STUDIA CROATICA
Year III, Buenos Aires, 1962, No. 6
Unpunished Crimes 2
Democracy and Liberation from Communism 7
Krizanic - Strossmayer – Mandic 16
Great Britain and Draza Mihailovic 23
Fernando Konschak S.J. 32
Life and Work of Ivan Mestrovic 37
DOCUMENTS 41
Letters to the Editor 45
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 46
Milovan Djilas: Land Without
Justice 46
Jovan Djordjevic: Yugoslavia, Socialist Democracy 48
Anton Knezevic: The Croatians and Their Wars 50
Walter Letsch: Moscow, and the Politics of the Emperor
in the 17th Century, Part I, 1604–1654 51
Statesmen and public opinion
in Western democracies, driven by short-term interests, favored this state of
affairs. They felt so protected from such an eruption of barbarism and so
intensely yearned for total victory that they had become more supportive than
necessary of their Soviet ally, a dangerous vehicle for the destructive forces
of barbarism. In doing so, they contributed to the creation of the prevailing
relations, fraught with even more terrible conflicts. Instead of considering
their alliance with the Soviet Union, conditioned by the adversary's
unscrupulous policies, as a lesser evil in a ruthless war where allies are not
chosen but accepted, they treated the Soviets not only as circumstantial allies
but as potential and desirable partners in the future organization of a better
world. They failed to consider that the Soviet Union lacked traditions of
political freedom and was at the service of an ideological group that
systematically pursued the dismantling of all the values of the
free world.
Thus it happened that
Western democracies gave both material and moral support not only to their
Soviet ally but also to various communist guerrilla groups whose program,
despite having adopted the terminology of the liberal left, was to seize power,
dismantle free institutions, national independence, and even the territorial
integrity of certain countries like Poland, for whose defense these same
Western democracies ran the grave risk of a brutal war with the Third Reich.
The bearers of this new slavery were presented as "liberators" even
as the communists, in the final phase of the war and immediately afterward,
openly liquidated the democratic leaders of several European countries.
When questioned in the House
of Commons about arming Tito's guerrillas, Winston Churchill responded by
defending such a policy of immediate effect: "We will supply a rifle to
every bandit who can kill a Hun," that is, a German soldier, even though
it was known at the time that those same rifles would fire on Britain's
friends. Fitzroy Maclean, head of the British military mission at Tito's
headquarters, recounts in his book "Eastern Approaches" that when he
emphasized to Churchill that Tito and other leaders of his movement were
notorious and avowed communists, and that the system they would establish would
inevitably follow the Soviet line and was very likely to be firmly oriented
towards the Soviet Union, he received the following reply:
“Do you intend to settle in Yugoslavia after the war?”
“No, sir,” I replied.
“Neither do I,” he said. “In
that case, the less we worry about the form of government they establish, the
better. They must decide that. What interests us is which of them will cause
the most harm to the Germans.”
The communists, taking advantage of this tacit
recognition of the right to liquidate their ideological adversaries, and first
and foremost those of democratic persuasion, exterminated their opponents not
only in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe, already sacrificed as a future
zone of Soviet interest, but also in Italy and France, where they used
guerrilla warfare to give the resistance the character of a ruthless civil war
and, under the pretext of patriotism, to exercise terror in order to seize
power.
If they did not achieve their objective and were
gradually removed from government positions as enemies of democracy, this must
be attributed primarily to the presence of the Allied military forces. In the
part of Europe occupied by Soviet troops, under the guise of the suicidal theory
of unconditional surrender, the communists seized power and continued the
extermination of anti-communist forces without distinction. Even in countries
where the communists failed to gain control, a political and psychological
atmosphere had been created—a consequence of the misguided attitude toward
communism—in which the crimes of communist terror went unpunished, being
considered understandable excesses of the struggle against the occupiers.
Crimes against humanity weighed solely on the defeated side.
The communists, cynically exploiting the mistakes of
their adversaries and the dismay of the civilized world at the shocking
excesses of Nazism in Germany—a country universally respected as the homeland
of great thinkers—not only concealed their crimes, which went unpunished, but
also participated as judges in the first international tribunal to prosecute
crimes against humanity. Currently viewed and considered the most dangerous
enemies of freedom, the communists, invoking their circumstantial alliance with
the Allies during the war, manage to confuse and bewilder certain sectors of
public opinion in democratic countries, accusing individuals, governments,
groups, or entire peoples of supposed revanchist aspirations and a return to
nationalist totalitarianism.
While the defeated were tried in Nuremberg and other
trials held in Europe, their communist emulators, who far surpassed them, are
the object of festivities and honors in the capitals and courts of the
Christian West. Having been appointed judges in trials for crimes similar to
those they themselves committed, the communists arrogate to themselves the
right to behave in international organizations as champions of the freedom of
Afro-Asian peoples, even of the Christian nations of South America. They criticize
Western democracies that, in turn, almost spontaneously, faithful to the ideals
of freedom and humanity, pursue the policy of
decolonization, while the Soviets and their Yugoslav epigones practice a
ruthless policy of oppression against various European and Asian peoples,
unparalleled in human history, denying them even the right to be considered
enslaved and exploited countries.
What is most worrying in all of this is the
disorientation of so many Western intellectuals, deprived, in this crisis, of
moral support, having lost faith in universal progress, the source of the
liberal optimism of previous generations. In contrast to the dialogue, debate,
and systematic doubt of the Western world, which values and seeks
truth as an intrinsic worth, regardless of political interests, communists act
blindly, driven by faith in the liberating role of the proletariat, with which
they identify, and in the dogmas of "scientific socialism." As
spokespeople for the doctrine that supposedly uncovers all the mysteries of the
historical process, inevitably leading toward a classless society, communists
can exert a powerful and suggestive influence on skeptical Westerners during
this time of crisis, when they have lost their monopoly on the achievements of
our technological civilization and, consequently, the possibility of global
supremacy.
Fortunately, the heritage of Western culture embodies
enduring values, and as long as these values persist, it must be
defended against internal and external barbarians. The recovery of Western
Europe, devastated and divided by war, occurred so rapidly and unexpectedly
that it is considered miraculous. This European recovery is often valued for
its economic results. In fact, even greater progress was made in eliminating
the causes of the contemporary social crisis: national and class conflicts.
Europe, on the path toward economic and political integration, overcoming
national and class conflicts, disorients the strategists of communist world
subversion, since these phenomena do not align with the frameworks of Marxist
dialectics, conceived in the superseded phase of the industrial revolution and
the national conflicts of Western Europe.
Slowly but surely, the possibility is emerging that
the politically and socially consolidated Western world, freed from the burden
of colonialism, will take the offensive and address the issue of the
responsibility of communist leaders for so many horrific crimes against
humanity.
Indeed, there are signs that the free world views with
growing distaste the anomaly of tyrants and oppressors of the worst kind
continuing to play the role of champions of freedom and human rights.
We must point to two cases that reveal the reaction of
those concerned with violated justice in the face of such duplicity. Although
these events occurred in West Germany and concern the attitude adopted by the
German authorities, they are of interest to us because they are linked to what
happened in Croatia during and after the war, and especially because they bring
to the forefront a very important principled question: should the crimes
perpetrated by communists go unpunished simply because they fought in the last
war on the side of the Allies?
The first incident concerns the so-called
"Vracaric incident." It involves a representative of a Yugoslav
state-owned company who traveled to Germany last November on business and was
arrested in Munich (Bavaria) pursuant to a 1942 German military order. He was
accused of killing a German soldier as a civilian, having ambushed him in Zagreb,
then the capital of the Independent State of Croatia. The Yugoslav government
maintained that Vracaric was indeed a civilian and, according to international
conventions, could be tried in Germany, but that he was acting as a member of
the Yugoslav (communist) resistance in territory that now forms part of the
People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Yugoslav communists argued,
with the end of the war, the German defeat, and the victory of the communist
resistance, the previous orders of the German military authorities were no
longer legally valid.
The Bonn government, which had opportunely recognized
the Yugoslav government that emerged from the ranks of the communist guerrillas
in order to break diplomatic relations after the latter recognized the Pankow
regime, requested and obtained Vracaric's release from the Bavarian
authorities. The Bonn government simultaneously noted that this was an
overzealous act by local authorities, unrecognized by the federal government,
declaring "that no prosecution can be continued in the Federal Republic of
Germany against partisans and resistance fighters for acts committed during the
war and resistance in the last world conflagration" and that "no
lists exist of the perpetrators of such acts."
It is obvious that Bonn's stance was due less to the
protests and arguments presented by the Yugoslav communist government than to
the unfavorable comments published in the European press. The question was
whether the German government has the right to punish acts of violence committed
against German occupation forces by members of the resistance in the respective
countries.
Aside from the question of whether certain forms of
communist guerrilla warfare are politically advantageous and permissible under
international law, it is clear that the Bonn government did not want to provide
communist propaganda with tired arguments, so as not to weaken solidarity among
the Western powers—a factor of great interest to West Germany, especially given
German unification and the status of Berlin.
The self-styled Marshal Tito, the Yugoslav communist
dictator, seized this opportunity to try to counter the unfavorable impression
created in the West by his complete adherence to Soviet views during the
Belgrade Conference. This alignment with Moscow in international politics led
Washington to question further economic aid to Tito. For this reason, he
extensively debated the "Vracaric affair" in his speech delivered in
Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, on November 13th.
It is worth transcribing the entire paragraph
concerning this matter, as it reflects the extent to which Tito, while
simultaneously aspiring to lead the neutralist bloc, sympathizes with the
Soviet Union in all the dire international problems upon which the preservation
of world peace depends. For him, true democracy is only communism. He overlooks
the fact that the Western Allies and the Germans themselves had already
condemned the war crimes of Hitler's Germany. He behaves as if international
conventions related to warfare were binding only on the defeated.
“We have been criticized in the United States,” Tito
said, “for having facilitated the recognition of East Germany at the Belgrade
Conference. However, this is not a new attitude, but a well-known one. I repeat
once again that it is fortunate that East Germany exists, fortunate that there
isn't only one Germany like West Germany, where those who fought against the
odious occupiers in our country during the war are imprisoned. Not long ago,
one of our men was arrested there on business.” He then glosses over the
aforementioned principled declaration by the Bonn government and refuses to
consider the incident an administrative error. "This is about something
bigger than an individual or restricted group procedure.
It all originated in Bonn, where they were familiar
with the case. Then, the matter takes on importance; it becomes something they
want to legalize in order to collectively avenge themselves against those who
defended their countries with their blood and their lives. That's revenge!
That's their policy. Therein lies the heart of the problem, what those in the
West who are arming that same West Germany with atomic weapons and other
equipment refuse to see, without thinking about what will happen tomorrow when
'the devil is unleashed.' Symptoms like this indicate that a spirit is emerging
today, and increasingly so, in West Germany, a spirit capable of one day
endangering world peace and provoking catastrophe. Thus, in the wake of the
case I mentioned, they are digging into legal norms to prove their right,
claiming that our comrade who shot at the German soldiers wasn't in uniform but
in civilian clothes. What kind of uniform were we wearing then? They could
persecute me too, under the same pretext." Because, like so many of our comrades,
I wasn't in uniform then.
An arrest warrant was also issued against me, with a
price of 100,000 gold marks. Yes, nonsense, but the underlying issue is that
both those in Bonn and those in the West who share their views have prematurely
dropped the mask. That's just foolishness, but no one can deny the kind of
spirit that arises there. We fear such a Germany and we don't hesitate to fight
it... That's why I say it's fortunate that there is at least a part,
unfortunately small, founded on democratic principles and without revanchist
tendencies... They want to blame us for having fought against them in civilian
clothes, which isn't in accordance with their regulations... That's why I
believe that our allies from the last war are doing humanity a disservice by
arming and creating a militaristic Germany, instead of remaining consistent in
the final and total extermination of all the fascist remnants that caused so
much harm to humanity and destroyed so many lives. "human."
Tito's presentation culminates with this statement:
"Therefore, we continue to believe that our attitude toward Germany can be
none other than that of the Soviet Union. Both the Russian people and the
peoples of the Soviet Union were subjected to immense sacrifices, as were our peoples,
the people of Poland and others, and it is understandable that our views on the
problem are identical. This is our position regarding Germany, and because it
coincides with the position of the Soviet Union, we will now say that we see
this problem as the West does. You cannot expect that from us."
Although the cited text explicitly states Tito's
understanding of neutrality, we are primarily interested in his insistence on
"the definitive and total extermination of the fascist remnants."
This is the argument with which the Yugoslav regime justifies all its misdeeds
and exactions in domestic and foreign policy. All opponents of communism can,
if necessary, be labeled as "fascist remnants" and thus outlawed. For
Tito, it is an affront when members of the defeated Wehrmacht invoke legal
norms.
While the "Vracaric case" was treated as an
incident by the German authorities, nevertheless sparking discussion about
important matters of principle, the other case mentioned refers to the
proceedings initiated by the German courts against the Yugoslav consul in
Munich and cannot be treated as a mere incident.
The Yugoslav diplomat Predrag Grabovac was one of the
leaders of the communist guerrillas during the war and one of the organizers of
Tito's army after the war. At the end of last year, he was appointed consul in
Munich. On this occasion, one of the newspapers of the numerous Croatian exiles
held him responsible for the execution of Croatian and German prisoners of war
during and after the war. The matter attracted the interest of German political
and military circles who, for reasons of political opportunism, maintained
official relations with the leaders in Belgrade, knowing them to be responsible
for the expulsion and massacre of several hundred Volksdeutscher (members of
the German collectives) in the People's Republic of Serbia.
Based on the information gathered, Dr. Paul Wüllner, a
deputy of the ruling CSU party... The Christian Social Union (CSU) submitted a
motion to the Bavarian Parliament (Landtag) on November 29, 1961,
requesting the Minister of Justice to initiate proceedings against Consul
Grabovac, whom they labeled a murderer. "We must ask ourselves," the
Bavarian politician remarked, "whether we should consider any means
acceptable that prevents murderers of this kind from moving about with impunity
among us and even being held in high esteem."
Dr. Wüllner's request was granted, and the Bavarian
Minister of Justice ordered the initiation of a judicial inquiry against
Grabovac, on suspicion of "the murder of several hundred German and
Croatian soldiers after the German defeat in 1945."
This time, instead of making excuses, Bonn responded
to Belgrade's protests by stating that it was a matter for the judiciary, which
is independent. The Yugoslav government was forced to withdraw Grabovac, who
left Germany on December 8, 1961, escorted to the border by German security
agents at the request of the Yugoslav consul general, because "the press
campaign unleashed against Mr. Grabovac made his consular activities impossible
and his personal safety was no longer guaranteed."
Before leaving Germany, Grabovac tried to present his
case as a plot by Croatian exiles, a claim that convinced few given the
background information and data available to the federal government, the
numerous witnesses, and because the German courts, after the Vracaric incident,
cannot act rashly. Nor can the argument be made that the Grabovac case is a
watered-down version of the Vracaric case. These are not isolated incidents,
but rather the mass killing of German and Croatian prisoners of war, including
those who surrendered upon the signing of the armistice.
These are flagrant violations of existing
international conventions and mass murders with characteristics of genocide,
which implies the responsibility of the highest authorities of the Yugoslav
communist regime. Therefore, the Yugoslav dictator's view that this was merely
"an understandable action, the definitive and total extermination of the
fascist remnants" is untenable. No political or consular office can
absolve the criminals of guilt. Moreover,
Tito believes that even the regime in West Germany
must be "democratized," just like that of East Germany. In his
opinion, the new German army (Bundeswehr), an integral part of NATO's defensive
forces, falls into the category of "fascist remnants." German military
circles are aware of this, and that is why they published Dr. Wüllner's speech
on the front page of their newspaper, the "Deutschen Soldaten
Zeitung," calling it one of the most important political speeches of the
past year.
The German press and public opinion actively
participated in the discussions surrounding the Grabovac case. Communist
practices during and after the war were examined; political and moral arguments
were presented for and against the Grabovac trial. The issue of the tribunal's
jurisdiction in cases of transgressions committed on foreign soil was debated,
and compelling moral and political reasons were offered in support of the
argument that the crimes of communists cannot go unpunished and that sanctions
for crimes against humanity should not be limited solely to the leaders and
officials of the defeated Third Reich, simply because the communists were on
the Allied side during the second phase of the war, which they helped to ignite
(the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact).
There is no doubt that forced coexistence with
communist regimes in a divided world presents significant political and legal
difficulties regarding territorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the trial of
Grabovac, as well as various political and diplomatic measures taken by democratic
governments against Tito's regime, indicate that these political difficulties
are not insurmountable. Furthermore, there is precedent that eliminates any
debate about territorial jurisdiction. In the final months of the war and after
the end of hostilities, Yugoslav communists committed numerous crimes in
Austrian and Italian territory, murdering prisoners of war and political
opponents without due process.
The "foibe," mass graves, around Trieste,
where the communists dumped their victims, are infamous. Less well-known is the
mass killing of Croatian civilians and soldiers near Bleiburg, an Austrian town
bordering Yugoslavia. There began the mass murder of Croats, whose numbers and
atrocity surpass those of Katyn. While most of the crimes took place on
Yugoslav territory, numerous unmarked graves of victims of the communist
massacre remain in Austria. Croatian exiles erected a modest monument to these
victims. Whether or not a trial for these crimes begins depends solely on the
political climate.
Therefore, the investigation conducted in Bavaria
against the Yugoslav consul is of great importance at a time when calls are
growing to address communist crimes against humanity. This issue is directly
linked to the liberation of peoples subjugated by communism. Until lofty
declarations give way to action, the moral prestige of Western democracies will
continue to decline in captive nations, in countries inclined toward
neutrality, and especially in Latin American countries, which are encouraged on
the one hand to combat communist infiltration, and on the other hand to allow
communist crimes against entire populations to go unpunished.
As a corollary, the anti-communist powers continue to
provide military and economic aid to the communist government of Yugoslavia,
which to date exceeds two billion dollars—more than enough to solve so many
pressing problems on the South American continent. Only if this problem is
addressed unequivocally and with the assurance that it will be handled in
accordance with ethical and legal principles can the moral authority of
civilization in crisis be recovered. This, moreover, is essential if we want to
prevent the forces of barbarism from prevailing and the communists from
imposing their views on the free world, conquering it without resorting to open
warfare.
With all this in mind, although these disagreements at
the summit between the two parties are important, in our case the question
arises: "And after Cuba, what?", that is: "What to do with the
exiles after what happened in Cuba?" The way the CIA prepared the invasion
of Cuba, both politically and militarily, reveals that this American
organization fundamentally conceived of the invasion not as a continuation of the
social revolution that had emerged on the island after the overthrow of the
Batista dictatorship, but as a return to the status quo ante, which existed
before Castro's resistance and, above all, before his rise to power. It is true
that the problem of cooperation with the Cuban exiles worsened daily.
Initially, the Cuban émigré community during the first months of Castro's
government was numerically small and mostly comprised of Batista supporters.
This group, unpopular both in Cuba and in the U.S.,
had no possibility of taking any action. Then, as the Castro regime revealed
its true intentions, especially in the second half of 1960, the division among
Cuban refugees intensified, and different social and political tendencies
crystallized. As among exiles from communist countries, the problem of
political, social, economic, and national division not only aggravated and
complicated the problem of liberation but also constituted a serious obstacle
for the democracies that should be helping these exiles and their people. In
the case of Cuba and its emigrants, there were hundreds of groups, factions,
movements, and juntas, all with their respective leaders and sub-leaders, their
programs and ambitions, believing themselves unique and capable of leading the
people in a liberated Cuba. They all operated along the lines of Miami,
Florida, New York, the Caribbean islands, or many countries of the Latin
American continent. In such a situation, it was not easy for the CIA, tasked
with organizing the invasion and, if necessary, establishing democratic
authorities, to find its bearings. Anyone who has had the opportunity to
collaborate with American agencies during or after the war knows that their
tendency is rather conservative, not very or not at all revolutionary, and that
the vast majority of their officials tend to cooperate with the right, if not
with the center, but never or rarely with the anti-communist left.
In the case of Cuban exiles, the choice was between
collaborating with the right wing of the Pre-Batista movement, which was not
fascist but rather advocated political and economic conservatism, or with the
center, while overlooking the groups that were part of the Castro movement or
that, as in the case of Sánchez Arango, had a program similar to Castro's but
did not join his movement because they did not believe in Castro or those
around him. They foresaw the possibility that Castro would become a
collaborator with communism and link the island to the Soviet Union and Mao's
China.
The author of these lines spoke with Arango in Cuba in
February 1960 and came away with the unequivocal impression that he was a
popular leader who, under different circumstances and with greater organization
among Cuban political circles, could have eventually given the Cuban revolution
a more constructive direction. Arango believed at the time that the Cuban
revolution had to continue, but without Castro and without the internal and
foreign communists. This was only achievable if the U.S. government had
recognized Castro's nationalization policies in its guidelines and sacrificed
everything it had lost with Castro's rise to power. The fact that this
perspective displeased the American organizers of the invasion stems from the
absence of Arango and the dynamic Manuel Ray, Castro's former Minister of
Public Works who led a perfectly organized clandestine movement in Cuba, from
the Cuban National Committee.
The "Democratic Revolutionary Front" (FRD)
was chaired by Dr. José Miró Cardona, former Cuban Prime Minister during the
first six weeks of the Castro regime, but lacked prominent collaborators. Those
who were initially disillusioned with CIA policy, as they told the American
press, founded the "People's Revolutionary Movement" (MRP),
emphasizing in their manifesto: "Fighting against the 'Fidelism-Communism'
faction does not mean fighting against the Revolution for which thousands of
Cubans sacrificed their lives, but rather liberating it from those who betrayed
it." The right wing and much of the center rose up against this position,
labeling them and their movement "Fidelism without Fidel." This deep
division was also the cause of the failure, which, even so, would not have
occurred had the American army undertaken the task of liberation. Given the
current situation, one wonders: what should have been done? The responsibility
assumed by the Washington government in the attempted invasion of Cuba implied
such a commitment that we are convinced the moral responsibility would have
been equally great had the expedition been carried out with the support of the
American army. The difference, however, is that the Soviet hierarchy and every
communist branch in every communist-ruled country would have had to modify
their views on the workings of American political and military strategy. Both
Soviet leaders and communists in general are highly sensitive to the role of
power in relation to world events. From 1917 in Russia, through the Hungarian
uprising of 1956, and up to the failed invasion of Cuba in 1961, every attempt
to remove or overthrow the communist regime in any country it held power failed
due to:
1) The division of internal social and political
forces, and
2) the division among the major powers, primarily the
democratic ones.
In his new book, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and
Stalin*, George F. Kennan, the current U.S. ambassador to Belgrade and
undoubtedly one of the most astute experts on the Soviet Union and global
communism, offers a sharp, almost harrowing, analysis of relations between
Russia and the West from Lenin, through Stalin, and up to Khrushchev. Written
in an engaging and well-documented style, the book demonstrates not only a long
and meticulous study of the Soviet-communist problem, but also a vast political
experience, making Kennan one of the most astute American political writers.
While Kennan barely touches on the Cuban issue, he proves that the spread of
communism in the world was and continues to be the result of the deep divisions
within the West.
