect. Because of the
simplicity of its rites and hierarchy, as well as its close connection with the
common people, this sect also attracted many peasants in the region. The
Bosnian Church and its followers fostered a sharp antagonism against both
Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, and both persecuted the Bogomils with
inquisitorial methods. This situation weakened Bosnian resistance to Islamization.
Therefore, when the Ottoman invaders offered the
Bosnian nobility hereditary rights to their lands and freedom from serfdom to
those peasants who embraced Islam, the Bogomils were easily persuaded. Bosnia
and Herzegovina fell to the Turkish conquerors in the latter half of the 15th
century with little or no resistance. However, the Islamization of Bosnia did
not destroy the indigenous culture of its agricultural population, nor that of
its warrior nobility or mountain clans. The Croatian nobility, of the Muslim
faith, continued to rule in the region, and their warlike mountain warriors
distinguished themselves in the battles under the Croatian Crescent. But later,
in the 19th century, with the rise of nationalism, the Muslim intelligentsia in
Bosnia and Herzegovina identified (with very few exceptions) with Croatian
national ideals.
In the cities along the Adriatic coast, events took a
different course. This region (Dalmatia) was under Venetian control from the
early 15th century until the late 18th century, with the exception of
Dubrovnik, which became an independent republic. These urban centers,
originally populated by the Romance-speaking population, gradually became
Croatianized through the constant influx of Croatian shepherds from the nearby
Dinaric Mountains and rural people from the coast and islands. These immigrants
settled in the cities as merchants, artisans, laborers, and landowners.
Some, over time, rose to become patricians and nobles.
At the same time, many Italians also arrived in these cities as artists,
clergymen, teachers, doctors, scribes, and chancellors. Very soon, young
Croatians were encouraged to study abroad, particularly in Italy. And already
in the first part of the 13th century some outstanding artistic and architectural
works in these cities were carried out by masters with Croatian names. From the
15th century until the end of the 17th century, in some coastal cities
(especially in Split, Hvar, Dubrovnik) there was an extraordinary flourishing
of Croatian science, arts and letters, both in Latin and in Croatian, following
the general lines of the Renaissance and Humanism, as well as the
Counter-Reformation.
The Counter-Reformation, however, was very active in
the urban centers of northern Croatia, which, as part of the Hungarian-Croatian
Kingdom, was particularly exposed to the ideas of the Reformation due to the
rise of Protestantism in Hungary. For this reason, the Jesuit Order established
the first schools and academies of higher learning in Croatian lands in the 16th
century. At the same time, the Catholic hierarchy of Croatia, in conjunction
with the high nobility, taking advantage of Croatia's existing autonomy,
prevented the spread of Protestantism within its territory, especially since
Protestantism was seen as a new instrument of Hungarian domination.
Later, under the absolutism of the Austrian monarchs,
particularly Maria Theresa, Joseph II, and Francis I, Croatian cities had to
endure a strong German influence; liberal philosophy seeped in, especially
among the nobility and the upper classes of the urban population, disseminated
by German-speaking Austrian civil and military officials. These influences
manifested themselves in social customs, lifestyles, education, the arts, and
literature, as well as in governmental and administrative structures. The
children of the high nobility were educated at the Theresianum in Vienna, while
the children of the middle class enrolled in universities in Austria and
Germany.
Although some of these newly educated individuals
became Germanized, the majority received Western culture through German
schools, thus resisting denationalization. The position of the latter was
reinforced by the ideas of the French Revolution, which had penetrated Croatia
since the late 18th century, particularly as a consequence of the reforms
promoted by the French administration in Dalmatia and in the Napoleonic state
of Illyria at the beginning of the 19th century. The use of the Croatian
language was encouraged in schools, the press, and public offices. In this way,
most of the foreign residents educated in the Croatian provinces, with the
exception of the Serbian minority, were gradually Croatianized.
Meanwhile, these Westernizing influences on the
Croatian urban population were, to some extent, counterbalanced by the Eastern
pull of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism. The first known written formulation of
Pan-Slavism was published in a book, printed in Vienna, by the Croatian
Dominican friar Vinko Pribojevic, originally from the island of Hvar, in the early
15th century. He was followed by the Croatian priest Juraj Krizanic in the 17th
century. Originally, Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism identified with the numerical
strength of the Slavic peoples and their achievements, which provided a sense
of power and pride in comparison with other large peoples, such as the
Germanic, Latin, and Anglo-Saxon, who often looked down upon the Slavs.
Pan-Slavism was also supported by some enlightened minds of the
Counter-Reformation who saw in the union of the Roman Catholic Church and the
Russian Orthodox Church a counterweight to the growing vigor of Protestantism.
As a consequence of these currents in Croatian
thought, when Croatian nationalism developed in the 19th century under the
impact of the French Revolution, its ideology continued to exhibit a dual
orientation: pro-Western and pro-Slavic. The pro-Slavic orientation of Croatian
nationalists in the last century was also influenced by the philosophical and
literary romanticism of some German thinkers and writers, primarily the works
of Johann Gottfried, as well as by Czech and Slovak scholars and Slavophile
writers. One of the main exponents of the pro-Slavic orientation in Croatia at
that time was the Catholic bishop Joseph Georg Strossmayer, a Croatian
statesman of German descent. He also cherished the desire for the union of the
Western and Eastern Churches, which is why he opposed the dogma of papal
infallibility at the Second Vatican Council of 1869-70.
As an outgrowth of Slavophile Romanticism, a group of
young Croatian secular intellectuals in the early decades of the 19th century,
most of whom studied at the University of Graz, Austria, developed ideas
regarding the political union of all South Slavs. The formulation of this
"Yugoslav (South Slavic) idea constituted the ideological birth of the
future state of Yugoslavia. However, the Yugoslav idea soon experienced
setbacks due to the political activities of the ethnic Serbian minority in
Croatia during the second half of the 19th century. At that time, Hungarian nationalists,
pursuing a policy of centralism and Magyarization, found their strongest
support in Croatia among adherents of the Eastern Orthodox Church. These people
settled in Croatia, on the lands of the Croatian nobility, during the Turkish
invasions of the Balkans. A considerable number were originally
Romance-speaking shepherd warriors who embraced Eastern Orthodoxy under Turkish
rule, which favored it over Roman Catholicism.
The Austrian authorities, in turn, had invited them to
settle in the Military Frontier because of their warrior qualities. But, unlike
German and other immigrants in Croatia, these Orthodox shepherds and warriors
resisted assimilation.
In Eastern Orthodoxy, the traditional identification
of Church and State persists, along with the Church's role as an instrument of
national politics. Therefore, the Orthodox clergy of Serbian ethnic background
had identified with the medieval Kingdom of Serbia, which had promoted the
formation of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, and dedicated all their
efforts to restoring that kingdom from the moment of its fall. They practiced
this policy in the Ottoman Empire, in Austria, and in Hungary after Eastern
Orthodox immigrants settled there. And when the Serbian state was finally
established in the last century, the Serbian Orthodox clergy and intelligentsia
continued to pursue in Austria-Hungary the policy that best suited the current
interests of the Kingdom of Serbia at that time. Thus, while the Serbian kings
were allied with Austria-Hungary, the Serbian leaders in the Danubian Monarchy
supported the policies of the Austrian and Hungarian authorities.
In Dalmatia, for example, which became an Austrian
province after Napoleon's defeat, the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox minority,
in association with the ethnic Italian minority, opposed the demands of the
Croatian population in Dalmatia for union with Croatia. In Croatia itself,
Serbian leaders supported the dictatorial and police-state government of the
Hungarian representatives, receiving special favors and privileges in return.
A radical shift occurred in the politics of the
Serbian minority in Croatia when the Serbian military, backed by Tsarist
Russia, embarked on an aggressive policy of territorial expansion in the
Balkans through military conquests from the beginning of the 20th century.
Austria-Hungary was the main obstacle to these plans. Therefore, it was
necessary to weaken it on the domestic front and eventually dismember it.
The most effective strategy for achieving this seemed
to be a policy of supporting radical Hungarian nationalism, which sought
complete independence and separation from Austria. In pursuit of these
objectives, the leaders of the Serbian minority in Croatia and Dalmatia strove
to reach an understanding with anti-Austrian, Yugoslav-oriented Croatian
political leaders regarding a common political line toward Austria and Hungary.
As a result of this policy, the Croatian-Serbian political coalition was
formed, which, acting in cooperation with the Hungarians, was able to come to
power in Croatia. In this situation, the Serbian intelligentsia was in a
favorable position to disseminate anti-Austrian and pro-Serbian propaganda,
which intensified particularly following Serbian victories in the Balkan Wars
of 1912–13.
It was precisely this pro-Serbian climate, coupled
with the long-standing resentment of the Croats against the hegemonic policies
of Austria and Hungary and the fear of Italian claims on Croatian territory,
that contributed to the formation of the common state of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes, under the King of Serbia, at the end of the First World War. This
union was consummated before the legitimate representatives of the Croatian
people had agreed upon and stipulated the necessary conditions regarding its
form and content.
Therefore, as soon as the new state was created, two
irreconcilable state and national ideologies immediately clashed. The Serbian
leaders, who had been relentlessly expanding their state's borders through
successive military conquests since the mid-19th century, were inclined to view
Croatia simply as another region they had conquered, one that, like other
regions, would eventually be subjugated and Serbized.
On the other hand, the Croats, who throughout the
centuries had managed, through tenacious struggle against superior forces, to
preserve their ethnic identity, continued to defend their national
individuality, claiming the right to self-determination. They were resolved to
achieve this right both through parliamentary struggle and through mass
resistance against the military and police regimes in Belgrade. That clash with Belgrade led to a series of
assassinations, executions, and mass killings, directed by the Belgrade police.
In this atmosphere of persecution and terror, an
intensely nationalist movement, known as the Ustaše, was organized in Croatia.
Its radical militancy attracted combative elements, especially among the
Croatian population of the Dinaric regions. The population of these regions had
preserved the essential foundations of their original patriarchal social
organization, which fostered deep feelings of kinship and friendship while
simultaneously instigating intense conflicts and violent, uncompromising
actions, thus perpetuating the age-old warlike characteristics of the area.
The Ustaše turned their attention to Italy and
Germany, orchestrated the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, and
re-established the Independent State of Croatia at the beginning of World War
II. This Croatian state included a large ethnic Serbian minority, many of whose
members retained warrior traditions and positions and harbored deep resentment
toward the new authorities. They were inclined to join Serbian guerrilla groups
(Chetniks), whose objective was to fight against the newly established authorities
in the former territory of Yugoslavia. Thus, clashes between the Chetnik groups
and the Croatian authorities soon intensified, leading to full-blown civil war.
This civil war was exacerbated by communist
activities, the majority of which, especially the militant activists, came from
traditionally warlike regions, and particularly from the Serbian and
Montenegrin ethnic groups of the Dinaric territories (the partisan guerrillas).
Following Lenin's precepts to seize power under conditions of disorientation
and discrediting of the rulers, and Stalin's instructions to transform the
Second World War into a civil war, the communists made every effort, resorting
to all means, to incite the warring and extremely nationalistic Serbian and
Croatian groups against each other and to prolong and intensify their mutual
struggles. With this strategy, the communists ultimately seized power
throughout Yugoslavia with the active support of the Western Allies.
Before delving into the subject, it is worth
highlighting another problem that Tito addressed: the still unresolved national
question within the multinational Yugoslav state. Tito speaks of political
discontent, of "national chauvinism," that is, of national divisions
in all spheres of public life: in the economy, in literature, in family
education, and in the communist education of youth in general. He refers to the
chauvinistic behavior of members of the Communist Party and to attempts to
undermine from within the "brotherhood and unity" of the peoples of
Yugoslavia.
He is astonished that 17 years after the war he still
has to insist on "brotherhood and unity" and threatens that he will
not allow anyone to undermine it from within. Here, the comparison with the
dictatorial King Alexander Karageorgevic and his Great Serbian policy directed
against Croats, Macedonians, and Slovenes under the pretext of preserving
national unity naturally arises. King Alexander also sought to suppress,
through brute force, the justified aspirations of non-Servian peoples to enjoy
the right to self-determination, but he ultimately became a victim of his own
policies and accelerated the collapse and disintegration of monarchical
Yugoslavia.
Tito's desperate cry for the unattainable
"brotherhood and unity" of the peoples of Yugoslavia and his threat
against those who dared to destroy them are strikingly reminiscent of the
supposed last words of the dictator Alexander: "Preserve Yugoslavia."
Shouldn't Tito's words, in the face of these insurmountable national antagonisms,
be interpreted as a confession of communist impotence in the face of a
historical factor that transcends the framework of communist doctrine and
proves insoluble with the resources and methods of communist politics? A
careful analysis of Tito's speech will, here too, provide a valid answer.
The
Economic and Social State
Alluding to the deficiencies in the economic sector,
Tito speaks of investments, noting, among other things, this disastrous fact:
"Today we have here and there one or two
companies that tomorrow will have to be closed, given that their excessive
products have no market. There can't be many similar establishments left, and
you know that each commune, each municipality often wanted to have its own
company, and when building them, responsibility wasn't taken into account, nor
was thought given to what would happen tomorrow with their products when
saturation was reached in that and other branches of our industry and our
economy in general..." "Moreover, errors were made in planning. For
example, the construction of large establishments began before the plans were
drawn up, and it's logical that the cost was then double what was anticipated.
All of which affected our workers, who had to tighten their belts." The
communist leadership, due to its megalomania in the area of
industrialization, its incompetence, and the lack of popular
control, draws up unrealistic plans and It makes investments that often fail to
meet needs or contradict reality.
Sometimes the actual market demand is disregarded, or
the transport of raw materials proves uneconomical, or there is a lack of
skilled labor, so that, ultimately, new industrial plants fail and are often
left unfinished. All of this represents a pointless waste of vast sums. Of
course, such practices are not unique to Titoism, but a common phenomenon in
the Soviet Union and Red China, as well as in all the satellite communist
countries. Erroneous and uneconomical investments are inherent to the communist
economic system. Despite the promises of the communist leaders, the same
mistakes are repeated. It is necessary to mention here the methods of economic
development in this communist country. Plans cannot be implemented without the
approval of the central planning commissions and the Communist Party.
Once approved, an intense official propaganda campaign
begins, demanding sacrifices from the people in the form of "voluntary
labor." This is how low wages are justified. These plans partially absorb
American aid. It is well known that many economic projects were built using
forced labor and that young people must participate in so-called voluntary
youth brigades if they wish to advance later in life. After so much effort and
sacrifice, many industrial establishments turn out to be counterproductive or
superfluous.
Tito, speaking about investment policy, also alludes
to the distribution of accumulated funds and admits that it is not always
equitable. Regarding the banking system in relation to this distribution, he
states explicitly:
"Our banking system has many weaknesses. There
have been cases where those who could have used certain funds more profitably
did not obtain them, while others obtained them through bribery or other means,
although they could not guarantee their profitability. Therefore, we will try
to correct this banking system somewhat."
It is well known that common investment funds are
distributed arbitrarily and that protectionism and corruption play a leading
role in this. Tito himself acknowledges that funds for unproductive businesses
can be obtained through bribery. It is worth noting that those who receive the
bribes are the directors and other managers, generally members of the Communist
Party. These should be the exemplary communist elite, yet instead they live off
corruption and bribes.
Tito then addresses the painful problem of workers'
wages in Yugoslavia. It is no secret that neither workers nor employees can
live on their wages but must find additional work or live within a family with
many working members to cover basic needs. The very frequent consequence of low
wages is embezzlement and fraud in companies, so often prosecuted but always
recurring. "Economic crime" is also an inherent part of the communist
system. This criminality first infected those at the top of the economic structure
who possess vast funds and commit irregularities, fraud, embezzlement, and
misappropriation, while also awarding themselves disproportionately high
salaries and other benefits. Here are Tito's words on the matter:
"The problem of wage inequality in our country is
a significant one. There are cases where the highest salary exceeds the lowest
by twenty times in the same establishment. It is simply incomprehensible how
such a thing could have happened and how unfortunately it came about... As for
the internal distribution of profits in companies, there were also various
irregularities. It happened that a worker received, let's say, 2,000 dinars as
a share of the surplus, and someone else received 80,000 dinars."
Tito blames the workers' "collectives,"
admitting that the communists, that is, the regime, are partly to blame for
having allowed such injustices. He acknowledges that the communist leaders are
arrogating greater rights. He initially speaks of sporadic cases, but later
admits that such anomalies occur "almost every day," that these
errors take on a political character, and that general discontent is spreading.
Tito promises "to take measures to rectify these things and prevent them
from happening again."
Tito's admission that the corruption of communist leaders
has political consequences is interesting; that is, it provokes discontent
among the masses, who blame the entire Communist Party and the regime, not just
any individual. This is one of the reasons that led Tito to address this
problem publicly. It is also revealing to observe that the workers' situation
is miserable compared to that of their employers and that they are exploited
worse than in the early stages of capitalism. It seems paradoxical that the
communist system has created greater injustices and social inequalities than
the worst forms of capitalist exploitation.
Tito promised to take measures to clean things up.
Purges and the imprisonment of certain leaders are underway. These purges,
however, do not affect the highest-ranking officials, who are bribable and
corrupt to a fault and enjoy the greatest privileges. The prime example is Tito
himself, whose lavish lifestyle sets a very poor example for a communist
leader. He owns numerous castles and hunting estates, has access to luxurious
trains, boats, and special yachts, his entourage is very large, and his
expenses are disproportionate to the population's standard of living. In the
current "purge," minor bosses and leaders will certainly fall, but
the top brass will remain untouched. Otherwise, the communist leadership would
have to eliminate itself, which, of course, it does not want to do despite the
people's discontent and exasperation.
Besides villas with luxurious furnishings and high
salaries, the communist leaders are fond of cars and trips abroad. They
squander their main energies in the silent internal struggles for privileges.
Trips abroad, especially to Western countries, are preferred since, in addition
to contributing to "social prestige," they mean foreign currency, refrigerators,
cachets, and other luxury items. Tito stated the following:
"I would like to address the issue of trips
abroad and the waste of foreign currency they entail. Many travel abroad
unnecessarily, at the expense of the collectives, that is, at the expense of our
entire community. Many stay away for
months on end, squandering money..."
"Regarding these trips, I would like to add a few
more words. It so happens that these travelers often end up with a car. I ask
how this is possible. Well, there are a few cases where they can buy a car,
which costs less abroad than here, but I don't believe that so many cars can be
bought with the travel allowances received. It's obvious that something else is
going on. Abroad, our representatives are frequently bribed and then sent
gifts, etc."
I mean, some concessions were made, of course. But
those concessions came at the expense of our community, since something was
either paid for more than necessary or sold at a lower price. There are cases
of secret deposits in foreign banks that are difficult to verify...
"In our country, there is often a lot of talk,
and in this way, through contact with foreigners, our economic secrets are
revealed..."
Consequently, the Supreme Leader of the Communist
Party acknowledges that communist leaders squander state funds, allow
themselves to be corrupted abroad, make deposits in foreign banks, and sell
economic secrets to foreigners. Such infractions are common among communists
and demonstrate extreme corruption and demoralization. Such leadership cannot
promote or manage a healthy economy, nor deserve the prestige and respect of
the workers. These individuals and these phenomena are a normal consequence of
the communist socioeconomic system and cannot be remedied by the administrative
measures advocated by Tito.
It is known that in Yugoslavia, prices are constantly
rising and that the ratio between the cost of living and wages is worsening
daily for workers. The main cause of this grave situation must be sought in the
centrally planned economy, the suppression of private initiative, and the lack
of self-interest—the main levers of this system. These are the factors
contributing to economic progress. It should also be added that there is a lack
of popular control, the squandering of public funds through uneconomical
investments, corruption, and the subjugation of national assets to the service
of communist leaders capable of managing the economy. Tito acknowledges and
confirms all of this.
It goes without saying that trade cannot function well
or benefit the people under such a system either. Tito points out in this
regard:
"Allow me now, comrades, to turn to trade, to
address certain problems in this sector of our economy. In Yugoslavia, we
constantly feel—not only feel, but see—how the prices of many goods are rising.
The prices of many products rise steadily even when a good harvest is on the
horizon, from which we expect price stabilization. One must ask, what is the
cause of this price increase? What is the crux of this problem? The crux lies,
first and foremost, in the poor organization of supplies."
"We know this very well. Nevertheless, we allow
those involved to raise prices as they please." Even in capitalist
countries, there are certain regulators that prevent excessive price increases,
and here our merchant raises prices so quickly and rapidly as soon as a
shortage of certain products is noticed that, in my opinion, he is not a
capitalist merchant at all. There were numerous cases in which our merchants
withheld stored merchandise to create shortages in the market and maintain high
prices. Hence, we now have so much merchandise piled up in warehouses that
merchants refused to sell at lower prices. Hence, we currently have to sell
certain stored items at perhaps half price.
"This merchandise is not only stored but also
deteriorates. Much is lost in this way for merchants to achieve a large profit
margin... Therefore, the deficient system of supply and organization of our
merchants constitutes a serious problem."
"Since we're talking about our domestic trade, I
must say that we suffer from a certain incapacity not only in terms of
organization but also in the preparation and preservation of products."
"Until now, the situation has been that the
agricultural producer harvests, let's say, a lot of tomatoes and other
vegetables and fruits, and if the buyer—that is, the company involved—doesn't
purchase that harvest, the producer has no incentive to produce more. They
don't want to risk their vegetables and fruits spoiling again, so the market
often experiences shortages of certain agricultural products. Garlic, for
example, is currently extremely expensive. The same is true for other
products... The purchasing companies also have to take some risks. Today in
Yugoslavia, we have cold storage facilities where large quantities of
agricultural products can be stored, where they won't spoil. However, they are
empty, and the markets lack products that could have been preserved."
" Tito blames all of this on the supposed
democracy introduced into the economy, which he claims caused such a worsening
of the situation compared to previous years. He also blames "national
chauvinism" in the economy, the creation of closed local markets, etc. The
fundamental point is that the economy in communist Yugoslavia did not fulfill
its primary function as an intermediary for goods but became an end in itself;
speculation was its main concern; it ruined large assets and was parasitic at
the expense of the consuming masses and the entire economy.
No less disastrous is the picture Tito painted of
Yugoslavia's foreign trade. One of the arguments put forward by the communists
regarding rapid industrialization was the increase in the export of industrial
products in order to obtain the foreign currency needed for imports. In this
way, Tito's regime sought to overcome the difficulties in importing foodstuffs
during the "transition phase" of the socialist transformation of
agriculture, until domestic needs were met. Similarly, there was an attempt to
import other essential goods for the consumer and manufacturing industries.
However, actual development took the opposite course; instead of generating
foreign exchange through the export of industrial products, the balance of
payments deficit steadily increased. Tito summarizes this development as follows:
"Allow me now, comrades, to address our foreign
trade. It is not entirely successful, partly because we had to contend with the
old merchants, some of whom were good, but also some unprofitable ones, who
introduced several negative and detrimental elements into our foreign trade. At
this time, we have more than 500, that is, 540 import and export firms... A
small company is like a traveling salesman when it sells its goods abroad. The
merchant must always maintain a certain stock, while the small salesman makes
one transaction and then has no more goods.
The consequence is that we are losing market share.
That is why I said two years ago that 540 import and export firms are too many
and that we should reduce them by half, but now there are even more than
before... You see, comrades, that these firms commit irregularities and
sometimes have a negative impact, so we lose markets abroad and appear
unprofessional. Because of such practices, for example, several products are
returned to us." Such an unscrupulous merchant believes it is lawful to
deceive the foreign buyer and sell him overripe apples or cherries, for which
reason the foreign customer returns the entire shipment."
"Since I'm talking about foreign trade companies,
I should also mention their representatives in other countries. I've traveled
to several Afro-Asian countries and found many of our merchants spending months
and months in bars and cafes without finding a single customer. They waste time
and squander foreign currency they receive from their country without finding a
buyer, because they don't know the market, nor have they worked on it or
studied it enough to know what could be sold and what would be needed. Strange
things happen, like, for example, sending clogs to warm Africa that have been
stored for a long time, clogs that nobody wears here, nor can they be used
there. It goes without saying that the merchandise then spoils, and the same
thing happens with other products from our country. All of this damages our
reputation abroad."
" "It is true that we constantly import more
than we export, but we have also lost a great deal due to a lack of integrity,
or rather, due to the impropriety of our export companies. Today we import just
about anything, even though our industry is not bad. The assortment is vast,
and in our country we can find almost everything. But, due to inertia, people
prefer to buy abroad. It is not merely a matter of inertia, but, in fact, of
seeking some personal gain or profit. They go abroad and often buy what we
don't need, saying that it costs less there. Yes, but we profit with foreign
currency that we lack. We owe foreign countries around 800 million dollars, and
our deficit is growing unnecessarily. In such a situation, we must rely on our
own internal strength; we must decrease imports and increase exports."
