STUDIA CROATICA
Year II, Buenos Aires, 1961, No. 5
CASTRO AND TITO - SOWERS OF NEUTRALIST DISEASE 2
MEMORIES OF MEN AND POLITICAL EVENTS 7
THE YUGOSLAVIC FEDERAL SYSTEM 21
IVO ANDRIC, CROATIAN WRITER, NOBEL PRIZE IN LITERATURE 27
NATIONAL INCOME IN POST-WAR CROATIA 34
VALUES IN THE ART OF IVAN MESTROVIC 41
DOCUMENTS 44
POLITICS OF NATIONAL OPPRESSION IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA 44
CHRONICLES AND COMMENTARIES 52
TITO'S VIOLENT REACTION TO A COMMEMORATIVE EVENT FOR THE VICTIMS OF HIS
REGIME 52
BOOK REVIEW 59
While Castro, a declared protégé of Moscow and Beijing, acts in this way
for obvious reasons, Tito's motives are more complex and less evident. His
unconditional loyalty to Moscow in the field of international politics,
evidenced at the Belgrade Conference, and above all his acceptance of Soviet
and even Stalinist interpretations of the colonial and national question, can
only be truly appreciated if we consider the fact that imperialist policies of
the communist type were practiced not only in the Soviet Union but also in
Yugoslavia, perhaps even more harshly.
Indeed, Serbia in Yugoslavia, like Russia in the Soviet Union, practices
a policy of economic exploitation and national oppression detrimental to entire
populations, who constitute the vast majority of its inhabitants. In this
sense, the policy of tiny Serbia, that is, of the Yugoslav communist leaders,
is a miniature reproduction of the Soviet model. The Yugoslav communists, like
the Bolsheviks before they came to power, criticized the Russian Empire and the
Yugoslav Kingdom, respectively, aptly calling them "the prison of
nations."
However, through the magical power of communist dialectics, things
change color and character as soon as the communists seize power. Thus, the
Yugoslav communists, bitter critics of the pan-Serbian expansionism of
Alexander, the king-dictator, continued with the same policy of national oppression.
Despite the propaganda about the supposed liberation and self-determination of
the peoples of Yugoslavia, behind the façade of communist federalism,
omnipotent centralism reigns in favor of Serbia, under the control of the
communist party, governed autocratically, with clear Serbian supremacy, even
though the multinational character of Yugoslavia is officially recognized.
Therefore, the Yugoslav communist dictator, the main sponsor of the
Belgrade conference, took great care to ensure that the problem of colonialism
and imperialism was not discussed in its entirety, as some countries had
proposed at the Belgrade conference. The organizers of the Belgrade conference
simply did not extend an invitation to any democratic government that could
raise the issue of Soviet imperialism. If, in principle, it was believed,
apparently even in Washington, that the conference of neutral countries could
yield something positive, at least in comparing Western and Soviet policies
regarding the national aspirations of oppressed countries, those hopes were
dashed. Those familiar with the Yugoslav reality could not harbor such
illusions. Speaking of Soviet imperialism in Belgrade is like talking about
rope in the hangman's house.
The Belgrade Conference, therefore, was conceived from the outset as a
deliberation by those newly emancipated Afro-Asian countries which, due to
their defined pro-communist stance or because they were preoccupied with their
local problems, would not bring the problem of the Central European and Asian
peoples, oppressed by the Soviets, to the agenda. Thus, the conference of the
"non-committed" countries took on the character of a meeting of
representatives from some twenty Afro-Asian countries, held in a European
capital that, in fact, gravitated towards the Soviet and even Eurasian zone.
It so happened that, with the exception of
Cuba, only those countries that traditionally do not belong to the Western
world participated in the Belgrade Conference. For this reason, the political
terms of the West used there did not always have their true and original
meaning. Western political ideas and forms, such as democracy and the
nation-state, if established in Eastern Europe, would provoke the automatic
disintegration of both the Russian Empire and its Serbian successor.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Tito and Castro both confined
their anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist pronouncements exclusively to
countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence. Setting aside the causes of
the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade, deep affinities and a close community
of interests existed between the Soviet and Yugoslav communist leaders, a
situation that could not be altered by the billions of dollars given to Tito by
the United States. This explains why Castro's representative, a protégé of
Moscow and Beijing, and Tito, repudiated by the Soviet and Chinese communists
as a revisionist, found themselves on the same page.
In the plans of Moscow and Beijing, Castroism
and Titoism play the same role in propagating pro-Soviet
neutrality. While Khrushchev and Mao Zedong forbade their satellites from
contacting Yugoslav dissidents, they approved Cuba's participation in the
Belgrade Conference, sponsored and financed by Tito. Consequently, Khrushchev's
attitude toward this conference was neither vague nor contradictory, as some
Western commentators, disoriented in the tactical and dialectical communist
labyrinth, have described it.
Khrushchev did everything possible to prevent genuine neutral viewpoints
from crystallizing in Belgrade, resorting to both brutal and subtle means, as
was his custom—namely, resuming atomic bomb tests on the eve of the conference
and officially welcoming it. Khrushchev, like Mao Zedong, does not believe in
genuine neutrality, considering it a disguised form of pro-Western policy. They
tolerate and promote only neutrality that—as noted—implies an anti-Western
position.
The Belgrade Conference, despite the fact that it escaped the control of
the Yugoslav dictator, demonstrated that Tito's intense prior diplomatic
activity, in his frequent trips to the newly formed Afro-Asian countries,
actually aligned with the intentions of Moscow and Beijing. Furthermore, the
exorbitant expenses that Tito's government invested in organizing the
conference are not reasonably proportional to the supposed advantages of
increased trade.
Cuba's participation and its unreserved support for its claims regarding
the Guantanamo base demonstrate the purposes that concern the peoples of the
Americas. Everything indicates that Tito, an experienced proponent of
neutralism, is acting as Castro's mentor, instructing him on the most
appropriate methods for promoting pro-Soviet neutrality in Latin America.
The activities of Tito and Castro must complement each other. It has
been speculated that Tito's frankly pro-Soviet stance surprised and irritated
the American ambassador in Belgrade, George Kennan. It is difficult to imagine
that Tito managed to deceive one of the most astute observers of communism.
What is certain is that, after the conference, Washington announced a review of
its economic, military, and moral support provided to the Yugoslav communist
dictatorship. First, the delivery of 500,000 tons of surplus American wheat was
postponed.
Alarmed by this reversal, Tito rushed to Cairo to meet with Nehru, who
was returning from Washington. It is known that Nehru adopted a cautious and
reserved demeanor. He made it quite clear that he had not anticipated this
meeting with Tito. Once in Belgrade, he hampered Tito's maneuvers and hastened
to demonstrate this with his official visit to Washington. India's neutral
stance should not be confused with neutrality, bargaining, or political
extortion. The impromptu conference in Cairo even annoyed Nasser, whose
downfall in Syria he largely owes to the advice of his friend Tito, the
inspiration behind certain socialist economic measures and an intemperate
centralism.
The review of Western policy toward the Yugoslav proponent of
neutralism, pro-Soviet by definition, does not mean that the current of thought
that, from the outset, was morally opposed to the unconditional support given
to the Yugoslav communist dictatorship will suddenly prevail in Washington.
Nevertheless, this policy must be modified, primarily due to the Cuban
situation. While the roles of Yugoslavia and Cuba differ considerably within
the framework of Western global strategy, it is unacceptable to practice and
promote diplomatic and economic isolation of Castro's Cuba while invoking
democratic principles and Western values, and simultaneously providing material
and, regrettably, moral support to the ruthless Yugoslav communist
dictatorship.
According to the assessments of an expert, Dr. Drago
Zalar, recently published by a Senate committee in
Washington, the United States, after 1950, gave Yugoslavia the enormous sum of
2.5 billion dollars (Le Monde, Paris, November 15, 1961), that is, enough funds
to solve many of the problems of South American nations. A portion of those
funds, more than 200 million dollars, had been given by Tito to the neutralist
countries of Africa. As long as this continues, the fight against Castroism is stripped of its ethical meaning and provides
ammunition to those who suggest that it is merely an undignified game of
interests.
Leaving aside the moral aspect of the problem, the aid given to the
Yugoslav communist dictator because he had clashed with Stalin, cautiously
defined as "political, a calculated risk," did not yield the expected
result because it was unconditional aid. Washington set no conditions, readily
accepting the emphatic pronouncements that the Yugoslav communist leaders,
jealous of their national sovereignty and communist principles, would refuse
such aid if it were tied to political concessions. The nature of the
Stalin-Tito conflict was not properly considered, nor was the boundless lust
for power of the Balkan and Eastern politicians taken into account.
Tito and his cronies managed to remain in power thanks to the absence of
a Soviet military occupation. The Soviet army entered Serbia in 1944 and handed
them power, but was later forced to withdraw under pressure from the Western
Allies—that is, under the threat of an eventual Anglo-American landing on the
Croatian coast.
Even so, Stalin's chances of exerting pressure on the Yugoslav communist
government were still considerable, and it is very likely that Tito would have
ended up like Rajk in Hungary, Pauker
in Romania, and Petkov in Bulgaria, had Stalin not
feared the collapse of the communist regime, hated by the oppressed peoples of
Yugoslavia. But the regime was consolidated thanks to the substantial aid
provided by the West.
When the policy of unconditional support for one communist dictator
against another was inaugurated, it was believed that a breach would be opened
in the monolithic system of world communism and that the contagious example of
the unpunished dissent of the supposed Yugoslav national communism would spread
to other satellite states.
The Hungarian rebellion and Tito's simultaneous support for Soviet
repression, which culminated in the cowardly surrender of Imre
Nagy and provoked the furious indignation of progressives, did not entirely
discourage those who advocated unconditional aid to the despicable communist
dictatorship. It was erroneously argued that there was only one alternative:
unconditional support for "Titoism" or the
triumph of the Yugoslav communist faction loyal to Moscow.
Western foreign ministries imagined Tito as a man of principle, instead
of seeing him as a fortunate leader and adventurer, an autocrat of the Eastern
type, eager above all to cling to power. The "eternal tyrannies of the
East," to use Ortega y Gasset's expression,
imply countless privileges for those who hold them (Tito, lord of the lives and
property of his subjects, lives and travels surrounded by the luxury of the
Arabian Nights), but also great risks. When power is lost, freedom and life are
endangered.
Ignoring these socio-political factors, Western governments squandered a
golden opportunity to link their support for the Yugoslav ruling group to
political concessions and, even worse, became complicit in a shameful tyranny.
Support for an oppressive regime would only be justifiable if it were the
lesser evil, with no other alternative. By proceeding in this way, democratic
governments discouraged resistance to oppressive communism, especially in
Central and Eastern Europe.
It makes no sense to fight the Soviet Union on the one hand, because it
is a system that denies political, individual, and national freedoms, and on
the other hand, to support Yugoslavia, which is essentially the Soviet Union in
miniature. The mistaken distinction between Soviet and Yugoslav communism has
gone so far that anti-communist exiles from Yugoslavia are excluded from
anti-communist organizations sponsored by Western governments and, in some
cases, denied the right to political asylum.
Thus, for example, organizations of peoples subjugated in communist
Yugoslavia are not part of the prestigious "Assembly of European Captive
Nations," as if they were not victims of communist tyranny just like
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and others. In reality, the situation of Croats,
Slovenes, and Macedonians is, in some ways, even more difficult. They are not
even recognized in theory as having the right to establish their own
nation-states. Instead, under the pretext of the "union and brotherhood of
the South Slavs," they are subject to Serbia, just as the Ukrainian,
Lithuanian, Armenian, and so many other peoples, forcibly incorporated into the
Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, are dependent on Russia. It is
pointless to criticize the Soviet Union for suppressing the national freedoms
of so many peoples if the same plight of the oppressed peoples in Yugoslavia
continues to be ignored.
It goes without saying that the peoples held captive
in communist Yugoslavia await with some apprehension the announced
revision of US policy toward the Tito regime. Supporters of unconditional aid
to "Titoism" will argue that Tito is
already strong enough (let us not forget, thanks to substantial American aid)
to rule out political concessions aimed at the democratization of the country,
and that conditioning this aid in the current circumstances would push the
Yugoslavs towards the normalization of relations between Moscow and Belgrade
with the respective impossibility of fostering dissent within the communist
bloc.
That assumption is entirely wrong. The normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav
relations would mean the Kremlin taking control of the Yugoslav communist party
and government, giving Khrushchev the power to eliminate Tito and his group
from the Soviet sphere. Consequently, the Yugoslav communist leaders have no
possibility of an agreement with the Kremlin, with or without American help.
And if Moscow were to endanger the Yugoslav regime, the "Titoists" would have no alternative but to accept the
West's conditions.
This could happen sooner than expected. Yugoslavia, despite appearances,
is a relatively small, impoverished, and politically complex country. It was
able to play the role of one of the "great" neutralists thanks to
American aid, part of which was invested in anti-Western propaganda campaigns.
Despite rapid industrialization and persistent publicity about socialist
methods, unknown even in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia failed to solve even the
basic problem of feeding its population, although between the two world wars,
under an incompetent and corrupt administration, it exported considerable
quantities of food.
Currently, official sources acknowledge that the country is experiencing
a serious economic crisis. The attempt to implement certain reforms, sponsored
by the International Monetary Fund, failed. Two years ago, Tito boasted
blasphemously that from then on, the country's grain supply would no longer
depend on "the grace of heaven," that is, rain, but this year he was
forced to twice request urgent wheat aid from Washington. Nor is the political
situation in Yugoslavia, both externally and internally, favorable. The
exchange of visits between Tito and the monarchs of Nepal, Abyssinia, and
Morocco is of little use, while he has no friends in Europe or in the countries
of his immediate neighborhood.
The communist governments accuse him of selling out to the enemies of
the working class, while West Germany—the main source of foreign currency for
the Yugoslav economy—broke off diplomatic relations with Belgrade for
recognizing the communist government in Pankow.
Relations with neighboring countries, mostly communist—Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Albania—are far from satisfactory. These countries, at Moscow's
possible initiative, can use ideological arguments against "Titoism," weakening the cohesion of the ruling
communist party. They can also exploit the opposition of the peoples and
minorities suffering under Serbian rule.
The communist states bordering Serbia can foment opposition from the
large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, the
Macedonians who gravitate toward Bulgaria, or the Albanians of Kosmet, who constitute a third of the Albanian population.
In Yugoslavia's internal politics, aside from the serious national question,
many other rifts are emerging. From the outset of the current regime, there has
been strong opposition from Catholics to atheistic communism and persistent and
successful resistance from peasants to attempts at collectivizing
smallholdings. Recently, conflicts have arisen within the communist ranks
themselves, reflecting national and cultural contrasts.
Communist leaders in Croatia and Slovenia, pressured by their
environment, openly oppose centralism and, in particular, the investment policy
favoring Serbia, which they consider a form of colonial exploitation.
Furthermore, there are signs of a simmering struggle over who will succeed
Tito. This underlying tension takes on special significance, as the Slovenian Kardelj is primarily favored by Slovenian and Croatian
communists, while the Serbian Rankovic is supported
by his compatriots. These national differences, despite the fact that communist
leaders consider them non-decisive, coincide with differing interpretations of
Marxist principles.
Croatia and Slovenia are countries with a Western tradition, and
therefore, even within their communist ranks, a certain pro-Western tendency is
reflected, while in Serbia, communism is amalgamated in a unique synthesis with
Serbian patriotism and Pan-Slavic traditions. For the first time, the Western
powers have an opportunity to intervene in these internal struggles among
Yugoslav communists, favoring pro-Western tendencies and opposing
"neo-communist" tendencies. Furthermore, the struggle for Tito's
succession and the political orientation, combined with factors of the
political and economic crisis, could pose serious difficulties for the regime.
The Western powers must be better prepared for such an eventuality than they
were for the Hungarian and Polish crises.
Everything indicates, therefore, that the right measures must be applied
to counter "Fidelism" and "Titoism," taking into account, of course, the
different conditions and geographical locations of Cuba and Yugoslavia. The
impossibility of fostering anti-Soviet resistance in the governments imposed
and controlled by the Russian occupation, the experience gained from "Titoist" support for the repression of the Hungarian
Revolution and pro-Soviet neutrality, demonstrates that the right path is not
to back one communist dictator against another, but to support those who fight
for democratic and national freedoms.
These speculations with Tito, aimed at dividing the communists, proved
completely fruitless. Only the successes achieved by freedom fighters in any
country under the communist yoke would contribute to the prestige of the
democratic powers and raise the morale of the oppressed peoples, including the
Russian people. Far more important than all the theoretical subtleties
surrounding "Titoism" and the supposed
"national communism," which serve only to foster illusions among
communist-leaning progressives about the possibility of a communism acceptable
to the conscience of the free world and to demoralize the oppressed peoples of
Yugoslavia.
The prevailing situation in Europe, the Caribbean, and throughout Latin
America no longer permits these fundamentally immoral tactics of Titoism, tactics unworthy of great democracies.
Furthermore, it is dangerous to forget that the repression of "Fidelism" cannot be justified while simultaneously
providing unconditional support for "Titoism."
Castro's declaration of his Marxist-Leninist faith, intended to secure Soviet
support with a formal declaration placing him within the Soviet bloc, thus
preventing Khrushchev from sacrificing him for advantages elsewhere in the
world, changes nothing.
Conversely, Khrushchev is free from the obligation to protect the
Yugoslav "revisionists," so the West must not miss the opportunity to
demand essential political concessions from Tito in exchange for its aid.
Otherwise, it will be condemned to perpetual blackmail by supporting such a odious communist tyranny until
the day the Soviets decide to exert effective pressure in order to impose the
orthodox communist group in Yugoslavia. And with the current communist
government, they will undoubtedly succeed.
"I know the king asked for his resignation and that Davidovic submitted it. Then, after a few minutes, the king
asked him to withdraw it, granting him broader powers."
"Ljuba might tell the tale, but it can't
be."
"Let Cika Ljuba
try with Radic. Perhaps he's the most pious, given
his approachable nature, capable of speaking and negotiating with Radic."
"No, Mr. Joco, blood must be
spilled!"
"Whose blood, Mr. Gavrilovic?" I asked him.
"Radic must be killed. The State is more
important than Radic."
"Of course the State is more important than anyone, but do you know
that the entire Croatian people stand behind Radic,
or do you intend to shoot my father and brother through Radic?"
"The State matters more than all the Croats! Blood, blood must flow
so that it's clear who is stronger, the Croats or the
State." “According to such logic, the State would matter more than the
Serbs as well. So, what and who is the State? Only the
Belgrade clique?” I looked at the chair, my hands trembling, I wanted to
jump up and grab it, when Dr. Milan Curcin entered,
having tiptoed to the door. He overheard the conversation and intervened,
harshly criticizing Gavrilovic and his conduct. This
scene greatly displeased Jovanovic.
ASSASSINATION OF ESTEBAN RADIC
I was in Split when, on June 20, 1928, in the National Assembly building
in Belgrade, an attempt was made on Radic’s life.
When the news of the attack arrived, people were horrified. It was said
that the Croatian deputies had been killed, Radic
himself seriously wounded, and another person as well. It was suspected that Radic had also been murdered and that he was only being
reported as seriously wounded to lessen the immediate impact and allow for a
more measured response later. The term "seriously wounded," however,
aroused the most sinister premonitions.
The next day I met Admiral Stankovic's wife.
She approached me and said in French:
"Those Serbs are not only primitive, but born bandits and
treacherous scoundrels."
Then she told me what the garrison commander, General Trnokopic, had replied to her husband when Admiral Stankovic told him it was a disgrace to fire on the
national deputies, and moreover, within the parliament building, as this could
have serious consequences both internally and externally. Instead of replying,
the general asked the admiral:
"Is Stipica dead?"
-No, Esteban Radic no está muerto - replicó Stankovic
- sino, de acuerdo a las noticias - solo gravemente herido. Los muertos son su
sobrino Pablo Radic y Jorge Basaricek.
“Oh, damn it, how badly he shot!” Trnokopic
replied, adding, “The result will be that he’ll have to be shot again, if he
survives.”
That same day I ran into Admiral Stankovic and
asked him if his wife had accurately relayed her conversation with Trnokopic. “Yes,” the admiral replied, “what she told you is entirely accurate, but not everything Trnokopic
told me. Besides what you already know, he expressed that it was necessary to
kill Trnokopic, all prominent Croats, including you.”
Stankovic and I looked at each
other as if we were at a loss for words. Stankovic,
pale, said through gritted teeth, “With such beasts in human skin we sat in the
Jadranska straza magazine,
and your foolish Spalatinians named a stretch of the
waterfront ‘Major Stojan’s Bank.’” I find it hateful
and I am ashamed to be considered Serbian for professing the Orthodox faith.
"Don't go to the other extreme, Admiral..."
"Why not? Last night, in Sibenik, the Serbian Orthodox bishop Irineo
Djordjevic expressed the same thing to me. All of us
who are part of the Serbian minority in Croatia are naive, and especially the
Croats."
"Is that possible?"
"Believe me, as you can see me here now, he said it to me because
he considered me Serbian, and he put it exactly like this: 'Good heavens, Stipica (Radic) isn't dead! That
means we'll have to cover ourselves in shame once again.' And isn't that the
same thing Trnokopic is saying?"
Then Stankovic added with a sigh:
"Can anything be expected from such a country? In it, if you'll
excuse the expression, people collectively think of massacres." Although I
disliked certain aspects of Radic, especially his
notorious ambiguity in his statements, I now fully realized that the attack
against Radic was, in fact, aimed at the entire
Croatian people. And I concluded that Radic's
supposed inconstancy was nothing more than an evasion of the deadly projectile
that had been prepared for him since he assumed his well-known position in the
National Council, until the moment it struck him in the Belgrade parliament. I
was extremely disturbed and immediately left Split for Zagreb.
There, too, I couldn't find peace, so a few days later I went to Opatija, where my wife and children were.
AT THE LEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBIANS, CROATS, AND SLOVENS IN ROME
In Opatija, after a few days, my bladder
stones began to bother me, as they often did before, and I had to go to Fiuggia, near Rome, to get treatment, as on other
occasions.
The day after my arrival in Rome, I went to the Yugoslav legation to
visit Ambassador Milan Rakic and
introduce myself. Upon entering the legation offices, I found two employees
sitting at their desks, pretending to write something. I didn't think it
necessary to introduce myself again, since the messenger had announced me, but
simply said, "Good morning," and asked for Ambassador Rakic. Neither moved, and one, without looking up from his
desk, replied:
"He's not here."
"Do you know when he'll be here?"
"I don't know."
"Can you tell me if he's in Rome or away?"
"I don't know." “Well, gentlemen,” I said, and went out into
the courtyard of the Farnese Palace. Halfway across the courtyard, a rather
tall young man caught up with me, called me by my surname, and asked me to
stop. I stopped and looked him in the face.
“Do you know me? Well, how could I…”
“Oh, Rastko! Is that you?” He smiled.
“Yes, it’s me,” and he began to apologize.
“I am utterly ashamed of the way you are being treated in our legation,
which you must leave in this manner. I was in my office, the door to which you
had your back turned when you entered and asked for Rakic.
And them acting like this… how shameful! I am a junior official and couldn’t
intervene.”
“It doesn’t matter, Rastko. They don’t know
me, and the ambassador I asked for isn’t here; the matter is settled, then.”
“That’s not right, please, and it’s not true that they don’t know you,
nor is the other thing accurate, that… Therein lies
the impertinence. How many days will you be staying in Rome?” “Rastko asked.
“I’m leaving for Fiuggia tomorrow morning and
will be there for two weeks.”
“On my return, will you be staying in Rome, and would it be possible for
us to meet and talk?” As we said goodbye, I told him I would be staying in Rome
for a couple of days before returning and that I would be very pleased to see
him.
This was Rastko Petrovic,
son of Mita Petrovic,
originally from Vojvodina, whose house I used to
visit. I was friends with his daughter Nadezda, a
talented painter. The whole family was well-versed in the fine arts. Rastko, Mita’s youngest son,
might have been eight or nine years old when I used to go to their house; I
hadn’t seen him since. Now, grown, I recognized him as the spitting image of
his father.
When I returned from Fiuggia, I called Rastko, who visited me at my hotel, and we had dinner
together. He told me, or rather explained, why I had
been treated that way at the legation.
When I was announced, Rakic was
in his office. He stood up and exclaimed, "What does this man want
here?"
He then told me that Rakic and
everyone at the legation considered the separation of Croatia a fait accompli
and even wanted to place the Serbian coat of arms on the legation's facade and
raise the Serbian flag. That's why my visit to the legation surprised Rakic. Nevertheless, they had sent a woman, J. Hristic, after me to Fiuggia,
staying at the same hotel, to observe who I met with. She was the daughter of a
certain Hristic, a former minister under Obrenovic, who lived in Italy as a singer and was also a
spy for the legation.
DICTATORSHIP OF KING ALEXANDER
(On January 6, 1929, King Alexander abolished the pseudo-democratic
constitution, banned political parties, and established his personal
dictatorship. Mestrovic publicly disapproved of this anti-democratic political
course inaugurated by the King.)
Upon arriving in Belgrade, I first went to see the Minister of the Court
to inquire whether the material for the bust, dispatched from Zagreb, had
arrived and to find out what time the King would receive me. Dragomir Jankovic, the Minister
of the Court, was a kind but depressed man. We had known each other well for a
long time, and I asked him what was wrong. He told me that he had served at the
Court since the enthronement of King Peter, that he was loyal to the dynasty,
and that he had done everything within his power for the good of the dynasty.
"And now this is how they repay me," he added, "simply
for daring, with the best of intentions, to express my opinion."
"But what happened?"
"The Gospodar dismissed me. He told me
that after the first [of the month] I wouldn't hold this post anymore. I don't
care a fig. Perhaps it's better for me, but the way... as if I were a servant.
Like a servant, like a dog." Dragomir gritted
his teeth to keep from bursting into tears.
"And why?"
"Well, I'll tell you, because I advised him not to violate the
constitution, to follow in his father's footsteps in that, and, my friend, to
come to terms with the Croats. 'How can I come to
terms with the Croats?' he replied, 'when they want to constitute themselves as
if they were a state within a state. Well, Macek
won't give me orders!'" he shrieked.
"If we won't give in on our Serbian cause, why force them to give
in on their Croatian cause? Why shouldn't they have their autonomy, their
parliament (Sabor), their ban (viceroy), and their
flag, if they want it, if that's their tradition?" "I answered the
King."
"No, I will never allow it," the King told me. "Are we to
see the Croatian flag flying in Zemun from Kalemegdan, as Macek
demands?"
-
Trying to calm him down, warning him that what was
being plotted could prove fatal for him and for the State, he told me: "Go
away." You see why he threw me out. And your Croats still say that Punisa left my office to shoot at Radic
and his deputies in Parliament.