His book, read carefully, recounts so many events we
witnessed that it becomes clear the West never had a clear stance on how to
react to the communist takeover, first in Russia and then in other parts of the
world. First, there was the complete ignorance of Marxism and communism among
Western leaders, followed by constant disagreements regarding joint decisions
aimed at restricting and eventually destroying Soviet-communist expansion. From
the Peace Conference at the end of World War I to Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam
during and after World War II, the West was in a state of permanent political
and ideological division. Kennan attributes this division to the nature of
democracy and particularly to the character of "coalition diplomacy."
Pluralities in democratic systems, public opinion infiltrated by the enemy of
social security in democracy, opposing analyses and conclusions, as in the case
of Cuba, regarding whether to resort to the US armed forces or only to the
voluntary guerrillas of the exiles (for example, the Kennedy administration:
Adlai Stevenson opposed a US military intervention,
while Adolf Berle and Allan Dulles advocated for it)—none of this occurs or has
any place in the operations of the communist central committees or Politburos.
In democratic countries, such phenomena not only take place but are also the
subject of public debate and journalistic reporting, whereas under the
communist system, such actions are rigorously concealed, and heads roll if
there are failures or even leaks.
Applying Kennan's criteria to the Cuban problem and
the American position on it—though he doesn't explicitly mention it in his
book—a great power like the United States should have foreseen that Batista's
fall was inevitable and that the change in the situation, in relation to
current world events, would create a vacuum that would have to be filled by
some political force. However, even certain right-wingers in Cuba and the
United States supported Castro's 26th of July Movement. How is it that neither
Havana nor Washington took communist elements into account within the Castro
movement?
The New York Times, which contributed so much to
Castro's popularity as it did to Tito's during the previous war, failed to
foresee the possibility that Castro could introduce a communist regime in Cuba
and, moreover, draw Cuba into the Soviet sphere of influence, which would
completely alter the balance of power not only in the United Nations but also
change the political landscape, bringing international communism within 90
miles of American territory. After carefully and critically reading Kennan's
book, one is no longer surprised that American diplomats failed to foresee and
assume that Che Guevara-type elements would infiltrate Castro's revolution.
These individuals, following Soviet and Maoist
theories, developed the ideal platforms for the Latin American continent, ripe
for revolution, through which guerrilla warfare transformed into a war for the
political conquest of power. Mao's thesis, according to which "political
power flows from the gunpowder of the rifle," apparently became the
starting point for all guerrilla action. Wars of liberation, in the communist
interpretation, are nothing more than levers for seizing power through
guerrilla warfare. Several years had to pass before democratic leaders realized
this reality; today it is obvious not only to President Kennedy but to the vast
majority of Western political and military leaders that in communist parlance,
"war of liberation" means one thing, and in Western political
thought, another.
III
In addressing this problem, a contemporary political
writer must step back and look back at the history of the so-called National
Resistance during the last war, which we witnessed. In March of last year, the
"Second International Congress on the History of the Resistance" was
held in Milan, attended by about one hundred historians, all European except
for one American. The material from that Congress, with all the contributions
of the delegates and historians present, is of great importance for the study
of the Second World War and the role played in it not only by the guerrillas
but also by their political leader, the National Resistance.
As is well known, the National Resistance is called La
Resistenza in Italy, La Résistance in France, and The Resistance in English. It
is significant that the Congress was attended mostly by leftist representatives
of the Resistance and, naturally, by official delegates from communist
countries. The Greek representative, for example, emphasized in his speech the
position of the EAM, the leftist wing of the Greek Resistance, criticizing the
nationalist-monarchists as collaborators, first with the Germans and then with
the British embassy. The Yugoslav delegate, a certain Dusan Plenca, presented
the official and current viewpoint of the communist government in Belgrade
regarding the guerrillas, highlighting, importantly, the parallel indecisive
attitude of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies toward the actions of the
communist guerrillas and the national Resistance in Yugoslavia.
We must point this out because Tito's communist propaganda
until 1948, that is, until the Moscow-Belgrade conflict, strove to minimize the
Allied support given to Tito, while exaggerating and emphasizing Soviet support
for the communist guerrillas. Barely had the well-known revelations of Mosha
Pijade, a prominent communist theorist from Belgrade, been made public, and
Soviet aid to the "national uprising" was dismissed as a
"fiction" in Yugoslavia, only to be quickly demoted into a blatant
communist lie.
The prevailing narrative regarding the partisan resistance
in Yugoslavia tends to establish a balance, almost a neutral one, with respect
to the support provided by the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Great Britain
and the United States on the other, in accordance with Tito's current foreign
policy. The aim is to present the resistance as an action undertaken
exclusively by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the
Yugoslav Communist Party. Both the Eastern and Western allies act slowly,
remaining reserved and indecisive, and their contribution is not insignificant.
However, it is a telling fact that both the Yugoslav Colonel Plenca and the
Soviet General Boltin do not conceal in their reports that the primary and
overriding objective of the resistance was to seize power—understood to be "democratic
and popular" in communist terms.
Nevertheless, it was Deakin, an Oxford professor and
English historian, who explicitly and clearly identified the key to the problem
of the guerrillas in their struggle to seize power. Deakin was head of the British
military mission, parachuted into Yugoslav territory in May 1943, to establish
contact with Tito's partisans. According to Deakin's report, the British
conduct of the war had not considered the problem of employing
"incorrect" means until the conflict drew in the Soviet Union.
With the Soviet Union's entry into the war, guerrilla
warfare not only took on greater significance, but the concept that guerrilla
warfare implies the conquest of power in the postwar period constituted a new
element in the nature of the war itself. It is worth noting that Deakin
highlights the fact that during the First World War and in the Desert War
(Lawrence case), the British government adhered to "orthodox military
concepts," avoiding altering the social, national, and political systems
of the conquered countries. After the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars,
after Clausewitz and Lenin's theses on the political conduct of war, applied in
Russia after the October Revolution, and after the Spanish Civil War, in which
the Soviet-Communist element was involved on one side, and the fascist
ideological moment on the other, which inspired and politically directed it,
British military circles sought, at the beginning of the war, to remain within
normal and customary military practices. For the British, the war should be
waged using normal military methods, while any political interpretation, let
alone a revolutionary one, of the conduct of the war should be postponed or
simply disregarded.
This lack of imagination, says Deakin, disappeared as
soon as Churchill assumed leadership of the government and the war effort. Not
before, since from May 1940 Churchill issued the necessary instructions to
"coordinate all action by means of subversion and sabotage against the
enemy across the Channel." From these decisions emerged a special agency,
the well-known Special Operations Executive (SOE), which Churchill incorporated
into the Ministry of Economic Warfare, which he cleverly called the Ministry of
Ungentlemanly Warfare. Its aim, in his own words, was "to set Europe
ablaze."
For us, the less humorous and far more important
aspect is that Deakin cites, as the first action of this "ungentlemanly
war," "taking part in the confused preparations for a conspiracy
against the Yugoslav government, which at the end of March 1941 was forced to
sign the Axis Pact." This action merits the following comment from Deakin:
"Strictly speaking, this was the first political experiment, admittedly an
isolated one, of the new organization" (SOE). From the above, it can be
concluded that the coup d'état in Belgrade on 27/3/1941 and the overthrow of
the Cvetkovic-Macek government was not, as the communists maintain even at this
Congress, the exclusive work of the broad popular masses under the leadership
of the Yugoslav Communist Party, but also the first British action in the
conduct of political warfare.
Deakin then emphasizes that the political war within
the military war coincided, in fact, with the German aggression against the
Soviet Union. The military situation throughout Europe then changed radically.
"The Russians," Deakin says, "had a coherent and diametrically
opposed concept" of military and political operations. Then, and
especially after Stalin's first message to the oppressed peoples of Europe, in which
he expressly stressed that "the struggle against Germany should not be
considered as a conventional war... nor a war between two armies," the war
changed form and became a clandestine war as well.
Mikhailovich, leader of the Serbian nationalist Chetnik
guerrillas, convinced that the Allies would land in the Balkans, refused to
fight until the war was over. Deakin says that "for Mikhailovich, the
political element was of greater importance, and what interested him was the
political balance in Yugoslavia at the end of the war." Given this, the
British Command in Cairo decided to establish contact with Tito's communist
guerrillas, a move undertaken under the direction of Maclean and Deakin.
"The decision," Deakin continues, "to strengthen ties and provide
maximum support to Tito was exclusively British, and only after lengthy
discussions did the Americans follow suit." Deakin strives to justify the
support given to Tito, which, according to him, contributed to the war's swift
end. Summarizing his reference to the guerrillas in Yugoslavia, Deakin
conjectures:
"It is a debatable point, and one that would
provoke great controversy if stated categorically, regarding the effect on
Yugoslavian territory of the British abstention from establishing contact with
and providing assistance to Yugoslav forces. Such a discussion does not
entirely fit within this report, but I wish to present it as a point of
controversy, supported by irrefutable historical evidence: that British aid to
Tito, in a completely unforeseen and unexpected manner, played a decisive role
in convincing the Russians that the British had deliberately orchestrated this
entire operation for ulterior political reasons, and in arousing suspicion
among the Russians about the total loyalty of the Yugoslav partisan movement to
the cause of international communism, and thus led to the break between
Yugoslavia and the Russians in 1948."
While English Machiavellianism is sometimes more
ruthless than Machiavelli himself could ever have imagined, Deakin's assertion
seems too audacious to be considered a serious prediction of a politician's
future actions. It is hardly surprising that Churchill's "disciples,"
graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, were captivated in the mountains of Bosnia
and on the Dalmatian coast by Tito's "charm," devoid of imagination
and ideals, unsure of what to do at home, and foreseeing that the days of the
British Empire were numbered. Undecided about which path to take—towards
reformist or revolutionary Marxism—they pledged their allegiance to Tito and
his communists in a country that was, among other things, strange and
mysterious to them.
But the idea that they could already imagine deceiving
even the leaders of world communism and Stalin himself, and that they would
soon sow discord between Tito and the communist agents in his Balkan empire,
seems to us more like poetry and fantasy than a serious historian's assessment.
It goes without saying that when discussing Greece and Italy embroiled in
guerrilla wars like Yugoslavia, Deakin states that both the British government
and its agents in the Near East had no doubt whatsoever that the same thing
that happened in Yugoslavia—that is, the establishment of communist
regimes—should not be allowed to happen in those countries. Consequently, what
was permitted in Yugoslavia could not be permitted in the classic Mediterranean
countries where it was believed that British interests were in clear conflict
with communist expansion and Russian imperialism.
IV
What policy, or more precisely, what policies did the
United States pursue regarding guerrilla and national resistance movements in
Europe, including Yugoslavia, was the subject of Professor Norman Kogan's
historical review. "Any analysis of American policies," Kogan stated,
"regarding European resistance movements in the Second World War requires
a prior examination of certain fundamental historical positions that provide
the essential assumptions of those policies." The three fundamental
positions were: 1) the isolationist tradition in American diplomacy; 2) the
Wilsonian legacy of American leaders; and 3) the late entry of the United
States into the Second World War, two years and four months after the Nazi
attack on Poland.
1) The isolationist tradition of American diplomacy
meant that it had little or no experience with the complex and tangled problems
of European politics. Firstly, American diplomacy knew little or nothing about
the complicated problems of Central Europe, Southeastern Europe, the Balkans,
and the Mediterranean. For this reason, American policy sought to avoid
involvement in the complex problems of guerrilla warfare and resistance
movements, refusing to commit to any action regarding the political or social
restructuring of postwar Europe. At worst, it preferred to leave the decisive
role in resolving these issues to the British. "The main American concern
was to win the war in the shortest possible time and with the fewest
casualties. As soon as a Resistance movement could contribute to achieving that
goal, we supported it. This support was given exclusively on the basis of
military assessment, without any political criteria."
2) Both President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull were true heirs to the Wilsonian tradition.
This, in Kogan's opinion, consisted of: a) distrust of any balance-of-power
policy among the great powers; b) adherence to the principles of
self-determination of peoples, also enshrined in the Atlantic Charter; and c)
opposition to imperialism. Hence Roosevelt's distrust of General de Gaulle and
all the actions of the refugees who, even during the war, wanted to draw up
plans for the future. Roosevelt and Hull did not allow American weapons to be
used for such purposes. They strongly opposed the raising of territorial issues
during the war. In short, both abhorred the movements of Guerrilla movements
were discouraged because of the fear that such movements would deprive people,
after the war, of the right to choose the government that best suited them. The
official American opinion was that all these problems should be resolved once
the war was over.
3) Having entered the war late, the U.S. was primarily
concerned with preparing itself for military action, then making its military
supplies available to its allies, Great Britain and Russia, and only lastly
considering the problem of assisting the resistance movements. Washington, on
the other hand, only began to take an interest in the resistance movements
after the landing in Italy and when the Russians were approaching Poland.
Analyzing each of the resistance movements in Europe,
Kogan observes that the most serious problems arose in France, Italy,
Yugoslavia, and Greece. In these countries, there were "resistance
movements loyal to the exiled governments and others in conflict with them. The
situation in Poland was even more serious, as it involved two governments in
exile, one sponsored by the Soviet Union and the other by England and the
United States." It is worth noting Kogan's assertion that "the
fundamental feature of American policy toward Central Europe was to consider
that region outside its sphere of influence.
The American position was that no policy should be
formulated regarding the problems of Eastern Europe and that it would be better
to leave those matters to the British, except for problems likely to affect
feelings in the United States. One of those problems, as is well known, was the
Polish situation." According to recent data now also clarified in an
official source, contained in the documents of the Tehran Conference, published
by the State Department, the widespread opinion is reaffirmed that the main
argument put forward by Roosevelt in his deliberations with Stalin on the
Polish problem was that he did not want to lose votes in the future elections
from Poles residing in North America.
Regarding Greece and Yugoslavia, which faced similar
situations, Kogan states that the Americans generally followed British policy.
Until July 1943, Kogan notes, the British supported Mikhailovich, who was
collaborating with the Germans and Italians. In September 1943, Churchill sent
Maclean to Tito's headquarters to decide on support for his partisans. In
December 1943, during the Tehran Conference, Churchill decided to back Tito,
basing this decision on the fact that he was the only one fighting the enemy in
Yugoslavia. Roosevelt approved this decision, and from then on, relations
between Tito's partisans and the Western Allies grew increasingly close. Kogan,
however, emphasizes that the U.S. established direct contact with Tito only in
the final days of the war, following the Triestine Crisis and after Tito's
forces invaded Istria and the surrounding areas. Kogan recounts here a series
of conflicts that arose between General Alexander and Tito's partisans, noting
that this time the Americans insisted that the entire disputed area of
Istria, Trieste, and even Fiume be occupied by the Allies and
placed under the Allied Military Government (AMG). "From April 28, 1945,
when the Supreme Allied Command ordered General Alexander to occupy Venezia Giulia,
until June 9, when a formal agreement on participation was concluded, the
constant in the American position," Kogan states, "was to refrain
from the use of force against the Yugoslav communist partisans."
At the heart of this "constant" in American
policy, Kogan uncovers many reasons governing Washington's diplomatic actions.
The primary reason was to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, especially among those
fighting the common enemy. The second reason was that Truman refused to fight
Tito's guerrillas, which would tie up many American contingents in the Balkans
and Italy, contingents needed on the Pacific front, where the war with Japan
remained uncertain. The third reason was political: American public opinion
would not understand a war between allies and the need to maintain American
troops as occupying forces in friendly countries. Finally, a significant reason
was also to strain relations with Russia, since the American government was
counting on Russian intervention against Japan.
Even so, on May 8, 1945, Truman decided to strongly
oppose Tito on the issue of Trieste, and American diplomacy reacted vigorously
against the occupation of Piedmont and Venezia Giulia by France and Yugoslavia,
respectively, emphasizing that these measures undermined the restoration of
peace. Unlike American policy, which was reluctant to use force against
resistance movements, the British, and Churchill himself, did not hesitate to
resort to force if positive results were expected. Analyzing the actions of
American diplomacy in this way, Kogan concludes that Washington wished to avoid
armed conflicts between allies at all costs while simultaneously avoiding
taking a stance on the creation or formulation of a future peace before the war
ended. Without explicitly stating it, Kogan clearly demonstrates how difficult
it was for the British and Americans to establish solid foundations for a just
peace and a democratic world order, whereas the communist leaders, considering
and respecting only force, were able to structure a world in which they occupy
a position they had never dreamed of. That this is indeed the case is also
confirmed by Kennan's new book, in which all those naive, unfounded, almost
unreal attitudes and sentimental and moral reactions are correctly
characterized and defined, which Kennan rightly calls a trait not only of
Anglo-Saxon diplomacy but also of the Anglo-Saxon character.
V
But before discussing that policy, let us see what the
official viewpoint of Soviet historiography is, as expressed by its delegate at
the aforementioned Congress, General E. Boltin. At the very beginning of his
extensive written report—in the style of official Soviet historiography, where
historical truth is subordinated to political and ideological contingencies
and, therefore, not considered true—Boltin defines the character of
contemporary warfare in the following terms:
"Soviet historians believe that two types of war
can be clearly distinguished in world history: annexationist wars, that is,
unjust wars, and liberation wars, that is, just wars. If war is fought to
conquer new territories, to oppress and enslave peoples, to strengthen the
external yoke, or in the name of the domination of the exploiters, such a war
is unjust. On the other hand, if war is fought in the name of liberating the
country from enemy invasion, in the name of freedom and national independence,
to free itself from the yoke of the exploiters and colonialists, this war is
just. Such a war is capable of inspiring the masses." popular movements
actively joining the armed struggle under the banner of liberation. The just
aims of the war become an inexhaustible source of the high morale of its
participants, their steadfastness, their courage, and their heroism.”
Consistent with this thesis, Boltin asserts that the
Second World War acquired the character of a just and logical war when German
aggression extended to the Soviet Union. “The Second World War,” he states
verbatim, “which erupted from the conflict of two imperialist alliances, only
began to change its character on the enemy side of Germany when the broad
popular masses initiated the anti-fascist struggle. From then on, the war
gradually acquired its just, liberating, and anti-fascist character. This
character crystallized and was defined after the Soviet Union entered the war
as a result of Hitler’s aggression.” It is important to emphasize that this
viewpoint was entirely consistent with the thesis of the Yugoslav communists,
who before the German-Soviet war defined the war as a conflict between two
capitalisms and after June 1941 interpreted it as a conflict between democracy
and fascism, beginning by organizing resistance and guerrilla warfare.
Speaking of the supposed support the Soviet Union
provided to resistance movements in Europe, in the chapter on Yugoslavia,
Boltin emphasizes that the Yugoslav partisans were among the first to organize
resistance and that they contributed significantly to the outbreak of guerrilla
warfare throughout Europe. Boltin fails to mention that Soviet diplomacy
initially recognized Mikhailovich and only later began to sponsor Tito and his
guerrillas. Instead, attempting to assert, where possible, the logic and
consistency of the Soviet narrative, he stresses that the Soviet factor was
also decisive in the "liberation" of Yugoslavia—more decisive than
the current official narrative of Tito's historiography acknowledges.
Therefore, we find it superfluous to cite
propagandistic half-truths in a work that aims to be concise and objective.
French historian Professor Henri Michel notes in his report on "The Allies
and the Resistance in Europe" that even in March 1942, the Soviet Union
rejected Tito's request to abandon Mikhailovich and support his partisans. In
May 1942, the Kremlin accepted the proposal from the Yugoslav government-in-exile,
whose Minister of War was Mikhailovich, to elevate Moscow's legation to the
rank of embassy. In August 1942, Moscow expressed its willingness to send a
mission to Mikhailovich's headquarters, which the exiled government in London
refused. Even during the autumn of 1942, Moscow did not grant Tito's requests
for assistance, but instead advised him to exercise restraint and criticized
him for the aggressive nature of the guerrilla warfare.
However, such fundamental differences arose between
the viewpoints held by the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets that they could provide
a suitable response to the thesis of a lost war. According to Soviet criteria,
any war waged by communists or in which the Soviet Union participates is
justified, logical, just, and liberating. A war in which the Soviet Union does
not participate and which communists do not lead, either alone or in coalition
with other forces, is not only unnecessary and historically negative, but also
unjust, conquering, and imperialist. In other words, the attempt by democratic
exiles to liberate Cuba constitutes an unjust and imperialist war, while the
armed crushing of the Hungarian national revolution by Soviet tanks is a just
war. Yugoslav policy also aligns with this Soviet thesis. Faced with the choice
of seeing Hungary liberated from the communist regime, albeit under the
leadership of Imre Nagy, Yugoslav approves of the Soviet armed intervention and
condemns the Hungarian people's attempt at freedom.
VI
If we confront these two opposing theses, the Soviet-communist
and the Anglo-Saxon, analyzing certain aspects of the past war and the recent
failure of the invasion of Cuba, we come to the conclusion that the liberation
of the peoples subjected to the communist yoke cannot be achieved if the
classic assumptions, let's call them Anglo-Saxon, according to which the
political and ideological factor must be separated from the military factor,
remain in force. Obviously, we did not intend in this review to provide an
exhaustive account of all the facts and reasons that contributed to the last
conflict being a catastrophic defeat for so many peoples of Europe and Asia,
especially for southeastern Europe, and that for the same reasons the Latin
American continent may also be lost. Much, even too much, has been written on
this subject.
We have limited ourselves to highlighting certain
criteria expressed by Anglo-Saxon historians at a Congress held last year. We
could also refer to the recently published documents of the Tehran Conference,
which demonstrate, for example, how lightly and irresponsibly Roosevelt
discussed the fate of Eastern Europe with Stalin. This lightheartedness, this
ignorance of the problems and realities at hand, also constitutes the central
theme of Kennan's book, which we recommend to the reader; for there one will
see with what ignorance of historical facts and with what misunderstanding of
current problems Western statesmen are resolving these problems and dictating
the fate of other peoples. It is evident that the West has been losing the battle
against world communism since 1917, that is, from its very beginnings, when it
was born and seized power in the largest European-Asian country, underdeveloped
or less developed. From 1917 onward, communists have remained in power in
almost all the countries they have subjugated, aided not only by the internal
conflicts of these captive nations, but also by the complete moral and
political division within the West.
However, no matter how deeply Kennan penetrated and
unraveled the West's weaknesses in the face of communism, he was unable to
perceive or tell the whole truth. By ridiculing certain liberal intellectuals
in Anglo-Saxon countries, Kennan partly pointed out the inherent defects and
dangers of Anglo-Saxon foreign policy. But he lacked the courage to include
himself and his earlier analyses within that same Anglo-Saxon liberalism, the
cause of this Western weakness in the struggle against communism. When one
studies the evolution of diplomatic relations between Western democratic
leaders and the Asian despots of the Kremlin, one perceives that Churchill, to
some extent, was aware of the potential consequences, but Roosevelt was not. A
novice in world politics, Roosevelt perhaps gave more impetus to Stalin's
excessive ambitions than any communist movement in any country.