From the above, a simple and logical conclusion can be
drawn. The large deficit in Yugoslavia's foreign trade should not be attributed
primarily to improper practices, as Tito does. The causes lie in megalomaniacal
industrialization, which absorbs all available resources, on the one hand, and
in the irresponsible management of national assets and unrealistic economic
plans, on the other. The same occurs with family budgets or those of private
companies, where spending, waste, or irrational investment exceeds income. This
creates a permanent imbalance that jeopardizes the company if its expenditures
and investments are not fundamentally changed. The same applies to the national
economy. Yugoslavia's current external deficit of 800 million dollars is an
enormous sum and a heavy burden for Yugoslavia, which will be felt for years to
come. According to Tito, this deficit is constantly increasing. It should also
be remembered that this deficit occurred despite substantial American aid. What
will happen if this source of subsidies dries up, as suggested by the latest
resolutions of the Washington Congress?
In the analysis of prices and wages, we have already
seen that the cost of living is rising, that there are shortages of many goods
in the market, and that the purchasing power of wages is decreasing. These
would be the outward signs of a long-standing and recently accelerating acute
inflation. This means there is no equilibrium in the Yugoslav economy: the money
supply exceeds the supply of goods, so the state covers the excess expenditures
by printing more paper money. This is also reflected negatively in the balance
of payments and in foreign trade. In addition to the aforementioned deficit,
agricultural inflation makes it impossible to restore equilibrium in the
balance of payments.
Mentioning once again the importation of cars and the
worsening balance of payments deficit, Tito tried to blame the critical
economic situation and irregularities on the workers' collectives, alluding to
the problem of the strike. He attributed some of the responsibility to the
directors, protecting them, however, because most of them were members of the
Communist Party. Tito said on the matter:
"What, for example, constitutes the shortcomings
of our workers' collectives? Their failure to exercise their rights. If the
workers' collective governs through its governing bodies, then it is
responsible and must not allow such things to happen. It is understood,
moreover, that we cannot hold only the directors responsible, nor make them the
target of a general campaign. We have very good directors, excellent men,
outstanding comrades who never uttered a word to ask for a higher salary than
the one assigned to them by the workers' collectives. But there were also
directors who tried to extract the greatest possible benefit without adhering
to the decisions of the workers' collective. These directors colluded with
certain local leaders and made and broke everything in their respective companies.
This must stop. Ensuring normal production and equitable distribution within
each company—that is, the allocation of wages—is the task of the workers'
collectives. It sounds ridiculous when some say that, if the situation does not
improve, we will go to the..." "Strike."
"Against whom should they strike? Against
themselves! Such things should not be allowed, and if someone is useless, they
should be dismissed..." It is evident that the power of workers'
collectives is merely theoretical and that the main decisions are made by the
Communist Party and the company directors. It is logical, then, that the
workers are discontented and publicly threaten to strike. It is precisely at
this point that the Communist Party and Tito reveal their true colors as violators
of fundamental workers' rights. They do not allow strikes even though the
workers' economic situation is desperate. They deny the right to strike that
they proclaimed before coming to power, a right guaranteed in all democratic
countries. They resort to the tired argument that the workers would strike
against their vital rights, even though Tito's speeches reveal that they are
ruthlessly exploited. Titus reaffirms this in another paragraph of his speech:
"On the other hand, precisely because of these
shortcomings I have just mentioned, the standard of living of the workers
hardly increases, although much more can be done in this respect. The worker
has the right to receive a share of the surplus value he has created. We cannot
deny him this right. The insufficient rise in the productivity index is also
due to a certain apathy, a certain distrust that the worker will not receive a
share of what he is creating... The workers must strive to create surplus
value, that is, profits that they can share among themselves. It is logical
that the question of how to distribute it should arise. If it continues to be
distributed as it has been until now, then the workers will lose all motivation
and incentive."
Therefore, Tito admits that the current system for
allocating wages and distributing profits is not motivating for the workers.
The workers are apathetic and disinterested in their workplace; their wages are
insufficient to cover basic needs, and they think only of how to earn extra
money outside of work hours to survive. And seeing the corruption, unfair
wages, and luxurious lifestyles of the directors and party leaders, they become
desperate and politically content. Hence the rumors favoring a strike, which
Tito forcibly suppresses.
Since food supplies and the low rate of agricultural
production constitute a pressing problem in the Yugoslav economy, Tito could
not avoid addressing it in his speech. He acknowledges that subjective
shortcomings, that is, political and agricultural measures, outweigh
difficulties such as adverse weather conditions. Although it is obvious that
the agrarian crisis stems from the suppression and marginalization of
individual peasant holdings, Tito insists on promoting the socialist sector of
agriculture. Pressure will intensify against the peasants and in favor of the
socialist sector, which, due to its small size, cannot meet market demand,
instead absorbing disproportionately high funds compared to its uneconomical
output. Tito addresses this problem as follows:
"...We have achieved great successes with
socialist cooperative farms worked collectively using modern technical means
that can produce high yields. This high level is not achieved across all of
agriculture, since the socialist sector comprises only about 12%, insufficient
to feed all of Yugoslavia and its cities. Therefore, we must expand the socialist sector."
"... "To achieve this, we resorted to
various methods: we bought land, contracted with individual farmers, etc. But
we must accelerate the pace to achieve self-sufficient production, not just for
one year, but to create reserves. We cannot depend on wheat imported from the
United States and other countries; we must secure it with our own resources. In this respect, we must move forward more
boldly..."
The "bolder" path leads to socialism, that
is, to communism in agriculture, and is regressive. Tito's regime expected that the peasants, with the
collective farms dissolved, would voluntarily take this path.
However, since these hopes were not fulfilled, Tito's
agricultural policy faced this dilemma: 1) strengthening the socialist sector
and completely eliminating private land ownership; 2) promoting the private
sector in agriculture. The Tito regime apparently opted definitively for the
first solution. It is already reasonable to predict, based on past experience,
that this new experiment will also fail to solve the food production problem,
much less satisfy the needs of agricultural workers. The errors in the previous
agricultural policy were remedied by American aid in the form of food supplies.
Tito deluded himself into thinking he could get rid of this aid by
strengthening the socialist sector. The course of events could be different,
according to current indications. The renewed strengthening of the socialist
agricultural sector will lead to greater food production deficits, while new
shipments of American food supplies are provoking growing opposition in
Congress, so they may one day cease.
The
National Problem
Speaking of economic difficulties, Tito also addressed
the obstacles to the economy caused by antagonisms between peoples and
"republics." He mentions closed local markets, specifically cites the
"people's republics" of Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia, and speaks of
political discontent and national chauvinism. Here are his exact words:
"In this respect, such anomalies exist that, due
to these weaknesses in the general Yugoslav market, local isolationism and the
creation of local markets are employed. Thus, certain products cannot be bought
or sold from some republics, such as Slovenia, Serbia, or Croatia. This,
comrades, must not happen in our socialist communities. We must, disregarding
the republics as parts of our federal community, have a single market. In this
matter, speculation is neither possible nor necessary, as it stirs up political
discontent and, step by step, national chauvinism. Such phenomena are appearing
here and there, and we must attack them at their root."
That unresolved national problems have repercussions
on the economic life of Yugoslavia is a normal and well-known fact. It is known
that discontent is widespread in Croatia and, more recently, in Slovenia, due
to investment policies at the expense of these two republics, Serbia's
privileged position, and the fact that Serbs have been occupying key positions
in the other republics. The reason for this lies in the Greater Serbian
character of communist Yugoslavia and in the latent national question. The
causes are the opposite of those cited by Tito. The economy facilitates the
manifestation of these phenomena, while their true causes lie in the very
organization of the state.
It is interesting to note that these phenomena have
reached such a scale that they have forced the government to acknowledge them
and to issue threats against political discontent and so-called national
chauvinism. This is a revealing indication of the profound crisis of the state
order and of the reciprocal relations between the peoples that make up
Yugoslavia. The economy also suggests that "brotherhood and unity" are
merely a slogan and a disguise for the Great Serbian regime in Yugoslavia, as
was recently confirmed by the favorable report of the Commission for the
Exchange of the investment program for the construction of the Belgrade-Bar
railway branch line. It is highly likely that the central government will issue
a resolution approving this costly, uneconomical, and harmful project for the
Croatian Adriatic coast, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for the other Croatian
provinces, a project that serves the Great Serbian policy of exploitation and
neglect of non-Serbian regions.
When Tito criticized "national chauvinism,"
his attack was primarily directed at the Croats, who have been deeply
discontented from the outset for nationalistic reasons. It is also curious that
Tito addressed national problems at length in his speech, which was primarily
focused on economic issues, separate from the economy. His observations reveal
the crisis of the state itself and the concern of the communist leaders
regarding national problems. Tito lays bare the harsh reality and acknowledges
that his policy of "brotherhood and unity" lacks a firm foundation,
and that many communists are even imbued with "chauvinism," that
"the bourgeoisie" are poisoning the youth with their chauvinistic
tendencies and endangering the state. This amounts to a rebuttal of his earlier
assertions, as he admits that the national question is threatening the very
existence of Yugoslavia. We will quote his exact words:
"Allow me, comrades, to say a few words also
about the shortcomings in our political life. I have already mentioned some of
them. Lately, quite a few phenomena have appeared, such as localism and
chauvinism, attributable to material reasons and a lack of vigilance on the
part of the communists. Some communists have forgotten the overall interests of
the community and are limiting themselves to their own narrow circle, resulting
in political discontent and irregularities in some republics. We have shed
rivers of blood for the fraternity and unity of our peoples, and we will not
allow anyone to undermine them from within."
"These weaknesses and political anomalies are the
result of the cultural process in our country. In some republics, bourgeois
writers write things unimaginable in a socialist country. They return to their
history, delve into it, and forget about the future development of our
socialist community as a unified whole. None of our republics, if not united,
would have the slightest importance. We must create our history, our Yugoslav
socialist history, united also in the future, without undermining the national
rights of the republics or the cultivation of their traditions, but not to the
detriment of, rather to the benefit of, the entire community, so that we may
complement each other. This is our path and what we want, not the
disintegration of our unity for any reason. We do not share the opinion of
various bourgeois elements, impervious to socialist thought regarding our
development, that we must return to the old path. These elements also influence
certain communists."
" "We have allowed anything to be written in
our press. Look at certain publications and articles and you will realize their
destructive impact. They are poisoning even our youth. It is distressing to see
how this chauvinism is winning over our young people. I think it doesn't come
from the clouds, but from the home, from the elders. We must safeguard our
greatest achievement, the fraternity and unity of our peoples, for only these
will facilitate our progress forward in creating and building a thriving
socialist community and a happier life for our population. Even today, 15 years
and more after the war, we still have to talk about fraternity and unity, even
though they should already be in the very blood and flesh of every citizen of
Yugoslavia."
Tito and his supporters either cannot or will not
understand that the communist regime did not resolve the national question.
Their "solution" in Yugoslavia consists of administrative division
into so-called "people's republics," with all power centralized in
Belgrade. Both the Communist Party and state power serve to ensure Serbia's
dominant position, while the few high-ranking positions held by non-Serbs are
of no real importance. The fact is that the peoples comprising Yugoslavia
cannot decide on the organization of their country and are deprived of the
right to self-determination.
The communist elections for constituent assembly
members and deputies are not an expression of the people's genuine will. The
national question persists and plays a crucial role in foreign policy. Tito's
assertion that today, 17 years after the war, he must insist on the need to
maintain "brotherhood and unity" is disastrous for the regime.
Therein lies the crux of the problem. National consciousness and the aspirations
of peoples to establish their own state are factors that, in the modern
historical process, play a role comparable to that of religions in the
formation and preservation of culture, or to the national question, upon whose
successful resolution the undisturbed and lasting functioning of society also
depends. Economic interest and technology are not the only driving forces of
historical development, as the communists maintain.
The national question, therefore, occupies the
forefront in Yugoslavia. The communist leadership knows this, despite its
interpretation of it. The center of gravity lies in Croatia and its
relationship with Serbia, since the Croats are the most numerous people in
Yugoslavia after the Serbs, and the Croatian problem was also the chronic ailment
of monarchical Yugoslavia, which could not consolidate and disintegrated due to
this pressing and unresolved issue. The national question takes on even greater
importance when one considers that not only Croats but also Macedonians and
Albanians do not consider it resolved, that national discontent is growing in
Slovenia in the face of Gran Serbian policy, and that repressed national
tendencies are resurfacing in Montenegro.
In the postwar tension between Yugoslavia and Albania,
Albanian national demands are more important than ideological disputes, and
from this perspective, a greater danger looms over Yugoslavia than that caused
by the ideological conflict. The large Hungarian minority (more than half a
million) resides mostly in Vojvodina, incorporated into the People's Republic
of Serbia. Due to its traditions and current situation, it would turn against
Gran Serbian policy should a state crisis occur. The population of Serbia, plus
the Serbian minorities in other republics, constituted, according to the 1953
census, 42% of the total population. Serbs are, therefore, the minority.
If we add that these Serbian minorities almost
entirely disagree with Serbia's imperialist policies and are willing to make
peace with the Croats, then Serbia's position becomes even more vulnerable.
Should major political upheavals occur in Yugoslavia and Southeast Europe, the
other peoples comprising this heterogeneous conglomerate would rise up against
Belgrade and Serbia if the Serbian leaders do not avert this danger by agreeing
to a peaceful separation from Croatia and other oppressed nations.
The Crisis of Titoism and the Yugoslav State
After the break with Moscow
in 1948, Tito embarked on a path independent of Soviet policy, both
domestically and foreignly. Without altering the basic communist character of
his regime, he pursued a neutralist course in foreign relations, relying on the
so-called non-committal countries of Asia and Africa. In domestic policy, the
radical measures were gradually softened. Without modifying the communist
objective, the methods applied in the economy and administration became
somewhat flexible, which manifested itself in the dissolution of the collective
farms (kolkhozes) and the establishment of closer relations with non-communist
countries. The main feature of Titoism on the international stage was its
constant oscillation, leaning primarily toward Soviet international policy and
frequently supporting it. Another characteristic of Titoism, as a peculiar
variant of communism, was that it received abundant financial and material aid
from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from other Western countries.
Titoism is, in fact, a
tactic, not an ideology or a system. Lately, the regime and the state have been
going through a profound crisis whose multiple repercussions threaten Titoism
itself.
On the international stage,
a gradual shift toward Moscow has been underway for some time. This new course
was clearly manifested in Tito's attitude during the conference of
non-committal countries held in Belgrade last year. This alignment with Moscow
is evident not only in the support for Soviet policy at the United Nations and
in relations with Western democratic powers, but also in the re-establishment
of close and direct ties between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and between
the two communist parties. It is clear that political coordination between
Moscow and Belgrade is progressing and that there are no fundamental
disagreements in their actions on the international stage. Given Yugoslavia's stance
at the Belgrade Conference,
Titoism ceased to exist
internationally as an independent form of communism, since Yugoslavia's views
on disarmament, nuclear testing, the German and Berlin questions, and
colonialism were identical to those of the Soviet Union. In recent times,
Tito's hostile attitude toward the European Common Market, mirroring Moscow's
position, must also be considered. The recent, hasty rapprochement between
Moscow and Belgrade, coupled with their reciprocal efforts to resolve remaining
differences, led to the demise of Titoism as a phenomenon separate from
communism in international relations.
Added to this are the resounding failures of Titoism
in domestic policy. The experiments to "liberalize" the economy
failed, according to the unanimous opinion of impartial foreign observers.
Despite substantial US aid amounting to $3.5 billion since the break with
Moscow, despite the special loan granted last year by the US and some European
countries totaling $212 million, and the $75 million credit provided by the
International Monetary Fund—a total of $287 million—aimed at liberalizing
foreign trade and adjusting the dinar's exchange rate to its true purchasing
power in international trade, and despite abundant US subsidies in food, the
state of Yugoslavia's economy is catastrophic.
The foreign trade deficit has grown steadily to $800
million. Exports of manufactured goods have collapsed. Prices are rising
rapidly. The cost of living is constantly rising, while the real purchasing
power of wages is falling and workers are discontented. Agriculture is mired in
a perpetual crisis, unable to meet the needs of the domestic market, so
consumers are no less desperate than the farmers. Continuing the current
economic policy promises not better results but further deterioration, making
new measures necessary.
Given that the insignificant liberal-leaning
corrections in the economic sector, despite injections of dollars, have not
been fruitful, two alternatives are imperative: 1) To abandon the generalist and
bureaucratic communist economy and introduce greater freedoms in the
organization of businesses and the market; to reduce taxes on peasant
landholdings and to abandon discriminatory agricultural policies. To allow free
competition between the socialist and private sectors in all economic sectors.
2) A return to the economic state prior to 1952 and 1958, respectively, and the
implementation of rigid centralism, planning, and bureaucracy; That is, the
application of the Soviet system to the economy and close ties with the Soviet
bloc.
The first solution would benefit the workers and the
masses, but it would contradict communist policy and program. The second
solution would be more in line with the current rapprochement between Tito and
Moscow on the international stage. By adopting Soviet economic methods, Titoism
would also cease to exist in economic policy and would become synonymous with
its Moscow model.
The second alternative seems logical, given that
continuing the current "liberal" policy without abandoning the
communist economic system would create greater difficulties, while an economic
orientation toward the Soviet Union would be facilitated by the pro-Soviet
political course. Finally, with the integration of Western Europe, Yugoslavia
becomes isolated, considerably diminishing its competitiveness in the European
market. Overcoming these difficulties will not be a difficult task at all if
Yugoslavia were to orient itself toward Moscow. The entire Soviet bloc is
struggling with similar or even greater difficulties than Yugoslavia.
The economic situation in these countries is
unsatisfactory; food production is very low, so Moscow has significant
obligations to its allies in the Eastern European Economic Bloc (COMECON), and
there is little left to help Tito. However, by increasing foreign trade with
the Eastern bloc and decreasing it with the West, the balance of payments
deficit could be reduced. But to eliminate the existing deficit, large loans
would be needed, which Tito is unlikely to obtain from Moscow. At best, it will
be aid to plug the biggest holes. Needless to say, in that event, the standard
of living for the masses would fall.
Tito listed the measures he intends to adopt to
resolve the economic crisis. He promises new laws and new administrative
measures aimed at eliminating anomalies and correcting errors. The system
itself will not be modified. Since these are superficial administrative
measures that do not address the root of the problem, no significant changes or
economic recovery can be expected. Foreign observers and those familiar with
Yugoslavia's problems do not believe in the effectiveness of these measures, to
which the affected population attaches no importance whatsoever. Similar
measures were adopted on previous occasions, without producing any improvement.
Thus, economic crimes are a constant theme for the
communist leaders; severe laws and sentences were handed down, and Tito, after
all, had to admit that this criminality reached such proportions that
corruption and embezzlement are key elements in his economic system.
In order to improve the economic situation, Tito
promised: a law on social surveillance and control; a law on internal trade; a
law on price controls; an amendment to the penal code; new provisions regarding
economic crimes; a revision of pension laws; a law on social accounting; and,
finally, a draft of a new constitution. As is evident, these formal measures
and prescriptions could not cure the chronic and fundamental illness of the
Yugoslav economy.
Titoism, therefore, as a new form of economic
communism, suffered a major crisis and was on the verge of collapse and
liquidation. To this must be added the national question. Tito himself had to
acknowledge that the fundamental national and political problems remained unresolved,
that the so-called policy of "brotherhood and unity" had failed, and
that Yugoslavia as a state was threatened at its very foundations. This threat
was posed by the Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, and Macedonians—although Tito
refrained from mentioning them explicitly—who opposed Yugoslavia and its Great
Serbian regime.
Thus, Tito and his regime face a state crisis whose
scope extends beyond the country's borders and acquires significant
international repercussions. The discontent of the Croats, given their numbers,
geographic location, and economic power, has a reach that transcends the
boundaries of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the direct interest of some neighboring
countries in the national question within Yugoslavia must be considered. The
fate of nearly a million Albanians along the Albanian border concerns the
entire Albanian people and largely determines Albania's foreign policy,
regardless of its internal political regime.
Moreover, Bulgaria has always been interested in the
Macedonians in Yugoslavia, irrespective of whether the Macedonians desire their
own state or the resolution of their national question within a federation or
confederation supported by Serbia or Bulgaria. The essential point is that the
Macedonian and Albanian problems remain unresolved, and that in the next crisis
of Yugoslavia as a state, international complications will arise in this area.
It is logical that Moscow would also be interested in these problems of great
importance in its relations with Bulgaria and Albania. Moscow can, in this
regard, give Tito some support, at least provisionally, but it can also harm
him. Its recent tension with Albania facilitated Tito's rapprochement with
Moscow. But Titoism is stumbling over the national question, which for his
regime and Yugoslavia, located predominantly in the turbulent Balkans, could
have more sinister consequences than the economic crisis.
Tito's rapprochement with Moscow and his alignment
with Soviet anti-Western policies have already caused him difficulties in the
West. These include the severing of diplomatic relations with West Germany, the
withdrawal of the French ambassador from Belgrade, and the expulsion of the
Yugoslav ambassador from Paris; difficulties with Greece; and the recent
reduction of US aid, which could be entirely suspended. A closer relationship
between Moscow and Belgrade will exacerbate current difficulties with the
countries of the European Common Market, which remain major importers of
Yugoslav products.
In time, Western foreign ministries may revisit the
issue of the right to self-determination of oppressed peoples within a state
whose regime promotes that very right where it might cause problems for Western
democracies, which certainly need neither advice nor interference from a
full-fledged dictatorship, especially when it comes to applying the principle
of self-determination. On the other hand, the economic and political
integration of Europe is attractive to peoples with European traditions and
orientations, such as the Croatians and the Slovenians. European integration
invalidates the argument put forward by Tito's propaganda during the last war
against the formation of small nation-states in the Danubian-Balkan region.
From the moment these countries can integrate economically, politically, and
militarily into the Western European community, the main argument in favor of
maintaining the forced community of the peoples of Yugoslavia will be
discarded.
The staunchly anti-Western
group—known as Slavophiles—opposed by the pro-Western Zapadniks, who advocated
for cultural integration with Europe and questioned Russia's cultural maturity,
believed in their country's global mission, emphasizing Russia's unique social
order. The Slavophiles attacked Peter the Great, portrayed in a widespread
popular legend as the Antichrist; they criticized his reforms and Western
culture, contrasting them with the Russian spirit and culture. Based on their
negative assessment of European cultural influence on Russia, the Slavophiles
emphasized autocracy, Orthodoxy, and national identity—that is, a Tsar, a
religion, and a people—as the foundations of true Russian politics,
encompassing state, national, cultural, and ecclesiastical matters. These
foundations are once again in the spotlight today, with the difference that now
the State and its Party occupy the place of God and the Tsar, while so-called
traditional vernacular culture, as well as Orthodoxy with its representative,
the Patriarch of Moscow, continue to play an important role alongside Marxism.
II. Separation from Europe
Russians disagree on the
dilemma of accepting or rejecting European culture. It should not be forgotten
that European influence on Russia has, in fact, always been very strong and, in
certain respects, even detrimental.
Until the Tatar conquest,
Russia, in its way of life, was closer to Western Europe than to the Byzantine
Empire. The consequence of Byzantine influence, later exerted with the
Christianization of the Russian people, did not exclude ancient Russia from the
community of European nations. On the contrary, Russia was admitted into the
spiritual life of that community. In the 11th and 12th centuries, the first
Russian dynasty became linked by marriage ties with the French royal house and
with several German princely families, which brought with it an essential
influence on Russia.
Only in the 13th century, when the Tatar yoke severed
the ties that bound Russia to the West, did Russian life, under the pressure of
the Asian conquerors, take on forms foreign to the West. It can rightly be
argued that the character and, in general, the entire life of the Russians
until 1917 were determined by these three factors: 1) the aforementioned Tatar
yoke (1237-1480); 2) the serfdom of the peasantry (1586-1861); and 3) the
autocratic rule of the Tsars until 1917. In historical perspective, Russia was
set back centuries in its normal development because of Tatar domination. It
was violently separated from Europe. Only Peter the Great turned his attention
back to it. There is no doubt that Russia, particularly the Russian soul and
national character, would have developed differently without Tatar despotism.
A pivotal event in the history of the Russian soul was
the Germanic invasion of the 13th century. Swedes, Danes, and Germans invaded
Russian lands via the Baltic Sea, founding Riga and Reval and reaching as far
as Novgorod. Unfortunately, this was a response to the Russians' pleas to the
Christian West for help against the Tatar assault.
This was Russia's first experience of direct contact
with Western Europeans. An aversion to the West took root then. From these
Baltic struggles between the Russians and the Germanic peoples arose the
historical conflict. But the strong Asian influence only began in the late 16th
and 17th centuries (and continues to this day), when Russia maintained very
active relations with Persia, India, and China. It was then that Russia
distanced itself most from the Western peoples.
The establishment of serfdom was crucial for the
further formation of the Russian national spirit and character. It began a
century after the end of Tatar rule, as in 1586 the Russian peasant was bound
to the land. Until then, despite all the abuses, the peasant had the
possibility of changing his place of residence. Now he became the property of
the landowner, exploited at the owner's whim. The lord had the right to whip
him, sell him, and forbid his marriage.