"Isn't that true, Mr. Jankovic?"
"Formally it's true, but not in the way you're implying. Punisa could come to the Court whenever he pleased, and he
could enter through here or through the main entrance. On that fateful day he
didn't come through here, but he left through here without saying goodbye to
me. That's the plain truth."
ATTEMPTS AGAINST SUFFLAY AND BUDAK
When Professor Dr. Milan Sufflay was
assassinated in the center of Zagreb on February 18, 1931, great excitement
swept through the city, not only because of his personality, but also because
of the methods used by the regime to get rid of dissidents. It was eventually
learned that he was killed by police officers, and soon after, their identities
were revealed. There were other indications that Sufflay's
murder was carried out on the orders of state authorities. King himself, for
example, told Dr. Rittig, when the latter visited him
to complain about such methods:
"He had to be killed, because he was an Italian agent."
"When the same officers assaulted Mile Budak
on June 7, 1932, fracturing his skull, my friend Trumbic
came to my house early that morning. He informed me that he had been told that
very morning by these so-called 'patriots' that they had drawn lots to see who
would kill him, Trumbic, and who would kill Macek. His informant even provided him with the names of
the executioners." I didn't ask him who the informant was, but I believe
it was Vasiljevic, the deputy chief of police in
Zagreb, who was Croatian, of Serbian origin, and had been freed from captivity
by the Yugoslav Committee during the First World War. Trumbic,
of course, was uneasy but composed, despite being under the impression that the
assassination was about to take place.
"I don't know how to protect myself," he said, "because at
night they could break into my home and kill me in my bed." I accompanied
him to his residence and then went to the Governor's Office to see Governor Perovic. He was ill and bedridden. I found his secretary, Vojnovic, who had held the same position during Silovic's administration. Through him and other channels, I
knew that Vojnovic was a spy for the regime within
the Governor's Office. Therefore, I didn't want to tell Vojnovic
the reason for my visit and insisted on speaking with the governor personally.
Mrs. Perovic barely let me in, as her husband was
indeed running a high fever.
I told her about Trumbic's case, requesting
that she immediately communicate what she had heard from me to the government
in code. She promised to do so at once. But, unsure that this would work, I
arranged to meet with the French consul at my house. I told him the story,
begging him to also inform his English counterpart. I then went to see Jovo Banjanin, briefed him, and
asked him to travel to Belgrade immediately and request an urgent audience with
the King to convey the news and its source. Banjanin
did so. Alexander later thanked me "for having averted yet another
misfortune."
Trumbic was in poor health,
and this threat further distressed him. To rouse him from his apathetic state,
and partly from his insecurity, I secretly wrote to Beneš,
suggesting that Masaryk might invite Trumbic as a
guest, and advising Trumbic himself to go to the
thermal baths at Karloviš Vary (in Bohemia). I
thought that Trumbic, once recovered, would feel more
secure upon his return. I didn't mention Trumbic's
financial situation (he received only 3,500 dinars a month as a pension), but Beneš knew this through other channels. Beneš
replied that the President of the Republic couldn't invite him at the moment,
but that the Czechoslovak government would allow him to stay at Karloviš Vary for as long as he wished. Trumbic,
of course, refused, and I was offended by Beneš's
response. Masaryk's stance may have been motivated by certain disagreements
between him and Trumbic, or, more likely, by
consideration for the Belgrade regime.
INTERVIEWS WITH EDOUARD HERRIOT AND ALEXIS LEGER
(Mussolini, taking advantage of the Croatian discontent with King
Alexander's dictatorship, at a time when France, overwhelmed by pressure from
the Third Reich, was trying to foster the normalization of relations between
Rome and Belgrade, made territorial cessions in the Croatian Adriatic province
of Dalmatia a precondition. On the advice of Croatian politicians, Mestrovic,
on the occasion of his exhibition organized in Paris in 1933, visited
influential figures in Paris and London.)
Shortly after my arrival in Paris in March 1933, I visited Edouard Herriot. The leader of the Radical Socialists, who
in 1932 was Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, played a leading
role in French political life, even outside of government. He received me in
his office at the National Assembly. Cordial and outgoing, as soon as I sat
down, he said over his pipe:
"I know why you've come. The Italian pigs are claiming your
Dalmatia." I immediately inquired whether he was aware of the mission of a
French colonel (who had recently visited Sofia, Belgrade, and Zagreb) and
whether it was being carried out with the consent of the French government and
General Staff. He confirmed it and told me he was aware of his conversation
with me. Then he declared that the situation in Yugoslavia was far from
promising, both internally and externally. He censured the King and the
dictatorship in no uncertain terms.
"Those in Belgrade have gone mad with megalomania, and we have
other, more urgent matters to attend to than defending you from the Italians.
Twice we have prevented them from attacking you, and I don't know how long we
will want to or be able to do so, because Hitler and Nazism are gaining so much
strength that they worry us ten times more than the Yugoslav-Italian
conflict." Convey this to your "Alexander the Great" and tell
him we have more pressing matters than protecting you from the Italians. Let
him resolve the Serbian-Croatian problem, and the Italians will think twice
before attacking you individually. Without that, Mussolini believes attacking
you would be a walk in the park.
After the conference, Herriot sent me to Léger, director of the Quai
d'Orsay, who would inform me of everything the French had arranged in Belgrade
regarding the solution to the Serbian-Croatian conflict.
The next day I visited Léger at the Quai d'Orsay. He received me kindly,
telling me that Herriot had informed him of my visit. He spoke of his
increasingly serious concerns about the growing power of Germany, which is
expanding with incredible speed, and its capacity for organization. He then
declared that they, too, do not underestimate the power of the Italians,
"as your responsible agents apparently do." Perhaps Mussolini hasn't
succeeded in making Italians brave soldiers, but they are well-armed, while you
are sorely lacking and, moreover, disunited. We have repeatedly made efforts to
address this and offered friendly advice. Your King possesses incredible
self-sufficiency. On the other hand, however, we know that he is the only Serb
who supports Yugoslavia.
Generally speaking, all Serbs are megalomaniacs and want their own
Greater Serbia. Meanwhile, we are not interested in either Serbia or Croatia;
we are interested in Yugoslavia, and that is why we contributed to its
creation.” He then gave me to read the instructions sent to Naggiar,
his ambassador in Belgrade, and Naggiar’s reply. He
was instructed to tell the King, “in a courteous but serious manner,” that the
French government is very concerned about the Yugoslav-Italian conflict and the
internal relations between Croats and Serbs, advising amicably but seriously a
prompt solution to the Croat-Serb conflict. In his report, Naggiar
stated that he had visited the King, who received the suggestion favorably but
asked him to inform his government that he should allow the necessary time to
address the problem, which was one of his primary concerns. The King then
reportedly promised to give the Croats four ministerial portfolios and autonomy
to Croatia. Léger asked me what I thought of autonomy and whether the Croats
would be satisfied with it.
I replied that, being French, and given the internal organization of his
country, it might seem like a lot to him, but that I believed mere autonomy
wouldn't satisfy the Croats. Furthermore, we would have to see what kind and
scope that autonomy would have, and to what extent their fueros
(charters of rights and privileges) would be respected.
Léger shrugged and replied:
"You're right. This is the Balkans." He then told me that he,
in general, manages all affairs, because "the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Joseph Paul Boncour, is busy in Geneva, where he is
at the moment, but as soon as he returns, I'm sure he will gladly receive me
and talk with me." He spoke highly of Naggiar's
abilities, saying:
"If he weren't in Belgrade, he would be sitting here next to me. He
is from the East, so he will be able to understand and negotiate better in Belgrade.
We sent him to Belgrade entrusting him with the mission of contributing to the
solution of your internal problem."
He then emphasized that they would continue to advise Belgrade so that
the internal problem could be resolved.
"Visit Naggiar in Belgrade from time to
time; I will send you instructions to communicate everything related to the
problem, especially our messages and the King's replies."
Returning to the tense relations between us and the Italians, he
complained about the English stance. "Every time we proposed to intervene
with one side or the other..." In order to ease tensions, they agreed to
make joint efforts in Belgrade, but they never agreed to take joint steps in
Rome.” At the end of the interview, he declared: “At this moment, the situation
is also very murky, and we don’t know what Mussolini will be capable of doing
to you.”
MEETING WITH SVETOZAR PRIBICEVIC IN PARIS
Precisely during those days, in 1933, Pribicevic
published his book “The Dictatorship of King Alexandre”
in Paris, in French. He called me, asking if we could meet, where and when. I
suggested we meet at my exhibition. He asked if I didn’t mind appearing in
public with him. I replied that I didn’t, and we arranged to meet at eleven.
Shortly afterward, he called me again and asked me to change the place and time
of the interview, as he was being followed closely by Spalajkovic’s
spies, and, moreover, he wanted to talk with me at length alone and without
being disturbed. We agreed that he would arrive at my hotel around six in the
evening.
He arrived on time; he looked thin, nervous, and unhappy. We met in the
hotel lounge, and after exchanging only a few words, he suggested we go up to
my room. We did so, and as soon as we were seated, Svetozar
told me he wanted to talk to me at length about his experience with the Serbs,
especially the King, about his character, his personal and Great Serbian
conceptions, and about the Croats' inability to understand the Serbs of Serbia
and defend themselves adequately. Radic
was the only one, he told me, who had understood his methods. That is why he
was assassinated, and this crime was not committed without Alexander's
knowledge, for he was in a hurry to see Radic
disappear after Baja, so that he could be, in addition to king, the leader of
the people.
When I replied that I didn't know who had participated in planning the
assassination and moved Punisa's hand, but that I
found it hard to believe it could have been done with the King's knowledge,
since it wasn't in his best interest to further widen the chasm between Croats
and Serbs, Pribicevic told me:
"He doesn't see things that way. His aim is for everyone to become
enemies, to turn against each other, so that he can then establish himself as
the sole arbiter to whom everyone would turn for favors. That's how he
justifies his dictatorship, which he had been plotting with Pera
for some time. Punisa was merely a tool, and the
bullet was fired by all the Great Serbs, not only against Radic,
but symbolically, against all Croats. I'm surprised you don't understand that,
even though you're not a politician." “But what kind of politics is this
that thinks problems are solved with bullets, especially among those who must
live under the same roof?”
“That’s how they think. That’s their tradition and their Balkan
temperament.” Svetozar looked at me the whole time as
if he thought I understood him or didn’t trust him. When I noticed, I said:
“Mr. Svetozar, your brother Milan is my
friend, and we always talk like brothers, frankly and with complete mutual
trust, even though we sometimes disagree. However, between the two of us,
between you and me, there’s a wall; there’s something that needs to be cleared
up before we can talk like friends and brothers.”
“I experienced the same thing for years and years, even after that
tragedy in Parliament when we talked in Zagreb. However, my chest was exposed
along with Radic’s in the parliamentary chamber, and
for the same reason.”
“That’s true, Mr. Svetozar, and it does you
credit, but there’s a previous matter that…” It bothers me. You know that for
quite some time I hadn't wanted to return your greeting; that is, I didn't do
it until recently, when you came to my table at the Grudski
Podrum restaurant in Zagreb.
I then told him what Protic had told me about
his repeated proposal in the Council of Ministers to send a punitive expedition
to Croatia, since the Croats refused to acknowledge having been liberated by
the Serbs and would not acknowledge it until they were subdued by force. I
asked him if this was true. He replied that it was. Then I asked him: "Is
it true (what Bishop Ritting had told me) that you
had already wanted to assassinate Radic in 1918, or
organize his assassination, after he had opposed your proposal in the National
Council to consummate that form of union with Serbia? Bishop Ritting had found out about this, so he took Radic out of the Parliament in Zagreb through the back door
and hid him for several days in his parish quarters."
"All that is true, but I was delirious and agitated at the time,
like everyone else, and not only Serbs but Croats as well." We feared the
union would fall apart and that, if not consummated quickly, others might
intervene. We were all crazy, not just me, without any inkling of where we were
going or who we would have to deal with. I admit that for years I was mistaken.
I believed I was a minister and wielded power until I discovered that all that
time I had been merely a figurehead for the King.
He then recounted several phases and events that opened his eyes, to the
point that he became more radical than Radic himself,
seeing no other solution than the union of the Serbs residing in Croatia with
the Croats and the overthrow of Serbian hegemony, even the dethronement of the
king and the establishment of a confederated republic. If the Serbs of Serbia
did not agree, so be it; let them live as they wish in their ancestral
homeland, and we here, united in Croatia and other territories that would form
an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. "And
your Serbian proselytizing, Mr. Svetozar? Do
you recall how stubbornly you insisted in 1905, in Rijeka, during the
discussions on the Rijeka Resolution, that Serbian individuality in Croatia be
emphasized?"
"Yes, I remember. Now I see it more calmly. We Serbs, in the Triunicate, can in no case, under any circumstances, in no
arrangement, separate ourselves from Croatia, whereas a diminished Croatia is
against our interests, for it would weaken us. Therefore, our fate is linked to
that of the Croats. Besides, we weren't neglected in Croatia before either; the
viceroy's lieutenant was always a Serb, and even the president of the Croatian
Parliament was a Serb—do you remember Medakovic?—and
the Croats, I must admit, never made an issue of it. And now, you see, how the Croats are treated in Belgrade!" We Serbs
living in Croatia can only be pleased and benefit from the incorporation of
Bosnia and Vojvodina, since it will increase our
numbers and influence and equality will rest on even firmer foundations.
After this presentation, Svetozar returned to
the prevailing situation in the country, referring in particular to the King,
his deficient education, his irascible and treacherous nature, and especially
to his dictatorship, emphasizing that as long as the King lived, he would do
everything possible against the constitution and parliament. He would evade the
Croatian problem and never provide a just solution. If he saw that things were
not going well, he would try to grant the territorially reduced Croatia a kind
of autonomy with fewer powers than it had in the union with Hungary.
After this initial clarification, our conversation proceeded smoothly
and in an atmosphere of complete mutual trust. We stayed until midnight, and,
chatting, we had forgotten about dinner. We said our goodbyes very cordially,
and when I shook his hand, I felt a certain pain inside, perhaps because of his
lamentable physical and mental state. He was very weak, and his gaze was
restless and fearful. It seemed to me that he even feared for his life.
A few days after the Cvetkovic-Macek
agreement, Dr. Curcin and I met in Belgrade. We had
dinner at the Srpski Kralj
(Serbian King) restaurant. After dinner, Dr. Bogdan Popovic invited us to another corner of the room, where the
academics had their weekly gathering.
Present were: Professor Slobodan Jovanovic, Bogdan Popovic, Guta Protic, Misa
Trifunovic, and Dr. Nikola Stojanovic,
who was attending in his capacity as secretary of the newly founded "The
Serbian Club," presided over by Slobodan Jovanovic.
I knew Slobodan Jovanovic well, and we were on
good terms. He seemed to favor the normalization of Serbian-Croatian relations.
He spent every summer on the island of Hvar, and we
would meet in Split. When we sat down, Slobodan Jovanovic
addressed me in his eunuch-like voice and said rather brusquely:
"How long will you Croats continue killing Serbs in Zagreb?"
I looked at him in astonishment and, smiling, replied:
"Until now, we knew that only Croats were being killed, Slobodan,
but I believe that neither should be killed. And why are you so worked up over
two men? Of course, we should all be concerned about every human life. This
involves, from what I've heard, a policeman, notorious for his brutality, whom someone killed at night for reasons of personal
revenge. Another dead man, they say, was taken by a police officer. We should
all be sorry, but what can be done? This change is a small revolution, in which
two men perished, one guilty, the other righteous, as often happens in
revolutions." Dr. Macek complained in my
presence about this accident and condemned it. The culprits are being sought.
“The second one, indeed, was killed unintentionally and by mistake. He
was mistaken in the dark for a policeman who was torturing detainees. He is a
distant relative of my wife, and we have been informed that he was killed by
mistake,” commented Dr. Nikola Stojanovic.
“But we will not allow Serbs to be killed in this country. If necessary,
we will incite the Serbs to revolt, and blood will flow freely!” roared Cika Slobodan.
“Neither Serbs nor Croats should be killed, Cika
Slobodan, nor anyone else. You weren’t bothered, or at least you didn’t make
yourself heard, when Croats were being killed. In Senj,
the gendarmes killed people like rabbits, as if it were nothing. None of you
said a word, didn’t raise your voice in protest, even though you imagined that
blood cries out for blood.”
“That was something else entirely.” "In defense of the State,
anything is done," replied Mr. Slobodan Jovanovic.
"Who says that's how you defend the State and that this is the
right path?" I answered.
At that moment, Misa Trifunovic
took my hand, saying quietly,
"Leave it alone, we have to throw water on the fire, because
otherwise the Serbs will indeed revolt, as Mr. Slobodan said. Then, every man
for himself! You don't know the Serbs."
"I know them, Mr. Trifunovic, but you
can't demand that others remain silent while you beat them. Negotiating and
threatening with stabbings and bloodshed, that's unacceptable. We all have the
devil under our skin."
"You, in fact, are getting worked up over an insignificant, albeit
regrettable, incident, and you, along with us, wanted an agreement to be
reached," Dr. Curcin said to Slobodan. “Yes, of
course, but I didn’t want this agreement. What agreement… a Gypsy signed it…
We’ll see about that… Such an agreement doesn’t bind the Serbs,” Slobodan
retorted.
“I always said that creating a common state with the Croats was the
greatest folly. We should take and annex the provinces with Serbian minorities
in Croatia and leave the Croats in their own land to do as they pleased and
sort things out as they saw fit. I still hold this opinion; and, in the end,
that’s how it will be,” Mr. Protic interjected in a
highly authoritative tone.
There was a silence that seemed to be in approval.
“We are divided, divided,” Slobodan continued; “divided by religion and
by mentality. That must be attributed to the past of those from abroad (Croats)
and to both Churches, especially the Catholic Church, whose head resides
abroad.” "That's the source of all the quarrels and intolerance,"
Slobodan railed.
"Only in part, Mr. Slobodan. Since you insist, I'll tell you where the intellectual blame lies, and
where the breeding ground of chauvinism is: in your Academy of 'pure science.'
Your academics write, and you publish, that if there are Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, they were 'imported by Austria.' And you still want our children
to accept this and believe it as historical truth, despite the graves of their
ancestors dating back to before the arrival of the Orthodox population.
Consequently, you intellectuals and your Academy of Sciences are the main
breeding ground of chauvinism; others, ignorant, follow you because they
consider you their guiding light.
"We left soon after. Upon saying goodbye, Bogdan
Popovic expressed his desire to have dinner the
following day alone with me and Dr. Curcin. So we
did. Bogdan was downcast, but composed and kind. He
immediately began:
"I wanted us to meet and talk. The problem is serious and, if you
will, sad. However, you and Slobodan adopted a tone that precluded any
high-level academic discussion. Slobodan is an intelligent man, but he was
agitated by what happened in Zagreb and began in a curt tone, and you responded
in kind and said things that hurt not only him but everyone. We were especially
hurt by what you said about Bosnia, which we have carried in our hearts for a
century.
"I believe you, Professor, but we carry it in our hearts too. My
family is originally from Bosnia, and half of Dalmatia comes from there. That's
why we shouldn't look at it like an apple we want to put in our saddlebag. Above all, neither you nor we should..." to consider it in
such a way that it becomes the apple of discord.
"What you're saying is true, but our people have been accustomed,
ever since Karageorge, to considering Bosnia as their
province and don't take into account whether others who are not or do not want
to be Serbs also live there."
"And who is to blame if you don't tell your people the truth?"
"You, however, told Slobodan yesterday that the Serbs are upstarts in
Bosnia."
"I didn't use that term: I said that your colleagues, the
academics, write—and you, that is, the Serbian Academy of Sciences,
publish—that the Croats in Bosnia were 'imported' by Austria. And that is a
blatant lie. You, as an educated man, know that this isn't the case, which,
moreover, you can verify even in Serbian documents, if you wish, since not all
Serbian historians are like Stanojevic."
"I am not a historian. Perhaps some historians exaggerate, but it
is true that in Bosnia there are two There are
sometimes more Serbs than Croats.
-That will be so, if by Croats you only mean Catholics. However, it is
also true that Serbs in Bosnia do not constitute even half of the total
population. So, what do we do?
-You also take into account the "Turks," or, as the Bosniaks call them, Muje.
-You can call them Muje or Alije,
it doesn't matter, they are there, they are native, they live on ancestral
lands, and they are our blood.
-In their hearts, they consider themselves Turks. In their minds, they
look not towards Zagreb or Belgrade but towards Istanbul. Their numbers don't
count for either you or us. I know that they hate Serbs, and some even pretend
to be Croats, even though they are not.
-That's their business. They know better than anyone what they are and
whose side they are on. However, they have the divine and human right to be on
equal footing with their other compatriots.
-In any case, They are of secondary importance;
the serious thing is that the Croats hate us and want nothing to do with us.
"They don't hate you, Professor, or at least not the overwhelming
majority; it's just that we're in litigation, and you know why. Don't listen to
the stories; go to Zagreb and spend some time there, meet the people, talk to them,
and you'll see what's really going on."
“I don’t want to, my friend, nor can I. Even before unification, I never
stayed in Zagreb for more than a day, and even less so since we’ve been
together. I didn’t say that you or men like you hate us. But one swallow
doesn’t make a summer. Most people hate us, and that’s where we stand. Not even
the people of Hvar would tolerate us when I used to
spend my summers there with Slobodan.”
“They don’t want to be subject to Belgrade, Professor, which doesn’t
mean they wouldn’t want to be on equal footing with Belgrade. You’ve gotten it
into your head that only the Croats are discontent. I, on the other hand, like
many Croats, would agree that in Bosnia, only the Serbs should be consulted on
whether they want to be governed as they are now, subject to Belgrade, or
whether they would prefer to govern themselves. If they choose to remain
subject to Belgrade, then annex Bosnia.”
“I know, and we all know, that they wouldn’t vote for it.” “Everyone
hates us: Croats, Bosniaks, and Montenegrins, even
you Lales,” he said, addressing Dr. Curcin.
“They don’t hate us, they just don’t want to be oppressed and
exploited,” replied Dr. Curcin. “Nobody wants to be
with us; go away, then, everyone, go with whomever you want.”
“What would that mean now?” exclaimed Dr. Curcin.
“It would mean: the Serbia of before Kumanovo.
Exactly. Back then we were
more peaceful and happier, we lived better than we do now.”
IMPRESSIONS OF A MUSSOLINI ENVOY IN DALMATIA
(When the Kingdom of Yugoslavia collapsed, Mestrovic was in Split and,
after its occupation and annexation by Italy, he moved to Zagreb, where he
spent several months imprisoned, accused by the authorities of the Independent
State of Croatia of plotting his escape to London. At the urging of Pope Pius
XII, he regained his freedom, and in 1942 he took refuge at the Croatian
Institute of St. Jerome in Rome, and from there he left in 1943 for
Switzerland, where he remained until the end of the war.)
In Rome, my old Italian acquaintances didn't
invite me to their homes, nor did I, moreover, have much desire to go out.
Once, I had to accept an invitation from a young lady to dinner at her house.
The daughter of some friends of mine, whom I had held on my lap as a child, she
called me "uncle" for a long time. Her father was Italian and her
mother Russian. She married a A
professor, at the time a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Education
and, as such, of course, a member of the Fascist Party.
The three of us were alone. After dinner, my "niece" insisted
that her husband inform me about his mission in Split and Šibenik.
Volpicelli—that was her husband's surname—felt
uncomfortable, but yielded to his wife's insistence. He explained that a month
earlier Mussolini had asked him to travel to Dalmatia, without telling Governor
Bastianini in Zadar, or
anyone else, the reason for his trip or who had sent him. He was tasked with
thoroughly investigating how many genuinely Italian families there were in
Split and Šibenik. Volpicelli
spent more than fifteen days in Šibenik and Split,
delving into all the records, going back two hundred years and more, and found
that only eight genuinely Italian families lived in Šibenik
and only three in Split, two of which no longer had a drop of Italian blood.
One had arrived from Sarajevo about one hundred and thirty years ago, the The root of their surname was
Turkish, and half the members of that family felt Croatian and the other half
Italian. Upon learning this, Mussolini looked on in astonishment, as if it were impossible, and when Volpicelli
explained how he had gathered the aforementioned information, he began to shout
at him:
“Even if there isn’t a single Italian left, I will expel the last Croat
and colonize the Italians there.”
He told me how surprised he was, as were the Italian officers and
teachers he met, by the high level of national consciousness of the Croats,
whose cultural level is superior to that of the Italians.
“In Split, there are two secondary schools better than those in Rome,
and the young women of Split are more educated than the wives of our officers.”
From the occupying authorities, he had heard that popular opposition was
growing daily and that their measures were too harsh; several people had been
shot, including a few schoolchildren who were demonstrating against the
Italianization of the schools. The Fascists were blamed for the drastic
measures, since in Italy there were also two paths: the army and the Fascists,
the latter being more influential. Volpicelli warned
me that an Italian, sent as director of the classical high school in Split, had
told him that my eldest son had caused "a serious incident" with a
portrait of the King or Mussolini, which could have cost him his life, but he
didn't want to investigate further—he was a father himself.
He did, however, advise my wife to withdraw the boy from school and pay
for private lessons. She did so, but nevertheless, the danger remained that the
incident would be discovered and the boy would suffer. Therefore, Volpicelli advised me to call my whole family under the
pretext of spending Christmas with me. I did so, and my wife, with her three
children, obtained permission to join me.
STEPINAC ON DRAZA MIHAILOVIC'S RELATIONS WITH FASCIST ITALY
-Shortly before I managed to move to Switzerland, Archbishop Stepinac came to Rome briefly. He arrived by plane and
confided in me the reason for his visit: to deliver to the Pope all the
documents relating to the crimes and atrocities committed by the Nazis and
Fascists in our territory, including the annexed part of Dalmatia. He had
secretly instructed all the parish priests to send him the relevant documents,
also secretly. Eighty-five percent responded, and Stepinac,
with all those reports in his briefcase, flew to Rome to deliver them to the
Pope.
"Why didn't you send them with your secretary?"
"I didn't, because I believe I should only risk my own life, not
someone else's, and I'm sure I would have lost mine had the Germans surprised
me."
This time Stepinac was very nervous and told
me that the Nazis had shot his brother eight days earlier for alleged
collaboration with the partisans. He emphasized that the Nazis and fascists
were becoming more cruel every day and the situation in Croatia more desperate,
largely due to the fighting between the Chetniks and
the Ustaše, which was stirring up unprecedented
hatred between Serbs and Croats. He noted that hatred was becoming widespread
on both sides. As proof that not all Serbs hated Croats, he recounted what had
happened to him not long ago with a Serbian officer. The officer in question
visited him at the Curia and said the following:
"General Draža Mihailović
sent me to deliver this letter to the Italian general. Mihailović's
men escorted me to Belgrade and handed me over to Nedić's
men, who then handed me over to the Germans, who escorted me to Sarajevo, and from there to Zagreb, to the Italians."
