STUDIA CROATICA
Year II, Buenos Aires, 1961, No. 3-4
Studia Croatica 1
SYMPTOMATIC COINCIDENCES BETWEEN CASTROISM AND TITOISM 2
THE CONTEMPORARY CHAPTER OF THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 17
AGRARIAN POLICY IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA 19
TWO POEMS 31
HUNGARIAN-CROATIAN RELATIONS AFTER 1918 33
EXILED CROATIAN PAINTERS AND SCULPTORS 42
NATIONAL PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 47
ON THE NATIONALITY OF MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 67
CROATIAN BIBLICAL TRADITIONS 74
THREE MEDITATIONS ON THE COMMUNISM 77
MARITIME NAVIGATION AND CROATIAN MARITIME TRADE 86
DOCUMENTS 95
DETAINEES AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN YUGOSLAVIA 95
CHRONICLES AND COMMENTARIES 105
EXPLOITATION OF CROATIA FOR THE BENEFIT OF SERVIA 105
FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND THE HOLY SEE TO REACH A
MODUS VIVENDI 109
MINIMUM WAGES AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA 111
"THE CROATS AND AUSTRIA" - THE OPINION OF A SERIAN POLITICIAN
113
THE FORCED REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES IN ITALY AND AUSTRIA 115
ERNEST PEZET, COMMANDER OF THE LEGION OF HONOR 118
BOOK REVIEW 119
The official invitation extended to the Yugoslav
communist dictator to visit Brazil this year, and the unconfirmed reports that
Tito might be an official guest on this occasion, along with representatives
from other Latin American countries, cannot be interpreted as a mere act of
international courtesy related to efforts to secure new markets and unrelated
to the Cold War and the Cuban crisis. Above all, such an interpretation is
untenable given the evident shift of the Cuban revolution towards communism.
It is true that the Yugoslav dictator's visit to
Brazil was arranged before the Cuban problem intensified and the situation in
Berlin worsened. This, along with other recent events, proves that the Soviets
conceive of the policy of "peaceful coexistence" as an effective form
of the Cold War, and that until recently the much-lauded "spirit of
Geneva" and "of Camp David" constituted one of those dangerous
illusions of the West that made possible the expansion of the Soviet empire in
Europe and Asia, its penetration into Africa, and its threatening emergence in
the Western Hemisphere.
The expansion of the Cold War to all continents
confirms in retrospect that those who, with surprise and displeasure, learned
that a government of conservative origin and Western and Christian orientation
was preparing to pay official honors, at this moment, to a odious communist
dictator were right.
While foreign observers struggle to understand
Brazil's hesitation regarding the Cuban crisis, given the potentially
unpleasant repercussions for pro-communists in Brazil's economically
underdeveloped Northeast, free international opinion, and even President Jânio
Quadros's own supporters, wonder what interest Brazil could possibly have, in
the current situation, in offering hospitality to one of the most prominent
figures of world communism.
How can one ignore the displeasure of the Catholic
hierarchy, which knows that Brazil, as the world's largest Catholic country,
cannot help but sympathize with the "Church of Silence"? The Cardinal
of Rio de Janeiro declared that Tito's arrival would be a day of mourning and
that Catholics should not grace his visit with their presence, as he is one of
the most vicious persecutors of Catholics.
TERROR AND COMMUNIST CONTROL IN CUBA
The arranged visit of the Yugoslav dictator to Brazil
reveals itself as one of the symptoms of insecurity, imprecision, and
contradiction in the criteria and procedures of political actors and, to some
extent, of public opinion in certain South American countries in the face of
the coordinated tactics of international communism, that is, Soviet
imperialism. The culmination of this shock is the reaction provoked by the
degeneration of the Cuban revolution.
The evolution of events in Cuba took not only the
Latin American public by surprise but, to a great extent, the United States,
which bears the greatest burden and responsibility for defending the free world
from the communist threat. Therefore, more appropriate reactions and, above
all, more effective preventive measures could have been expected.
This surprise is not only the result of the
deep-seated conviction that the Americas, due to their geographical distance,
are beyond the reach of direct Soviet intervention, but also stems from a lack
of understanding of the true nature and insidious methods of communist
subversive action. The Soviet strategy in its struggle for world domination is
based primarily on concealing its true objectives, on sowing confusion and
discord, both among its declared adversaries and its most immediate victim.
The Cuban Revolution should have been a painful
undertaking aimed at the political and social cleansing of a young American
nation that knows how to value dignity and freedom and fight for them. Its
takeover by the communists was not inevitable, since the vast majority of Cuban
revolutionaries and their sympathizers reject communism. If it did occur, it
can be attributed to the atmosphere of liberal optimism, typically American,
and to a deeply rooted faith in human goodness.
Because of this mentality, even among those who openly
oppose communism, there is a tendency to perceive it as a form of the extreme
left. According to this mentality, the Soviet Union would be one of the great
powers and nothing more. If it is exporting communism and maintaining inhumane
living conditions within its empire, they benevolently attribute this to
revolutionary excesses and the historical conditions of Russian development.
Instead of offering vigorous resistance, they place their hope in a spontaneous
and inevitable evolution of Bolshevism toward democracy, since the aspiration
for freedom, inherent in human beings, must necessarily prevail.
Without further reservations, they project the
circumstances and mentality of Western society onto a completely different area
of political and social development, where humanist traditions are
conspicuously absent, into a world hermetically sealed by the Iron Curtain and
inaccessible to the liberal and democratic ideas of the West.
The failure of the "invasion" of Cuba to
overthrow the current tyranny becomes understandable when one considers that it
was all planned within that optimistic climate regarding the inherently
perfidious communist system. It was reasonable to assume that Castro's current
adversaries, his former collaborators, in deciding on heroic action to liberate
their homeland from communist oppression and all of America from a latent
danger, proceeded with a thorough understanding of their enemy's strengths and
weaknesses.
The same could be assumed of their collaborators in
the American intelligence agency, specialized in methods of combating
communism. However, neither group took into account how oppressive the moral
and physical terror exerted by a communist government on its unfortunate
subjects truly was. Ignoring this fundamental fact, they organized the
invasion, certain that it would produce a spontaneous uprising in the country.
Furthermore, the communists were able to learn of it
in advance and take all necessary repressive measures. The tragic outcome,
therefore, is not only the consequence of political and technical errors but,
first and foremost, the result of underestimating a dangerous and treacherous enemy.
Those who conceive of political struggle as fair play
tend to be skeptical of anti-communist refugees, even though they offer them
moral and material support. They expect the refugees to accept their defeat,
even though it is known and understood that communists never play fair.
In this regard, the experiences of our acquaintances
are revealing. They had long warned the prominent leaders of the Cuban
revolution of the serious danger of being taken over by the communists. These
warnings were dismissed as expressions of pessimism and resentment from
anti-communist exiles.
However, they acquired their significance when these
Cuban revolutionaries themselves became political exiles. Even then, they
failed to grasp that what happened in Cuba—the communist takeover of a
revolution with democratic aspirations—was neither the first nor the last
instance. Instead of understanding that those who had experienced communist
methods could foresee the communists' plans in Cuba, they were interested in
knowing where they obtained such confidential information about the designs of
Fidel Castro and his communist cronies.
DISGUISES OF AGENTS OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM
The same danger faced by the democratically oriented
Cuban revolutionaries and their North American friends is present in all Latin
America for those who ignore the subversive nature of communism. While the
Cuban revolutionaries were preoccupied with the struggle and praised the
contribution of the communist guerrillas for their effectiveness and
outspokenness, they failed to realize that these were carefully selected
activists who coldly and premeditatedly executed with meticulous care a planned
program, developed at the headquarters of the world communist revolution,
conceived based on experiences gathered in hundreds and hundreds of
revolutionary actions.
They did not realize that these individuals were part
of a vast and ruthless apparatus, backed by the immense Soviet empire, which
places all its enormous power and influence at the disposal of world communist
subversion. The greatest danger of communism lies in the fact that, while it
advances using the methods of psychological warfare and revolutionary activism,
it does not operate openly. It disguises itself in a way that is usually the
polar opposite of the political and social system it intends to implement.
In countries where it mobilizes the masses against
dictatorship, communism presents itself as the most consistent and authentic
champion of democratic rights and freedoms. In reality, its objective is to replace
one dictatorship with another.
In communist countries, free trade unionism does not
exist; strikes are considered a crime of high treason. Yet, the Soviet fifth
column in free countries is the loudest advocate of free trade unionism and the
unrestricted right to strike. They demand the systematic expropriation of land,
without any compensation to its rightful owners.
The land should belong to those who work it, the
communists argue, but, once in power, they nationalize it, and the land becomes
the property of the omnipotent state. Invoking democratic freedoms, they
imperatively demand that the broadest democratic rights be granted to communist
subversion groups, while under communist governments all expressions of free
thought, political activity, and even the most lenient criticism are prosecuted
as crimes against the people. Political activity is permitted only to the
communist party, under the absolute control of its "infallible"
leadership.
Supporters of dialectical materialism, ideological
enemies and persecutors of religion, the communists, whenever they deem it
convenient, present themselves as defenders of religious traditions in the
Afro-Asian sphere to counteract the influence of Christian countries.
As exponents of Soviet and Chinese colonial
imperialism, the communists present themselves as the most tenacious champions
of anti-colonialism. But the proletarian internationalism they advocate is
nothing but a disguise for aggressive expansionism. They are tireless in
defending Black people in free countries, but when it suits the Soviets, they
incite xenophobic and racist sentiments. They fight for the right to
self-determination when it can morally damage their adversary, yet they deny
the same right to millions upon millions of human beings.
While they monitor governments in various satellite
states, they categorically uphold the right to absolute sovereignty without
foreign interference, with the sole aim of allowing the governments imposed by
force in countries under communist rule to practice repressive and dictatorial
policies without hindrance.
They invest vast sums of money in pacifist propaganda
while simultaneously accusing democratic countries of militarism. All of this
is nothing more than a smokescreen behind which the expansionist power of the
Red Army is concealed. It can be taken as a general rule that whenever
communists present themselves in their supposed role as defenders of democratic
and national rights, their purpose is to deceive and co-opt those who
collaborate with them.
In the first phase of the Bolshevik revolution, the
declared Soviet agents inciting subversion and revolution were less dangerous
than later, when large Soviet diplomatic and commercial delegations appeared in
the capitals of the free world and participated in debates in international
organizations.
When they suggested to the West that peaceful
coexistence was feasible and that explosive Bolshevism was evolving into
democratic socialism, they were, in fact, carrying out a gigantic plan of
infiltration involving hundreds of thousands of agents, more dangerous than
divisions of the Red Army.
CONQUESTS WITHOUT WAR
Two decades later, Soviet expansionism reached a scale
that even the most hardened pessimists in the West could not have imagined.
However, the Soviet victories and conquests on the one hand, and the defeats
and setbacks of the free world on the other, were not achieved in victorious
battles of the Russian Empire, but rather through communist conspiracy.
Communism skillfully exploits the fact that its
adversaries are unaware of its true nature and ignorant of the internal
situation of the communist empire. It primarily exploits the national and class
antagonisms that are a consequence of the contemporary social crisis. With
these means, and without resorting to open warfare, the Soviets managed to
subjugate and militarily control a number of the old European nations, more
advanced than Russia itself, and where, after fifteen years of red rule, there
are relatively fewer communists than in some free countries.
The communist methods of conquest were calculated to
exploit with the greatest success the internal conflicts of the world they call
capitalist. Despite their claims to the contrary, they made no distinction
regarding the ideological blocs of non-communist countries.
With the end of the period of anti-fascist popular
fronts, the Soviets abruptly signed, in 1959, the pact with the Third Reich, so
necessary for Hitler to concentrate all his military might against France and
England. The Soviets enabled the Third Reich to wage war, since with the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact they were able to virtually reintegrate the Baltic
states into the Russian Empire, partition Poland, and annex the Romanian
provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina.
When, later, attacked by the Third Reich, the Soviets,
due to a confluence of circumstances, became allies of Great Britain and the
United States and, as such, were obliged to adhere to the principles contained
in the Atlantic Treaty—one of the foundational documents of international
ethics—they did so without hesitation. However, they did not for a moment
renounce their program of conquest and expansion, taking advantage of the
fratricidal and suicidal conflict of the Western nations.
They dissolved the Comintern solely to be able to use
communist fifth columns more effectively for imperialist ends. Something
similar happened to Western statesmen, and especially to Americans, while they
were laying the foundations for the future world order during the last war, as
happened to the democratically oriented Cuban revolutionaries with their
communist comrades.
In the heat of battle, the foundations for future
peace were drawn up assuming that the Soviet Union was an acceptable partner in
achieving the proposed objectives. The war is over, but peace—true peace,
defined by St. Augustine as tranquilitas ordinis—so longed for by a troubled
humanity, has not been established. The threat of an exterminating atomic war
or of global communist domination looms over the world.
The limited effectiveness of the UN, which was founded
to safeguard collective security, the failure of the policy of peaceful
coexistence, and the turbulent state of the world are all primary consequences
of the grave error of believing that fruitful international cooperation between
powers or blocs of powers, guided by opposing political philosophies, was
feasible.
In the UN, based on principles rejected by the
communists, the Soviets, who were its co-founders, participate with the aim of
undermining this global organization. There can be no peace in the world until
communist governments and some neutralist governments accept the fundamental
principles of natural law and morality as the unshakeable foundation of
international organization.
Until then, the policy of peaceful coexistence can be
nothing more than a truce that will transform into outright war the moment the
communists, through subversion and psychological warfare, manage to dominate
the Afro-Asian region, thus encircling Western Europe, and then, entrenched in
South America, isolate the United States, their most feared adversary, which
they will then attack with the prospect of final victory.
There is no doubt that domination over the United
States and Western Europe constitutes the ultimate objective of Soviet strategy
on its path to world conquest, but the first victims will be those Afro-Asian
and South American countries that prove incapable of containing Soviet
penetration and aggression with their own means, rejecting the support of
Western powers and lending a complacent ear to the seductive voices of
neutralist propaganda. The communists try to convince them that they run no
risk whatsoever if they directly or indirectly obstruct measures of common
defense.
COEXISTENCE, NON-INTERVENTION, AND NEUTRALISM:
INSTRUMENTS OF CONQUEST
The policy of peaceful coexistence—which the
proponents of ideological neutrality, of the famous Third Position, take as
justification for their stance—is conceived by the Soviets as an obligation of
the Western powers to respect the political and territorial status quo.