Roosevelt saw in Stalin his own reflection projected
onto a different terrain: Anglo-Saxon-style democracy. Disillusioned with
classical capitalism, fed up with conservatism, and disgusted with fascism,
Roosevelt viewed world communism through the lens of his New Deal. He genuinely
believed that communism was a vast movement of the masses, necessarily fair to
every underdog. In Churchill, he saw imperialism, reactionary conservatism, and
the disintegration of an outdated society. Such views inevitably led to the
fatal division within the Western bloc, creating that political and
geographical vacuum so conducive to the advance of communism. One of the
fundamental failings of Western leaders is that, lacking intelligence and
political initiative, their constant hesitation in postponing solutions, their
rejection of initiative, and their fear of using the force at their disposal
embolden communist leaders, driving them to further actions. The communist
successes recorded so far were not the result of their superintelligence or the
historical inevitability of Marxist doctrine, but of the weakness, I would say
organic, of the Western ruling class incapable of committing to radical
solutions.
When we read daily that American diplomacy, on principle,
avoids the use of force, and when we know that this is indeed American policy,
it is obvious that communist leaders can resolve any problem without resorting
to force, or rather, by employing it in their own specific way. The nature of a
great power consists of employing all the material and moral forces at its
disposal. The U.S. today possesses forces that no other power has ever had. If
the Soviet Union had these forces, it is undeniable that the entire globe would
become a Soviet fiefdom. What, then, does the U.S. lack? The answer to this
question is knowing how to choose. When and at what moment to make use of a
portion of its political and material power?
The main reason for the current Soviet supremacy in
the world lies in the fact that the Soviet leaders, in more difficult
circumstances and with fewer material resources, almost always, with very few
exceptions, knew how to make the right selection in their decision-making and
in the use of their political and military force. While the US is not the kind
of great power that Spain, then Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and
even Italy were in past centuries, today it represents a force that could be
used to restrict and eventually eliminate the Soviet-communist imperialist
advance across the world. Until 1948, the US, knowing it was the only country
possessing the atomic bomb, could, by choosing the right political moment,
re-establish a free world order without risking war. Stalin halted communist
expansion in Italy only because he calculated that such expansion would provoke
an American reaction and eventually threaten world communism with total
liquidation.
Here, too, was the main cause of the conflict with
Tito: Tito was acting against Stalin's plans in Trieste and Greece, exposing
him to open conflict with the US, which Stalin could not accept at that time.
Currently, what can restrain Khrushchev from insisting on his excessive
demands, if nothing has happened since the war to convince the communists that
the US is even prepared to resort to force? Could the failed action in Cuba
have achieved this? How many can perceive today the subtle distinction between
the support given to the Cuban exiles, their landing on the island aboard
American ships, and the eventual invasion of Cuba by the American military
expedition? Although the Hungarian case damaged the prestige of the Soviet
Union, it is also true that the Soviet decision to prevent the liberation of
Hungary through armed intervention strengthened the conviction, in world
opinion, that Moscow is prepared to defend the conquests of communism—or
rather, its imperialist program—by force.
The fundamental question, then, arises: Can democracy
resort to force to safeguard threatened freedom anywhere in the world? We know
that this is the crux of the current controversy in the free world. It
effectively disarms American-style democracy, which bases its democratic
beliefs on almost ethical-religious principles. From the Wilsonian era until
now, the American vision has projected itself toward a better, nobler, more
humane, and more just world, which, in fact, is being realized on the North
American continent and in certain parts of Western Europe. For the realization
of that world, the use of force would be contradictory.
The fact that democracy has not yet decided to use
force against communism, as it did against Nazi-fascism, is not due to a lack
of reasons, but rather because certain liberal circles in the free world
continue to see communism as the future social and economic wave. The communists
know this, and that is why they never cease to delude the world with their
false humanism. Terrorizing with the threat of war is one of their skillful
tools, facilitating their conquest of new positions that discourage the West,
which shuns war. The idea is to win everything without war; this path,
unsuitable for the West, which lives in economic euphoria and moral excess, can
yield more positive successes for the communists than the moral and sentimental
ploys of Western circles.
Why, for example, does communism as a movement
represent a much greater force in Italy and France than in the countries it
governs, while the standard of living in France and Italy is constantly rising
and is higher than in any communist country? This and many other reasons explain
why neutralism is spreading among liberal intellectuals in the West, and why
public opinion is becoming less and less prepared for organized opposition to
communism. The leaders of Western countries do not always think about taking
the initiative or reacting against communist imperialism in the same way that
communist leaders do. In the free world, there are no political parties with
communist discipline, nor are there organized anti-communist forces in
communist countries. The free world has done little or nothing to help these
forces, to inject them with the impetus and encouragement that communist
leaders instill in communist parties in the free world.
VII
At this point in our discussion, the question arises
of the role of exiles in the eventual liberation of their countries from
communist captivity. The Cuban failure is a clear example of how not to proceed
with exiles. First and foremost, the prevailing view in certain government
offices that every action of the émigrés must be subordinated to the interests
of the great powers is entirely erroneous. Exiles can coordinate their actions
with the interests of the great powers and with their diplomatic and military
efforts, but these powers and their organizations must never, under any
circumstances, make exiles and their movements their mere instruments. Exiles,
in their struggle, bear a moral and ideological responsibility to their
respective peoples.
This responsibility does not always coincide with the
aims of the great powers. In the case of Cuba, social reform and the economic
restructuring of society do not align with the interests of certain American
capital, nor are they a common program of all Cuban political groups. When
certain American officials accept the agenda of some groups against others, they
clash not only with the émigrés but also with the interests of the people they
seek to liberate. At the very moment President Kennedy announces a broad and
progressive economic and social program to Latin American countries—the
Alliance for Progress, which could prove decisive in containing communism—its
apparatus, unbeknownst to him, is compromised by its cooperation with
right-wing and antisocial elements in the liberation of Cuba from communism,
thus jeopardizing the entire liberation effort.
Addressing this problem, and in the interest of
impartiality, I want to clarify that I am not opposed to the American agencies
tasked with assisting the exiles also cooperating, so to speak, with the most
reactionary elements. However, they must understand that their responsibility
must be total and declared. The objectives must be clear and pursued
tenaciously, even if the tactics vary.
The most tragic situation regarding the great powers
is undoubtedly that of the exiled groups from Yugoslavia. They felt discouraged
and superfluous in the face of the great powers' misguided actions when Tito's
ideological disagreement with Moscow was mishandled in the West, and especially
in the United States. Instead of bolstering the exiles' efforts at that precise
moment, the great powers, primarily the United States, did everything in their
power to remove them from the lists of anti-communist exile groups, even from
the list of "Captive Nations," with the latter's astonishing
knowledge. This historical error is also a moral one.
It reveals that the West not only lacks a firm
anti-communist policy but is also willing to cooperate with certain communist
movements should they, as a consequence of Tito's contagious example, break
away from the Moscow bloc. This so-called apparent realism brought more harm
than good to the West. Applied to the Cuban case, the logical question arises:
if American capital was invested in Tito's communism, why wasn't the same
approach taken in Cuba to distance Soviet and Chinese influence from the Western
Hemisphere and discourage internal communism? It is far more important for the
United States to have a clear position in the Caribbean than in the Adriatic,
where the situation is never clear or secure as long as communists are in
power.
With that attitude, American policy effectively
destroyed the political influence of the Yugoslav exiles. In reality, there is
no single unified group of Yugoslav exiles, but rather separate groups
depending on the countries that made up Yugoslavia. The politicians who
emigrated during and after the war and who held outdated views are either
already dead or dying. With them, an old world died in the country, one that
will never return. Neither before nor now in exile have these politicians
sought to resolve Yugoslavia's fundamental problem: the national question. The
great powers still respect Yugoslav legitimacy, and even Moscow, which
interferes in and stirs up all national and international problems in old and
young countries with multinational structures, has so far refrained from airing
any national problems in Yugoslavia.
The major Western powers fear the prospect of new
national problems arising, especially in Southeast Europe and specifically in
Yugoslavia. Both official policy and liberal American public opinion consider
Yugoslavia a creation of Wilson and, therefore, remain loyal to it. Among the
exiled groups from Yugoslavia, there are, broadly speaking, these divisions:
among the Serbs, unlike their position during the First and Second World Wars,
the prevailing view is that Yugoslavia is more necessary now than ever to the
Serbian nation. The Serbs support Yugoslavia because of their exclusive and
enduring interests. On this point, both the Serbian reactionaries and the right
and left agree. At the moment when a genuine federalization of Yugoslavia would
truly be feasible, with equality for all the constituent peoples and a capital
other than Belgrade, but In some central city of the country, Serbian
politicians would mostly split and tend toward the formation of Greater Serbia.
This calculated and fictitious stance of the Serbian exiles regarding
Yugoslavia aggravates the position of the Croatian exiles without making it
impossible.
The Croatian exile groups, although disunited in the
face of future alternatives, are stronger than ever before. Croatian exile
intellectuals make their presence felt on every continent. It can be said that
the Croatian exiles have clearly, unequivocally, and unanimously raised the
issue of Croatian national self-determination and the Croatian state. Although
internal dissension exists among the Croats, as among other groups, it is not
of a national nature but rather socio-political. The difficult test for the
Croatian exiles will come when the issue of liberation from communism arises.
To whom will the foreign ministries of the great powers turn? Experience
teaches us that they will turn to the Opportunistic elements will follow the
interests and orders of the major powers, often those unfamiliar with the
issues. This is precisely what happened during the last war and is happening
now with Cuba. Therefore, what is needed is not only a united bloc of
exiles—very difficult to achieve in peacetime—but also strong groups within the
country who know what they want and are capable of taking the reins in times of
crisis.
VIII
First fascism, then communism contributed to the
destruction of the old world, and while the fascist cycle is almost over, the
communist cycle remains to be completed. From 1914 until today, my generation
has sailed toward a freedom that we may not attain. Our ideal was that humanity
can only exist and progress in freedom, and that any form of government that
restricts freedom must, sooner or later, be overthrown by the will and strength
of humankind.
If humanity in the atomic age does not lose
self-control and the end of the world does not occur, I am convinced that the
principle of freedom will be the principal element that will end communism. The
fate of the world, in one direction or another, will perhaps be sealed within
the next 25 or 50 years. Two generations of free people who follow us have the
opportunity to solve the fundamental problems not only of the West and the
East, but of all humanity. I hope that in these generations, men worthy of the
mission of contributing to the liberation of the Croatian people from communism
and laying the foundations for a better life will appear in our country.
Jorge Krizanic
Jorge Krizanic, born in
Ribnik, near Karlovac, Croatia, in 1618, descended from an old family of
military nobility. He studied in Vienna, Bologna, and Rome, where he was a
student at the College of Saint Athanasius, affiliated with the Sacred
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. Even as a student, he was
enthusiastic about the unification of the Churches, and so in 1640 he moved
from Bologna to Rome in order to dedicate himself more fully to the problems
inherent in union, which from that moment on became the ideal of his life.
After graduating, he wrote a treatise entitled "Bibliotheca
Schismaticorum," which is preserved in the library of Santa Maria sopra
Minerva in Rome, according to H. Iswolsky, and demonstrates the extraordinary
erudition of the young priest.
Krizanic approached the
problem of unification not only from a missionary perspective, but also from
linguistic, political, socioeconomic, and, above all, cultural ones.
His work in Rome reveals him
as a dedicated student of Croatian linguistic problems, a field he would later
expand to include Slavic philology. The first fruit of his linguistic studies
was a Croatian grammar, which he sent to his bishop in Zagreb, but which was
subsequently lost. He also sent his bishop a letter concerning the union of the
"Vlahi" (i.e., "Vlachs," the Croatian term at the time for
Orthodox Christians). However, living in Rome alongside Ukrainian Orthodox
Christians, his missionary zeal eventually extended to all the separated Slavs,
and especially to the Russians, given their greater number and power.
Ordained a priest according
to the Latin rite, rather than the Eastern rite as he had desired, he returned
to Zagreb, where he remained only briefly as a teacher and parish priest. His
mind was occupied, and his heart drawn to Russia. He had read everything he
could find about Russia: accounts by famous travelers, reports, letters, and
"quaestiones disputatae" concerning theological controversies. In
Vienna and Rome, he made contact with all the emissaries, travelers, and visitors,
seeking to learn as much as possible about Russia, so that he became aware of
everything that was happening in Moscow, both in matters of religion and in
social, political, and economic life.
His original approach to the problem of reunification
was based on the conviction that the Russians, despite their estrangement, had
preserved their faith intact, so that evangelization was not necessary, but
rather reunification with the universal Church, to which they were bound by
many common ties. He attributed the separation of the Russian Church to
historical contingencies and a lack of understanding of the true nature of the
conflict. Krizanic maintained the importance of the Eastern rite and the use of
the Slavic language in the liturgy, opposing any attempt at Latinization. Two
centuries later, the Russian philosopher and apostle of unity, Vladimir
Soloviev, would defend the same thesis.
In a report sent to the Sacred Congregation for the
Propagation of the Faith in 1641, the young Croatian priest elaborated on his
ideas and plans, requesting permission to travel to Russia. In his report, he
asserted that the Russians were not heretics, but merely separated by
ignorance, and therefore needed to be enlightened, educated, and introduced to
Western European culture to improve their social, economic, and political
conditions. The Congregation carefully studied Krizanic's report, appreciated
his scholarly research, but did not respond to his request to travel to Moscow.
Krizanic, in a broad but fantastical plan, envisioned
the possibility of Russia uniting all Slavic peoples and, once reunited with
the universal Church, identifying with the Western world. In this, he revealed
himself as a precursor of Pan-Slavism, albeit a Westernized one, a path he
would follow until the end of his life, despite the many disappointments,
misunderstandings, and trials he would experience in the Russia of his dreams.
He was a man of vast encyclopedic knowledge, courageous, tireless, and fiery in
temperament, yet stubborn, imaginative, and impatient. He reiterated his
request, complaining of the lack of understanding, and insisted that he be
allowed to carry out his fantastic plans.
Fervent as he was, he embarked on his first journey
without waiting for proper permission. Upon arriving in Smolensk, Russia, he
made contact with the Uniates and enthusiastically began perfecting his
knowledge of the Russian language. Shortly afterward, after stopping in Poland,
he returned to Vienna to undertake another journey with the Austrian embassy,
disguised as an officer, attached to the mission traveling via Constantinople.
This gave him the opportunity to learn firsthand about the organization of the
Greek Catholic Church.
Apparently, his first visit to Russia yielded very few
results. He had some contact with crypto-Catholics and, it seems, with Fedor
Rtischev, chamberlain to Tsar Alexis, and with the Russian Patriarch. He
acquired, with great difficulty and at a very high price, a publication of the
Russian Patriarchate, intended to combat Protestant Catholic influences in
Russia, which greatly helped him understand the prejudices of the Russian
Church regarding Catholicism.
In 1652, we find him again in Rome, at the Illyrian
College (Croatian). The Congregation regarded him with displeasure, considering
his trip to Russia an act of disobedience. Nevertheless, his reports were
carefully examined, and after five years, so agonizing for his impatience, he
was officially permitted to return to Russia, which he did in 1657. He faced no
shortage of setbacks and disappointments of all kinds. He was sent to Galicia,
under the authority of a severe and rigid Latin bishop, who did not allow him
to dedicate himself to his research. His protests ended with his imprisonment.
He sought refuge in the castle of a Uniate nobleman,
and after two months, he went to Russia, passing through Ukraine, then
embroiled in civil war between the supporters of Russia and Poland. Krizanic, a
staunch Russophile, wrote a proclamation in favor of Tsar Alexis. Arriving in
Moscow in November 1659, he presented himself to the Tsar under the assumed
name of George Bilisa, posing as the son of a merchant from Bihac (Bosnia),
thus concealing the true purpose of his journey. He offered the Tsar his
linguistic expertise, committing himself to compile a Russian history, a
dictionary, and a grammar, as well as to defend Russia's cause against the
Poles through his writings.
In this way, Krizanic obtained the position of
librarian at the imperial court. At the time, the Raskol (schism) was
devastating Russia. As in the conflict with the Ukrainian Cossacks, Krizanic
resolutely sided with unity. His position as librarian, though humble,
delighted him. He believed he had reached a post where he could fully develop
his agenda. But after a year, due to a "glupo slovo" (a careless
word), as he himself put it, who exposed him as a Catholic priest in disguise,
he was banished to Tobolsk, Siberia. This was a denunciation by someone he had
trusted. He arrived in Tobolsk almost at the same time as Avakum, one of the
leading "raskolniki" (a derogatory term for Russian leaders), but
Avakum, highly suspicious and fanatical, refused to engage with Krizanic. He
had brought his extensive library with him, so he was able to devote himself to
intense intellectual activity. During the fifteen years of his Siberian exile,
Krizanic wrote his best works. He completed his grammar and dictionary, wrote a
treatise on Siberia, entered into correspondence with Western scholars and
geographers, and above all, between 1663 and 1667, wrote "Discourses on
Government," commonly called "Politics," and "On the
Providence of God," works in which he summarizes and clarifies his ideas
about Russia.
Both treatises were written in the Universal Slavic
language invented by Krizanić, with occasional Latin interpolations.
"Politics" deals with the ideal government and reforms, but with
consideration for the actual situation in Russia. In the treatise "On the
Providence of God," he investigates "the causes of victory and the
fact that the prosperous and unfortunate state of the republic is a matter of
choice."
In his exaltation of the future and of Russia's
universal mission, Krizanić agrees with the Russian Slavophiles, but with
the difference that he advocates a gradual rapprochement with the West, while
the Russian traditionalists want to preserve "the purity of their Orthodox
faith" from Western contamination. He gave us a surprising and accurate
definition of the Russian psyche: "Our great misfortune is our lack of
moderation in the exercise of power; we are incapable of following the mean; we
have no sense of proportion. We go to extremes and wander along the edge of
precipices."
Krizanic sent his two main works to the Tsar,
receiving no reply; they were filed away. One day, H. Iswolsky tells us, the
young Tsar Peter discovered them "somewhere in the attic," as the
historians say. Did the Tsar actually study Krizanic's grand plan? At least it
seems that, in some of his reforms, he followed the path indicated by the
Croatian; but to what extent? Professor Klyuchevsky writes in this regard:
"Reading Krizanic's program, we readily exclaim: 'It's the program of
Peter the Great!' with all its flaws and contradictions, with its faith in the
creative power of the ukase and in the possibility of spreading education with
the help of books translated from German and with the closure of businesses and
merchants who refused to learn arithmetic..."
All of Krizanic's attempts, after contracting a
serious illness, to regain his freedom proved futile while Alexis Mikhailovich,
Peter's father, was in power. He promised him pardon if he renounced his
Catholic faith. Krizanic indignantly refused, and believing himself near death,
wrote his will, indicating to the Russian people the only path to salvation:
union with Rome and Western Europe. Meanwhile, Alexis died, and his successor,
Peter's half-brother, granted him amnesty but did not allow him to return to
the West. He appointed him translator in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Finally, in 1677, he managed to leave Russia. Arriving in Vienna, he entered
the Dominican Order, but shortly afterward joined the army of Jan Sobieski,
King of Poland, and returned to Vienna in 1683 with the army that helped repel
and defeat the Ottoman Turks, liberating the besieged city. Krizanic died on
September 2nd in this last great battle between Western Christians and the
Turks, thus ending his itinerant and suffering life, a life fueled by the great
ideal of Christian unity.
The widely discussed question, "What is Russia's
place in the world?" was addressed by Krizanik in its entirety:
culturally, socially, politically, and religiously. His answer can be
summarized in the assertion that Russia stands between Europe and Asia and
should serve as a link between civilizations. Two centuries later, the same
concept was developed by great Russian Western thinkers, especially Peter
Chaadaev and Vladimir Soloviev. Krizanik had closely linked the union of the
Churches with the development of the Russian people. He was the first Catholic
scholar to expound on the religious ties between the two Churches.
This man of great zeal and vast culture held very bold
ideas at a time when almost no one, on either side, nurtured any hope for
union. "His erudition and the vastness of his program instilled fear in
the hearts of the uneducated and skepticism in the minds of the learned."
Nevertheless, his approach to the schism is accurate. His vision of political
development and religious destiny, his understanding of the Russian soul,
remain a valuable and useful source of study. The transformation of Russia into
a powerful empire through the adoption of Western technology is proof of
Krizanic's accurate assertions and historical perspicacity. He stood at the
threshold of a new Russian era; his Westernized Pan-Slavism was a dream. The
cultural dualism of the Slavic peoples continues to divide them into two groups
belonging to different worlds of culture and civilization.
We may disagree with many of Krizanic's attitudes,
ideas, and plans, but we cannot fail to admire his fervor, love, and dedication
to his brothers and sisters in Christ, which, in light of the current prospects
for the reconciliation of the Churches, reveal him as a brilliant champion and
precursor of unity.
Joseph George Strossmayer
Quite different from
Krizanic, in his life, position, and work, was the Bishop of Diakovo, Joseph
George Strossmayer (1815-1905), although he shared the same ideals, projects,
and dedication to bringing the Orthodox Slavs into the Western world and
uniting them with the universal Church.
Strossmayer was born in
Osiek, in the Croatian province of Slavonia. He studied at the diocesan
seminary in Diakovo and in Budapest. A graduate in philosophy and theology, he
was ordained a priest in 1838. In 1847, Emperor Ferdinand appointed him
chaplain to the court of Vienna and director of the Augustianum College. Two
years later, at the age of 34, Emperor Franz Joseph appointed him bishop of the
vast and wealthy diocese of Diakovo, where he remained until his death.
A man of subtle wit, great
talent, and vast humanistic culture, a brilliant orator—admired at the Second
Vatican Council—expressing himself in Ciceronian Latin, a true patron of the
arts and tireless promoter of numerous cultural works, Strossmayer left a
profound mark on Croatia, although some of his political views—he was for decades
the inspiration and virtual leader of the National Liberal Party—remain
debatable. It cannot be denied that he was the organizer of modern Croatian
cultural life. Many of the Croatian cultural institutions of the second half of
the last century owe their existence to Strossmayer: the revitalized University
of Zagreb, the Academy of Sciences and Arts, the National Gallery of Fine Arts,
to mention only the most important. He was also a major benefactor of the
Croatian College of St. Jerome in Rome. He built the seminary for aspirants from Bosnia,
then under Turkish rule, and the monumental neo-Romanesque cathedral in
Djakovo, adorned with paintings by renowned contemporary masters Seitz, father
and son, Overbeck, etc.
Today's Croats disagree with the great bishop insofar
as he was one of the main proponents of the illusion of cultural unity among
the South Slavs, and first and foremost among the Croats and Serbs. Krizanić
sought the solution in the union of the Russians with the Western world, and
Strossmayer, with his historian friend Raki, in the union of the then relatively
backward Orthodox Serbs with the Croats of Western culture and Catholic faith.
A true humanist, he wanted to make Croatia the cultural center of gravity for
all the South Slavs, who, in his view, had been designated by Providence as
intermediaries between Eastern and Western Europe.
It was inevitable that a Catholic prelate, in seeking
to bring Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs closer together, would encounter
the fundamental problem: the separation of Church and State. He did not shy
away from the crux of the problem; rather, he confronted it wholeheartedly. He
dedicated himself to promoting, discussing, writing, and acting in order to
achieve Christian reconciliation, with Strossmayer serving for half a century
as the principal standard-bearer for the union of the separated Slavs.