In Zagreb, the Italians put me up at the Hotel Esplanade, telling me to wait
until they could take me back to the general. I waited and waited, and today is the fourth day. I was bored; it was raining outside, and
I carefully opened the letter.
When I read its contents, I felt ashamed and decided not to hand it
over, no matter what happened to me. Your Excellency, I am from Serbia. I swore
allegiance to the Yugoslav state, but this letter is a betrayal of that state,
and I no longer want to carry it with me. Instead, I want to give it to you so
you can keep it for posterity. What happens to me matters little; I am already
weary of life after so many calamities and infamies.
"The man left, and I was left with the letter," Stepinac finished.
"Do you remember its contents, Your Excellency?" I inquired.
"How could I forget? I remember every word, for I read it
repeatedly." It begins with the title "Your Excellency" and
"Colleague." Then Mihailovic gets to the
point, emphasizing that relations between Italy and Serbia were always not only
good but friendly until the Croats were incorporated into the Serbian State.
From that moment on, they became debased and worsened day by day. Currently,
however, both Serbs and Italians know the Croats, so the time has come for
close collaboration, since "the objectives pursued are identical: yours,
the extermination of the Croats of Dalmatia; ours, their extermination in
Bosnia and Herzegovina."
We didn't dwell on this letter any further. Stepinac,
as if the letter contained nothing new for him, and I preferred to talk about
the documents he delivered to the Pope.
"Will the Pope, Your Excellency, read the documents you
delivered?"
"I think so, or he will entrust their reading to one of the
cardinals." “You know that half the cardinals are pro-fascists, so…”
“I know, but the Holy Father isn’t, and he’ll want to hear the truth,
he’ll want to be informed.”
“The Pope is Italian, and he won’t like news unfavorable to Italians.”
“Good heavens, he’s Italian, and if I were the Pope, I’d be Croatian
first and foremost, but the current Pope professes such high principles and is
aware of his high mission…”
“I’m convinced of that, but I think it would be advisable to give a copy
to Mr. Miron Taylor, Roosevelt’s delegate to the
Vatican.” Stepinac agreed, and Mr. Taylor later
confirmed to me in New York that he had received the documents. Stepinac was to leave for the airfield in half an hour when
the orderly of Monsignor Magjerec, rector of the St.
Jerome Institute, arrived, inviting him to dinner.
“I don’t have time, and I don’t mind having dinner. You can bring me a
piece of bread and an egg, or something like that, which I’ll put in my pocket
and eat on the plane.”
Two minutes later, the orderly returned and told the archbishop that a
priest wished to speak with him.
“I’m sorry, but I don’t have time, as I have to leave in five minutes,” Stepinac replied, shaking my hand.
“Please stay for those few minutes.”
Meanwhile, the waiter returned immediately and handed him a card. Stepinac stood up, saying:
“It’s a Jesuit sent by your General. I must see you; please stay, I’ll
be back in two minutes.”
He left and, indeed, returned soon, somewhat nervous, and said to me:
“The General warns me to be careful, that the Nazis are trying to
eliminate me, but what do I care?” And he said goodbye:
“Goodbye, it’s very likely we won’t see each other again.” The Nazis or
the Communists will kill me later.
INTERVIEW WITH ALLAN DULLES
One day I was visited by Dragutinovic, an
official at the Yugoslav Legation in Bern, who, with the exception of a clerk,
was the only Croat at the Legation. He told me that his life at the Legation
was becoming unbearable, as every day the Croats were insulted with the worst
outrages, as if they were all Ustaše, and he was also
labeled an Ustaše, even though his rank placed him
after the ambassador, and he certainly never was one.
The reason for his visit was not to complain about this, but to inform
me that Mr. Allan Dulles wished me to visit them, as he had an official message
from Washington for me. Dulles was President Roosevelt's personal envoy to
Europe. Suffering from phlebitis, I was unable to attend the appointment, so I
told him I would come as soon as I felt better and could walk. My illness
lingered, and I was unable to move for a while.
Dulles informed me again, through Dragutinovic,
that if I didn't dare visit him in Bern because of the potential persecution of
my family in the country, he would come to Lausanne, and we could meet at a
restaurant in the evening. I had no choice but to go, though my steps were
hesitant. I arrived in Bern that night and had dinner at Dulles's house. After
dinner, Dulles addressed the matter that had prompted our meeting and read me
the instructions from Washington, along with the
questions he was to ask me. The first part was a sort of explanation of why
they were contacting me. It was pointed out that in the United States, there was a growing number of Croatian and Serbian immigrants who
were quarreling and hurling virulent accusations at each other. The Serbs
accused the Croats of betraying Yugoslavia and joining its enemies, while the
Croats accused the Serbs of mistreating and persecuting them.
Even the official Yugoslav representation in Washington denounced the
Croats. The Americans didn't know what to make of it, who
was right. They argued that Croatian immigrants were more numerous and already
their citizens, but they wanted to be fair to both sides. They believed I would
tell them objectively the main causes that precipitated the collapse of
Yugoslavia and motivated such violent conflicts. To the best of my knowledge
and understanding, I explained the causes to them. Then they asked me how the
people in Croatia had welcomed the Independent State of Croatia and its
collaboration with the Germans and Italians. I told him my impression: that
ninety percent of the Croatian people would welcome an independent state, but
that the same percentage opposed the Ustaše state
simply because it was not free and they did not believe it could ever be free
under the protection of Germany and Italy.
The next question was whether an understanding between the Croats and
Serbs and the maintenance of the common state was viable. I told him that after
having longed for union for so many years, it was difficult for me, and I
deeply regretted having to give a negative answer, but that I did not believe
that after everything that had happened since the beginning of their shared
life and what was happening now, any understanding to preserve the state
community was possible. It was difficult to believe that the Croats and Serbs
were capable of resolving their conflict on their own and finding a judicious
solution. Impartial and disinterested arbitrators would be necessary.
"Who would they be, and how should they act?"
"Well, the Allies. You and the British should land in Dalmatia. The
entire population would welcome you with jubilation, and the Croatian army, the
Domobrani, would immediately switch sides to the
Allies, as would most of the Ustaše, who were
discontented because of the Italian annexation of Dalmatia. The whole
population would be on your side, and the Italians would flee at the first
sight of an Allied soldier, since they entered through fraud without firing a
single shot. The presence of many soldiers of Croatian origin, of whom there
are so many in the United States and Canada, would be
very effective in this invasion.
They would connect with the people, instilling confidence and
enthusiasm. You shouldn't use Serbian officers because that would arouse
suspicion among the people." Once the country was occupied by the Allied
army, a Croatian government, headed by Dr. Machek,
who held a majority, should be installed in Zagreb, and a Serbian government,
even if under the presidency of Nedic, in Belgrade.
The Allied occupation should last until tempers cooled and people were capable
of sober thought, and then the people, in both Serbia and Croatia, should vote
separately on whether they wanted a state community and, if so, what kind of
regime.
In short, this was my response to Dulles regarding the official
questions from Washington.
Dulles told me that, among the Yugoslavs, he knew Ambassador Fotic, an intelligent man, and that he seemed to favor a
larger Serbia, from which the Croats would be excluded. I replied that I knew Fotic little, but that I understood him to be part of the
Greater Serbian clique, primarily responsible for the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. I then asked him if he had met any Croats.
He told me that he had once conferred with Subasic,
who hadn't given him the impression of any significant hunger, claiming, by way
of correction, that perhaps this was due to Subasic's
poor command of English, which prevented him from expressing himself
adequately. He wanted to know what Subasic
represented. I explained that he was the Ban of Croatia and that Dr. Macek had sent him abroad to represent the Croats, along
with Krnjevic, and that it would be most convenient
to bring Krnjevic along in the event of an Allied
landing in Dalmatia, which is a Croatian province.
Dulles relayed the conversation to Washington, and I don't know how the
Yugoslav government in London found out and discussed the matter in the Council
of Ministers, which, as I later learned, had resolved to issue a statement
declaring me a "traitor" for having proposed foreign occupation. Only
two ministers, Jovo Banjanin
and Srdjan Budisavljevic,
had opposed it.
COMMUNIST CRIMES IN CROATIA
(At the end of the war, Mestrovic ignored the flattering calls from
communist officials to return to the country; he settled in the United States,
renounced his Yugoslav citizenship, and opted for American citizenship. He is a
professor of Fine Arts at the University of Notre
Dame.)
A few days after Tito's partisans entered Zagreb, a messenger arrived
from there. He was an acquaintance of mine who worked in the underground
organization and had worked for the partisans throughout the war. He was a
supporter of communism. He was morally devastated. He told me that during the
first few days after the partisans arrived, there were very few casualties, a
fact that pleasantly surprised him and many others, who were happy that the
bloodshed had stopped.
Later, hundreds and hundreds of people were interrogated and released.
On the fifth or sixth day, not only they, but a multitude of citizens—more than
16,000—were summoned again and taken to the concentration camp, surrounded by
barbed wire on the outskirts of Zagreb. From there, they disappeared during the
night in the direction of Sljeme. There, they were
led to the edge of the quarry pits, finished off with hammer blows to the back
of the neck, thrown in, and buried. Just like the Polish officers in Katyn. This is a small fragment of the overall picture of
the "third liberation" of unfortunate Croatia, while the full picture
includes Srijem, in eastern Slavonia, where the Chetnik partisans exterminated the Croatian population.
The final act was Bleiburg, where the
"liberators" murdered all who fell into their hands: soldiers and
civilians, men and women—in short, all those whom "the glorious Poglavnik" had incited to seek refuge with the British
troops. The British, in their supposed "humanity," handed them all
over to the communist partisans as if they were sheep, and the partisans
treated them like wolves with terrified sheep in the flock. The same fate
befell the government of Pavelić, the elderly
President Mandić, innocent of all guilt, and
others. A freight car, crammed with these unfortunate souls, supposedly
destined for Italy where the Allies would try the guilty, was hitched by a
British officer to a train bound for Ljubljana, and thus they were delivered to
the communist partisans. The aforementioned British officer had been bribed by
the partisans, who gave him a brand-new American car. This detail was told to
me years later by a senior communist officer who arranged that exchange.
University of Notre
Dame, Indiana, EE.UU.
The first post-war constitution of 1946 was a
consequence not only of this historical backdrop and the tragic experiment of
monarchical Yugoslavia, but also of the communist military organization during
the war. A form of federalism took shape within the ranks of the partisan
guerrillas when, for strategic and tactical reasons, regional
"anti-fascist councils" were established, with their own
"legislative" and "executive" bodies. The electoral law,
promulgated by the Provisional Assembly in 1945, confirmed the existing federal
principle by providing for a two-chamber parliament: the Federal Council and
the Council of Nationalities.
The Federal Council represents the people as a
whole, and the Council of Nationalities represents the individual federal
republics and autonomous provinces. With these preparations, the foundation of
the federal system was established in advance, so that the constitution adopted
in 1946 merely ratified the existing situation. Article One of the constitution
declares that "The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a people's
federal state in republican form," a community of equal peoples who, by
virtue of the right of self-determination, including the right of secession,
expressed their desire to live together in the federal state.
However, despite the constitution's federal
facade, even communist leaders today acknowledge that the state during that
period was governed by a rigorously centralist program. The federal ideal was
undermined from the outset by two negative factors: first, the fact that all
power was held by the communist party, whose administrative staff was largely
composed of Serbs, leaving the impression that the new state was once again
dominated by a single people.
The other negative factor was the Five-Year
Plan for economic recovery. While all the republics formally adhered to the
country's recovery, it was not implemented at the republican level but rather
at the state level, with the aim of strengthening national unity, and was
directed This was entirely controlled by the central
government. This practical distortion of federalism caused serious consequences
from the outset, both politically and economically. Following the conflict with
Moscow in 1948, Tito personally condemned this attempt at forced unification,
stating at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia that
"under the guise of an economic plan, such bureaucratic centralism had
been created that all initiatives of certain republics were thwarted."
The split with the Soviet Union in 1948 provided an opportunity to blame
all the shortcomings and failures on Soviet pressure and to begin reviewing
certain political and economic procedures that threatened the existence of the
communist regime. Several measures aimed at decentralization led to the first
constitutional reform, carried out on January 13, 1953.
Under Article 115 of the new Constitutional Law, Chapters VI through XII
and XV of the previous Constitution were repealed, as were all provisions of
that constitution "that contradict the provisions of this law." These
chapters concerned the structure of the state and the organs of power. The 1953
Constitutional Law thus retained the federal form of government. The
sovereignty of the republics, including the right of secession, was not
directly revoked.
However, the content of Yugoslav federalism was distorted by the new
constitution. Article 2 of the new constitution stipulates that "all power
belongs to the working people." The 1946 constitution did not include the
attribute "worker" when discussing power. Article 6 of that
constitution stated that "all power emanates from the people and belongs
to the people." In the new Constitutional Law, however, the attribute
"worker" is repeated every time power, freedom, and political
activity are discussed. With this formulation, the Constitutional Law itself
has sanctioned a class-based direction for the country.
That the new Constitutional Law was drafted in this sense is confirmed
by all subsequent political and administrative reforms. Its purpose is no
longer the federation of national communities (people's republics), although
these were not abolished, but rather the autonomy of smaller, local units, such
as communes and workers' councils. The State is conceived as an indivisible
community that no longer has to deal with national problems. The constitutional
reform in its entirety was interpreted by official bodies as a transition from
centralism to decentralization or, according to communist terminology, as a
transition from the dictatorship of the proletariat to the period of the
withering away of the state. In this sense, a certain territorial reform of the
communes and of the legislative and executive bodies was carried out, the
fundamental features of which we will now outline.
The 1953 Constitutional Law introduced two chambers into all representative
bodies, from the communes to the republics and the federation: the People's
Council and the Producers' Council. Under this reform, the people's committees
of villages and cities, as well as the parliaments of the republics, became
bicameral, which they were not under the 1946 constitution. In the federal
parliament, the Producers' Council replaced the former upper house, the Council
of Nationalities, which had been elected by the republics and autonomous
territories and represented their interests before the federation.
However, the Council of Nationalities was not entirely abolished but was
transformed into a rather unstable committee within the current lower house,
the Federal People's Council, only able to convene when the laws and decrees of
the people's republics differed from those of the federal government. Even so,
the identity of local (republican) laws and interests with federal ones is
believed to be so firm that Eduardo Kardelj,
vice-president of the Federal Executive Council, anticipated in his comment on
the new Constitutional Law that the Council of Nationalities would never meet.
The Federal People's Assembly (the federal parliament), composed
according to the new Constitutional Law of the Federal Council and the Council
of Producers, holds "national sovereignty and is the supreme organ of
power of the federation" (Art. 3). Art. 15 lists in 11 points the powers
of the Federal People's Assembly, which include: amending the constitution;
electing and removing the President of the Republic and the Federal Executive
Council; and appointing and removing the justices of the Federal Supreme Court.
The federal parliament's jurisdiction also extends to the federal
legislature, which, in practice, covers all aspects of citizens' private and
public lives, their rights and freedoms, education, property, labor, and
insurance. The Federal People's Assembly sets the amount of social
contributions (taxes) for the communes and workers' collectives, decides on
economic plans and the federal budget, guides education and culture, and
decides on other matters "when these pertain to the general interest of
all the people's republics."
It exercises control over foreign policy, declares a state of war,
ratifies international agreements, and approves modifications to the borders
between republics that mutually agree to such modifications. With regard to the
six people's republics, the Federal People's Assembly is the sole body that
judges whether the republican constitutions and laws are in accordance with the
federal constitution and laws. In all these matters, both chambers participate
on an equal footing in joint or separate sessions.
The work of the Federal People's Assembly is carried out through
standing committees formed ad hoc. Each chamber may propose amendments to a
bill or other legal act submitted or already voted on in the other chamber. If
a conflict arises between the two chambers regarding proposed amendments, a
special joint committee is appointed to reach an agreement. If the special
committee fails to reach an agreement, it dissolves the Federal People's
Assembly and calls for elections.
The Yugoslav constitution, which upholds the viewpoint of direct
democracy, does not recognize the separation of powers. The Federal People's
Assembly, therefore, exercises both legislative and executive power. Executive
power is entrusted to the President of the Republic and the Federal Executive
Council. Article 70 of the Constitutional Law states,
"The Federal People's Assembly delegates to the President of the Republic
and the Federal Executive Council the representation of the Federal People's
Republic of Yugoslavia as a state, the enforcement of laws, the control of the
federal administration, and other executive duties incumbent upon the
federation."
Each newly elected Federal People's Assembly, in turn, elects the
President of the Republic at its first plenary session. The President is
elected from among the members of the Assembly and serves a four-year term,
although the Assembly may recall the President before the expiration of this
term. The President also exercises power after the Assembly is dissolved until
the election of a new President. The rights and duties of the President are set
forth in Articles 71 to 78 of the new Constitutional Law. The President
represents the state both domestically and internationally.
The President enacts laws, issues revocable notes on the ratification of
international conventions, appoints ambassadors, accepts and revokes the
credentials of foreign diplomatic representatives, and confers decorations by
decree. As concurrent President of the Federal Executive Council, the President
may suspend the execution of any act of government, with the obligation to
promptly submit the matter in dispute to the Federal People's Assembly.
Furthermore, the President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces and, as such, presides over the National Defense Council,
appoints and dismisses officers, and, in collaboration with the Military
Council, oversees the organization and mobilization of the resources and forces
necessary for national defense. The President of the Republic acts in
accordance with and within the framework of the Constitution and current laws
and is accountable to the Assembly for their actions, reporting to it on the
activities of the Federal Executive Council. The President does not personally
participate in Assembly voting, and in the event of absence or illness, one of
the Vice-Presidents of the Federal Executive Council replaces the President.
The Federal Executive Council is also elected from among the members of
the Assembly at its first plenary session. It comprises 30 to 40 members, with
two or more vice-presidents. The Federal Executive Council's mission is to
oversee and implement resolutions and laws applicable throughout the country.
According to the Constitution, it drafts the federal social plan and the
federal budget, sets guidelines for the work of federal social bodies, drafts
and submits bills, proclaims mobilization, ratifies international agreements,
establishes new enterprises, manages state funds, appoints and dismisses
secretaries, undersecretaries of state, and the governor of the National Bank,
rules on the dissolution of the Assembly, grants pardons, oversees the
judiciary, and exercises other functions determined by federal laws (Articles
79 et seq. of the Constitutional Law).
The Federal Executive Council is elected for a four-year term, the same
as the Federal People's Assembly, although the latter may recall the entire
Council or any of its members before the expiration of that term. Like the
President of the Republic, the Federal Executive Council continues to function,
even after the dissolution of the Assembly, until the new election. The Council
is accountable to the Assembly for its actions, and the Assembly can annul any
act that, in its opinion, does not conform to the law. In turn, the Federal
Executive Council can suspend the execution of decrees and other acts of the
Executive Councils of the six "people's republics" if it considers
them inconsistent with the constitution and federal laws. Thus, the governments
of the six "people's republics" are subordinate not only to their
respective assemblies, but also directly to the Federal Executive Council.
The Federal Executive Council establishes State Secretariats,
administrative entities, and other specific bodies that directly exercise
executive functions of federal jurisdiction. The State Secretariats replace the
former ministries, and their competence also includes the direct execution of
federal laws when the general interest so requires. The number of secretariats
is not fixed; they are created and dissolved by law. The most important current
secretariats are: Foreign Affairs, Interior, National Defense, Economy, and Public
Administration. They report on their performance to the Federal Executive
Council and are sworn in before the President of the Republic.
The text of the oath is determined by the Federal Executive Council.
Each Secretary of State is empowered, within their jurisdiction, to invalidate
the decrees and other acts of the secretaries of the executive councils of each
of the six "people's republics." Other executive institutions at the
federal level, such as the Federal Police and the UDBA (State Security Office),
have the same right. The number of such administrative institutions is not
fixed. They are formed according to the criteria of the Federal Executive
Council, to which they are subordinate, and the Council, in turn, is
accountable to the Assembly for them.
Regarding the political and administrative structure of the
"people's republics," nothing substantial needs to be added to what
has already been said. The republican People's Assemblies—in Croatia, the
former name Sabor remains—consist of the Council of
the Republic and the Council of Producers, both participating on an equal
footing. The republican Executive Council, elected in a joint bicameral
session, is responsible for implementing resolutions. The President heads the
Executive Council.
Each republican assembly has its own President, but the republics do not
have Presidents, as that title is reserved for the President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the model of federal administration, at the
republican level there are also secretariats and other institutions to handle
matters within the sphere of each republic. They are responsible for their
performance to the Executive Council, and the Executive Council is responsible
to the republican assembly (Articles 100 to 112 of the Constitutional Law).
Article 16 of the Constitutional Law deals with the
relationship between the republics and the federation in the legislative
sphere. It is emphasized that "the people's republics
may enact laws only if they are authorized to do so by federal law." This
established their almost absolute dependence on the federation, which is
further confirmed by subsequent measures. Each of the six republics may enact
laws supplementing any federal law and promulgate its own legislation in areas
where no federal legislation exists, provided that such legislation is
consistent with federal laws. Upon the enactment of a federal law, the
provisions of republican laws relating to the same subject matter are
automatically repealed.
The question of the conformity of republican laws to federal laws falls
exclusively to the Federal Assembly, while the motion to examine such
conformity may originate from the Federal Executive Council, the Republican
Executive Council, the Federal Supreme Court, the
representative bodies of the autonomous provinces, and even the relevant local
organization or institution.
There is no doubt, nor is it a secret, that the republican organs of
power are merely administrative instruments of the central government. Strictly
speaking, there is no area of social life in which the sovereignty of the
republics is unequivocally defined. This seems to be quite unwelcome, not only
for political reasons—because of the pride and aspiration to independence that
the peoples incorporated into Yugoslavia have not relinquished—but also because
of the dependence and economic exploitation that threaten the very existence of
the Communist Party in certain republics and national territories. A new
constitutional reform was recently announced. It is interesting to note that in
the debate taking place in the federal parliament, it has been proposed, among
other reforms, that "the new constitution should regulate the relations
between the federation and the republics more precisely."
According to the Yugoslav Constitution, all citizens aged 18 and over
enjoy the right to vote and to stand for election. However, the current
structure employs two electoral systems: one for the election of deputies to
the People's Council and another for the Producers' Council. As an example, we
can consider the Federal People's Assembly, whose model is followed by the
assemblies of the six republics. For the lower house, the Federal Council, all
citizens aged 18 and over 18 elect their representatives by direct and secret
ballot.
As a rule, one deputy is elected for every 60,000 inhabitants. In
addition, each republic allocates 10 deputies, plus 6 deputies from the
autonomous province of Vojvodina and 4 deputies from
the autonomous territory of Kosovo-Metohija. The
total number of national deputies in the current Federal Council is 371. For the upper house—the Producers' Council—only producers, that is,
members of workers' collectives, are eligible to be elected.
Consequently, the Producers' Council is not elected by universal suffrage, nor
by republics, nor indirectly, but rather through delegates from the workers'
councils. Only the workers' councils of the communes' people's committees are
elected directly by local producers.
The current Federal Producers' Council is composed of 216 deputies,
representing two groups of producers: industrial and agricultural. Regarding
this division, it is important to emphasize that the industrial group has 168
deputies on the Producers' Council, while the agricultural group has only 48.
The reason for this disproportion, which in itself relegates the agricultural
sector to a secondary position, lies not in the numerical disparity between
industrial and agricultural producers, but in the electoral system that
deliberately favors the industrial group. The electoral system and the title of
producer are not based on the number and qualifications of the workers, but
rather on the volume of the so-called "social product" of the
respective group.
This means that the greater the "social product," the more
seats a given group would have. Since industrial products are more expensive
than agricultural products, their overall "social product," expressed
in monetary terms, automatically exceeds that of the agricultural group. Thus,
the industrial group obtained two-thirds of the seats and the agricultural
group one-third. Such an electoral system is not only undemocratic but also
antisocialist, as it considers not the worker and their labor, but only the
product of labor.
This injustice was sanctioned by a special law in 1954, according to
which the "social product" of the respective groups is measured by
the average obtained over the previous three years. Kardelj
justified this procedure, primarily targeting peasants and agricultural
workers, when he stated that "workers' councils are instruments of the
class struggle" and that they "compensate for the numerical
inferiority of the working class and ensure it the social role that belongs to
it as the driving force of development toward socialism." With those
words, the trend of the constitution and the entire political structure was
clearly defined.
The third and most basic instance of power in the Yugoslav federal
system is the commune. The name evokes the Paris Commune, very fresh in the
memory of communists and which is cited with unusual frequency in the press and
speeches in Yugoslavia. According to the new Constitutional Law, the commune is
an autonomous socialist community, headed by the People's Committee, in which
the workers decide directly and democratically on matters related to communal
life and management.
The People's Committees are not a recent institution. They date back to
the war years, when each partisan detachment organized itself in the invaded
territory, establishing local authority and preserving it after the war. When,
with the schism from Moscow in 1948, the policy of decentralization was
promoted, the communist regime brandished the commune as an argument that its
power derives from the people. From that date onward, special attention was
paid to the commune.
Two reasons led the central federal government to reform the commune.
The first was to limit the autocracy of local partisan leaders, whose
incapacity and administrative ineptitude were of no benefit to the state. Their
authority was restricted by their greater accountability to the local
population, which was given the opportunity for broader criticism through
elections and local meetings. The second reason was that in this way, the
central government could shield itself with local autonomy and hold local
authorities responsible for failures. It should be noted that the regime not
only tolerates such criticism but encourages it, especially in cases of
corruption within local bodies or non-compliance with economic plans.
However, communal autonomy is restricted by the fundamental principle of
the prevailing system, which requires total adherence to the established
socialist order, and also by the complex web of dependency and administrative
responsibility, as well as by the laws that prescribe the actions of the
communes and establish the "social contribution" (taxes) they must
pay to the state and to each republic. Although these "social
contributions" are quite burdensome, it is worth noting that through
overtime and "voluntary" work, dispensing with low wages in this
instance, remarkable results are sometimes achieved, particularly in the
construction of buildings and public works, such as: power plants, aqueducts,
roads, schools, etc.
The reorganization of the communal system was preceded by an attempt at
workers' self-management in production, and, strangely enough, the commune was
established as the basic instance of power precisely to control workers'
self-management. When the system of workers' self-government was introduced in
certain enterprises, many of them quickly took advantage of the relative
freedom and, competing with others, obtained profits that were distributed
among the workers.