This implies not only the de facto recognition of the
situation imposed by Soviet imperialism on a number of countries incorporated
into that empire, but also its definitive acceptance. The Western powers should
not only refrain from any action aimed at liberating the subjugated countries,
but should even renounce issuing statements and criticisms of the created
situation. If they proceeded otherwise, this would imply a violation of the
principle of coexistence and would endanger world peace.
On the other hand, the Soviets have the right to
impose communist governments through subversive actions in countries
experiencing internal tensions. In this way, and gradually, they reverse the
balance of power in their favor. Furthermore, under the guise of democratic
freedoms, they claim the right to censor and criticize all aspects of life in
free countries.
They call the imposition of communist governments
"liberation," while simultaneously condemning any attempt to establish
democratic freedoms in countries under the communist yoke as a sinister work of
international reaction, monopoly capitalism, and Western imperialism.
Likewise, they give a one-sided interpretation to the
principles of international coexistence, namely national sovereignty and
non-intervention, the right to political and national self-determination, and
even the right to neutrality.
They disseminate and emphasize these principles to
such an extent that they become political taboos for all peoples, except those
within the communist bloc. The peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellite
states have no possibility of opposing communist imperialism.
Even in multinational communist countries like
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the invocation of the right to national
self-determination by Slovaks, Croats, Macedonians, and Slovenes is judged and
prosecuted as high treason, while at the same time the independence of the most
underdeveloped African territories is vigorously demanded.
While the Russians and Chinese monitor the politics of
their militarily occupied satellite states and intervene with weapons in Korea,
Hungary, Tibet, Laos, and elsewhere, and while they interfere in the politics
of free countries through the communist parties they control and finance—parties
that the Belgian politician H. P. Spaak described as a civilian militia, so
dangerous that Nazi fifth columns were harmless Boy Scouts in comparison—they
simultaneously denounce the UN's actions in the Congo as an armed intervention
by Western imperialism.
The Soviets invoke only the principle of
non-intervention, derived from the concept of absolute sovereignty, to prevent
any aid to peoples subjected to the communist yoke, who yearn to exercise their
right to self-determination, and above all to undermine existing international
institutions and the creation of new ones whose purpose is to guarantee and
enable the right to self-determination and protect fundamental political and
human rights. With this, they seek to close the only path that leads to true
peace with justice and freedom for all people and all nations.
Neutralism, which as a concept and political practice
is completely foreign to the communist world, is interpreted with the same aim.
It is inherent to monolithic Eastern empires not to recognize the right to
neutrality, unless forced to do so. For the Soviets, the normal form of
coexistence with weaker neighbors is satellite subjugation, doubly ensured by
the imposition of the communist minority government and by military occupation.
Neutrality is only acceptable in countries that the communists fail to
dominate. In the opposite situation, that neutrality will never be respected.
Therefore, communists conceive of and propagate
neutrality only as a form of the Cold War, as an instrument of corrosion and
isolation, both in the member countries of the Western bloc and in the
so-called neutral countries that exist as independent nations only because the
balance of power is still in favor of the democratic world. From the moment
that balance shifts in favor of the communist bloc, neutral countries would
lose their internal and external independence.
IDEOLOGICAL NEUTRALISM AND LATIN AMERICA
Only the Western world conceived of the neutral policy
of small countries as a piece in the balance of power. Neutrality, conceived as
a measure to protect small countries during conflicts between large powers, can
be beneficial and justified. But neutrality is ineffective if it is not
recognized and respected by the powers in conflict.
However, when not only economic interests but also the
highest principles of social coexistence are at stake, the policy of neutrality
cannot be conceived in terms of national egoism. Neutrality, therefore, is not
possible between two opposing ideological blocs: the bloc of free countries and
the communist bloc.
During the last war, Switzerland was not ideologically
neutral and, under extremely difficult circumstances, demonstrated its
unequivocal democratic orientation.
The third position today, on the other hand, entails
indifference and even repulsion with respect to democratic principles and
institutions. The supposed equidistant position adopted by certain Latin
American countries between the Soviets, who disregard the sound principles of
international coexistence because they aspire to world domination, and the
democratic powers, which, due to their military and economic might, bear the
primary burden and responsibility for the defense of the free world, including
neutral countries, is both absurd and an abdication of responsibility and duty,
so detrimental to all.
The misgivings of certain countries regarding the
potentially excessive influence of the great powers, systematically exploited
by the communists, can be understood, but they do not justify the demagogic
steps of certain proponents of the Third Position.
The countries that until now have maintained a correct
stance toward communism, controlling its subversive actions and refusing to
establish diplomatic and commercial relations with communist governments,
cannot justify an abrupt change in their policy by invoking the example of the
great democratic powers. There is no doubt that those powers made mistakes that
proved disastrous for everyone.
As stated, the policy of these powers during the last
war was based on the mistaken premise that the Soviets, their circumstantial
allies, could loyally cooperate in securing world peace. The interests of the
peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, victims of the Soviet occupation, were
sacrificed to this illusion. This illusion lies at the root of the subsequent
negative political process, including recent events in Cuba.
If the statesmen of the great powers exchange visits
with Khrushchev, trade with Russia and China, provide abundant aid to communist
Yugoslavia, and pay sovereign honors in London and Paris to an obscure Balkan
communist dictator, this does not mean that other countries should imitate
them. By not acting as they do, they would demonstrate their independence and
protect their people from the dangers of diplomatic, commercial, cultural, and
technical exchange with communist governments. It is well known that communists
exploit these relationships for infiltration purposes, while the political and
economic benefits that democratic countries might obtain are highly problematic.
The fact that certain South American countries deemed
it appropriate to sever relations with some communist countries, and that
others had to request restrictions on the growing number of diplomatic agents
from countries behind the Iron Curtain, indicates that the dangers of communist
infiltration are real.
The problem of diplomatic and commercial relations
between communist governments and countries where there is a danger of
subversive communist interference must be addressed differently than in the
case of the great powers.
Western and Christian-oriented countries should not
imitate those Afro-Asian governments that do not consider themselves obligated
to defend human values and the principles of international
coexistence, which are the fruit of our Western civilization.
It would be illusory to expect ideological
identification with the West from recently emancipated colonial countries that,
due to their specific development, have not been able to establish
Western-style democratic regimes. While in the Cold War era every step taken in
international politics benefits or harms one bloc or the other, making true
neutrality impossible, the neutralist illusions of countries outside the sphere
of Western culture can be understood.
For them, the Soviet Union represents the attractive
example of a formerly underdeveloped power that, by adopting Western
technology, managed to build a powerful industry without the direct involvement
of foreign technicians, entrepreneurs, and capital. Where man is a mere
instrument of state power and where the sacrifices demanded to achieve economic
development are deemed insignificant, such reactions are conceivable. However,
the problem is reversed in developing countries within Western society, and
therefore they have an obligation to resort to humane methods and to share
ideals and interests of solidarity in the face of a common threat.
"The limited effectiveness of international
organizations dedicated to collective security, the safeguarding of peace, and
human rights does not preclude us from taking advantage of their potential.
Constructive criticism of these international organizations is always
beneficial and desirable, and proposals that promote their improvement are
plausible, especially since communist countries do everything possible to save
them and create tense and turbulent situations in a divided world, conducive to
their designs of conquest.
Indeed, it is difficult to make universal
organizations in which communist governments participate effective. However,
this should not prevent nations with a Western cultural background from
coordinating their actions on all the major issues of international politics
and striving to promote, at least, regional institutions that would operate
within the framework of solidarity and according to the principles of the same
civilization they comprise.
Recently, a step forward has been taken in this
regard. Certain European institutions already operate on the supranational
principle. Similar reasons and aspirations exist in the Western Hemisphere. The
OAS has all the conditions to become such an organization." The effective
governance of free nations that share identical principles of
self-determination and freedom, national sovereignty, and democratic rights,
which are not in conflict as the communists claim.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the Cuban
communist government insists that its relations with neighboring countries be
discussed not within the OAS but before the UN. They maintain that the UN is a
universal body and that the United States' influence within it is less, and
therefore its decisions are more impartial than in the OAS. Castro avoids the
Organization of American States because it reflects the shared views of its
member countries, while the United Nations lacks this attribute.
For this reason, any debate on the Cuban crisis before
the UN is necessarily fruitless due to the incompatibility of political
philosophies and the right of veto. In contrast, at the OAS, Castro can expect
a resounding condemnation, since the American countries cannot share the
communist interpretation of the right to self-determination and
non-interference.
Therefore, the rights The sovereign rights of Latin
American countries are not protected by a neutral stance that, politically and
ideologically, implies a betrayal of their own interests and ideals. The
national interests and sovereign rights of the American peoples will find their
most effective protection within strengthened regional institutions, which will
also guarantee individual rights and freedoms.
TITO ALSO FOUGHT "ONLY FOR NATIONAL
LIBERATION"
In Latin America, there is already unanimity of
opinion when it comes to defending the continent from Soviet interference.
Certain disagreements arose because the Cuban government tries to hide and
cover up its ideological ties with the Soviets. However, it is only a matter of
time before Latin American countries unanimously consider the communist nature
of the Cuban government. Those who had the unfortunate opportunity to witness
the establishment and consolidation of people's democracies and socialist
regimes in Central European countries have no doubt about it.
In support of the argument that a pro-Soviet
government was not established in Cuba, the case of communist Yugoslavia was
also cited. It is argued that despite the communist regime, Yugoslavia cannot
be considered a Soviet exponent, since it pursues an independent foreign
policy. Cuba, by analogy, even if it exhibited all the common traits of
communist regimes, would pose no danger to the American continent until it is
proven to be a Soviet satellite.
Perfect analogies do not exist, nor can they exist, in
the historical development of such different countries. Therefore, in the case
of Cuba, due to its geographical location in the Western Hemisphere, far from
the Soviet Union, the same satellite dependence seen in countries bordering
Russia cannot be expected. Even so, there are symptomatic similarities between
Cuban and Yugoslav communism in terms of their methods of seizing power.
Although in dissimilar circumstances, both Tito and
Castro took control of the government as leaders of the victorious guerrilla
forces. Although a minority, the communists in both countries oversaw the
guerrilla actions and participated in the struggle with the sole aim of
establishing a communist dictatorship.
At the same time, they categorically affirmed that
they were fighting the existing dictatorship and struggling for the
establishment of broad democratic rights and freedoms. They did not deny their
participation in the struggle, but argued that their objective was identical to
that of the democratic combatants who constituted the majority.
The communists would be content as long as they could
act freely like the other parties once the conflict was over. They were
fighting for national independence just like other patriotic groups. Several
statements by Yugoslav communist leaders during the war reflect this sentiment.
Josip Broz Tito declared at the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of
the Peoples of Yugoslavia—a body that assumed the role of a provisional
parliament, composed of representatives of varying political persuasions—held
on November 29, 1943:
"We have been slandered and continue to be
slandered everywhere, according to a pre-established plan. All the occupiers,
all the 'Quislings'—the sellouts, the Ustaše, Nedic's men, Draža
Mihailović's Chetniks within the country and their masters abroad—said and
continue to say that our struggle for the national liberation of Yugoslavia is
a purely communist affair: the Bolshevikization of the country, communist
attempts to seize the government, the abolition of private property, the
annihilation of the Church and religion, the destruction of culture, and so on.
These slanders are old and worn out. They originated
in Goebbels's kitchen and have now become a uniform argument that Goebbels's
coreligionists are instilling in the minds of the population of 'new Europe'
and trying to export beyond Europe. However, few still believe these lies, and
least of all the people of Yugoslavia." Our struggle for existence is too
bloody and costly, and the suffering of our people too great, for anyone to be
able to divert them from the path of that great and glorious struggle for
independence, for a better and happier future, with such hackneyed calumnies.
Those days are long gone when a handful of
reactionaries, sometimes successfully, attributed such things and designs to
the Yugoslav communists in order to isolate them from the people...." [1].
On the international stage, Tito played the same
cards. In this way, he even managed to win over Winston Churchill at their
meeting in Bari in 1944. These maneuvers earned the Yugoslav communists
considerable aid from the Allies.
Once installed in government and protected by the
Soviet Union, the Yugoslav communists continued to disguise themselves, and to
that end, they also included the right to private property in the new
constitution, promulgated in 1946. At the same time, and using all available
means, they confiscated property, applying severe punishments to thousands upon
thousands of honest, uncommitted people to strip them of all their possessions.
This systematic concealment of the true objective and
the authentic nature of their political actions was necessary for the Yugoslav
communists to gain the sympathies of the masses and dampen the momentum of the
anti-communist opposition. It goes without saying that the communists
constituted an insignificant minority, barely a few thousand activists in a
country of over 15 million inhabitants.
The guerrilla war they unleashed was only possible
because they exploited the deep-seated national antagonisms latent within the
multinational Yugoslav state. In this way, they secured the support of the
Serbian masses, especially the younger generation, by presenting themselves as
the only ones who could restore the Yugoslav state, which had disintegrated in
1941, in which Serbs would once again be the dominant force. The supposed
struggle against the occupier was a mere pretext, as it was clear that the
final outcome of the war did not depend on the Balkan guerrillas.
To appease the Western allies, who had given refuge to
the Yugoslav monarchist government, and to eliminate the opposing Serbian
nationalist guerrillas, led by General Mihailovic, who was also the Minister of
War for the Yugoslav government in exile, the communists disguised their
intentions by formally accepting several political compromises. They demanded
only that the new Yugoslavia not form a new anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire.
Similarly, Fidel Castro sought to persuade Latin
America that he was fighting solely for democratic freedoms and the social
progress of the Cuban people. If he confronted the United States and received
moral and material support from the communist bloc, it could be attributed
solely to his uncompromising struggle against capitalist monopoly and Yankee
imperialism.
Winston Churchill, known for his political acumen,
later declared, regrettably, that the biggest mistake he had made was
supporting Tito. This case is particularly relevant for politicians who wish to
learn from the experiences of others.
Under the Yalta agreements, Yugoslavia was within the
sphere of influence of both Russia and the Western Allies. Once the war ended,
the people were to decide, through free elections, on the regime to be established.
The communists were so subservient that they agreed to allow the Regency to
appoint a provisional government, composed even of representatives from the
ranks of the parties that, before the war, had outlawed the communist party.
Meanwhile, as in Cuba, they exercised exclusive
control over the army and established a feared political police force, taking a
series of measures aimed at curtailing the right to self-determination and
rigging the elections—measures diametrically opposed to what they had claimed
and promised. By acting in a plurinational state, they also denied the right of
Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and numerous minorities to freely decide their
destiny, although, as a smokescreen, in the 1946 constitution they also
recognized the right of separation of each people that made up Yugoslavia.