In the Bishop's mind, civilization was to serve as a
vehicle for attracting the dissenters. The study of culture at that time was
not as profound as it is today. Western culture was easily identified with
Christianity and, even more so, it was often imagined as the only true
civilization. Such confusions are not
accepted today:
The Catholic Church does not identify itself with the
West and its culture, even though the latter is inspired by the former. But at
that time, the West was at the height of its power and progress. The
progressive faith in human perfectibility permeated the minds of all
contemporary society, of thinkers, politicians, and economists. We find no
difficulty, therefore, in understanding Strossmayer, a product of his time,
when he and his collaborator Racki conceived a plan according to which all the
South Slavs, and especially those fighting for independence from Turkish rule,
should be integrated into and participate in Western civilization. By virtue of
being within the sphere of Western culture, coexisting with it and contributing
to it, Croatia should automatically become a cultural and leading center for
its Slavic neighbors—a center of culture, a religious center over time, and a
political center as well.
It should not be forgotten that Serbia, newly
recognized as a kingdom, was then effectively under the protection of
Austria-Hungary; its Obrenovich dynasty had pro-Western leanings, and there
were even attempts at incorporation into the Austrian Empire. Strossmayer's
political plans, therefore, were not without foundation. But the realization of
his aims required a fundamental condition: cultural unity. In his optimism,
linked to the illusions of his generation, he made a fatal error in judgment.
He simply assumed that the cultural unity of the South Slavs would
automatically follow from the historical juncture: the liberation of the
Balkans from Turkish rule, the national awakening, Slavic solidarity, and the
benefits of modern civilization.
In contrast, reality indicated the opposite path: the
Orthodox Slavs did not opt for the West, but remained rooted in
their Byzantine-influenced cultural and political tradition, strengthened in
modern times by the influence of the Russian Empire, a powerful protector of
the Orthodox Slavs. The fact that the Serbs belonged to the Eastern Church was
decisive. The factors of historical destiny followed those of religion.
Ultimately, Strossmayer's "Slavism," a Croatian and Western-oriented
ideology, became in our century an instrument of Serbian and Russian
expansionism. Strossmayer also failed in his efforts to bring the Churches
closer together.
Nevertheless, the idea of ecclesiastical unity guided
him in all his great endeavors, in his writings, speeches, and contacts with
prominent figures of the time. He was associated with Cardinals Rampolla and
Jacobini, British Prime Minister Gladstone, Lord Acton, the Czech leader
Palacký, and many others. Bismarck himself, in his attempt to end the
Kulturkampf, tried to establish contact with Bishop Strossmayer. He maintained
friendly ties with Vladimir Soloviev, a great proponent of the union of Russia
with Rome. He encouraged the unionist movement in Bulgaria and oversaw the
first edition of the Bulgarian folk poems of the Miladinov brothers. He
assisted with the new edition of the liturgical books in Glagolitic (Old Slavic
in Croatian script). He dedicated the new cathedral in Diakovo to the concord
of the Slavs and the union of the Churches.
His concern for Christian unity was evident in his
oppositional stance at the Second Vatican Council. In his statement regarding the
definition of infallibility, he said: "...quod definitione hac de qua
agimus, in effectum deducta, gregi meo, cui praesum multa pericula sunt
crearda" (...that definition which we have adopted, in effectum deducta,
my gregi, whose precepts have created many dangers).
But, despite everything, I am inclined to believe that
Strossmayer, as evidenced by the aforementioned speech and other circumstances,
was an anti-infallibilist by conviction. However, those who sought to portray
him as a rebellious and insubordinate bishop are far from the truth.
Strossmayer exercised his episcopal right to maintain his opinion during the
council, and once infallibility was defined, he submitted, remaining filially
devoted to the Pope throughout his life.
The most resounding refutation of these mystifications
lies in the fact that he maintained close ties with the Holy See for half a
century. He was a trusted advisor to Leo XIII and carried out important
missions on his behalf. In 1881, Strossmayer brought a delegation of various
Slavic peoples to Leo XIII, with the purpose of drawing attention to the vast
but unknown Slavic world, a feat that the Pope acknowledged by having
Strossmayer's figure engraved on the commemorative medal and, with the
encyclical "Grande Munus" of September 30, 1880, extending to the
whole Church the cult of the Slavic apostles Saints Cyril and Methodius.
Testimony of Vladimir Soloviev
We are pleased to conclude
this brief chapter by quoting the words of the renowned Vladimir Soloviev on
the profound impact of Krizanic and Strossmayer's unionist work on Slavic souls
yearning for unity in Christ's flock.
Two years before his death,
Soloviev published his acclaimed work "Russia and the Universal
Church" in Paris. At the end of the "Introduction," in a
"Postscript," he left us a kind of spiritual testament, in which he
professes his faith by recognizing "as supreme judge in matters of
religion the one recognized by St. Irenaeus, St. Dionysius the Great, St.
Athanasius the Great..." He goes on to name all the great Fathers and
Doctors of the Eastern Church, and especially the Apostle Peter, who lives on
in his successors and who did not hear in vain the Lord's words: "You are
Peter... Feed my sheep... my lambs."
After highlighting that the
immortal spirit of the blessed apostle in the government of his visible Church
needs a social body, first in the Greco-Roman world (Constantine's empire), and
then in the Romano-Germanic world (Charlemagne). “Then,” Soloviev continues,
“from these two temporal incarnations, the third and final incarnation is
expected. The whole world, full of strength and desires, but without a clear
awareness of its destiny, knocks on the door of universal history. What is your
word, peoples of the word? Your masses do not yet know, but powerful voices
arising from among you have already revealed it. Two centuries ago, a Croatian
priest prophetically announced it, and in our day, a bishop of the same nation
has repeatedly proclaimed it with admirable eloquence. What the representatives
of the West Slavs, the great Krizanic and the great Strossmayer, said needs
only the simple amen from the East Slavs. This amen I come to say in the name
of one hundred million Russian Christians, in the firm and complete confidence
that they will not disavow me.”
Let us hope that these two
“powerful voices” will continue to express, with greater effect than in our
time, to our dissenting brethren, that we are all “one in Christ.”
Servant of God Father Leopold Mandic
Krizanic and Strossmayer, as
mentioned, had confused the elements of the temporal plan with those of grace
in their unionist plans.
Their attempt to exploit the
sense of solidarity among Slavic peoples—to draw dissidents to the West and the
universal Church—ultimately proved counterproductive. Russians and Serbs have
also used Pan-Slavism in the opposite direction, first seeking to isolate
Catholic Slavs from the Western world and then to draw them to Orthodoxy and
Bolshevism, a result diametrically opposed to what Krizanic and Strossmayer,
promoters of a Western Slavism, had envisioned. It is therefore understandable
that the Croats felt wary of all forms of Slavism, and even the very idea of
Christian unity encountered a setback among them. Everything
experienced in this century as a consequence of the Slavic movement has had no
other effect than the mutual estrangement between the Slavic peoples of the
Catholic faith on the one hand and the Orthodox faith on the other.
Leaving aside the political
aspect, it should be emphasized that the problem of the reconciliation of the
Churches must be addressed solely on the religious plane, through the work of
divine grace: "Nisi Dominus aedificaverit domus..." While the
rapprochement of the Greeks with the West currently favors the work of unity,
this may not be the case in Russia. On the supernatural plane, the problem of
unity was confronted by the third Croatian precursor, the Servant of God,
Father Leopold Mandić, a Capuchin friar who spent most of his life in
Padua.
The Italians call him Father
Leopoldo of Castelnuovo, as he was a native of Herzegnovi (Castelnuovo in
Italian) in Dalmatia, born on May 12, 1866. In 1884, he took the Capuchin
Franciscan habit in Udine and, after a year of novitiate, made his religious
profession. Ordained a priest in 1890, he served in the Croatian cities of
Zadar, Kopar, and Rijeka before settling in Padua in 1906, where he remained
until his peaceful death on July 30, 1942. He was renowned as an apostle of the
confessional and gained a reputation for holiness due to numerous conversions
and healings attributed to his intercession.
Four years after his death, the ordinary process
began, concluding in 1962, and in 1968 the "positio ad introductionem
Causae" was made, and his beatification is now awaited.
Only after Father Leopold's death did it become clear
that the tireless minister of the Sacrament of Confession was above all a great
apostle of unity and that all the sacrifices of his life were offered with that
intention.
In the southernmost part of Dalmatia, where Father Leopold's
birthplace is located on the shores of the magnificent Bay of Kotor, the
Orthodox element has long been descending from the Balkan mountains, coexisting
for centuries with Croatian Catholics. This element, ecclesiastically and
nationally heterogeneous, now constitutes half the population in a
traditionally Catholic region, so much so that the current Yugoslav rulers
separated this region from Croatia, annexing it to Montenegro.
In that environment, a zone of cultural intrusion,
Father Leopold was born and raised. The tender and religious soul of the boy
Bogdan (Diosdado, his given name) soon perceived the difference stemming from
the separation of the Churches, and it was there that he felt the first divine
call to dedicate himself entirely to the unity of all his countrymen. A similar
case to that of Krizanic; both had been in contact with the Vlahi from
childhood; both, for religious reasons, began to work for unity, gradually
encompassing all the dissenting Slavs.
Bogdan Mandic, from a young age, wanted to do
something in this regard. But he didn't know what he should do. Once ordained a
priest, his heart longed to dedicate his efforts to the apostolate of unity.
But unlike his predecessors, he had no worldly project. His soul burned with
fervor to see his brothers united in one Church as soon as possible, and that
was enough for him. Finally understanding that his desire would not be
fulfilled, he submitted to the will of his superiors, which was the will of
God. He offered this sacrifice to God and vowed that his prayers,
mortifications, works, and above all, his work in the confessional, would be
dedicated to this goal of unity, and he offered himself as a holocaust.
The Postulator General of the Capuchin Order, Father
Bernardino of Siena, published a treatise in Latin last year with the aim of
highlighting this lesser-known, unionist aspect of Father Leopold's apostolate.
Father Bernardino brings to our attention a detail that is only now regaining
its full significance. Father Mandic, despite having spent almost his entire
life in Padua, that is, in Italy, absolutely refused to become an Italian
citizen.
During the First World War, with Italy at war with
Austria-Hungary, which at that time included the Croatian provinces, even
Dalmatia, Father Leopold preferred to be confined within Italy rather than
renounce his Croatian nationality. "He remained in Italy," says
Father Bernardino, "but by his blood he always felt Croatian." He
wished to remain united to his country of origin even through these formal
ties, to demonstrate that one can belong to the Croatian national family, to
the Slavic-speaking world, and at the same time be a faithful son of the Roman
Catholic Church.
To his Capuchin brothers in Italy, this seemed at the
time a certain "pervicacia et obstinatio," as the same author states,
and only now, when the question of union occupies the center of contemporary
affairs, does Father Leopold's persistence in not renouncing his national
identity appear as a work of Providence. Thus, one of his lineage, his brother,
became a model and a glory, destined to become tomorrow, God willing, the
patron saint of religious unity among the Slavs. The Croatian and Slovenian
episcopates have expressed this sentiment in their "Litterae Postulatoriae"
to the Supreme Pontiff, requesting the introduction of his "Cause."
In the case of the Capuchin friar Leopold, who always
felt Croatian, connected by his native language to Eastern Europe, it was not a
matter of Slavicism or nationalist exclusivism, nor of racist deviation, but
simply of the Christian virtue of "pietas," inspired by supernatural
motives, in order to remain united in some way with the dissenting Slavs, to
speak to them heart to heart, to embrace them as brothers, and thus draw them
more easily to union in Christ. Undoubtedly, his apostolate would have lost
much of its power of attraction had he renounced his nationality.
A profound sorrow filled his soul for the Eastern
Schism, for the wound in the Mystical Body of Christ. He never ceased weeping,
praying, and groaning, renewing his vows and sacrifices, so that the Eastern
peoples, whom he called "my people, my people, my brothers," might
return to the bosom of the Common Mother. In a brief prayer to the Virgin, so
beloved among Eastern Christians, he wrote: "I, Brother Leopold, to
fulfill your mission among the Eastern peoples, promise... to work for the
eternal salvation of that people. You see the conditions of my life, the
sorrows that oppress me: deign, I pray, to take my cause into your hands."
Of the many similar notes, we quote the one he made a year before his death:
"The whole purpose of my life must be this divine act: that I may
contribute, in my own way, so that one day, according to the order of divine
Wisdom that arranges all things, fortiter et suaviter, the Eastern dissidents
may return to Catholic unity."
He was not concerned with ecclesiological matters or
the historical circumstances that, for a millennium, had prevented a solution
to the problem of unity. He sensed that the moment of grace was approaching and
that divine designs would be fulfilled in history.
His life, filled with pain that tormented his frail
and small body, and his apostolate in the confessional proved that God accepted
his sacrificial offering. Only priests know the cost of spending twelve, even
fifteen, hours a day in the confessional. And Father Mandic endured this work
for forty years, without complaining of heat or cold, despite the great pains
that afflicted him in his stomach, pains that turned out to stem from cancer.
But his constant sacrifice was not being able to return to his hometown and
dedicate himself directly to his life's mission.
When he was informed on one occasion that his
superiors had just transferred him to Rijeka, his heart rejoiced, and he immediately
went to the church to give thanks to God. But his joy was short-lived. At the
urging of the Bishop of Padua, now Cardinal Dalla Costa, to allow him to remain
in Padua, where he was already highly regarded for his confessional ministry,
his superiors reversed their decision. Father Leopold submitted: "...my
ministry will be my guiding light in the meantime," he noted on September
10, 1935. He saw the means that would lead to the union of the Churches in the
intercession of Christ the High Priest, primarily in the sacrifice of the Holy
Mass, and in the intercession of the Mother of God. He also desired that this
apostolate be "to the mind of the Seraphic Father Francis... and according
to the principles of the Blessed Father Ignatius of Loyola," while he
professed a particular devotion to St. Josaphat Kuncevicz, the martyr of the
union between the Slavs.
Alongside the two Croatian forerunners of the union,
men of vast culture and renowned public service, and many others, stands a
humble Capuchin friar who, unlike other forerunners, is a reclusive soul who
prays and suffers in union with Christ, and thus possesses a transcendent
efficacy. While his predecessors may be criticized for their political actions,
the Servant of God, Father Leopold, while affirming his origins and his
national love, is completely detached from all temporal contingencies. He
trusts and believes that the "great deed" of union will be
accomplished by supernatural means, and, once this is achieved, many causes of
friction and enmity between Eastern and Western Europe will disappear. What did
not prosper through Pan-Slavism, God will bring to fruition through the
mystical substitution of merits, through the supernatural solidarity of prayers
and sacrifices.
The work, therefore, carried out by these three
Croatians and their followers is magnificent. Three men, driven by their genius
and initiative, embarked on the same ideal path, distant and arduous, when
there was no room left for a flicker of human hope. They undertook it with their
whole soul, heart, and mind, with a personal commitment that their
contemporaries neither attained nor could even imagine. All three were priests,
and all, at heart, were driven by divine love, which moves heaven and earth.
Father Leopold chose the most difficult path, and therefore the most fitting
and correct, for it was, first and foremost, an event of such transcendence
that no cultural, social, or political activity could bring it about without
the presence of the "digitus Dei" (God's hand).
If, God willing, the "Great Deed" begins to
materialize, Krizanic and Strossmayer will regain their rightful place, while
Father Leopold Mandic, should he one day be canonized, as we confidently hope,
will be proclaimed the Patron of the Union of Eastern Christians. Quod Deus
faxit.
Although the Yugoslav government-in-exile, based in
London, knew it could not decisively influence events in the country, and
particularly the relations between the Chetniks and the Partisans, its
president, General Dusan Simovic, was determined to achieve a kind of
cooperation between the two factions, thus preventing the internal struggles
that were escalating into civil war. He clearly understood that future British
aid to Draza Mihailovic depended on this. He hoped to influence the Partisans
through Moscow, with the support of the British, who, as will be seen below,
were acting in this way.
The Serbian ministers, who held a majority in General
Simovic's government, were not pleased with this course of action. In their
view, a new situation was emerging in Yugoslavia that had to be seized to
realize Serbian national and political goals, namely, to reestablish Serbia's
dominant position in the restored Yugoslavia and the Balkans.
All Serbian exiles, including the Serbian members of
the government, considered it their mission to carry out the national program
by exploiting the moral and political capital recovered, after the crushing
political and military defeat of 1941, by the actions of Draza Mihailovic, the
principal symbol of the resistance in the country. As a consequence of the
perceived betrayal by the Croats, they longed to obtain, even during the war,
assurances from the Allies that, once hostilities ended, the political
leadership of the Balkans would be entrusted to the Serbs, given their status
as loyal friends and comrades-in-arms.
For this reason, General Simovic's attempts were in
direct opposition to the views of the Serbian ministers in his government, who
argued that all moral and material support should be given exclusively to
Mihailovic. Simovic desired a compromise with the Serbian leftist, communist,
and pro-communist forces. This difference of opinion led to a cabinet crisis,
with Simovic presiding. On January 12, 1942, King Peter II appointed a new
government under the presidency of Slobodan Jovanovic, in which Draza
Mihailovic, previously promoted to the rank of general, assumed the portfolio
of Minister of the Army and Navy.
With Mihailovic's appointment, several objectives were
sought simultaneously. It was necessary to demonstrate to the Allies that
Yugoslavia, both politically and militarily, was still fighting against the
Axis powers; They then wanted to grant the Chetnik guerrillas the status of a
Yugoslav army, to facilitate, on the one hand, their position against the enemy
in accordance with international conventions, and on the other, to ensure their
supremacy over the partisan guerrillas. However, the most important aspect of
this appointment was that General Draza Mihailovic, a minister in the royal
government recognized by the Allies, could now, with full state authority,
represent King Peter and the government-in-exile within the country, thus filling
the vacuum created by the dismemberment of the state and the collapse of all
its institutions.
Most of those serving in the government, by assigning
this role to General Mihailovic, secretly hoped that, by investing him with
ministerial authority, he could, when victory came, legitimately assume power
on behalf of the government-in-exile, which enjoyed diplomatic recognition from
the Allies. This would eliminate and neutralize the rebel forces that emerged
after the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, forces that
favored a new order. At the same time, General Mihailovic's assumption of power
would ensure the continuity of the previous order and regime. In short, the
Serbian exiles wanted to regain control of postwar Yugoslavia through
Mihailovic and his resistance movement.
The role assigned to General Mihailovic could only be
fulfilled if his reputation among the Allies were impeccable and beyond
reproach. Therefore, Serbian circles did everything in their power to prevent
Allied public opinion from learning about the true and highly complex
relationships prevailing in the country. Consequently, the official propaganda
of the exiled government routinely denied any reports of collaboration between
Mihailovic's Chetniks and Nedic's supporters or with the Italian occupation
troops. When they could no longer conceal it, they argued that Nedic was not a
true Quisling, but rather a kind of Serbian Pétain, who, through his technical
expertise and cooperation with the invaders, was protecting the Serbian people
from German reprisals. Furthermore, they argued that there is a difference
between collaboration with the Italians, which can be tolerated, and
collaboration with the Germans, which is reprehensible.
During 1942, General Mihailovic's main task was to
recruit and organize his forces for combat at the time of the Allied landings
in the Balkans, whether in Thessaloniki or on the Croatian coast of the
Adriatic. This tactic, advised by the exiled government in London, required
avoiding engagements with the Germans and Italians in order to preserve his
troops for the decisive moment.
In contrast to this tactic of waiting for Chetniks,
the partisans obeyed instructions from Moscow, according to which an implacable
fight against the Germans should be waged in the widest possible sectors,
regardless of the sacrifices and reprisals this would entail for combatants and
the civilian population. The Soviet government, therefore, wanted, in the
interest of its own military operations, to create a kind of second front
behind the German front that would hinder German military actions in Russia.
This disagreement in the interpretation of the role of
the guerrilla and the tactics of the underground struggle further deepened the
contrasts between the Chetniks and the Partisans, raising political problems
that dominated the Yugoslav scene during the war.
Simultaneously with the reorganization of the Chetnik
movement, the primary purpose of the guerrilla warfare—the fight against the
Axis powers—was abandoned. Mihailovic, aware of his true role, devoted himself
to combating internal adversaries: the partisans and the Independent State of
Croatia, serious contenders for power once the war ended.
This focused program and the expansion of the conflict
led to rapprochement among Serbian nationalist forces, which, over the course
of the war, resulted in more or less open collaboration between the forces of
Draza Mihailovic—a minister in an allied government—and other Serbian
nationalist groups fighting against the communists in Serbia under the command
and protection of the occupiers.
By the autumn of 1941, several Serbian groups were
already openly collaborating. Not only with the Germans in Serbia, but also
with the Italians in Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, the Chetniks of
Draza Mihailovic and the units of Milan Nedic collaborated during the winter of
1941-42. There is no evidence that Mihailovic approved of such cooperation, but
it is important to note that he could not prevent it. As minister and official
representative of the Royal Government, he did not stop the various Chetnik
leaders in Montenegro and Croatia, who nominally recognized his authority, from
openly cooperating with the enemy (Italian troops), since he was politically
and morally responsible to the Allies for their collaborationist actions.
Due to the consolidation and increasingly powerful
communist character of the partisans (Tito's guerrillas), the concentration of
Serbian nationalist forces was also becoming more pronounced. This situation
must have aroused suspicion among the Allies regarding the integrity of General
Mihailovic's conduct. Official circles and Allied public opinion were unable to
grasp the opportunistic combinations, driven by circumstances, national and
ideological conflicts, and especially by General Mihailovic's actions, which
were based on propaganda fictions that prevented an objective assessment of
what was actually happening in the territory in question and its underlying
causes.
At that time, Allied public opinion was aware of only
two fronts: the Allied and the enemy, showing little understanding of the
communist threat or local details. Therefore, it was not to be expected that
Draza Mihailovic's role would be viewed through the lens of a complex and
multifaceted war, in which the problem of resisting the Axis forces would be of
secondary importance compared to the struggle for power after the war. The
Western Allies neither understood nor could accept Balkan arguments, where
tactics often overshadow principles and arguments have a different meaning and
application than in the West. In this different conception of what is allowed
and what is not, we can look for the tragedy of Draza Mihailovic.
***
The Soviets, particularly interested in achieving some
relief on their front through the Balkan guerrillas during the early stages of
the war, were dissatisfied with Draza Mihailovic's passive stance. Throughout
1942, they repeatedly demanded a radical change in the Chetniks' behavior. When
these protests proved ineffective, the Soviet government began to publicize
documents concerning the cooperation of certain Mihailovic groups with German
and Italian troops, ultimately leveling an open accusation against Mihailovic
himself, imputing collaboration with the Germans.
The British had sent a military mission to General
Mihailovic's headquarters as early as the autumn of 1941 and were therefore
well aware of the situation in Yugoslavia. Their sympathies lay with the
Chetniks. They successfully exploited Mihailovic's rebel movement for
propaganda purposes and initially did not oppose his delaying tactics. The
Soviet attitude, however, led the Foreign Office to begin criticizing Draza
Mihailovic's actions from the summer of 1942 onward, unwilling to further
strain already awkward relations with the Kremlin over this minor matter. Due
to the profound changes taking place in the country, dissatisfied with the
actions of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, and above all, eager not to
disrupt inter-Allied relations, Her Majesty's Government, at the end of 1942,
began to modify its favorable stance toward General Draza Mihailovic.