All of this was achieved despite high taxes imposed by the State, which,
apprehensive about "capitalist tendencies," implemented the system
according to which not only the workers but the entire local population must
direct production through the People's Committees. The Constitutional Law of
1953 sanctioned this innovation, which, in fact, became the basis and main
characteristic of Yugoslav federalism. To make the economic independence of the
communes more effective and control easier, a territorial reform was carried
out that reduced the number of communes from 4,052 to 1,193, in 95 districts.
The representatives of the people's authority in the communes and
districts are the People's Committees. Currently, as mentioned, they consist of
the People's Councils and the Communal or District Producers' Councils,
respectively. Both Councils are elected for four years, with the difference
that the Producers' Council is elected directly only in the communes, while in
the districts these elections are carried out through the delegates of the
Workers' Councils.
The People's Council of the Commune is composed of 15 to 30 members. The
relationship between the People's Councils and the Producers' Councils is
identical at the federal and republican levels, with the difference that they
lack their own executive bodies. The executive bodies enjoy the status of civil
servants, but operate primarily under the control and directives of the
People's Committees. The chairman of the People's Committee is elected from
among the municipal councilors and oversees the work of the communal bodies,
although he has no authority over them.
Workers' Councils constitute the basic instance of workers'
self-management. Their rights and duties were established by law in 1950 and
subsequently supplemented by numerous decrees. All workers in a company elect
the Workers' Council by universal suffrage, and it can be composed of 15 to 160
members. If the company has fewer than 30 workers, then all of them are members
of the Workers' Council. The Workers' Council elects its delegates to the
Producers' Council, sets the company's industrial plan, determines wages, and
decides on the distribution of profits. From among its members, it elects and
oversees the Executive Committee, a kind of executive body. The People's
Committee of the commune appoints the company director. The trade union
proposes the list of bodies to be elected, and another group representing
one-tenth of the voting workers may also propose a list.
Article 7 of the Constitutional Law determines the main rights and
duties regarding self-management at the commune, city, and district levels. The
primary function of the commune is to align the interests of the citizens with
the interests of the community, ensure social, cultural, and economic progress
within its jurisdiction, administer public assets, set municipal taxes, manage
revenues, organize the commune's self-government, oversee the performance of
its bodies and institutions, safeguard public health, insurance, education, and
public order within its jurisdiction, elect and remove municipal and district
judges, implement federal and republican plans and other provisions, and submit
motions to that effect, etc. The People's Committee exercises all these powers
in accordance with and within the framework of the Constitution and current
laws.
To the political and administrative structure that we have just outlined
in summary form, two factors that directly affect citizens must be added: the
assembly of electors and the referendum. In principle, a certain number of
electors can, at any time, convene the electors and demand an accounting from
each of their representatives, from the communal to the federal level. In turn,
each deputy must convene an assembly of their constituents at least once a
year, report on their activities, and hear any complaints.
This interesting aspect of the system is not properly utilized, and
generally, when it is invoked, the initiative comes from the Communist Party,
which wishes to rid itself of an undesirable deputy. The same principle applies
to referendums. Faced with both possibilities, the people remain rather
reserved, knowing that they cannot impose their will in any case. The regime,
on the other hand, resorted to these means when they were advantageous. The
most interesting case is that of Milovan Djilas,
formerly the regime's second most powerful figure, who, according to
statistics, obtained a higher percentage of votes in his electoral district
than Tito himself. However, simply expelling him from the Communist Party was
enough to automatically cause him to lose the confidence of all his
constituents.
Considering that Yugoslavia is a multinational state and that its
constitution theoretically recognizes the self-determination of its constituent
peoples, and that, on the other hand, the excessive centralism practiced
between the two world wars was the main impediment to the rapprochement of its
peoples, the Yugoslav federal system should be based on respect for the
national identity of each people and, at the very least, recognize a degree of
sovereignty for the republics in matters determined and defined by the
constitution. However, there is no area of action in which a
republic can decide on its own, that is, without the interference of the
federal bodies in Belgrade. The system, viewed from a theoretical perspective,
may seem somewhat attractive with regard to the commune and workers'
self-management. In this respect,
Yugoslavia more closely resembles a federation of communes than a
federation of people's republics. Furthermore, the people's republics are the
only area where duties and rights are not specified in the constitution, except
in ambiguous terms regarding the power to proclaim their constitution, which
must conform to the federal constitution. They can also enact their own
legislation on specific matters not included in federal legislation. Given that
federal legislation covers virtually all aspects of life and social structure,
the republics are left with no other function than administrative execution and
control of the communes.
Even this control of the communes is quite restricted since they can
deal directly with the federal government, and federal national deputies are ex
officio members of the People's Committees. In addition to the imprecision
regarding the legislative power of the people's republics and their total
subordination to the federation, each republican body or institution is also
subordinate to the corresponding federal body or institution. Thus, for
example, republican secretaries are not only dependent on the republican
Executive Council but directly on the federal secretaries.
The Republican Executive Council is responsible not only to the
Republican Assembly, but directly to the Federal Executive Council, which can
annul any act, disregarding the opinion of the Republican Assembly. Similarly,
the Republican Assemblies are, of course, dependent on the Federal Assembly.
Regarding the latter, we must reiterate that despite the constitutional
attributes that grant it sovereignty, there is no doubt that it is merely a
subservient executor of the orders issued by the Communist Party. Central power
is neither shared with nor controlled by anyone.
The judiciary, which in a federal system should be the independent and
impartial interpreter of the constitution, is simply another executive branch
of the central government. Judges are appointed and dismissed by resolution of
the Federal Assembly, the Republican Assemblies, and the People's Committees,
depending on whether they are federal, republican, or municipal judges. Even
so, the ruling of the lower court is subordinate to the higher court. The same
system of appointment and dependence also applies to prosecutors. In this way,
all authority and every organ of power ultimately resides in the central
government.
The most significant factor that undermines not only a genuine federation
but also democracy is the one-party system for the entire state. Since the end
of the last war, all power has been held by the Communist Party, which neither
denies this fact nor conceals its decision not to share it with anyone. To the
extent that the regime, over the years, has managed to consolidate its position
through constitutional and legal means, terror and police oppression have
subsided.
However, if the regime wishes to judge and condemn anyone, nothing can
prevent it. It maintains its position through controlled organizations, the
most important of which are: the Communist Party, the Socialist League of
Working People, and the trade unions. The same principle of hierarchical
subordination—commune - republic - federation—also governs these organizations.
The still very low number of members in all these organizations is
growing, while the quality and, very importantly, the revolutionary fervor are
declining. Nevertheless, the communists are not satisfied with the current
political or economic situation, as evidenced by public statements made by
party leaders and the need to implement a new constitutional reform. The
Yugoslav press announces that the new constitution will transcend classical
conceptions and will be a genuinely socialist constitution. Such comments lead
us to conclude that the current one is not.
Paris
If classifying Andric among Yugoslav writers meant that he was a subject
of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, born in a province now part of
Yugoslavia (Andric was born in Bosnia in 1892, then occupied by
Austria-Hungary, but which de jure recognized the sovereignty of the Sublime Porta), and that he lived in Yugoslavia, then
there was no objection. However, by the same logic, one would have to say that
Boris Pasternak was a Soviet writer, not a Russian one.
In other words, simply stating that he is a writer from Yugoslavia does
not clarify to which national literature and culture Andric belongs. It doesn't
even clarify whether he is a writer of Eastern or Western culture.
From the well-known fact that Yugoslavia is not a nation-state but a
multinational one, it follows that Yugoslav nationality, in the ethnic sense,
does not exist. Contradicting reality and historical truth, the dictatorship of
King Alexander proclaimed the theory of a Yugoslav nationality, which even the current communist regime could not accept. Instead,
it reorganized Yugoslavia as a federal state, dividing it, with one exception,
into six "people's republics" based on national criteria. Therefore,
there is no single Yugoslav people, but rather the
peoples of Yugoslavia.
According to the official classification, these peoples are: Serbian,
Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, and Montenegrin. Nor is there a single Yugoslav
language, as at least three languages are officially recognized
today: Slovene, Macedonian, and Croatian-Serbian. Regarding Croatian-Serbian,
differences are officially acknowledged, and commissions of linguists are
formed to standardize and harmonize the idiomatic expressions and grammatical
forms of the two languages. Leaving aside the specific question of whether
Serbs and Croats use two different languages or dialects and
variations of the same language, the fact remains that there are two separate
and distinct literatures, Croatian and Serbian, with different historical
developments and idiomatic forms, two literary traditions, two reading publics,
and two different alphabets.
Croatian national literature dates back to the Renaissance, emerging
from Glagolitic works of a sacred nature and drawing on classical and medieval
Western literature, while Serbs lacked a true national literature until the
mid-20th century. Serbia had a meager literature, focused on ecclesiastical
themes, written in Old Russian, which the people did not understand. Serbian
literature only developed in the second half of the 20th century. Serbs use the
Cyrillic alphabet, like Russians, and Croats use the Latin alphabet.
Therefore, if there is no Yugoslav people, language, and culture, then
one cannot speak of a Yugoslav literature or Yugoslav writers. Nobel laureate
Ivo Andrić cannot be considered Yugoslav, either
by nationality or as a writer. He may be, according to the current
constitution, a subject of Yugoslavia, but based on national affiliation, he
could be Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, or Montenegrin. Since he
writes in Croatian, was born into a Croatian Catholic family and raised in
Croatian national territory, and then, from a young age, was active in Croatian
literary circles, publishing his work with Croatian publishing houses, he can
only be considered a Croatian writer.
In this respect, it matters little whether Andric's last books were
published in Belgrade and whether he is officially called a "Yugoslav
writer." The fact that his Croatian nationality is deliberately omitted
and attempts are even made to present him as a Serbian writer, subjecting him
to intense pressure both then and now, clearly reveals how fallacious the
official propaganda about the "brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav
peoples" truly is.
Yugoslavia was able to be restored in 1945 only because the communists,
in the critical phase of the war, managed to convince the Allies that they were
the antithesis of the Great Serbian chauvinism of General Draza
Mihailovic and supposed champions of egalitarian
politics and the reconciliation of the peoples of Yugoslavia, above all the
Croats and Serbs, "united" so fortunately in 1918 that, when the
first international crisis arose, the swift collapse of Yugoslavia and the
bloody war between the Serbs and Croats occurred.
The case of Andric also indicates that the re-establishment of the
"new Yugoslavia" in 1945 was not the triumph of the "brotherhood
and unity" of divided peoples, according to the official propaganda
slogan, but rather the victory of Serbia's Balkan and Byzantine-Russian
tradition and thought in cultural and political terms over Croatia, the
repository of the values of our Western society on its eastern border in the
Balkans, twice sacrificed, in 1918 and 1945. Ivo Andric was born on October 10,
1892, in Travnik, once the city of viziers, in
Bosnia, into an old Croatian Catholic family. In Travnik,
where the Catholic and Muslim Croatian populations have coexisted for
centuries, Andrić was educated at the renowned
Jesuit high school, which for decades was the epicenter of Croatian national
spirit until 1945, when the communists seized it and the State of Croatia
collapsed. Bosnia, his homeland, with its deep-seated Ottoman Empire of 400
years and a Muslim population comprising a third of its population, would
become a favorite subject in Andrić's stories
and novels. He studied philosophy at universities in Zagreb, Vienna, Krakow,
and Graz, where he earned his degree.
Thanks to his solid classical education at the Travnik
high school, his higher studies in Croatia and Austria, and his experience as a
diplomat in major cultural centers, Andrić
became a great European writer. His first literary claim to fame was his
inclusion in several Croatian journals and in the symposium "Young
Croatian Lyric Poetry" (Zagreb, 1914), where the refined poet Ljubo Wiesner (who died in Rome
in 1950 as a political exile) brought together twelve poets of a generation
that would elevate the level of Croatian literary production.
These young writers presented themselves on the eve of the First World
War as combative Croats, some of them with revolutionary ideas against the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had incorporated Croatia for centuries
(1527–1918) as an associated kingdom. Invoking the principle of national identity,
they advocated the dismemberment of the Danubian
Monarchy because it was multinational and the inclusion of Croatia in a state
community of South Slavic peoples. Andric, sharing this ideology, was interned
following the Sarajevo bombing, a prelude to the First World War, although he
had no connection whatsoever with the Serbian terrorists' crime.
In 1918, Andric published his lyrical meditations in Zagreb under the
title "Ex Ponto," borrowed from Ovid. In this "dialogue with the
soul," Andric describes life as a prison: "There is no other
truth," he says, "than pain; no other reality than suffering; pain
and suffering in every drop of water, every blade of grass, in every sound of a
living voice, in sleep and waking, in life, before life, and perhaps after
death." Umberto Urbani, an Italian Slavic
scholar, says that Andric expressed the pain of the common human destiny, and
that it should be read "like the psalms of David, like the book of
Job."
"...The light, kindled by the soul of the poet Ivo Andric, burns
like a votive lamp over the immense sepulcher of the great war to remember the
Dead and show the living the new path of salvation and perfection."
In 1919, Andric published his second book of prose poems,
"Inquietudes" (Anxieties), in Zagreb, and in 1920, a collection of
short stories and narratives, "El viaje de Alija Djerzelez" (The
Journey of Alija Djerzelez),
which were very well received in Croatia, where this literary genre has many
practitioners. The Italian Slavic scholar Giovanni Maver
states that "Inquietudes," a "diary of the soul," along
with the book of narratives "El viaje de Alija Djerzelez," reveal
Andric's refined artistic sensibility, extraordinary spiritual maturity, and
profound reflection. From 1924 to 1936, three books of prose were published
under the title "Stories," in which Andric explored, in a more
nuanced way, the themes and human destinies that he would later develop in his
great novels. He also wrote literary studies and essays, including one on Simón Bolívar, and translated Walt Whitman, among others.
After the war, Ivo Andric was accepted into the diplomatic corps of the
newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which the Serbs
considered an extension of the Kingdom of Serbia. He was one of the few Croats
in the diplomatic service, which was reserved for Serbs as trusted advisors. He
served in Graz, Rome, Bucharest, Madrid, Geneva, Trieste, Belgrade, and finally
became minister in Berlin (1939-41). Throughout this period as a diplomat, his
literary output was not prolific. During the last war he wrote in Belgrade,
occupied by German troops, his masterpiece "The Bridge on the Drina
River", (1945) and after the war "The Chronicle of Travnik" and "The Miss".
Even his works written before the Second World War earned Andrić a place of honor in contemporary Croatian
literature. The Croatian scholar Slavko Jezčić considers him "the most prominent
literary figure among the Croatian revolutionary youth" of the First World
War era. Of his book "Ex Ponto," he says that it consists of
intimate, sincere, and warm dialogues with the soul. His prose poems
"Inquietudes" (Anxiety) are of a similar inspiration and style. His
short stories about Bosnian life and traditions are of a different character,
distinguished by their density of form, delicate psychological insight, rich
color, and idiomatic beauty, especially "El Viaje
de Alija Djerzelez"
(The Journey of Alija Djerzelez)
and "Narraciones" (Narratives).
The Croatian critic Ante Petravić wrote
of Andrić's first book that it could serve as a
vade mecum for all who suffer in this earthly life. "Only those who have
endured life's suffering and pain can truly appreciate this book and perceive
all its beauty and grandeur." Petravic believed
that with this work, Andric had already acquired "an immortal name in
Croatian literature."
Andric was included in several Croatian anthologies. Milan Begovic included two of Andric's short stories in the
symposium "Croatian Prose of the 20th Century," noting that "he
is one of the foremost Croatian storytellers in general." "In his
dense, meticulously crafted stories, full of lyrical flights of fancy, he
primarily describes Bosnia and the Bosniaks, striving
to imbue them with a universal character." He quotes Dr. Antun Barac, professor of
Croatian literature at the University of Zagreb: "Through his narratives,
one feels how vain human life is, how futile man's efforts are to escape pain
and passions, how permanent and inevitable his fall into nothingness and death
is," and concludes by asserting that all of Andric's stories are worthy of
anthology.
Renowned foreign Slavicists include him among
the best Croatian writers, among them the Italians Luigi Salvini,
Umberto Urbani, and Giovanni Maver,
and, among the French, Jean Dayre, who included him
in his excellent anthology of Croatian short story writers.
Andric's longer major works, "The Bridge over the Drina River"
and "The Chronicle of Travnik," are closer
to the novelistic genre, although they are actually stories and, as the author
says, "chronicles." In both novels, he gives us a picture of his
native province, Bosnia, revealing himself as a seasoned connoisseur and deep
diver into the psychology of the Muslim population, although one has to regret
the incorrect and arbitrary political attitude he assumes toward this secular
ruling class and the indigenous Muslim population.
The action in "The Bridge over the Drina River" unfolds over
several centuries, from the bridge's construction in the mid-16th century until
1914, or more precisely, until the first weeks of the war between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The bridge, a crossing point for the routes of the
Ottoman Empire, is taken by the author as the axis of his historical narrative.
The setting is Visegrad, a small Bosnian town
overlooking the swift waters of the Drina River, on the border between Bosnia
and Serbia.
The location of the bridge and the town on the dividing line where
opposing cultures and state organizations clash shapes the events that drive
the action and determine inevitable human destinies, the most dramatic moments
in the lives of individuals and communities. A sense of resigned melancholy and
Eastern fatalism permeates the pages of this work, all under the influence of
the three fatal forces on this ill-fated border of worlds, a reflection of the
rise and fall of great empires.
Life is tranquil and idyllic while peace reigns; upheavals and storms
erupt during conflicts between antagonistic forces, for on this border three
civilizations meet and collide: the Byzantine-Russian, the Western, and the
Islamic. In vain had Mehemet Sokobi
(Sokolovic, in Croatian form), Grand Vizier to three
Ottoman emperors and a native of Bosnia, tried to forever unite the Bosnian
Bastion with the heart of the Ottoman Empire by means of a monumental bridge
over the Drina River, thus consolidating the cultural and political forms of
the Islamic world that the Ottoman Empire was successfully expanding while it
lived up to its historical mission.
As soon as the Empire lost its momentum, exhausted in the futile
struggle with Western Christendom, crises arose that gradually led to the
Turkish retreat to Asia Minor. Each phase of that secular regression will have
painful repercussions among the Muslims of Bosnia, whom Andric in his novel
called "Turks" and only in a footnote observes that it is an
erroneous nickname to define the aboriginal population of Bosnia who are not
Turkish in either "the racial or ethnic sense", and who, it should be
added, speak the same language and express themselves in the same dialect as
the Catholic Croats.
The protagonists of the Islamic faith in the novel speak like other
Croats, a nuance that disappears in translations. The fact that strong Muslim
communities exist in Bosnia must be attributed to the sharp internal divisions
and religious-political conflicts in the medieval Kingdom of Bosnia—a vassal
state of Croatia-Hungary—prior to the Turkish invasion in the 15th century.
Perhaps due to limited access to influences from both Rome and Byzantium, the
religious sect of the Patarenes, called Bogomili or "the Church of Bosnia," took root in
Bosnia, similar to the Albigensians and Waldensians in southern France.
Against this sect, the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom, the first line of
defense for Western Christendom in Eastern Europe, organized several crusades.
The result was that the Bogomilis welcomed the
Ottoman conquerors as allies, eventually converted to Islam, and safeguarded
their political and economic privileges. Bosnia was the only province of the
Ottoman Empire that preserved the Western institution of the hereditary landed
nobility, as well as the use of the Croatian language in administration.
Consequently, the Muslims whom Andric portrays as disoriented and lost
are not newcomers or conquerors, but rather native inhabitants, and their main
families are the old local nobility. In contrast, the Orthodox Christians who
settled in Bosnia during the Turkish wars are newcomers, appearing only
centuries later as instruments of Serbian expansionism.
By narrating life in Visegrad, located on the
Serbian border and lacking a Catholic population, Andric failed to provide a
complete and accurate picture of the confessional, cultural, and political
relations in Bosnia, which are incomprehensible without the presence of the
Croatian Catholic element. Nor did he offer a realistic portrayal of the
Orthodox population, comprised mostly of immigrants from the Balkan interior,
making Visegrad, or more precisely its surroundings
adjacent to Serbian territory, an exception.
Thus, in Andric's narrative, the Drina River loses its significance as a
fatal border between East and West Europe, which Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha Sokolovic (Sokobi in the Turkish version) tried in vain to unite. It
is one of the oldest European borders. It appears in the time of the emperors
Diocletian and Theodosius; later as a border between the Byzantine and Frankish
Empires, between the Western and Eastern Churches; a border between the
medieval Croatian and Bosnian kingdoms, respectively, and Serbia.
Within the Ottoman Empire, the Drina is the dividing line between the Bablatte of Bosnia and the Bablatte
of Belgrade, and later, with the establishment of the new Serbian nation-state
at the beginning of the 19th century, it becomes the border between the Turkish
province of Bosnia and Serbia, finally becoming, by virtue of the resolution of
the Congress of Berlin, the border between Serbia and Austria-Hungary
(1878-1918). It reappeared in 1941-45 as a border between the Independent State
of Croatia and Serbia, militarily occupied by the Germans, and, from 1945 until
now, as a border between the "People's Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina" and the "People's Republic of Serbia", within the
"Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia".
Andric doesn't write history but a "novel" about the bridge
over the Drina. He doesn't present the past in its historical truth but rather
his imagined reconstruction, which, unfortunately, doesn't conform to
historical reality. He is influenced by the Serbian nationalist myth of the
fall of the medieval Serbian kingdom and by the romanticized description of the
Balkan peoples' struggle for national emancipation. This is especially true of
the anachronistic accounts of torture scenes from when the Ottoman Empire was
at the height of its power and its Balkan subjects didn't even dream of
rebelling.
Andric profoundly captures the different reactions of the Orthodox and
Muslim populations to major events, namely: the withdrawal of the Turks from
Hungary and Croatia, then from Serbia and Bosnia, and finally from Sandzak and Macedonia. In each of these changes, the Serbs
see the possibility of a role reversal; that is, they hope to transform from
subjects into the ruling class, while the Muslims face the future with anxiety
and fear. Islam in Bosnia, besides being a religious affiliation, encompassed
the cultural and political forms of Islamic civilization. Bosnian Muslims, by
integrating themselves into the Islamic world through religion, had preserved
the positions of the ruling social class, and the loss
of power meant economic catastrophe for their nobility, and liberation—not only
political but also economic—for their serfs, mostly Orthodox.
The Ottoman Empire was the political heir of Byzantium in the Balkans as
well as the vehicle of Islamic, Arab, and Persian civilization. Its withdrawal
raised the issue of its political and cultural legacy, which became acutely
apparent in Bosnia, a region of encounters and conflicts between three distinct
cultural conceptions, whose respective custodians were the Orthodox, the
Muslims, and the Catholics. With the Turkish withdrawal and the Austrian
occupation, Bosniaks faced the choice between the
predominance of Western influence, supported by the Croats, or
Serbian-Byzantine influence, backed by expansionist Russia.
The choice of Catholics and Orthodox Christians was spontaneous. The
position of the Muslim population was far more serious. In an environment where
religion is often identified with cultural and political forms, the orientation
was not easy. Muslims could not choose Serbia, since by origin and language
they are Croats. Bosnia, from a geographical, economic, and transportation
standpoint, gravitates toward other Croatian regions. The Croatian national
idea, faithful to Western conceptions, distinguished between religious and
national affiliation. The Western world, in the current secular phase of its
civilization, has successfully integrated not only Catholics and Protestants,
but also adherents of other faiths and agnostics.
At a time when Turkey is reforming and adopting Western cultural and
political achievements, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats by
origin, can choose a similar path. Adopting Western cultural achievements, they
simultaneously integrated into the Croatian national community. In this sense,
the Austrian occupation of Bosnia indirectly favored Croatian penetration at
the expense of the Serbs, who continued to equate religion with nationality.
According to these deeply ingrained beliefs, only members of the Serbian
national church could be full and equal citizens.
Furthermore, the nationalist propaganda of the Romantic era accentuated
the antagonisms between the Muslim and Orthodox populations. It is clear from Andrić's works that Muslims, despite their origin and
language, were forced to leave Serbia along with the Turks. Not all of them
could go to Turkey, for the simple reason that they were not Turks. The only
refuge left to them was Bosnia, under Austrian administration. They were no
longer the ruling political class, but neither were they oppressed. Until the
Balkan Wars (1912-1913), while Bosnia bordered the Ottoman Empire, they might
have harbored certain illusions and sometimes sympathized with the
anti-Austrian agitation of Serbian nationalists. However, seeing that the Serbs
aspired to conquer Bosnia and knowing what fate befell the Muslims in Serbia
and Montenegro, they sided with the Austrians, especially during the First
World War, when Turkey was allied with the Central Powers.
Andric interrupts his chronicle in 1914, achieving a favorable effect
for Great Serbian propaganda regarding Serbia's supposed right to annex Bosnia.
In his novel, the Serbian element possesses a deeply rooted national consciousness,
while the Muslims yearn for the Ottoman Empire. The Austrian administration is
presented as entirely foreign and without any popular support. Had he continued
his narrative, Andric would have had to write about the calamities that befell
the Muslim population with the collapse of the Danubian
monarchy and the establishment of Yugoslavia, dominated by Serbs.
He would have had to record the Serbian revanchist sentiment, evident in
his chronicle, which yielded horrific results precisely at the time he was
writing "The Bridge on the Drina." In the Visegrad
district, and partly on that very bridge, according to the official report of
the Croatian authorities, Draza Mihailovic's
Chetniks slaughtered 6,000 Muslims. The bloodied
Drina carried away in its swift flow the innocent victims of aggressive Serbian
chauvinism. Indeed, the bridge over the Drina River today unites and symbolizes
nothing.
Leaving aside the political and historical context, this novel by Andric
acquires the literary value of a masterpiece. His style is "brilliant and
flows like water, crystalline, finished in detail and refined, so that it
leaves the impression of the great novels, intelligible to foreigners because
it deals with human problems, just as, or similarly as, they occur along all
the rivers of the world."
Another major work by Andric is "The Chronicle of Travnik," in which he narrates the events in the city
of Travnik seven years before the fall of Napoleon.
The plot revolves around the conflict between the French and Austrian consuls,
and through their intrigues and squabbles, we learn about the divisions and
disputes between Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and Jews. His more
recent works include the novel "The Young Lady," as well as several
short stories. Although almost all of his work concerns Bosnia, its past, and
its typical themes, Andric does not confine himself to a local setting.
Instead, through a penetrating psychological analysis of his protagonists, he
elevates human destinies to a universal level.