III. The Europeanization of Russia
The impact of Western
influences on Russia under Peter the Great and his successors must be
considered a historical event of paramount importance, comparable to the
influence of classical Latin culture on Germanic countries during the Middle
Ages, especially Germany.
In Russia, Peter the Great
imposed the conquests of Western civilization by decree. Old customs and cultural
forms were abolished and new ones introduced, such as the Christmas tree, a
custom of German origin. The Tsar personally plucked out the long, patriarchal
beards of his courtiers. He ordered that all his subjects, except priests and
peasants, should shave their beards and dress in European fashion. It is worth
noting that before this decree, cutting one's beard risked excommunication.
When Tsar Peter tried to
extend his innovations to the beards of the Russian Old Believers (raskolniki),
many of them chose death. Some were burned alive when forced to cross
themselves with two instead of three fingers. The peasants did not understand
the meaning of the new cultural values introduced by the upper
classes: they were disoriented and bewildered.
Peter, called the
"first German, Russian," took Prussia as his model. He unleashed the
first Europeanizing revolution, determined to make Russia the second Prussia.
From a country that was difficult to access, seemingly with more Asian than
European features, he forged a powerful empire, structured in the Western
manner.
But the revolutionary tsar
failed to make Russia a modern European state, since he did not address the
fundamental problem: serfdom. Also under strong Western influence was Alexander
I (1777-1825), who dreamed of an international system that would guarantee
lasting peace for Europe. His successor, Nicholas I, also tried to uphold
Alexander I's European policy by all means, but in doing so, he unwittingly
played the role of a police commissioner in Europe. Thanks to his intervention,
the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 was crushed. Approximately 100 years later—in
the autumn of 1956—Russian-Soviet military power again crushed the Hungarian
people's rebellion. Nicholas I was the epitome of a Prussian officer and
governed his empire strictly according to the Prussian model. The famous
anarchist Bakunin described Russia at that time as "the German Empire
under the Knut." Indeed, under Nicholas I, the prevailing motto was:
Russia must be a good Prussia, an idealized Prussia.
The Germans of the Baltic
and other regions exerted an enormous influence in the last century, to such an
extent that the Russian general Yermolov, hero of the year 1812 and viceroy of
the Caucasus, once said that he would ask the tsar to "promote the
German."
In general, it can be said that the educated classes
of that era were very receptive to French political ideas. Civil servants, on
the other hand, preferred to imitate German methods and, prone to exaggeration,
made Russia the homeland of bureaucracy.
It was precisely in this important arena of political
ideas and state structures that French influence clashed with the discordant
German influence—that is, the influence of Frederick the Great's Prussia.
Indeed, French and German influences were two of the
strongest and most contradictory currents. The assimilation of this new Western
spirit led many prominent Russians to doubt the value of Russia's vernacular
culture. Thus, the poet Pushkin complained: "To hell with it! Why did I,
with the talent and spirit I possess, have to be born in Russia?"
Under Alexander III (1845–94), ties with the West
weakened, only to deepen and strengthen under the last Tsar, Nicholas II. Never
before had a cultured Russian felt so naturally European, a member of a nation
that occupied its natural place among the other peoples of Europe.
Nor were concerns for peace in Europe foreign to the
last Tsar. It was at his urging that the first Hague Conference was convened on
May 18, 1899, resulting in the formation of the International Court of Justice,
which already contained the seeds of the League of Nations.
Unfortunately, it was precisely under this last
Romanov that Russia regressed to the Byzantine Middle Ages. Above all, the
imperial court sank into superstition, mysticism, and corruption.
In conclusion, one could say: Russia developed on its
own, mirroring the Western peoples. Later, Christianization laid similar
foundations, capable of developing in Russia ideas and institutions similar to
those of Byzantium and the West. The same can be said of subsequent
Europeanization and Western influence.
IV. The Destructive Impact of Western European Ideas
The process of Europeanization in Russia did not occur
suddenly or abruptly, but it nonetheless arrived unprepared, since the Russian
Church, which exercised spiritual leadership over the people, lacked its own
theology.
In Constantinople, Rome, and even in Germany and
England, there was a philosophy and a theology. Scholasticism had prepared
Western Christians for centuries for scientific and critical thinking. In the
West, the great spiritual movement of the Renaissance and Humanism took place.
The new philosophy and science, moreover, had a clear path thanks to the
Reformation and the gradual evolution of Protestantism. Great thinkers like
Voltaire, Kant, Hegel, and others constituted an organic link in the revolution
in Europe, while in Russia they represented a radical revolution of the spirit.
Orthodox Russia, spiritually stagnant, was easy prey, first for French
rationalism, which was anti-ecclesiastical and anti-religious. Voltaire,
Rousseau, and others were secretly disseminated within the imperial court and
high society. For example, Voltaire's works were printed at a printing press
located in a village. But Voltaireanism was merely a harmless teaching,
incomparable to the poison that Kant was for the Russians.
As mentioned earlier, German influence was added to
French influence: German culture in general, science, and philosophy penetrated
Russia as early as the time of Peter the Great, but on a larger scale under
Alexander I and even more so during the reign of Nicholas I.
Hegel and the radical Hegelian left, in particular,
exerted a profound influence on the minds of the Russian intelligentsia. It was
the European philosophers, and Kant above all, through whom the new Europe
awakened the Russians from their Orthodox slumber and dogmatic lethargy.
Figuratively speaking, Peter the Great opened Russia's windows to Europe; then
Voltaire brought in European air; and finally, Kant and German philosophy shook
the foundations of the Russian cloister and absolutist Tsarism.
For understanding relations in Russia at that time,
the description given by a cultured Russian of his encounter with Büchner's
work, *Force and Matter*, is highly significant: "But look, one fine day
Büchner's book arrived like a bombshell in a lithographic translation. Everyone
has read this work with great enthusiasm, and in everyone, the remnants of
traditional beliefs have suddenly vanished..." Oswald Spengler aptly
characterized the spiritual situation of Russia in the last century when he
said: "Above were the intelligentsia with their well-read problems and
conflicts, and below were the uprooted peasants with all their misery and
primitivism... Society was permeated with a Western spirit, and the people
carried within them the soul of the country."
Russia had two faces. Through its aristocracy, it
appeared to be a cultured country, but without a genuine inner life. The
people, on the other hand, remained barbaric, backward, and enslaved by the
upper classes.
Faced with such a situation, it was natural that
European ideas, European spiritual life, which the government prohibited and
repressed, would have a revolutionary impact. Thus, for example, Tsar Nicholas
I forbade the study of philosophy in Russian universities. He promulgated a
decree prohibiting the teaching of the discoveries of Copernicus and Newton in
Russian schools, as they contradicted the doctrine of orthodoxy.
But, precisely, the forbidden fruits of Western
civilization were harvested with even greater avidity. Philosophy and science,
the arts and technologies in Russia were transformed into revolutionary
weapons. Literature was a social and political vehicle, but at the same time an
index of the banished, the imprisoned, and the exiled, for those who followed
Western philosophers and scientists, for example, the followers of Darwin, were
imprisoned or exiled to Siberia (Chernyshevsky), while in England this thinker
was buried in Westminster Abbey.
Now, let's imagine the situation clearly: the
international communism of a Karl Marx had to disrupt and replace the medieval
agrarian economy of Caesaropapist Russia.
In Leo Tolstoy's "Confessions," we can
observe how a Russian underwent an internal revolution when he learned, for
example, of the great novelty that God supposedly does not exist. This novelty,
the teaching of God's nonexistence, had been preached in Europe for several
centuries, and the medieval worldview as a theocentric organization was
gradually, step by step, transforming. However, Europe itself was neither
always nor could it always be fully prepared for this novelty.
Now let us imagine Russia, transporting ourselves to
the spiritual world of a Russian educated by his Church. Suddenly, like a
lightning bolt from the clear sky, this devout Russian hears the message of
Western thinkers. How would such an atheistic doctrine have affected a country
where the Church and its monks had been, until then, the supreme intellectual
authority, recognized by all, and where the State was the right and left hand
of this authority? The Russian Church, whose foundations are Greco-Byzantine,
was more important to the Russian power structure than Catholicism was to
France or Spain, or Protestantism to Germany; it was the people, the Russian
Empire—in short, the Church was Russia.
The Russian Church and Orthodoxy, in their historical
role as heirs to Byzantinism, were far more static than the Roman Church. The
Church and religion in Russia are, in principle, reactionary. They remained,
broadly speaking, attached to the teachings and practices established in the
3rd century by the great Greco-Alexandrian dogmatic theorists.
The Greeks were exposed to Asian influences from very
early on; by the time Christianity began to develop, the influence of religious
Asia was not limited to the Old and New Testaments. As Byzantium became
politically and culturally isolated from the West, becoming an oasis of
civilization due to the onslaught of barbarian peoples from Asia and Eastern
Europe, and later especially from Muslims, its religious and cultural
stagnation became self-sustaining.
The Russians did, it is true, receive a fully formed
religion from Byzantium—but not Hellenism, or its presence in theology was only
occasionally noticeable. The Greek language did not play the same role in
Russia as Latin did in the West. Moreover, Russia lacked humanism and the
Renaissance, as well as the advancement of science, independent philosophy, and
above all, the Reformation, both Protestant and Catholic.
The Russians were no less isolated than the
Byzantines, and for this reason, they adhered, just as the Byzantines did, to
religious and ecclesiastical traditions. During the period of Kievan Rus's
dominance, a degree of cultural communion with the West existed, but this was
soon disrupted. Russia became isolated from the West and very soon from the
East, which explains its cultural and religious stagnation. Furthermore, the
constant defense of the state against numerous hostile neighbors inevitably
contributed to a predominantly state-driven and military-led, unilateral development.
V. The Russian Church and Tsarism
The Russian Church often
recognized and utilized the state as its helper and protector. The same was
true, as a national necessity, in Byzantium, as a consequence of the attacks
against the Byzantine Empire from Asia and Europe. Because of this state and
national isolation, the Church could not develop in the universal sense as the
Western Church did.
In Western Europe, the Roman
Empire collapsed a thousand years earlier than in the Byzantine East. After
several centuries, the Western Empire was, to some extent, restored by its
past, which in turn invigorated and organized it as a state in its own right,
following the Eastern model.
In Russia, too, the Church
became more national than the international Western Church, primarily due to
its struggle against Muslims, the Catholic West, and later, the Protestants.
The defining characteristic
of both Byzantium and Moscow was that, unlike the West, they lacked a Saint
Augustine, a Gregory VII, a Saint Thomas Aquinas and his followers, or a
Boniface VIII in terms of valuing the Church over the state. Medieval Russia
had no Saint Bernard, the Divine Comedy, or cathedrals, and had to do without
great theologians, mystics, and distinguished monastic orders. Neither
Byzantium nor Moscow produced monarchomaniacs who would defend the right to
kill a tyrant.
Theologians, defenders of
the primacy of the Church, who considered temporal power and rulers inferior,
even morally worthless, promoted the democratic principles of popular sovereignty
while simultaneously upholding the right to eliminate a tyrant. According to
these doctrines, the people had the right to elect their ruler, to depose him,
and to punish him. We find nothing similar in either Byzantium or Moscow. There
wasn't even a struggle there between the Patriarchs and the Emperor, a struggle
comparable to that of the Popes in the West.
It is true that in Byzantium
and Moscow there were also defenders of the primacy of the Church, of the
Priesthood over the State and temporal power, but this antagonism never
amounted to the condemnation of the prince in the sense of Gregory VII. Despots
and criminal rulers like Ivan the Terrible were not deposed. The boyars fought
against him, but only to safeguard their caste rights, without questioning his
right to rule. Thus, in both Moscow and Byzantium, the emperor was recognized
as head of the Church. The Church recognized the tsar's autocracy as a holy
institution, and in return, the Church was protected by the means available to
this sanctified absolutism.
The emperor did not dare to
promulgate new dogmas, for according to the Eastern conception, these were
defined once and for all. It is now clear why the vast majority of Russian
thinkers opposed Christianity. It is clear why, for example, Belinsky linked
the idea of God with the knut. This also explains Russian nihilism, which was
atheistic and materialistic. Nihilism, as a response to Christianity's betrayal
of its own being, as a symptom of despair over this betrayal, arose in the same
form in Russia as in Europe, with the difference that, because Russian
Orthodoxy was so closely tied to Tsarism, the political character of Russian
nihilism was strongly accentuated.
It is characteristic that
the leaders of Russian nihilism, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, were, like
Nietzsche, sons of priests or seminarians.
The Church itself demanded protection from the Tsar
against all innovation, and in turn, lent the autocrat its support against
every attempt at reform. The Russian Orthodox Church never raised its voice in
protest against serfdom, Tsarist terror, censorship, and other reactionary
measures and institutions; rather, it went so far as to defend them throughout
the centuries. The official Church was a servant or auxiliary of Tsarism, and today
it is a docile instrument of the Soviet regime. In contrast to the papacy, it
never aspired to the supremacy of spiritual power over temporal power.
VI.
Subversive Movements, a Consequence of Sudden Europeanization
The consequence of the sudden Enlightenment in Russia
was a spiritual and political revolution against the existing system. Negation,
pessimism, and nihilism were now the natural consequences of this direct
transition from Orthodoxy to atheism, materialism, and positivism, given that
the Russians, thanks to their predisposition to radicalism, took these
ideologies to extremes. The Russian completely lacks a sense of evolution, of
cultural continuity, and instead possesses a highly developed sense of crisis. He
prefers declines to transitions.
The European, for example, the German, has grown
accustomed over centuries to self-reliance; the European lived through the
Renaissance, Humanism, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the
Enlightenment. The German was led to Feuerbach successively through many
transitions, which explains why, for example, Stirner, Nietzsche, or
Schopenhauer did not cause such havoc in the West as they did in Russia. The
German or the French were exposed to other thinkers and became accustomed to
other arguments for and against. The Russian embraced modern Western thinkers
as the sole and ultimate authority. The consequence was the rejection of the
entire past, which was bound to lead, ultimately, to social and political
revolution.
This struggle of philosophy against theology and
autocracy in Russia claimed its victims. It demonstrated above all that
characteristic inadequacy that always arises when an ancient civilization comes
into contact with a younger one. This inadequacy is equivalent to a general
process of decay with all its accompanying effects. The Russians consoled
themselves for this inadequacy by arguing that they didn't need to expend their
energies on experimentation and research, nor waste their inventive forces on
difficult tasks. That is why Byelinsky believed that in Russia, what took fifty
years in the West was often accomplished in five. The development that took so
many centuries in Europe, the Russian colossus achieved in the same number of
decades. The consequence of this rapid, even precipitous, achievement is
evident in a dangerous inadequacy that, of course, does not necessarily
manifest itself in all spheres. It
should not be forgotten that the 1917 revolution was the work of semi-educated
people.
In the last century, the Russian man awoke from his
mystical orthodoxy, and Merezhkovsky aptly said: "We have slept for 800
years, and in the century between Tsar Peter and Pushkin we awoke. In the
decades between Pushkin and Tolstoy, we lived through three centuries.
Precisely for these reasons, Russia is young, for the centuries before Peter
the Great do not count." The beginning of Russia's political organization
dates back to 882; but Russian participation in cultural development did not
begin before the 19th century. Dostoevsky expressed the truth when he said:
"We Russians are a young people; "We are only now beginning to live,
even though we have already lived for 1,000 years."
Analyzing the works of certain Russian writers, we can
clearly see this sudden leap across centuries. Thus, we can consider Dostoevsky
a spiritual contemporary of Shakespeare, as well as of Dickens or Baudelaire.
In turn, we can consider Pushkin's work a summary of medieval and modern
Europe. We must vividly imagine how a Russian, accustomed to the passive
acceptance of Christian revelation, was suddenly confronted with the results of
progressive European thought. Until then, he had lived in an objectivist
manner, believing in the supreme authority of the Church and the State.
Suddenly, he had to rely on himself and his inherent spiritual strength. Kant
and his followers came to tell him: "The content of science, philosophy,
and religion is the fruit of the activity of your intellect and not of
Revelation; "Not God, but man is the creator of all life in human society."
This crisis was suffered by Russia and continues to be
suffered by it today. The crisis caused by the importation of European cultural
goods is comparable to the process of disintegration and decomposition that the
peoples of Asia and Africa are currently undergoing in contact with Western
civilization. Russia, still medieval, was directly incorporated into the
European evolutionary process of the 18th and subsequent centuries. In the last
century, Slavophiles sought to oppose this disintegrating influence from Western
Europe with the Russian spirit and vernacular Russian culture, advocating for
an almost total separation from Europe.
Dostoevsky declared himself in this vein in 1860 when
he wrote: "The first condition for the resurgence of our national
sentiment is to hate St. Petersburg with all our strength and all our
soul." From this preaching—to reject everything of European origin, and
St. Petersburg as the visible symbol of modern Russia—stems a hatred of the
West, a frankly apocalyptic hatred. which was turning – Spengler observed –
against Europe. Spengler saw in the burning of Moscow, with which the Russians
thought to prevent the Napoleonic conquest, a grand symbolic act of a primitive
people, the hatred, in fact, of the Maccabees against everything that comes
from a different creed, against everything foreign.
But none of the capitals Napoleon conquered gave him
such a reception as Moscow. The Russians burned their former capital and left.
It must be remembered that for no other people does their capital mean what
Moscow means to the Russians. Napoleon realized at once that he was witnessing
the most extraordinary event a European could ever encounter: the almost
demonic eruption of feeling in a world so strangely formed. Napoleon was never
again able to shake this feeling.
VII.
The Russian and the European
a) The Russian and Earthly Goods
Indeed, nowhere are earthly goods so easily renounced,
nowhere is their lack so readily forgiven, nor is what is lost so easily
forgotten and borne forever as in Russia. The Russian enjoys material goods as
long as they are offered to him, but he will not feel wounded in the depths of
his being if he has to sacrifice them or if he lacks them.
On the other hand, how difficult it is for a European
to bear material losses! It is significant that Russians have a less rigid
notion of private property than Europeans, and that they do not define the
boundary between mine and yours as precisely as Europeans do. Among Europeans,
the poor person never looks at a rich person without envy, whereas among
Russians, the rich person looks at the poor person with shame. They possess a
very deep sense of what wealth is, that it possesses us rather than us
possessing it.
If a European falls on hard times, he will despair
more easily, but he will also recover more quickly. The European enjoys the
world. He settles into it as if it were his own home and clings to material
possessions. He is a realist. On the contrary, the Russian is not very
concerned with the world. He is not attached to anything or anyone. He does not
hold onto anything firmly and permanently. The Russian is more excited by the
prospect of cataclysms than by the pursuit of traditionalism.
b) Lack
of Moderation
The fundamental spiritual disposition of Russians is
not proportion, but a tendency toward extremism, toward the extreme. In Russia,
feelings clash. The alternation of extremes makes the Russian character
somewhat capricious. The character of the Russian people has been shaped not
only by the long history of serfdom and despotism, but also by the gloomy
forests, the harsh soil, the rough climate, and especially by the forced
inactivity during long winters.
In Russia, everything is boundless and excessive.
People have no measure or goal; they don't know how to limit themselves,
whether in good or bad. They cannot maintain moderation in anything. The
potential for tension in the Russian soul is enormously great. The breadth of
the Russian character is often compared to the vastness of their land.
The Russian is either a fervent believer or a
recalcitrant atheist; a passionate adherent of the West or a rabid
anti-European. For Russians, changing their personal convictions means a
complete change in their lives. Tolstoy once said: "If anyone among us
converts to Catholicism, he will inevitably become a Jesuit. If one embraces
atheism, he will categorically and imperiously demand that faith in God be
uprooted by fire and steel, if necessary."
What in the West was merely a hypothesis, in Russia
became dogma, and any other supposition was considered heresy. Russians are
captivated by a grand idea as if they were literally crushed by it. In such
cases, they lack the strength to adapt it properly, and so they believe in it
to the point of fanaticism. They always gravitate toward extremes, are
nihilistic or apocalyptic; they disintegrate everything: themselves and others.
c)
Propensity for Extremes
Russians are defined by their tendency to rush
headlong toward the opposite pole. Without this innate trait, Bolshevism would
not have been possible, since it constitutes, in all essential matters, the
opposite pole to everything that until then had been sacred to Russians. A
Russian is always in search of the opposite, of the contradictory. Berdyaev, a
former Marxist philosopher, became a profoundly Christian philosopher;
Bulgakov, a former socialist economist, was ordained an Orthodox priest;
Leontiev—the Russian Nietzsche—a staunch hedonist, took the habit of a monk in
the Eastern Church.
The Russian man delights in abandoning himself to the
point of indolence; in reality, it is a state of disarray bordering on anarchy.
If the fundamental characteristics of the Russian people are wisdom, kindness,
zest for life, and patience, then indolence and a lack of energy are no less
so. A lack of opposition, a distinctly passive, Eastern, fatalistic humility,
and submission to the Tsar as well as to current rulers, are unmistakable
traits of their character.
When Ivan the Terrible retired to the monastery, the
people begged him to return to the throne. Maxim Gorky himself emphasized that
the people kneel before their God at night and by day ruthlessly trample upon
the bodies of their fellow human beings. The Russian is the most obedient
people when governed severely, but incapable of governing themselves. As soon
as the reins are loosened, it descends into anarchy.
d)
Cruelty
The Russian mood changes suddenly and for no apparent
reason, swinging from one extreme to the other. Thus, for example, in Russian
songs and dances, the abrupt transition from joy to melancholy is common.
Ivan IV killed during the day, and at nightfall, he
would bang his head against the floor of his chapel until it bled as a sign of
repentance. Without blinking, he had 60,000 citizens of Nizhny Novgorod killed
for making a pact with the Lithuanians. In 1571, he ordered the execution of
more than 3,000 noble rebels in Moscow's Red Square. While the heads of these
aristocrats hung in Moscow's Red Square, Ivan the Terrible had a mass
celebrated for the souls of his victims.
Stalin, in turn, ordered the liquidation of more than
5,000 officers in 1937, led by Marshal Tukhachevsky.
To be impartial, we must say that atrocities were also
committed outside of Russia during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. For example,
in 1572, under the regency of Catherine de Medici, the St. Bartholomew's Day
Massacre was staged in France as a blood wedding for her daughter. Philip II,
for his part, had those condemned by the Inquisition burned at the stake.
Peter the Great, the most progressive of the Russian tsars,
also appears on the list of cruelties committed by rulers: he beat his friend
Maria Danilova Hamilton for speaking unfavorably about the dubious origins of
his future wife, later Empress Catherine I. He later had her publicly beheaded
as a suspected infanticide. He attended her execution, explaining to those
present, like a modern anatomist, the veins in the victim's head, and finally
kissed the lips of his decapitated friend.
Maxim Gorky believes that the Russian people exhibit a
propensity for a particular kind of atrocities and harshness, which reveal the
limits of human suffering, endurance, and the human capacity to withstand
torture.
It is debatable whether Russian cruelty can be
explained as a consequence of centuries of slavery. The cruel treatment that
Russians had to endure for 1,000 years undoubtedly contributed to the
brutalization of their character. If it was already fierce and savage from its
origins, it is difficult to avoid it today. In any case, one cannot speak of
the good-natured Russian as if this were one of his inherent qualities.
Excessive heat and cold drive man to extremes. Just like heat and cold, so do
unbridled passion and restraint. Unrestrained excesses are suddenly followed by
remorse and penance. After committing atrocities, Russians almost always feel
the need for public repentance. Confessions of guilt and self-criticism are not
solely a consequence of Soviet education, as Russian history provides numerous
examples.
e)
Lying and Alcoholism
Turgenev believes that lying is one of the greatest
vices of the Russian people. In his view, Russians are the most deceitful
people in the world, and, on the other hand, they value and love nothing as
much as the truth.
Michelet agrees with Turgenev on this point, asserting
that Russians are good-natured but completely lack a sense of rectitude and
morality. Michelet concludes: Since Russia is essentially lying, its foreign
policy and its weapons against Europe must necessarily be lies.
Bakunin shares this opinion, stating: The Russian
government lies about everything. This is its strength, its life, the secret of
its existence. Lying has become a system.
For Legras, the fundamental reason for insincerity,
besides the system of serfdom, lies in the immense size of the country, which
makes evidence difficult. To this must be added the low level of education.
Lying is the natural weapon of children, the dispossessed, and the subjugated.
It would be wise to make the following observation: if
Russians assert or feel today that there is a certain degree of freedom in
their country, this is true in comparison to their past, and therefore they are
not lying. The Russian people have never known true freedom in history, whether
under the sovereigns of the Rurik dynasty, under Tatar rule, or later under the
Romanovs.
The current government replaced the rule of the tsars;
in place of the tsar came another autocrat, who granted certain rights to the
peasants and workers, making everyone, without exception, a slave of the state.
In reality, the same slavery has always existed for all classes, for all social
strata.