What happened in Cuba after Castro seized power—mass
persecutions and executions, extermination of political leaders from democratic
parties, summary trials, sentences handed down by people's courts without the
right to a defense, suppression of political parties and freedom of the press,
persecution of religion, suppression of trade union freedom, a sham agrarian
reform tending toward nationalization, confiscation of businesses and property,
denial of free elections, relentless police terror, popular militias, mass
exodus, etc.—is a faithful replica of what happened in Yugoslavia when Tito and
his cronies came to power.
All of this unfolded with an analogous pattern. It is
necessary to point out the support provided by Western governments in light of
the claims that Cuban communists would have treated the United States amicably
had they continued to receive its moral and material support, even after the
communist nature of Fidel Castro's regime was proven. These hypotheses go so
far as to argue that Castro's orientation would have been democratic had his
firing squad policy been approved.
ALLEGED YUGOSLAVIC AND CUBAN NEUTRALISM
As an argument against intervention in Cuba, the case
of Yugoslavia is cited—a communist country, they say, but not an exponent of
Soviet imperialism. Such comparisons—a misleading cliché—lack foundation, if
one considers Yugoslavia's geographical location and its initial, unequivocally
pro-Soviet orientation. The changes occurred four years after the communist
dictatorship was established and under circumstances derived primarily from its
geographical position, circumstances that are not applicable in the case of
Cuba. Moreover, the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow is not ideological in
nature today either.
The reasons that provoked the dispute between Moscow
and Belgrade stemmed from the new course of Soviet foreign policy when Stalin
abandoned the apparent alliance with democratic governments established during
the war. Acting in accordance with the principle of "new policy, new
men," Stalin, with the impassivity typical of Eastern despots, had decided
to eliminate the communist leaders of the satellite states who were
implementing his previous policy of accommodation with Western democracies and
replace them with others, more manageable and docile.
This purge was carried out successfully in all the
satellite states, where Stalin's orders were backed by the occupying Red Army.
It was not implemented in Yugoslavia, which, by virtue of agreements between
the Allies, was not occupied under the pretext of ensuring the right to
self-determination.
The Soviets had to accept this situation, knowing that
the Western powers would not accept a unilateral Soviet occupation and that, in
the event of a multilateral occupation, as planned for Austria and Germany,
those areas occupied by the Western powers could freely choose their form of
government, which would certainly not be communist. It could even be expected
that Croatia, in such a hypothetical scenario, would regain its national
independence to secure Western influence in the Balkans and prevent the Soviet
bloc from gaining access to the Mediterranean.
However, the Yugoslav communists, who had been
installed in Belgrade by the Red Army—which later withdrew from Yugoslav
territory—and consolidated their power with Western aid, were building a
communist system without Russian occupation. When Stalin, with his
characteristic ruthlessness, attempted to implement measures that would have meant
their political and perhaps physical elimination, the Yugoslav communist
leaders had a chance to avert the blow.
Thanks to Western aid and the people's hope of shaking
off the communist yoke, the Yugoslav communist leaders managed to save their
lives and remain in power. They were also successful because Stalin's anathema
was not accompanied by all available repressive measures. In their fight
against the Yugoslav communist rebels, the Soviets were able to successfully
exploit the discontent of the peoples and national minorities subjected to
Serbian domination, the main backbone of the communist dictatorship.
The communist governments of Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Albania were able to successfully organize popular uprisings in the areas
annexed by Serbia. If the Soviets did not resort to such measures, it is very
likely that they feared that this would ultimately benefit the democratic
elements. Otherwise, they did not lose hope that, with the passage of time, the
situation would evolve in their favor and they would be able, without direct
intervention, to dominate the Balkans and reach the borders of Italy.
Despite all the disagreements and disputes with
Moscow, mostly of a personal nature, Yugoslavia remains a communist country.
Its leaders do not renounce communist ideology and consider themselves more
authentic interpreters of Marxism-Leninism than Stalin and Khrushchev.
Furthermore, Moscow was able to verify that Tito was a
very useful instrument for communist penetration, particularly in areas where
direct interference by Soviet diplomats and secret agents was not possible. It
is seriously doubtful that the contacts between Moscow and Belgrade after
Stalin's death were aimed at reintegrating the Yugoslav communist schismatics
into the orthodox communist bloc.
This will not be possible as long as the current
communist leaders govern in Belgrade. It is true that they always appear
willing to integrate, even formally, into the communist bloc, but only on the
condition of remaining in power. However, such a solution contradicts the
traditions of the monolithic empires of Eurasia and would set an undesirable
precedent should the Soviets ever be forced to withdraw their troops from the
Balkan and Central European countries.
For all these reasons, the Yugoslav communist
dictator, who never intended to join the Western bloc, is compelled to seek
political compensation by undertaking political and tourist expeditions to
various Afro-Asian countries, with a preference for those with dictatorial
regimes, which for various reasons do not wish to identify with the democratic
West.
To maintain the illusion of political and ideological
neutrality in the current phase of the Cold War, this political tourism by the
Yugoslav dictator serves the interests of Moscow and Beijing, as he thus serves
their purposes more effectively than if he were a member of the communist bloc.
On the other hand, Yugoslavia is neutral only in
appearance. From an ideological standpoint, it identifies with Soviet
communism. The difference lies solely in the methods employed. Regarding
political action, Yugoslavia's neutrality is theoretical. In international
forums, it votes almost without exception against the Western powers. Its
supposed neutrality was shamelessly demonstrated when, after crushing the
Hungarian rebellion, it handed Imre Tagy over to the Russian occupiers.
It is conducting intense propaganda in Africa
promoting neutrality, given that the African continent now holds many votes in
the UN. These activities are of substantial interest to the Soviet Union at a
time when the Afro-Asian bloc could scupper the majority of Western votes in
that world organization. The Soviets, by using their veto power, can paralyze
the Security Council. Through the neutralists, they hope to counteract the
actions of the General Assembly.
Furthermore, communist Yugoslavia proved to be an
excellent instrument for the ideological penetration of communism. The slogans
about national communism, which the Yugoslav dictator categorically denied,
served to support the thesis that communist interference, such as that in Cuba,
was a result of the internal politics of the respective countries. Using such
slogans, communism disguised as nationalism increasingly and successfully
exploited the emotional reactions of national movements in Asia, Africa, and,
regrettably, in Latin America as well.
The position of Cuba, that is, of Castro, in relation
to Moscow, differed fundamentally from the Yugoslav position due to
geographical distance and Cuba's location on the doorstep of the United States.
The Soviets, therefore, could not and would not benefit from direct control
over the Cuban revolution through Russian armed forces.
Any attempt of this kind would be considered in both
Americas as sufficient reason for a military intervention that the Soviets
could not prevent, unless they wanted to provoke World War III, which is not in
their interest at this time and in Cuba. If they want to provoke war, they can
always do so under more favorable conditions in Europe and Asia. Therefore,
there is no prospect whatsoever of the Soviets taking steps for direct
oversight of the Castro government or for his personal elimination.
I. DECLINE IN THE RURAL POPULATION
The rural population in pre-war Yugoslavia represented
more than three-quarters of the total population. In the 1931 census, that figure reached 76%. [2].
After the war, due to the
country's rapid industrialization, the rural population declined significantly.
Comparing different figures for the rural population is difficult because they
are obtained using different statistical methods and because the definition of
agricultural population is not uniform across all censuses and statistics.
For example, the 1951 census shows that 73% of the
Yugoslav population still depended on agriculture, while more recent data
indicate that this figure fell to 60% in 1953 and to 56% of the total
population in 1958. [3]. According to Vladimir Bakaric's report at the VI
Congress of the League of Communists of Croatia, held at the beginning of April
in Zagreb, the number of the agricultural population in the People's Republic
of Croatia was lower than the average for Yugoslavia and reached 50% of the
total population in 1958 [4].
During the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Federation
of the Working People of Croatia, Bakaric himself announced with great
satisfaction "the disappearance of patriarchal structures in the
countryside" since, according to general statistics, 43% of the population
in Croatia is rural, and according to data from the Social Security Institute,
only 37% of the total population is engaged in agricultural work. [5].
In the Croatian provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this
percentage, due to the lower level of industrialization, is perhaps somewhat
higher than in the so-called People's Republic of Croatia.
Since Croatia was already overpopulated under the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and monarchical Yugoslavia, the reduction of the rural
population due to industrialization is now a natural process. Before the First
World War, the surplus rural population emigrated to overseas countries and
generally did not return. Industrialization and the development of other
sectors of the national economy currently serve not only to raise living
standards but also to employ the surplus rural population in all underdeveloped
countries, regardless of their political system.
Even in the economically advanced countries of Western
Europe, the relatively low percentage of the agricultural population continues
to decline, as industrial development absorbs the surplus labor produced by the
rationalization of agriculture and especially by the improvement of the
agrarian structure.
The decline of the agricultural population would occur
in Croatia and throughout Yugoslavia under a democratic regime as an
unavoidable process. Only the influence of the State and the methods of
economic policy would be different from those of today. The current communist
regime is pursuing industrialization at an accelerated pace and with inhumane
methods. For ideological and prestige reasons, it seeks to transform an
agricultural country into an industrial one overnight.
To carry out this plan, incalculable funds are
squandered without national control or accountability; forced labor is applied,
and most of the income is invested long-term. Thus, the consumption of the
masses, except for the privileged communist class, is unsatisfactory, and the
standard of living remains extremely low. On the other hand, the private
agricultural sector—that is, the majority—is not progressing; rather, it is
being suppressed and taxed to such an extent that large segments of the
agricultural population are abandoning the countryside, moving to the city, and
seeking new employment, which industry cannot always provide.
The agricultural policy of communist Yugoslavia has
frequently modified its initial program, passing through various phases to
date.
I will now briefly outline the development of the
agricultural and peasant policy of communist Yugoslavia to date, highlighting
its main phases and indicating the trends that are emerging for the future. Due
to the breadth of the topic, it is necessary to limit myself to the essentials.
II. AGRARIAN REFORM
For psychological and propaganda reasons, the
communist government of Yugoslavia did not immediately address the problem of
collectivizing peasant lands. Drawing on Soviet experience and eager to gain
the sympathies of a segment of the rural population, the communists initially
implemented agrarian reform under the law of September 23, 1945.
This law confiscated the lands of expelled or murdered
Germans and large estates exceeding 45 hectares, including forests—that is,
properties exceeding 25 to 35 hectares of arable land. In addition, the
possessions of churches and convents, banks, missing persons, and possessions
not belonging to peasants were confiscated.
The fundamental principle of this law was: "The
land belongs to those who work it." Even small properties were confiscated
from political opponents. All the land confiscated by the agrarian reform was
taken without any compensation. This created the rural fund, which comprised
1,560,000 hectares, or 6.8% of the total agricultural land. The aim was not,
therefore, to eliminate large estates, which in reality did not exist in
Yugoslavia, but rather to implement measures against property ownership. A
total of 162,171 landowners were affected by the agrarian reform, which
indicates a tendency toward the elimination of medium-sized landholdings for
political and ideological reasons, and with the desire to destroy the economy
of the majority of independent farmers.
Slightly more than half of the confiscated land (51%)
was distributed between settlers from other regions and local peasants. In this
way, 42,587 families of new settlers, mostly communist guerrillas from
Montenegro, were relocated from the territory of other republics. An additional
23,106 settlers came from the territory of the respective republic. This
colonization, like that which occurred following the first agrarian reform decreed
by the monarchical government after the First World War, bore the unmistakable
mark of Serbian nationalist and imperialist policy. Most of the new settlers
were destined for Vojvodina.
18% of the rural fund created by the agrarian reform
was allocated to state properties, 24% to state forests, and the remainder to
collective farms (kolkhozes), official institutions, and so on.
This reform was primarily political in nature. Before
the war, large estates (latifundia) were very few. Properties larger than 50
hectares constituted 0.4% of all rural properties, or 6.7% of the total
agricultural area. With the 1945 agrarian reform, large estates contributed
only 235,000 hectares to the rural land fund, representing 15% of the
confiscated land. The vast majority of this land, 37,000 hectares, belonging to
Germans, accounted for 41%.[6].
In this phase, the communist government favored the
creation of rural properties for its supporters, justifying this policy with
the supposed desire to maintain agricultural production. Entry into the
kolkhozes was still voluntary and limited to a negligible minority of communist
party members.
The creation of peasant work cooperatives, or
kolkhozes, was sanctioned by the Law on Cooperatives on July 18, 1949, and
supplemented by the Law on Agricultural Cooperatives of June 1, 1949.
Immediately after the war, all sectors of the economy
were nationalized, except for agriculture. Knowing that the peasants would
offer strong resistance and fearing for the food supply, the communist leaders
proceeded cautiously. They first tried to persuade the peasants of the
advantages of the kolkhozes over smallholdings. Since peasants did not
voluntarily join the kolkhozes, compulsory collectivization was decreed in
1948, and its pace accelerated in 1949. With these coercive measures, the
number of kolkhozes rose from 1,318 in 1948 to 6,626.
The peak was reached in 1950, with 6,835 kolkhozes.
The highest number of peasant farms registered in the peasant work cooperatives
(kolkhozes) reached 430,000, or slightly more than one-fifth of all peasant
properties in 1951. The area of the kolkhozes, state farms, and
agricultural cooperatives accounted for 36% of the total agricultural land. In
total, slightly more than one-third of the agricultural land was collectivized
and expropriated.
The collectivization of agriculture accelerated
following the conflict with the Cominform, which began in 1948, as the Yugoslav
communists wanted to prove they were more orthodox than the Russian Bolsheviks.
The authorities encountered fierce resistance, particularly from Croatian
peasants. This resistance manifested itself, first and foremost, in reduced
production, limiting it to their own needs. As a result, the supply dwindled so
much that the non-rural population depended on imports, and the collective
farms failed to meet expectations.
III. DISINTEGRATION OF THE KOLKHOZES IN 1953
As a consequence of the economic crisis and Western
aid, a new phase in agricultural policy began in 1952. The government and the
Communist Party concluded that it was necessary to find new ways to increase
agricultural production. A reorientation of agricultural policy was
implemented, to such an extent that the government, with the decree of March
30, 1953, concerning the ownership and reorganization of peasant labor
cooperatives, allowed peasants to withdraw from these cooperatives.