Andric's compatriots, and especially his Bosniak
Croats, including some supporters of the current communist regime, reproach him
for having gone too far in his interpretation of Yugoslav integralism
and for the distorted and biased portrayal of Muslims he created, which
benefited Serbian dominance in Bosnia at the expense of the Catholics and
Muslims who constitute the majority. In recent decades, both Catholics and
Muslims in Bosnia have given conclusive proof of their Croatian national
consciousness, and therefore should be treated equally to Orthodox Christians
and not as second-class citizens, currently unable to freely declare their
nationality.
Indeed, "The Bridge on the Drina," in which Andric presented
Muslims as lacking national consciousness, contributed to one of the most vile machinations of the communist regime: declaring
Muslims "nationally undefined." Thus, in Bosnia, inhabited by
one-third Catholics and one-third Muslims—the latter declared "nationally
undefined"—the political supremacy of the Serbs was assured.
The "people's republics" of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Montenegro, and Macedonia, within Yugoslavia, were constituted according to
national criteria, except for the "people's republic" of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, on the pretext that there was no defined national majority there.
For this reason, Muslims were not granted Croatian nationality, and Serbian
supremacy was imposed in Bosnia. Within a federal system, it would be logical
and just for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be incorporated into the "people's
republic" of Croatia.
If the "autonomous provinces" of Kosmet,
with its Albanian majority, and Voivodeship, where
Hungarians, Germans, Croats, and Romanians form the majority, were integrated
into the "People's Republic" of Serbia, there is nothing preventing
Bosnia, as an autonomous province, from being part of the "People's
Republic" of Croatia. The reason is clear. The communist regime continues,
albeit somewhat toned down, the policy of Serbian expansion. It is regrettable
that a great writer has supported, albeit indirectly, such an imperialist
policy.
L
Andric's stance towards Muslims provokes justified
censure from the communists themselves, and yet such critical .eferences cannot be published. This is undoubtedly an
interesting aspect that the Royal Swedish Academy ignored while deliberating on
Yugoslavia's official candidate.
Ivo Andric, who allows these maneuvers, is also a victim of the inherent
circumstances of a heterogeneous state like Yugoslavia. He and some Croatian
intellectuals, while acting as idealistic young revolutionaries, envisioned
Yugoslavia as a community of equal South Slavic peoples, where Croatia would
occupy a place befitting its Western tradition and its advanced cultural and
economic development. While most of his coreligionists backed down in the face
of the harsh Yugoslav reality, Andric, serving in the foreign
service and living abroad, followed the path of least resistance. One of
his colleagues in the diplomatic service, the Serbian political asylee K. S. Pavlovic, says that
Andric adapted so well to the new environment "that very few suspected he
was Catholic and Croatian, and even fewer a former Jesuit pupil.
Very likeable, approachable, serious, hardworking, and trustworthy, he
would successively hold the positions of assistant to Stojadinovic,
ambassador to Cincar-Markovic in Berlin, and
president of the Writers' Society during Tito's reign. He would don the turban
and invoke Allah, accept the cross and pray to God, neither renounce the red
star nor display it too prominently, and he would find that his old friends—who
were very numerous—would have to call him—much against his will—"Brother
John, Hadji-bey Andric."
In what appeared to be a naive reproach from a disappointed friend, this
former Serbian diplomat leveled serious accusations against Andric, counting on
the sensibilities of both nationalist and communist Serbian circles. Calling
him a Jesuit student, Friar Ivo, a bey, and a hadji (pilgrim to Mecca) is, in the eyes of the Serbs, the
antithesis of their ambitions in Bosnia. The Serbs identify the Jesuits with
Austria, which they consider their "hereditary enemy."
The friars are the prototype of Catholics in Bosnia and of Western
influence, while beys and hadjis
evoke the power of the Turks, "Servia's
ancestral enemies." Mentioning that Andric had risen to high positions in
his diplomatic career during the governments of Stojadinovic
and Cincar-Markovic would amount to a dangerous
denunciation, were it not for the communist police's knowledge that Dr. Milan Stojadinovic—who died last October in Buenos Aires—was
prime minister of that Yugoslav government which, during the monarchical
dictatorship (1935-39), abandoned the French "cordon sanitaire"
system in Central and Eastern Europe and cultivated close ties with the Axis
powers. Stojadinovic boasted of his friendly
relations with Goehring and Ciano and was prepared to
introduce the one-party system.
Dr. Alejandro Cincar-Markovic, Yugoslavia's
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1939-41), negotiated and signed Yugoslavia's
accession to the Tripartite Pact in March 1941. Andric was then head of the
Yugoslav representation to the government of the Third Reich. During the war,
he lived peacefully in occupied Belgrade, a persona grata to the Germans. For
the communists and Serbian nationalists, this was more than enough reason to
deprive him of his freedom and take his life. Having come to power in 1945, the
communists hanged the great Croatian novelist Mile Budak,
banned his works, removed them from all libraries, and erased his name from all
textbooks and histories of literature, simply for being a Croatian patriot.
The great Croatian cosmic poet and insightful essayist Agustín Ujevic, a confirmed
bohemian who abhorred political infighting—and who deserved the Nobel Prize
more than any other Croatian writer—was brought to trial for refusing to
renounce his national sentiments. There is no doubt that Andrić's
situation was precarious during the critical moments of the Soviet occupation
of Belgrade in late 1944 and in the early days of the communist regime. He was
saved, as we have seen, because his stance toward the Bosnian Muslims coincided
with Great Serbian interests, which were also decisive under the new system.
His novel "The Bridge on the Drina River" was published even during
the war, in March 1945, by Prosveta, "the
national publishing house of Serbia."
Whether Andrić's attitude was sincere or
feigned to save his life will be known when the communist tyranny ends. What is
certain is that the Serbs do not consider him one of their own. The Croatian
publicist Bogdan Radica, son-in-law of Guillermo
Ferrero, who spent the war in the United States, returned to Belgrade in 1945.
Seeing that the regime consolidating its power was totalitarian, he chose
freedom and fled. During his time in Belgrade, he was able to speak with Andric
and observe how the Serbs judged him. In his literary reflections, published
not long ago, Radica emphasizes that Andric, "by his style and form, is a
Western writer...
His Catholic education at the Jesuit Lyceum in Travnik,
later perfected in Zagreb and at Austrian universities, enabled him to grasp
the essence of French prose and adapt it to our linguistic possibilities."
Radica also recounts that the Serbian writer Branko Lazarevic had told him that Andric was "Friar
John," a man with the mentality of a Bosnian Franciscan. Even if he
wasn't, the intellectuals of Belgrade felt that way. For them, Andric was
"a Catholic friar" from Bosnia and nothing more, which for the Serbs
meant an Austrian cultural ambassador, infiltrated among the Bosnian Serbs.
"In Ex Ponto and several essays," Radica continues,
"especially those about Latin countries, Ivo Andric expressed himself with
the language of a Catholic, educated by the Jesuits. One day, while we were
walking through the streets of Belgrade, he spoke to me nostalgically of the Travnik high school and Archbishop Saric,
recalling the latter's words: 'Omnia bona ex Travnik'
(All good things come from Travnik)."
Even so, on the occasion of the Nobel Prize nomination, an attempt was
made to present Andric as if he were a Serbian writer. A Serbian correspondent
for United Press reported this highly significant news: "In Croatia,
critics may say that the Croat Miroslav Krleza is more deserving of the prize than Andric, a Serb.
For its part, the Federation of Yugoslav Authors put forward the names of both Krleza and Andric as candidates for the Nobel Prize." Miroslav Krleza is undoubtedly a
great literary talent, more prolific and multifaceted than Andric. A
playwright, novelist, short story writer, essayist, critic, and poet, Miroslav Krleza is the most
prominent representative of Expressionism in Croatia and, indeed, the most
outstanding communist intellectual in Yugoslavia.
A militant communist since the Russian Revolution, Krleza
was destined to be the official candidate of a communist regime he consistently
supported. The insistence on Andric's candidacy, with substantial sums invested
in the translations of his novels, must also be attributed to the fact that,
among other reasons, Krleza, who views the Croatian
national struggle within Marxist-Leninist frameworks, is, despite his
destructive critique of Croatian society, a writer who highlights his Croatian
national consciousness. His work does not align with Serbian expansionist
ambitions, nor can his Croatian nationality be misrepresented as in Andric's
case.
The fact that the Yugoslav communist regime gave preference to an
opportunist who is not a communist over an explicitly communist author of equal
or perhaps greater literary stature, simply because he was more acceptable to
Serbian nationalist circles, speaks volumes about Serbian supremacy in
communist Yugoslavia.
While Croatians are genuinely pleased that a Croatian writer has won the
highest international literary award, demonstrating the high level of our
national culture, it is equally regrettable that the new Nobel laureate's
nationality has been intentionally concealed. His nationality has been silenced
and even falsified in order to exploit Croatian cultural treasures to bolster
the prestige of a nonexistent Yugoslav national culture and even to glorify a
repressive regime. It is deplorable that prestigious Western intellectuals and
the Royal Swedish Academy failed to acknowledge that Andrić
is a Croatian writer, formed within both Croatian and Western traditions.
This omission is suicidal, as it once again harms a people who have
sacrificed themselves, upholding and defending the values of our
Western world on its exposed eastern border. Furthermore, it is impossible to
understand Andric's art without recognizing that the human destinies he depicts
have been shaped by the encounters and conflicts inherent in the frontiers of
civilizations.
Buenos Aires
The following table reflects the annual fluctuation of national income,
population, and gross investment in the economic and non-economic development
of postwar Croatia (we are limiting ourselves to the so-called "People's
Republic of Croatia," forcibly incorporated into communist Yugoslavia).
FLUCTUATION OF INCOME, POPULATION, AND GROSS INVESTMENT IN CROATIA
1947-1960
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 National Income (in billions)
347
296
325
316
323
268
320
353
400
395
479
492
572
620 Population (in (thousands)
3750
3788
3820
3851
3882
3913
3946
3989
4036
4072
4108
4152
4194
4238 Gross Investments (in billions)
68.8
99.6
113.3
103.3
86.0
66.7
70.9
88.5
87.9
97.4
110.2
118.6
142.8
- (2)
From the figures provided, it can be deduced that national income during
the period under consideration increased at an average rate of approximately
7.3%. Overall, this rate is quite favorable. However, if we consider the very
high share of gross investment in gross social product (national income plus
depreciation), which in the period under study reached approximately 24%, a
different picture emerges. In the pre-war period (1919-1940), this share was
17%.
It should be noted that in the post-war period, efforts were not made to
replace certain plants and buildings with amortization funds, which led to
undercapitalization in many industrial sectors (textiles, housing, etc.). For
comparison, we also note that, according to Stevan Stajic's estimates, national income, based on stable prices
between 1935 and 1939, grew at a rate of 7.84%. It can be assumed, therefore,
that this growth in the territory of what was then the Banat of Croatia was
higher.
Based on the aforementioned work by Dr. Vinski
and other sources, the following comparative table of national income fluctuations
in the pre-war and post-war periods could be compiled.
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF NATIONAL INCOME BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR
Territory Average National Income (in billions) Index Index
Croatia 1919-1940 308 100 100
Croatia 1947-1960 (same territory) 328 106.5 95.2
Croatia 1947-1960 (territory of the P.R.) 386 125.3 104.2
The average national income in the pre-war period reached 11,370 million
dinars according to 1938 prices. If we value this amount according to 1956
prices (for comparative purposes), we obtain the figure indicated in the table.
The valuation ratio is 22. Dr. Vinski calculated a
ratio of 18.7 (op. cit., p. 28) in his estimate of wealth based on 1953 prices
relative to 1938. However, he does not take into account the prices of consumer
goods, since his calculations refer to the valuation of capital goods and
stable consumer goods. Taking this into account, as well as the price increases
between 1953 and 1956, the chosen ratio of 22 is not excessive, although it
cannot be considered strictly accurate.
To obtain the most accurate comparison possible, it was necessary to
deduct the share of Istria, Rijeka, Zadar, and Lastovi from the postwar income figures, as these areas are
not included in Dr. Vinski's work on the prewar
period. According to our estimate, the average income of this area in the
postwar period would account for approximately 15% of Croatia's national
income, and its population would represent 7%. Taking these factors into
account, we have arrived at the figures shown in the table above.
When comparing the national income of two periods, it is important to
note the significant share of foreign funds in the postwar period compared to
the prewar period. According to the sources available to us, the following
table would result:
THE AVERAGE ANNUAL NET INCOME FROM ABROAD IN US$ (8)
Net Income Negative Trade Balance
Croatia 1919-1940 2,760,000 -
Croatia 1947-1959 (territ. of the P.R.)
26,544,000 36,214,000
The difference between the negative trade balance and income was covered
mostly by long-term loans and private gifts from abroad, the most important
being remittances from emigrants. (According to incomplete calculations, the
average annual income from remittances and gifts from emigrants would not be
less than 6 million dollars).
We already noted at the beginning that total consumption reflects the
level of material well-being better than anything else. It is true that when a
community reaches a high level of economic development, its consumption does
not grow at the same rate as national income. At the same time, savings
increase, both individually and nationally. In our case, consumption is far
from satisfied, even for the most basic needs, such as food, clothing, and
housing. As for savings, it's not even worth discussing, since it is not only
hindered by the very low standard of living but also by the nature of a
totalitarian collectivist system, in which the central power "thinks"
for everyone. The relationship between national income on the one hand and
personal income and consumption on the other can be seen in this table.
NATIONAL INCOME, PERSONAL INCOME, AND PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION
Annual Average 1956 Stable Prices
National Income in Dinars Index Personal Income Index Consumption Index
Croatia 1954-1958 104,090 100 44,134 42.4
60,497 58.1
in US$ 260.2 100 110.36 42.4 151.24 58.1
The preceding table was compiled using data on the share of individual
income and consumption in the national income of all of Yugoslavia. It can be
assumed that these shares for the "People's Republic of Croatia" did
not differ substantially from those for Yugoslavia. Consumption is
proportionally higher than income, due to the inclusion of consumer credit,
social security contributions, personal income from abroad, and some minor
items.
The conversion to dollars was made using an exchange rate of US$1 = 400
dinars. This exceeds the official exchange rate at the time by 33.3%, while
simultaneously being 30% lower than the real exchange rate at the time. It can
be assumed that in those years the dollar-dinar ratio
was 1:400 with respect to purchasing power. A group of economists from
present-day Yugoslavia had also proposed this ratio.
II. From the preceding discussion, several conclusions can be drawn
regarding the growth of national income, individual consumption, personal
income, etc. It is worth highlighting, first and foremost, the relatively slow
growth of national income, disregarding consumption, which is so low
considering the high share of investment. In the period 1947-1959, the
approximate share of net investment in national income reached nearly 16.0%,
while in the pre-war period that percentage was 5.7%. However, high investment
levels can be a double-edged sword: they almost always harm consumption, and
low consumption, in turn, stagnates labor productivity
growth, etc., while, strictly speaking, intensive investments should create
more jobs, and therefore more income, more goods, etc. Weighing the
relationship between investment and consumption is of paramount importance for
any economic system. Furthermore, in our case, we must not lose sight of the
excessive spending of a totalitarian state and the squandering of national
resources, free from parliamentary control.
In short, the primary cause of this state of affairs lies in the social
and political conceptions of communism, which reduce all economic phenomena to
two sacrosanct dogmas:
a) state-capitalist collectivization (communists, of course, refuse to
admit such a character of collectivization);
b) comprehensive central planning of the
national economy, with absolute priority given to the development of heavy
industry. Of the direct causes, we could highlight the three most important:
A) the flawed agricultural
policy and the resulting catastrophic losses recorded in agriculture;
AVERAGE NATIONAL INCOME (based on 1956 prices)
|
In billions of dinars |
Promedio anual |
|||
|
|
Croacia 1919-40 |
R.P. de Croacia 1947-60 |
Diferencia |
Pérdida Total |
|
Ingreso nacional de agricultura[1] |
123,1 |
106,0 |
17,1 |
239,4 |
Total losses in the postwar period would thus amount to 239.4 billion
dinars, if we consider as losses everything that falls below pre-war levels.
This sum represents approximately 56% of gross investment in heavy industry.
The actual losses were undoubtedly even greater, including the abandonment of
the best agricultural holdings and widespread decapitalization
in the private agricultural sector. Industry did not compensate for the losses
incurred in agriculture, although its share of national income increased
considerably (reaching 44% in 1960).
Even so, this increase alone is meaningless, given the entirely inadequate
structure of industrial production, particularly with regard to consumer goods.
From 1946 to 1959, the production index for consumer goods rose from 104 to
351, a meager increase considering the low level of production in the initial
year. The most reliable indicator is the data cited by Jakov
Blazevic in a speech delivered in Zagreb in 1960 and
reproduced by the newspaper Vjesnik on January 22,
1961, according to which, in the current "People's Republic of
Croatia," 48% of the territory and 34% of the population are economically
underdeveloped relative to the level of the entire "PR of Croatia."
The continued importance of agriculture in Croatia's economic structure is
evidenced by the fact that national income decreases relatively, and in some
years absolutely, whenever agricultural production fails.
B. As is well known, the development of industry, especially heavy
industry, contributes to the rapid and vigorous expansion of any country.
However, such an industrialization policy must be based on both natural
resources and the general potential of the economy and the population, taking
into account all limiting factors, that is, the level of consumption, the
availability of skilled labor, markets, etc. Under these and other assumptions,
and with the condition of rational administration, the national economy will
grow in volume and pace, all the more so the greater the percentage in heavy
industry in relation to global investments.
Contemporary economists from various countries have developed detailed
methods and comprehensive analyses of this economic growth, known as economic
models. Many are based on Marx's elementary model, which divides the entire
economy into two basic sectors: products for further production (Sector I) and
products for direct consumption (Sector II). Such a model is still in effect
throughout the planned economy of the People's Republic of Croatia and all of
Yugoslavia. In this paper, we will use the well-known model of the Indian
economist, Professor Mahalonobis.
According to the attached model, Sector I includes investments in heavy
industry and the corresponding income, plus 25% of investments in
transportation. The rest (agriculture, forestry, handicrafts, trade, light
industry, and construction) has been placed in Sector II. We note that this
classification is summary and basic, but in practice, an ideal division is
unrealistic. Furthermore, due to a lack of precise data on net investments, we
had to take into account gross investments, that is, social product and not
national income. (Social product is equivalent to national income plus
depreciation.)
The average depreciation percentage of national income was calculated at
a rate of 11%, based on figures published in the 1960 Yugoslav Statistical
Yearbook, in Finance, Belgrade, 1958, and the depreciation percentage in the
"People's Republic" of Croatia from 1952-1957, etc. According to this
calculation, the following values of the relevant ratios of the
model result: a = 0.24; Lk = 0.4; Lc
= 0.6; Bk = 0.326; Bc = 0.333; t = 13 (and not 14 because the investment
maturation period was taken as one year).
Consequently, the calculations for investments cover the period
1947-1959, and for national income, 1948-1960. The portion of investments
corresponding to Sector I thus reaches 40%, representing a fairly high rate in
relation to total investments made in both the economic and non-economic
spheres. From the above, the following table can be deduced:
Producto social potencial y realizado en 1960
|
Ingreso |
En miles de millones (precios 1956) |
Indice |
|
Potencial |
927 |
100 |
|
Realizado |
688 |
74 |
|
Diferencia |
-239 |
-26% |
As the table above shows, the difference between actual output and
potential output is very large. This can be explained in several ways. First,
the ratios applied are not realistic. However, they are based on official data.
Second, the application of the model is incorrect. In this regard, we see no
theoretical obstacle to its application to the raw figures as well.
Third, the model itself is flawed. In this respect, we should note that
this model served as the basis for India's second five-year plan (which is
about to end) and yielded accurate results. Therefore, the difference must be
sought elsewhere, namely in the poor performance of the post-war Croatian
economy. Above all, Professor Mahalanabis's model
assumes the full utilization of available economic capacity. In the post-war
Croatian economy, the opposite occurred, with national resources being
squandered left and right.
This phenomenon is widespread, whether we are talking about arable land,
old or new industrial plants, the communications network, etc. Furthermore, the
results are inconsistent even due to the constant fluctuations in agricultural
production. It should be emphasized that this production depends as much, if
not more, on other factors and not only on the resources invested.
Finally, we have taken a one-year period as the activation period for
all investments. While this period is certainly short, the actual period
(according to Vojnic and Horvat)
ranges from three to four years, on average for the entire economy. This is
excessive and stems from the irrational, lengthy, and costly construction of
some important economic assets in the postwar period. To all this is often
added the unsuitable location of industrial plants, the lack of a domestic
market for large factories, the shortage of domestic raw materials for various
industries, the outdated nature of transportation, and so on. As an example of
poor location, the construction of the aluminum factory in Strnisce
(Slovenia) is often cited.
Raw materials and semi-finished products had to be transported from Sibenik (Dalmatia) – a considerable distance – instead of
building the plant in Dalmatia (a province of Croatia) where bauxite and
electricity were more than sufficient. Conversely, an expensive iron foundry
was built in Sisak, operating with imported coke and
ore brought from Vares and Ljubljana, the transport
of which significantly increases production costs. There are many similar
examples, not only regarding poor locations but also all other aspects.
As a third factor in the unsatisfactory economic development of postwar
Croatia, we have pointed to the "transfer" of resources to other
areas of Yugoslavia. We will limit ourselves to noting the general facts and
some aspects of this problem, since its in-depth study requires more information
and data, including confidential information. When writing about this problem,
investments are usually broken down by region and per capita.
From a political-economic standpoint, the percentage of investments in
the total accumulated funds formed in the respective region is of greater
importance. Logically, what accumulates in a region (that is, profits after
deducting expenses and salaries) is generally allocated to: 1) investments; 2)
payment of state expenditures. Of course, these categories can be further subdivided,
and a portion is eventually reinvested in personal consumption, etc. For our
research, however, it is essential to determine what proportion of a region's
total accumulated capital was invested within that same region and to compare
the results with those of other regions. These results provide a fairly
accurate picture and reveal the tendency to "transfer resources,"
indicating the extent to which a given region contributes to the expenditures
of the central government, the armed forces, the diplomatic service, etc. The
figures for the period 1952-1959 are shown in the attached table.
Percentages of gross investments in Republican accumulation funds
1952-1959 in billions of dinars - at current prices
|
República |
Acumulación + amortización |
Inversiones brutas |
Porcentajes inversiones% |
|
Servia |
2325 |
1248 |
53,7 |
From the preceding table, interesting observations and conclusions can
be drawn. For us, the most interesting conclusion concerns the resources that
primarily finance the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is interesting to
note that during the so-called key construction period (1952-1957) in the
territory of the "People's Republic of Croatia," only 8 facilities
were built compared to the ninety built throughout Yugoslavia. These facilities
were erected in Zagreb (foundry), Vinodol
(hydroelectric plant), Sisak (iron foundry), Razine (aluminum), Zapresic
(ceramics), Knin (screw factory), Nin (saltworks), and Sisak (spinning
mill).
In 1960, the same trend continued, which is also reflected in the
published data referring to the new five-year plan. Gross investments in
Yugoslavia's RFP (in fixed capital, economic and non-economic resources) in
billions of dinars - at current prices
|
|
Servia |
Croacia |
Eslovenia |
Bosnia y Herze. |
Macedonia |
Montenegro |
|
Inversiones |
357 |
204 |
116 |
108 |
55 |
39 |
Acumulación más
amortización (Enero-noviembre 1960)
According to data
published in the daily press – Vjesnik, January 21,
1961, and February 2, 1961 – 1.994 billion dinars would be invested in Croatia
and 3.585 billion dinars in Serbia during the period 1961-1965. These figures
comprise investments in working capital, so they cannot be compared with the
series indicated above. If the annual averages of these investments are
compared with the annual average of planned social product, it turns out that
45.6% of Croatia's product would be invested and 59.2% in Serbia. Calculated
per capita, we find that 462,000 dinars per capita would be invested in Serbia
during that period, and slightly less, 460,000 dinars per capita in Croatia. As
explained, however, this percentage is not as relevant as the percentage of
investments in own accumulated funds.
In light of the data
presented, a genuine decentralization of the economy—so widely discussed and
promoted lately—is unlikely. On the contrary, the transfer of resources will
continue.
Finally, we must
point out that this work suffers from shortcomings in its comparisons with the
pre-war period, and that the analyses of the causes of unsatisfactory economic
development are far from complete, exhaustive, and detailed. Such analyses
cannot be exhaustive without due sociological and political considerations,
which are beyond the scope of this work. From an economic perspective, these
analyses should be broken down by economic sectors and branches, whereas our
exposition has been limited to macroeconomic categories, as access to the
necessary data is much easier for us.
Regarding the
comparisons with the pre-war period, the main deficiencies are:
a) the
unequal nature of the periods compared; b) the need for approximation of these
estimates. If we were to extend the postwar period to 1968, using the method of
extrapolation, we would, of course, obtain different results. But such an
investigation would necessarily be arbitrary, since no one knows what will
happen in the coming years. Even the very premises—such as ceteris paribus—would
not allow for such an extrapolation, since there are positive indications that
economic growth will decline considerably in the coming period. The primary
reason for this eventuality is the increasingly reduced contribution of foreign
loans. (By way of illustration, we note that not long ago—April 1960—the
National Bank suspended all loans not included in the plan due to difficulties
encountered in negotiations with England, France, Switzerland, and the
consortium of private banks in West Germany to obtain loans.) This is due,
then, to the precarious stabilization of the economy in general, the imbalance
in the industrial sector, and the even greater mismatch between industrial
production and market development, as well as to transportation, commerce, etc.
We must also add the urgent need for greater investment in housing construction
and other sectors neglected for years.
In short—assuming the
current political regime remains in place—the coming period will have to atone
for all the fatal errors and mistakes, both theoretical and practical, made in
economic development during the past 14 years. If a regime change were to
occur—whether through evolution or revolution, it matters little—and the
Croatian state were re-established with a democratic system, these same
inherited problems would overwhelm the new government. However, within the
framework of national and individual freedom, the solution to these serious
problems would be more feasible and more humane.
London.
It would be absurd, however, to force artists to adhere to a political,
social, or religious agenda. This practice has led to an extreme degradation of
art in totalitarian regimes. The fact is that most contemporary artists have
lost faith in humanity and God, so that their art becomes a religion for them.
From the perspective of such artists, Mestrovic's attitude represents an
anachronism. But if we consider that the value and vitality of a civilization
are not independent of the attitudes of the individuals who participate in it,
but rather depend on the energy with which each individual reaffirms, at every
moment, the ideals that inspire the civilization, then only an attitude like
Mestrovic's can be the path to resolving the current crisis of culture.
The opposite attitude signifies pessimism and fatalism, which
facilitates the work of destructive forces. Even admitting that we are in the
period of formation of a new civilization, that
changes nothing because a new civilization is not created in a vacuum, but
rather preserves the most valuable elements of the preceding one.