A Russian cannot conceive of freedom in the Western
European sense, nor draw comparisons with freedom as Europeans or Americans do,
since Russians have never enjoyed complete freedom.
Besides vices of all kinds, alcoholism was also
widespread. The Tsarist regime treated this vice among students with a certain
degree of complacency, since drunkenness distracted them from revolutionary
thought. Russians drank not only to warm up and liven up, but also to forget
the gloomy monotony of everyday life. The Soviet government had to take
measures against drunkenness despite the revenue generated by taxes levied on
the state alcohol monopoly.
f)
Lack of a sense of order and time
By nature, the Russian is optimistic. This optimism
and the pessimistic view of culture that also characterizes the Russian are not
mutually exclusive, as they are two aspects of the same psychic constitution.
The predominant psychic predisposition of Western man is primary anxiety. The
European is a metaphysical pessimist insofar as he tends to be content with
empirical reality; he experiences the world as chaos, to which only man gives
meaning and justification. He is always tormented by the anxiety that the world
will go off the rails as soon as he removes his ordering hand. Order is the
meaning of Western life.
Europeans and Americans seek order within themselves
in the form of self-discipline and the dominance of reason over instincts; they
also seek it in their surroundings in the form of political order and the
dominance of authority over the citizen. What most distinguishes the Russian
from the West is his deficient sense of an inner necessity that impels him to
seek form in all areas of life. Western man often seems to Russians as if he
possessed a perfectly functioning clock instead of a soul. This is why
over-organization, psychological stagnation, and the suffocating effects of a
life regimented by rules constitute a danger to Western man. Social anarchy,
psychological hysteria, and the over-extension of life, beyond all norms, in
turn threaten Russian man.
Russians and other peoples have a completely different
sense of time: "Time is money," goes a German and Anglo-Saxon
proverb. The Turks say: "Haste makes waste." And the Russian proverb
expresses: "Right away," meaning within the hour. Punctuality is
certainly not a Russian virtue, and a good Russian says: "Thank God we're
not German!"
The Russian has time to spare. This lack of
appreciation for time implies a lack of a sense of proportion. If man has no
measure for anything, he also has none for time, which is perhaps related to
the vast geographical expanse of Russia. The Russian never experiences the
agonizing feeling of having omitted something or of having to perform a certain
daily task.
A German proverb says: What you can do in the morning,
don't leave for the evening. That is the pessimism of time. A Russian, like an
Englishman, thinks the opposite: What you shouldn't do in the morning, leave
it; perhaps it will get done by itself.
g)
Vanity and Envy of Western Man
Not infrequently, in the Russian's opinion, Western
man is dominated by vanity and envy. Western vanity constitutes the Roman
inheritance. With it, Westerners became directly linked to the Latin cult of conceit,
to the civilization of actors and poseurs. If they cannot display some personal
quality or achievement, then they put on airs by invoking their origin, their
profession, the location of their house, their political party, their friends,
their travels and adventures; If they do this in front of foreigners, then they
boast of their nation and its leading figures. What they find most pleasing is
to be envied, and what they find most painful is to be pitied, for the envy of
their neighbor reveals their poverty, while the pity of their neighbor
demonstrates the destitution of the one being pitied. Hence, European public
and social life is tinged with pretense.
It is interesting to note that Russians are bound
together, deep down, by mysterious ties. Barely having met, they immediately
become friends. After an hour, it seems as if they have known each other all
their lives. In Europe, especially in Germanic countries, the opposite is true:
people may know each other their whole lives, but it very rarely happens that
one opens their heart completely to a friend.
***
Today, Bolshevism is in the process of fundamentally
changing the Russian national character. Bolshevism makes Russians realists who
only accept their own precise knowledge. In the ranking of spiritual gifts,
technical ability currently occupies the highest place. Art lags behind,
philosophy and religion neglected. The artist must create only on commission
and for predetermined purposes. They fulfill assigned social mandates. The
absolute conviction of Bolshevism is that communist literature cannot exist
without a social mission.
Of course, the Bolsheviks wanted not only to imitate,
but to surpass, the materialistic, technocratic, and agnostic West. Bukharin
expressed this quite clearly when he said: "We need Marxism and
Americanism. Individual life, which separates man from the collective process
of production, must be abolished to make way for the collectivist man-machine:
the tradition of contemplative spirit that preceded Bolshevism must be overcome
by Americanism. A pair of boots, after all, is more important," Bukharin
maintained, "than all of Shakespeare's work."
The recent successes in rocket production and space
exploration irrefutably prove this.
What is being put into practice in Russia are, in
fact, Western principles, but the way in which they are applied is Russian.
Hence the national pride in having applied them in this way and for the first
time. In reality, the ideas that were at the origin of the Russian Revolution
are all, without exception, borrowed from the West. Russia eagerly embraced
modern European ideas and, due to Russian excess, carried them to their
ultimate consequences in the Soviet Union.
In its integral development, Bolshevism is not simply
Marxism implemented elsewhere, but an event that could only have developed in
such a way on Russian soil. Therefore, it cannot be understood based on the
tenets of Marxist doctrine, but primarily on the depths of the Russian
character.
If Russia ever breaks this intimate bond with its past
and definitively renounces its former thinkers, poets, and artists, then it
could become an America, but a North America that we would have to imagine
without freedom, without union with Europe, and without continuity with Western
and Anglo-Saxon civilization, because in the new Eastern Empire, Europe and
Christianity mean nothing; for the Bolsheviks, they are ridiculous trinkets.
Western values are nothing more to them than paper money out of
circulation. As Tocqueville said, Russia has in common with the United States
of America the fact that it inaugurated a new cycle in world history, in which
the roles of Western Europe and China take on decisive importance corresponding
to their strength.
Some Aspects of the Yugoslav Economy in Mid-1962
Tihomil Radja, Fribourg, Switzerland
"We have piles of
various high-value goods in warehouses that have no outlet. These goods have
cost us, and continue to cost us, and yet they are included in the national
income," Tito told political science students.
The Five-Year Plan 1957-61
was completed at the end of 1960, a year ahead of schedule. The new five-year
period 1961-65 began in 1961, with the aim of placing the Federal People's
Republic of Yugoslavia among the moderately developed countries by the end of
1965, with a national income of approximately $600 per capita.
Such is the purpose of the
plan currently being implemented. Time will tell to what extent it will be
fulfilled. In contrast to the previous plan (1957-61), its completion by the
end of 1960 proved quite problematic. If everything is measured according to
the increase in national income, then it could almost be said that it was
achieved, according to the data presented below:
National income - in
billions of dinars, 1956 prices
|
|
|
|
|
Ańo |
|
Plan |
|
Realización |
|
% |
||||
|
|
|
|
1961 |
|
2275 |
|
2247 |
98,8 |
|
|
||||
However, in many branches and industrial sectors, the
plan was not implemented by the end of 1960, as can be deduced from the
following figures: Implementation of the 1957-1961 plan
(in some branches and sectors)
|
|
Sector |
|
Plan 1956-61 |
|
Realización 1960 |
||||||
|
|
Cobre |
|
136 |
|
119 |
||||||
|
|
Carbón |
|
148 |
|
127 |
||||||
|
|
Energía eléctrica |
|
184 |
|
176 |
||||||
|
|
Aluminio |
|
239 |
|
171 |
||||||
|
|
Fertilizantes |
|
401 |
|
143 |
||||||
|
|
Máquinas agrícolas |
|
260 |
|
171 |
||||||
|
|
Camiones |
|
217 |
|
166 |
||||||
|
|
Máquinas de construcción |
|
498 |
|
136 |
||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Azúcar (toneladas) |
|
331.000 |
|
264.000 |
||||||
|
|
Tabaco (toneladas) |
|
54.000 |
|
35.000 |
||||||
In other sectors as well, such as footwear, radio, and
furniture production, the Plan was not implemented, while in other sectors, the
production projected for 1961 was largely achieved by the end of 1960. However,
in general, the pronounced imbalance between capital goods on the one hand and
raw materials and consumer goods on the other was not overcome in industrial
production:
Industrial Production
(indices)
|
|
Grupos de productos |
|
1956 |
|
1960 |
|
1946 |
|
1956 |
|
|
Bienes de capital |
|
100 |
|
184 |
|
100 |
|
802 |
|
|
Materias primas |
|
100 |
|
159 |
|
100 |
|
334 |
|
|
Artículos de consumo |
|
100 |
|
178 |
|
100 |
|
278 |
Such a disproportionate fluctuation in industrial
production—coupled with agricultural stagnation from 1960 onward—had a negative
impact on the foreign trade balance, whose growing deficit constitutes a major
obstacle to normal economic development.
II
"Our foreign debt has reached 800 million
dollars, and our deficit is constantly growing," Tito declared in Split.
Indeed, one of the primary objectives of the 1956-61 Five-Year Plan was to
increase imports and exports, by importing much less in order to mitigate the
foreign trade deficit in goods and services. However, the trade deficit increased significantly:
The trade balance
(in millions of dollars)
|
|
|
|
Promedio 1952-56 |
|
1957-61 |
|
|
Exportación (F.O.B.) |
|
276 |
|
556 |
|
|
Importación (C.I.F.) |
|
429 |
|
768 |
|
|
Déficit |
|
153 |
|
212 |
The average deficit in the period 1957-61 was covered
with these resources:
|
|
Remesas particulares |
|
42 millones de dólares |
|
|
Reparaciones |
|
32 " " |
|
|
Obras Públicas |
|
7 " " |
|
|
Excedente productos agrícolas
EE.UU. |
|
70 " " |
|
|
Préstamos Fondo Monet. Internac. |
|
14 " " |
|
|
Créditos públicos a largo plazo |
|
8 " " |
|
|
Créditos públicos a corto plazo |
|
33 " " |
|
|
Varios |
|
6 " " |
|
|
|
|
212 millones de dólares |
The considerable amount of US agricultural surpluses,
caused by the stagnation of agricultural production in communist Yugoslavia
from 1960 onward, is particularly striking, as can be seen from the data cited:
Wheat and corn production
(in millions of tons)
|
|
|
1957 |
|
1958 |
|
1959 |
|
1960 |
|
1961 |
|
promedio |
|||||||
|
|
Trigo |
|
3,1 |
|
2,5 |
|
4,1 |
|
3,6 |
|
3,2 |
|
3,3 |
||||||
|
|
Maíz |
|
5,6 |
|
4,0 |
|
6,7 |
|
6,2 |
|
4,7 |
|
5,4 |
||||||
According to the estimate of Yugoslav Minister and
Economic Planner Todorovic (see: Vjesnik, April 8, 1962), the losses resulting
from the decline in agricultural production in 1960 and 1961 amounted to
approximately $100 million annually. This was reflected primarily in the
growing foreign trade deficit and, consequently, in the increase in foreign
debt, which stood at $476 million at the end of 1960 and $681 million at the
end of 1961. Interest and annuities exceeded $70 million per year, while the
debt represented 20-25% of national income.
III
"The social and material conditions make it
easier for us to successfully achieve the high rate of economic growth and the
other objectives set out in the presented plan," declared Tito on December
26, 1960, in the National Assembly.
Apart from the pronounced imbalance in industrial
production, including the artificial maintenance of many sectors through state
subsidies; apart from the decline in agricultural production and the lack of
prospects for its increase while collectivist tendencies prevailed; apart from
the catastrophic state of foreign trade, the new Five-Year Plan set itself
extremely ambitious goals. However, in the very first year of its
implementation, all the contradictions and anomalies of the Yugoslav economy
became fully apparent and, of course, disproved the Plan's objectives and
forecasts.
Production (percentage growth)
|
Sector |
Incremento |
1961 |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Industria |
13,0 |
7,0 |
4,0 |
|
Agricultura |
7,2 |
-6,0 |
- |
|
Demás sectores |
12,3 |
6,0 |
0,0 |
|
Total |
11,4 |
3,6 |
- |
During 1962, in some key industries the downward trend
continued, namely:
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Carbón |
100 |
97 |
|
No metales |
100 |
99 |
|
Industria metalúrgica |
100 |
98 |
|
Materiales de construcción |
100 |
80 |
|
Industria del caucho |
100 |
93 |
|
Indust. de alimentación |
100 |
96 |
|
Tabaco |
100 |
72 |
Other sectors are also barely maintaining their
production at 1961 levels, which is well below the original targets. At the
same time, the rate of job creation is slowing, even in industry. According to
the Plan, 74,000 more workers should have been employed in 1961, but only
56,000 were hired, while registered unemployment shows a rapid upward trend:
Unemployment (in 000)
|
1958 |
132,0 |
|
1959 |
161,6 |
|
1960 |
159,2 |
|
1961 |
191,3 |
|
1962 (enero-febrero) |
281,3 (en 1961 enero-febrero
240,5) |
Regarding foreign trade, the situation worsened
compared to last year:
Exports and imports
(in billions of dinars)
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Exportación |
51,3 |
53,1 |
|
Importación |
79,2 |
87,9 |
|
Déficit |
27,9 |
34,8 |
Regarding agricultural production, no increase is
expected compared to 1961, according to Todorovic's forecast.
IV
"We have frequently pointed out the excessive
investments, the phenomenon where everyone builds what they want and how they
want. Now we are paying the consequences. Many companies will have to
close," Tito declared in Split on May 6th.
While in recent years there has been stagnation and
even a decrease in production in all sectors, the rate of investment has not
increased:
Investment (indices in current prices)
1961/1962 = 121
1960/1961 = 112
The relative decrease in investment in 1962 is an
unavoidable consequence of the low production in 1961 and the increase in the
foreign trade deficit. This decline will undoubtedly continue in the coming
years until the essential balance is established between the production,
consumption, and balance of payments sectors. Due to excessive investment, a
stockpile of industrial and consumer goods has accumulated in recent years. The
domestic market cannot absorb these stockpiles precisely because of
insufficient purchasing funds. Companies cannot sell their products below cost.
The only way to lower prices is to reduce taxes on consumer goods.
It is logical that such a reduction would
automatically limit investment resources and other state needs. As for the
foreign market, it is even more difficult to place industrial goods there due
to strong competition and various integration movements.
"Garlic costs more than gold today," Tito
declared in his speech in Split. The accumulation of industrial and consumer
goods is partly due to the rise in agricultural prices.
Consumer Goods Price Index
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Productos agrícolas |
100 |
123 |
|
Artículos ind. de consumo |
100 |
106 |
|
Servicios |
100 |
110 |
Since food items still represent 45-50% of the
consumption structure, it's worth noting that the price increase of agricultural
products significantly reduces the consumption of industrial products, whose
demand is more elastic. Hence the reduction in overall consumption, which in
turn affects both agricultural and industrial production, thus perpetuating the
classic vicious cycle of depression. While investment, as we have seen,
increased, consumption declined, and consequently, real wages fell: Nominal and
real wages in industry and mining (indices)
|
|
1961 (I-IV) |
1962 (I-IV) |
|
Salarios nominales |
100 |
111 |
|
Salarios reales |
100 |
98 |
DOCUMENTS
Memorandum
Latin American Croatian Institute of Culture
On the Policy of National
Oppression and Colonial Exploitation in Communist Yugoslavia, on the Occasion
of the Speech Delivered in Toronto on November 22, 1961, by the Prime Minister
of Canada, H.E. John G. Diefenbaker, to Ethnic Groups
In his speech, delivered on
November 22, 1961, in Toronto to ethnic groups, Canadian Prime Minister John G.
Diefenbaker announced that Canada intended to place the problem of Soviet
imperialism and colonialism on the agenda of the United Nations General
Assembly during its regular sessions this year. On this occasion, the Latin
American Croatian Institute of Culture, based in Buenos Aires, prepared this
Memorandum, which was delivered to H.E. the Canadian Prime Minister by
representatives of the Canadian Croatian Federation.
Mr. Prime Minister:
All that H.E. The points
made in his now-famous speech on Russian-Soviet imperialism and colonialism can
be fully applied to the situation prevailing in Yugoslavia, which, due to its
structure and Serbia's dominance over most of the population, is, in fact, a
small and deteriorated version of the Soviet Union. This is a case of
imperialism by a small, relatively backward Balkan country, to the detriment of
other, more developed nations with a millennia-old Western cultural tradition.
The Soviet Union, His
Excellency said in his speech, dominates, subjugates, and exploits vast areas
of Asia and the Caucasus... employing them as a source of cheap raw materials,
cheap labor, and a captive market. The Soviet Union, by force of arms, has
deprived highly developed countries of their independence, driven tens of
thousands of their citizens into misery and death, exploited their resources,
and ruthlessly stifled any attempt by these peoples to maintain even a
semblance of national identity. Everything said above applies to the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in which, according to the official census,
Serbia represents 26% of the total population, dominates, subjugates, and
economically exploits Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and areas
inhabited by small national minorities from neighboring countries.
The federal character of
Yugoslavia is merely theoretical, as in the USSR. The all-powerful Communist
Party, dominated and directed by its Serbian members in the Serbian capital,
Belgrade, which is also the capital of the entire Yugoslav federation, is in
power.
Due to its constitution in
1918 and its reestablishment in 1945, Yugoslavia is nothing more than an
enlarged Serbia, similar to the Soviet Union, in which the attributes of
Tsarist Russia predominate. Because of exceptional circumstances arising from
the crisis of the two world wars, as well as the protection and support of
first Tsarist Russia, then Soviet Russia, small Balkan Serbia managed to
realize its imperialist dream and impose its dominance over the other five
"people's republics": Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, and Montenegro. It is no mere coincidence that in both world wars
Russia protected Serbia, its agent in the Danubian, Adriatic, and Balkan
regions.
The First World War was
partly motivated by Serbia's subversive and expansionist actions, which
culminated in the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne,
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, perpetrated in 1914 in Sarajevo, the
capital of the Croatian province of Bosnia. The assassination, orchestrated to
prevent the consolidation of power in the southern part of the Danubian
Monarchy, was carried out by a young Serbian revolutionary, a socialist, and a
supporter of Serbian expansionism backed by Russia. Through Serbia, Russia
aimed to establish its dominance in the Balkans and control the trade routes
between Europe and Asia Minor. Both monarchist and communist Yugoslavia glorify
this assassination; the site of the murder bears his name, as indicated by a
commemorative plaque.
In the war sparked by this
assassination, Serbia was defeated. The king, his government, and part of the
army fled abroad, awaiting the Allied victory. Upon their return, they invaded
Croatia and other southern provinces of Austria-Hungary. Thus, Serbia, with the
help of the Allies, was able to annex these regions, feigning the
"liberation" and "unification" of the "South
Slavic" peoples, assuming the role of Piedmont. Tsarist Russia planned to
create Greater Serbia, but when the Bolshevik Revolution broke out, Serbia,
needing the support of the Western Allies, accepted the formula of
"national union," calculating that it would undermine the principle
of national self-determination championed by President Wilson, which it did.
The Second World War caused
such a crisis in Europe that Serbia, through the active intervention of the
Soviet Union, managed to retain the territorial status established in the 1919
peace treaties. The coup d'état of March 27, 1941, carried out by a group of
Serbian military officers, aimed to secure Serbian hegemony over Croatia,
which, on the eve of the Second World War, had obtained limited autonomy over a
small territory. This coup, also influenced by the Kremlin and cheered on by
the communists in Belgrade, prompted the Axis powers' aggression against
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav army, under the almost exclusive command of Serbian
officers, disintegrated in a few days without offering any noteworthy
resistance. Likewise, the Serbian-Yugoslav state collapsed and disintegrated,
which was inevitable since the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not a national state
but a multinational one, dominated by Serbia so brutally that most of its
subjects felt like true prisoners.
King Peter Karageorgevic and
his government, this time without the army, fled. Serbia was occupied by the
German army. The border areas of Serbia, inhabited by national minorities, were
annexed to Romania, Albania, and Hungary, respectively. The Croats established their
own national state, which was dissolved in 1918 and incorporated as a province
into the Yugoslav state.
The Serbian nationalist Chetnik guerrillas under Draza
Mihailovic, who were presented as fighting against the German-Italian
occupation, actually fought against the Croats and even against Serbs who
opposed the restoration of a militaristic dictatorship, promoted by the exiled
government. This is irrefutably proven by Allied documents, such as Foreign
Office note F 2538/2G, dated March 23, 1943, signed by Prime Minister Winston
Churchill in the absence of Sir Anthony Eden. "This note, addressed to the
president of the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, protests against the
policies of General Draza Mihailovic, leader of the Chetnik guerrillas and
Minister of War in the government-in-exile. The note expressly states that
Mihailovic 'does not hesitate to declare publicly (in the presence of members
of the British military delegation) that his enemies are not Germans or
Italians, invaders of his country, but his fellow Yugoslav citizens...
partisans, Ustaše, Muslims, and Croats.'"
The Yugoslav Communist Party organized its guerrilla
forces after the Third Reich's attack on Russia with the primary goal of
seizing power after the war. To this end, the communists also exploited the
Serbian nationalist masses, promising them the restoration of Yugoslavia, that
is, Greater Serbia, with the help of Soviet Russia. The Serbs consider Russia
their traditional protector. Thus, the Serbian communists, like the Russians
before them, abandoned their previous program regarding The dismemberment of
Yugoslavia or Russia, respectively, stemmed from the realization that it would
be easier for them to seize power by relying on Serbian or Russian expansionist
imperialism.
The communist guerrillas benefited when the Western
Allies withdrew their support for the government of King Peter Karageorgevic
due to his pan-Serbian chauvinism. By the end of 1945, the Red Army had
advanced as far as Belgrade, where it installed a communist government that
gradually occupied Croatia and Slovenia, taking advantage of the Allied
victory. Thus, under Soviet protection, a new Serbian colonialism, this time
with a communist bent, was established.
Servia, finding itself on the side of the Allies in
both world wars due to a confluence of circumstances, managed to create and
then restore Yugoslavia as its colonial domain. Yugoslavia was presented as a nation-state,
when in fact it was Serbia's empire; as a nation that, after centuries of
effort, had achieved its mission, even though it involved forced unification
with flagrant violations of national principles and the right to
self-determination. Self-determination.
While the communists recognized the multinational
character of Yugoslavia, they continued to incorporate foreign territories into
Yugoslavia, such as Macedonia, a territory claimed by Bulgaria and which is by
no means Serbian. In Kosmet, an autonomous territory within the "People's
Republic of Serbia," nearly a million Albanians live in densely populated
areas contiguous with Albania, and according to national principles, they
should be integrated into their homeland. In the "autonomous province"
of Vojvodina, also within the People's Republic of Serbia, several hundred
thousand Hungarians live along the Hungarian border. Nearly half a million
Germans from the same province were exterminated or expelled.
The communists theoretically uphold the principle of
national self-determination, but in practice maintain a forced unity between
Serbia on one side, and Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia on the other, even
though these are distinct ethnic groups with different political, cultural, and
religious traditions. Croatia and Slovenia are Central European countries due
to their historical, cultural, and political development, as well as their
economic importance, while Serbia is entirely Balkan. Croatia, a kingdom since
the early Middle Ages, maintained its own deeply rooted political traditions
for 1200 years, until 1918, while Serbia's political development was very
different.
To justify Serbia's dominance over Croatia and
Slovenia in monarchical Yugoslavia, it was argued that these were, in reality,
three ethnic groups so closely related that they constituted a single people
with three names. Today, five nationalities are officially recognized in
Yugoslavia: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins.
Now they try to justify the forced union by resorting
to the well-known Soviet theories of "brotherhood and unity,"
socialist theories, and by emphasizing the Slavic linguistic group's shared
identity with a mixture of racism and interpreting Slavism in terms of
irreconcilable antagonism toward the peoples of Western Europe, particularly
their neighboring peoples: Italian, Hungarian, and German.
It is true, however, that the basic conditions
indispensable for a state community among Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs do not
exist, since while Croatia and Slovenia belong to the sphere of Western
culture, Serbia developed within the Byzantine-Russian cultural tradition.
Therefore, the English historian A. J. Toynbee, analyzing the creation of the
Yugoslav conglomerate in 1918, rightly wrote in his great work "A Study of
History" that "the fusion of the population, hitherto nurtured by two
different civilizations... constitutes a daring experiment in political
alchemy."
The dividing line between Western and Eastern European
civilization, according to the same author, runs from Finland in the north to
Croatia in the south, coinciding with the Serbian-Croatian border, the boundary
between the Western and Eastern Christian worlds, and was already drawn in 396
by the Roman Emperor Theodosius as the boundary between the Western and Eastern
Roman Empires.
Until 1918, Croatia and Serbia, although contiguous
and neighbouring countries, were never united within a single state. During the
Migration Period, the Croats settled in the area between the Danube and the
Adriatic, where they were formed and developed within the society we now call
the world of Western civilization and culture. They assimilated its distinctive
features and contributed to its enrichment and defense. They received
Christianity via Rome. Their sociopolitical structure resembled that
established by Charlemagne in his empire, whose sovereignty Croatia recognized,
becoming an independent kingdom in the 9th century under the rule of a national
dynasty. Western-style feudalism was gradually implemented in Croatia, and the
free cities also flourished. Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, and Baroque
architectural styles also flourished in Croatia.