The first warning in this regard was conveyed to
Yugoslav officials in London on December 22, during a visit by the
Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry of the Yugoslav government-in-exile to
his British counterpart, Sir Orme Sargent. He told him: "...that the
communists are much more active than Draza Mihailovic and are the only ones
fighting in Yugoslavia; that Mihailovic stopped fighting last October, which makes
it difficult to counter Soviet propaganda against General Mihailovic."
Because it was the first time a high-ranking British
official had criticized General Mihailovic, Serbian official circles were
unpleasantly surprised. Their displeasure grew when they learned of the
conversation held on December 29, 1942, between Major Zivan Knezevic, head of
the military cabinet of the Yugoslav president, and Major Peter Boughey, a
British expert on military affairs in Yugoslavia. Major Boughey declared to
Knezevic, among other things, "that Draza, Mihailovic was a Quisling just
like Nedic, since Nedic collaborated with the Germans and Mihailovic with the
Italians... General Mihailovic's detachments are not fighting now, and it
matters to us British that the fighting begins now, not in two or four months.
When the Allied troops land in the Balkans, it will matter very little to us
whether Nedic, Antonescu, or General Mihailovic join us. By then it will all be
too late..."
Such public displays of the modified British attitude
toward General Mihailovic shook the self-confidence of the Yugoslav
government-in-exile. Its majority, from 1942 onward, based its policy
exclusively on the Chetnik movement and General Mihailovic. Such a policy
provoked conflicts within the cabinet and among the exiles, forcing Prime
Minister S. Jovanovic to reshuffle his government in January 1943 to prepare it
for the tasks ahead. However, he did not wish to proceed with the reshuffle
until the dispute with General Mihailovic was resolved and the doubts
surrounding his conduct were dispelled, as his continued tenure as Minister of
War depended on this. Therefore, Prime Minister Jovanovic, through George
Rendell, the British ambassador to the Yugoslav Court, decided to clarify Draza
Mihailovic's situation and ascertain the Foreign Office's position regarding
him.
According to Professor Jovanovic's official record, he
met with Ambassador Rendell on December 31, 1942. On this occasion, he referred
to the well-known statements made by Sargent and Boughey and informed him of
his intention to reshuffle the cabinet. Rendell replied that he should
investigate further, as he did not determine the Foreign Office's stance. They
arranged a meeting for the following day, which did indeed take place. On this
occasion, Rendell emphasized that "the Foreign Office's attitude toward
General Mihailovic had not changed in the slightest. The British government
would continue to support Mihailovic, and Colonel S. W. Bailey was recently
sent to Yugoslav territory precisely to further strengthen the ties between the
British and General Mihailovic."
Simultaneously with this effort, President Jovanovic
also sounded out Washington's perspective on the same issue. The White House's
response was favorable. Jovanovic therefore reshuffled his government on
January 2, 1943, becoming president of the new administration. The number of
ministries was reduced, as, with two exceptions, all its members were leaders
of exiled political parties, with the exception of two Croats: Dr. Juraj Krnjevic,
vice president of the government, and Jure Sutej, minister of finance, who were
considered Croatian representatives in the government.
The second exception was Draza Mihailovic, who
nominally retained the portfolios of the army and navy. Slobodan Jovanovic
wielded almost all the power, since in addition to his previous roles as prime
minister, minister of the interior, and acting minister of the army and navy,
he had also assumed the foreign affairs portfolio.
***
The British government closely followed all
developments among the Yugoslav émigrés and hoped that, following the cabinet's
reconstitution, relations would normalize, allowing the government to address
future relations between the peoples of Yugoslavia and its democratic order.
These issues were becoming increasingly pressing and of paramount importance
for the future of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, it soon became clear that Slobodan
Jovanovic's second cabinet did not differ from the first in terms of political
conceptions and procedures. Furthermore, given the military plans, the British
government could not wait for the normalization of relations among the Yugoslav
émigrés and decided to intervene to clarify the role of Draza Mihailovic and
his links with the Soviet-backed partisans. The aim was to influence the
reconciliation of the members of the exiled Yugoslav government and make it a
useful instrument for the planned Allied operations in the Balkans.
At the same time, the British government sought to ascertain
the intentions and position of the Soviet Union and, if possible, to get the
partisans, through Moscow's mediation, to recognize the authority of the
Yugoslav government-in-exile, which was in turn recognized by the Soviets, and
therefore, its representative on the ground, General Draza Mihailovic. The
direction of these efforts can be inferred from Her Majesty's Government's
memorandum of March 9, 1943, addressed to the Soviet Government. This document
consists of 11 points. After clarifying that conflicts between the two
resistance groups were becoming increasingly apparent,
Her Majesty's Government deemed it necessary to
coordinate these actions and, to that end, "wished to align its policy
with respect to Yugoslavia with the policy of the Soviet Union." It then
noted that as early as November 1941, Sir Stafford Cripps had pointed out how
damaging this division was and how necessary it was for the communist elements
"to place themselves in military affairs at the disposal of General Mihailovic
as the national leader." The same issue was also discussed with the Soviet
ambassador in London, Maisky, but without any result. Moscow was then asked to
influence Tito's partisans in its radio broadcasts to encourage them to
cooperate with Mihailovic. Maisky responded negatively in July 1942, arguing
that General Mihailovic was linked to Nedic and therefore could not be trusted.
The British government, in its note of May 28, 1942,
informed Maisky that, according to the information available to it, General Mihailovic
had indeed informed his government that he maintained ties with Nedic, stating
that many of the latter's officers were loyal to him. In the opinion of Her
Majesty's Government, there was no evidence to distrust Mihailovic, and
therefore the Soviet government could and should make a concerted effort to
ensure that the Chetniks and the partisans fought together against the enemy. Maisky never replied to this note.
The memorandum then emphasizes that the situation had
recently deteriorated considerably and that "the overall result is
Mihailovic's limited activity in recent months, as he seems to wish to
consolidate his position so that he can establish an orderly government, at
least in Serbia, once the Axis tide recedes." Her Majesty's Government supports
Mihailovic, believing that his organization could prevent anarchy in the
country after the war, and because he is a minister in the Yugoslav government,
the British support him as much as they can. The situation is also serious
because one group of guerrillas is supported by the British and a rival group
by the Soviets.
When advised by the British to cease fighting the
partisans, Mihailovic simply replied that he was the one under attack.
Meanwhile, Her Majesty's Government observed with concern that the Soviet press
and radio have been attacking Mihailovic, and therefore appealed to the Soviet
Government to seek a reconciliation of their respective views on the Yugoslav
question, especially as war loomed over the Balkans.
To this end, the public attacks should cease, and if
the Soviet Government were willing to offer its good offices to the Partisans,
Her Majesty's Government would then request the Yugoslav Government to "go
halfway to meet the Partisans." The British Government was prepared to
assist all elements, regardless of nationality or ideology, in order to unite
their war efforts. However, given the technical difficulties of establishing
contact with the Partisans, it requested the Soviet Government to facilitate
such contacts, inform the Partisans that the British would assist them, and
send a military delegation. The British government would provide technical
assistance, even for sending Soviet agents to the partisans, if the Soviet
government so desired.
The Soviet government did not reply to this British
memorandum. I. Zemski comments on this in the cited issue of International
Affairs: "The Soviet government did not agree with the British proposals,
believing it impossible to impose such a form of collaboration on Marshal Tito,
and maintained the justified view that Mihailovic and his Chetniks could not be
considered resistance forces."
Upon realizing that the Soviets intended to exploit
Mihailovic's stance and the internal conflicts within Yugoslavia, the British
resolved to intervene decisively. The pretext for British intervention was
provided by Mihailovic himself. At a meeting of his supporters in Serbia on
February 28, 1943, Mihailovic delivered a speech in which he attacked Her
Majesty's Government, in the presence of Colonel Bailey, head of the British
mission at his headquarters, for not providing sufficient support to the
Chetnik movement. Colonel Bailey reported this to his superiors, and on March
29, 1943, the Foreign Office sent Note No. R 2538/2G to the President of the
Yugoslav Government, Slobodan Jovanovic. The note was signed by Prime Minister
Churchill, acting as Foreign Secretary, as Anthony Eden was in Washington at
the time.
The note is transcribed below. In the English version:
"I have the honor to bring to your attention that
His Majesty's Government is seriously alarmed by the recent course of Yugoslav
affairs and increasingly concerned about the future unless steps are taken to
bring about greater unity not only among the various elements of resistance
within the country and among Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but also within
Yugoslav circles abroad. I am fully aware of how difficult it is now, under the
present circumstances, to achieve a lasting solution to the various problems
that constitute the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian problem. Nor is it my wish to
address this particular aspect of Yugoslav affairs in this note, except to say,
with due consideration, that, as far as I can judge, the divergence of views
and opinions is deepening, and that this seems to make it difficult for His
Excellency's Government to resolve even minor matters.
However, it is the situation within Yugoslavia that I
wish to discuss in this note." Note. The reports received by Her Majesty's
Government from its liaison officer to General Mihailovic and from other
sources leave no doubt that there is no unity whatsoever between the various
elements of the resistance, and that a veritable civil war is raging between
the forces of General Mihailovic and the Chetniks on the one hand, and other
resistance units on the other, and that in this struggle General Mihailovic
himself has become linked, directly or indirectly, with the Italian occupation
army. These reports, some of which Her Majesty's Government was hitherto
unwilling to believe, were confirmed by General Mihailovic in his speech
delivered at a local meeting on February 28, which was reported by Colonel
Bailey, who was present.
In that speech, General Mihailovic said that the Serbs
are now left without any friends and that the British, with a view to their own
strategic interests, are pushing them into operations without the slightest
intention of helping them now or in the future, and that the British are now
fighting in Yugoslavia to the bitter end. Serbian. He went on to say that the
British were striving to buy Serbian blood at the price of paltry supplies of
arms, but that he would never be a partner in such a shameful trade, so
characteristic of traditional British perfidy.
Far from being guests, the King and government of
Yugoslavia are in fact prisoners of the British. They were forgotten and
confined by Her Majesty's Government, which shamelessly injured Yugoslav
sovereignty when it negotiated directly with the Soviet government concerning
internal Yugoslav problems. BBS, with thrilling cynicism, ceased to support the
sacrosanct Serbian cause. The Allies' eagerness for deception was satisfied by
the untimely, hypocritical, and anti-Yugoslav action of the partisans, but the
Allies must know that, whatever they do and despite all their threats, they
will not be able to dissuade the Serbs from their solemn and sacred duty to
exterminate the partisans.
While the Italians If they are his main and sufficient
source of benefit and general assistance, the Allies will be unable to change
his attitude toward them. His enemies are the partisans, Ustaše, Muslims, and
Croats. Once he settles accounts with them, he will turn against the Italians
and Germans. In the end, he said that there was no longer any need to maintain
contact with the Western democracies, whose sole objective was to win the war
at the expense of others.
"You know that Her Majesty's Government's policy
has always been to give General Mihailovic its full support in the fight
against the Axis and to send him all possible material assistance. For two
years we pursued this policy to the fullest extent of our capabilities, and
that is why we are all the more dismayed by General Mihailovic's reaction. I
believe that words spoken in a state of emotion may not represent a balanced
opinion, and that General Mihailovic may be temporarily disappointed by the
limited assistance Her Majesty's Government has recently been able to send him,
unfortunately for reasons beyond its control.
You will understand that Her Majesty's Government
cannot overlook this incident, nor can it accept, without explanation and prior
protest, a policy that is entirely contrary to its own. It could never justify
to the British public or to its Allies its additional support for a movement
whose leader does not hesitate to declare publicly that his enemies are his
allies—whether temporary or permanent, it matters little—and that his enemies
are not the Germans and Italians, invaders of his country, but his fellow
Yugoslav citizens." And, first and foremost, the men who are currently
fighting and sacrificing their lives to liberate their country from foreign
oppression.
"I do not believe that this policy, endorsed by
the Yugoslav government, in any way reflects its views. However, since General
Mihailovic is a minister in His Excellency's Government, I consider it my duty
to bring to his attention the views I recently expressed and to propose to the
Yugoslav government that it immediately take the necessary steps to fully and
accurately inform General Mihailovic of its views on these matters.
Instructions will be sent to him to pursue a course of action more in line with
the attitudes of the Yugoslav government and His Majesty's Government."
You, I am sure, will understand that if General Mihailovic is unwilling to
modify his policy with respect to both the Italians and his fellow Yugoslavs,
Her Majesty's Government will inevitably have to review its current policy of
supporting General Mihailovic to the exclusion of other responsible movements
in Yugoslavia."
Sir George Rendel, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav
Government, delivered the aforementioned note to Prime Minister Jovanovic on
April 30, 1943, who then summarized the conversation in an official memorandum.
From this memorandum, it can be deduced that, faced with Churchill's firm
stance, Jovanovic tried to downplay the significance of Mihailovic's actions,
claiming it was "a mere faux pas in a speech," and expressed his
suspicion that, under the pretext of censuring General Mihailovic, there was an
attempt to "strike a blow against the government by gathering everything
that could be imputed to it."
He tried to deflect the discussion from specific, but
secondary, problems by attempting to neutralize British reproaches by
complaining about his own conduct. He alleged that the British had recalled to
London certain officers they favored who had mutinied in early 1942 against the
replacement of senior officers following the formation of Jovanovic's second
government. These rebel officers, along with General Simovic, hung like the sword
of Damocles over Jovanovic's government, representing a potential British
alternative to governing Yugoslavia. Rendell insisted that Churchill had been
surprised by the hostile tone General Mihailovic used against Great Britain,
while simultaneously describing the Italians as his only allies.
Prime Minister Jovanovic's maneuver was ineffective,
and the case of Draza Mihailovic remained at the top of the British-Yugoslav
agenda.
Sir George Rendell delivered the note, which we have
just summarized, to President Jovanovic on April 30th, arranging a new meeting
for the following day. At this meeting, Jovanovic informed the British
ambassador about the drafts of the reply to Churchill's note and the telegram
to be sent to Mihailovic on the matter. The minutes of this meeting indicate
that Rendell was generally satisfied with the draft of the note, but objected
to the text of the telegram. The following day, Note SPDVK 33 was delivered to
Rendell, along with the draft of the telegram to Mihailovic, requesting that
the British government make its observations known as soon as possible. On this
occasion, Rendell stated that Jovanovic had been informed at the Foreign Office
that further assistance would be provided to General Mihailovic only on the
condition that he cease collaborating with the Italians and attacking his own
countrymen.
Following these discussions, the Foreign Office sent
Yugoslav Prime Minister Note Y.P. 63, dated April 3, proposing some changes to
the telegram to General Mihailovic and demanding that it be emphasized
"that Her Majesty's Government cannot understand how you could have said
that the Italians are your only source of help," and that "it is
extremely concerned by your statement that you consider the Partisans, Ustaše,
Muslims, and Croats as your principal enemies and that you will turn against
the Germans and Italians after settling accounts with the former." The
Foreign Office proposed that Mihailovic should be made clearly clear that Her
Majesty's Government might re-examine its policy toward him and support another
opposing movement.El primer ministro Jovanovic aceptó las sugestiones
británicas y despachó a Mihailovic el cablegrama D.V.K. Nº 40, cuyos párrafos
especiales traducimos del inglés:
"The British Foreign Office has in its possession
the text of the speech you delivered at a local rally on February 28th of this
year. In that speech, there is an entire paragraph filled with attacks on the
British government, which drew its particular attention, especially the part
where you said that the Italians are your only source of help. The British
Government took this statement seriously and lodged its strongest protest.
Furthermore, the British Government is very concerned that you consider the
Partisans, Ustaše, Muslims, and Croats as your main enemies and that you will
turn against the Italians and Germans only after you have settled accounts with
the former. The British Government cannot endorse the view that the main
enemies of Yugoslavia, even more than the Germans and Italians, are its own
children, and among them particularly those who are fighting against the
Germans and Italians..."
"We understand that there were times when you
could not avoid encounters with the Partisans, but that cannot justify your
collaboration with the Italians against them. However beneficial Italian aid
might seem in the current circumstances, it would be repaid..." "at a
very high price if it were to jeopardize the much more important and useful aid
that Great Britain is providing us..."
"Bringing the above to your attention, I am
writing to you in my capacity as President of the Yugoslav Government so that,
in accordance with the British officers attached to your headquarters, you will
adopt a stance toward the Italians and partisans that will not make them
subject to reproach from either the British or the Yugoslav Government."
After the negotiations with the Foreign Office were
concluded and a telegram was dispatched to General Mihailovic, President
Jovanovic replied to Prime Minister Churchill's note with his own, SPVK 67,
dated April 6, 1943. A copy of the text of the telegram addressed to General
Mihailovic was attached to this note. Jovanovic shared Churchill's opinion that
the Germans and Italians were the principal enemies and that it would be beneficial
to unify all the resistance groups. He acknowledged the internal conflicts
within the Yugoslav government, but emphasized the unanimous agreement on the
necessity of continuing the fight against the Axis powers.
Thus, the incident was brought to a close, though it
created unease and led to a tense and strained atmosphere in subsequent
relations between the British and General Mihailovic, which, in turn,
inevitably affected relations between the British and Yugoslav governments.
***
Meanwhile, in the spring of 1943, the British were
preparing for a possible invasion of the Balkans, apparently considering
several options. One operation was planned along the eastern Adriatic coast,
that is, through Croatia, and another through Thessaloniki, as in the First
World War. A third alternative combined both operations simultaneously in the
aforementioned territories.
In connection with these preparations, the British
government sent a note to the Yugoslav government on May 7, 1943, informing
them that "the British Military Command is primarily interested in the
contribution that the resistance movements in the occupied countries can make,
within their capabilities, to the conduct of the war." If Mihailovic
fulfilled certain political conditions, he would be sent substantial support
for the operation "in the closest and most continuous cooperation"
with the British War Command. Among the political conditions required was
"that all collaboration with the Italians and General Nedic must end now
and forever... Extraordinary efforts must be made to cooperate against the Axis
with other guerrilla groups in Croatia and Slovenia, and under no circumstances
should any action be taken against the Croats and Slovenes unless they are
openly collaborating with the Axis..."
Based on this note, President Jovanovic drafted a
telegram for General Mihailovic, which he had previously sent to Foreign
Minister Anthony Eden as note SPVK 99, dated May 11, 1943. Minor amendments to
the text of Jovanovic's draft were accepted by the Foreign Office. By telegram
No. 1597 of June 11, 1943, General Mihailovic replied to President Jovanovic
that he had only received his telegram No. 306, dated May 12, on May 28, 1943.
He reiterated that he only fights against the communists when they attack him.
He is willing to cooperate with the British Command in the Near East, but he
received orders from the British, through Colonel Bailey, which he cannot
accept as grounds for any discussion. By telegram No. 1958, Mihailovic informed
the Yugoslav government in London on the same day about the content of these
orders. We translate the essential parts from the English below:
"What follows constitutes a detailed operational
decision. Its immediate implementation is required. This decision was taken
after a thorough examination of all available reports and the general
instructions of the Chief of the General Staff of the British Armed Forces. Its
execution is extremely urgent. The decisive factors are as follows: In view of
the possible Allied offensive, Mihailovic must immediately reorganize his
forces.
"General Mihailovic does not command a
significant fighting force west of Kopaonik (Mountain in Serbia). His units in
Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Bosnia are either annihilated or collaborating
closely with the Axis; It is difficult to assert that his units exist in
Croatia, Slovenia, and Slavonia. He is ordered to concentrate his forces in
Serbia, where he will receive ample support. Separately, the actions of
Mihailovic's commanders in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia
are discussed. The Supreme Command demanded that British radio be used to
denounce as traitors all quislings fighting alongside the Italians, including
Major Stanisic, General Djukanovic, and Mr. Jevdjevic, operational commanders
of General Mihailovic's movement.
In informing President Jovanovic about these orders,
General Mihailovic expressed his opinion on the matter: “The content of the
preceding orders completely contradicts the information from the British
Government, which was forwarded to me through the President of the Yugoslav
Government under No. 306 of May 12, 1943. Moreover, these orders from the
British Supreme Command in the Near East are inconsistent with the Constitution
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and with Yugoslav military regulations. Therefore,
I personally cannot respond to the British Supreme Command in the Near East, as
I believe I am not authorized to do so.” For the reasons stated, I am
transmitting these orders to the Royal Yugoslav Government with the request that
the Government and the Supreme Commander, His Majesty the King, decide on the
matter.”
Mihailovic then denounces as intolerable offenses the
claims that his army is practically nonexistent outside of Serbia. He complains
of these to the Royal Yugoslav Government. He rejects the order to “withdraw
into exile” his units in Serbia, which, according to that order, “should hand
over the remaining territory to the communists under the command of the
criminal Josip Broz, known as Tito.” “Only the Royal Yugoslav Government can
decide who is a quisling and who should be attacked by radio.” In such matters,
foreigners should not interfere in the internal affairs of their ally
Yugoslavia, the only one that sacrificed a million lives for freedom in this
war.
***
The British government's displeasure with General
Mihailovic's conduct and Churchill's demand that the Yugoslav government modify
its policy forced President Jovanovic and the other Serbian ministers to take
steps that would please the British while simultaneously saving the Chetnik
leader's precarious position, since the entire policy of the Serbian exiles
rested on his prestige. The ministers knew they could only save Mihailovic by
remaining in their ministerial posts; and to maintain their positions, they had
to satisfy, at least in part, the British demands regarding a course
correction. Faced with the choice between Mihailovic or a revision of the
political line, the Serbian politicians opted to abandon their hegemonic
program, replacing it with a program based on the equality of Serbs. Croats and
Slovenes.
Opting for this tactical compromise, Prime Minister
Jovanovic presented a draft political declaration to the cabinet in June 1943,
written in the spirit of a policy of equality. Initially approved by the
government, it nevertheless collapsed because Dr. Juraj Krnjevic, a prominent
Croatian member, had expressed doubts about President Jovanovic's ability to
implement the proposed program. This marked the culmination of the crisis of
the "political" governments. Another attempt was made to form a
"political" government under the presidency of Misa Trifunovic,
representative of the Serbian Radical Party, but it fell after only a few
weeks.
It became clear that the disagreements between the
Serbian hegemonic group and other ministers with federalist leanings were
insurmountable, to the point that the exiled government was unable to develop a
work program for the country's recovery after the war.
Subsequently, a "technical" government was
formed, headed by Dr. Bozidar Puric, in which General Mihailovic retained his
nominal post as Minister of the Army and Navy. This government formulated its
program in accordance with the political course inaugurated on January 6, 1929,
when King Alexander had abrogated the Constitution and decreed the theory of
the supposed national unity of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. Puric's cabinet
also failed to consolidate its position with the British, as it relied
exclusively on Mihailovic's resistance movement. The favorable course of the
war in the Mediterranean, with the possibility of an invasion of the Balkans
via the Croatian Adriatic coast, and the fact that the communist-led
"national liberation movement" could serve as a useful ally,
contributed to the British government's realization of the unpleasant truth
that events in Yugoslav territory would take a course contrary to its wishes
and designs.
Britain's subsequent stance toward General Draza
Mihailovic and his movement is clearly inferred from the memoirs of Prime
Minister Winston Churchill. In his book "The Noose Is Tight,"
Churchill writes that the British General Staff in the Near East, "which
supported the system of agents and liaison officers with Mihailovic's
supporters," considering him "the official representative of the
resistance against the Germans and of the Yugoslav government," in May
1943 "took a new course," "resolving to send (to Yugoslavia)
small groups of British officers and representatives without full powers for
the purpose of establishing links with the Yugoslav partisans, despite their
mortal enmity with the Chetniks and the fact that Tito, as a communist, was
fighting not only against the German troops but also against the Serbian
monarchy and Mihailovic."