Thus, paradoxically, the reason that distanced Mestrovic from the
prevailing naturalism around 1900 is the same reason that makes him a
relatively conservative sculptor today. That reason is the insistence on
symbols and values, as opposed to the exclusive interest in the individual in
the first case, and to the disappearance of the individual (parallel to the disappearance
of the ideals that should guide him) in the second.
This insistence of Mestrovic on religious, ethical, and social values
makes his art akin not to the art of the classical periods, but
to that of the archaic periods: to Assyrian, Egyptian, Cretan, pre-Periclean Greek art, and the Romanesque and Gothic art of
the Middle Ages. Because in Mestrovic's works, as in the art
of that era, the universal predominates over the individual, the expression of
collective and transcendent ideals over the expression of individual subjective
states.
For the psychic attitude revealed in such works, ideals are far more
important and more interesting than introspection. This is not to say that in
Mestrovic's works we do not often find a very precise individualization of the
characters, nor that he despises the individual; quite the contrary, the
affirmation of the value of each individual is a fundamental affirmation of the
West, one that Mestrovic fully shares. But in his art, these individuals do not
float in the void of solipsism; rather, the ideals that inspire them give
meaning and direction to their actions and emotions. It is faith that gives
both Mestrovic and his characters the strength to endure in solitude and
despair, and the best symbol of this is the figure of Job, one of his greatest
achievements.
Another characteristic of Mestrovic, common to the periods mentioned, is
his concern for the conception of his works within a specific architectural
ensemble. This concern has led Mestrovic to create several
architectural-sculptural ensembles. The location of a sculpture within an
architectural ensemble corresponds to the individual's place in the world
through a system of ideas called a worldview or Weltanschauung, while
sculptures conceived without knowing where they will be placed symbolize the
individual who feels thrown into the world against their will and moved by
circumstances beyond their control.
The first of these architectural-sculptural ensembles conceived by
Mestrovic was the Kosovo Temple, inspired by the myths born from the Slavic
struggle against the Turks in the Balkans. Mestrovic soon abandoned this theme,
and the ensembles he created afterward were primarily churches and votive
chapels. This could be considered a transition from the patriotic to the
religious, but in reality, while it is an affirmation of the religious, it is
also a definition of his political and national stance.
Because the mythology that Mestrovic sought to highlight in his Kosovo
Temple is peripheral to Croatian national tradition. The essentially Croatian
tradition concerning the struggle against the Turks is a tradition of
resistance—hard and bloody, but successful—while the mythology of Kosovo was
born of defeat. Now, if a defeat persists for centuries, that, like the defeat
itself, is due to an insufficient will to resist. The fall of Bosnia, for
example, was mainly due to the presence of the Manichean sect of the Patarenes or Bogomilis who,
enemies of both the Catholic West and the Orthodox East, offered no resistance
whatsoever to the Turks. The fall of Serbia was due to the fact that the Caesaropapist Byzantine system had isolated that country
and did not inspire much enthusiasm among its inhabitants to fight for it. The
western and northern parts of Croatia, on the other hand, were strongly linked,
with both spiritual and military ties, to the West, and this gave them the will
and the power to resist.
The fact that Kosovo's mythology resonated with the Croats is due to the
fact that the area where these epics originated was far removed from both
Byzantium and Rome, so the national consciousness of neither people had
developed there, since the constitution of the Serbs and Croats as two distinct
nations was conditioned by their affiliation with two different cultures and
two different faiths.
Taking these myths as a symbol of the unity of the two peoples then
means attempting a return to unity through barbarism or the annihilation of one
of the two cultural traditions.
Mestrovic soon realized this dilemma and, with his characteristic
honesty, abandoned this dream destined to fail. But even before he had
understood the tragic contradiction of his ideal, it had manifested itself in
the lack of harmony of the temple itself, perhaps the only work of his that
lacks unity and spontaneity.
For all these reasons, the insistence on Christian themes in Mestrovic's
later work is simultaneously an affirmation of the universal values
of love and freedom, and an affirmation of his nationality, which
is a conjunction of these ideals with a particular language. As for Mestrovic's
figures, they have never lost their vigor and energy. The change that occurred
after his youthful dreams faded consisted only in the purification of the
ideals in whose service that energy was channeled. The process of purification
was extraordinarily rapid; Even among his early works,
alongside occasional displays of sympathy for an elemental force, we find
mature pieces that explore the problem of destiny and teach the great
principles of love and sacrifice. For Mestrovic, the struggle against evil was
subsequently waged increasingly in the realm of the spirit, against the inherent
weakness in every human being.
This synthesis of supreme moral values with equally high artistic
quality is what characterizes the work of Ivan Mestrovic, who, in this dual
aspect, remains the greatest phenomenon among contemporary sculptors.
Buenos Aires.
It is solely due to a lack of understanding of the true relations within
present-day Yugoslavia—which practices the same type of imperialism and
colonialism as the Soviet Union, albeit on a smaller scale—that Yugoslavia is
listed among the non-committal countries. Non-committal countries, according to
the definition issued by the Preparatory Commission in mid-June in Cairo, are
not to enter into political or military obligations with either of the two
opposing blocs and, at the same time, must support national liberation
movements and demand the right to self-determination for all subjugated
peoples. It is only because they continue to skillfully conceal their role as
protectors of Serbia's petty imperialism against the other peoples of
Yugoslavia that the Yugoslav communist leaders can present themselves as
supposed champions against national oppression and, during their frequent
visits to Afro-Asian countries, portray themselves as protectors of the newly
liberated nations. For all these reasons, the governments and delegates of
those countries, who sincerely strive for national rights and the freedom of
all oppressed peoples, have a profound interest in knowing the truth about
national relations within Yugoslavia and about that country's relations with
its neighbors.
YUGOSLAVIA -
MODERN SERBIAN EMPIRE
Yugoslavia is not a nation-state but a multinational one, created after
the First World War in an exceptionally favorable international climate for
Serbian nationalism. This nationalism is valid in principle as much as any
other, with the caveat that it was formed in the tradition of medieval Serbian
imperialism. The Serbian ruler Stephen Dushan the
Mighty, in 1346, arrogated to himself the title of "Emperor and Autocrat
of the Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians." Dushan
aspired to take advantage of the decline of Byzantium, conquer Constantinople,
and replace Basileus. His kingdom encompassed
medieval Serbia, Macedonia, Duklia (present-day
Montenegro), Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly. This Serbian empire was ephemeral,
but its memory was deeply etched in the minds of the Serbs, lasting for
centuries. Only in modern times did it crystallize the peculiar traits of
contemporary Serbian nationalism, aggressive and coveting territories not
belonging to its own nation.
Serbia expanded only slightly during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) by
annexing (the Serbs say "liberating") most of Macedonia and a large
portion of Albanian territory, the region of Kosovo and Metohija.
Although Serbs represent only 2.5% of the population in Macedonia (official
statistics from 1948), Macedonia was declared "Southern Serbia." In
Kosovo and Metohija, the majority of the population
is Albanian, so that almost half of Serbia's Albanians live in direct proximity
to their nation-state. Despite all these facts, Serbian nationalists continue
to call this region "Old Serbia," because in the Middle Ages, it
seems, Serbs constituted the majority of the population there.
However, Serbia's new, unexpected, and extensive expansion took place in
1918 with the incorporation of Croatia, a former kingdom associated with
Austria-Hungary, Slovenia, and the Kingdom of Montenegro, which had been
independent until then. Vojvodina, formerly part of
southern Hungary, was also annexed to Serbia in 1918, although the majority of
its inhabitants were German, Hungarian, and Croat. As is well known,
Austria-Hungary was dismembered because it was a national community, based on
the national principle that each people should create its own state, while
minorities would be integrated into the respective national states. Therefore, when
Croatia, Slovenia, and other regions were incorporated into Serbia, the
argument was made that it represented the "liberation and unification of
an indivisible people who bear three names." Hence the name of the new
state: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which in itself reflects the
multinational character of the new state. That name was valid until 1929 and
recognized by all nations. By decree of King Alexander I of the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty, it was changed to the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. The king had simultaneously abolished the constitution, banned
political parties, and prohibited national names and symbols, establishing a
dictatorial regime supported by the army, which was largely controlled by
Serbs. To make matters worse, the king had decreed that Croats, Slovenes,
Montenegrins, and Macedonians were not separate historical and political
entities, but rather "tribes" of the supposed Yugoslav people. The
Serbian name and national symbols were retained by the Serbian national church,
while Catholics and Muslims were required to fly the official flag instead of
their national flags. Those who dared to challenge these repressive measures,
asserting, for example, that the Croats are a distinct people with an
uninterrupted historical, state, and cultural tradition spanning over twelve
hundred years, and that, in accordance with the national principle and the
right to self-determination, they can demand the restoration of their state,
violently and illegitimately erased from the map in 1918, were persecuted for
high treason, imprisoned, or treacherously murdered by the political police.
The official narrative was that Yugoslavia had undergone a process analogous to
the unification of Italy or Germany in the previous century. Serbia was assigned
the role of Prussia or Piedmont, respectively.
Thus, through fraudulent and violent methods, the modern Serbian empire
was established. The national principle was distorted under the pretext that
all Yugoslav peoples constituted a single national unit. However, Bulgaria was
deliberately excluded from this "liberating" mission of Serbia, even
though Bulgarians speak a Slavic language, are Serbia's immediate neighbors,
and their religious and cultural traditions are far more akin to those of Serbs
than those of the Catholic and Islamic Croats or the Catholic Slovenes.
Bulgaria was omitted because, in this restricted Yugoslavia (South Slavia), Serbia would represent only a quarter of the total
population. (According to the official Yugoslav statistics of
1948, Serbia had 4,136,934 inhabitants, or 26.2% of the total population.)
In a Yugoslav state that included Bulgaria, Serbia would not have been able to
exercise political hegemony under any circumstances. On the other hand,
Macedonians are so closely aligned with Bulgarians that perhaps the majority identify with them nationally, while all, without
exception, yearn for the unification of Macedonia, uniting with Bulgaria, which
possesses Pirin Macedonia.
Yugoslavia, as it was created in 1918 and reconstituted in 1946,
includes several South Slavic peoples. Today, five "people's
republics"—Servia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia,
and Montenegro—are officially recognized as having a national character, while
the "People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" is considered a
mixed territory in the national sense.
Furthermore, Yugoslavia inherited many thorny problems from Serbia due
to the forced annexation of significant ethnically distinct territories. Open
hostility has simmered between Serbia and Bulgaria since 1913, stemming from
Serbia's annexation of Macedonia. This was the cause of the armed conflicts
between Sofia and Belgrade.
The Serbs prevented the unification of the Albanian people by annexing
the regions where almost half of all Albanians live.
Serbia, moreover, annexed Vojvodina, a region
with a German, Hungarian, and Croatian majority.
For the reasons stated, the Croats could not stand in solidarity with
the Serbs in defending these borders, which constitute a latent threat to peace
and a violation of the rights of the Balkan and Central European peoples. The
Croats wish to live in peace and friendship with all these peoples.
Such an imperialist and adventurist policy could only have been
initiated and maintained through deception and violence. Yugoslavia, although
created invoking democratic principles and with the backing of the victorious
democratic powers of the First World War, could not be governed democratically
in the interwar period. Nor can it be today, even without the "people's
democracies." Such a state cannot be the homeland of free peoples.
Stalin and Tito First Condemned Serbian Imperialism...
It could be said that the attitude of the Soviet Union,
and by extension the Yugoslav Communist Party, toward the policies of the
Pan-Serbian governments between the two world wars was negative. This applied
not only to the regime but also to the state itself. Like the Bolsheviks in
Tsarist Russia, the Yugoslav communists maintained that the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia was "a prison of the people" and, in Tito's words,
"the most typical country of national oppression in Europe" (See:
"The Struggle for the Liberation of Yugoslavia," p. 132).
The Yugoslav Communist Party, meeting at its Second Congress in June
1920, resolved to "defend the national unity" of Yugoslavia. At the
Fifth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern,
held in Moscow in 1925, Stalin spoke invoking the Leninist criterion, according
to which the struggle for national liberation is inextricably linked to the
general problem of the proletarian revolution, as a part of the problem of the
triumph of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He censured the Yugoslav
communist leaders for having underestimated the important popular movement for
independence among the Croats and Slovenes. The communists in Yugoslavia must
uphold the right of nationalities to self-determination, that is, the right of
each nationality to separate and lead an independent state existence (See: Bolsevik, No. 7, April 15, 1925).
When the Serb Sima Markovic,
then General Secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party, later tried to narrow
the scope of these disparate criteria, Stalin, in an ad hoc article (Bolsevik, Nos. 11-12, April 30, 1925), flatly refuted his
claims. Markovic was subsequently dismissed as party
secretary. “What,” Stalin asked, “is the essence of the national question at
the present time, when this question has been transformed from an internal
state problem of a local nature into a world problem, into the problem of the
struggle of colonies and countries.” Dependent peoples against imperialism? The essence of the
national question lies in the present struggle of the popular masses of the
colonies and dependent countries against financial exploitation, political
subjugation, and the cultural depersonalization of these colonies and
nationalities by the imperialist bourgeoisie of the dominant nationality.”
Stalin warns that the Yugoslav state itself was formed as a result of the clash
between the two fundamental imperialist coalitions” and that the current borders
of the Yugoslav state, borders created as a result of wars and violence, cannot
become the starting point and legal basis for the solution of the national
question.
Therefore, the problem of self-determination and separation of the
subjugated peoples in Yugoslavia cannot be treated as an academic problem, but
as a matter of practical necessity.
The Yugoslav Communist Party was subsequently reorganized, according to Comintern instructions, on the basis of national sections,
and the Communist Party of Croatia was immediately formed. Emphasizing the
right of secession of the subjugated peoples of Yugoslavia, the communists
sought to win the sympathies of the masses while simultaneously weakening the
Yugoslav state, created by the victorious powers to serve as the cornerstone of
a system functioning as a "cordon sanitaire" against Soviet
expansion.
This radically anti-Yugoslav stance was later modified when, with Hitler
in power, the Soviet Union sought an alliance with France, Yugoslavia's main
protector, and attempted to structure, within the League of Nations, a system
of what was called "collective security." At the same time, in
Europe, it advocated coalitions with socialists and liberals, known as Popular
Fronts.
However, this Soviet shift regarding Yugoslavia was carried out with
extreme caution. Although the communists were disappointed at having failed to
win over the Croatian masses—since, as repeatedly noted in Comintern
meetings, the Croats had organized their own national liberation movement under
the leadership of Stefan Radić—they proceeded with caution. In the critical years, the Croatian
Peasant Party was, in fact, the only significant democratic movement in
Yugoslavia openly opposed to the pan-Serbian dictatorial governments. Even
after the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade, at the Fifth Congress of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia, held in 1948, Josip
Broz Tito harshly criticized those communists who, after the First World War,
advocated for the "so-called unity of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the
politically disorganized Yugoslavia of Versailles." In his political
report presented to the Central Committee of the Party, Josip
Broz Tito (quotes taken from the official edition published in Belgrade in
1948) emphasized that "as soon as the State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
was established in 1918-20,
it became clear that within this
State, fraught with numerous antagonisms imposed under Pan-Serbian hegemony by
the Karageorgevic dynasty and the bourgeois
government, these contrasts were intensified from the outset. One of the main
factors in this intensification was the unresolved national question,
completely ignored by the ruling clique, which clung tenaciously to the
formula: 'one people with three names,' meaning that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
constituted an undivided people, disregarding Macedonians and Montenegrins. The
unification of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was effected in 1918 through
assistance." effective of the victorious Serbian and French troops, who
invaded Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro to secure a leading position for the
Serbian bourgeoisie, even though there was not a single Austrian or German
soldier in Croatia or Slovenia."
"In Montenegro and Croatia," Tito continued, "there was
strong opposition to this national union; this opposition was brutally
suppressed in both Montenegro and Croatia. This, then, was the mission of the
French and Serbian troops in the newly annexed regions." The elections for
the constituent assemblies were held "under terror," and the new
constitution, promulgated without the participation of the Croatian deputies,
"sanctioned the views of the Pan-Serbian hegemons."
The centralist system denied the existence of the national problem in
the newly created state, thus creating the conditions for the sharp conflicts
that would arise in the future around this very issue. The Great Serbian
circles and the Serbian monarchy disregarded all these factors, attempting to
resolve the national problem through violent measures. "In view of all
this," says Tito, "the conflict, instead of diminishing, continually
intensified, to such an extent that a Serbian deputy, a supporter of the
regime, Punisa Racic, fired
his revolver, killing the (Croatian) deputies Paul Radic
and George Basaricek, while Esteban Radic (the Croatian leader), who later died from his
wounds, and the deputies Pernar and Grandja were seriously injured."
That crime committed in parliament, orchestrated by reactionaries close
to the king and with the king's consent, provoked street fighting in Zagreb
(the capital of Croatia) and stirred deep unrest in other parts of the country.
Losing the possibility of continuing to disguise himself
with a democratic mantle, King Alexander trampled on the constitution,
abolished the Constitution of St. Vitus, dissolved parliament, and proclaimed
his monarcho-fascist dictatorship. Thus ended a
period of sham democracy and began a period of open dictatorial methods, the
most brutal national oppression, and social exploitation of the peoples of
Yugoslavia.
A country, created in the name of the national principle and the right
to self-determination, which turned out to be their utter negation, had to
disintegrate and will disintegrate every time an external conflict arises.
During the last war, Edward Hallet Carr, a renowned
British authority on national issues, aptly wrote in his work,
"Nationalism... and then what?":
"The settlement of the First World War cannot in any way be
considered final and definitive. National self-determination became a permanent
invitation to secession. The movement that dismembered Austria-Hungary and
created Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia had to be followed by movements for the
dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Having accepted the premises of
nationalism, its evolution was natural and legitimate, without it being
possible to put an end to it."
The constitution of the Slovak Republic in 1939 and the re-establishment
of the Croatian state in 1941, as well as the reintegration into Bulgaria,
Albania, and Hungary of the territories previously annexed by Serbia, implied a
political evolution consistent with the national principle and the right to
self-determination. The annulment of these acts in 1945 through the restoration
of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would, strictly speaking, imply a violation of
these principles and rights. This is, therefore, a regressive political
process, fraught with problems and harmful both to the interests of the peoples
involved and to the interests of other countries, especially those that enabled
and continue to maintain such an abnormal arrangement.
The collapse of monarchical Yugoslavia occurred while the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 was still in force. Although by the end of 1940
there was already tension between Moscow and Berlin due to conflicting
interests in the Balkans, the communists still viewed the victories of the
Third Reich with a degree of sympathy. Consequently, there was no unanimous
reaction among Yugoslav communists to the coup d'état of March 1941. While
Serbian communists enthusiastically supported the defense of Yugoslavia,
non-Serbian communists continued to consider Yugoslavia a "prison of the
people," which, in effect, it was.
Therefore, Croatian and Macedonian communists viewed the collapse of
Yugoslavia with a degree of satisfaction. It is true that the regime change did
not favor them, as they continued to operate illegally, but they had to
acknowledge that the new situation signified the realization of the right to
self-determination and separation of subjugated peoples and minorities. The
Macedonian communists joined the Bulgarian Communist Party, which accepted them
as the most natural thing in the world. When Draza Mihailavic organized the Serbian nationalist war with the
aim of restoring Yugoslavia, many communists, especially Macedonians and
Croats, labeled this struggle harmful and reactionary.
The communists launched a guerrilla war at the Soviet invitation, but
not all agreed with the official program of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which
stated that they should fight not only to relieve the Soviet Union, under
attack by Hitler, but also for the reestablishment of Yugoslavia. They believed
it would be difficult to convince Croats, Macedonians, Albanians, and other
formerly subjugated groups that the restoration of Yugoslavia meant
"national liberation." Such slogans could only resonate with Serbs,
who, with the dismemberment of Yugoslavia—in effect, an enlarged Serbia—had
lost their colonies and aspired to recover them. For this reason, the communist
leaders had to smooth over many differences before achieving discipline within
their ranks.
Even so, the partisan guerrillas, as they themselves acknowledge, found
their main support among Serbs, thus giving their struggle a Serbian national
character. Joseph Broz Tito admits in the aforementioned political report that
difficulties existed, but he attempts to downplay their significance. Among
other things, he emphasizes that in Macedonia, due to the opposition of the
communist leaders, it was not possible "in the early years of the war to
organize an armed uprising... because in his opinion Macedonia was not occupied
but liberated by the troops of King Boris, while the German troops played
"a positive role," since they contributed to the
"liberation" of Macedonia." Stalin himself had to mediate in the
conflict between the Bulgarian and Serbian communists, establishing a kind of
condominium for Macedonia that lasted until 1948.
In the same report, Josip Broz Tito also
accused Croatian communists, particularly Andrija Hebrang, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia, of having taken an incorrect position toward the Serbian
minority in Croatia. This minority had sided with General Mihailović,
a Serbian nationalist whose program was to restore a monarchical Yugoslavia and
eliminate the Croatian state. Regarding Hebrang and
his supporters, Tito said that they "were in favor of weakening Croatia's
ties with Yugoslavia" (Serbia) and that "their Croatian nationalist
separatism was evident in every step of every day." Hebrang
was already imprisoned when Tito made these accusations.
As a prominent member of the Communist Party's Central Committee, he
held important party and government positions until the Belgrade-Moscow
conflict. He was not removed earlier because Moscow did not fully approve of
Serbian chauvinism, although it initially consented to the restoration of
Yugoslavia. For this reason, Hebrang, after the war,
was able to censure Serbian chauvinism behind the scenes, protest against the
fixed borders to the detriment of Croatia, and against the mass killing of
Croatian soldiers outside of combat. Rankovic, a Serb
and head of the political police, justified these measures as reprisals against
fascist remnants. Hebrang retorted, even in
parliament, that it was primarily a matter of exterminating Croatian patriots.
During the war, Moscow accepted the program of restoring Yugoslavia,
considering that in that situation the Serbs were the most discontented and
that their militancy could only be exploited by promising them the resurgence
of Yugoslavia. At the same time, efforts were made to appease the subjugated
peoples and minorities in Yugoslavia by promising them a federal structure
after "liberation." How were the rights to self-determination violated
in Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia?
As mentioned, the Croatian and Macedonian communists did not approve of
the Serbian communists' program during the last war, which aimed at the
re-establishment of Yugoslavia on a federal basis. When Yugoslavia collapsed in
April 1941, Stalin expelled the Yugoslav ambassador and, in a statement
transmitted by TASS, implied that he recognized the situation.
But when Hitler attacked the Soviets, and given the analogous hegemony
that Serbia and Russia exercised over other nationalities, it was not difficult
for the Serbian communists to persuade Stalin of the advantages of a restored
Yugoslavia structured according to the Soviet model, which would guarantee the
Soviet Union access to the Adriatic Sea through Croatian territory. Once
Yugoslavia was restored after the war as a communist state, in violation of the
Yalta agreement between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, its constitution, a
faithful copy of the 1936 Soviet constitution, was promulgated on January 31,
1946. Its first article reads: "The Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia is a federal people's state in republican form, a community of equal
peoples who, adhering to the right of self-determination, including the right
of secession, expressed their will to live together in the Federal State."
Since federalism in a country governed exclusively and centrally by the
communist party is a mere formality, the only difference is that in present-day
Yugoslavia, its multinational character is not concealed as it was in the
monarchy. Therefore, as in the USSR and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia also has a
dominant people: Russians, Czechs, and Serbs, respectively. Members of the
remaining peoples and minorities continue to be second-class citizens.
National discrimination in Yugoslavia is more drastic than in the USSR
and Czechoslovakia, countries with a homogeneous civilization where the
dominant ethnic groups constitute the majority or near majority of the total
population (Russians and Czechs, respectively), surpassing other ethnic groups
in cultural and economic development. In Yugoslavia, the situation is reversed,
as it is a heterogeneous state in cultural and religious terms. The dominant
ethnic group (Serbia) represents a quarter of the total population and, due to
centuries of Turkish domination, suffers from a clear cultural and economic
backwardness compared to Slovenia and Croatia, which are currently victims of
Serbian hegemony and colonial exploitation.
Regarding the assertion in the aforementioned article of the Yugoslav
constitution about the supposed application of the right to self-determination
in Yugoslavia and the renunciation of secession, it is worth noting that
Yugoslavia was restored by force of arms and terrorist measures. In this
climate, the communists called for elections for the constituent assembly,
allowing only one list of candidates and eliminating all opposition.
While a portion of the population fought in the ranks of the partisan
guerrillas, this does not imply that all of them wished to establish a
communist regime or restore Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Croats, Macedonians, and
members of other ethnic groups, as even the communists admit, did not join the
insurrection. The partisan troops were composed mostly of Serbs.
On the other hand, the communists forced people into their ranks by
exploiting German reprisals against the population, reprisals often
intentionally provoked, and in the final phase of the war they decreed
mandatory mobilization in the territories they controlled. They also had abundant
support from the Western Allies.
Even so, the partisan guerrilla movement was on the verge of
disappearing in 1944. Tito escaped by fleeing on a British plane and remained
on the island of Vis until the end of that year when Red Army contingents
invaded Serbia, capturing Belgrade and installing a communist government there.
In the aforementioned political report, that is, after the
Moscow-Belgrade dispute, Tito still praised the Red Army's contribution to the
"liberation" of Yugoslavia, although he now claims the complete
opposite. We quote his exact words:
"In the autumn of 1944, in its magnificent advance, pursuing
Hitler's defeated hordes, the heroic Red Army reached our borders... The heroic
Red Army helped us liberate Belgrade, Eastern Serbia, and Vojvodina.
That was a great help to us, as was the assistance the Soviet Union provided us
during the war in equipping our army with military equipment, which at the end
of the war numbered 52 divisions."
Thus, the communists came to power thanks to the direct help of the Red
Army. However, the conquest of the western regions, where the Soviets could not
operate according to the prior agreements between the Allies, was extremely
difficult. There were 200,000 Croatian soldiers, 20,000 National Guardsmen in Slovenia,
and an undetermined number of Draza Mihailovic's Chetniks on the
Montenegrin border. Tito, in the aforementioned report, explicitly states that
the Croatian border was a tough nut to crack. Fierce fighting raged for months
along the Croatian-Serbian borders, in Srijem and
Slavonia. Tito says of these battles:
"In these final struggles, we suffered heavy losses. For your
information, I will say that on the Srijem front
alone, for a few months, and then also in Slavonia, we had 70,000 wounded. This
proves the intensity of the fighting. Above all, the remnants of the Croatian Ustaše fought desperately for every inch of ground..."