The Croats contributed to European culture with a
number of Renaissance humanists, sculptors, and painters, who worked both in
Croatia and in the major European centers. In Croatia, both the Protestant
Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation manifested themselves. Shortly
after the invention of the printing press, books were printed in the national
language and in Latin, then the language of the educated classes. In the
multinational Danubian monarchy, political leaders communicated in Latin, and
in Croatia, until 1848, Latin was spoken in the Diet of the Estates (Sabor). At
the same time, since the early Middle Ages, the Old Croatian language (Old
Slavic) has been used in the Roman liturgy on the Croatian coast by special
privilege of the Holy See.
With the extinction of the national dynasty that ruled
between the 9th and 11th centuries, Croatia entered into a Personal Union with
Hungary. Then, faced with the growing threat of the Ottoman Empire, the Croats,
seeking the support of Western Europe, elected Ferdinand of Habsburg, Archduke
of Austria, King of Bohemia and later of Hungary, brother of Charles V, Holy
Roman Emperor and King of Spain, as their king in 1527. Within this defensive
community of the Danubian peoples, Croatia remained until the end of the First
World War.
Croatia's political status within the Danubian
community was defined by the words of Ban Count Tomáš Erdedi (who ruled from
1583-95): "Regnum regni no prescriptit leges" (Reign of kings does
not prescribe laws). This was the response to the imposition of Hungarian laws
on Croatia, which was governed by the bans (viceroys) as heads of the executive
branch and the army, while laws were promulgated by the Sabor, a system dating
back to the Middle Ages. Even during the Austro-Hungarian dualist rule
(1867-1918), Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia were an associated kingdom with
full sovereignty in internal affairs and justice, and limited sovereignty in
matters shared with Hungary and Austria.
In Bosnia, a Croatian province by virtue of its
location, history, and ethnic composition, even while part of the Ottoman
Empire (1463-1878), its Islamic nobility was the only territorial nobility
within the Empire, wielding considerable political influence in the Sublime
Porte, so much so that Croatian was one of the diplomatic languages
in Constantinople.
In modern times, Croatia experienced constant economic
and industrial progress. Thanks to its favorable geographical location in the
Danubian and Adriatic region, it gravitated economically primarily toward
Central Europe. Even before the First World War, Croatia had established a
solid foundation for agriculture, forestry, mining, land, river, and sea
transport, trade, tourism, industry, and banking.
The historical, political, and social process in
Serbia was entirely different. The Serbs fell under the influence of the
Byzantine Empire after settling in the heart of the Balkans. Under the impact
of the Ottoman Turkish invasion, both Byzantium and Serbia were soon absorbed
by the Ottoman Empire. For five long centuries, the political and social status
of the Serbs was that of the rayah (a term referring to a specific region or
territory). Only during the decline of the Ottoman Empire, in the mid-19th
century, did Serbia achieve independence, and in 1878, at the Congress of
Berlin, it was recognized as an independent kingdom.
During the Turkish occupation, the only Serbs who
could read and write were the monks, who preserved the traditions of the
Serbian state and national church modeled on the Byzantine system. This
tradition, reinforced by the influence of Tsarist Russia, characterizes the
modern Serbian state. Russia exerted a powerful influence as the presumed heir
to the Byzantine Empire, as the largest Orthodox nation, and as the center of
Pan-Islamism in its Russian form. Therefore, modern Serbia is not a
Western-style nation-state. Its basic institutions are autocratic power and the
national church, identified with the nation. Hence the insurmountable
difficulties in consolidating the new state, formed in 1918, which was only
possible with the granting of democratic freedoms, national equality, and
religious tolerance—all unknown in Serbia and demanded by Croatia and Slovenia.
The role of modern Serbia in European history,
faithful to these deeply rooted traditions, was that of an exponent of Russian
imperialism in the Balkans. Popular sentiment remained unchanged even after the
fall of Tsarist Russia and the subsequent reliance on Western democracies for
support. Serbia's nationalist newspaper, "Balkan" (Belgrade, July 26,
1922), defined its solidarity with Russia: "Whether Tsarist or Bolshevik,
Russia is 'Holy Russia' for the Serbian people, our Slavic mother. Can a single
Serb raise a hand against a Russian soldier?"
Modern Serbia, despite its imperialist ambitions, was
a poorly managed country, lacking a stable economy, characterized by
patriarchal social relations, and without properly developed social structures.
This can be attributed to Serbia's isolated location in the heart of the
Balkans, as well as its centuries-long dependence on Turkish rule. On the other
hand, Serbia's geographical position favored its expansionism, which claimed
Macedonia as its victim in 1912, and later, in 1918 and 1945, more advanced
nations such as Croatia and Slovenia. This petty imperialism took on the
character of a hateful domination and brutal economic exploitation by a relatively
backward country over more developed nations.
The new South Slavic state, "that audacious
experiment in political alchemy," was bound to produce sinister results.
The linguistic similarity between Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes could not erase
their differing mentalities, much like the differences between Russia and
Poland. The name of the new state created in 1918 was: "Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes," declaring that Montenegrins and Macedonians were
Serbs. The new state was, in reality, an enlarged Serbia, and Serbs still feel
and perceive it as such today. The Serbian army entered Croatia at the end of
the First World War as a victor, considering it its spoils of war, although it
was claimed then, as in 1945, that it was a matter of "liberation."
The Serbs, like the Russians, when they impose their
domination, claim it is a matter of "liberation." Days after the Act
of "union," the Serbian army murdered Croatian youth in Zagreb, who
were protesting against the liquidation of Croatia's millennia-old sovereignty.
The first task of the new government was to abolish the centuries-old Croatian
political institutions, namely the ban and the parliament, by implementing a
policy of Balkan terror. Political freedoms were not respected.
Nor was human dignity respected. Instead of the
exemplary administration of the Austro-Hungarian era, corruption, incompetence,
and the ignorance of the new, semi-literate officials prevailed. The press, the
right to assembly, discussion, and association were all subject to their
control. Croatian schoolchildren were forced to study Serbian national history
and the Serbian-Russian alphabet, known as Cyrillic. They were taught that
Croats were not a people in a political or ethnic sense, while Croatian history
was falsified. There was religious discrimination in favor of Orthodox
proselytism, while the Catholic Church was considered an anti-national
institution and Islam the harmful remnant of Turkish rule.
Economic measures that amounted to plunder were
implemented. The agrarian reform consisted of dispossessing the Croatian
landowners—for there were very few large landowners—of their lands, which were
then given to Serbs from Serbia. With these new settlers, the Serbian minority
in Croatia increased, while in Bosnia, the old Islamic nobility was literally
dispossessed of their ancestral holdings, which passed into the hands of the
Serbian Orthodox population. The monetary change—the Serbian dinar was
established in place of the koruna, at a rate of four korunas to one dinar—was
implemented in such a way that Croatia and Slovenia were left without capital.
Taxes in Croatia and Slovenia were four times higher than in Serbia. They had
to contribute to the payment of Serbia's war debts, while German war
reparations benefited Serbia exclusively. Most of the national revenue was
invested in Serbia. Belgrade, until then a backward Balkan town, was rapidly
becoming a modern metropolis.
King Alexander, of the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty,
established his autocratic system supported by an army in which there were no
Croatian senior officers. (In Austria-Hungary, there were more than 80 Croatian
generals and admirals.) The pseudo-democratic and centralist constitution of
1922 was promulgated based on fraudulent and biased elections. In many
provinces, the deputies were appointed by the government. The constitution was
proclaimed by a simple majority and in the absence of the Croatian deputies.
The Croatian Republican Peasant Party, the majority
party in Croatia, and other Croatian democratic politicians fought for a
Croatian Republic, always resorting to democratic and peaceful means. Radic,
leader of the Croatian Peasant Republican Party, was imprisoned several times.
Although his struggle found understanding and sympathy in international public
opinion, he was advised in Paris and London to take the fight to the Belgrade
parliament, as there was no possibility of revising the peace treaties.
Radic, head of the opposition to Serbian centralism,
domination, and economic exploitation, supported even by representatives of the
Serbian minority in Croatia, was shot on June 20, 1928, during a parliamentary
session by a pro-government deputy, a friend of the king. Two Croatian deputies
were killed instantly and three were seriously wounded, among them Esteban
Radic, who succumbed to his injuries shortly afterward.
This treacherous crime shocked the civilized world.
Public opinion pointed to the Serbian dynasty as complicit. Instead of granting
Croatia, as expected, democratic freedoms and autonomy in the form of a
federation, King Alexander repealed the constitution, banned political parties,
and established a rigid personal dictatorship. It was decreed that Croatian
nationality did not exist, not only in the political but also the ethnic sense;
even Croatian national symbols—the flag, coat of arms, and anthem—were
abolished. The system became an autocratic tyranny, accompanied by brutal
police measures, the imprisonment and internment of prominent politicians,
torture, and murder without trial or due process.
In response to the assassination of prominent Croatian
cultural and scientific figures in broad daylight, the International League for
Human Rights raised its voice in protest. Among others, Albert Einstein and
Heinrich Mann called for "all those who value freedom and human rights to
raise their strongest protest against the reigning terror in Croatia. All
nations where branches of the International League for Human Rights exist must
offer protection to this small but enlightened and peaceful people."
Among the many protests, we will cite the manifesto
published in "The Manchester Guardian" on December 24, 1929, and
signed by Englishmen familiar with and sympathetic to Yugoslavia, whose list is
as follows: James Berry, Edward Boyle, Roland Bryce, Victor Cazalet, Cushendun,
Arthur Evans, H. A. L. Fisher, G. P. Gooch, Ellinor F. C. Grogan, Harry Lamb,
Gilbert Murray, H. W. Nevinson, Noel-Buxton, Ben Riley, R. W. Seton Watson,
Wickham Steed, and Gertrude F. Wilde. The signatories pointed out, first and
foremost, "the difficulties arising from history."
"Our brave Serbian allies," they continued,
"were raised in a more primitive world. Their religion was the 'Orthodox'
faith." But the traditions of the Adriatic and Transdanubian provinces are
linked, to a great extent, to European civilization due to contacts with the
Venetian, Austrian, and Hungarian regimes. Their religion is, to a large
degree, Catholicism.
The situation between these two groups worsened
because many members of the second group actually fought against the Allies,
having been compelled to seek relief from Austria due to the secret London pact
that ceded a large swathe of their homeland to Italy.
"Belgrade's military dominance was in itself a
temptation that encouraged its use to impose premature centralization. Examples
of the means adapted to this end include not only the almost exclusive
allocation of administrative posts, even in the smallest localities, to agents
of the central government, but also the falsification of election results in
entire provinces, thus dividing the country once again into artificial
territorial units, disregarding traditional historical borders, especially in
the cases of Bosnia and Montenegro. It is as if, immediately after the union of
the English and Scottish crowns, a government in London had separated the
Lothians from Scotland and incorporated them into Northumberland."
"The press is muzzled. Official espionage is
rampant. Police methods have reached the point where, as a consequence of a
series of assassinations or attempted assassinations, whose victims were
prominent leaders of opposition parties, the belief has prevailed throughout
most of the country—rightly or wrongly, and it is necessarily difficult to
verify its basis—that the guardians of public order were in league with the
murderers.
The signatories of this declaration, having recently
returned from the western provinces of Yugoslavia where they undertook
separate, extensive journeys, can attest to the fact that the despair and
resentment provoked by the dictatorship are shared by all segments of the
population. One of us has received personal assurances from the Muslim leaders
of Bosnia, who consider the current situation intolerable and who are in
complete agreement with their Croat neighbors." "And what is of
particular interest is that this attitude of inflexible opposition is also
shared by the Serbs of the former Hungarian Banat north of the Danube... and in
the districts of Lika, the old military district."
"Unfortunately, as far as we could ascertain, the
government in Belgrade cannot be counted on to offer any remedy to this state
of affairs.
"Given the persistent and virtually unanimous
opposition of the western provinces of Yugoslavia to the Belgrade dictatorship,
we find ourselves in such a situation that, if allowed to continue, it will
inevitably constitute a constant temptation for neighboring governments hostile
to the unity of the South Slavs, which is a permanent danger to the peace of
Europe. The circumstances require a thorough review of the entire constitution
of the new state." If an "absolute" dislocation is to be
avoided, it will be necessary to establish, in one form or another, a
federation "that guarantees the broadest possible provincial autonomy"
to its various constituent elements.
The signatories of this manifesto, which we have
quoted at length because they were friends of Yugoslavia, conclude by appealing
to Her Britannic Majesty's Government to, in conjunction with the French
government and in agreement with the governments of Prague and Bucharest, exert
appropriate pressure on Belgrade and, if necessary, withhold any further
financial assistance from the Yugoslav government.
All these warnings proved fruitless, and this was
inevitable, since many Western friends and sympathizers of Yugoslavia failed to
understand that Serbia, due to its autocratic tradition, its Caesaropapist
conception of the state, and its imperialist ambitions, cannot coexist in a
free community of South Slavic nations, and that the Yugoslavia desired by
Serbian chauvinists can only exist under a dictatorial regime.
When the war spread to the Balkans in 1941, the
oppressed peoples could neither defend nor defend Yugoslavia, which, de facto,
was their national prison. The Croats established their own state, confident
that, once hostilities ended, they could count, according to the letter and
spirit of the Atlantic Charter, on the support of the Allies to consolidate and
organize it democratically, respecting the right to self-determination.
Even during the war, public opinion in democratic
countries clearly saw that the main cause of Yugoslavia's total military and
political collapse was Great Serbian imperialism. The Allied governments ceased
their support for the governments of King Peter and their representative in the
country, General Draža Mihailović, leader of the Serbian nationalist
Chetnik guerrillas. It is only regrettable that, under pressure from the Soviet
Union, the Allies provided substantial support to Tito's communist guerrillas,
who skillfully concealed their true intentions and character, presenting
themselves as democrats and opponents of the policy of national oppression in
Yugoslavia, which they described as a "prison of peoples," and
pretending to recognize the right of all its constituent nations to secession.
The Croats, directly affected, saw that this was merely propaganda camouflage
and, with enormous sacrifice in lives and property, opposed the communist
designs to impose a dictatorship and domination even more brutal than before,
until the very last moment.
Therefore, what H.E. He aptly observed regarding the
Soviet Union:
"While the new Bolshevik government of Russia in
1919 declared that each part of the former Russian Empire could go its own way,
the Red Army trampled on the newly won independence of Ukraine. The same can be
said of Transcaucasus and Central Asia.
"Soviet representatives will tell us that the
people of these subjugated countries invited the Soviet army to invade them,
since what they most desired was to be part of the Soviet Union.
Is there any sovereign state in the world—independent,
democratic, economically vigorous, and enjoying a high standard of living—that
would willingly invite its powerful neighbor to occupy it militarily and
subjugate it politically? Would such subjugation be welcomed if that neighbor
had the lowest standard of living, lacked democratic institutions, and was
under a dictatorship?" "No free country would desire such invasion
and subjugation. The peoples of Ukraine, the Baltic states, and other countries
of Eastern Europe, Transcaucasus, and Central Asia did not extend this
invitation. It was imposed upon them. They never had the opportunity to choose
freedom. The USSR continues to deprive them of the very right it proclaims for
all peoples."
Like the Soviets, the Yugoslav communist leaders
enshrined in the 1946 constitution—a faithful copy of Stalin's 1936
constitution—the right of each Yugoslav people to secession. However, in
practice, this is impossible, just as it was in the Soviet Union. Anyone who
invoked this paragraph of the constitution was considered a traitor. Given the
obvious contradiction between the right recognized by the constitution and the
reality in a heterogeneous, multinational country with diverse cultural and religious
backgrounds, the right was subsequently repealed. Thus, the peoples of
Yugoslavia are deprived, even formally, of this fundamental right, recognized
in the Atlantic Charter and by the United Nations. Lately, centralism has
intensified, and a constitutional reform is being considered to revive the
theory of dictator Alexander I, according to which Croatian and Slovenian
nations do not exist.
Just as in the Soviet Union, in Yugoslavia the theory
persists that the Croats invited Serbia to "liberate" them, a claim
that is completely unfounded in both monarchical and communist Yugoslavia.
Croatia, an associated kingdom with sovereign
attributes until 1918, sought independence from Austria-Hungary, and the
Croatian Parliament promulgated national independence on November 29, 1918.
This was recognized by Serbia until December 1, 1918, when the Regent of the
Serbian throne proclaimed the "union" of Croatia with Serbia. This
act was not sanctioned by either the Parliament or the Croatian people, who in
subsequent elections voted overwhelmingly for a Croatian republic.
The few Croatian politicians who believed that a
Serbian-Croatian state community would be mutually beneficial were soon
disappointed to see that the Serbs did not respect previous agreements and
pursued a hegemonic policy, and subsequently went into opposition. Thus, the
Croatian politician Dr. Ante Trumbic, former president of the "Yugoslav
Committee" in London and first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia,
declared to a French publicist during the monarchical dictatorship: "The
The "Yugoslav" union never existed and never will. Serbia exists; it
has occupied Croatia, Slovenia, Banat, Montenegro, etc., and is simply trying
to transform them into Serbian provinces, mere and ordinary colonies in order
to "exploit" them. The term Yugoslavia represents nothing but
suffering, persecution, and moral and intellectual ruin."
Svetozar Pribicevic, leader of the Serbian minority in
Croatia and one of the principal architects of Yugoslavia, a proponent of
centralism and unitarianism, concluded that freedom and democracy were
impossible in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He demanded the establishment of a
republican regime and, if necessary, the separation of Croatia. In his opinion,
the Serbian minority in Croatia would live better and with greater freedom in
an independent Croatia than they did now that Croatia was under Serbian
domination. (Ivan Mestrovic: "Memories of Men and Political Events,"
Buenos Aires 1961, pp. 233-34.)
The Croatian Republican Peasant Party, which between
the two world wars garnered almost all Croatian votes in elections, issued a
significant declaration on March 8, 1919, protesting against foreign tyranny in
Croatia and challenging the legitimacy of the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes" under the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty, arguing that this
state had been established without the consent of the Croatian parliament and
people. Similarly, a memorandum endorsed by 180,000 signatories was presented
to the Paris Peace Conference demanding the application of the right to
self-determination in Croatia, whose aspiration was to become a pacifist and
neutral republic.
Violating the express will of the Croatian people, who
had fought heroically during the last war to preserve their nation-state,
Yugoslavia was restored in 1945 under communist leadership and with the direct
support of the Red Army. The Metropolitan of Croatia, Cardinal Aloysius
Stepinac, declared on October 3, 1946, during the trial brought against him by
the communists: "that the Croatian people had expressed themselves in a
plebiscite in favor of a Croatian state and that the right of the Croatian
people to freedom and independence was entirely in accordance with the
principles of the Allies as set forth at Yalta and in the Atlantic Charter. If,
according to these principles, all peoples have the right to independence, why
deny it to the Croatian people?"
In view of the Croatian people's firm resolve against
the restoration of Yugoslavia, President Franklin D. Roosevelt repeatedly
argued in his deliberations with Sir Anthony Eden in 1943: "that the
Croats and Serbs have nothing in common and that it is ridiculous to force two
such antagonistic peoples to live under a joint government." (E. Sherwood:
Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History, vol. 1, p. 318. Banton Books, New
York). The Soviet leaders described the military occupation, political
subjugation, and colonial exploitation of so many peoples as
"liberation." The Yugoslav communist leaders used identical terms, although
they acknowledged that the Croatians put up a tenacious resistance and that in
Sriem alone, in a small border area between Croatia and Serbia, more than
100,000 soldiers fell in these struggles within a few months.
Before the end of hostilities, some 200,000 Croatian
soldiers retreated to the Austrian border, where, disarmed by the British, they
were handed over to the Yugoslav communist authorities, with assurances that
they would be treated according to international conventions. However, the communists
committed a crime unparalleled in history, a true genocide, perpetrating the
mass killing of these prisoners of war and even of the civilian population.
Furthermore, the communists exterminated hundreds of thousands of Croats during
the guerrilla war, and once in power, countless others passed through their
concentration camps and prisons.
The unwavering will of the Croatian people to be
independent is also evidenced by numerous Croatian anti-communist political
exiles. Among the tens of thousands of refugees were politicians and military
personnel, intellectuals, professionals, priests, industrialists, merchants,
artisans, laborers, and peasants. All preferred to live free abroad than as
slaves in their captive homeland. Lately, beginning in 1947, new waves of
refugees escaped from Yugoslavia, to such an extent that, with the exception of
East Germany, Yugoslavia was the country from which the largest number of
anti-communist refugees in Europe originated.
It is worth noting that many Serbian patriots opposed
a forced state union between Croatia and Serbia, as they believed that the
violent conflict between the two nationalisms would benefit the communists and
ultimately harm Serbia.
As for the Croatian communists, their role is
comparable to that of the communists in Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, and other
countries of the Soviet Union who meekly accepted Russian rule. Due to their
small numbers and without the support of the Serbian communists, they would
never have come to power in Croatia. They did not fight for the independence of
their homeland and behaved like true quislings by not demanding that Croatia
be, at the very least, a separate state, even if a satellite state like
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and tiny Albania. The few among them
who raised their voices in favor of a Croatian state, albeit with a communist
regime and ideology, were silenced and exterminated, like Andrija Hebrang,
former general secretary of the Communist Party in Croatia.
To the national oppression of Croatia and Slovenia
within Yugoslavia, it is necessary to add their economic exploitation as if
they were colonies. Applying Marxist theory on economic equality, the Yugoslav
communist leaders are attempting, at an accelerated pace, to bring the economic
level of Croatia and Slovenia, the industrialized and advanced "people's
republics," in line with that of the remaining backward and underdeveloped
republics. To this end, unproductive industries are being built in Serbia and
Montenegro with funds extracted from Croatian and Slovenian workers, whose
productivity is far higher. Such colonial exploitation provokes opposition even
within the ranks of the communist leaders themselves in Slovenia and Croatia.
This opposition to the central government's investment policy is labeled as
chauvinistic, nationalistic, localist, and particularistic behavior on the part
of the Croatian and Slovenian communists.
To avoid elaborating further on arguments and
evidence, we believe, Mr. Prime Minister. His conclusion regarding Soviet
colonialism extends to Yugoslavia as well:
"Is the Soviet Union the only remaining colonial
power in the world? Why should the Soviet empire be more sacrosanct than any
other? Different standards neither apply nor should apply to the Soviet
imperialists. There should be no double standards at the United Nations.
"The United Nations Declaration makes no
distinction as to the color or race of the people subjected to foreign
domination and exploitation. It uses the inclusive word 'all' in its preamble,
stating that all peoples have the inalienable right to their complete freedom,
the exercise of their sovereignty, and the integrity of their national
territory."
Nor does Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, have the
right to be an exception in the concert of nations, since it adhered to the
principle that all peoples have the right to be free. Furthermore, the Yugoslav
communist leaders seized every opportunity to advocate for the independence and
decolonization of Afro-Asian peoples, attempting to impose themselves as their
mentors. They cannot deny that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a
multinational state, a reduced and deteriorated version of the Soviet Union.
They must, therefore, recognize the right to self-determination of the peoples
that comprise it, since, as a member of the UN, Yugoslavia committed itself to
respecting the two main foundations of its constitution:
(1) The principle of equal rights to
self-determination of peoples (Art. 1, para. 2).
(2) Respect for human rights and freedoms without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Art. 1, para. 3).
Yugoslavia insistently demands that the Western colonial powers respect these
principles, yet it does not. Ruled by a totalitarian regime, it violates and
infringes upon fundamental human rights and freedoms, and as a multinational
state, created and maintained by force, it violates the primary and fundamental
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
The principles contained in the Charter of the United
Nations are legal principles, and member nations must respect them as if they
were international law, ensuring their effective application throughout the
world.
The Croatian people expect the United Nations to apply
these principles and to assist in achieving Croatia's independence. Of course,
this would mean the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, which, incidentally, would
benefit the Western world. The Croatian people want to live under a democratic
regime and integrate into Western Europe. The consolidation of relations in the
Adriatic-Danubian region, with the freedom of all peoples, would contribute to
world peace. For over a thousand years, Croatia has legitimately possessed the
eastern coast of the Adriatic.
Croatia and Slovenia border Italy, Austria, and Hungary,
so with the re-establishment of the Croatian state, this entire region would be
reintegrated into the Western bloc. As long as Yugoslavia remains under Serbian
domination, there is a potential danger that it will become a linchpin of
Russian imperialism. By virtue of their tradition, culture, and religion, the
Croatian and Slovenian peoples are an integral part of the West, and in any
emergency that threatens Western interests, their position is already fixed and
defined.
From all of the above, it follows that the United
Nations' measures against Russian-Soviet colonialism must also extend to
Serbian-Yugoslav imperialism and colonialism. Both violate the fundamental
principles of the United Nations and, as such, pose a danger to world peace and
the freedom of all peoples without discrimination, including the Russian and
Serbian peoples.