Peasants began to withdraw en masse from the forcibly
created kolkhozes, and within a few months these peasant labor cooperatives
disappeared. Their number in 1953 was 1,236, and it decreased thereafter. By
the end of 1956, 578 peasant work cooperatives were registered in Yugoslavia,
most of them in Vovodina.
The remaining collective farms (kolkhozes) were
generally composed of members of the Communist Party who had previously been
landless. The state farms of the agricultural cooperatives were not dissolved.
These properties currently constitute the most important part of the
"socialist sector of agriculture." They are favored in every way and
given considerable attention.
To morally strengthen the collectivist principle, a
law was enacted on May 22, 1953, expropriating the land of peasant farms larger
than 10 hectares, ostensibly to prevent the capitalist exploitation of rural
labour. By setting the maximum size limit of 10 hectares for individual peasant
farms, the law effectively reduced production destined for the market.
For the collectivized land, the peasants now receive
compensation, unlike in the 1945 agrarian reform. The confiscated lands were
allocated to kolkhozes, state-owned properties, and various organizations and
institutions. Through this process, 200,000 hectares of peasant land were
expropriated. It was, as can be inferred, a reform of meager proportions,
intended to hinder the development of peasant landowners.
In parallel with the dissolution of the kolkhozes and
the introduction of a more "liberal" economic policy, the compulsory
purchase of agricultural products and the rationing of foodstuffs were
abolished. With these measures, the government began, as early as 1951, to
delay collectivization.
IV. THE SITUATION OF AGRICULTURE AFTER THE FAILURE OF
THE COLD FARMERS
The Yugoslav communist leaders considered granting
greater freedom to the peasants a necessary tactical measure, without having
abandoned their plans to create large socialist estates, the ultimate goal of
the communist party, which they reiterated with complete clarity. The
concessions to the peasants were imposed by the severe food crisis that
threatened the development of other economic sectors.
In enacting these measures, the government expected
increased production on private farms and an improvement in the supply of
foodstuffs. However, continuing its hostile attitude towards the peasants, it
took new measures against private peasant property. With the dissolution of the
collective farms, it is true that they had more freedom to dispose of their
assets and products, but the unfavorable economic and political conditions for
progressive development and increased production persisted, and in some cases
worsened.
By abolishing forced food purchases and dissolving
collective farms (kolkhozes), the communists substantially increased taxes on
peasant income. Prices of essential agricultural products were also raised.
With these anti-peasant measures, the government went so far as to decree a
special tax in 1956 on oxen and all types of vehicles, including peasant carts.
Peasants could not obtain credit from official banks
or credit institutions, which were also controlled by the state. Only the
socialist sector of agriculture could benefit from credit and other advantages,
such as the acquisition of agricultural machinery and implements or other means
of production. Increasing investments were made in nationalized agricultural
properties, the remaining collective farms, and the properties of agricultural
cooperatives.
For these reasons, peasants produced primarily for
their own consumption, severely limiting production for the market. The
consequence was the paralysis, or rather the return, of food production and
agricultural raw materials. Supplying the population became more difficult, and
the shipment of food subsidies from the US increased.
The characteristic sign of the government's neglect of
agriculture is the vast areas of uncultivated land and the ever-increasing
depopulation of purely rural areas. Thus, in 1955, in addition to fallow land,
there were 420,000 hectares of unsown arable land, or 5.7% of the total arable
land in Yugoslavia. These lands belonged to private owners and agricultural
organizations, to which they had been allocated by the rural fund or by the
collectivization decree, and were left completely abandoned.
Every year, the authorities issued new provisions and
regulations concerning the cultivation of these abandoned areas, but without
success. This phenomenon, which arises during a period of acute food scarcity,
is a typical result of the misguided and failed agricultural and economic
policies of the communists. These
uncultivated areas still cover large tracts of land, although they have
decreased somewhat in recent years.
With the dissolution of the collective farms
(kolkhozes) in 1953, the communist leadership of Yugoslavia sought to carry out
the socialist transformation of barter indirectly through general agricultural
cooperatives.
According to statements by leading communist
officials, these cooperatives were intended to be the cornerstone of collective
life in the countryside and an important instrument for increasing collective
agricultural production. On the one hand, it is true that the failure of
collectivization in agriculture was officially acknowledged, without favoring
private farms, which were tolerated only as the lesser evil.
The general agricultural cooperatives were now
required, in addition to buying and selling agricultural products and
everything else the peasants needed, to take on a greater role in agricultural
production. They often owned their own land or leased it and cultivated it at
their own risk; furthermore, they were to coordinate and control production in
the private sector.
These cooperatives possess the necessary machinery and
implements, can lend them to farmers, provide them with advance loans against
their harvest, supply seeds and fertilizer, and offer technical advice. According
to this trend, the cooperative would eventually assume management of the
peasant farm, with the farmer remaining the nominal owner, while the
cooperative would decide on all important matters related to the organization,
production, and exploitation of its property.
Over the years, different forms of cooperation emerged
between the cooperative and the farmers, clearly defining two categories: 1)
The cooperative performs certain tasks on behalf of the farmers for an
agreed-upon sum, with all relations between them ceasing once the agreed-upon
work is completed and paid for. According to communist doctrine, this is a
typically commercial relationship between the cooperative and the farmer, an
inferior and incomplete form of cooperation; 2) Participation in the production
of the peasant farm, in which the cooperative and the peasant work on an equal
footing during the production process, and the harvested products are
distributed according to their share of the labor.
With this form of collaboration, the cooperative tends
to increasingly control and manage the private farm. In the opinion of the
Yugoslav communists, only in this way is it possible to promote and develop the
insufficient production of "incapable" individual farms.
The new agrarian policy of Yugoslavia primarily
supports the second form of cooperation, making it the central focus of all its
efforts.
V. RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND COOPERATIVES IN PERSPECTIVE OF APRIL 27, 1957
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Due to the neglect of the private rural sector,
agricultural production remained low even after the dissolution of the
kolkhozes in 1953. Stagnation and even temporary decline in production lead to
greater difficulties in supplying food to the growing population and raw
materials to industry. The persistently low income in agriculture postpones
industrialization and overall economic development, while increasing imports of
agricultural products create new obstacles for foreign trade.
Thus, increasing agricultural production became the
primary concern of the Yugoslav communist leaders, since the implementation of
various economic, social, and political measures depended on success in this
area. Therefore, the Yugoslav communist leadership decided to adopt new
measures formulated in the Resolution on the Prospective Development of
Agriculture and Cooperatives, proposed by the government and approved without
substantial modifications by the Federal People's Assembly in Belgrade on April
27, 1957.
This resolution set the course and defined
agricultural policy for the following five to seven years. In principle, it
continued the policy initiated after the dissolution of the collective farms in
1953, with the difference that now more substantial funds were being invested
in promoting agriculture, and the methods for achieving the proposed goals were
more clearly defined than before. However, many aspects of this new trend
remained unclear and imprecise.
Both the resolution and the report presented by the
executive branch's representative in the Federal Assembly, Slavko Komar,
highlighted two factors as the main causes of the prevailing unsatisfactory
state of agricultural production: 1) accelerated industrialization coupled with
insufficient investment in agriculture; 2) the backwardness of peasant farms
and their "inability" to drive rural progress. Price policies, the
tax system, and credit are mentioned only in passing and are not considered
significant causes of the observed shortcomings.
The main objective of the new efforts was to intensify
and increase agricultural production as much as possible. The Belgrade
government admitted that this objective could not be achieved through the
collectivization of agriculture and that such experiments would not yield positive
results in the future either.
However, the government refused to promote and
encourage private farming through subsidies, by modifying its price policies,
tax burdens, and credit, by improving the soil, eliminating the fragmentation
of peasant landholdings, etc., as certain circles advised, since, in the
opinion of the communist leaders, the proposed objective could not be achieved
by this means either.
The communists argued that this would facilitate the
capitalist development of agriculture and preserve the backward agrarian
structure of smallholdings. Therefore, the pillars and driving forces of rural
modernization should be socialist agricultural cooperatives and socialist
agricultural enterprises (state lands, properties of agricultural cooperatives,
and peasant worker cooperatives). The greatest importance was attributed to
collaboration between the general agricultural cooperative and the individual
producer. The cooperative must coordinate the peasants' land and labor with the
collective means of production.
Since, according to this conception, the development
of agriculture and the socialist transformation of the countryside constitute a
single, indivisible process, the general agricultural cooperative is considered
the main engine of progress and labor collectivization in rural areas. Only in
close collaboration and within these agricultural cooperatives can—Marxist
theorists argue—a satisfactory solution be found to the problem of large
investments of social capital in agriculture. This is the fundamental point of
the new agrarian doctrine of Tito's government.
The specific objective of the new agricultural policy
for the next five to seven years is to increase the wheat harvest by 50%, that
is, to achieve an average of 23 quintals per hectare. Total wheat production
should rise to 3.3 million tons in the same period. The corn yield per hectare
should increase from 14 to 30 quintals. Livestock production should increase by
50%.
Furthermore, a considerable increase in the production
of industrial plants, fruits, legumes, vegetables, potatoes, etc., was
anticipated. Over the next five years, overall agricultural production was
expected to increase by 30-35% compared to the 1951-55 average. In
predominantly grain-producing areas, the increase was projected to reach 50%,
and on collectivized lands, up to 100%.
To achieve these goals, enormous sums of money had to
be invested, and various technical measures implemented. The plan was, first
and foremost, to complete drainage, canalization, and other soil improvement
works, particularly in Voivodeship. Total investments in agriculture from
social funds were to be twice the amount invested in 1957, which totaled 37
billion dinars.
An average annual investment of 82 billion dinars,
drawn from social funds, was projected for the implementation of the new
agricultural program. The plan also envisioned an increase in tractors from
13,800 units in 1957 to 40,000. The consumption of artificial fertilizers was
projected to reach 2.2 million tons, four times greater than the consumption of
1956. A considerable increase in the production of chemical products for plant
protection was also anticipated, followed by the production of seeds, breeding
animals, and so on.
Some of these objectives, given the actual possibilities,
appear illusory. There is serious doubt that the country's industry is capable
of multiplying tractor manufacturing and artificial fertilizer production in
such a short period.
One of the most important measures within this new
orientation of agricultural policy is the government's decision, made on May
28, 1957, to facilitate the granting of loans to individual rural landowners.
Although loans for individual producers had been previously provided, peasants
practically never obtained them. With the new regulations, peasants could
finally benefit from loans for certain investments and farm improvements.
However, over time, it became clear that, despite the
existing regulations, peasants were unable to take full advantage of the
available loans, which were almost entirely channeled to the socialist sector
of agriculture. All investments, as well as loans, originating from socialized
resources were used in the agricultural sector, which occupies barely one-tenth
of the total land area. The tax system also brought no relief to the private
sector.
In 1957, and especially in 1959, agricultural
production increased, thanks in part to favorable weather conditions, which led
the Belgrade authorities to intensify anti-peasant measures.
Before discussing the new course of action, it is
worth reviewing the wheat harvests in Yugoslavia during recent years, compared
to pre-war production and the country's wheat supply, the most important food
for the vast majority of the population.
VI. WHEAT PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS [7]
|
Year |
Total surface |
Yield per hectare in metric quintals |
Total Production |
Imports |
|
1934/38 |
2.167 |
11,4 |
2.467 |
- |
Despite the erratic course of Yugoslav agricultural
policy, wheat production only reached and surpassed pre-war levels in 1957,
1958, 1959, and 1960. Considering that the average wheat yield in Western
Europe varies between 20 and 40 quintals per hectare, the yield obtained in
Yugoslavia in 1959, a record year, at 19.0 quintals per hectare, and 17.3 in
1960, is relatively low. [8].
Wheat production up to 1959 was insufficient to meet
the population's needs, so Yugoslavia provided its inhabitants with bread only
thanks to US aid. Until 1959, US wheat shipments accounted for half of
Yugoslavia's total bread consumption. This means that the Yugoslav population
would have starved without this assistance. Meanwhile, Western Europe increased
its agricultural production so much after the war that it had surplus food,
despite population growth.. The abundance of agricultural products poses
serious difficulties for democratic countries, while the so-called progressive
order of communist governments is decades behind. All communist countries face
identical difficulties, including Yugoslavia.
The 1959 harvest was the best in postwar Yugoslavia
and, for the first time, enabled the communist government to supply the
population with bread from its own production. Although the yield of 19.0
quintals per hectare is not high compared to Western European countries and
considering the potential for increasing it through modern agricultural
techniques (given the favorable natural conditions, it is quite low), it still
represents progress.
The same applies to corn, which provides exportable
surpluses. The excellent 1959 harvest prompted the Belgrade government to
suspend further wheat imports subsidized by the United States and announce that
it had solved the problem of bread production and supply. Since a large portion
of the wheat fields belonged to the socialist sector of the countryside, more
so than for other major crops, government circles seized upon this circumstance
to emphasize that, from then on, bread supplies would no longer depend on the
private sector, as the socialist sector would soon meet all market demands.
Landowning peasants, therefore, would soon be unnecessary.
With regard to overall agricultural production,
however, the situation is not promising. The state of livestock production,
especially meat, is far from satisfactory. In this sector, as in wheat and
corn, enormous investments are being made aimed at increasing production.
However, even the problem of wheat and bread supply is not definitively
resolved, despite the good harvest of 1959. For propaganda reasons, Tito's
government suspended imports of American wheat before the harvest was in, and
was able to do so because reserves of imported wheat were large.
Yugoslavian wheat production has shortcomings,
currently masked by propaganda disseminated by the communist regime both
domestically and abroad following an exceptional harvest. The communists, eager
to become independent of the small-scale farmers who cultivate most of the
arable land and still constitute the primary source of food, are resorting to
every means to ensure the socialist sector of the countryside has the largest
possible share of market production.
To this end, they are investing all available funds in
acquiring machinery, livestock, and constructing houses, silos, and so on,
exclusively for this sector. To overcome the latent bread shortage, high-yield
Italian wheat varieties are being cultivated. Because these wheat varieties are
of inferior quality, despite their high yield, they are not grown in other
countries. Mussolini imposed these wheat varieties, driven by the desire to
make Italy self-sufficient in its bread supply.