The shift in British policy toward Mihailovic was
decisive for both him and the entire Yugoslavia, as from that moment on, the
partisans received Allied aid for their fight against the Axis powers, and
shipments to the Chetniks were suspended. Despite Britain's clear and defined
new political course, Mihailovic did not change his behavior, nor did the
Yugoslav government, now based in Cairo. The Serbian ministers, who held the
majority, stubbornly adhered to their policy of hegemony, thus widening the
rift between the British on one side, and General Mihailovic and the Yugoslav
government on the other, which sooner or later was bound to have disastrous
consequences.
Mihailovic's fate was sealed at the Tehran meeting
between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, held on December 1, 1943. Under the
pressure of the general war situation and the conflicts in Yugoslavia, it was
agreed that henceforth, in the interest of inter-Allied relations and the
continuation of the war, aid would be provided exclusively to Tito's partisans.
Prime Minister Winston Churchill had the unenviable task of communicating the
Tehran agreement to the Yugoslav political representatives in exile. During his
stop in Cairo, he met with King Peter and Dr. Bozidar Puric, then the Yugoslav
Prime Minister, demanding the immediate dismissal of General Mihailovic, since,
as he noted in his memoirs, "the King's only hope of returning to the
country was to secure, with our (British) mediation and without delay, some
provisional agreement with Tito, and that before the partisans further consolidated
their power in the country."
King Peter and President Puric, consistent with their
Great Serbian conception of Yugoslav politics, refused to abandon Mihailovic
and his movement, ignoring Churchill's advice. A few months later, a government
crisis erupted, and under British pressure, the mandate to form a new
government was entrusted to the former Ban of Croatia, Dr. Ivan Subasic. Hoping
to find a compromise between the exiled Yugoslav government and the
"national liberation movement," he negotiated an agreement with Tito.
With the Tehran Agreement, Tito's partisans were
recognized as the de facto Allied army, while General Mihailovic and his
movement were definitively abandoned. Thus, their ultimate tragedy was only a
matter of time. The fact that, at the end of hostilities in their territories,
there was only one army recognized by the Allies, the so-called Liberation
Army, controlled and led by the communists, proved decisive for the postwar
fate of the peoples of Yugoslavia.
Although fate did not lead
Father Ratkaj to California, his compatriot, Fernando Konschak, a member of the
Jesuit order, did, and there he became a distinguished missionary. Fernando
Konschak was born on December 3, 1703, in Varazdin, a few kilometers from
Ratkaj's birthplace, both hailing from the Croatian region of Zagorje. It is
interesting to note that three great Croatian missionaries who served in the
New World were born near Zagreb, the third being Father Joseph Kundek. His
hometown of Zagorje, densely populated, is a region of rolling green hills,
vineyards, and small farms, adorned with castles belonging to ancient noble
families, ruined old towns, and churches and chapels perched atop nearly every
hilltop.
Konschak's father, an army
officer, came from the minor nobility. After primary school, Fernando enrolled
in the Jesuit college in Varazdin. At the age of 16, in October 1719, he was
accepted as a novice in the Society of Jesus in Trenchin, Slovakia. By 1720 he
was a rhetorician, and in 1723 he was ordained a priest in Graz, Austria. He
was first assigned as a teacher to the Jesuit college in Zagreb in 1726 and
later transferred to Budapest. Teaching classical subjects—humanities
studies—he published a book of poems, Nagadia versibus latinis, in 1726. At
this stage of his life, he resolved to become a missionary among the Native
Americans. He waited a full year in Cádiz for passage and in 1730 embarked for
America.
From 1730 to 1732 he lived
in Veracruz, from where he sent an important letter to his provincial superior
in Vienna. In 1697, Father Juan María Salvatierra established the first
permanent Spanish settlement and Jesuit mission in California at Loreto.
However, the key figure in the founding of a chain of Jesuit missions in Baja
California was Father Francisco Kino. He was with Ratkaj's group when more than
20 Jesuit missionaries were shipwrecked in the port of Cádiz and arrived in
Mexico eight months after Ratkaj. He founded several missions in northern
Mexico, Arizona, and Baja California. Like many of his followers, he was not
only a missionary but also an explorer, astronomer, cartographer, mission
builder, rancher, and defender of the frontier. At the time, all Spanish
geographers firmly believed that Baja California was an island. In 1702, Kino
explored the territory northward and confirmed its peninsular status.
In his visionary plans for
the conquest of California, he intended to provide Baja California with a route
around the Gulf to connect the missions and settlements in Sonora and elsewhere
with those in California. Proving that California is a peninsula was of
paramount importance for further expansion into Baja and Alta California.
Father Kino died in 1711. After his death, the misconception that California is
an island persisted, so Father Juan de Ugarte undertook a new exploration and
in 1721 confirmed once again that California is not an island but a peninsula.
In the early decades of the 18th century, there was a
great shortage of missionaries. Then came a religious awakening. A group of
German, Bohemian, and Spanish volunteer missionaries came to fill this void.
They came despite the fact that some of their predecessors had been killed by
the indigenous people. Each of the martyrs was replaced by new, enthusiastic
missionaries. In early 1733, Father Sistiaga, Ugarte's successor, returned to
his mission with a new missionary, recently arrived from Europe, Reverend
Konschak. The old missions of Kino were restored, and new ones were founded.
Not even a new indigenous uprising in 1734, which resulted in the murder of two
more Jesuits, could halt this process.
To avoid unnecessary confusion regarding Konschak's
surname, it is worth remembering that, according to the prevailing custom in
the Spanish colonies in America, the surnames of European missionaries were
adapted to the phonetic and morphological forms of the Castilian language.
Because of this practice, it is sometimes difficult to determine the
nationality of these architects of civilization and progress. J. Bryan Clinch argues
that Kino's true surname was Kühn. The same occurred with Konscak's Croatian
surname (to maintain phonetic equivalence, we spell it Konschak in this work),
which underwent several modifications. Perhaps no foreign surname was spelled
with as many variations as his. The authors Krmpotic, Dunne, Bancroft, and
Decorme addressed how the surname Konschak should be correctly spelled.
Krmpotic mentions variations such as Consago, Konsak,
Conssag, and Konshak. Bankcroft adds Konsag and Konschak, the first being a
Spanish derivation and the second Germanic. Dunne cites the surnames Konscak
(as in its original Croatian), Konsag, Consago, and Consag. In Decorme's
Mexican work, Konzag, Conzag, and Konschak appear. In the "Noticia de la
California," which we will discuss later, the Croatian missionary's name
is written as Consag and Gonsag, and in some works it appears as Gonzago.
Consag is the form most authors use, and this is based on good reason: the
missionary himself signed his name that way, as can be seen in the Book of
Marriages and Deaths of Santa Rosalía Mulege. However, the form González, as
some Croatian and American authors erroneously claim in their articles about
Konschak, appears in none of the writings.
When he began his missionary work, the San Ignacio
outpost was the northernmost mission. For years, Konschak lived as a typical
missionary and colonist. Besides the spiritual work of educating the indigenous
people, guiding the catechumens, and teaching them various trades, Konschak had
to fulfill numerous administrative tasks for his mission settlement.
He also dedicated himself to scientific pursuits,
especially geographical explorations, and quite successfully so. In this sense,
the year 1746 is very important in his life and also holds historical significance
for California. Father Kino had already confirmed that Baja California is not
an island, as previously believed, but a peninsula. However, the official
Spanish opinion regarding the insular nature of California continued to
prevail. To provide conclusive proof of this and establish a land route to the
mainland, Father Cristoval de Escobar, at the request of the royal ministry,
sent Konschak on an exploratory voyage to re-examine the Gulf, reach the north
as far as the Colorado River, and provide irrefutable proof of California's
peninsular formation.
Accompanied by soldiers and Native Americans from the
Jesuit missions, Konchak departed Loreto on June 9, 1746. His arduous journey
along the Gulf Coast to the Colorado River lasted until July 25. He charted the
mouth of the Colorado River at the Gulf, thereby proving that California is
connected to the mainland and not separated by the ocean, as had been
stubbornly maintained.
Upon returning to the mission outpost of San Ignacio,
Fernando Konchak summarized his feat in a letter to Father Visitor Baltasar
(dated San Ignacio, October 31, 1746). He drew a good map that reflected the
peninsular character of California and titled it: "Shloo of California,
and its eastern coast newly discovered and recorded from Cape Virgenes to its
terminus, which is the Colorado River, in the year 1747 by Father Ferdinando
Cansag of the Company of Jesus, Missionary in California."
The Jesuit authorities sent his diary and map to
Madrid, where royal advisors tried to refute it. Juan de Ulloa used all his
imagination to deny the validity of Konschak's report, but ultimately failed.
It was Konschak, then, who dealt the final blow to the theory that California
is an island. Later, by royal decree, the new geographical fact that California
"is not an island but mainland" was officially confirmed, bordering
New Mexico to the north.
H. H. Bancroft describes Konschak's 1746 exploration
as the most significant event of that period, while another scholar of that era
emphasizes that the conclusive proof provided by Konschak regarding the
peninsular nature of California contributed to the development of important
land routes and, consequently, to the conquest of that entire important
territory. Jacobo Sedelmayr, a contemporary of the Croatian missionary who
worked in the Primeria region, wrote a letter in 1747 to his rector, José de
Echeverría, from which we transcribe the following paragraph:
"Father Fernando (Konschak) provided us with the
desired information that California is a peninsula. Although Father Eusebio
Francisco Kino saw it and constantly affirmed the same thing, because Father
Agustín de Campos contradicted him, the matter remained in doubt, which is now
resolved."
The map that Father Konschak prepared and submitted to
the authorities served as the basis for all other maps and charts of the Gulf
of California shores well into the 20th century. A copy of this map is held in
the British Museum and another in the Archives of Spain.
Konschak's 1746 diary was first published in Teatro
Americano in Mexico City. It was reprinted in abridged form in the well-known
publication Apostólicos Afanes, which was published anonymously in Barcelona in
1754. Then, in 1887, it appeared in the Mexican edition Historia de Nayarit,
Sonora, Sinaloa, y ambas Californias, whose author was Father José Ortega. In
the introduction to the new Mexican edition of 1944, Juan B. Iguinis proved
that of the three books of Afanes, only the first was written by Ortega. The
following two volumes, which deal with the explorations of Kino, Keller,
Sedelmayr, and Konschak, were written by the Jesuit Visitor and Provincial Juan
Antonio Baltasar. Francisco Zevallos, after Konschak's death, maintained in his
work *Vida del P. Fernando Konschak* that Konschak had written *Apostólicos
Afanes*, an assertion that Bancroft, who read Zevallos's manuscript in Mexico
City, refuted.
In the first and most important work on California,
*Noticia de California*, compiled by Miguel Venegas, a learned Jesuit
missionary working in Mexico and California, Konschak's diary and map were
published in 1767 with their lengthy titles.
In an interesting note written by the editor, Father
Venegas, added to the end of Konschak's diary, the historical importance of his
exploration is highlighted, definitively proving the fact "that California
is a peninsula, joined to the continent of America."
Two years after his celebrated exploration, in 1748,
Father Konschak was appointed visitor of all the mission stations in
California. The history of this period tells us that there were then 10 to 15
Jesuit missions in California. Konschak, superior of these missions, brimming
with vigor and new ambitions, dedicated himself to exploring the region, hoping
to find suitable locations for new mission settlements.
According to Father Dunn, in one of his laudatory
reports, Konschak was very active from his arrival in San Ignacio and that
"his Croatian energy would not have allowed him to rest or even work any
less rapidly." In just a few years, he baptized 548 Cochimí. During 1740,
he extended "an even wider ring to the north," explored the terrain,
examined the prevailing conditions, and discovered vital water springs without
which no mission could be founded in the Californian desert.
By 1751, he had instructed 448 more Native Americans
with whom he hoped to found a new mission. Another California historian, even
before Bancroft, Bolton, and Dunne, paid tribute to the Croatian priest,
praising his intelligent pursuit of plans related to the further colonization and
conquest of Baja California. The missionary, now visitor of all the Jesuit
missions in California, diligently compiled all information concerning the
geography, orographic features, races, and tribes.
In 1748, Father Konschak wrote a document entitled
"The Life and Works of Father Antonio Tempis." It is, in fact, a long
letter, dated in San Ignacio, October 1, 1748, and addressed to his superiors
in the order in Mexico. Following the custom of that time of writing a report
on the life and works of deceased missionaries, Konschak wrote a report on the
life and works of Father Tempis, a Bohemian native of Olmutz, who died in
Santiago, California, on July 6, 1746. This report was written after Konschak's
death by his provincial, Father Francisco Zevallos.
With the purpose of finding suitable locations for new
mission posts, Father Konschak undertook another long expedition in 1751. He
left San Ignacio on May 22, accompanied by Captain Fernando Rivera, some
soldiers, and about one hundred indigenous neophytes. They traveled through the
Sierra Nevada and the arid valleys of the Pacific coast until they reached a
point at 30 degrees latitude. Konschak befriended many Native Americans and
baptized some dying children, but he found no suitable place in those dry regions
to establish a new mission. The expedition returned on July 8 to the ranchería
of Piedad near San Ignacio. In Dunne's opinion, the enduring mystery
surrounding California spurred this second great Jesuit exploration.
In 1752, Konschak began construction of a new mission,
located 29 miles from San Ignacio at 28° 3' north latitude and 113° 5' west
longitude. It was named Santa Gertrudis. When the German Jesuit, Father Jorge
Retz, took charge, there were more than 600 neophytes instructed and baptized
by Father Konschak.
According to North, this mission began as early as
1751, and Decorme confirms this assessment by citing the first baptismal record
as dated July 16, 1751. Thinking about the future of the missions and trusting
that one day all of California would be baptized, including all the tribes he
had encountered on his last expedition, Konschak was nevertheless alarmed by
some serious issues for which he hoped to find a solution.
"It is a pity that the conquest of this very poor
and needy peninsula must be interrupted due to the lack of provisions necessary
to support the evangelical ministers. The resources provided by the piety of
the gentlemen and ladies, eager to save so many souls, have been entirely
employed in the missions already established and maintained to this day. May
Our Lady of Loreto, patroness of California, move the hearts of the devout so
that, with their wealth, they may supply the provisions denied them by this
barren and rugged region."
The success and prosperity of Santa Gertrudis spurred
Father Konschak to seek other locations to establish a chain of missions toward
San Diego. In 1753, he undertook a new exploration of the peninsula's western
coast as far south as 31° latitude. He was well received by the natives and
brought numerous Indians to Santa Gertrudis.
Repeatedly, he and Father Retz ventured deep into the
wilderness, exploring in all directions for water and arable land. On these
frequent journeys of 200 or 300 miles, he was often in danger of dying of
thirst. Endless stretches of sand and mountains were traversed by Konschak and
Retz with very little success. In 1753, they found an alkaline spring 200 miles
from Santa Gertrudis, but it was too far to establish a mission post without an
intermediate station. Five years passed before another water source was
discovered 90 miles from Santa Gertrudis, at a place called Adac by the
natives. As tireless as Konschak was, he wanted to establish a mission there
under the name of Saint Francis Borgia, and the necessary endowment was provided
by Maria de Borja, later Duchess of Gandia. However, Konschak was unable to
complete his final undertaking, as he died on September 10, 1759. This mission
was founded three years later by Father Retz.
Great was the work accomplished in California by this
distinguished and selfless missionary. Although he was 55 years old when he
died, Konschak was a veteran of many years in the missions. He spent 39 years
in the Society of Jesus, and of these, 29 as a missionary in America. In San
Ignacio, which is still preserved in all its beauty as a relic of those
glorious times when the priests colonized the peninsula, he had spent 22 years.
In addition to founding new missions, he cooperated in the establishment of the
mining town of San Antonio Real in 1748. It is remarkable, notes one author,
that Konschak and other missionaries were able to endure the routine of desert
life for so many years. Such a lifestyle undoubtedly hastened his premature
death at the age of 56.
Another author calls him "the tireless Consag,"
emphasizing his "exemplary virtues and apostolic labors," for which
"Consag's name deserves to be included among the most illustrious in
California."
Bancroft was the first among renowned non-American
historians to recognize Konschak's multifaceted work and paid him due tribute,
calling him a great missionary, explorer, and colonizer. Bolton honors him as
one of the European missionaries who played a distinguished role in "the
transplantation of Christian culture to the American West." In the Mexican
work of G. Decorme, S.J., Konschak is described as a great missionary, "a
great apostle," "the most prominent figure" in the last period
of Jesuit missionary activities in California.
Father P. M. Dunne, S.J., in his work Black Robes in
Lower California, pays great tribute to the "famous Consag" of
California. He emphasizes, as he does in other works, that Konschak was
Croatian and that he should be considered among the greatest explorers of
California.
A recent French work distinguishes Konschak—his name is
cited in three forms: Konsag, Consag, and Gonzago—as the successor to the great
Eusebio Kino in the exploration of California. Indeed, according to this
assessment, Konschak was the first to systematically explore California, and
his map was the first scientific map of California.
Beyond the activities we have discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, Konschak was a linguist. He knew several indigenous
dialects, which facilitated his contact with the natives he loved so much. His
native language was Croatian, but as an 18th-century priest and intellectual,
he had a thorough knowledge of Latin. Furthermore, he spoke and wrote German,
Spanish, and French. A great expert in mathematics, he was equally versed in
geography and geology, and also possessed extensive knowledge of the
construction of mines, roads, and dams. First and foremost, of course, he was a
missionary, and we can attest that he baptized—according to the records—at
least 996 Native Americans. As Dunne mentions, in the northern part of the Gulf
of California there are rock formations—Consag Rocks—that still bear the
explorer's name.
His fellow countryman, Bishop Martin Davorin Krmpotic,
published the first and only English version of Konschak's Life, written by the
provincial, Father Francisco Zevallos, after the Croatian explorer's death.
Zevallos (spelled Ceballos in some Mexican sources) speaks highly of the
missionary. He states that "Father Fernando was Croatian by birth. He was
born in the city of Varaždin in Croatia." Then, after a detailed
biographical sketch, he emphasizes that Konschak spoke the indigenous language
as well as the natives. "With remarkable regularity, he combined admirable
veneration and devotion by offering daily that tremendous sacrifice (the Holy
Mass) to God.
Despite their insensitivity, the Indians were moved by
Father Konsag's celebration of Mass. He incessantly desired to catechize and
baptize, 'and if possible, convert all of California.' He proceeded in a superb
manner to attract the Indians and win them to the Faith of Christ. With
resolve, he undertook works that seemed impossible to accomplish. He made
journeys fraught with danger. Nothing could discourage him; 'judging that what
he undertook would be for the greater glory of God, he did it fearlessly.' His
death deeply impressed the Indians, who came from afar, sobbing and weeping
aloud, to see their beloved father. Long after his death, the Indians would
come to his grave in San Ignacio and pray.
Adamic, in his book A Nation of Nations, p. 235,
states It is a mistake to claim that the Spanish changed the name Konschak to
González; he does not appear as González in any document. Roucek writes in his
*Our Racial and National Minorities* (p. 246) that Konschak was known as
González, which contradicts the truth. Furthermore, his assertion that Konschak
made the first known geographical map of Baja California is a blatant denial of
historical facts, since Kino was the first to map Baja California. Bonifacio
Soric was the only one to publish Konschak's original map in his *Centennial*,
as preserved in the photostatic reproduction at the Library of Congress in
Washington.
In 1959, the bicentennial of Father Konschak's death
was commemorated. The author of this modest work on the life and missionary
work of this extraordinary man would like to pay him the tribute he deserves.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that Father Konschak's work is part
of the contribution that Croatian immigrants contributed to the colonization and
progress of the Americas. Konschak, to some extent, continued Ratkaj's work,
although it is unknown whether he was aware of his compatriot's life and
missionary work.
In summarizing Father Konschak's life and missionary
work, it would be superfluous to repeat that he was the one who mapped out what
would later become the Camino Real, since without his splendid organization and
maps, Father Serra y Portolá would not have been able to undertake his great
work so soon. The beginning of the state of California would have been delayed.
During this period, he executed several sculptures,
more than 25 large pieces including portraits, saints, religious themes, nude
figures, and original compositions. The largest work exhibited at the Secession
Salon in 1904 was a plaster model entitled At the Fountain of Life, depicting
several intertwined, nude symbolic figures: Love, Youth, and Old Age, all
thirsting for the water of Life.
The Zagreb municipality acquired this composition in
1910 and placed it in the square in front of the National Theatre. For Carl
Wittgenstein, Mestrovic executed another version: At the Spring of Life, with
universal symbolism, and with the money he earned, he traveled to Italy and
then to France. From the same period date several compositions of daring and
original content: Timor Dei, a sculpture of an enormous bare foot with tense
muscles and convulsing toes; A relief symbolizing the old legend surrounding
the Skadar Building, with a woman impaled by fate on the city walls; the
monument to the Croatian Romantic poet Luka Botic, erected in Split.
The following decade, or the second period of
Mestrovic's art (1904-1914), inspired by the national and epic motifs of the
South Slavs, is characterized by its grandeur, its pathetic, vigorous, and
passionate forms. This cycle is also often called the Kosovo cycle, the
realization of which was Mestrovic's youthful dream, born from folk poetry. His
plan was to erect a "temple," a mausoleum, in commemoration of the
Battle of Kosovo (1389), in which many Christian fighters perished against the
Ottoman conquerors. The legends and folk poetry he heard as a child inspired an
epic style, devoid of religious content. It also coincided with the Balkan
Wars, a prelude to the First World War.
Mestrovic's project to erect a national shrine had
several precedents, from antiquity and the Roman Pantheon to the neoclassical
Pantheon in Paris and the Vaihalla near Regensburg in Germany. Rodin himself
addressed patriotic themes, such as in The Citizens of Calais. Moreover, this
first architectural and sculptural ensemble by Mestrovic was destined to fail,
as was his youthful dream of uniting the South Slavic peoples, so disparate and
antagonistic from a political, cultural, historical, and religious standpoint.
Besides lacking unity and harmony, the construction of the pantheon was
stubbornly resisted by the Byzantine-minded Serbs, who repudiated and abhorred
statuary in general in churches and, moreover, many of the classical, Gothic,
and Renaissance elements contained in the project, not to mention the very
concept, which was alien to them, rooted in Catholicism and Western traditions.
Mestrovic exhibited in Paris in 1905 at the Salon
d'Automne, and his works aroused particular interest from the elderly Rodin.
From that time on, a close friendship and mutual admiration united them. His
first major exhibition took place at the Vienna Secession, comprising more than
fifty sculptures of varying sizes, mostly related to his project for the Kosovo
temple. Art critics and historians such as Arthur Roessler and Joseph
Strzygowski praised the vigor, originality, and technical mastery of the
figures and materials, particularly highlighting the artistic and symbolic
value of Widows, Memories, and Widow with Child.