On one side were the Serbs fighting under communist leadership, and on the
other, the Croats fighting for their national independence. Wherever Tito's
guerrillas, supported by British aircraft, arrived, they exterminated the
Croatian population, supporters of national independence.
These repressive measures culminated when, after the war ended, they
entered Croatia's capital—evacuated to save lives and property—and murdered
more than 100,000 Croatian soldiers, disarmed and returned by the British
military command to Austria, where they had sought refuge after the end of
hostilities. This mass killing also involved former soldiers and Slovenian and
Croatian civilians. Furthermore, the prisons and concentration camps in Croatia
and Slovenia were overflowing.
In such a climate, the "elections" for the constituent
assembly were held. As stipulated among the Allies, a mixed government composed
of communists and politicians from the exiled government, formed ad hoc, was to
call for free elections. To prevent this, the communists resorted to terrorist
measures, trampling on the obligations they had undertaken to not impose their
system and to respect the freely expressed will of the people of Yugoslavia.
Tito even went so far as to boast that they had acted in bad faith. He said in
his political report: "We had to accept these obligations because the
Western Allies would not have recognized the new situation in Yugoslavia
otherwise." (p. 78 of the official edition).
If the colonial powers had organized similar elections and plebiscites
in their Afro-Asian possessions to determine whether the respective peoples
wanted independence, it is quite certain that none would have achieved national
independence, and it would later be asserted that they "had renounced
being free and independent." If Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and other
countries behind the Iron Curtain constitute nation-states, why deprive Croatia
of that right? If Russia recognized Poland, once an integral part of its
empire, as a national, historical, and political entity, why doesn't Serbia do
the same for Croatia, which, due to its historical and political development,
culture, and religion, is at least as different from Serbia as Poland is from
Russia?
Furthermore, maintaining Serbian domination and the colonial
exploitation of Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and the national minorities
living along the Albanian and Hungarian borders is not a prerequisite for
maintaining a communist regime. At least, this was not the case until 1948, the
year of the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade. Under the slogan
"brotherhood and unity," Serbian communists attempt to conceal their
policy of oppression and economic exploitation of other peoples and national
minorities. Why, for example, is the Albanian minority in Kosmet
not allowed to reintegrate into their nation-state, Albania? Why has the same
not been done for the Hungarian minority?
The case of Macedonia is particularly serious. Macedonians aspire to
unite with Bulgaria for two reasons: a high percentage of their compatriots
live in Bulgaria, and they also feel an affinity with the Bulgarian people, so
some form of union between Macedonia and Bulgaria would be a positive and just
solution. If both Bulgaria and Serbia have communist governments, by what right
do the Serbs prevent the national liberation and unification of the
Macedonians? Moreover, the atheist government in Belgrade imposes the
jurisdiction of the Serbian national church on Macedonians, a church that is
favored not only over Catholics and Muslims, but also over Orthodox Macedonians
and Montenegrins.
Serbian chauvinism also benefited greatly from the creation of the
"People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," which, although it has
a Croat majority among both Catholics and Muslims, was not incorporated into
the "People's Republic of Croatia." All power in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is in the hands of the Serbs, who imposed an artificial distinction
between Catholic and Muslim Croats. If this province were part of the People's
Republic of Croatia, Muslims would have a voice and a vote, and a preponderant
role in all matters concerning Bosnia.
Currently, as before in monarchical Yugoslavia, a policy of economic
exploitation in favor of Serbia is practiced. Serbian nationalists maintained
that Croats and Slovenes were part of the supposed "unitary Yugoslav
people" and that, in the name of national solidarity,
they had to bear the main burden of reparations for the damage Serbia suffered
in the First World War. The Serbian communists who rule Yugoslavia cannot
justify the exploitation of Croatia and Slovenia by invoking national
solidarity because they officially recognize the multinational character of the
Yugoslav state.
Therefore, they invented an absurd theory about the mandatory economic
equality of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. They argue that they are applying
this principle of economic equality so that the "most economically advanced
people's republics"—that is, Slovenia and Croatia—must bear the costs and
the burden of the accelerated industrialization of Serbia, Macedonia, and
Montenegro. It is not a matter of sacrificing surpluses and reserves, but of
working for a meager standard of living (the average monthly salary is $20) in
order to promote the industrial progress of other peoples favored by the
regime. The central government in Belgrade allocates most of Croatia's and
Slovenia's national income to finance projects in other republics, often under
the guise of experiments that yield little benefit.
All of this proves that Serbia is favored in communist Yugoslavia, which
remains the same as it was under monarchy, one of the most typical countries of
national oppression and economic exploitation for the benefit of the minority.
To the national oppression and colonial exploitation practiced in
Yugoslavia for the benefit of Serbia are added its imperialist ambitions
towards neighboring countries. Serbian communists contributed to the
establishment of a communist government in Albania, a country they considered a
dependency of their own. Albania was only able to free itself from thousands
upon thousands of Serbian "technicians" who behaved as if in an
occupied country when the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade arose.
Currently, the Albanian communist leaders seek support in distant
Beijing, fearful that Moscow and Belgrade might once again reach an agreement
at their expense. Yugoslavia had attempted to subjugate Bulgaria, incorporating
it as the seventh people's republic, while Sofia
demanded that their relations should be those of two associates with equal
rights. The Soviet support given to Bulgaria on that occasion was one of the
main causes of the Belgrade-Moscow dispute. Subsequently, the Kremlin, along
with all the other Cominform countries, accused the
Yugoslav communist leaders of nationalism, or rather, Serbian chauvinism.
Therefore, the supposed "national communism" in Yugoslavia and
Belgrade's alleged struggle for "independence" against Soviet
dominance within the communist bloc, primarily signifies the defense of Serbian
interests and privileges to the detriment of other oppressed peoples and
minorities in Yugoslavia and neighboring countries, namely: Albania, Bulgaria,
and Hungary. It is undeniable that Yugoslavia does not meet the conditions to
be considered a non-committed country, according to the definition given by the
Preparatory Commission of the Conference of Non-Committed Countries. It is a
state that practices an inhumane policy of national oppression. The
declarations of Yugoslav representatives in favor of African liberation
movements and their national self-determination stand in stark contrast to the
national oppression and colonial exploitation within Yugoslavia.
It is now incumbent upon the participants in the Conference of
Non-Committed Countries to consider whether Yugoslavia can be included in the
group of neutral countries and whether it is not their moral obligation to also
address the suffering and exploitation of the subjugated peoples and minorities
in Yugoslavia when discussing the issue of human dignity and freedom for all
peoples, and especially the right to self-determination.
Croatian-Latin American Institute of Culture
"It is necessary to remember," Feighan
emphasized, "that communists recognize only their own laws. They recognize
our laws only as long as they can use them to destroy us. I am very well aware
of the distorted facts surrounding the so-called criminal activities attributed
to the Croatian people. I am also aware of the numerous crimes committed by the
Yugoslav Communist Party. Of course, for them, these crimes are acts of
justice, since the end justifies any means. I also know the character of the
Yugoslav communist state. It is a state that seeks to destroy our way of life.
They incessantly proclaim the destruction of our system and encourage
neutralism, which leads to communism throughout the world. Their subversive
activities in the Far East and Africa are well known... As for me, I am highly
honored to stand with the United Croats of the USA. They are American citizens
and free to express their opinions. They live as free men, and it is only
natural that Consul Mirosevic hates them, since he
and his government hate and They fear all free men, as
long as they try to expose communist crimes and promote the cause of
freedom."
At the end of his speech, Deputy Feighan
invited those present to oppose the international conspiracy of communism:
"We must continue this struggle until nations, great and small, are free and
independent, with the right to determine their own destiny. With your help and
the help of every God-fearing person, both great and small nations will be
free, and the Croatian nation will regain its place in the family of nations
and hold its head high, as it always has and always will."
Another American speaker at the memorial event in Cleveland was the
former U.S. Commissioner for Refugees in Europe, Dr. Edward M. O'Connor. In his
opinion, the mass killing of the Croatians in 1945 constitutes "one of the
greatest and most tragic massacres in the history of humankind." Referring
to communist interpretations of the Croats' struggle for national independence
in 1941, when they proclaimed secession from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and
organized their own nation-state, he stated: "No one can argue that this
independence was imposed on the people by Hitler or Mussolini or any other
dictator. The Croatian people had claimed this status for centuries. They (the
Croats) were not content with their situation within the Yugoslav community or
empire. Like other peoples of Southeast and Central Europe, they yearned for
their national independence, and being a cultured and astute people, the Croats
realized that the war had created an appropriate and opportune situation to
declare their national independence."
The information provided by the former American official regarding the
extradition and massacre of the Croatians in 1945, during his time in a
prominent position in Europe, carries significant testimonial value.
"Eleven days after the agreement signed in Reims,"
said E. M. O'Connor, "the British demanded that the Croatian
army, or most of it—perhaps seventy thousand soldiers—lay down their weapons,
guaranteeing them the protection prescribed by the Geneva Convention,
applicable not only to prisoners of war but also to the civilian
population." This forced repatriation later horrified the American
conscience when, during the Truman administration, it became clear that the
extradition meant the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.
"What is certain," the speaker continued, "is that the Croatian
army, upon laying down its arms, was handed over to Tito's partisans... It is
certain that no fewer than five hundred thousand Croats were killed, and their
only crime was having fought for the independence of their country. They fought
for the right to be free; they fought for the freedoms for which we too are
prepared to give our lives."
"Tito and his accomplices know very well, by the way, that not all
Croatian patriots have died. Many of them continue the struggle in their
homeland. Many have sought asylum in the free world to truthfully report on
Tito and his gang and to continue fighting for the freedom and independence of
Croatia..."
Representative Feighan kept his promise, and
on June 7, 1961, he addressed the insolence of the Yugoslav consul in
Pittsburgh in Congress, simultaneously sending a note of protest to the State
Department. In Congress, he stated: "I consider this matter very serious.
The communist diplomat violated the constitutional guarantees regarding freedom
of assembly and free speech, assured to our citizens. I will demand nothing
less than the expulsion of the Yugoslav Consul from our country..."
Indeed, the Yugoslav consular agent had to leave American soil.
All of this, which we have just summarized, provoked the wrath of the
Yugoslav communist dictator, who could no longer feign ignorance of the
Croatian exiles' activities. Therefore, when speaking in the Serbian city of Užice on the twentieth anniversary of the first communist
guerrilla struggles in Serbia, he expressed himself in the same way as the
expelled consul in his aforementioned letter. Just as all totalitarian
dictators conflate their regime and its crimes with the country:
“We,” Tito said, “know that there are many people in the world who don’t
like our country. Many reactionaries in the West publicly say they don’t like
our country; moreover, many hate it. We understand them, because in relation to
our country they are guided by their personal and class interests. But when it
comes to a case as drastic as the organization and celebration of an Ustaše event in North America and its connection to
Memorial Day, then it’s not just about the personal interests that inspired it.
The cited case is one of many examples of the incorrect relations with our
country. However, when various reactionary elements in Western countries
undertake or sustain similar actions, we can understand them because we know
they are our class enemies. We know they do it for their ideological and class interests
and because they hate communism and everything that is progress, everything
that is inevitable and accelerates the collapse of their obsolete system.”
On that occasion, Tito concealed the fact that it was a commemorative
event for the victims of communism, exterminated en masse, which constitutes
one of the greatest crimes in history. At the time, Milovan
Djilas tried to justify this crime, stating that it was necessary for "the
unarmed Croatian soldiers to die so that Slavia could
live."
By expressing himself in this way, the main ideologue of Yugoslav
communism, then Tito's lieutenant, had pronounced the condemnation of the
regime that, invoking raison d'état, cynically practices the most brutal
Machiavellianism. At the same time, he had revealed the true nature of the
Yugoslav state, which can survive only through the criminal collective
slaughter—a true genocide—of the Croats, who constitute a third of the
population of that heterogeneous conglomerate imposed on the vast majority of
its unfortunate subjects through deception, violence, and crime.
Between the two world wars, the unofficial society Les Amis de Yugoslavie (Friends of Yugoslavia) was established in
Paris. In accordance with official French policy, this society accepted the
thesis that Serbia, having played the role of Piedmont in 1918, had
"liberated and unified" the Croats, Slovenes, and Montenegrins. The
absence of the necessary cultural and political conditions for such a role was
disregarded, as Yugoslavia is a culturally, nationally, and religiously
heterogeneous country, lacking the conditions necessary to become a nation like
Italy and Germany. (At the same time, the Germans presented Serbia as the
"Prussia of the Balkans.")
When Yugoslavia was restored in 1945 under the communist regime, Les
Amis de Yugoslavie focused primarily on assisting the
numerous Yugoslavian refugees, first the Serbs and then the Croats. It is worth
highlighting here the great merits France earned after the war by receiving all
the anti-communist exiles and refusing extradition requests from their
respective governments, which, unfortunately, was not the case with Italy and
Austria.
The favorable treatment afforded to the Serbs stemmed from a political
tradition reinforced by the understandable sentimental French attitude toward
Serbia, their small ally in the First World War. While there are no cultural
affinities between France and Serbia, unlike between France and Croatia, the
French were deeply affected by the memory of the poilus
d'Orient, who fell on the
Salonika front for the liberation of Serbia. Consequently, Yugoslavia was
treated as an expanded Serbia, not as a multinational state. Little by little,
and slowly, the true nature of Yugoslavia was revealed. Even now, many French
leaders do not realize that Serbia allied itself with France as an agent of
Russia and appeared as a protégé of France, barely after the collapse of
Tsarist Russia, closely linked to the Serbian dynasty of Karageorgevic.
Established in 1929, King Alexander's dictatorship was ostensibly
intended to safeguard national and state unity against the threat of
"Croatian separatism." Many prominent French figures recognized that
the dictatorial regime was, in reality, an attack on the national freedom of an
entire people. Official policy, at least in theory, accepted the official
narrative of the royal dictatorship. Croatia's struggle for national freedom
was further hampered by the 1934 Marseille bombing, which was tendentiously
attributed to fascists, National Socialists, and even communists.
However, the Yugoslav dictatorship's withdrawal from the French alliance
system on the eve of the last war, along with the events during and after the
conflict, led France to view Yugoslavia not as an enlarged Serbia, but as a
multinational state with persistent opposition to Serbian hegemony.
Furthermore, religious discrimination, practiced in both monarchical and
communist Yugoslavia, to the detriment of Croatian and Slovenian Catholics, is
condemned in French Catholic circles. Even so, a significant portion of French
public opinion still fails to clearly recognize that France and Serbia share
distinct cultural and political traditions and that a thorough overhaul of
outdated approaches to the situation in Central Europe and the Balkans is essential.
If France wishes to preserve its influence in this vital European region, it
must ground it in a firm foundation of cultural affinities.
The confusion reigning even among the members of Les Amis de Yugoslavia
regarding the true Serbian position is perfectly illustrated by the incident
caused by the condolences that the Society's board of directors sent to His
Holiness Pope John XXIII on the occasion of the death of Cardinal Louis Stepinac. The board, chaired by the late former minister
Louis Marin, considered it an act of international courtesy and Christian
solidarity, given the significance of the heroic figure of the Metropolitan
Archbishop of Croatia. However, the attitude of the Serbian exiles present at
the assembly was quite different. Some left the room in protest, and several
maintained a conspicuous silence that implied disapproval. The Serbian
nationalist press in exile harshly criticized the board's initiative, alleging
that Cardinal Stepinac, being a Croatian patriot, was
an enemy of Serbia. They expressed solidarity, no more and no less, with the
thesis held by Stepinac's communist persecutors.
This outward display of religious hatred and intolerance could only have
a negative effect among the French friends of Yugoslavia. In this climate, a Croatian
politician was invited to give a lecture, something that had occurred for the
first time in the society's history. The speaker was Dr. Juraj
Krnjevic, general secretary of the Croatian Peasant
Party, a prominent figure in the struggle against Serbian hegemony and a
veteran of political battles. After the First World War, he was appointed
general secretary of the main Croatian party, which in every election obtained
an overwhelming majority of the Croatian vote. A politician with a decidedly
democratic orientation, he spent many years in exile during the dictatorship of
King Alexander and, from 1941 until now, he resides in London.
Dr. Krnjevic spoke on May 24th to the Friends
of Yugoslavia about the Croatian struggle for national freedom. Below are some
excerpts from his lecture:
"The problem of Serbian-Croatian relations is, in its essence,
quite simple and easy to understand. It is the problem of Serbian domination in
Yugoslavia, of the resistance and struggle of the Croats against this
domination. One cannot properly understand the tragic events that have shaken
and continue to shake Yugoslavia without a full awareness of this fundamental
fact. Indeed, every important event has been presented to national and
international public opinion in such a way that its real causes have been
obscured and ignored. From the very beginning of Yugoslavia's existence, its
leaders have striven to convince international public opinion that Yugoslavia
is a unitary state, based on the will and fraternal sentiments of the peoples
of Yugoslavia.
This is precisely the opposite of the truth. As soon as the Croatian
people were able, after the formation of Yugoslavia, to express their will in
the 1920 general elections with universal suffrage, they repudiated by an
absolute majority the act of..." The union of Yugoslavia and the regime
established by the Serbs guaranteed them total domination over the other
peoples of that country, and particularly over the Croatian people, whose
resistance was approaching unanimity every day. This vigorous attitude of the
people was constantly affirmed in subsequent elections. The behavior of the
Croatian people did not signify preconceived hatred of the Serbian people, but
was the expression of the Croatian people's long-held awareness of their
political and national identity, as well as their firm will to establish a
sovereign Croatian state.
"In the Habsburg Empire, the Croats had clearly manifested this
national will centuries ago. Croatian national consciousness was so vigorous
that in the 19th century, when the Habsburgs' centralizing tendencies were at
their most virulent and when Bohemia was a mere Austrian province, only the
Croats, along with the Germans of Austria and the Hungarians, had preserved the
status of a state, the position of a clearly defined political nation, which,
moreover, they managed to maintain, despite all the combined efforts of Vienna
and Budapest, until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire:
"Moreover, the political evolution of the contemporary world provides
additional impetus and justification to the ongoing struggle of the Croatian
people to restore their national sovereignty. Once this sovereignty is
recovered, the door will automatically open to all possibilities of cooperation
between the Croatian state and the Serbian state in the spirit of equality and
within the framework of a free and democratic Europe."
The fact that a genuine Croatian politician was invited to speak at the
Friends of Yugoslavia society, defending and substantiating the thesis that the
only solution to the Serbian-Croatian problem lies in the creation of two
separate states, and that this solution is beneficial for a free Europe, came
as a surprise to exiled Serbian politicians. Serbian chauvinists residing in
Paris then portrayed Dr. Juraj Krnjevic
as an extremist unilaterally promoting the program of an independent Croatian
state without the consent of his party and, above all, without the approval of
its president, Dr. Vlatko Macek,
who lives in Washington as a political exile. The board of directors of the
Friends of Yugoslavia, meeting on June 26, addressed a letter not to Krnjevic, but to Macek, president
of the Croatian Peasant Party, stating their opinion that "the policy that
calls into question the existence of the Yugoslav state constitutes a danger to
Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes."
This machination by Serbian chauvinists, however, did not achieve the
desired result. Croatia Press (Review and News Bulletin, New York, No. 219,
August 1961) commented on the matter:
"This attempt, through the French, identical to so many previous
attempts by the Chetniks, is based on the hope that
Dr. Macek would disapprove of Dr. Krnjevic
due to alleged political differences. We were informed by reliable sources that
those who engage in such speculation are completely mistaken. In Croatian
circles in the United States, both among those affiliated with the Peasant
Party and among independents, this act is considered an improper interference
in Croatian political affairs."
Subsequently, further information was published regarding the position
of "The Friends of Yugoslavia," as well as Dr. Macek's
response. The board of directors of the French association, meeting on June 26,
according to a press release, expressed its satisfaction at "having established
close contact and held sincere talks with representatives of the Croatian
Peasant Party, but felt obliged to maintain a reserved stance regarding Dr. Krnjevic's views." To this end, its president, Paul Bastid, was tasked with conveying to Dr. Macek the society's opinion that "any policy that
calls into question the existence of the Yugoslav state constitutes a danger to
Croats and Slovenes as well as to Serbs."
Nevertheless, the president of the "Friends of Yugoslavia," in
his message to Dr. Macek, expressed himself
unequivocally against the Pan-Serbian policy, maintaining that "the
Yugoslav union must respect, in its constitutional forms, the national
particularities of the peoples that make up Yugoslavia." In other words,
the plurinational character of the Yugoslav state has
been highlighted.
President Dr. Vlatko Macek
did not delay his response. In a letter dated July 19, from Washington, he
expressed his solidarity with Dr. Juraj Krnjevic, the general secretary of the party he leads.
Below is the full Spanish translation of Dr. Macek's
response, as published in "La Revista Croata" No. 44, pp. 473-4, Buenos Aires 1961:
"Mr. President: I acknowledge receipt of your kind letter of July
10. Allow me to make the following comment:
In my opinion, it was not Dr. Krnjevic who
called into question the unity of the Yugoslav state. This unity was already
called into question in 1918 by the manner in which the State of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes was created, becoming even more doubtful when, in 1929, King Alexander,
through a dictatorial edict, attempted to create a single, unified Yugoslav
'people.'
In this way, we Croats were deprived, as early as 1918 and especially in
1929, of all the rights that we had managed to safeguard for many centuries in
the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new state, whether called the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes or Yugoslavia, was, in reality, Serbia." It
is not surprising, then, that such a situation provoked the most vehement
opposition from all Croats, which manifested itself throughout the existence of
the Yugoslav state, and particularly in the elections held in 1935 when,
despite the public vote, the Croats gave the Croatian Peasant Party more than
90% of their votes. Taking this fact into account, and wishing to normalize
state affairs,
Prince Regent Paul concluded with me the Agreement of August 26, 1939.
Three days later it was ratified by the Croatian national deputies with 90
votes in favor and 1 against. However, this Agreement (and not the Pact with
Hitler) motivated a handful of irresponsible officers to stage a coup against
the government of Dragisa Cvetkovic
and remove Prince Paul (on March 27, 1941). Nevertheless, we did not break
relations with this government. of conspirators, and
Dr. Krnjevic agreed to go into exile as Deputy Prime
Minister in order to continue the search for a compromise. His experiences with
representatives of Serbian parties convinced him on many occasions, as they did
me, that a union with Serbia without conditions and guarantees was impossible.
In other words, we realize that it would mean, once again, submitting the
Croats to Serbian hegemony. That is why it is only natural that every
responsible Croatian politician opposes such a solution. I hope, Mr. President,
that you will understand these sincere and brief words.
It is obvious that Dr. Macek, with his letter,
gave his full support to Dr. Krnjevic's statements. A
state union between Croatia and Serbia is impossible. The painful experience of
this union over the past forty years has unequivocally demonstrated that it is
only feasible within the Serbian dictatorial system. Therefore, Dr. Krnjevic is correct when he maintains that the only
guarantee and condition for Croatia's freedom is a sovereign Croatian state
within the framework of a free and democratic Europe.
As for the core issue, that is, whether maintaining Yugoslavia is in the
best interests of the Croats, experience has unequivocally proven that Croatia,
throughout its 1300-year history, has never been in a worse situation than in
recent decades within the state community with Serbia. Esteban Radic, imprisoned for his fight for a Croatian republic,
noted in his diary more than 30 years ago that the forced union between Croatia
and Serbia would cause both to fall victim to the communists, due to the
Serbian hegemons, while a Croatian republic could avoid such a disastrous fate.
Events proved Radic right. If Croatia is today under
the communist yoke, it is due to the Greater Serbian policy.
Furthermore, Croats abhor Serbian imperialism, which harmed all of
Serbia's neighbors—Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. Croats do not want
to become accomplices of Serbian chauvinism by defending the borders of a
Serbia unduly expanded with the national territories of the peoples with whom
Croats want to live in peace and friendship. The French, friends of the peoples
of Yugoslavia, must understand that Serbia, due to its national traditions, is
a potential ally of Russia, and that Croatia is the long-standing defender of
Western cultural values in that region. Today, as the European
community is being formed, Croatia's place is surely alongside France and
Europe, while Serbia's orientation is more than doubtful.
Croats, like other European peoples, participated in the colonization of
overseas countries, especially in the Americas. Immigration flows intensified
at the end of the last century and the beginning of this one, to such an extent
that a quarter of Croatians now live in various countries of the New World,
South Africa, Australia, and Oceania. To these economic migrants must be added
the post-war refugees, opponents of communism and Serbian domination in
Yugoslavia. The number of these refugees reaches 100,000 and grows daily,
because, apart from East Germany, Croatia is the European captive country that
supplies the most political asylum seekers.
The communist government in Belgrade pays special attention to overseas
Croats. On the one hand, it benefits from the numerous remittances in foreign
currency that these immigrants send to their families and attempts to gain
political advantage from their political and social ties; on the other hand, it
strives to paralyze the anti-communist activity of numerous political exiles.
Below, we will briefly refer to recent events to demonstrate how the
Yugoslav communist rulers proceed to counteract the political activity of
Croatian exiles. The verbal protests and pickets by political exiles in New
York, demanding freedom for the Croatian people during Tito's presence at the
United Nations deliberations this year, so disturbed the Yugoslav dictator, who
tolerates no political opposition whatsoever, that he lodged a strong protest
with the American authorities and organized mass demonstrations throughout
Yugoslavia against American freedom. The extortion practiced by Yugoslav
diplomatic and consular representatives against exiles in relation to their
families living in Yugoslavia deserves special consideration.
If these exiles wish for their relatives to integrate with them, visit
them, or simply not be persecuted, they are required to abstain from any
political activity at odds with the communist regime, which, in effect, limits
the freedom of free countries. Such coercion, therefore, concerns the
governments of free countries, especially when it involves the extorted
individuals who opted for their citizenship. Among those who stood out in this
intimidating and coercive activity was Predrag Grabovac, a former Yugoslav consular official in Buenos
Aires, where, as is well known and public knowledge, several attacks were also
committed against Croatian immigrants and a violent smear campaign was
unleashed.
On that occasion, Croatian newspapers provided evidence that Grabovac, who accused Croatian exiles of being war
criminals for fighting against Yugoslavia, their national prison, and against
communist tyranny, was responsible for the murders of Croatian and German
prisoners during the war. This proven incrimination had an unexpected echo not
long ago in West Germany. The French news agency AFP reported from Munich on
December 6, 1961, that Grabovac, appointed Yugoslav
consul in that city, was accused by the Croatian newspaper Hrvatska
drzava of identical crimes and that, based on the
charges brought, Christian Democratic MP Dr. Paul Wullner
requested that the Bavarian Minister of Justice initiate proceedings against
the new Yugoslav consul in Munich. His request was granted, and the Bavarian
courts have already begun the relevant proceedings by questioning witnesses. In
view of this, the Belgrade government hastened to dismiss its consul.