It is understandable that Yugoslavia, also driven by
necessity, is trying to solve its wheat problem in the same way and emerge
victorious in the "wheat war." However, it would be an exaggeration
and inaccurate to see this progress as a typical and intrinsic success of the
Yugoslav communist system, given that the average yield of high-quality wheat
in Western European countries is much higher than that obtained in communist
Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, wheat production in Yugoslavia suffers
from another weakness that could cause a major crisis. As is well known,
Italian wheat varieties are not sufficiently resistant to the harsh winters of
Yugoslavia's wheat-growing regions. In recent years, the winters have not been
severe, so the aforementioned deficiency of the Italian wheat has not yet
manifested itself. In the winter of 1959-60, however, severe frosts struck,
albeit briefly, which significantly damaged the Italian wheat varieties.
According to the newspaper "Borba" of June
1, 1960, last spring 7% of the wheat fields in Voivodeship, the center of wheat
production, had to be plowed again due to "adverse weather
conditions." The newspaper emphasized that "this phenomenon is
causing major headaches in some districts."
Despite warnings from qualified experts about the
weaknesses of Italian wheat varieties, official circles underestimated the
danger. They are already experiencing problems, and if the cold weather
intensifies, insurmountable difficulties will arise. Furthermore, there are
signs that these types of wheat are susceptible to various pests in Yugoslavia,
which in turn is causing serious problems.
Incidentally, the regime's propaganda about wheat
self-sufficiency was premature. In light of the exceptional 1959 harvest, Tito
boasted: "We no longer depend on the grace of heaven; on whether it will
rain or not... Until now, we received wheat from the United States of America
as aid, but I believe none of you are happy about that, for the Yugoslav
people, a proud people, do not like to receive constant help from anyone... All
the more so because even in the political sphere, that aid had unpleasant
repercussions, so that for these reasons political problems arose for us."
[9].
However, last year's wheat harvest could not meet the
population's needs, forcing the government to request another 500,000 tons of
wheat from the United States. On April 20th, the Yugoslav ambassador visited
the State Department in Washington, requesting that payment for the purchased
grain be made in Yugoslav currency and not in foreign currency, which the
Belgrade treasury lacked. From 1950 to 1959, the communist government in
Belgrade received 6,858,379 tons of wheat and 247,856 tons of flour from the
United States.
The deficit recorded in 1960 was due not only to the
poor harvest but also to increased flour consumption, resulting from
insufficient meat and milk supplies and rising prices for all food items.
Furthermore, farmers refused to sell their grain due to price instability.
American wheat will make it easier for the government to force farmers to sell
their wheat at low prices. The American contribution is necessary because the
"socialist sector" has not yielded results; that is, it produces at
enormous losses that the State must then absorb, to the detriment of other
economic activities.
All this proves that the wheat problem in Yugoslavia
is not solved. It would be more realistic to cultivate the country's quality
wheat varieties than to force the planting of other, non-acclimatized
varieties. Cultivating the country's good varieties requires years of work to
obtain good results, but with lower yields than Italian wheat.
The indispensable requirement for this would be to
promote private land ownership by farmers, the only way to increase
agricultural production in both quantity and quality. As we have emphasized,
communist Yugoslavia does not tend to strengthen peasant smallholdings; on the
contrary, it seeks to suppress and eliminate them through coercive measures and
indirectly.
VII. THE "SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION" OF THE
COUNTRYSIDE CONTINUES
Despite the many failures suffered thus far in
agricultural production, Yugoslavia is intensifying its efforts toward the
socialist transformation of the countryside. This is evident from the report
that Eduardo Kardelj, Vice-President of the Yugoslav government, presented to
the plenary session of the Federal Committee of the "Socialist Federation
of the Working People of Yugoslavia," held in Belgrade on May 5 and 6,
1959, as well as from the resolution adopted at that session. Later, Tito, in
his report read at the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Federation in April
1960, in Belgrade, again emphasized this course of official policy.
This confirms that the ultimate goal of the Yugoslav
communist leaders, regarding anti-peasant policy and agricultural production,
is identical to that of the Soviet Union. This goal consists of the
socialization of land and other essential means of production in agriculture.
In this sense, the cooperation of peasants with
cooperatives is considered only as a necessary transitional phase in the
socialist transformation of the countryside. Association with cooperatives
implies concessions to the peasants after the failure of collectivization and
the insufficient supply that seriously threatened the country's economic
development.
By returning land to the peasants and increasing
investments, a certain increase in agricultural production was recorded.
However, since, for political and doctrinal reasons, strengthening peasant
ownership is not desirable, it continues to be subjected to strong pressures.
The aim is to solve the food problem and the plight of the peasants by
intensifying production in the so-called socialist sector.
According to official plans, the socialist sector
would have to fully satisfy market needs, becoming independent of the peasants,
who would then be forced to sell their land and abandon private production.
This objective is far from being achieved, and the policy being pursued is very
costly and risky. The Party and the State want to ensure the population's food
supply through the socialist sector, so they must expand it significantly, as
its current capacity is insufficient.
However, expanding the socialist sector to such an
extent would mean the State assuming exclusive responsibility for most
agricultural production. This, in turn, means investing so much money and
taking so many risks that Yugoslavia cannot afford it. Even the Soviet Union,
which in recent years has tended to expand its sovkhozes (state farms), has not
reached such a level of expansion.
By expanding the socialist sector without creating
collective farms, in which the peasants would bear all the risks and losses, an
excessively heavy burden would be placed on the remaining economic sectors, and
the results would be identical to those of collectivization, with the
difference that then it would be the State, instead of the peasants, that would
suffer the losses.
On the other hand, the abandonment and ruin of private
peasant farms presents difficult and dangerous problems for society, the State,
and the Party. Already, the influx of peasants to the cities is such that the
question of employment and housing for so many people is a serious concern for
the communist leaders. With the acceleration of this process, new social and
political problems are emerging, which could prove more unpleasant for the
current regime than the economic ones.
The communists pursue the destruction of peasant
properties primarily for political reasons. The economically independent
peasantry represents an unyielding political force, which the communists fear.
It is worth noting a more recent measure directed against the interests of
peasant private property: the decree-law "on the exploitation of
agricultural land," passed by the Federal Assembly in Belgrade on October
16, 1959.
This law authorizes the People's Committees of
municipalities and districts to prescribe mandatory methods of land cultivation
and the application of agricultural measures. If producers fail to comply with
the established regulations, the respective lands, according to said law, may
be placed under official administration. The compensation that producers must
pay in that case goes into the investment fund and is used for the promotion of
agriculture.
The landowner, therefore, does not receive any compensation.
The forced administration ceases at the owner's request, provided that they
commit to cultivating their land within a specified period, comply with the
established regulations, and offer a guarantee, the amount and form of which
are determined by the municipal or district authorities, with which they must
demonstrate their capacity and solvency to fulfill the obligations assumed.
Should the producer fail to comply, the total amount of the guarantee goes into
the Investment Fund and is allocated to agricultural development.
These measures are expressly directed against
individual farmers. They represent a further step towards the complete
elimination of peasant landholdings. The forced administration of land is
generally entrusted to agricultural cooperatives and, in practice, means the
loss of rural possession and mandatory relocation to the city for the producer.
Furthermore, they are not entitled to compensation for the confiscated land.
The same law contains other measures detrimental to
the private property of peasants. For example, regarding land irrigation, the
rounding of plots can only be carried out for the benefit of cooperatives and
other rural organizations. This means that, as a result of improvements and the
consolidation of plots, the peasant cannot round up their plots, that is,
reduce the number of plots to a minimum or eliminate the parcelling altogether.
Therefore, even in the context of improvements and
consolidations, peasants are forced to cultivate their parceled land inefficiently
and at high cost. Then their land is seized and annexed to agricultural
cooperatives, citing as justification "outdated farming methods and the
non-application of prescribed agrotechnical measures."
This law also modified the land leasing system. Individual
farmers, when leasing their land, must advertise their offer on the notice
board of the respective municipal people's committee. Their land can be leased
to another private producer if, within the established timeframe, no official
agricultural organization has leased it. Thus, the law tends to make it more
difficult for individual producers to lease their land.
The law on the exploitation of agricultural land
greatly harms private producers by limiting the area of
individual holdings to 10 hectares. Since farmers are not granted
larger investment loans, acquiring implements, machinery, or other means of
production is difficult, and they cannot modernize their methods or cultivate
their land rationally; instead, they regress and become increasingly
impoverished. In this way, the State, with premeditation and a fixed plan,
postpones the individual production sector, facilitates collectivization indirectly,
and destroys the existence of independent and free peasants.
Brugg/Aarg, Switzerland.
The Hungarian government, unlike during centuries of
coexistence, once again refused to recognize the legal validity of the Croatian
Sabor's (parliament's) decision. It recognized the separation of
Croatia-Slavonia and sent its diplomatic representative to the National Council
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which held sovereignty.
Even in this most tragic period of its history, the
Hungarian people, deprived of the right to self-determination, with almost
two-thirds of their territory annexed by other states and thus reduced by three
and a half million inhabitants, followed with the greatest sympathy the tragic
changes in the fate of the Croatian people, striving, within their limited
means, to assert the rights of the Croats at the Paris Peace Conference. This
intention is evident in the memorandum presented by the Hungarian delegation at
that Peace Conference:"No doubt, the Serbs,
who have brought about the union, and who are the most interested in its
stability, will pretend to the hegemony, and try to impress the Serb character
upon every State institution, which endeavours will meet with resistance on the
part of the sister nations, leading to repeated frictions and collisions making
the collaboration sooner or later impossible...
"The
Croatian nation especially will be disappointed by the Serbian rule. The great
ambition of the Croatians was the union under their hegemony of the
Southern-Slav territories belonging to Austria-Hungary, which undoubtedly they
would sooner or later obtain, at least, so far as Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia and
Dalmatia... are concerned - Hungary desirous to live in fraternal understanding
and sympathy with Croatia, was always favourable to such a plan, and our
present government respecting the principle of self-determination, would have
certainly acknowledged the right of the Croatians to achieve their union.
"The
Croatians therefore might have aggregated - if we add the Croatian part of
Istria - about 5-900.000 inhabitants... Such a political formation built up on
historical, lingual, geographical and economical principles, would have had
much more right to existence, and a more promising future than the
"Yugoslavia to be created on the 'Great-Serbian' basis" [10].
("There is no doubt that the Serbs, who carried
out the unification and are the most interested in its stability, will seek
hegemony and will try to imprint the Serbian character on every state
institution; this endeavor will be resisted by the sister nations and will
provoke repeated frictions and clashes, making all cooperation impossible
sooner or later.
"The Croatian nation will feel especially
disappointed by the Serbian administration. The great ambition of the Croats
was the union, under their leadership, of the South Slavic territories
belonging to Austria-Hungary, which they will undoubtedly achieve sooner or
later, at least with regard to Croatia-Slavonia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia. Hungary,
eager to live in understanding and fraternal sympathy with the Croats, has
always favored this plan, and our current government, respecting the principle
of self-determination, would certainly recognize the Croats' right to achieve
their union.
"The Croats can thus unite—if we include the
Croatian part of Istria—around 5,400,000 inhabitants... Such a political
entity, founded on historical, geographical, linguistic, and economic
principles, would have had more right to exist and a more promising future than
'Yugoslavia,' which is to be created on the basis of 'Greater Serbia').
The Treaty of Trianon had not yet been signed when the
Soviet Union attacked Poland. The French government suggested establishing
secret contact with the Hungarian government, the only one among the Central
European governments willing to provide Poland with armed support. When, during
the course of the talks, the possibility of a possible revision of the Treaty
of Trianon arose, the Hungarian government seized the opportunity to request
that the right to self-determination be applied to the Croatian people as well.
HUNGARIAN-CROATIAN TIES BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS
a) The relationship between
Budapest and Belgrade. The Croatian problem.
The main objective pursued by the Hungarian
governments between the two world wars was to disrupt the unity of the alliance
known as the "Little Entente," which encircled Hungary. With no
possibility of a settlement in sight with either Romania or Czechoslovakia,
Hungary twice attempted to reach an agreement with Yugoslavia, trying to
separate it from the "Little Entente," since the latter received the
smallest share of the spoils. Both attempts were made only when relations
between Belgrade and Zagreb temporarily improved, suggesting that a policy
based on Croatia's separation from Yugoslavia was not feasible.
The first attempt was reflected in the speech given by
Nicholas Horthy, Regent of Hungary, on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of
the Battle of Mohács. This attempt was made only after Radic and his party had
entered the Belgrade parliament, abandoning their previous abstention;
moreover, he had provisionally accepted a ministerial post. The Yugoslav
government, considering its position in international politics at the time, did
not yet deem an agreement with Hungary necessary.
The Hungarian government's second attempt took place
when, after the Cvetkovic-Maček agreement of 1939, it seemed that the
Croatian people would resolve their problems within the Yugoslav state. At that
time, Europe was ablaze, Czechoslovakia had collapsed, and in such a situation,
the Yugoslav government considered it necessary to make a friendly gesture to
the Hungarians: to grant basic rights to the Hungarian minority of half a
million inhabitants, forced to live in Yugoslavia; it was even prepared to make
territorial concessions.
This rapprochement was fostered both by Germany, which
had economic interests in the Balkans, and by Italy, which, after its military
failure in Albania, wished to see Yugoslavia neutral. Thus, the
Hungarian-Yugoslavian agreement of December 1940 (the Pact of Friendship) was reached,
which would soon prove to be the most misguided step in Hungarian diplomacy
between the two world wars. It quickly became clear that Yugoslavia, or rather
the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian military caste, were far from
following the prudent policy of their own government, which sought to adapt to
reality. With the coup d'état of March 27, 1941, the policy based on friendship
with Yugoslavia utterly failed.
Apart from these two attempts, Hungary's foreign
policy with respect to Yugoslavia was guided primarily by the aim of supporting
Croatia in its struggle for national sovereignty. The definitive separation of
Croatia would have automatically caused the total disintegration of Yugoslavia
and, therefore, the collapse of the order established by the Treaty of Trianon
in the Carpathian Basin.b) Relaciones húngaro-croatas entre 1920-1929.
Hungary, in the first decade after the Treaty of
Trianon, was struggling with a severe economic crisis resulting from the First
World War. Given the military superiority of the nations of the Little Entente,
Hungary lacked the power to support the Croats in their struggle for
independence, which began on the very day of the proclamation of the South
Slavic Union. Nevertheless, Hungary did everything in its power to express its
sympathy for the Croatian cause.