The same exhibition was held a year later in Zagreb,
the capital of Croatia. Portraits of his parents, a complete expression of the
authentic peasant type—plain, simple, suffering, and kind—also date from this
period. The following year, Mestrovic exhibited the same group at the
International Exhibition in Rome, which brought him worldwide fame and awarded
him first prize. This period of Mestrovic's art is characterized by vigorous
expression, grandeur, monumentality, and heroic patriotic themes drawn from the
history and epics of both Croatia and other South Slavic peoples.
During the First World War, he lived in exile in
Italy, France, and England, alternating his sculptural work with political
activity. He undertook less ambitious projects, including several religious
themes: crucifixes, Pietàs, Saint John the Baptist, and busts of Leonardo
Bistolfi and the elderly Rodin. In 1915, he exhibited at the Albert Museum in
London and in several other cities in the United Kingdom. British critics
highlighted the powerful élan, dynamic forms, and architectural adaptability of
his sculptures.
In addition to numerous portraits and busts created
during the war, Mestrovic began to increasingly focus on religious themes,
moving from national and local motifs to universal subjects, expressing the
intrinsically human ideals of freedom, justice, charity, and kindness. Along
with his superb relief, Archers of Domagoj (a medieval Croatian prince), he
carved an elongated wooden crucifix and created the first panel of his cycle of
the Life and Passion of Christ, which he would complete after the Second World
War. The devastation, tragedies, and suffering caused by the war find their
profound expression in the Pietàs and Virgins with Child.
His statuary of a national character runs parallel to
biblical and evangelical motifs and figures: Prophets and various Moseses,
symbols of the moral authority of the law. His style enters a new phase,
imbuing his movements with elongated forms and designs reminiscent of archaic
Byzantine art. A heart-rending pain and the contortion of faces and figures
give his new creations a spiritual and sublimated expression unknown in his earlier,
more realistic and naturalistic works. With the end of the First World War,
Mestrovic's creative maturity begins.
With feverish zeal, he dedicates himself to the
realization of his projects. Monuments and statues of the heroes and
illustrious figures of Croatian history emerge. First and foremost, the
monumental votive chapel of Our Lady of the Rosary stands out. Our Lady of the
Angels—the Racic family mausoleum—is built on the small peninsula, nestled
among cypress trees and overlooking the Adriatic Sea. This church, designed and
built by Mestrovic, contains several of his sculptures and bas-reliefs, in a
new style characterized by greater purification and spirituality. In 1919, he
held a major exhibition at the Petit Palais in Paris.
Then, in 1924–1925, he organized exhibitions in New
York (Brooklyn Museum), Chicago (Art Institute), Detroit, Buffalo, and other
North American cities. On this occasion, the city of Chicago commissioned him
to create two equestrian statues of Native Americans for Grand Park. The
following year, he executed the monument to Gregory, the medieval Croatian
bishop of Nin, which he gifted to the city of Split. At the same time,
Mestrovic directed the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb, injecting new energy
into the institution and elevating its prestige. Under his guidance and
direction, several talented young artists were developing their skills.
In 1930, in addition to the powerfully expressive
equestrian statue of Simón Bolívar, he designed and built his magnificent
residence in Split, a combination of various styles that harmonize with the
enchanting seaside landscape and the stark mountains in the background. He
furnished his mansion with numerous sculptures and paintings, which he later
donated, along with his Zagreb gallery, to the Croatian people. His glory and
renown reached their zenith. The sculptor imbued his compositions with greater
synthesis and restraint, fully realized in the impressive marble sculpture
Croatian History.
In 1933, the French government organized a solo
exhibition of Mestrovic's works at the Jeu de Paume. The same exhibition was
subsequently presented in Prague, Berlin, Munich, Vienna, and Graz. In the
following years, he designed and executed the Monument to the Unknown Soldier,
erected on Avala Hill, not far from Belgrade. In Otavice, to honor the memory
of his parents, he built the Chapel of Saint Redeemer, adorning it with
exquisite statues and superb reliefs and bas-reliefs.
He participated in the restoration of the old Church
of St. Mark, located in the old part of Zagreb. For the high altar, he created
a large, elongated, and stylized Crucifix, and for the side altars, the Virgin
and Child and the Pietà, all bronze statues. In stone, he sculpted the figure
of St. Mark, patron saint of the church, "The Redeemer at the Tomb,"
"The Carol," and a triptych depicting the Annunciation, the Nativity,
and the Presentation of the Child Jesus in the Temple.
Around the same time as this work, Mestrovic designed
a memorial church dedicated to Our Lady in Biskupija, a modest village near his
birthplace. The church was built in memory of the medieval Croatian king
Zvonimir and very close to the site of an eleventh-century Catholic church
built in the Croatian medieval style. This small church resembles the style of
old Croatian basilicas.
Mestrovic adorned the church with several statues,
including a marble Virgin and Child (the Virgin dressed as a peasant woman from
the region) and a figure of Christ the King placed above the portal. The church
was desecrated and damaged, and the sculptures destroyed, during the last war
by Serbian nationalist guerrillas under Draza Mihailovic, who, in their hatred
and anti-Catholic and anti-Croatian proselytizing, did not hesitate to destroy
the works of the sculptor, who had glorified and popularized so many
outstanding figures and episodes in Serbian national history.
During this period, Mestrovic, among other
commissions, designed and created the monument to the Romanian statesman Ion
Bratianu, erected in Bucharest. For the same city, he made two large equestrian
statues in bronze, one of King Carol I and the other of King Ferdinand I. When
the Russians occupied Bucharest in 1944, they dismantled both statues. Two
years before the outbreak of World War II, Mestrovic decided to return to Split
and complete the cycle of bas-reliefs with Gospel themes, begun during World
War I.
To provide a suitable space and setting for these
works, Mestrovic rebuilt a chapel in an ancient, primitive style on a small
promontory, along with a cloister, using stones he found there from the
partially ruined chapel and cloister dating back to the 12th century. Once the
architectural structure was complete, Mestrovic placed the completed wooden
bas-reliefs in the chapel, adding statues of Christ, the Virgin Mary, the
Evangelists, and the central figure of Saint John of the Apocalypse. In
addition to these, Mestrovic designed several other architectural structures,
including the Fine Arts Pavilion in Zagreb and the Votive Church of Christ the
King, built to commemorate the millennium of the founding of the Croatian
kingdom.
In 1942, he was given a dignified representation in
the Pavilion of the Independent State of Croatia at the Venice Biennale. He
then moved to Rome, where he executed a bust of Pope Pius XII, several pieces
for the Croatian Institute of St. Jerome in Rome, a large-scale Pietà, and the
expressive and monumental relief Stigmata of St. Francis for the church of
Santa Maria Mediatrice. Shortly afterward, he moved to Switzerland, where he resided
for three years, partly in Lausanne and partly in Geneva. After the war,
despite the depressing nostalgia and Tito's flattering calls to return to his
country and continue his work, he refused to go back to his homeland, enslaved,
deprived of national freedom and human rights.
The unspeakable suffering and tragedies unleashed by
the Second World War, which he experienced firsthand, constituted the starting
point of a new style, a new vision and approach in Mestrovic's work, fully
reflected in the solo exhibition of his sculptures held in 1947 at the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. It was the first time in the annals of
the Metropolitan Museum that a sculptor was honored with a living exhibition.
The figure of Job, twisted and torn by pain, was no longer a poetic expression
of the sculptor but a testament to the many tragedies and horrors of war.
The religious character of his art became increasingly
pronounced, more spiritualized; more stripped of the anecdotal and episodic; it
became a pure symbol, an embodied message of human and Christian values. From
this period, several studies of the Evangelists, the statue of Saint Francis,
the sorrowful Pietà, and above all, the Women at the Foot of the Cross are
notable.
In 1947, Mestrovic was appointed Professor of Fine
Arts at Syracuse University, New York, and from 1955 until his death, he held
the same professorship at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend.
One of the distinctive features of Mestrovic's
portraits is his emphasis on expressive character. Hence his interest in
prominent figures, both biblical and historical, national, and universal; hence
also his numerous studies of Saint Jerome, his compatriot and Patriarch of the
Church; the figure of Pope Sixtus V, reformer and builder, who completed St.
Peter's Basilica in Rome, of Croatian descent and patron of the Croatian
hospice in Rome; and several portraits of his close friend, the great and
righteous Cardinal Louis Stepinac.
The previous muscular tension gives way to spiritual
ecstasy (Mary Magdalene at the foot of the Cross). Instead of the contorted
forms of his primitive Widows from the Kosovo cycle, we find exquisite movement
in Psyche and Persephone Supplicant. The classical figure of Venus takes on a
less pagan and sensual interpretation.
The list of works Mestrovic produced in the United
States is impressive. It includes the project for the enormous monument
dedicated to the Jews, victims of racial persecution; numerous statues for
American churches, institutes, and schools; as well as several portraits,
busts, and the gigantic and magnificent Pietà. He also executed the monuments
of Mila Gojsalic, Andrija Kacic Miosic, Saint John the Baptist, Saint Anthony,
and others that he gifted to the Croatian people. He also created the monument
to the Montenegrin poet Petar Njegos and to Father López de Mendoza, who in
1565 celebrated the first Mass in what is now the United States. These
monuments, the work and gift of this great son of Croatia, will remain for
centuries as a testament to, and an inspiration for, the spirit of freedom that
lies dormant and vigilant behind the iron curtain of silence imposed by the
communists.
After the many uncertain paths taken by experimental
art in our century, and after the recent consecration of abstract art, the
powerful figure of Mestrovic stands like a leafy, ancient tree, rich in fruit
and firmly rooted. Although many may see him as a survivor of "a world
dreamed up in the classical manner," no one who appreciates sculptural
values will deny his historical importance and greatness.
Mestrovic never attempted to distance himself from the past for the mere sake
of a fashionable contemporary conception. There is a clear affinity between pre-classical
and classical sculpture in Mestrovic's vast artistic repertoire and
"mythology." However, if the past is revived in the present through
his extensive statuary, many elements of the future are also present, to such
an extent that his early works had an avant-garde character.
Mestrovic's masterpieces, especially his religious
themes, possess a timeless quality and are not dependent on any one style or
artistic expression. More than the art of the classical periods, he was drawn
to the archaic art of the Assyrians, Egyptians, Crete, and Mycenaeans, the
early Hellenic art before the time of Pericles, and the Romanesque and Gothic
art of the Middle Ages, due to their universal character and their religious,
ethical, and Higher-order social forces, with the impulse that elevates
humankind toward God. As their worldview expands, individual aspirations and
sufferings are expressed in epic terms, becoming perennial and monumental,
stripped of all incidental and literary elements. In the newest cycle of this
giant, on par with Michelangelo and Rodin, refined expression, spiritualized
matter, and lyrical elevation are manifested to the highest degree.
A Case of Extermination of the Muslim Population in
Yugoslavia
In the article "On the
Nationality of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina" in Issue No. 3-4,
Year II of our journal, Professor Dinko A. Tomasic refers (pp. 178-9) to the
case of the horrific extermination of the Muslim population of Pavino Polje and
Sehovic by Orthodox fanatics, described by the Montenegrin politician and
writer Milovan Djilas in his book "Land Without Justice" (Editorial
Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1959). For documentary purposes, we transcribe a
few pages from this book.
On pp. 91-93, Djilas refers
to the atrocities committed in regions with Muslim populations, where power,
after the defeat of Austria-Hungary in 1918, fell into the hands of the
Montenegrins.
"It was as if a
tremendous fury, a great fire, had suddenly swept through the entire region.
Everyone rose up—young and old, women and even children—to plunder the Muslims
in Sandzak. Even men who were not easily strayed, who had led lives of
righteousness and austerity, lost their heads. Many felt not the desire to
gain, but merely the fear of being left behind, of not allowing someone else to
keep something they themselves could seize. Everyone knew that this kind of
theft was a sin, but everyone persisted as if afraid of losing something great
and fatal. It was like a mass migration or a religious frenzy.
Even those who opposed the
pillaging and tried to persuade others not to give in to the looting, gave in
to it themselves, for nothing could be done to stop or guide the events. Men
came from other regions, from all over Montenegro, driven, it seemed, by some
irresistible instinct, by an exciting scent." “Not even my mother
refrained, although she always said that stolen goods are cursed and that no
one ever found happiness in looting. In truth, she never took part in open
theft. Her sights were set on wheat. The guerrillas were distributing goods
from an Austrian depot in Bijelo Polje, and our house, which had always been
hospitable to the guerrillas, received a good quantity, supplemented by a
Muslim driver. But the driver was snatched from my mother's hands and
murdered.”
All of this is merely a
retelling of what happened during the last century, when the Montenegrins
conquered the city of Kolasin, which had been under Turkish control. This is
what pp. 37-39 and 144-45 refer to.
"My father's brothers,
who were already married, built mud houses on the new land, the former estate
of a beg, and began a new life. But in the village itself, there wasn't enough
land for my father. The village land had already been distributed among the new
settlers who, after the war of 1875-77, had descended from the mountains toward
the Muslim holdings like hungry wolves upon a flock of sheep."
"Almost all the land in
Kolasin had been taken from the Muslims, whom the Montenegrins killed or
expelled after their victory. Even their cemeteries were leveled and plowed:
The bloody enmity between the two faiths had been so great that the Muslims
themselves withdrew, abandoning their homes and farms..."
"The Muslim houses and
mosques had already been demolished, and their cemeteries leveled as if they
had never lived or ruled there. Not a single Muslim remained in the town or the
entire region." In 1942, the victims were the villages of Pavino Polje and
Sekovici. The event that sparked the massacre of Muslims was the ambush and
murder of a Montenegrin, Bosko Boskovic, by fellow Montenegrins. But, as Djilas
(pp. 190-95) points out, the murder had taken place in Sandzak, on the other
side of the Tara River, long a bloody border between two faiths. Consequently,
it was not difficult to incite the masses to a punitive massacre of Muslims.
"Some politicians wished to weaken the strength
and unity of the Muslims, who were banding together after their setbacks during
the war. And they incited the uprising populace to organize a crusade against
the Muslims."
"Immediately after Bosko's burial, without any special
consultation, the Poljani brothers and others with them took their hidden
rifles and marched against the Muslims. Half of them were unarmed, but weapons
were unnecessary. The Muslim population against whom they marched was also
unarmed, and most of them were not warriors, except for those who lived along
the original border, the Tara; most of whom had moved inland in 1912 (or 1918).
The Montenegrins were not particularly organized. They spontaneously placed
themselves under the command of the former officers, now retired, with whom
they had marched and whom they involved in the raid."
"There was never a campaign like this, nor is it
possible to imagine that such a thing latent in what is called the national
soul. The pillaging of 1918 was child's play compared to this: Most of the
crusaders were ashamed afterward of what happened and what they did. But...
they did it. My father intervened, although he was not particularly given to
cruelty, no more so than any other Montenegrin. He never wanted to talk about
it..."
"The police officers in the small town beyond the
Tara, as well as the civil authorities in the communities, were almost all
Montenegrins, and they were in the hands of the rioting mobs. In Sahovici, the
authorities informed the gendarmes that a group of Muslims, in custody under
the pretext that their lives were in danger, were being transferred to Bijelo
Polje. The Montenegrins waited for them at a convenient location and murdered
them near the cemetery in Sahovici. About fifty prominent Muslims were killed.
A similar attempt was made against the Muslims of Bijelo Polje, a working-class
town and peaceful. They too were taken to Sahovici with safe passage. But at
the last minute, a Serbian army officer prevented treachery and murder.
"The destruction of Muslim settlements and the
killing of Muslims reached such proportions that the army was sent to
intervene; the police authorities remained passive and insecure. The incident
devolved into a small-scale religious war, but one in which people died on both
sides. If it is true, as a rumor later claimed, that Belgrade wished to exert
pressure on the Muslim party, which is quite likely, the affair turned out to
be much larger than expected. Neither Belgrade nor the leaders of the mob could
control it."
"Despite all this, some did not lose their lives.
Following the tradition of their ancestors, the mob killed only males over the
age of ten, or fifteen, or eighteen, depending on the mercy of the murderers.
Amid the pillaging and looting, there were also rapes, unheard of among the
ancient Montenegrins." "No sooner had the army appeared than the
crowd realized the situation was serious and immediately withdrew. After that,
the Muslim villages slowly declined; the Muslims of that region began to
emigrate to Turkey, selling their lands for next to nothing. The Sahovici
district and part of Bijelo Polje were emptied, partly as a result of the
massacre and partly out of fear. The Muslims were replaced by
Montenegrins."
"The affair produced general horror, even among
those who had devised it. My older brother and I felt genuine dread. We blamed
our father for being one of the leaders of the riot. He himself used to say
afterward that it was good fortune. Besides, there were many unsettled scores
from days gone by. Carefully chosen assassins waited six days and six nights
for Bosko in the same place... But the leaders who organized the crime didn't
lift a finger to prevent the slaughter of the Muslims. They understood that the
crime of Bosko's murder was just a pretext, and they secretly rejoiced that
Bosko and the Muslims were eliminated in the same sweep."
"Sekula, the one who had severed the tendons of
the Muslims, hated the Turks more out of innate hatred than criminal
tendencies. He, too, was dissatisfied with the political situation and detested
the existing forces, the gendarmes. He felt that his sacrifices and exploits
during the war went unrewarded. He had previously robbed and killed Muslims in
secret. He was not alone in this; neither he nor the others felt the slightest
remorse. However, he stood out for his cold hatred, of which he was proud. He
reveled in it... Yet, there is no reason to suppose that he wished to tarnish
his Serbian faith and his Montenegrin name. He simply considered the Muslims,
whom he called Turks, as naturally responsible for all evil and felt it his
inescapable duty to avenge himself against this foreign creed and eradicate it.
He considered anyone who missed an opportunity to do so a traitor."
" What Djilas described has little to do with
religion and even less with the spirit of the Crusades, which was completely
foreign to dissenting Eastern Christians. Djilas himself maintains that his
Montenegrins "hardly know the Bible; Njegos's poem served as their holy
book" (p. 129). He is referring to the poem Gorski vijenac ("The
Garland of the Mountain"), by Prince-Bishop Peter II Njegos, an apotheosis
of the extermination of the Islamized Montenegrins on Christmas Eve of 1708.
"It was," says Djilas, "the Prince-Bishop... who played with the
many heads of his victims as if they were apples" (p. 27).
Djilas is right when he condemns fanaticism, the cause
of genocides and hatreds that spare not even the dead, but it should be noted
that the events of 1918 and 1924, described by Djilas, were surpassed a hundred
times over when, at the end of the Second World War, the communists massacred
hundreds of thousands of their adversaries. The communist fanatics, when the
war had already ended and When the communist government was universally recognized
as the established power—Djilas was then the second most powerful Yugoslav
communist, Tito's most prominent collaborator—they killed over one hundred
thousand unarmed Croats. They spared neither the women nor the dead. In Zagreb,
the capital of Croatia, in 1945, the authorities, not the irresponsible,
leveled the Croatian army cemeteries. Montenegrin communists, disciples of
Djilas, played a particularly prominent role in the repression (see the study
by D. A. Tomasic, "New Class and Nationalism," Studia Croatica, Year
I, No. 1, pp. 68-69).
Some Serbian exiles attempted to deny the veracity of
Djilas's testimony, claiming that he was one of the pillars of the communist
regime and, therefore, his statements could not be trusted. This maneuver led
to the publication of the newsletter Bosnian Perspectives. (Bosanski Pogledi,
No. 15, September 1960 London), to publish the text of the memorandum that the
Muslim survivors of said massacre had addressed to King Alexander I. Said text,
which we transcribe below, coincides entirely with Djilas's account:
"The abominable massacres committed in recent
days against the Muslims of the municipalities of Pavino Polje and Sahovici,
within the jurisdiction of the Bjelo Polje district, compel us to address Your
Majesty and explain the injustices that oppress us and which we can no longer
endure, as even far lesser injustices and atrocities exceed human strength.
"On November 7, 1924, Bosko Boskovic, former
mayor of Kolasin, was killed in the village of Cer, belonging to the municipality
of Majkovac, where there are no Muslims."
"Once the murder had been committed, the first
duty of the authorities was to investigate the crime, identify the
perpetrators, and bring them to justice to be tried according to the law.
Instead, something horrific, inconceivable, and utterly unbecoming of a state
with an established legal order occurred. The competent authorities, having
been warned in time that the Orthodox were preparing, under the pretext of
avenging Boskovic's death, to exterminate the Muslims, had allowed
approximately 2,000 locals from Kolasin and Polje, Montenegro, in collusion
with the Orthodox population and Montenegrins residing there, to arm
themselves, organize, and march on the remote Muslim villages to carry out a
'blood vengeance' (vendetta).
"Before addressing the merits of the case, allow
us to highlight a circumstance as important and significant as it is
regrettable. The deceased, Bosko Boskovic, was buried on November 9th in Polje,
in what was then Montenegro." During the funeral, which was attended by,
among other officials of Your Majesty, the heads of the Bijelo Polje district:
Nikodem Cenovic, Lazo Bogicevic, and Milan Teric, speeches were made to incite
the crowd against those present. Milan Teric, in particular, whose father,
while administering the Bijelo Polje district, had been responsible for many
crimes committed in 1920, delivered a violent speech against Muslims and openly
incited the massacre. Immediately after the funeral, on the night of November
9-10, some 2,000 armed locals from Kolasin, Polje, and other areas gathered and
simultaneously attacked Muslim villages along a 19-kilometer stretch.
Two days earlier, the authorities had confiscated all
weapons in these villages and distributed them to Orthodox Christians in
neighboring areas. As the armed assailants prepared to attack the Muslims,
state authorities—perhaps to facilitate the attackers' actions and thwart any
potential resistance from the Muslims—took the heads of families and the
strongest men from the Muslim villages hostage and brought them to the
government house in Sahovici. There, they were told they had been summoned by
the mayor, but were then handed over to the assailants under the pretext of
escorting them to Bijelo Polje.
These criminals took charge of the handcuffed
hostages, but it is unknown whether they received orders to kill them. We only
know that these criminal escorts, at a distance of 250 meters from the district
headquarters, murdered 58 hostages; three were saved by paying a ransom. A man
named Novak Hasanin from Sahovici saved a 13-year-old boy, and for his noble
act, he and his family narrowly escaped the same fate as the murdered hostages.
After killing the hostages, the criminals launched an assault along a
19-kilometer front, simultaneously setting fire to houses and killing the
elderly, young, women, and children. It is unknown how many died from stab
wounds and gunshots, or how many were burned alive in their homes. The number
of victims is in the hundreds, while the material damage from the fires and
looting has not yet been assessed. While these atrocities unfolded, the local
authorities took no action to prevent them; instead, they condoned these
horrendous crimes with their passive attitude. Only the head of the Plevlje
district—that is, of another district—came to the aid of those under attack,
and it was thanks to the intervention of this official, surnamed Kreckovic,
that the survivors were saved.
"We complain to you, convinced that there is no
one else to whom we can complain. According to the constitution, we Muslims
should enjoy equal state protection, freedom, and other civil rights. The
constitution and the laws do not deny us these rights, even if one of our own
is guilty of the murder of Bosko Boskovic. The competent court should, in that
case, pass sentence and punish the murderer and his accomplices. Unfortunately,
the authorities of the Bijelo Polje district allowed their duty to be carried
out by armed mobs, incited by the very organs of the state, who remained
impassive in the face of the looting of our property and the slaughter of our
children and women.