CHRONICLES AND COMMENTS
"Declaration of Principles" of the Congress
of Croatian Exiles in New York
From August 29 to September
2 of this year, the Congress of delegates from numerous associations and
institutions of Croatian exiles from the United States, Canada, Europe, Latin
America, and Australia was held at the Commodore Hotel in New York. The
Congress, chaired by Dr. Ibrahim Bey Dzinic, was convened with the purpose of
forming an organization of all Croatian exiles to assist and represent before
the free world the struggle of the oppressed Croatian people for liberation
from communist tyranny and for the restoration of the Croatian state.
The participants of the
Congress examined the current situation of the Croatian people and Croatian
exiles. An executive committee was elected to act in accordance with the
Declaration of Principles and to strive to ensure that delegates from those
organizations and groups not represented at this Congress are present, thereby
potentially forming a unified body of all Croatian exiles and emigrants. At the
Congress, several resolutions were adopted, along with the Declaration of
Principles, which serves as a platform to unite all Croatian groups,
associations, and institutions in exile around shared objectives.
The preface to the
Declaration, which we summarize below, states that in communist Yugoslavia the
Croatian people have no possibility of freely expressing their will. Therefore,
it is necessary for Croatian exiles to make the truth about the situation in
Croatia and the aspirations of the Croatian people known to the free world.
The first point of the
Declaration states that the Croatian people exist as a distinct ethnic unit
with their own national consciousness and that, by virtue of their
millennia-long state continuity—interrupted only in 1918—they have the right,
according to the principle of national self-determination enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, to demand and re-establish their nation-state in
their historical territory, inhabited by the ethnic Croatian majority.
The second point states:
"In the re-established Croatian state, all fundamental human rights will
be guaranteed. All citizens, without distinction of origin, national sentiment,
or religious creed, will be completely equal." The third point states:
"The internal order of the re-established Croatian state will conform to
the principles of Western democracy." Croatia will be a state governed by
the rule of law, with a multi-party system, separation of powers, and equal
rights and duties for all citizens.
Regarding the economic
system imposed by the communists, point four specifies that in the
re-established Croatian state, all social classes will be guaranteed equal
participation in the national income in proportion to their contributions, so
that everyone is guaranteed a standard of living worthy of human dignity. The
free economy must be "the main driving force of economic progress and
democracy."
Point five deals with the relations of the
re-established State of Croatia and European integration. "Croatia, due to
its ideological, political, and economic orientation towards Western Europe,
should join the community of free European states..." "Croatia's participation
in the European Common Market is perfectly aligned with Croatian national
interests and the general interests of a free Europe. The Congress considers
that 'the natural path to forming large political and economic communities' is
through nation-states," emphasizing that "on these, as on all other
fundamental issues, the final decision will be made by the Croatian people
through their freely elected parliament (Sabor)."
The sixth and final point of the Declaration refers to
the attitude of exiles towards Croats who collaborate with the current Yugoslav
communist regime. It is emphasized that "no motive of revenge guides the
exiles, nor will it guide the Croatian people in the future, but rather love
for freedom and for the homeland"... "To those who, out of necessity,
weakness, or disorientation, collaborate directly or indirectly with the
communist party or regime, we say the following: the Croatian people will be
very considerate in condoning such collaboration on the condition that everyone
loyally and actively defends the vital interests of the Croatian people
expressed in this Declaration, according to the circumstances and capabilities
of each individual."
The Croatian-Latin American Institute of Culture,
which sponsors this journal, was represented at this Congress by its president,
Dr. Milan Blazekovic, who was elected to the executive committee.
Surprising Inconsistencies of an American Magazine
The American publication Reader's Digest, widely
distributed throughout the free world, is a publication with a clear and
resolute anti-communist stance, consistent with the policies of its country.
The fact that Robert Littell's report, originally published in Nouveau Candile
of Paris (Reader's Digest Selections, March 1962: "Success of the Yugoslav
Schism," pp. 122-30), was published in a condensed form in that magazine,
with its subtitle already highlighting the "surprising prosperity" of
communist Yugoslavia, strikes us as a truly remarkable inconsistency. This fact
deserves special attention given our commitment to clarifying all aspects of
so-called Titoism, especially since this is not the first time that prestigious
anti-communist publications have featured reviews, notes, and commentaries
consistent with the intentions and suggestions of the Yugoslav communist
tyranny.
Reader's Digest's motives are understandable, but not
acceptable. They seek to satisfy the psychological need of Americans by finding
moral justification for aiding the communist regime in Belgrade after the 1948
Cominform resolution against the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Since
then, the Washington government, along with those of Paris and London, has
provided substantial economic, military, and political support to the Yugoslav
communist dictatorship. This policy of subsidies was termed "calculated
risk," and its aim was to gain certain advantages in the struggle against
another, more powerful and dangerous communist country: the Soviet Union.
However, when this political realism failed to yield the expected results, the
aid provided to a communist tyranny for years, which requires enormous material
resources and is morally detrimental to Western democracies, provoked harsh
criticism and censure from a public that does not understand this policy. To
counter these criticisms and censures, the Yugoslav dictatorship tends to be
portrayed as a kind of "Western-style communism," not as rigid or
abominable as Russian Bolshevik communism.
The inaccurate account of relations within Yugoslavia,
published in the aforementioned French weekly, was likely exacerbated by the
fact—skillfully exploited by the Yugoslav communist leaders—that deep-seated
prejudices persist in France in favor of Yugoslavia, or rather, of the enlarged
Serbia, France's small ally in the First World War. Perhaps due to this
underlying bias, Littell failed to see that pronounced national antagonisms
existed within communist Yugoslavia, manifesting themselves primarily in the
economic sphere, which he addresses.
But when avowedly anti-communist American circles so
surprisingly inconsistency praise the supposed prosperity of a communist
country, we see a repeat—if small matters are compared to great ones—of the
incoherent policy practiced during the war with the Soviet Union, when, within
the framework of wartime propaganda, the political and economic situation in
Russia was romanticized. It is well known that such a policy had unpleasant
repercussions on political developments in North America itself, when a
disillusioned public began to question who was to blame for the current state
of affairs in a divided world. We discuss the danger of illusions regarding
Yugoslavia elsewhere (see our editorial).
Here we will limit ourselves to subjecting to
objective analysis the assertions concerning communist Yugoslavia contained in
the Reader's Digest article, which attempt to convince public opinion: 1) that
"Tito was astute in breaking with the communist economy and with the
USSR"; 2) that "Western observers have watched with amazement this
dynamic, fruitful type of socialism" with attributes "of the free
market," in which initiative and creative drive come from the lowest rungs
of the economic ladder"; 3) that "this has earned it surprising
prosperity... which will continue to develop vigorously"; that for all
these reasons it is "unlikely that Yugoslavia will return to the Soviet
bloc, at least while Tito, who is 69 years old, remains alive...".
I
The first premise, that the differences between Moscow
and Belgrade were due to Tito's will and shrewdness, is simply not true, a fact
easily proven.
After the collapse of the Third Reich, the sole common
goal of the Soviets and their Western Allies, Stalin strove to organize a
cohesive Soviet bloc against his former allies. To achieve this, he had to
impose the most complete control possible over the satellite states, and
adhering to the principle that new policies require new executors, he proceeded
with purges in the respective communist parties.
Stalin was able to implement this policy without major
difficulties in the satellite states under Soviet occupation, but not in
Yugoslavia, from which the Red Army withdrew at the end of the war following
the vigorous demands of the Western democracies. The Soviets had invaded
Yugoslav territory north of the Danube, part of Serbia with its capital,
Belgrade. There, they installed Tito's communist government. They withdrew,
convinced they had done enough to communize the country and fearful that
otherwise the Western Allies might land on the Croatian Adriatic coast and thus
prevent Soviet control over the strategically vital Danubian-Adriatic region of
Croatia and Slovenia.
This was happening at the same time that Churchill,
defending the imperial route to India, was using the British Navy's guns to
clear Greece of communist guerrillas. At that time, Tito and his group were
staunch enemies of this Western policy. Nevertheless, in 1948, precisely
because of this Western policy that prevented the Soviet occupation of
Yugoslavia, they were able to resist the formidable Stalin without needing any
special political acumen, defending their power and their lives. They were
luckier, not more intelligent, than the communist leaders of the occupied
countries: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, who lost
their lives.
If a small, weak country like Albania, not occupied by
the Soviets, is currently opposing Khrushchev, how could a much more powerful
country like Yugoslavia not do the same?
Furthermore, it should be noted that Stalin did not
exhaust all his resources to eliminate Tito and his group. Perhaps he did not
want to risk the potential collapse of the communist regime in Yugoslavia,
which in turn would diminish the possibility of future control over the
Balkans, the Danube basin, the Adriatic, and land access to Italy via Slovenia
from the Croatian province of Istria. Stalin could have broken Finland's
resistance in 1940, but he did not. In Tito's case, he did not employ Russia's
enormous power for specific reasons.
Tito, in essence, is as much a communist as Stalin and
Khrushchev. Moreover, he is more a product of circumstance than a shrewd
politician.
II
The premise that Tito has broken with "orthodox
communist economics" is erroneous, for the simple reason that, strictly
speaking, there is no economic doctrine of communism. There are only the
theories of Karl Marx, conceived during the Western industrial revolution, and
subsequently disproven by experience. Hence the need for experimentation by
communist leaders, who, faced with reality, often have to change course, so
that their vacillations sometimes lead to premature conclusions that the
supposed evolution of communism toward Western humanism is underway.
When Tito, expelled from the Soviet bloc, depended on
aid from capitalist countries, he began with economic experiments somewhat
different from those of the Soviets. In this respect, he was not original,
since he acted in the same way as the communists of other satellite states
facing insurmountable difficulties. As a committed communist, he continued to
cling to the fiction of a communist economic system that, from the perspective
of contemporary economic science, does not exist.
The only difference is that Tito could no longer, as
he had until 1948, blindly follow Soviet "orthodoxy" in every way,
and was compelled to experiment on his own. In doing so, he vehemently rejected
any insinuations that he had strayed from Leninist ideology and affirmed that
he would never accept Western aid at the price of ideological concessions.
Moreover, he maintained, and continues to maintain, that Yugoslav communism,
not Russian communism, faithfully interprets and implements communist theories,
applied to the specific situation in Yugoslavia.
Therefore, Khrushchev, during his visit to Belgrade in
1956, while attempting to reconcile with the Yugoslav communists, was able to
accept Tito's thesis that socialism can be reached by different paths. With
this, Khrushchev effectively acknowledged that there is no single orthodox
communist doctrine, for if one existed, it would have to be singular and
equally binding for all communists. After this recognition by the leader of
world communism, the leaders of Red China, Yugoslavia, and even Albania could
rightly maintain that their specific path to socialism was the best, or at
least as orthodox, as the Soviet one.
Therefore, if one cannot speak of Tito's break with
"orthodox communist economics," it remains to be clarified whether
the Yugoslav type of communism, as some Western observers maintain, differs
fundamentally from the Russian one, and whether Tito is implementing this
supposed Western type of communism, which is somewhat akin to the traditional
humanist ideals of democratic countries.
Without overestimating the importance and significance
of the Milovan Djilas case, so prominent in the West, the official reactions
against his rather vague suggestions regarding the necessary evolution of
Yugoslav communism toward Western socialism prove that the Yugoslav communist
leaders do not wish to depart from their Soviet model, even though the reasons
of political opportunism, certainly considered by Djilas, would advise
different approaches.
This persistent approach of the Tito regime, in
accordance with the Russian form of Marxism, has its historical and scientific
explanation.
Russia and Yugoslavia (in its capacity as an
aggrandized Serbia) share the same Byzantine cultural and political tradition.
Autocracy and Caesaropapism, Russia's Byzantine legacy, determined that Lenin
would become the contemporary father of totalitarianism; they also explain the
failure of the attempt to introduce democracy after the collapse of Tsarism.
Serbia's dominance in communist Yugoslavia determined the Russian type of
Marxism. Therefore, as long as the basic Serbian tradition remains in force in
Yugoslavia, the speculations that the Yugoslav regime, with North American
support, could move closer to laborism and serve as an attractive example to
Hungarian, Polish, and other parties in Central and Eastern Europe are entirely
unfounded.
If anyone believed that the well-known events in
Hungary and Poland were influenced by the Yugoslav example, they were deluded,
and Tito very quickly hastened to refute that belief with his conduct during
the Hungarian rebellion, which Western Marxists labeled vile. The Hungarian and
Polish revolutionaries had no need to draw inspiration from Tito's Balkan
tyranny, given their glorious tradition of fighting for the freedom of their
own peoples.
A certain distancing of the Yugoslav communist regime
from Soviet orthodoxy, and only on secondary issues, cannot be interpreted as a
symptom of evolution toward democratic socialism (the question of whether
democracy is possible in a system of a fully state-controlled economy is
another matter), since it represents a temporary abandonment of measures that
were orthodox from an ideological standpoint but economically ineffective.
Officially, this distancing is justified as a necessary step in the transition
from the capitalist or "semi-feudal" system to socialism in
underdeveloped countries, which, strictly speaking, never experienced either a
capitalist economy or feudalism. For communists, all private property signifies
capitalism, and all large landholdings, feudalism.
Even in the Soviet Union, we find precedents for this
distancing, such as Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), meaning that Tito is not
original in this regard. Nor does Khrushchev cling today to an inflexible
system of central planning. Consequently, Littell is mistaken in seeing in the
insignificant decentralization of the Yugoslav economy the beginning of a new
socialist economy with elements of free enterprise. However, while the editors
of Reader's Digest were "condensing" Littell's report, in Yugoslavia
serious economic stagnation was being denounced and the official campaign in
favor of greater controls and a more rigid centralization was beginning.
This means that the relevant authorities in communist
Yugoslavia did not tolerate even the slightest deviations from economic
centralism, since the governing bodies in enterprises were imposed or closely
controlled by the Communist Party, despite all the propaganda about workers'
self-management and self-governance.
In acting in this way, the communist leaders were
guided, on the one hand, by their ideological conceptions regarding the
necessity of centralized socialist planning, and on the other, by the policy of
Serbian hegemony.
This becomes clearer when we consider that Littell
could only cite sporadic examples, seeking evidence of grassroots initiative,
such as the establishment of a radio and television factory in Zagreb,
competing with a similar company in Belgrade; the success of the Zagreb optical
factory; and the maintenance of six independent film studios in six different
republics. Littell, unwittingly, came close to the truth when he attributed
this competition to patriotic motives. He simply failed to grasp that this is
not about Yugoslav patriotism, nor even local patriotism, but national
patriotism, as a sign of resistance by oppressed peoples to centralism, which
favors Serbian national interests. This partial decentralization of the economy
was exploited by Croatian and Slovenian experts in defense of their national
economies.
In contrast, Serbian sectors (including anti-communist
exiles) unabashedly advocate for economic centralism. To justify this, they
invented a theory according to which the principle of economic equality should
apply not only to individuals but also to the peoples that comprise the
multinational Yugoslav state. According to this monstrous theory of reverse colonialism,
investment policy should be directed from Belgrade, so that with funds
extracted from Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina—far more advanced
regions—industry would be fostered in Serbia and Montenegro. In other words, it
is necessary to slow the progress of Croatia and Slovenia and further reduce
the already meager wages of workers in the western parts of Yugoslavia in order
to raise the standard of living of a population still incapable of developing
an industry that operates at enormous losses.
Littell, like many other Western observers, fails to
recognize that in a communist dictatorship, where fundamental human and
political freedoms are absent, national resistance manifests itself in
disguised forms and, in this specific case, in the struggle for investment. The
example of the uneconomical promotion of film studios in each people's republic
demonstrates the desire to assert their respective national cultures.
III
The "surprising prosperity" of the
"Yugoslav schismatics" should demonstrate the shrewdness of those who
deviated from Soviet communist orthodoxy. The author, however, remains
cautious. It is described as "relative prosperity." Of course, this
reservation is not reflected in the subtitle, which simply proclaims
"surprising prosperity."
To assume that certain elements of a free market
economy exist within the totalitarian communist system is not only inconsistent
but absurd from the standpoint of economic science. The unidealized reality of
communist Yugoslavia refutes all assertions about surprising or relative
prosperity. The ambiguous term "relative prosperity," discreetly
inserted into a mass of data intended to prove surprising prosperity, would
imply that communist Yugoslavia achieved greater prosperity than other
communist-governed countries, and that it represents remarkable progress
compared to the situation under the pre-war monarchical dictatorship.
However, those familiar with the situation in
Yugoslavia and Central and Eastern Europe would not agree with this cautious
reservation. The Yugoslav economy shows no special progress whatsoever compared
to the communist countries of Central Europe, since the standard of living in
some of them is higher than in Yugoslavia. Nor Nor are the results
significantly better than the previous situation.
While maintaining objective criticism of both
present-day Yugoslavia and the monarchical Yugoslavia, we insist that the
communist dictatorship does not represent economic progress compared to the
frankly disastrous previous situation, in which, despite everything, the
economy managed to avoid total interference from dictatorial governments. This
issue is of particular importance from a principled standpoint, as there is a
desire to convince the new states in Asia and Africa, as well as the Latin American
nations, that rapid industrialization can be achieved through nationalization
and planning, without resorting to any kind of "imperialism."
Yugoslavia should be the attractive example.
Of course, the fact that the Yugoslav communists
squandered enormous aid amounting to several billion dollars is conveniently
overlooked. Similarly, the nationalist monarchical dictatorship had squandered
billions of good pre-war French francs, large sums received from Germany as war
reparations, and various foreign loans. Then, as now, the talk was... Regarding
the supposed prosperity in Croatia and Slovenia—which until 1918 developed
within the Danubian Community—which resulted in their incorporation into a
Balkan state under the supremacy of Serbia, a relatively backward country.
If Croatia and Slovenia did experience some economic
progress, even in this unfavorable situation, it was more a matter of the
natural growth of their economies, which benefited from favorable conditions:
raw materials, especially iron, coal, and hydroelectric power; a favorable
location in the Danubian-Adriatic region; crafts, industry, commerce, banking
and credit institutions; and subsequently, well-developed agriculture,
livestock, and forestry, as well as great potential for international tourism.
Thus, their economic progress could not be completely halted by either the
corrupt and incapable pre-war centralist governments or the inhumane post-war
communist experiments. The solid foundations of the modern economy in Croatia
and Slovenia had already been laid during the Austrian-Hungarian period. While
the Croats, and even less so the Slovenes,
They were not entirely satisfied with the political
relations of the time. Austria-Hungary was a large, balanced economic unit,
governed by a free market system. Even the most inept democratic government
would have facilitated greater economic progress for Croatia and Slovenia than
the monarchical or communist dictatorships in Yugoslavia, which, moreover,
favored the Serbian regions, practicing a policy of colonial exploitation of
Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina. It is not widely known that the
electrification so touted by the communists was partly implemented according to
plans drawn up before the First World War, and that the shipbuilding industry,
so often mentioned, was more developed during the time of the Danubian
monarchy.
True economic progress is not manifested in certain
spectacular industries but, first and foremost, in the standard of living of
the population. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia's standard of living is one of the
lowest in the world and even lower than before the last war. This is evident
from official statistics. According to the Statistical Yearbook of the People's
Republic of Yugoslavia for 1961, pp. 436-440, the average wage of workers and
employees last year ranged from 13,000 to 19,000 dinars. At the official
exchange rate, this amounted to between $17.35 and $25.35. It should be noted
that the socialist principle, according to which each person should earn
according to their needs, was applied in communist Yugoslavia in such a way
that a system of incentives based on production levels was implemented—the very
system against which trade unionists in free countries are desperately
fighting.
In light of these facts, Littel's account of the
construction of houses worth $25,000 and the purchase of cars that, at the
official exchange rate, amount to around $1,500, borders on black humor, much
like the joke circulating in Yugoslavia that goes: "All unskilled workers
(earning less than $20 a month) should be shot on the spot. And why? So they
don't steal."
Of course, Littel himself writes that in the land of
"surprising prosperity," the indispensable source of sustenance is
"theft, now widespread."
Sacha Simon, a contributor to another French newspaper
(Le Figaro, Séléction Hebdomadaire No. 433, Paris 1962), expelled from the
Soviet Union despite his sympathies for communist countries, refers at length
to the scandalous cases of corruption in Yugoslavia. He cites official data
showing that 27,000 people were punished for economic crimes in Yugoslavia in
1956, and around 14,500 in 1961. While the number of proven offenses decreased,
the average amount defrauded increased, from 83,000 dinars in 1956 to 166,000
in 1961. It is worth remembering that the main beneficiaries of embezzlement
and fraud are beyond the reach of the law, as depicted by the Russian writer
Nikolai Gogol in his comedy "The Auditor."
Littell is right about the recent increase in workers'
and employees' wages. However, since Yugoslavia is experiencing inflation,
these increases are nominal and bear no relation to rising prices. The Belgrade
newspaper "Politika" (December 16, 1961) reported that "real
income across the economy increased by 4.4% during the first ten months of 1961
compared to the 1960 average, but according to statistical estimates, the cost
of living during the same period increased by 8%." The Federal Statistical
Institute reported that during the first two months of 1962, the cost of
living, compared to the previous year, increased by 11%.
Inflation could not prevent a decline in industrial
production. The Federal Statistical Institute reported that in the first two
months of the current year, production suffered "a significant decrease in
most industrial sectors." Mihajlo Todorovic, Vice President of the Federal
Executive Council (government), noted in his report to the Federal People's
Assembly on July 14, 1961, "the serious setback in 1961 in industry and
the two-year stagnation even in agricultural production in 1961,"
emphasizing that "personal incomes should be adjusted to labor
productivity."
These official admissions are highly significant,
given that the Yugoslav communists, interpreting statistical data in their own
way, boasted that their industrial production growth was among the highest in
Europe.
At the same time, the specter of unemployment looms
under a regime that used to highlight as the main advantage of the communist
system the absence of the danger of unemployment - which inevitably looms over
capitalist countries as a consequence of the supposedly inevitable cyclical
crises in the economy: the London "Times" published on 1/3/1962 that
an agreement had just been signed in Vienna regarding the employment of 10,000
Yugoslav workers in Austria.
The Times emphasizes that the Yugoslav government
"finds it difficult to admit that unemployment exists within the communist
system." The Yugoslav government "was for years blind and deaf to
unofficial emigrants." According to reliable data, 23,000 workers from
Yugoslavia are currently employed in West Germany. These figures should not be
confused with the tens of thousands of anti-communist refugees, which puts
Yugoslavia second in the ranking and East Germany first in that respect.
The Times even predicted that unemployment would reach
such proportions that the press would be forced to explain it as a consequence
of readjustment, resulting from ongoing economic reforms and, in part, from the
nascent automation in Yugoslavia. Communist propaganda makes no mention of the
export of labor to capitalist countries, even though before coming to power it
condemned it as white slavery.
Beyond the industrial stagnation, so induced to the
detriment of the agricultural economy, which continues to rely on peasant land ownership
despite forced collectivization, the problems of housing and transportation
arise acutely. Littell points out that "transportation is one of
Yugoslavia's weak points, and housing a gigantic and perpetual problem."
Due to the nationalization of houses, with the exception of privately owned
homes, the situation is such that few people have a room of their own.
Sacha Simon states in the aforementioned article that
one in two inhabitants of Yugoslavia is forced to work in the private sector to
secure a minimum income. After working 7 to 14 hours a day in nationalized
companies or offices, they take on other private jobs. "Private
initiative, whether permitted, tolerated, or illegal, gives impetus to the
family economy, but it is not certain that it does not harm the state
economy." Outside of nationalization, only small peasant farms burdened
with excessive taxes, cottage industries, and, to some extent, freelance
professions remain. Starting this year, medical services are nationalized,
leaving only the legal profession free for the time being.
In the country of "surprising prosperity,"
the concern for securing a basic standard of living leads to certain phenomena
detrimental to family and individual life. The struggle for survival distorts
character and leads to physical exhaustion. The official newspaper Borba
(February 27, 1962, Belgrade) reports on working conditions at the iron foundry
in Jesenice, Slovenia, one of the largest and best-organized companies in
Yugoslavia, founded in 1869 and employing around 8,000 workers. Last year, six
workers died in workplace accidents and 1,250 were injured. The company clinic
recorded more than 20,000 minor injuries. 17.8% of all workers were injured,
and sick leave accounted for 7%. The Communist Party organ maintains that the
primary cause of this situation lies in the fact that workers arrive at work
exhausted, as they must work elsewhere to earn a living.
Such would be the true picture of the "surprising
prosperity" in communist Yugoslavia, despite the substantial aid received
from the US and other democratic countries, amounting to between three and four
billion dollars.
IV.
From the foregoing, Littel's conclusion that
Yugoslavia is unlikely to return to the Soviet bloc due to changes in its
economic system is unfounded, since these changes did not occur. The
disagreements between Moscow and Belgrade are not economic but political, or
rather, personal. Personal conflicts
prevail, considering, of course, that Tito and Stalin are not the only
protagonists.
The conflict was inevitable from the moment Stalin
decided that changes at the top of the regime were necessary in Yugoslavia, as
in its satellite states. Even after Stalin's death, Moscow did not relinquish
this right to interfere in the internal affairs of its satellite states.