Even at the Peace Conference, it advocated for
Croatia's sovereign rights. The Hungarian press never ceased to assert that
this sympathy was not merely official policy, but the sentiment of the entire
Hungarian nation. Dr. Joseph Bajza, a young Hungarian professor, spearheaded
this pro-Croatian press campaign. It was he who, on the eve of the First World
War, had pointed out the fatal errors of Hungarian policy, demanding support
for the Croatian Party of Right. In the autumn of 1918, he participated in the
deliberations with the three representatives of the aforementioned Croatian
party, held in Vienna and Budapest, in which the last attempt was made to
resolve the South Slavic problem from the Croatian perspective and within the
Habsburg monarchy.
A highly significant indication of the pro-Croatophile
attitude in the 1920s was the desire expressed by the professors of the
University of Budapest for the chair of South Slavic history and literature,
temporarily vacant, to be filled by the most prominent intellectual of modern
Croatian nationalism, Dr. Milan Sufflay. Professor Sufflay accepted the offered
chair, but the Yugoslav authorities denied him a passport. Had Professor
Sufflay then traveled to Budapest, he could have avoided his martyrdom and
contributed to his nation's regaining of independence.
Finally, the chair was filled by Professor Bajza, who
continued to advocate for Hungarian-Croatian friendship, not only in the press
but also by educating a new generation of historians. While he, in his
inaugural lecture at the Society of Saint Stephen, summarized the history of
the dissolution of the Hungarian-Croatian union, his most eminent disciple, Dr.
José Deér, wrote a comprehensive essay on the origins of that union,
reconciling the Croatian and Hungarian conceptions of the Pacta Conventa, a
much-disputed issue.
Along with Vienna, Budapest had become one of the most
important centers for Croatian political exiles at that time. While Vienna was
primarily the meeting place for the leaders of the military uprising of
December 5, 1918, Budapest was the center of Dr. Ivo Frank's group, which was
active in the Party of Right.
c) Hungarian-Croatian relations
from 1929 to 1941.
After the horrific attack on the Belgian parliament on
June 20, 1928, and the establishment of a monarchical dictatorship, this time
undisguised (January 6, 1929), Croatian-Serbian relations entered a critical
phase. The failure of the idea of a Yugoslav state was evident.
Serbian terrorism in Croatia reached its peak. The number of Croats forced to
seek asylum abroad grew steadily. Those compelled to emigrate were no longer
just politicians, but ordinary people as well. Dr. Ante Pavelić, leader of
the Party of Right and deputy for Zagreb, organized the Ustaša movement to
oppose Serbian violence and to fight for the freedom of the Croatian nation.
Along with Italy and Austria, Hungary was the most important center of this new
and numerous wave of exiles.
To provide essential supplies to the refugees crossing
the Drava River, Croatian exiles organized an orientation and supply camp in
Jankapuszta, near the town of Nagy Kanizsa. After a brief stay in this camp,
most of the refugees moved to the major industrial centers of Western Europe.
Some were transferred to the military training camps that the Ustaša movement
maintained in Italy. Those who did not wish to stray too far from their
homeland found work on the Jankapuszta estate and in the surrounding area.
The Yugoslav government seized upon this situation to
accuse Hungary of orchestrating the Marseille bombing, as the Quai d'Orsay
pressured Yugoslavia not to implicate the Italian government before the League
of Nations Council, given that Italy had given refuge to the leader of the
Ustaša movement. Besides Yugoslavia, the two remaining countries of the
"Little Entente" also seized this opportunity to destroy Hungary,
given that the government of Julius Gombös had officially included in its
foreign policy program the demand for a revision of the peace treaties. With
the aim of increasing the war mentality, the Yugoslav government expelled
several thousand Hungarians residing in Bachka, and at the same time gave free
rein to the Chetnik and Dobrovoljci groups (the Serbian paramilitary formations),
which the authorities stationed in the border areas with Hungary, to commit
acts of violence against the Hungarian population of the region.
During the vehement discussions in the Council of the
League of Nations, Dr. Tibor Eckhardt, the first Hungarian delegate to that
international body, proved that it was not only impossible to maintain the
situation created by the Treaty of Trianon, but that it was also necessary to
resolve the Croatian problem. Once again, Hungary was the only European country
to raise the issue of Croatian independence before the international body whose
specific mission was to resolve such problems. Only thanks to the energetic
intervention of England was it possible to thwart the military action aimed at
dismembering Hungary, this time definitively.
It was natural that the outbreak of the
Serbian-Croatian crisis of 1928-29 forced the Hungarian government to make
contact with the Croatian leaders, assuring them that the Hungarian nation
stood with the Croatian nation and that it would ipso facto recognize Croatian
independence if it were achieved through fighting on the internal front or
through the actions of exiles. As early as 1929, an agreement in principle was
reached during private talks between Dr. Vlatko Macek, president of the
Croatian Peasant Party and leader of the home front, and the Hungarian
diplomat, Baron Gabriel Apor.
In these talks, Dr. Macek raised the possibility of a
personal union between Hungary and Croatia. However, Baron Apor, despite being
a Legitimist politician, refused to discuss the possibility of a personal
union, declaring that Hungary would be entirely satisfied if Croatia were to
become a free state.[11].
It was only in 1934 that a similar agreement was
reached with the leaders of the Croatian exiles, despite frequent talks and
cordial relations. However, while the agreement stipulated with Dr. Macek was
verbal, Dr. Tibor Eckhardt (at the time Hungary's delegate to the League of
Nations) signed a written agreement, on behalf of the Hungarian Revisionist League,
with Dr. Ante Pavelić, leader of the Ustaša revolutionary movement.
According to the agreement with both Dr. Macek and Dr.
Pavelić, Croatia, should it achieve independence, would retain possession
of Medjimurje (the region between the Drava and Mura rivers), renouncing, in
exchange, all other territorial claims in southern Hungary. Furthermore, Dr.
Macek had committed to persuading the Bunjevci (in Bachka) to side with
Hungary.
Dr. Ivo Frank formulated the Croatian viewpoint on
Hungarian revisionist policy in the following terms:
"We
want to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Hungarians for the idea of
revision; we want to exert our full influence—and it is considerable—in the
Banat region, urging the Croatian enclaves there and in Burgenland to give
their all so that Western Hungary and Voivodeship can be reunited with the
Hungarian motherland. We want to fight for you, with you, until victory or
defeat—but as a free, independent nation.".[12]
d) Independent State of Croatia
and Hungary.
The coup d'état in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, was an
unwelcome surprise not only for the political and military leaders of Germany,
but also for the Hungarian government. It revealed the complete failure of the
foreign policy based on the Hungarian-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship, just weeks
after its ratification.
The German military leadership, on the eve of the
military campaign against the Soviet Union, could not accept the situation,
seeing supply routes and imports of oil and copper—crucial commodities for its
war industry—threatened by Yugoslavia. For this reason, Hitler decided that
same day, March 27, to eliminate Yugoslavia.
In this new strategic situation, Hungary's attitude
became of great importance from the German perspective. On the one hand, it was
necessary to reinforce the German troops stationed in Romania by deploying
additional forces, primarily in the Banat region. This was only possible by
crossing Hungarian territory.
On the other hand, Hungary's active participation in
the planned campaign would ensure a faster success. Hitler invited Döme
Sztójay, the Hungarian Minister Plenipotentiary in Berlin, to an audience and
sent him on a special plane to Budapest to deliver his message to Regent
Horthy. In this message, Hitler promised not only the reintegration into
Hungary of the territories of southern Hungary annexed by Yugoslavia (in
1918-19), but also that he was prepared to grant Hungary complete freedom of
action in Croatia-Slavonia. He also alluded to the possible restitution to
Hungary of the city of Rijeka (Fiume), which at that time belonged to Italy.[13].
Although Regent Horthy was initially prepared to fully
support the German action, at the Crown Council session held on April 1st,
Hungary's specific conditions were established:
a) Hungary would initiate military action only after
Croatia proclaimed its independence, thereby effectively dissolving Yugoslavia;
b) The Hungarian army (honvéd) would only advance as
far as Hungary's southern borders, that is, to the Danube and Drava rivers,
without invading Croatian territory.
Hungarian Prime Minister Count Paul Teleky, the
architect of the Hungarian-Yugoslav friendship treaty, held out hope until the
very last moment that Hungary could remain neutral. But Hungary realized that
such an attitude was becoming untenable when it learned, from reading the
report of the Hungarian consul in Zagreb, Ladislaus Bartók, of the talks held
between the political leaders of southern Hungary and the head of the German
minority in Croatia, Altgayer.
The results of these talks were that the leaders of
the German minority in Yugoslavia, evidently in agreement with the leaders of
the National Socialist party, were planning to form what they called Prinz
Eugen Gan (a Danubian state) under the tutelage of Berlin. Hungary was then
forced to act if it wanted to prevent the creation of an adversarial German
state on its southern borders and avoid the trampling of the rights of the half
a million Hungarians previously and forcibly incorporated into the Yugoslav
state.[14].
When, on the fourth day of the German-Yugoslav War,
April 10, 1941, the independence of Croatia was proclaimed in Zagreb, Hungary
was the first country to recognize it through its consul in Zagreb, Ladislao
Bartók. Regent Nicholas Horthy, in a statement made public on the same day,
said:
"We
greet this decision with sincere joy and we are going to respect it in every
way. For a thousand years we have been living together with the Croatian nation
in bad and good times, respecting and helping each other, and now we wish that
the noble Croatian people should find happiness and prosperity in its
independence."
("Saludamos esta decisión con sincera alegría y
vamos a respetarla en todo sentido. Durante mil años hemos convivido con la
nación croata en los tiempos malos y buenos, respetándonos y ayudándonos
mutuamente, y ahora deseamos que el noble pueblo croata encuentre su felicidad
y prosperidad en su independencia")[15].
Although Dr. Ante Pavelić, upon returning to
Croatia, had spoken in friendly terms to the Hungarian delegation that came to
Karlovac to greet him, regarding Hungary and its attitude toward Croatian
exiles, relations between the two countries soon cooled. The reason for this
unexpected change lay in the territorial dispute over Medjimurje. [16].
The Croatian government considered Hungary's
occupation of Medjimurje and its subsequent annexation a violation of the
aforementioned agreements: the one made with Dr. Macek and the agreement signed
with Dr. Pavelic. The military occupation of Medjimurje was carried out under
the terms of the agreement reached in November 1910 by the Hungarian and German
general staffs. The Hungarian government, including Prime Minister László
Bárdossy, were willing to recognize the interests of the Croatian state in
Medjimurje.
Nevertheless, the Croatian civil administration ceased
to function in Medjimurje. Later, when the Hungarians took power on July 9,
1941, Bárdossy had to yield to those who argued that, on the one hand, Hungary
was being rather moderate in supporting Croatian independence despite Hitler's
offer, and, on the other hand, it could not fail to claim all the territories
of historical Hungary, precisely because the Germans had appropriated the
Banat.
The Hungarian government's repeated efforts to
maintain goodwill relations with Croatia, despite the Medjimurje dispute,
proved fruitless until the war's end. This tension was also due to the actions
of the German ambassador in Zagreb, Kasche, who did everything possible to
foster an atmosphere of distrust between Hungary and Croatia, thereby reserving
for Germany, in the event of a victorious outcome, the right to arbitrate
relations between the two countries. Furthermore, this policy explains why
Germany rejected Croatia's claim to the Novi Pazar district, even though annexing
it to Croatia would have been logical, even strategically, as it would have
separated Serbia and Montenegro.[17].
The lowest point in Hungarian-Croatian relations
during the world war was marked by the fact that, at the beginning of 1943,
some Croatian officials expressed a degree of sympathy for the Romanian
government's efforts to create a new "Little Entente" against
Hungary, an alliance that included Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia. Behind the
Romanian action lay the intention to recover Northern Transylvania,
reintegrated into Hungary under the Vienna arbitration of August 1940. The
political leaders of Zagreb must have understood, first, that the aggravation
of the Transylvanian problem was the result of German political intrigues and,
second, that Transylvania for Hungary is at least as vital an importance as
Bosnia-Herzegovina is for Croatia and, finally, that the defense of the
Carpathian line holds transcendental importance not only for Hungary, but for
the entire Carpathian-Danubian region, especially after the Don catastrophe,
when the Russian tide was advancing on the West. [18].
It seems an irony of fate that just a few months after
that unfriendly gesture, the Hungarian government, at the request of the German
military leadership, had to consider the possibility of replacing the German
troops stationed in Croatia with Hungarian troops. A few weeks before the
Italian armistice, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Nicolas Kállay, had to include
in his calculations, for obvious reasons, the eventual invasion of the Balkans
by Allied troops.
When Georg Bakách-Bessenyey, the Hungarian ambassador
in Bern, learned during his conversations with the American intelligence
officers in Switzerland, Allan Dulles and Royal Tyler, of the Allies' firm
refusal to invade the Balkans, Kállay definitively abandoned the German plan. [19].
***
It took the final, tragic phase of the war for the
neighboring nations to grasp, in the last hour before the catastrophe, the
common danger and to eliminate, in the traditional spirit of their long,
eight-century-old shared history, the controversies and quarrels fueled by
external forces. According to the official statement of the Hungarian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, concerning the talks held on February 20 and 21, 1945:
"...all military, political, social, and economic
issues of common interest to Hungary and Croatia were discussed. Among other
things, a complete agreement was reached concerning the situation, development
possibilities, and organization of Croats and Hungarians residing in both
countries, as well as regarding the use of language, teaching and education,
the printing and distribution of newspapers, periodicals, and books in their
respective languages, and matters pertaining to reciprocal cultural and press
cooperation..." [20].
In October 1918, Count Stefan Tisza declared to
visiting delegates of the Croatian Party of Right that Hungary recognized the
Croatian nation's right to self-determination and left it to the Croats to
decide whether or not to maintain relations with Hungary in the future, and in
what form. He added that the Hungarian people should support the Croatian
nation in its struggle for existence with all available means. [21].
Isidro Krsnjavi, painter and writer, made Zagreb the
true center of Croatian cultural activity. Among other cultural institutions,
he founded the Croatian Society of Art, the first hub of modern visual art in
Croatia. He surrounded himself with renowned painters Blas Bukovac and
Celestino Medovic, who, in collaboration with other Croatian visual
artists—sculptors Franges Mihanovic (a disciple of A. Rodin) and Rodolfo
Valdec, and painters Csikos-Sessia Bela, Clemente Crncic, and Oton
Ivekovic—became mentors to new generations and forerunners of modern Croatian
visual expression.