This is an abominable act that would discredit any
state. It is impossible to detail the enormous damage or express our suffering
and the constant fear for our lives and property; we are victims of atrocities
committed not in the course of armed conflict, but in times of peace, against a
population guilty of nothing except..." to profess the Islamic faith.
Having brought all this to Your Majesty's attention, we wish to draw your
attention to these horrific events and request Your Protection, as we trust no
one else. We cannot believe that official positions are distributed not based
on the employee's ability and integrity, but on their political affiliation.
Clearly, in such circumstances, the laws are broken and the innocent suffer,
thus undermining the authority of the State and Your Majesty.
"Great is the misfortune and calamity that has
befallen us and those who, fortunately, escaped certain death. We are left with
nothing and no one, without possessions and without protection. We do not
expect protection from the regular courts. We know that in similar cases
special commissions were sent, but we are unaware of the outcome of their
investigations." We expect nothing from these investigations, which in
well-governed countries are unnecessary and inconceivable, but we express only
one hope: that Your Majesty will understand our tragic situation and order that
the damages suffered be assessed and compensated, for we have been left with
nothing, and immediate aid would alleviate our misfortune.
As for our future, we humbly request that Your Majesty
issue a decree authorizing us to leave our ancestral home and settle in another
region of our kingdom, where we could live in peace and tranquility and prosper
under Your protection. We request permission to relocate, convinced that,
remaining in our homes, genocide and terror will be repeated.
Your Majesty's unfortunate subjects: Municipal
Delegates of Sahovici and Pavino Polje (signatures follow).
Given in Belgrade, November 21, 1924
Djilas, at the beginning of his work, describes
Montenegro as a country where "...men of several generations died at the
hands of Montenegrins, men of the same faith and the same name. My father's
grandfather; both my grandfathers, my father, and my uncle were murdered, as if
a terrible curse had befallen them. My father, his brother, and my brothers
were killed... generation after generation, and the chain of blood was not
broken... The fear and hatred inherited from rival clans was more powerful than
the fear and hatred of the enemy, the Turks. I believe I was born with blood in
my eyes: My first sight was of blood.
My first words were of blood..." This lawless
country, with clans "accustomed to all kinds of crimes and
illegalities," was ruled by a schismatic prince-bishop who "burned
with hatred for the Turks" and delighted in killing and then "ripping
out the heart with a dagger." In the fighting, he spared neither infants
nor children in their cradles. The massacres, pillaging, and looting by the
Muslims have been considered a special merit. On several occasions, the
Montenegrins "had descended from the mountains into Muslim possessions
like hungry wolves upon a flock of sheep... Almost all the lands of Kolasin had
been taken from the Muslims, whom the Montenegrins killed or expelled after
defeating them. Even their cemeteries were leveled and plowed... although they
were of the same language and blood as the Montenegrins."
All of this, recounted with ruthless realism and
emphasizing the acts of the most savage barbarity, offers a chilling image of
an evolution whose product and direct legacy are those much-lauded guerrillas
of the last world war and high-ranking officials of Tito.
From a sociological point of view, the description of
the incipient urban development of the towns and inhabitants of Montenegro, a
region lacking cities and a differentiated social structure, deserves special
attention. There, the shepherd, half warrior and half bandit, descends to the
valleys and the sparse plains, seizes other people's lands, mainly those of the
exterminated and expelled Muslims, and transforms himself into a farmer, who
mostly abhors any systematic work other than herding, while heavy labor, in the
country where men boast of "heroism," is the domain of women.
Now this Montenegrin, half peasant, half illiterate
civil servant, sends his children to makeshift schools, organized by
"foreigners"—that is to say, by those who are not Montenegrins,
victims of widespread xenophobia. For the most part, the teachers were Croats,
practically exiled to Montenegro by the Serbian rulers of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia to prevent them from practicing their profession in their homeland.
In these semi-rural schools, the boys, still dressed in their regional
clothing, looked poor and rustic, living in utter misery and utter inequality.
They dreamed of Russia, once the protector of the Orthodox Slavs of the
Balkans, and particularly of the Montenegrins.
After the collapse of the Montenegrin state, most of
the urban population lived on pensions and subsidies, a heavy burden imposed by
the Serbian rulers on the Croats and Slovenes. The young Montenegrin
generation, aware of the impossibility of making a living with the insufficient
resources from the scarce and arid lands of their mountainous country, sought
to secure their future in makeshift schools, from which they emerged socially
resentful and without prospects of finding work. With the dissolution of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, these subsidies also ceased. It was then that
both the mountain dwellers and the urban population, along with members of
Montenegro's intellectual proletariat, embarked on the guerrilla adventure,
moving into the more prosperous regions to plunder them under the pretext of
fighting the invader.
These "liberators," as they called
themselves, initially acted in accordance with their supposed loyalty to the
Karageorgevic monarchy, but under strong pressure from the younger generation,
they readily opted to enlist in the ranks of the communist guerrillas, which
were organized following the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities. In a country
lacking a true cultural tradition, the young Montenegrin intelligentsia, for
the most part, considered their adherence to Soviet Marxism and Russia a
natural path forward, which in turn meant uniting traditions with revolutionary
action. During the war, the
Montenegrin communists proclaimed Montenegro an integral part of the USSR.
Despite his critical stance toward "the new class,"
Djilas demonstrates a number of facts that suggest he still belongs to that
circle of leaders. This is evident, first and foremost, in his position
regarding the national question of the multinational conglomerate of the
Yugoslav state. This state, the result of improvisation conditioned by the
exceptional circumstances prevailing at the end of the First World War in 1918,
granted an unexpected triumph to Serbian nationalist expansionism, the main
instigator of that war.
Djilas fails to see, or perhaps considers it a
positive fact, that the unhealthy conditions arising from the pressure of the
forced union, under the leadership of small Balkan Serbia—incapable of playing
a leading role in a country with a predominantly Adriatic-Danubian
character—thus created the conditions for a tragic conflict between Serbia on
one side and Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and numerous minorities
(Albanian, Hungarian, and German) on the other. Along these lines, Djilas
adopts a completely unfair position, even toward his own countrymen, supporters
of Montenegrin independence, and professes to be a supporter of Yugoslav
unitarianism, despite this conception lacking any material or moral basis.
One should not be deceived by appearances when, in
some pages of this book, sympathy is displayed for the opposition that fought
against the governments of a tyrannical monarchy in the period between the two
world wars. This is merely a purely communist tactic, in line with the conduct
of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which, faithful to Stalin's instructions,
exploited the discontent of the subjugated peoples and minorities without
offering any real solutions.
This fact became evident with the collapse of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, when the Serbs, having lost their privileged
position, found themselves reduced to a region governed by the occupying
military power, while other areas, mainly the Croatian provinces, had a
somewhat more bearable situation. It was precisely then, after Germany invaded
Russia, that the Yugoslav communists, in whose ranks Serbian elements
predominated, became the bearers of the Serbian tendency toward revenge and the
restoration of the destroyed Serbian empire. At least, this is how the
communist guerrilla presented itself to the Serbian masses, while the communist
leaders exploited the well-known combativeness of the mountain population,
accustomed during centuries of Turkish rule to the life of the haikuds, and
further educated in the cult of rebellion and political terrorism.
The assassination of Croatian leader Esteban Radich in
the Belgrade parliament in 1928 was, according to Djilas and his contemporaries
in the same political group, a momentous event. The assassin, Punisa Racich, a
deputy of the Serbian Radical Party (the ruling party), was Montenegrin, from
the Vasoyevichi tribe, and Djilas had the opportunity to meet him. He
considered him a political assassin. Djilas lacked regard for his own country
and, as such, was unable to offer a fair assessment of the Croatian national
resistance.
He simply downplayed the national conflicts in
Yugoslavia and, according to Marxist-Leninist conceptions, viewed them as power
struggles between the Serbian and Croatian bourgeoisies. Furthermore, Djilas,
coming from the Balkans, failed to recognize that the traditional form of
government in Serbia was autocratic and, as such, resembled Russia. It was precisely for this reason that the process of
transformation from an autocratic monarchy to communism was possible.
Djilas's allusion to "premature freedom"
aligns with the arguments of those who justify chronic dictatorships, and in
the case of Yugoslavia, it is the only form under which such a state can exist.
From this perspective, justifying the policies of an Alexander or a Tito is not
difficult, but from the standpoint of natural and moral law, the rationale for
the existence of such a state, created and maintained in this way, is highly
questionable.
To further complicate Djilas's "progressive"
stance on the national question in this book, the author of a lengthy and
equally biased introduction to the English edition, H. W. Jovanovic, of Serbian
descent, contributed his remarks. Unfortunately, in its polished edition,
Editorial Sudamericana translates the work in its entirety, disregarding the
fact that here in Argentina, thanks to prestigious publications like "La
Revista Croata" and "Studia Croatica," it has been easy to
obtain contributions from renowned experts on the political and cultural issues
of the Balkans, thus enabling the work to be presented appropriately to
Spanish-speaking audiences, in accordance with the standards of scholarly
accuracy.
The aforementioned introduction attempts to soften the
impact that these cruel events might have on a Western-educated reader.
Furthermore, with utter disregard for historical truth, the author had the
misguided idea of employing the mystifying interpretations of
Serbian official propaganda, both nationalist and communist, when referring to
various events.
Regarding current events, he unequivocally maintains
the existence of a supposed Yugoslav nationality, even though Yugoslavia is a
multinational state; moreover, he believes that presenting Djilas as a Yugoslav
Marxist without national sentiment is advantageous. Inaccurate and nonsensical
assertions also accumulate in the explanatory notes. On page 213, he refers to
the Croatian opposition in the Serbian Parliament. This is the Yugoslav
Parliament. The Croats are described as having been both
"separatists" and proponents of autonomy within the Yugoslav state.
According to this particular stylization, it appears
that King Alexander proclaimed a dictatorship because the Croats withdrew from
parliament, thus transforming the tyrannical king into the defender of
Parliament against the Croatian opposition.
Readers of Djilas's book will gain a broader
understanding of the new class of Yugoslav communism by examining another facet
of his personality. They will also come to understand the fraudulent nature of
the war propaganda that so glorified Tito's "liberators."
Furthermore, the desperate efforts of Croatia, a nation faithfully committed to
its Western and humanist traditions—no less noble in its Muslim province of
Bosnia—against the "liberators," among whom Djilas was considered one
of the most ruthless, will become readily apparent. This assertion, without
diminishing the documentary value of both of Djilas's works, situates the
reader within the relevant context and facilitates their understanding.
Jovan Djordjevic: Yugoslavia, Socialist Democracy
By B. Latkovic (Edition Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico, 1961, pp.
272. Translated from the
French.)
Since Yugoslavia emancipated
itself, to some extent, from Soviet tutelage in 1948, much has been written and
said about it in the West. It is well known how many hopes were placed in the
supposed breach opened in the monolithic communist bloc. Yugoslavia, on the
other hand, has consistently insisted that the principles of its social and
political organization are the basis of the independent path it has taken within
the family of communist nations.
The book by Jovan
Djordjevic, a professor at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, is undoubtedly a
considerable contribution to the dissemination of the Yugoslav thesis on the
correct application of Marxism-Leninism, and useful for those interested in
understanding the social, economic, and political organization of communist
Yugoslavia, as reflected in its Constitution and current laws. However, the
results of careful and objective analyses of the achievements to date differ greatly
from the picture one might form based on the system described in the book.
Therefore, and despite the author's authority, this book should be read with
caution if one does not wish to close one's eyes to the reality as it is
currently experienced in Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, it should not
be forgotten that between the communist conception and the Western conception
of the democratic regime, which "we cannot abandon without opening
ourselves to all kinds of intellectual confusion," there exists a "fatal
separation," as Marcel Prélot aptly observes in his "Preface" to
Djordjevic's book. For in the "socialist democracy" implemented in
Yugoslavia, "notwithstanding certain freedoms granted for discussion
regarding economic experiences, no ideological opposition can be formed, and
any inclination in this direction is immediately repressed," as Professor
Marcel Prélot notes.
In the
"Introduction," the author reviews the political and constitutional
evolution of present-day Yugoslavia. According to him, "the struggle for
liberation broadened and took on the character of a revolutionary struggle
against the representatives of the old social classes and their political
domination," a struggle led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This
assertion is inaccurate. In reality, there was no social struggle, but rather,
on the one hand, national resistance movements in the areas occupied by the
Axis armies, and on the other, rebel opposition from a segment of the Serbian
minority within the Independent State of Croatia, created after the collapse of
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941.
These resistance movements
were infiltrated by communists who then imposed themselves as their leaders.
The communists concealed their true aims for three years, and, as the author
states, "during this period no significant revolutionary decision was made
to change the economic and social foundations of the country, namely, the
private ownership of the means of production." Only when they firmly
assumed control of the resistance groups did they begin to act. The communists
revealed their true intentions, but it was too late to remove them from power,
as Russia was providing them with effective support and the Western powers
failed to grasp the full extent of the danger they posed.
Regarding the continuity of
Yugoslavia "from the standpoint of national will, clearly affirmed by four
years of struggle for independence," which the author discusses when
chronicling the evolution of relations between the Yugoslav government in
London and the National Committee in Belgrade, it should be clarified that such
will did not exist with respect to the Croats. Post-war Yugoslavia was imposed
on the Croats, who, during the four years of heroic struggle to assert their
independence, provided irrefutable proof of their national will to live in
their own independent state.
The book under discussion is divided into three
chapters: "The Foundations of the Social and Political System,"
"The Principles of Political Organization," and "The Structure
of Power." Selected excerpts from the Constitution and some organic
political laws are included as an appendix.
For Djordjevic, the foundation of the social and
political organization of communist Yugoslavia is "the self-government of
the producers," and it was precisely in Yugoslavia that such a system was
implemented for the first time in history. According to the author, this
development arose from the Yugoslav reaction "to the open attempt by the
leaders of the USSR at the time, with Stalin at the helm, to dominate the life,
politics, and economy of Yugoslavia," followed by "emancipation from
the doctrinal and political tutelage that the USSR had exercised over it."
It should be noted that the author insists on
demonstrating that it is in Yugoslavia where orthodox communism, or as it is
called, socialism, has been implemented, in contrast to the Stalinist
conception of the preponderant role of the State and its centralized apparatus
in the construction of socialism. It is evident, however, that despite such
much-touted decentralization, it is the State, through the Communist Party,
that directs and controls all economic, social, and cultural activity in
Yugoslavia.
The Communist Party, renamed the "League of
Yugoslav Communists," is the sole political party; no others are
permitted. Djordjevic, defending the compatibility of the single-party system
with "true democracy," that is, socialist democracy, refers to a
UNESCO survey on "Democracy in a World of Tensions." Several Marxist
philosophers, Djordjevic says, believed that socialist society possesses almost
all "the conditions necessary to eliminate the need for multiple political
parties. These conditions generally include the following: the absence of
profound differences of opinion within society, or at least among those in
power, and the fact that the doctrine of the ruling party is determined by
scientific criteria and ceases to be a mere matter of public opinion. Under
these conditions, dissenting opinions, and consequently dissenting parties,
could only be manifestations of ignorance or an antisocial, antidemocratic, and
even criminal attitude."
In reviewing the role of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, Djordjevic argues that political democracy failed in monarchical
Yugoslavia due, among other factors, to the weakness of the bourgeois parties,
continuing: "In the former Yugoslavia, the Communist Party already
appeared to the masses as the only political force capable of leading them in
the struggle for national independence and political freedom, against exploitation
and subjugation to foreign fascism." This is not true. Communism had no
roots among the peoples of Yugoslavia. In Croatia, it was an insignificant
minority.
While it is true that in the former Yugoslavia, even
before the dictatorship established in 1929, there was no true political
democracy, this was due to the tradition of autocratic rule in Serbia,
expressed in the hegemonic tendency of most Serbian parties, which never
abandoned the idea of Serbian domination over the other peoples
of Yugoslavia. In Croatia, the Agrarian Party represented the vast majority of
the Croatian people. From this party and later from the nationalist movement
"Ustasa" the Croats expected the realization of their freedom and
national independence, and not from the communist party.
Speaking of federalism, the author states that there
is a difference in the definition of federalism according to the 1946
Constitution and the 1953 Constitution. In his opinion, the 1946 Constitution
emphasized its legal structure, and Yugoslavia was defined as a community of
nation-states. The 1953 Constitution defines federalism "vigorously
emphasizing the unity of the Yugoslav peoples." This development closely
resembles what we have seen unfold in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes when the formal equality of these peoples led to Serbian domination
and the renaming of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kraljevina
Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca) to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
This is surely why the author is quick to clarify that
"these modifications to the character of Yugoslav federalism do not, in
any way, mean that a kind of new 'state unitarism' or centralism is currently
being created, nor that it has been established." or proclaimed a kind of
new, unified Yugoslav Nation. This observation by the author is interesting for
anyone familiar with the true problem of Yugoslavia, as it reveals that Serbian
imperialism, even within the new socio-economic organization of present-day
Yugoslavia, remains a constant threat to the other peoples that comprise it.
The author's words are not enough to reassure us
regarding the safeguarding of national identities in Yugoslavia, because,
speaking of the prospects for communal self-government, the basis of the social
and political system, the author notes that by expanding the powers of the
communes and districts, the functions of the people's republics are diminished.
And further on he concludes: "The Yugoslav federation acquires autonomous
social and economic foundations at the expense of state and national
foundations. Local self-government becomes an instrument for a more advanced
integration of Yugoslav society, for the creation of a new social, economic,
and political community of Yugoslav citizens."
This 'integration' is carried out, as is well known,
through the surveillance and pressure of the Communist Party, since—as we read
elsewhere in the book—"the productive forces and the consciousness of the
masses have not yet reached a level in Yugoslavia sufficient for social life to
do without a strong political organization or the support of the most conscious
social forces." Hence the aforementioned danger, since these "most
conscious socialist forces" are primarily composed of and led by Serbs.
Anton Knezevic: The Croats and Their History
By Angel Belic, Buenos Aires
(Düsseldorf 1961, pp. 144).
It is no easy task to give a
foreign reader a comprehensive idea of the cultural and political
life of a people over 1,300 years in just a few pages.
That is what Dr. Anton
Knezevic set out to do in his book in German, "The Croats and Their
History." In ten short chapters, subdivided into numbered paragraphs, the
author concisely recounts the events of Croatian history.
The first three chapters
cover medieval history up to 1102, when the princes and kings of the local
dynasties reigned in Croatia. Knezevic argues that the Croats arrived in the
lands they inhabit today in the 7th century, not as barbarian invaders, but as
allies of the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius. He clarifies that Croats today
consider themselves Slavic in terms of language, and regarding their origins,
he highlights theories about the Iranian and Gothic origins of the ethnic group
that shaped the Croats. In the West, Slavs are generally considered to be of
Eastern origin. However, the author demonstrates that Croats belong to the
sphere of Western culture due to their close ties with papal Rome and the
empire of Charlemagne.
Chapters IV through VII
cover Croatian-Hungarian and Croatian-Austro-Hungarian relations. These
relations were based on a fundamental constitutional principle: the common
kings assumed the obligation to respect Croatia as an associated sovereign
kingdom. A wealth of data and diplomatic records reveal the independent stances
taken by Croatian feudal lords in relation to the common kings and their
ongoing struggle to defend their sovereign rights. Foreign interference,
particularly from Hungary, intensified during the nationalist conflicts of the
last century. The author highlights the behavior of the Serbian ethnic minority
in Croatia, which, instead of siding with the Croats, tended to side with the
Hungarians.
Chapter VIII refers to the
First World War and the secret Pact of London, signed in 1915, by which the
Allied powers agreed to compensate Italy with the largest portion of the
Croatian Adriatic coast. Knezevic emphasizes the disinterest shown by the
Russian imperial government in this serious mutilation of the territory of a
Slavic people, since the Russians, Orthodox Slavs, distrusted the Croats, who
were Catholic and Western-oriented. The result was the formation of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
In the following chapter,
the author traces the history of this new state, summarized in the struggle of
the Croats against Serbian centralism and dictatorship, waged within the
country under the aegis of the Croatian Peasant Party and abroad through the
revolutionary movement founded and led by Dr. Ante Pavelić. Just four days
before the outbreak of the Second World War, a limited agreement was reached
between the Prince Regent and Dr. Čaček, president of the Croatian
Peasant Party. However, the author states, neither the Serbian Orthodox Church,
nor the military caste, nor the Serbian political parties were satisfied with
this arrangement, as they opposed any political concessions to the Croats.
The final chapter covers the
Second World War and describes its consequences. Yugoslavia, without military
resistance, disintegrated days after the German attack, and its government
fled. On April 10, 1941, the Croats proclaimed their national independence, an
act through which—according to the author's apt assertion—the age-old
aspiration of the Croatian people was realized. Due to the precarious
circumstances of war, the new state found itself in relative dependence on the
Axis powers. In May 1945, communist partisans, with the support of the Red
Army, occupied Croatia, incorporating it into the newly re-established Yugoslavia.
The Croatian people, without the opportunity to express their will in free
elections—the author concludes—have demonstrated, and continue to demonstrate
daily through enormous sacrifices in their tenacious struggle against the
communist invaders, their will to live in freedom and democracy.
The abundance of data,
details, dates, and names, presented succinctly, has its advantages and its
disadvantages. Disadvantages: On the one hand, it is advisable to cite all of
this data even if it is a book, written as a compendium, since it can serve as
a point of orientation for further, broader studies; on the other hand, this
method requires a greater effort from the reader to follow with understanding
the entire complex process of Croatian history.
Walter Letsch: Moskau, und die Politik des
Kaiserhofes im XVII. Jahrhundert, l. Part 1, 1604-1654
By Milan Blazekovic, Buenos Aires
(Moscow and the Politics of the Imperial Courts in
the 17th Century, Part I) Ed. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für osteurpüische
Geschichte und Südostforschung der Universität Wien -Wiener Archiv für
Geschichte des Slawentums und Ostereuropas-. Verlag Hermann Btihlaus Nachf.
Graz - Köln 1960, pp. 296).
This work, exclusively scholarly in nature
and devoid of political allusions or deductions applicable to current
international relations, was originally (1954) conceived and written as a
dissertation for a degree from the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of
Vienna. For its publication in this form, the work was considerably revised and
supplemented with additional research. The work, the first part of which we
review, extends the studies of the Austrian historian Hans Uebersberger,
"Oesterreich und Russland seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts"
(Austria and Russia from the End of the 15th Century) (Vienna-Leipzig 1906),
and attempts to demonstrate the futility of the efforts and negotiations of
both states to reach a common ground under the political circumstances of the
time. The author was right to speak of the "emperor" instead of
"Oesterreich" (Austria) and of the "Muscovite State"
instead of "Russia," since, on the one hand, in the 17th century the
emperor was the sole link between the countries that would later comprise
Austria, and, on the other hand, Russian historians used the term
"Muscovite State" instead of "Russia" around the same time.
In the insightful introduction, the author
succinctly clarifies the distinct processes of formation of both states and
their different reasons for existence: "Concord meant liberation in
Russia, and in Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, defense against
subjugation"—at the hands of the Turks and the Tatars—from which arises
the offensive character of one—Russia—and the defensive character of the
other—Austria. The work is particularly distinguished by its use of numerous
documents from the archives of Vienna and Munich, previously unpublished.