Therefore, despite Khrushchev's declarations in Belgrade in 1956, in which he
blamed Stalin for the Moscow-Belgrade dispute, and despite the increasingly
evident convergence between Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policy, especially
regarding Germany and Europe in general, a return to the previous situation is
impossible as long as Tito and his group remain in power in Yugoslavia.
For example, for reasons of personal security, they
cannot accept the Kremlin's control over the political repression apparatus,
such as that which exists in the satellite states occupied by the Red Army. On
the other hand, it seems unlikely that the Russians will relinquish their
traditional concessions regarding inter-Allied relations, which entail total
control over the weaker partner. Even less likely would the Soviets relinquish
their conception of "communist internationalism."
Despite all these differences, a close bond of
solidarity exists between these two affinity communist regimes. The communists
in Belgrade are aware that the collapse of Bolshevism would simultaneously
entail the end of the Yugoslav communist regime and, of course, the end of the
forced unity of Yugoslavia. It is for this reason that the concessions made by
communist Yugoslavia to the Western democracies, in exchange for its abundant
economic, military, and political aid, can only be verbal and superficial. A
democratic evolution is ruled out not only by the personal disposition and
inclination of the ruling group, but also by deeper causes beyond its control.
Given Serbia's centuries-old traditions, Yugoslav
communism is bound by unbreakable ties to Russian communism. Even if Tito,
Kardelj, and other lesser communist leaders, born and raised in what was
Austria-Hungary, were to subscribe to Milovan Djilas's well-known suggestions,
they could not accept them, since they depend on the party forces,
predominantly Serbian, which would violently oppose any radical deviation from
the Bolshevik and Russian models. A retreat is impossible due to the very
characteristics of Yugoslavia, which were favorable to their seizure of power.
Yugoslavia is a heterogeneous country from a national
and cultural perspective, torn apart by deep national contrasts. Exploiting
these national contrasts in monarchical Yugoslavia, the communists managed to
seize power. However, from the moment they took power, what was once an
advantage became a weakness for the regime. All of Yugoslavia's external
adversaries can take advantage of these national antagonisms, fostering its
dismemberment along national lines, which, in theory, were recognized by the
1946 Yugoslav Constitution. Furthermore, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania can
raise justifiable claims, given the latent and acute problem of national
minorities.
Because of these internal weaknesses in Yugoslavia,
any serious attempt by its communist leaders to bring it closer to the West
would be met with Soviet pressure aimed at exploiting national conflicts and
contrasts. In this game, the Soviets are consummate and experienced masters.
The raison d'état of a country that arose from and operates as an aggrandized
Serbia, the traditional exponent of Russian imperialism in the
Balkan-Danubian-Adriatic region, advises Tito against deepening the conflict
with the Kremlin.
Tito manages to maintain an apparent neutrality, not
only due to the vain illusions of Western observers regarding a new kind of
national communism in Yugoslavia—which, in essence, constitutes a permanent and
blatant challenge to the right to political and national self-determination—but
also because of the inability of Western democracies to exploit the internal
weaknesses of communist Yugoslavia in order to counter Soviet influence.
Instead, investing enormous sums and under threat of
moral and political repercussions, they continue to support Tito and his group,
mostly aging communist adventurers who will soon be replaced by younger
leaders, perhaps more amenable to Moscow's efforts to fully integrate
Yugoslavia into the Soviet bloc. Western strategists who rely on Yugoslavia's
geographical position will experience bitter disappointment. The only certainty
is that the Croats and Slovenes do not want to fight against the West, and that
the Serbs and most Montenegrins do not wish to fight against Russia.
It is possible that a new McCarthy will emerge in the
US and investigate who is responsible for letting slip a propitious opportunity
to strike a serious blow against world communism in Yugoslavia after 1948, a
blow with repercussions throughout Central and Eastern Europe, thereby creating
the conditions to push Russia back to its natural borders.
The Farce of Political Amnesty in Yugoslavia
On March 12, the Federal
People's Assembly in Belgrade passed the "Amnesty Law," pardoning
certain acts stipulated in the penal code of communist Yugoslavia. The amnesty
was presented to foreign correspondents as proof of liberalization and
consolidation of Tito's regime. Belgrade sought to curry favor with Western
public opinion at a time when Washington was deciding whether to continue
providing much-needed aid to Tito's regime after the resounding failure of its
much-touted and praised economic reforms. At the same time, Belgrade aimed to
harm the exiles, who, according to official figures, number over 150,000.
It is regrettable that many
prestigious voices in international public opinion disseminated, without
reservation, news and commentary that aligned with the intentions of the
Belgrade regime. Foreign correspondents in Belgrade are not entirely free in
their reporting, and when writing their dispatches, they have access only to
official, one-sided, and biased information. Therefore, we deem it appropriate
to present a complete picture regarding this "magnanimous" measure by
the communist regime.
The text of the amnesty law
is rather vague, as it does not detail the pardoned offenses, citing only the
relevant paragraphs of the Penal Code, which, it should be noted, are not found
in the penal codes of Western countries. These are political offenses, many of
which are not punishable in free countries and, in fact, constitute activities
protected by law.
Those covered by the amnesty
are categorized into three groups according to the respective law of March 13.
The first group involves "criminal acts"
committed "during the war and enemy occupation." (It goes without
saying that the communist regime also considers the Independent State of
Croatia, recognized by several powers between 1941 and 1995 and which, in fact,
had the status of a sovereign state, as occupied territory.) These acts,
included in paragraphs 125, 126, 127, 129, 129a, 130, 131, and 133 of the
Yugoslav Penal Code, are generally defined in international public law as war
crimes.
Therefore, there would be no grounds for objection
were it not for such a peculiar, one-sided criterion of justice as that of the
communists. For the communist regime, anything that can seemingly be attributed
to its adversaries and serves the purposes of propaganda is considered a crime
and an offense. If these same crimes were committed by the communists
themselves, they are disregarded and even considered great merits. Therefore,
as the Croatian exile press has already pointed out, wouldn't it be fairer and
more logical for the communist leaders, directly responsible for so many
horrendous crimes, instead of presenting themselves as generous accusers and
judges, to consider amnesty when the legitimate representatives of the people
come to power?
These are not exaggerations often attributed to
political exiles. It suffices to cite some of the criminal acts stipulated in
the aforementioned paragraphs of the Yugoslav Penal Code. It states that anyone
who, "in violation of the norms of international law during war... orders
or carries out murder, torture, or inhuman treatment of the civilian population,
including acts that inflict great suffering or injury to body or health;
illegal dispersal or displacement...; the application of intimidating and
terroristic measures...; collective punishment and arbitrary confinement in
concentration camps... deprivation of the right to a fair and impartial
trial" (para. 125) will be punished. "Whoever orders or carries out
torture or inhuman treatment on the wounded" (para. 126);
"Whoever orders or carries out murder, torture,
or inhuman treatment on prisoners of war... inflicting great suffering or
injury to their physical integrity or health..." (para. 127);
"Whoever kills or wounds an enemy who has laid down their arms or
surrendered unconditionally or is without means of defense" (para. 129); "Whoever
brutally treats the wounded, sick, or prisoners of war, or prevents them from
enjoying the rights to which they are entitled under the norms (of
international law)..." (para. 131).
It is public knowledge that all these crimes were
committed, in many cases, by the very authors of the new amnesty law. The
communist guerrillas, both before and after seizing power—which they
unfortunately achieved thanks in part to Western aid—took out their political
adversaries, subjecting them to bloody reprisals and committing all manner of
horrific crimes. While world public
opinion is not sufficiently aware of these crimes, which even Western
governments tried to conceal so as not to tarnish their former allies and
current protégés (moral, political, and material support continues to be given
to Tito's communist regime), there are irrefutable documents and facts, of
which, for the sake of brevity, we will cite a few.
Last year, the West German federal government
published Volume V, titled "The Fate of the Germans in Yugoslavia,"
in the "Documentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus
Ost-Mitteleuropa" (Documentation on the Persecution of Germans from
Eastern and Central Europe) series. This volume contains 500 classified and
verified documents detailing the tragic fate of 500,000 Germans residing in
Yugoslavia, some of whom fled the communist invasion, while others were
exterminated or expelled. Most of them came from Vojvodina, where their
ancestors had lived for centuries.
Many were killed in concentration camps or prisons,
subjected to torture, disease, and all manner of hardship. The Federation of
Slovenian Anti-Communist Fighters published the book "The Tragedy of
Vetrinje" in Cleveland, USA, in 1960. This book contains documents
relating to the massacre of 11,000 members of the anti-communist National Guard
in 1945. At the end of the war, these soldiers had retreated to the
British-occupied zone of Austria, where they were handed over to Tito's
partisans and murdered without trial (See: Studia Croatica, Year II, 4, p.
322). In 1959, the Serbian exile B. M. Karapandzic published the pamphlet
"Kocevlje - Tito's Bloodiest Crime" in Cleveland. In it, he recounts
not only the massacre of the Slovenians but also the murder of 4,000 Serbian
nationalist Chetnik guerrillas and 2,500 "Croatian soldiers," who
were also returned by the British military authorities.
The number of Croatian soldiers and civilians,
including women and children, the sick and wounded, murdered by the communists
after the end of hostilities exceeds 100,000. The Austrian historian Rudolf
Kiszling, in his work "Die Kroaten" (Ed. Hermann Bölhaus Naohf.
Graz-Cologne, 1956), cites that in May 1945, in the vicinity of the Austrian
border alone, the communists killed more than 40,000 Croatian soldiers. These
were members of the Croatian army that, after the war, wanted to surrender to
the Western Allies, but was rejected by the British military authorities and
forced to surrender to the Yugoslav communist army.
Several hundred thousand Croatian soldiers and
civilians fleeing toward the Austrian border fell into the hands of the
communists, who organized massacres and the sinister "death marches"
in many neighboring towns—long columns of prisoners who were killed or
succumbed to exhaustion and relentless torture during grueling, forced marches.
Unfortunately, there is still no comprehensive documentation of these crimes.
We hope that it will soon be made public, although the possibilities for
Croatian exiles in this regard are limited, and democratic governments aid the
communists who oppress Croatia.
Nevertheless, a number of documented works have
already been published concerning the massacre of the Croatians, which bears
all the hallmarks of genocide. "La Revista Croata," published in
Buenos Aires, released a Spanish edition in 1955, vol. 17. A study by Dr.
Krunoslav Draganovic, "Tito's Horrid Crimes That Have Not Yet Had Their
Nuremberg." In the book *In Tito's Death Marches* (José Hecimovic: *In
Tito's Death Marches*, Chicago 1961), Dr. Edward Mark O'Connor, former US Commissioner
for Displaced Persons, addresses the massacres committed against the Croats.
It is obvious that the Yugoslav communist leaders are
the ones who should be granted amnesty for their violations of international
law of war. Their amnesty, besides being provocative, is illusory, since in
those massacres they murdered most of the political leaders, especially Croats,
who fought against them during the war, and now they have excluded from the
amnesty their political adversaries who are fighting against them in exile.
The second group included in the amnesty consists of
those who, during and after the war, committed acts covered by the Yugoslav
Penal Code, paragraphs 100 to 121, 174, 292 to 303, 339, and 342. These
paragraphs cover "criminal acts against the people and the State."
The fact that the Yugoslav Penal Code prescribes severe penalties, including
death, for a whole range of political offenses sheds considerable light on the
situation in that multinational state, restored by the communists in 1945. In
Yugoslavia, whose multinational character is officially recognized and
emphasized, "any act that seeks to destroy the unity of the peoples of
Yugoslavia will be punished with severe imprisonment" (para. 100).
Consequently, despite the official recognition that
Yugoslavia is a union of five peoples and numerous national minorities,
anything that affects the "unity" of the Yugoslav people, which,
according to official sources, does not exist, is severely punished. In other
words, emphasizing the national identity of Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia can
be classified as a criminal act against national and state unity, punishable
under the penal code. It is not only national freedom that is curtailed, but
also other political freedoms. Article 100 of the penal code stipulates
imprisonment for any act "aimed at undermining the economic basis of
socialist reconstitution."
This means that mere criticism of Marxist economic
theory falls under the weight of the Penal Code. Paragraph 109 establishes
severe imprisonment for any citizen of Yugoslavia who "comes into
contact... with the exiled group of people or assists them in carrying out
their enemy activities." Therefore, mere association with the democratic
opposition to the communist regime—which, of course, can only operate outside
the country—is considered a criminal act. Paragraph 11 provides for
"severe imprisonment of up to 12 years" for anyone who "flees
abroad and prepares to flee or remains abroad without authorization." The
meaning of this is clear from the fact that the largest number of refugees,
after East Germany, came from Yugoslavia.
Article 117 stipulates "severe imprisonment of at
least five years" for anyone who forms any group of people for the purpose
of carrying out the "criminal acts" we have just listed. This means
that any participation in the organization of an opposition political group is
punishable. Furthermore, "severe imprisonment of up to 12 years is imposed
on anyone who, in writing, orally, or otherwise, incites or encourages a violent
or unconstitutional change of the social or state system... or who presents,
with malicious intent or falsehood, the prevailing socio-political situation in
the country." Given that Yugoslavia was under a totalitarian regime, which
considered itself the sole possessor of truth and that political action was the
monopoly of the Communist Party,
it is fair to say that the slightest expression of
opposition to communism and its interpretations of reality could be classified
as an invitation or encouragement "to an unconstitutional change of the
(communist) social and state system" or "a malicious or false
presentation of the prevailing socio-political situation in the country."
The criminal act, therefore, is not only any criticism of the communist regime,
but also "of the state system," although for the majority of
Yugoslavia's inhabitants it signifies the violation of national rights for the
benefit of Serbia. For this reason, paragraph 119 stipulates a punishment of
"severe imprisonment for up to 12 years" also for those who "sow
discord among the peoples and nationalities living in Yugoslavia."
As a culmination of all these provisions, paragraph
121, classifying as criminal acts those activities that in the free world are
inherent to political and national freedom, determines a "severe prison
sentence" not only for those who carry out the criminal acts, but also for
those who prepare them "by providing or facilitating the means for the
execution of these criminal acts, creating conditions for their commission, or
those who conspire with others to commit this criminal act." These
provisions of the Penal Code duly clarify what possibilities exist in communist
Yugoslavia regarding freedom of assembly, association, or any other political
activity directed against the monopoly of the Communist Party.
The other "crimes" included in the amnesty
and stipulated in paragraphs 174 and 292a of the Penal Code are "exposing
the State and its symbols, the supreme organs of power or the representatives
of the supreme organs of power, the armed forces, or their supreme commander to
ridicule." In a state where everything depends on the exclusive judgment
of the Communist Party, any attempt at political criticism can be labeled as
"exposing" the State and its organs to ridicule.
Paragraph 292a further restricts political freedoms by
establishing penalties "for the dissemination of false news." It
constitutes a crime "to invent or transmit false news or statements...
with the intention of preventing the implementation of decisions or measures by
state organs or institutions or of diminishing public confidence in such
decisions and measures." Therefore, when the communist authorities enact
measures against, say, freedom of conscience, family rights, strikes, or
religious freedom, the slightest opposition can be defined as an attempt to
"undermine public confidence in such decisions and measures" and
constitutes a criminal act.
The third group covered by the Amnesty Law consists of
"persons who are atoning and who were validly convicted up to the end of
1952 for the criminal acts" listed in the first two paragraphs.
However, as already stated, this amnesty is illusory,
since paragraph 2 excludes those who cannot benefit from their positions. These
are the people who acted "as leaders and organizers" and who, now in
exile, "actively work as instigators and organizers against the
constitutional order of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." This
excludes both prominent figures among the exiles and all those who act in a
political capacity. It turns out, then, that the amnesty was conceived as a
measure against politically active exiles, who, in reality, constitute
political emigration in its truest sense.
The aim is to isolate them from those refugees who
attend to their own affairs and families, and who gradually lose interest in
political activities. It should be added that democratic governments often
discriminate against anti-communist exiles from Yugoslavia. While
anti-communist exiles from other countries receive some support, those from
Yugoslavia encounter difficulties, as they are considered an obstacle to the
policy of aiding Tito.
All the opportunities for international cultural
exchange, scholarships, and invitations to participate in international
conferences are reserved for those nominated by the communist regime, while the
exiles can only count on the understanding and assistance of religious
organizations, mostly Catholic, which tend to be charitable in nature. The
Yugoslav communist regime, forced to temporarily abandon its drastic
persecution of the Catholic Church, is trying to extort international Catholic
institutions that provide assistance to exiles, threatening reprisals against
six million Croatian and Slovenian Catholics, veritable hostages in the hands of
the communists.
Regarding the number of people granted amnesty, the
Vice President of the Yugoslav government and head of the feared political
police, Alexander Rankovic, stated in his report to the Assembly on March 13
that the amnesty covered approximately 1,000 people "serving sentences in
prisons and concentration camps" and around 150,000 exiles. This figure
should be taken with a grain of salt, as Rankovic himself, in his statements to
the Belgrade newspaper Politika on July 8, 1986, referred to 200,000 people
"who remained abroad or left their country during and at the end of the
Second World War."
This figure does not include hundreds of thousands of
members of national minorities. On the other hand, it is known for certain that
the number of refugees who fled Yugoslavia after the war was relatively very
large; in 1958 alone, more than 20,000 people left Yugoslavia illegally.
According to Rankovic, the hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled
Yugoslavia because of the communist regime are divided into three groups. The
first and largest group consists of political exiles, anti-communists. The
second group comprises prisoners of war who were interned in Germany and
refused to return to their communist-dominated country. These are generally
former officers, almost all of Serbian nationality.
The third group includes young people who left the
country illegally in the last decade, second only in number to those who fled
East Germany. The communists cannot arbitrarily include these very recent
exiles among "war criminals." Therefore, with the deplorable
complicity of neighboring governments, they strive to reduce their numbers,
claiming that these are adventurers or people fleeing for economic rather than
political reasons. The forced repatriations from these countries are based on
erroneous assumptions, a consequence of insufficient knowledge of the reality
in those countries. Communist countries, where the economy is controlled by the
state and closely tied to communist political tyranny.
Otherwise, it would be absurd for thousands upon
thousands of young men to flee their homeland, even risking their lives.
Refugees from Yugoslavia have the same right to seek refuge and protection in
free countries as those who fled East Germany. The latter enjoy the protection
of West Germany, while Croats and other refugees from Yugoslavia do not find
the same protection abroad. Communists exploit this to describe to new
generations the disastrous and grim situation prevailing in free countries,
thus trying to dissuade them from clandestinely leaving their country.
The press in Yugoslavia, where the average monthly
salary is less than $20, brazenly writes that the situation in Western
countries is disastrous and abjectly miserable, that exiles live in slave-like
conditions, that their labor is traded, or that they are forcibly enlisted in
the foreign legions to fight in the wars. rebel colonies. This was the
sentiment expressed by the Vice President of the Yugoslav government, which
survives thanks to the copious aid of these Western countries.
In a statement published in the newspaper Politika,
Rankovic used even more drastic terms. He explicitly stated that refugees in
Western countries "become victims of known war criminals and other enemies
of Yugoslavia, who exploit them for the simple slave trade, smuggling, and
crimes of various kinds. Many of them, without any protection, wander the world
forced to accept the heaviest jobs as cheap labor... This labor force is
discriminated against by being paid much less than the labor of their own
citizens." The head of the Yugoslav political police goes so far in his
slander against Western countries as to claim that in these countries, refugees
"are forbidden from corresponding with their compatriots back home."
In other words, he attributes to democratic governments measures practiced by
communists. It is well known that censorship and the detention of
correspondence, particularly that of exiles, prevail in Yugoslavia.
Paragraph 2 of the Amnesty Law, by making an exception
for "persons who, as initiators and organizers, actively work against the
constitutional order of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia"—that
is, against communism and in favor of democracy—leaves the door open for the
arbitrary application of this law, to the extent that any political exile is
liable to be excluded from the amnesty. Almost all members of national
minorities are excluded. Rankovic specifically mentioned the German national
minority, which affects hundreds of thousands of people, since members of these
minorities (German, Hungarian, Albanian, and Italian) participated in military
units, were forcibly mobilized, or belonged to their respective patriotic
organizations.
From all of the above, it follows that the problem of
political exiles from communist Yugoslavia directly affects the individual and
political rights of hundreds of thousands of people and indirectly affects a
much larger number of their compatriots. The Yugoslav communist regime is
incapable of resolving this problem, as it offers not the slightest guarantee
of political, individual, national, and religious rights and freedoms. The mere
fact that the head of the fearsome political police, responsible for so many
horrific crimes against those he now seeks to grant amnesty for, acted as the
main promoter of the amnesty not only sheds ample light on the Yugoslav
communist regime but also constitutes an insulting challenge to the free world.
The months since the amnesty was proclaimed have
proven that the much-publicized "generous" measure was limited to its
propaganda value for the communist regime in Belgrade. Very few people returned
to Yugoslavia. A handful of Serbian former prisoners of war, who were promised
pensions, did. Given the meager results, Yugoslav diplomatic and consular
missions are trying to dissuade exiles from opting for citizenship in their
host country. They are urging them to accept Yugoslav passports or to visit
their relatives in Yugoslavia, on the condition that they refrain from
political activities. This amounts to a restriction of the freedom and rights
of citizens of free countries by a foreign state.
Regarding Croatian exiles, it is no exaggeration to
say that the amnesty granted by the communist Yugoslav government had no effect
whatsoever, except that a few visited Croatia for family or other reasons. This
aversion of Croatian exiles toward communist Yugoslavia is not only due to
their bitter experience with the communist regime, but also to the fact that
the current regime practices double oppression against Croatia: political and
national oppression.
Message from the Macedonian
Patriotic Organizations to the Croats
We have just received the
following message from the Central Committee of the Macedonian Patriotic
Organizations, based in Indianapolis, USA:
“To our friends – the Croatian
people.
On behalf of North Americans
and Canadians of Macedonian descent, the 41st Annual Convention of the
Macedonian Patriotic Organizations (founded in 1921), held in Buffalo, New
York, on September 3, 1962, extends its fraternal greetings to the Croatian
people in struggle.
In the past, the monarchical
dictatorship in Belgrade had set as its primary objective the assimilation of
Croats and Macedonian Bulgarians. This common danger to our peoples led to the
establishment of Macedonian-Croatian friendship. This common fraternal front
was created to counter Belgrade’s chauvinistic designs for hegemony and to
hasten the disintegration of Yugoslavia.” Just a faint breath of that memorable
wind was enough to bring it down. The historical events of the Second World War
prove it.
Today, once again, under the
Serbian-communist regime, Croatia and Macedonia face the same identical fate,
with one difference: the Croats, at least on paper, are recognized as a nation,
while the Bulgarian Macedonians have been denied their ethnic identity through
the creation of the so-called "Macedonian nation." The
Serbian-communists' aim, of course, is to assimilate and "Servitize"
the Bulgarian Macedonians so that it will then be easier for the Belgrade
regime to assimilate the Croatian people as well.
Now, as before, fraternal
Croatian-Macedonian friendship is not only important but necessary. Our growing
fraternal strength will ultimately lead to the dissolution of the current
Yugoslavia and the establishment of the free and sovereign states of Croatia
and Macedonia.
Long live a free and
independent Croatia!
Long live a free and
independent Macedonia! Long live the friendship between Croats and Macedonians!
It is obvious that the Yugoslav state will dissolve
sooner or later due to the insurmountable differences between Croats and Serbs.
It is hoped that this will occur under humane conditions and through democratic
means, respecting the population, their rights, and their history. In the
ongoing dispute, it is essential to reject falsifications and respect the truth
about the lives and history of the troubled provinces.
Croatian exiles can be proud of their contribution to
clarifying this issue, which is represented by the book "Bosnia and
Herzegovina" by Dr. Domingo Mandic, a historian by vocation, also known as
a distinguished researcher of the history of the Franciscan Order. Setting
aside the aims of cheap political propaganda, Dr. Mandic has dedicated 50 years
to research and study in order to write his work. In it, he has poured his
enormous erudition. His work is rich and mature. Anyone wishing to understand
the truth about a problem as painful as the quintessential Serbian-Croatian
conflict must study this monumental work. The presence of the Serbian Orthodox
element in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be denied, but they arrived in
Croatian lands during the Ottoman invasion. This conclusion of Mandic is also
currently held by the Serbian historian M. Dinic, a professor of history at the
University of Belgrade.