Another significant
incident occurred in Stuttgart, West Germany. According to news agencies,
Yugoslav representatives, on the occasion of the "national
holiday"—that is, the beginning of the communist uprising—organized a
celebration featuring a folk group from Zagreb. They sought to take advantage
of the presence of Croatian workers who, with the permission of the Yugoslav
authorities, were working in Germany. (These workers stand in stark contrast to
the propaganda about the total occupation and improved standard of living in
communist Yugoslavia.) When the Croatian refugees in Stuttgart demonstrated
against the communist regime in their homeland and demanded national freedom
for the Croatian people, they were attacked by communist secret agents. One of
the demonstrators, Vlado Balan,
was stabbed in the back, and the assailant, who was arrested, turned out to be Petar Trkulj, a man with a
lengthy criminal record, convicted several times for assault and distribution
of pornographic material.
The terrorism
perpetrated by Yugoslav communists was a response to the actions of Croatian
immigrants in Brazil regarding Tito's announced and subsequently postponed
official visit. Yugoslav communist agents sought to intimidate the Croatian
immigrants residing in that large country, and on October 30th, they attacked
Mrs. Anka Ilek, owner of a
pharmacy in São Paulo, where she kept the archives of the Brazil-Croatia
Society. Two communist secret agents entered the pharmacy at 11:00 PM, lowered
the iron security shutter, and rushed at the owner with the intention of
forcing her unconscious into a waiting car and stealing the aforementioned
archives. However, they hadn't counted on the employee in the adjacent
laboratory, who cried out for help. The assailants had to flee, leaving Mrs. Ilek, secretary of the Croatian immigrants' association,
unconscious. Her husband had been kidnapped years earlier in Rome by Yugoslav
communist agents.
In an effort to
intimidate Croatian refugees in anticipation of a possible visit by Tito to
Venezuela, the Yugoslav ambassador in Caracas, Lazar Udovicki,
reported to Venezuelan authorities that on December 1st, some young Croatian
immigrants had attempted to kidnap him. Following this sensational accusation,
the Yugoslav embassy, in a press conference, reiterated to the
Caracas media the well-known accusations made by the communists against the
Croatians, labeling them war criminals. Among other charges leveled was the
allegation that these were Croatians who, after Perón's
fall, sought refuge in Venezuela and were comrades of those who died fighting
for the Nationalist Liberation Alliance. Of course, they couldn't cite a single
name, as it is a judicially proven fact that no Croatian was among the Alliance
members. Tito's ambassador was unable to offer any concrete evidence, and
certain newspapers reflected the opinion of Croatian exiles that it was a farce
intended to unleash a new smear campaign against anti-communists. The Croatian
Association of Venezuela, rejecting the accusations of the communist
oppressors, published the following clarification, which we transcribe from the
newspaper "El Nacional" of December 5,
1961:
The book comprises four chapters: I. Slovenia under enemy occupation
1941-1946; II. Vetrinje. 1. Arrival in Vetrinje; 2. First
contact with the British; 3. In the Vetrinje
concentration camp; 4. Extradition of the Slovenian
National Army - Control of the means of transport; 5. The
rescue of civilian refugees; 6. Conclusion; documents
and observations. III. The fate of those handed over: 1. The transports from Podroznica (Rosenbach); 2. The transports from Pliberk; 3. Amnesty and
commissions; 4. Repercussions of the Vetrinje tragedy; 5. Fifteen years
later; 6. The wounded. IV. Documents: The
official British response regarding the extradition of the Slovenian National
Guardsmen (domobrani); Memorandum from the Slovenian
National Committee - Call to mobilization. The book also contains an epilogue
and photographs.
This massacre coincided with the massacre of Serbs, Montenegrins, the
large German minority, Italians in the Triestine
area, and especially Croats. This book, of course, focuses primarily on the
Slovenian tragedy, with few references to the mass killing of the Croats. Thus,
a witness who was in the St. Vid concentration camp near Ljubljana states:
"When we were moved into the barracks, there were about 4,000 Croats and
Germans detained there—civilians, women, and even children. In three days, 27
Croats died. When we were digging pits to throw their bodies into, and while
burying one, I secretly uncovered him and saw that he had foam at the mouth and
that, as a result of the torture, not a single piece of skin remained intact on
his back." (p. 75).
The political backdrop to the Slovenian tragedy differed somewhat from
what happened in Croatia. During the war, Croatia was a sovereign state, while
Slovenia was occupied by German and Italian troops. The population, especially
in the Third Reich's occupation zone, was subjected to severe repression,
leading to the emergence of a resistance movement. However, the communist
minority, numbering only a few thousand, refused to join the leadership of this
movement and organized the National Liberation Front, thus igniting a civil or
fratricidal war. The anti-communist Slovenian fighters recognized the Yugoslav
government established in London, and as soon as they organized, they began to
confront communist terror, maintaining ties with the Serbian general Draža Mihailović, then
Minister of War in the exiled Yugoslav government.
Later, the Slovenian Domobrani (National
Guard) also cooperated with Dimitrije Ljotic's Serbian Chetniks, who
collaborated with the German occupation troops in Serbia against the
communists. When the Allies recognized Tito's government as the only legitimate
government in the final phase of the war, the Slovenian national fighters tried
in vain, after the war ended, to present themselves as Allied troops. The
British believed the communist accusations that they were collaborating with
the occupiers, which sealed their tragic fate. The British command in Austria
handed them over to the communists, who immediately proceeded to exterminate
them. It was not taken into account that these Slovenes, with their
nationalistic and Catholic orientation, could not possibly collaborate with the
communist partisans, as they knew that their sole purpose was to seize power
and establish a communist dictatorship.
B. M. Karapandzic, a Serb and fellow Serb of Dimitrije Ljotic, recounts in his
pamphlet the Kocevlje massacre, where, along with
Slovenes and Croats, Serbian and Montenegrin "volunteers" were also
murdered. These men had fought against the communists during the war, mostly in
Serbian territory occupied by the Germans. They were primarily supporters of Ljotic, Nedic (head of the
Serbian government under German occupation), and Draza
Mihailovic, who had been abandoned by his British
allies in 1944. These supporters believed that Tito's partisans were primarily
seeking the expulsion of enemy troops, not the seizure of power. Thus, the
anti-communist partisans had no alternative but to cooperate increasingly with
the army of the Third Reich.
By the end of 1944, Serbia was occupied by Soviet troops and communist
forces, so the Serbian and Montenegrin anti-communist "volunteers"
retreated with German assistance to Croatia, then to Slovenia, and finally to
Austria. There, they were concentrated in Vetrinje
along with the Slovenes and small Croatian groups. The British handed them over
to the communist partisans under the pretext of transporting them to Italy.
They numbered several thousand, and all were murdered, mostly in Kočevlje, Slovenia. The author states verbatim: "In
Kocevlje, all those whom the British command had
handed over to Tito were exterminated, namely: 12,000 Slovenian 'domobrani,' 3,000 Serbian 'volunteers,' 1,000 Montenegrin 'chetniks,' and 2,500 Croatian 'soldiers.'"
The author indicates on page 62 a list of documents, without citing them
in the text, which detracts from its scientific rigor, although this work by Karapandzic constitutes, in its general outlines, a
reliable testimony. Leopold Rohrbacher recounted,
with the serenity and meticulousness typical of German authors, the
extermination of the German minority in what is now the autonomous province of Vojvodina, within the People's Republic of Serbia, by
Serbian communists. In Yugoslavia, there were more than half a million Germans,
who had settled there over the last few centuries as a result of the decline of
the empire. Ottoman, in what was formerly Southern Hungary, an extremely
fertile and ethnically diverse agricultural region.
Some of these German settlers, fearing Serbian communist retaliation,
withdrew with the German troops in 1944. However, according to the author,
nearly 250,000 remained, who were later brutally exterminated or expelled. This
ruined the once rich and progressive German colonies in Yugoslavia, which would
have disastrous consequences for the postwar Yugoslav economy. The cruel fate
and mass expulsion of the German minorities in Poland and Bohemia are well
known, but less so the tragic fate of hundreds of thousands of progressive
German settlers in Yugoslavia. They were replaced by the indigenous Serbian and
Montenegrin highlanders in order to alter the ethnic character of this fertile
region, the richest in Central Europe.
The Soviets promoted these drastic and inhumane measures, just as in
Poland and Bohemia, with the purpose of creating permanent causes of enmity
between Germany on one side, and Poland, Bohemia, and Serbia on the other, and
forcing these countries to depend on Russia in the face of Germany's just
claims. Martyrs of the Faith, a book by the Croatian author Dr. Ivo Omrcanin, published in Spanish, recounts the massacre of
Croatian Catholic priests during and after the war. The author compiled data on
363 priests, murdered not only by the communists, but sadly also many by the Chetniks, Serbian nationalists.
The Serbs, nationalists and communists alike, practiced Yugoslavia,
their national prison, which practiced religious discrimination and sought
revenge against the Catholic Croats for having separated from Serbia and thus
re-established their nation-state. Dr. Omrcanin
publishes a list of these martyrs of the faith, adding all the details, though
not always complete, about the place, date, and other circumstances of their
violent deaths. It is understood that gathering all the data is not easy while
a communist regime is in power in Croatia. Even so, Dr. Omrcanin's work is a first-rate
document that, we are sure, will
attract the attention of Spanish-speaking Catholic circles.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that in 1945 the communists persecuted
and exterminated the Croats with particular savagery and virulence for having
courageously and sacrificially defended their national, political, and
religious freedoms. To date, the complete documentation of this genocide has
not been published. Because it involved tens of thousands of heinous murders,
both individual and collective crimes, perpetrated in various locations, the
collection and systematization of the documentary material presents numerous
difficulties. This explains why, to date, no comprehensive and well-documented
book on the Croatian tragedy, which constitutes a classic genocide, has been
published.
Charles Kamber,
Lynch, Nebraska, USA
Fr. Marko Japundzic, T.O.F. - Matthew Karaman (1700-1771), Archbishop of Zadar,
Rome 1961, pp. 108.
Matthew Karaman, the illustrious Archbishop of
Zadar, a proponent of the conversion of the East
Slavic dissidents and the commendable author of a Glagolitic missal, did not
figure in Croatian political and literary history until the Croatian National
Renaissance began in the mid-19th century.
Father Japundzic, a
doctor of Eastern ecclesiastical studies, sheds light on the life and work of
this ecclesiastical dignitary in the book under the heading, providing much
previously unpublished information that he compiled in the Vatican Library. His
work was published with the appropriate Imprimatur. Mateo Karaman
was born in June 1700. He was educated and ordained a priest in Split, the once
magnificent palace of the Roman Emperor Diocletian, situated in a charming
region that, from the 7th century onward, would become the cradle of the
Kingdom of Croatia. Ordained a priest by the Archbishop of Split (Archiepiscopus spalatensis, olim salonitanus, Dalmatiae, totiusque Croatiae primas), he went to Zadar to occupy the chair of philosophy, hoping that the
Archbishop of that city, Vincent Zmajevic, a
distinguished humanist and nephew of the Archbishop of Antivari,
Primate of Serbia, would understand the problems of the Glagolitic priests.
With the aim of propagating the faith and promoting the return of Eastern
Christians,
Zmajevic had founded an "Illyrian" seminary
in Zadar, which would later be inaugurated during the
administration of his successor, Karaman. In that
Croatian institute, seminarians studied, among other subjects, Glagolitic
script and Old Church Slavonic. Popes Adrian II and John VIII, mindful of the
reasons for the spread of the faith, granted the Croatians the use of Old
Church Slavonic in the liturgy, written with a special alphabet called
Glagolitic. This exceptional privilege remains in effect to this day, so that
in the coastal region of Croatia, Holy Mass is celebrated in the archaic Church
Slavonic language, while the prayers, epistles, and Gospel are read in Literary
Croatian. In difficult times, when Glagolitic script was being combated in
order to impose Latin, the Croatian Glagolites
defended themselves with the authority of Saint Jerome, a native of Dalmatia,
the presumed author of Glagolitic script and the first translator of the Holy
Gospels into Croatian, the work of Saints Cyril and Methodius having been
forgotten.
In 1723, Archbishop Zmajevic sent Karaman to Russia to perfect his knowledge of Old Church
Slavonic, which he would later teach at the seminary and use to assist in
drafting the new Glagolitic missal he planned to publish. The last one,
published in 1631 and edited by Levakovic, suffered
from linguistic and conceptual errors. Karaman stayed
in Russia at the home of Matteo Zmajevic,
brother of the Archbishop of Zadar, who, having
fallen out with the Venetians, had fled Boka Kotorska and taken refuge in Russia. A naval engineer, he
fought alongside the Russians against the Swedes in 1714.
Thanks in large part to his intelligence and bold actions, the Russian
emperor was saved and the Swedish fleet was
defeated. In 1722, he was appointed admiral and tasked with rebuilding the
Russian fleet. During the reigns of Peter the Great and Peter II, he served as
supreme commander of the Russian navy. Through this Croatian, devout Catholic,
and Russian admiral, Karaman was able to connect with
the Russian ruling class and the imperial court, and to learn about the life
and customs of that vast country. Besides dedicating himself to the study of
Old Church Slavonic, his constant concern was how to bring the Russian people
back to the bosom of the Church of Rome. To this end, he sent reports and
concrete proposals to the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith
in Rome. He recommended sending Croatian missionaries to Russia because of the
linguistic similarity. "The Holy Catholic Church has a hidden treasure in
Croatian priests," he stated in one of his reports.
Upon returning to his homeland, he was summoned to Rome to oversee the
drafting of the new Glagolitic missal, a revised version of Levakovic's
missal. He was appointed abbot of the monastery of St. Cosmas
and Damian, renowned in Croatian history for having been founded by the
Croatian king Peter Krezimir IV (1058-1074), who
bequeathed to it extensive possessions, free from the interference of secular
power. Ecclesiastical writings in Glagolitic script date from the 9th century.
The best-known editions of Glagolitic missals are: a missal from 1405, written
in a Dalmatian monastery and published by the regent of Bosnia, Hrvoje Vukcic Hrvatinic;
a missal published in Senj in 1494; another dated
1483 but without specifying the place of publication; then the Misale Glagoliticum, printed in
1628; and the aforementioned Levakovic missal of
1631.
Karaman, working with
absolute dedication for two years, prepared the new edition of the Glagolitic
missal, which was printed in Rome in 1741.
As a reward for his assiduous work and exemplary life, he was appointed
Bishop of Osor, a diocese of very ancient origin.
Meanwhile, Esteban Rusic of Dubrovnik subjected Karaman's missal to severe criticism, which compelled him
to write an extensive and well-documented rebuttal, spanning 592 pages and
reflecting his profound historical, theological, and philological knowledge.
Perhaps the only justifiable objection would be that he had further Russified the language instead of bringing it closer to
literary Croatian.
Subsequently, Karaman held the position of
visitor of the Illyrian institutes (at that time, "Illyrian" meant
Croatian) in Fermo, Loreto, and Assisi. These colleges
provided training for clergymen destined to spread Christian doctrine in the
Balkans, and especially in the regions occupied by the Turks. With the death of
Archbishop Zmajevic of Zadar
in 1745, his position was filled by Karaman. Zadar, an ancient Dalmatian city nestled on the Adriatic
coast, was for centuries an important center of political, cultural, and
religious life. As early as 380, it was the seat of a bishopric, and later many
religious orders had their monasteries there. Benedictine monasteries date back
to the 11th century, the oldest being that of St. Mary, founded in 1066 by Cika, niece of King Peter Kresimiro.
The medieval Italian historian Farlatti notes
in his work Iliricum Sacrum that in 1177, Pope Alexander II visited
Zadar (Zara) and was greeted "imensis laudibus et canticis altissime resonantibus in eorum slavica lingua"
(with great ovations and resounding chants in their Slavic language).
In the territory of the Archdiocese of Zadar
lived small groups of Eastern schismatics, who settled
there fleeing the Balkans during the Turkish onslaught in the 16th and 17th
centuries. These refugees did not reach the shores of the Adriatic, as that
element was foreign to their mountain temperament. Upon coming into contact
with these dissidents, Archbishop Karaman became
quite disillusioned, as all his missionary zeal and apostolic efforts were met
with the complete incomprehension of the Orthodox newcomers, not only in a
religious but also a cultural sense. This conflict still exists today, and in a
more acute form, so that Croatia, the guardian of the western border that
centuries ago earned the honorary title of Antemurale
Christianisatis (Bridge of Christianity), now stands
as a bulwark against the assaults of communism.
The author clarifies many debatable points about the life and work of
this remarkable ecclesiastical dignitary, who died on May 7, 1771, in Zadar, and sheds light on his missionary activity among the
dissident Slavs.
Srecko Karaman, Buenos Aires.
Petar Ciklic: Man and His Personality, Ed.: Club de Lectores, Buenos Aires, 1958, pp. 387.
This is the second book that Dr. Ciklic has
published in Argentina. The first, titled Characterology, was published in Córdoba in 1948. The author has also
published a book in Latin in Rome on human intelligence.
Dr. Ciklic studied theology in his native
Croatia, later earning his doctorate from the Gregorian University in Rome. He
then continued and expanded his studies for several years in Munich, Vienna,
and Erlangen. During his time in Argentina, he resided in the city of Córdoba,
where he taught at the Metropolitan Seminary, the Monserrat
School, and the Higher Normal School. He is currently in the USA, serving as
head of the psychology department at Loyola University Los Angeles. The book
*Man and His Personality* is intended for educators, physicians, sociologists,
jurists, military personnel, priests, politicians, and anyone interested in
understanding the personality, temperament, and character of those around them,
in delving into their emotional states, and in comprehending their biopsychic
being. It is an excellent introduction to the study of personality, providing
the reader with extensive information on the subject while also being engaging
and interesting. The author's main objective was to spark interest in
psychological problems and offer the reader guidance in this fascinating and
captivating world of psychic phenomena, so interesting and attractive, yet also
so complex without a system for navigating it.
One such system, probably the best, is Kretschmer's
typology, which Dr. Ciklic explains at length in his
book. It is based on the relationship between different body types and
different temperaments and personalities. Psychology has studied this influence
of constitutional factors on human temperament and character since its
inception. It suffices to mention here the celebrated ancient physicians and
physiologists Hippocrates and Galen, the French typological school, and the
famous text of the "Aphorisms" from the Salerno medical school. But,
as Dr. Ciklic observes, "no one before Kretschmer has observed with such psychological insight the
relationship between physical constitution and human temperament."
The exposition of Kretschmer's typology in the
book under discussion is always done with the book's purpose in mind, which is
to help understand the behavior of the more or less normal people we encounter
in daily life. For this reason, the author devotes more attention to normal
cases than to pathological ones. Among the numerous and interesting examples
taken from literature or real life that the author cites to illustrate the
cases discussed, there are a large number of examples taken from Croatian
literature and national life, which demonstrates the author's effort to make
known certain aspects of Croatian cultural tradition.
Although Dr. Ciklic considers Kretschmer's system appropriate for the book's purpose, he
does not limit himself to it but also refers to the psychoanalytic and
experimental methods. There is also a chapter on the relationship between
personality and environment, and several more on the expressive signs of
personality: in behavior and dress, in gestures and music, in speech and
writing, and in physiognomy. In all these aspects of the subject, the author
demonstrates both his profound mastery of the material and his ability to
present the knowledge in a clear, coherent, and engaging manner.
It can be said, therefore, that the book fully achieves the objective
set by its author.
Branimir Anzulovic, Buenos Aires.
Jere Jareb,
Pola stoljeca hrvatske politike (Half a Century
of Croatian Politics), Ed. Biblioteca de la Revista Croata, pp. 180. Buenos
Aires 1960.
Dr. Vladko Macek, president of the Croatian Peasant Party, currently
residing in Washington as a political asylee,
published in 1957 in New York, in English, the autobiographical book: In the
Struggle for Freedom (see review in STUDIA CROATICA, Year II, Vols. 2-3, pp.
224-26), summarizing there his memories and assessments of Croatian politics, especially
concerning the period between the two wars, when he acted as the main
protagonist of political events in Croatia. Jere Jareb, a young Croatian publicist (who studied in Zagreb
and at Columbia University, USA), wrote an extensive study inspired by Dr. Macek's book. This study was first published in "La Revista Croata" in Buenos
Aires, and later expanded and published under the title of the epigraph, adding
a copious bibliography (pp. 143-173) and an index of names.
The half-century of Croatian politics that Jareb covers spans from 1896 to 1945. In the first chapter,
unduly brief, the author analyzes the political crisis caused by the dualist
system of Austro-Hungarian rule, in which the Croatian provinces were divided
into three administrative territories. When the multinational Habsburg
monarchy, unable to transform itself into a community of free nations, was in
its death throes—due in large part to the abnormal situation in Croatia—the
outbreak of the First World War caught Vienna, Budapest, and Zagreb unprepared.
Austria-Hungary was torn apart in the name of national principles, without
Croatia gaining national independence or even broader political rights than it
had previously enjoyed as an associated kingdom with sovereign attributes.
Instead, it was annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia as just another province. The
Croatian resistance between the two wars, the re-establishment of the
Independent State of Croatia in 1941, and the efforts to consolidate and defend
it against the onslaught of Yugoslav communism constitute the main theme of
this book, which focuses on three phases.
The protagonist of the Croatian national struggle in its first phase
(1919-1928) was Esteban Radić, founder and
president of the Croatian Peasant Party. Following his violent death, which
ushered in the second phase (1929-1941), leadership passed to his successor,
Dr. Vladko Macek. The
author meticulously analyzes this period, during which the Croatian resistance,
under Macek's leadership, had become a dynamic,
coherent, disciplined, and combative national front against the monarchical
dictatorship, one of the worst in Europe at the time.
Until the death of the dictatorial King, assassinated in Marseille in
1934, the action on the home front and that of the exiles continued. For the
first time in Croatian history, these exiles resorted to methods of political
terror as a logical consequence of the forced incorporation of Croatia, a
country with deep-rooted Western traditions, into a predominantly Balkan state.
With the death of dictator Alexander I Karageorgevich,
the divisions among Croatian opposition groups deepened. The nationalist
faction advocated for the unconditional severing of all state ties between
Serbia and Croatia, while the Croatian Peasant Party favored a compromise,
albeit a provisional one. The result of these conciliatory efforts was the Agreement
(Sporazum, in Croatian), stipulated in 1939 on the
eve of the war, by the Croatian Peasant Party and the Yugoslav government,
backed by the Regency or, more accurately, by Prince Paul of the Serbian Karageorgevich dynasty. Croatia obtained a restricted,
provisional autonomy over a fragmented territory.
Jareb, sharing
nationalist viewpoints, criticizes this policy of compromise, analyzing in
detail Macek's internal management and his
participation in the government between 1930 and 1941. However, he omits
analyzing the decisive events that led Yugoslavia to adhere to the Tripartite
Pact in March 1941, an act that motivated the coup d'état, organized by a group
of high-ranking Serbian officers, supported and instigated by the traditional
Serbian parties whose primary objective was the elimination of the restricted
autonomy granted to Croatia. The Serbs tried to portray the Croatian democratic
representatives to the Allies as collaborators with Fascist Italy and the Third
Reich. Dr. Macek, in his aforementioned work,
attempted to rectify the false information disseminated by Serbian politicians
during the war. In 1941, the Croatian nationalist opposition took advantage of
the aforementioned coup and the swift disintegration of Yugoslavia, proclaimed
Croatia's independence, and seized power.
The new government was recognized by the Axis powers and remained in
power until the end of the war. Jareb, who operated
within the nationalist ranks, criticizes Dr. Macek
for sharing the propaganda narrative that, during the war, fostered the
illusion of a unified Yugoslavia and labeled Croatian nationalists as quislings
and collaborators. The author observed that the restoration of Croatian
independence reflected the will of the people and believes that, despite the unfavorable
external situation that dictated a degree of accommodation with the
all-powerful Third Reich, the opportunity presented had to be seized.
Jareb extensively
addresses the problems related to the proclamation and organization of the
Independent State of Croatia, pointing out the errors and omissions committed
by the regime of Dr. Ante Pavelić. In his
opinion, Pavelić's fundamental error was his
inaction and his failure to allow others to take the necessary steps at the
crucial moment to sever Croatia's ties with the Third Reich and to find a way
for the Croatian army to collaborate with the Allied forces, at least after
Italy's capitulation. Jareb emphasizes that Croatian
nationalists, especially the younger intellectual generation, did not follow Pavelić as a political ideologue but rather fought for
and advocated the restoration and consolidation of the Croatian nation-state.
He critically examines the still incomplete data concerning the failed
coup attempt in Croatia in the summer of 1944, whose objective was to align
with the Western Allies. He meticulously details the relationship between Pavelić and Fascist Italy, and his assessment of Pavelić's attitude is negative. In the final chapter,
he advocates for united action by all Croatian exiles and condemns the
discrimination against those who fought for their nation-state during the war.
In this regard, when referring to the situation in postwar Croatia, he
criticizes the Croatian communists for accepting the Serbian program to restore
Yugoslavia, which had disintegrated in 1941, instead of maintaining the
Croatian nation-state, albeit under a communist regime.
He defines federalism, invoked by the Yugoslav communists, as a mere
disguise for Serbian domination. Nevertheless, he makes a concession to the
communists, which in our opinion is unjustified, as if they had safeguarded
Croatian interests on the Adriatic coast and given impetus to the country's
industrialization.
Jareb's method is analytical-critical, consistent with that prevalent in North
American political and historical science. While his basic position stems from
nationalism, his exposition and evaluation of historical events is far from
being political propaganda. His copiously documented book aspires to serve the
truth and, therefore, his people. The documentation is not complete, due to the
unavailability of many documents and because the author attributes greater
value to certain data and information than they possess.
In short, his work is a serious attempt to examine, with critical and
scientific method, the events that have occurred in contemporary Croatian
politics. The author himself emphasizes that these are not definitive
conclusions. Jareb's book may be useful for
foreigners interested in political and national relations in Yugoslavia, until
a similar work appears in a global language, as it refutes, with arguments and
readily available documents, so many falsehoods regarding the Croatian struggle
for self-determination and national freedom, disseminated by Yugoslav
propaganda both before and during the war, as well as now.
Ivo Bogdan, Buenos Aires.
[1]
Estimación efectuada según los mismos cocientes que para el ingreso nacional.
De acuerdo a ciertos datos - Vinski, Stajic en la Reseña Trimestral de la economía de
Yugoeslavia, IV, 1964 - puede estimarse que la participación de la agricultura
en el ingreso nacional de preguerra para el determinado territorio de Croacia
alcanzaba a cerca del 40%.