All these artists followed the techniques and styles
of the academies of Vienna, Munich, Paris, and Rome, and shared the prevailing
artistic concepts and approaches of those schools. Miroslav Kraljevic and José
Racic, precocious talents, both of whom died prematurely, reached the level of
late 19th-century European art outside the academic framework and charted new
paths in Croatian painting. Their contemporaries, such as the writer Ksaver
Sandor Djalski, demanded that young Croatian visual artists "preserve, as
the most sacred thing, the freedom of their convictions, their thought, and
their taste," taking care not to fall "under the absorbing influence
of any school."
The new ideas and conceptions that were emerging
reflected an intense desire to create an original and distinctive artistic
expression, to plastically highlight the national characteristics and traits of
the Croatian people, and thus, in close spiritual communion with the peoples of
the West, to contribute to European cultural values and heritage. The Croatian
Society of Art, founded by Krsnjavi, along with other similar institutions, and
especially the Zagreb Academy of Fine Arts, contributed substantially to the
formation and creation of Croatian artistic expression.
Before the war, Ivan Mestrovic, Jozo Kljakovic, Ljubo
Babic, Vladimir Becic, Jerolim Mise, Marin Tartaglia, and others taught at the
Academy of Fine Arts. Under their inspiration, dedication, and influence, new
names emerged, new visual artists, known and celebrated not only in Croatia but
throughout Europe. This artistic movement and this generation are known
collectively as the "Zagreb School."
When, at the end of the Second World War, the Balkan
forces invaded Croatia once again, and with the help and protection of Soviet
troops imposed a communist dictatorship, freedom of expression and artistic
creation were curtailed and restricted in many ways.
Among the tens of thousands of Croatian refugees were
several painters and sculptors, some already established, others young and
hopeful, who would later settle almost exclusively in the Americas. Below, we will
briefly discuss the work of these Croatian artists who work in various media,
some of whom have already made a valuable contribution to the cultural heritage
of their adopted countries. The brief references that follow are intended to
illustrate the reproductions of the more recent works by these painters and
sculptors published in this issue of "Studia Croatica."
Ivan Mestrovic, a leading figure in Croatian sculpture
and one of the most renowned sculptors of our century, has lived and worked
outside Croatia since the early years of World War II, and is currently,
nearing 80, a professor at the University of Notre Dame in the United States.
Given Mestrovic's worldwide fame and the widespread
dissemination of his vast body of work, we will limit ourselves to highlighting
only a few of its most interesting and essential moments. His early sculptures
were born under the influence of the Vienna Secession. From the outset,
Mestrovic's art was profoundly human, original in its poignant, vigorous, and
passionate forms, characterized by its grandeur, and guided by lofty sentiments
of constant ascent toward the eternal.
Moreover, seeking an expression befitting his inner
anxieties, the sculptor achieves stillness, tranquility, and contemplative
concentration (My Mother). The artist strives to master and spiritualize
matter. In search of a personal style and expression, Mestrovic, beginning with
his initial expressionist phase, combines Oriental and Hellenic art (Psyche),
and through the Renaissance (Virgin and Child), enters his current phase
(Pieta), no less creative and fruitful than the previous ones. With the new
works, executed in exile, mostly in Rome and North America, it would seem that
this latest cycle of Ivan Mestrovic's artistic creation is drawing to a close.
Afflicted by serious illnesses, he did not interrupt his creative work,
although he frequently lamented that he might not have time to realize
everything he carried in his mind and heart.
Mestrovic's new works, in addition to the
aforementioned characteristics that distinguish all his sculptures, exhibit
greater spirituality and inner concentration (Pope Pius XII, Cardinal Stepinac,
The Head of Socrates). The forms are more refined, enveloped in a certain aura
of lyricism and tenderness. His preferred subjects remain Virgins and Mothers.
Mestrovic, a prodigious genius of original expressions and grandiose
conceptions, perhaps poured his greatest inventive wealth into the cycle
entitled "Life and Passion of Christ," which comprises numerous
reliefs carved in wood. This cycle, begun during the First World War and
completed in 1954 in North America, was bequeathed by the sculptor to the
Croatian people. The influence of Mestrovic's art on his contemporaries and on
the new generation of sculptors, both Croatian and foreign, is extraordinary
and fruitful. Most European and American critics agree with this assessment.
Chronologically and due to the breadth of his work,
the painter Jozo Kljakovic occupies second place among Croatian visual artists
in exile. Like Mestrovic, this painter possesses a perfect understanding of
human anatomy, mastering its forms and movements (Annunciation, Jesus in the
Temple, Flagellation, Crucifixion, The Last Supper, Fishermen). The relief of
his figures, the density and plasticity achieved through tones and mid-tones of
his rich color palette, reveal Kljakovic as an excellent technician and a
restless thinker.
Kljakovic is also known for his numerous monumental
murals that adorn various buildings and churches in Croatia and Rome. In his
most recent paintings (Scherzo), the artist, despite his advanced age, sought
to enrich his artistic expression through broad and vigorous brushstrokes. Like
Mestrovic, Kljakovic leaves a rich artistic legacy, the fruit of his long and
tireless creative work, along with his insightful memoirs collected in the book
In Contemporary Chaos, published in 1952 in Buenos Aires.
Since 1934, the Croatian painter Maximilian Vanka has
resided in the United States. Almost forgotten by his compatriots, his contribution
to American visual arts is nonetheless significant. Vanka's paintings (Our
Mothers, Pilgrims, Ave Maria) are simple in content and form, much like the
peasants of his homeland, aptly reflecting in his technique and use of color
the difficult lives of his figures and faces (Croatian Mothers in the
Homeland).
Though far from his homeland, Vanka, even now, has
managed to convey in the canvases painted in Pennsylvania the pain and tragedy
that befell Croatia during and after World War II. Vanka is a distinguished
portraitist of the old school, clear, refined, and intelligible in his use of
color. Furthermore, the bridges, skyscrapers, and factories of New York are
reflected in his canvases, as are the figures of the poor, the unemployed, the
despised, and the drunk—the types who emerged from the New York underworld. M.
Vanka definitively entered the history of North American painting with his
frescoes in St. Nicholas Church in Milwaukee, which American critics consider
the finest religious murals in the United States.
In Peru lives Kristian Krekovic, a Croatian painter
known as the "painter with the golden brush," an interpreter of
ancient pre-Columbian Peru, evoking Inca chieftains, priests, and warriors. In
the last decade, his canvases have been exhibited in major American and
European cities, earning critical acclaim. A painter of imposing figures and
enormous canvases with themes drawn from ancient Peruvian history, he is also
known in Europe as a painter "of masterful conceptions with profound philosophical
and social content" (Gamile Mauclair).
Although exiled from Croatia, he often evokes in his
paintings the luminous and somber moments of his country's history (The
Croatian Widows). Jose Crnobori, having escaped Tito's communist dictatorship,
settled in Buenos Aires in 1947 and subsequently exhibited his paintings in
several Argentine cities. At his first exhibitions in Buenos Aires, critics
unanimously praised his pictorial qualities: a soft chromatism, the serene
tones in his portraits and nudes, the harmony of green hues, and the distinct
polychromy of his floral subjects. The critic for "La Prensa" noted
"that his landscapes with their soft tones remind us of Corot."
However, Crnobori, both in his artistic conceptions and his personal style and
aspirations, reflects more the influence of the Zagreb school and his teacher
Marin Tartaglia, a prominent figure in Croatian painting, than that of the
French landscape painters Corot and Ghardin.
Slavko Kopac, who was a student and later a professor
at the Zagreb Academy of Fine Arts, currently resides in Paris, where he has
had several solo exhibitions and enjoys considerable renown. Akin to the
"art brut" style, which some French critics also call "une autre
figuration," of his master and friend Jean Dubuffet, Kopac is a painter
and sculptor of original imagination, singular freshness, and naiveté. He
attracted particular attention for his unusual and audacious technique of
combining plastic paste, cement, wood, pieces of glass, paper, brick fragments,
and clay to create an artistic universe.
Until recently, Gustavo Likan, another well-known
Croatian landscape and portrait painter, resided in Argentina. Likan, a man of
dynamic temperament, studied in Munich and the Netherlands and exhibited his
works in several European cities. He is a painter of excellent technique and
profound knowledge, and his best works are his portraits of children and
maternal themes. Croatian critics link him to Franz Hals and Snyhers.
Zarko Simat primarily dedicates himself to portraits
and still lifes. The figures of this painter, original in their conception and
execution, and a series of drawings entitled "Pagan and Christian
Rome," convey firm and established qualities. After a long trip through
Italy and France, he returned to Argentina, and his new exhibition is eagerly
awaited.
Among the Croatian painters living and creating in
Argentina, Zivko Zic deserves mention. A talented and ambitious self-taught
artist, he attempts to interpret the Pampas landscape.
Zdravko Ducmelic is also worthy of special mention. He
is one of the most original, talented, and promising visual artists among
Croatian émigré painters. Ducmelic studied in Zagreb, Rome, and Madrid. He has
resided in Argentina since 1949 and currently teaches at the Higher School of
the National University of Cuyo. He has held more than 40 solo exhibitions, and
his works are included in several museums, galleries, and collections.
With a modernist bent, Ducmelic is a painter of
refined sensibility and impeccable draftsmanship. Boldly forging his own style
and color interpretation, averse to all academicism, this young painter has
already produced several works of surprising maturity and vigor. Certain
distortions of his figures, rather premeditated and forced, do not always
enhance a particular artistic idea. It is clear that within the avant-garde
currents of painting, Ducmelic is forging his own personality. He is an
authentic representative of our turbulent times of the atomic age, of
satellites and astronauts, and as such, he strives to be its faithful
interpreter.
To complete this brief overview of Croatian visual
artists who emigrated, it is necessary to mention Ivan Galantic, a painter of
lyrical reveries and a mystical world, enveloped in meditation, stillness, and
gentleness. After completing his studies in Florence, Galantic moved to Canada,
where he currently lives and works. Also worthy of mention are two young
Croatian sculptors, José Turkalj and Agustín Filipovic, who not long ago chose
freedom and fled Tito's communist regime.
Turkalj, along with Teodoro Golubic, a young American
of Croatian origin, studies and works under the guidance of his teacher Ivan
Mestrovic. The fruitful influence of the great Mestrovic is evident in the
works of these two talented sculptors, as well as in the sculptures of Agustín
Filipovic, who currently resides in Canada. Therefore, it is still premature to
make a definitive judgment on the future development of this group of young
Croatian sculptors.
Aside from the exiled visual artists, it is worth
highlighting the distinctly modernist style of the Croatian ceramist Sime
Pelicaric, based in Buenos Aires, who in 1959 won first prize for ceramics from
the Municipality of Buenos Aires. His numerous exhibitions, held in South
American capitals and in New York, were the subject of critical acclaim.
Buenos Aires.
In short, Central and
Eastern Europe constitutes a free zone of encounters and conflicts between
antagonistic forces and opposing cultural influences. It was only in the modern
era that this region acquired a degree of political stability, imposed from the
outside, when, after the final partition of Poland, four military empires
dominated the area: the Ottoman, the Austrian, the Russian, and the Prussian or
German, respectively.
Even the Holy Alliance could
not safeguard this situation. The corollary of the revolutionary movements of a
national and social character during the past and present centuries has been
the formation of numerous and relatively small nation-states between the Baltic
and the Mediterranean. This paved the way for the "Balkanization" of
the region, a complex political process that resulted in domination, first by
the Third Reich and then by the Soviet Union.
II. ZONE OF THE EFFECTS AND
ERUPTIONS OF CIVILIZATIONS
Of all this area, only the
countries of so-called Southeast Europe were located within the sphere of
influence of Greco-Roman civilization, while the countries north of the
Carpathians appeared on the historical stage at the end of the great migrations
of peoples, during the period when Europe was gradually forming and while
civilization was spreading in the vast area between the Adriatic and the Baltic
Seas and in the extensive plains of Eastern Europe.
With the definitive division
of Europe into two areas—not only political but also cultural and
ecclesiastical—the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were faced with the
dilemma of choosing one or the other form of Christian civilization, which was
sometimes propagated by the inappropriate means of military expansion. These
uprisings and struggles were the main features of the development of the new
kingdoms and principalities until the Mongol and Turkish invasions.
A large part of that area
has been organized politically outside the direct reach of the two Christian
empires. In that region, the Holy Roman Empire had only managed to integrate
the Bohemian kingdom, the territory inhabited by the Slovenes, and a small
portion of Croatian lands on the Istrian peninsula. However, Western influence
prevailed in the kingdoms of Poland, Croatia, and Hungary, which emerged over a
thousand years ago on the eastern border of the Holy Roman Empire (see map on
page 151). Further north, along the Baltic coast, lay the territory largely
settled by Germans.[22].
Even after the establishment of the new Western
society, Byzantium exerted a notable influence over all of Christendom.
However, the direct ascendancy of the Eastern empire halted at the age-old
dividing line between two civilizations. Braudel, quoting Madame de Staël,
points to this boundary as "the most astonishing scar of the Mediterranean
countries... the one that, between East and West, passes beyond the maritime
barriers... that precise and immutable land barrier that runs between Zagreb
and Belgrade, reaching out onto the Adriatic at Alesio (Ljes), at the mouth of
the Drin, and at the junction of the Dalmatian and Albanian coasts..."."
[23].
Nor did Byzantium, even within its sphere of
influence, manage to politically integrate the Slavic and Slavic-Bulgarian
populations. In the bloody struggles it waged against the Bulgarians, it was
weakened to such an extent that this attrition became one of the main causes of
its subsequent decline.
The political legacy of Byzantium passed into the
hands of the Ottoman Turks, but Eastern Christians constituted the vast
majority in the European part of the Eurasian Ottoman Empire.
For centuries, they were submissive subjects of the
Turkish conquerors, seasoned rulers. It was practically in the modern era that
the Ottoman Empire began to look beyond its borders, especially towards Russia,
when the latter became a powerful state aspiring to assume the imperial legacy
of Byzantium—the Second Rome—that is, only when the process of decline became
evident within the Ottoman Empire itself. Russia was able to present itself as
the heir to Byzantine culture because the Greek Church was, with regard to liturgical
language, more flexible than the Roman Church, which clung tenaciously to
Latin, seeing in it, and rightly so, a powerful factor in religious and
cultural unity.
For the Bulgarians, Serbs, Ukrainians, Belarusians,
and Russians, the Slavic liturgy signified the beginning of their national
cultures of Byzantine origin.
The Mongol invasions and the domination of the
"Golden Horde" halted, but did not prevent, the development of
Russia. With the fall of Byzantium, the Grand Duke of Muscovy donated the
imperial crown. Since then, Moscow has been considered the legitimate heir of
Byzantium, the Third Rome ("since there will be no fourth"). The
Russian Empire gradually became, in the eyes of the Orthodox Slavs of the
Ottoman Empire, the leading power in the world of the Byzantine tradition.