Dr. Mandic's book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina,"
covers the following topics: Part One: "The Territorial Development of
Bosnia and Herzegovina," subdivided into ten chapters: The Region of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Illyrian and Roman Era; The Arrival and
Possession of These Lands by the Slavs; How the Name Bosnia Appeared; The
Extent and Boundaries of Bosnia. Early history - Territorial expansion of
Bosnia from the late 12th century to 1463 - Formation and development of
Herzegovina from the 15th century to the present - Bosnia during the period of
Turkish rule (1463-1878) - Croatian Bosnia and Turkish Croatia - The formation
of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Part Two, which deals with "Bosnia's Statehood in
the Middle Ages," is divided into the following chapters: Bosnia's
Statehood in the Middle Ages - The belonging of Zahumlia and Travunia until
their union with Bosnia - The emergence and meaning of the title: Romanaeque
Rex - Bosnia's relationship with Hungary - Religious affiliation of medieval
Bosnia - Bosnia and Herzegovina were always within the sphere of the Western
Church - Bosnia and Herzegovina received Christianity from Rome - The Diocese
of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognized the authority of Rome - In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Roman rite was used exclusively. In the 9th century, the
Glagolitic-Slavic liturgy, but of the Roman rite, was established in Bosnia and
Herzegovina - There were no Eastern rite Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina
until the Turkish conquest.
The author has already published the second volume of
his major work, dealing with the problem of the Patarenes—"Bogomilis,"
"Bosniak Christians"—a topic of universal historical interest. The
third volume, which will address the question of national identity for the
population of Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout its long history up to the present
day, will be published shortly. More detailed information on the results of the
extensive research conducted by this distinguished historian will be published
in this journal.
The Croatian Historical Institute in Chicago is
directed by Dr. Mandic himself, who held important positions in the Franciscan
Order, first in his native Herzegovina, and then for several years in Rome,
where he managed the Order's finances for 12 years, including during the most
difficult period of World War II. From this position, he made numerous
contributions of enduring value. His contribution to the construction of the
new headquarters of the Franciscan Order in Rome, with its monumental church,
is particularly noteworthy, as it constitutes a valuable addition to Rome's
artistic heritage. There is no doubt that the work on Bosnia and Herzegovina
that Mandic is about to complete will also represent a significant contribution
to historical scholarship in general, as well as to the future of the Croatian
people.
Ilija
Jukic: Tito between East and West
Milan
Blazekovic, Buenos Aires
(Ed.
Demos Publishing Company, London, 1961, p. 99).
The author of the book Tito between East and West
belongs ideologically and politically to the circle of men from the former
Yugoslav government exiled in London during the war, who in 1957 founded The
Study Center for Yugoslav Affairs. The first two chapters of the book in
question were published in 1960 under the title Tito's Conflict with Stalin and
Khrushchev and the West by the publication Review, the Center's journal.
In the first eight of the book's thirteen chapters,
the author details the reasons for the Stalin-Tito conflict, Tito's resistance
with Western support, his reconciliation with Khrushchev, the renewed conflict
with Moscow after the Hungarian Revolution, the second Tito-Khrushchev
reconciliation, a new schism, and ideological disagreements between Belgrade
and Moscow. The following two chapters address Yugoslavia's international
position and its internal instability. In the final two chapters—"Warning to
the West" and "Conclusion"—Ilija Jukic offers his
recommendations on how to safeguard Yugoslavia's independence and what the West
should do to restore, at least partially, civil liberties in the country. In
the postscript, the author records the political events from May 1, 1961—the
date the manuscript was completed—to July 17, 1961—the date of its publication.
It is obvious that the author has been dealing with
the problems of Yugoslavia's foreign policy for years and that he knows the
subject well enough to offer his own judgments in cases where, in his opinion,
the background and sources are not sufficiently clear or accessible. The entire
work is quite subjective, due to its partly polemical and didactic nature, on
the one hand, and the sources he frequently uses without specifically citing
them, on the other. Apart from major newspapers and news agencies, his frequent
sources are "the well-informed British source," "member of the
Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party," "authoritative
source," "reliable source," and so on.
This anonymity of sources, while sometimes
understandable and justified, deprives the quotations of their documentary
character, leaving an impression of subjectivity in both the analytical and
dispositive sections of the book, if we may so characterize its critique of the
Western position in the Tito-Kremlin conflict and its suggestions to Western
powers regarding the solution to the fundamental problem, which in his view is:
How to save Yugoslavia for the West?
Given the current political tensions between Moscow
and Belgrade, the topic attracts the attention not only of Yugoslav politicians
in exile and within the country, but also of international specialists. This is
evidenced by the extensive international literature on Yugoslavia and its
socio-political system, as well as the recently published books by the
schismatic communist Milovan Djilas. Almost all of this literature approaches
the problem of Yugoslavia from the perspective of the political and territorial
status quo ante, seeking solutions to its ongoing political and economic crisis
in secondary areas within the current state. From this perspective, Jukic's
pamphlet cannot be considered a positive contribution to solving the Yugoslav
problem, which consists of the relationship between Croatia and Serbia within
the common state, regardless of its form or socioeconomic system.
Taking into account the viewpoint of the Croatian
Peasant Party, to which the author belongs, his assertion that the most
important question is how to save Yugoslavia is unacceptable. As a Croat, he
should be primarily concerned with how to save the Croatian people for the
West, of which they have always been a political, historical, cultural, and
economic part. If the author of this political book sees the salvation of the
Croatian people for the West as being tied to the salvation of Yugoslavia, then
he should have bravely delved into the relations between Croats and Serbs
within Yugoslavia, instead of interpreting this instability—to which he
dedicates eight pages—as mere tension and disagreements within the ranks of the
Yugoslav Communist Party.
His exposition of the antagonistic currents within the
Communist Party is interesting, though not groundbreaking. These currents are:
"the reformists," who want changes and closer ties with the West;
"the Muscovites," who advocate a return to the Soviet bloc; "the
reactionaries," who fight for the reestablishment of orthodox communism
without completely breaking with Moscow; and finally, "the opportunists,"
willing to support whoever guarantees them power and privileges. In Jukic's
opinion, Tito relies on the last two groups, which constitute the so-called
"red aristocracy."
The author does not specifically identify the
"Muscovites," who are in fact the opposition, attributing the
leadership of the "reformists" to Kardelj and Bakaric, the formal
victors at the Party Congress held in Ljubljana in April 1958, where they
achieved some concessions regarding the country's internal development. The
author argues that the victory of the "reactionaries" at the end of
1955, led by Rankovic and other Serbian communist leaders, was responsible for
the nationalization of houses, land, and housing, and in 1959 for the
suppression of private healthcare and the intensification of measures against
individual peasant holdings. The struggle between the "reformists,"
backed by the Slovene Croats, and the "reactionaries," supported by
the Serbs and Montenegrins, is linked to the succession of Tito, whose position
on this matter remains enigmatic. However, this struggle also reflects the
fundamental national conflict that the author, instead of clarifying, evades
and even conceals.
We find his thesis that the imprisonment of Archbishop
Stepinac could fall under the same causal chain as Tito's anti-Western actions
after his visit to Moscow in June 1946 quite audacious. The signing of the
military alliance with Albania in July 1946, the downing of American planes at
the end of August, the beginning of the communist uprising in Greece in
September, and a British destroyer being mined in the Corfu Channel in November
1946 are often interpreted—at the risk of straying from historical truth—as
part of the Stalinist plan against the West, in which Tito had a specific role.
However, attributing the trial of Archbishop Stepinac, which chronologically
coincides with these dates, to external factors rather than to domestic
political motives that ultimately boil down to Croatian-Serbian relations,
means evading the crux of the "Yugoslav problem," which does not
support the book's basic political thesis.
His exposition of the antagonistic currents within the
Communist Party is interesting, though not groundbreaking. These currents are:
"the reformists," who want changes and closer ties with the West;
"the Muscovites," who advocate a return to the Soviet bloc; "the
reactionaries," who fight for the reestablishment of orthodox communism
without completely breaking with Moscow; and finally, "the
opportunists," willing to support whoever guarantees them power and
privileges. In Jukic's opinion, Tito relies on the last two groups, which
constitute the so-called "red aristocracy."
The author does not specifically identify the
"Muscovites," who are in fact the opposition, attributing the
leadership of the "reformists" to Kardelj and Bakaric, the formal
victors at the Party Congress held in Ljubljana in April 1958, where they
achieved some concessions regarding the country's internal development. The
author argues that the victory of the "reactionaries" at the end of
1955, led by Rankovic and other Serbian communist leaders, was responsible for
the nationalization of houses, land, and housing, and in 1959 for the
suppression of private healthcare and the intensification of measures against
individual peasant holdings. The struggle between the "reformists,"
backed by the Slovene Croats, and the "reactionaries," supported by
the Serbs and Montenegrins, is linked to the succession of Tito, whose position
on this matter remains enigmatic. However, this struggle also reflects the
fundamental national conflict that the author, instead of clarifying, evades
and even conceals.
We find his thesis that the imprisonment of Archbishop
Stepinac could fall under the same causal chain as Tito's anti-Western actions
after his visit to Moscow in June 1946 quite audacious. The signing of the
military alliance with Albania in July 1946, the downing of American planes at
the end of August, the beginning of the communist uprising in Greece in
September, and a British destroyer being mined in the Corfu Channel in November
1946 are often interpreted—at the risk of straying from historical truth—as
part of the Stalinist plan against the West, in which Tito had a specific role.
However, attributing the trial of Archbishop Stepinac, which chronologically
coincides with these dates, to external factors rather than to domestic
political motives that ultimately boil down to Croatian-Serbian relations,
means evading the crux of the "Yugoslav problem," which does not
support the book's basic political thesis.
Ivo Andric: It Happened in Bosnia
Ivo Bogdan, Buenos Aires
(Buenos Aires 1961, Editorial Sudamericana, pp. 541.)
In our note on Ivo Andric
(Studia Croatica Year II, No. 4), we analyzed his main work, The Bridge on the
Drina River, making only a brief reference to the Chronicle of Travnik, pending
its Spanish edition. The original title was changed in this edition, following
the English translation (Bosnian Story), probably because Travnik, former seat
of the viziers and capital of Bosnia during the Turkish occupation, is not well
known abroad, while the title It Happened in Bosnia evokes the mysterious and
fateful province, a nerve center of world politics for half a century. In its
current capital, Sarajevo, Serbian nationalists assassinated Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in 1914, a crime that constituted the prelude to the First World War.
Unlike The Bridge over the
Drina River, which spans five centuries around the bridge of Mohamed Pasha
Sokobi (Sokolovic in Croatian) and depicts human themes and destinies—a whole
series of narratives, a genre highly cultivated in Croatian literature, of
which Andrić is an outstanding representative—the plot of It Happened in
Bosnia covers a brief period, the "consular era" in Travnik, from
1806 to 1914. The central character is the French consul, along with a whole
gallery of human characters, many of whom form a self-contained unit.
Until the beginning of the
19th century, Bosnia, the westernmost province of the Ottoman Empire, lived
isolated from Western Europe. The only contacts with the outside world were the
occasional skirmishes on the border with Dalmatia, which was under Venetian
control until its abolition, and on the northern border with Croatia, which had
been part of the Habsburg Monarchy as an associated kingdom since 1527. When
Napoleon conquered Dalmatia in 1797 and, faced with the British naval blockade
and the threat of Russian intervention, established a consulate in Travnik in
1806, the seat of the Turkish vizier. Bosnia, along with Albania and Thrace,
belonged to the more Islamized European part of the Ottoman Empire. A large
indigenous Muslim population lived there, and still lives there, comprising a
third of the total population, which is made up of Catholics and Orthodox
Christians.
The Muslims, formerly known as Bogomils, are as
indigenous as the Catholics, while the Orthodox settled in Bosnia mostly during
the Ottoman era. The Ottoman authorities relied on the Muslim population, which
formed the ruling class, especially the beys, the ancient Bosnian vernacular
aristocracy and the only hereditary landed nobility within the Empire. Titles,
similar to those in the Byzantine Empire, were more closely linked to
administrative and military functions than to territorial inheritance. Thus, the
influence of the indigenous population of the Islamic faith was predominant in
Bosnia (Andric refers to them as "Turks," meaning their religious
affiliation rather than their nationality), while the Ottoman Turks were few,
mostly imperial officials who tended to return to Constantinople, their country
of origin.
Bosnian Muslims were always deeply devoted to their
religion and, as such, provided a firm foundation for the Empire, which they
considered above all to be the bearer of Islamic affirmation in Europe. The
conservative provincial atmosphere, the victorious counter-offensive of Western
Christians—during the 17th and 18th centuries the Turks had to retreat from
Hungary, Slavonia, and Dalmatia and concentrate their forces in Bosnia after
the Peace of Pozarevac (1718)—and later the decline of the Empire, accompanied
by uprisings of the previously submissive Orthodox Christians, caused the
Islamic diaspora in Bosnia to react with extreme sensitivity against all
foreign influence, fearing for the future of the Empire and of Islam. Religious
differences in Bosnia, even today, imply different forms of culture and
civilization. In the years described in It Happened in Bosnia, these
differences were even more pronounced. The indigenous Muslims were—as mentioned—the
mainstay of the Empire's political thought and of the Islamic civilization that
predominated in Bosnia at that time.
The Catholics expected support from the neighboring
Croatian provinces that comprised the Danubian Monarchy. They envisioned their
liberation as integration with the other Croatian provinces under the rule of
the Habsburgs, the legitimate kings of Croatia. Moreover, the Habsburgs, until
the Napoleonic era, headed the Holy Roman Empire, which still symbolized
Western power and influence for both supporters and adversaries in southeastern
Europe. While Catholics awaited their liberation from the West, Eastern
Christians in the Ottoman Empire looked to Russia, which they saw as the Third
Rome.
Austria soon followed Napoleon's example and established
its consulate in Travnik. There was also talk of establishing a Russian
consulate, but this never materialized. The consulates of the two empires acted
in accordance with the tangled Franco-Austrian relations, sometimes observing a
truce, sometimes resorting to all means, tricks, and intrigues to discredit one
another. The novel's plot unfolds around this struggle. The Austrian consul
could count on the open support of Bosnian Catholics—the majority in
Travnik—particularly the Franciscans, the only Catholic clergy in Bosnia. The
French consul benefited from the generally proper conduct of Turkish officials,
since France, allied with Turkey, posed less of a threat to them than the
Habsburg Empire, the Sublime Porte's main Western adversary. The small
Sephardic Jewish community saw Napoleon's representative as the champion of
equality, while the Orthodox waited in vain for the Russian consul.
Given the presence in Travnik of all Bosnian ethnic
and religious groups, Andrić was able to paint an authentic picture of
Bosnia during the Turkish era, far more complete than in *The Bridge on the
Drina*, where he described the atmosphere of Višegrad, a small town on the Serbian
border with no Catholic population and, consequently, no Western influence.
Furthermore, Travnik is his birthplace, where he spent his youth and acquired
his early humanistic education at the renowned Jesuit school, which the
communists confiscated in 1945. Dolac, a neighborhood of Travnik inhabited
exclusively by Catholics, was the ancestral home of Andrić.
Therefore, his descriptions of the landscapes of the
green, shady, and humid Lasva River valley, the Travnik bazaar, and its people,
characters, and distinctive traits are entirely authentic, except for his
tendency to view the indigenous Muslims with certain prejudices. He uses
excessive detail in recounting the understandable displeasure of that
conservative Islamic milieu at the sudden arrival of the consuls and the
suspicious foreigners. He labels their reactions barbaric, which is inaccurate.
Despite the negative aspects of Islamic society during the decline of the
Ottoman Empire, Andric could only have labeled the Islamic ruling class barbaric
under the influence of prejudice and unease from the Christian Balkan rayeh
and, in part, influenced by the presumption of modern Western man when he
considered contemporary Western technological civilization as the only true
culture, and the members of ancient Eastern civilizations as barbarians.
Andric, unfortunately, does not clearly distinguish
between the problems of culture and civilization, not only Eastern but also
Western. Therefore, he contradicts the ideas of tolerance and progressivism of
the French vice-consul, with whom Andric evidently identifies. As a supporter
of the ideals of the French Revolution, Andric criticizes the influence of the
Austrian Empire in Bosnia, which, under the specific circumstances, was the
sole bearer of Western ideas and practices in southeastern Europe. Sharing the
views of Russian Slavophiles regarding the "rotten West," Andric
prefers the influence of Russia and its Balkan branch, Serbia, to that of
Austria.
Nevertheless, the picture of Bosnia painted by Andric
is the result of serious research. The consuls are not fictional figures but
historical individuals, as are certain Ottoman officials. Andric's
"chronicle" is a fictionalized account of the prevailing situation,
crafted from historical material, drawn primarily from the archives of Paris.
His doctoral dissertation at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the
University of Graz was on the topic of "Cultural Relations in Bosnia
during the Turkish Rule."
Andric, in monarchical Yugoslavia (1918-1941), served
in the diplomatic corps and was able to recount the concerns, intrigues, and
difficulties of the "Travnik consuls" based on his own experience.
When he describes the doubts and hesitations of the French consul Daville,
Andric is clearly alluding to his own personal drama. Daville, formerly a
moderate monarchist and defender of Louis XVI, becomes an enthusiastic adherent
of the ideas of the French Revolution and, successively, a zealous and loyal
servant of Napoleon. Finally, after Napoleon's fall, he seeks protection from
Talleyrand. He is also a writer, like Andric.
The parallels are evident. In his youth, Andric
belonged to those Croatian intellectual circles that harbored the illusion that
Croatia, with the Danubian community dissolved, would find greater freedom and
dignity within the state community with Serbia. This explains his clash with
the Austrian authorities and his internment during the First World War. In the
new state, all those illusions were abruptly shattered by the harsh reality of
Balkan Serbia's domination, culminating in the dictatorship of King Alexander.
Then came the military and political collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, and
finally, the communist dictatorship. Although Andric, due to his service, lived
almost exclusively abroad until 1941, without participating in the internal
political struggles so dramatic for Croatian intellectuals, he undoubtedly had
to defer to various regimes, concealing his innermost thoughts and feelings,
especially under the communist dictatorship, as one of the few Croatians in the
diplomatic service.
In many parts of his novel, Andric defines and
characterizes the negative traits of the Levantine, a Western man living in the
East where he struggles for self-preservation, which reminds us of the author's
own fate. Reading the deeply felt passages in which he recounts the anxieties
and fears of the French consul in a remote, provincial city at the time of
Napoleon's fall, we inevitably think of Andric during the collapse of
Yugoslavia, when he was its ambassador in Berlin.
"Daville couldn't say when he had begun to get
used to thinking about the events and affairs of the world without Napoleon as
a basic presupposition. At first, it had been hard and painful, a kind of inner
loss of consciousness. Daville had been mentally shaken, like a man who feels
the ground shifting beneath his feet. Then, he had merely felt within himself a
great emptiness, the absence of all emotion and all resistance, a miserable,
stunted existence, without prospects, without any of those distant apparitions
that are perhaps unreal, but which give us strength and dignity in our journey
through life. Finally, he thought about the matter so much and surrendered
himself so completely to his sensations that he came to see everything—the
world, France, his own fate and that of his family—from that perspective."
"In any case, he had long felt prepared for
anything, which in effect meant that he had distanced himself from the regime
that was collapsing in France and was ready to come to terms with whoever
succeeded it, whoever that might be" (pp. 513-14).
"And yet, it was hard not to think, not to
remember, not to see. I had dedicated twenty-five years to the search for the
'golden mean' that would reconcile everything and provide the individual with
the dignity without which he could not live. Twenty-five years had passed in
the search, the exploration, in advances and setbacks, in the shift from one
enthusiasm to another, and he found himself, exhausted and battered, back where
he started, in the place where he had found himself at eighteen. One simply
traveled. The meaning and dignity of the journey lay in what we found within
ourselves along the way, the extent to which we found it. There was no path, no
end to the journey. One simply traveled. One traveled until utter
exhaustion" (pp. 519-20).
While the author accepts the harsh reality with
resignation, he does not lose all hope. His message to his fellow countrymen
and those who find themselves at a dead end appears in the book's final pages:
despite all the hardships, that "right path" he had sought in vain
had to exist somewhere. It had to exist, yes, and one day someone would
discover it and open it to all humankind. Like a new inner melody, this thought
made his work lighter” (p. 537). Andric perhaps answered with this the question
posed by several critics upon his being awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature,
thanks to the efforts of a tyrannical communist regime.
The question of whether a writer so subservient to the
oppressors is worthy of such an international award is certainly pertinent
after the Pasternak case. It is illusory to conceal, as happens in the prologue
to the edition under discussion, that Andric was one of the leading figures of
the pre-war Yugoslav dictatorship. In the prologue we read: “Andric had been
Yugoslav ambassador in Berlin when his country broke with the Axis; he became a
prisoner again, though not this time in a cell” (p. 10). From this statement,
one might conclude that Andric was an exponent of the Yugoslav government that
confronted the Third Reich.
Quite the contrary, Andric was appointed to the most
important diplomatic post in monarchical Yugoslavia by Cincar Markovic, the
Foreign Minister and a persona grata to Hitler, negotiated and signed
Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact through Andric. When, following
the military coup of March 27, 1941, the German attack on Yugoslavia occurred,
leading to its swift capitulation and disintegration, Andric returned to
Belgrade, where he lived undisturbed under the German occupation, receiving a
pension from the Serbian government appointed by the occupiers. His rapid
integration into the communist regime as a national deputy, unanimously elected
on Tito's regime's single list, presents a far more stark contrast than the
French consul's entry into the service of the new King of France and Talleyrand
as soon as Napoleon fell.
Of course, it's inappropriate to judge the actions of
the Levantines according to the standards of the free West, but neither should
we distort certain unpleasant facts in Andrić's diplomatic career. We can
understand, but not justify, Andrić's tolerance of having his literary
talent exploited to glorify a tyrannical regime and a state that the Croatian
people, from whom he hails, consider their national prison.
However, wishing to be fair to Andrić and to
those who, with good intentions, bestowed this high honor upon him, expressing
their desire to pay tribute to the cultural environment of his country, it
should be noted that Andrić vehemently condemns violence and tyranny in
numerous passages of his literary work. While he lacks the fiery courage to
confront the lives of his contemporaries as Pasternak did, he does so
indirectly when he censures the dark and negative aspects of the autocratic and
intolerant rulers during the decline of the Ottoman Empire. There are many
clear allusions to the current situation. We believe that his readers, victims
of communist tyranny in Yugoslavia, understand it this way, and that the
communists tolerate it for reasons of political opportunism.
Finally, it is regrettable that the Spanish edition of
It Happened in Bosnia was translated from English and not from the original
language. This could have been avoided, given that numerous Croatian
intellectuals, political exiles, live in Spanish-speaking countries. If even
one of them had reviewed the terminology, they would have noticed many errors.
Forms like Fra Luka, Fra Marko, etc., should not have been used; instead, their
Spanish equivalents should have been: Fray Lucas, Fray Marcos, etc. Nor can the
affectionate term "ujak" (maternal uncle), by which Bosnian peasants
call the Franciscans, be translated literally.
Another regrettable flaw in this edition is the
omission of many timely clarifications that would have made Andrić's novel
more comprehensible. It is true that the "Editors' Note" (pp. 7-10)
attempted to offer some clarifications, but it turns out that it contains
falsehoods propagated by the communist regime in Belgrade. At the beginning of
the "Note," it speaks of a "vigorous national personality,"
a Yugoslav one, only to assert shortly thereafter that Yugoslavia is a
"new state, composed of old peoples." In fact, even the current
communist regime recognizes that there are five nationalities in Yugoslavia:
Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, and Montenegrin. If we add that these
peoples have never before lived in the same state, that they belong to three
religions and three cultural spheres, how can it be claimed that the
multinational Yugoslav state, heterogeneous in cultural and political terms,
constitutes a "vigorous national personality"?
How can one speak of Yugoslav national literature if
there is no Yugoslav people, but rather peoples of Yugoslavia with their own
unique national traditions and cultures? In Yugoslavia, moreover, three
different languages are officially recognized. The falsehoods contained in this
"Editor's Note" culminate in the assertion that Andric belongs to the
Serbian-Montenegrin tradition of so-called Yugoslav literature. In our work
(Studia Croatica, Year II, No. 4), we demonstrate that Andric cannot be a
Serbian or Yugoslav writer, but rather a Croatian, although he, whether out of
opportunism or coercion, tolerates being called a Yugoslav writer. Perhaps even
in Yugoslavia itself, this is not considered very important, since everyone
knows that there is no such thing as Yugoslav literature, but rather separate
Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian literatures with different readerships and
written in two alphabets (Croats and Slovenes use Latin letters, while Serbs,
like Russians, use Cyrillic letters).
It is obvious that the authors of the "Editors'
Note" did not invent the idea that Andric belongs to the
"Serbian-Montenegrin" literary tradition, but rather accepted the information
provided by Belgrade propaganda, failing to realize that
"Yugoslavism" as a cultural unity is a crude mystification. It is
high time that prestigious publishing houses stopped being deceived by the
mystifications of the Yugoslav communist regime. The fact that the communist
leaders in Belgrade, while acknowledging the multinational character of
Yugoslavia, continue to maintain and propagate the existence of an indivisible
Yugoslav culture and a "vigorous Yugoslav national personality," and
that Croatian cultural achievements are declared Serbian, proves that the new
communist Yugoslavia is following in the footsteps of pre-war Yugoslavia, that
is, practicing the expansionist policy of an enlarged Serbia.