The rise of modern Russia put an end to the
aspirations of its western neighbors—the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the
Baltic Germans, the Swedes, and the Finns—to extend Western influence eastward.
Since then, the trend has been in the opposite direction. Russia is penetrating
southward and westward. This synoptic chart, though limited to the essentials,
nonetheless underscores the characteristic features of this zone of ebb and
flow of civilizations, "those inexorable, subtle tides that nevertheless
govern everything, or almost everything.
The imbalances they cause are the decisive forces of
history." Even the current European crisis only secondarily concerns
diplomats, for it is, in essence, a debate between civilizations, constantly
reignited in favor of the advantages alternately gained by one or the other
contender. "The good cards pass from one hand to the other, and depending
on the winner, significant cultural currents, richer or poorer, emerge from West
to East or vice versa." [24] The
demarcation line between Western Europe and Eastern Eurasia, that border which
does not appear on any map, is more lasting and important than any political
boundary, even more so than the fateful "iron curtain".
III. THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURING
Although Peter the Great opened Russia's doors to
Western technology, his purpose was not to incorporate his empire into Western
society. He sought only to increase Russian power. However, contrary to his
intention, along with Western technology, he also imported the ferment of the
Russian Revolution. Western technology cannot be adopted without simultaneously
accepting its scientific methods, the result of long and persistent efforts by
Western intellectuals who, above power and political interests, affirmed truth
as an intrinsic value.
Conversely, in the practice of Eastern empires,
everything, even scientific truth, is subordinated to the interests of
autocratic state power. For example, in the Soviet Union, political power sets
the standards for artistic creation and even requires scientists to interpret
natural laws according to the regime's ideology.
In Russia, in addition to the moral crisis caused by
the impact of new ideas imported from the West, a crisis of social structures also
emerged in the last century. The most evident symptom is the emergence and
proliferation of intermediaries between traditional Russian society and the
West. This thankless role is played by the new social class, "the
intelligentsia."
The introduction of new ideas and forms, along with
technology, had devastating effects on a society where they were not the result
of a long evolution, as in their native Western soil. While the Russian
Revolution was born from contributions from Western Europe, Bolshevism does not
represent an evolution of Russian society toward Westernization.
On the contrary, it signifies the revenge of
traditional, Mongolized Russia against the Europeanized class of Russian rulers
of the old regime. It was a deliberate return to Eurasian traditions.
Bolshevism is merely the Eurasian version of a Western system, Marxism, which
Lenin, the true architect of modern totalitarianism, grafted onto the social
body of autocratic and Caesaropapist Russia. That is why communism, even when
it operates in countries with deep humanist traditions in the West, remains the
Eurasian version of Marxism.
Not only is Russia not Westernizing through
Bolshevism, but the Soviet domination of most of Central Europe constitutes, in
essence, one of the most brutal attempts to impose, by force, the ideas and
forms of a foreign civilization. The illusions of progressives regarding the
supposed evolution of the Soviets toward new forms of human rights and freedoms
stem from the optimism of previous generations, who based their illusions on
the idea that our political institutions could serve as a panacea for all the
ills that arise in other civilizations, as well as in regions that have just
appeared on the stage of history.[25]. The political and social forms of the West, which
are a result of specific historical, political, and social evolution, are not
indigenous there and appear in hybrid forms. Similarly, the formation of the
nation-state and representative constitutional democracy must be considered in
those European countries where Byzantine traditions predominate.
The nation-states that emerged in the Balkans during
the last century are more of the Nation-Church type than Nation-State. They
possess the attributes of Byzantine Caesaropapism and of the millet, a unique
institution within the Ottoman Empire that treated religious communities as
political units, granting them certain administrative functions. In the
Balkans, religious affiliation is still identified with nationality, leading to
religious discrimination. In many cases, the national Church has been an
instrument of the denationalization of ethnic minorities of the same faith.
Likewise, the attempt to establish democratic regimes
in the Balkans failed. In those regions where autocracy was a deeply rooted tradition,
behind the facades of liberal monarchies like Belgium, the monarch's
omnipotence prevailed. He relied on the bureaucracy, primarily the large
military caste, and even the hierarchy of the national Church. Parliamentary
elections, when they occurred, were a mere formality, given the passive
attitude of the submissive subjects.
It was known beforehand that the government's
candidates, appointed by the monarch with the mandate to organize the
elections, would inevitably win. The deputies, elected in this manner, could,
with varying degrees of restriction, debate and vie for power—that is, for the
favors of the sovereign and his inner circle; the monarch appointed and
dismissed ministers at will.
Only when these leaders clashed violently with the
interests, convictions, or prejudices of the privileged caste—primarily the
army and the clergy—did change occur, generally in the form of resounding coups
d'état. Western opinion, often scandalized by the cruelty of the conspirators,
failed to recognize that in an autocratic system of government, a coup d'état,
almost always followed by the assassination of the monarch, was the only
possible, one might even say constitutional, path to major political change.
There is a latent problem with social structures, or
rather, with the ruling class, in all the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. However, this issue is particularly acute in the countries with
Byzantine traditions that were subjected for centuries to Ottoman rule. The
social structure of the Byzantine world differed from the outset from that of
the West. Moreover, the Ottoman conquerors—except in Bosnia and Wallachia—had
uprooted the feudal ruling class.
Entire peoples were socially leveled and reduced to
the status of raiyeh. In these countries, following national emancipation, a
new ruling class, controlled by the rulers, formed rapidly, so that the new
national society—consisting of a ruling class, a docile instrument of
autocratic power, and a mass of obedient subjects—more closely resembled the structures
of Byzantium, Turkey, and Russia than those of the West.
The absence of social forces is primarily responsible
for the failure of the provisional democratic government established in Russia
in 1917 and the eventual victory of Bolshevism. In the Balkans, a new social
class, called the intelligentsia, also emerged. Toynbee masterfully outlined
the characteristics of this new social class, emphasizing its hybrid nature.
This social class, mostly direct descendants of
illiterate peasants, distanced itself from patriarchal traditions without ever
achieving parity with the Western ruling class. Hence the frustration and
resentment of xenophobic nationalisms, always with an anti-Western tendency.
Between the two world wars, throughout Central and
Eastern Europe, there was a surplus of "intelligentsia," children of
peasant parents and the lower middle class, who could only climb the social and
economic ladder through higher education. These
young graduates could only aspire to official positions.
But in the countries defeated in the First World War,
impoverished and territorially diminished, those prospects were almost
nonexistent, especially during the Great Depression. In the countries favored
by the peace treaties, the possibilities were somewhat better, at least in
theory.
However, a privileged caste had formed in these
countries. Invoking their merits, more assumed than real, the older generation
had filled all the positions and sinecures, with or without qualifications. A
multitude of semi-literate civil servants and army officers emerged, while
university graduates swelled the ranks of the intellectual proletariat.
This group has been relatively numerous because
certain governments, seeking to favor specific regions, promoted secondary
education, thus considerably increasing the number of social malcontents within
the new ruling class. A similar phenomenon occurred even in countries like
Italy and Germany. This social development significantly increased the
virulence of totalitarian movements, both nationalist and communist.
In countries whose national interests were harmed, the
intellectual proletariat sought solutions in extreme nationalist social
movements, while in countries considered more advantaged, this proletariat
increasingly turned towards communism. Thus, the University of Belgrade
supplied the communist party with its cadres, while students at the University
of Zagreb gravitated towards Croatian nationalism.[26].
The social crisis, especially in the Balkan countries,
was exacerbated by frequent cases of bribery and corruption within the public
administration, known as korupcija (corruption). This tradition, dating back to
the decline of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, facilitated such abuses.
At that time, the state did not pay its employees;
instead, public offices, including ecclesiastical ones, were sold to the
highest bidder. Contemporary Balkan states paid their employees very poorly.
Furthermore, obtaining a position through bribery was already the norm. For
these reasons, and due to a lack of moral balance in the makeshift ruling
class, there were staggering cases of embezzlement, which went unpunished
because they were so widespread.
In the countries that developed within the Western
tradition and under the Austrian model of good administration, the situation
was more favorable. However, there were difficulties regarding social
structuring in countries ruled by foreign nobility, while the indigenous
population was reduced almost exclusively to the social and economic status of
serfs. This was especially true in the Baltic countries, Ukrainian Galicia,
Slovakia, and Slovenia, so that the national movements in these regions
simultaneously took on the character of a struggle for social emancipation.
While in countries ruled by the local nobility under
the Old Regime and where free cities flourished in the Middle Ages, the
conditions for social structuring were more favorable, there were also
obstacles to the formation of a middle class. The cities, targets of Turkish
invasions, were sparsely populated, and their inhabitants were mostly
foreigners, German artisans, and Jewish merchants.
The underdeveloped social structures thus presented
serious difficulties for the democratization of public life in all the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, albeit to varying degrees. Moreover,
in countries whose destinies had previously been governed by the nobility, the
new ruling class inherited from the aristocracy more a sense of social
superiority than skill in managing political affairs. The example of certain
Danubian countries and Poland is typical in this respect.
Furthermore, after the First World War, the problem of
popular participation in political affairs arose, albeit in a disorganized
fashion, in all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This crucial
social and political process also unfolded under the impact of the First World
War and the Bolshevik Revolution, which was witnessed by numerous prisoners of
war from Central Europe.
With few exceptions, the working class was not numerous,
and agrarian parties were the ones that channeled popular aspirations. However,
these groups, frequently resorting to demagoguery and faced with the stubborn
resistance of existing socio-political structures, were in the vast majority of
cases unable to fulfill their purpose.
In short, political life and social transformation
throughout this region unfolded in a climate of constitutional insecurity,
popular discontent, and marked by stark social contrasts, all exacerbated by
the difficult agricultural situation. These circumstances, coupled with
significant political difficulties arising from the proliferation of relatively
small nation-states precisely during the era of the concentration of economic
and military power, did not foster the consolidation of democratic individual
and political freedoms, without which true government cannot exist.
IV. THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF
NATION-STATES
The system of small nation-states, surrounded by
Germany and Russia with their enormous military and economic power, inevitably
encountered immense difficulties. This was all the more true given that these
were regions with a high degree of territorial overlap among populations of
different ethnic origins, making it impossible to draw definitive borders according
to the national principle.
Moreover, in some parts of this area, the process of
ethnic definition was still not entirely complete. It is still debated whether
Montenegrins are a separate people or merely a subgroup of the Serbian people;
whether Macedonians are part of the Bulgarian people or a separate group.
Serbian nationalists even went so far as to claim that Macedonians are simply
Serbs lacking national consciousness.
They maintain the same position regarding the Balkan
Vlachs, even though the latter speak a Romanian dialect. The Yugoslav
communists, in turn, officially uphold the absurd thesis that the Muslims of
Bosnia are not Croats, but rather "nationally undefined Yugoslavs."
The pan-Serbian dictatorship of King Alexander had proclaimed its political
dogma that Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia are not historical nations, but
regional groups comprising the supposed Yugoslav people.
At the same time, it was asserted in Czechoslovakia
that Czechs and Slovaks are merely two branches of the same people. Based on
these demonstrably false theories, the application of the national principle
was denied in Croatia and Slovakia, officially declaring Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia as nationally homogeneous states. Thus distorted, the national
principle resulted in Czechs dominating in Czechoslovakia, even though they
constituted half the population, while Serbia, representing barely a quarter of
the total population, held hegemony in Yugoslavia.
Apart from these extreme cases of violation of the
national principle, several states in the region include strong pockets of
"national minorities" (see map on page 15), an inevitable phenomenon,
but one that worsened when, at the end of the First World War, borders were
drawn according to the "Woe to the vanquished" principle.
Many problems also arose because the institution of
the nation-state was conceived as a right of that ethnic group, which confers
national character upon the state, as it asserts itself and expands at the
expense of ethnic minorities and neighboring states. Many difficulties stem
from the fact that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe inherited from
their predecessors, the quintessential multinational empires, the distinction
between citizenship and nationality.
While citizenship is generally determined by place of
birth, nationality, in an ethnic sense, is established according to one's
origin or national consciousness. Members of ethnic minorities are citizens,
but they are not fellow citizens. For this reason, there are millions upon millions
of citizens whose ancestors came to and settled for centuries in their
respective countries, yet they consider it their duty to be nationally loyal to
the people of their ethnic origin, who almost always live nearby, in their own
nation-state. This inevitable conflict between two loyalties, patriotic and
national, produces national discrimination as its corollary.
These two phenomena are related as cause and effect; a
vicious circle is created with serious repercussions for the internal situation
and with strained relations between neighboring states, which demand freedom
for their citizens in other states, despite generally practicing national
discrimination within their own jurisdiction. Such situations largely motivated
nationalist dictatorships, precisely in the countries favored by the Peace
Treaties and considered natural allies of the great democratic powers.
Thus, the political constellation, fostered in the
name of democratic principles, contributed to the severe restriction of
individual freedoms, so that many people longed for the pre-war era. Even in
Czechoslovakia, the land of Masaryk and Beneš, lauded as a model of democracy,
there were no true democratic freedoms.[27].
The Habsburg Empire was dismembered because, within
the Austro-Hungarian dual system, most of its subjects felt their national
rights were being violated. However, in the new situation, the number of
national discontents was roughly the same. [28]. The roles were simply reversed.
By opposing the revision of the Peace Treaties in
order to safeguard their territorial and political status—conceived as a cordon
sanitaire against the resurgence of German militarism and the attempt to export
the Russian Revolution—the major democratic powers in fact facilitated not only
the expansion of the Third Reich but also communist activities aimed at fully
exploiting the discontent of oppressed peoples and minorities. Stalin was the
principal theorist and architect of this policy.[29].
Due to a fatal confluence of circumstances, the
democratic powers deemed it appropriate to sponsor militaristic cliques, the
main backbone of the nationalist dictatorships. The economic consequences were
no less severe than the political ones. Expenditures on armaments absorbed the
greater part of the meager national income. The standard of living suffered
greatly as a result. The finances of the powers that felt compelled to provide
economic support to the national dictatorships were also affected. Moreover,
this ideological inconsistency was one of the causes of the moral and political
crisis in France itself on the eve of the Second World War.
While some difficulties, stemming from the system of
relatively small nation-states, were unavoidable, many could have been avoided
had the national principle been correctly applied and the democratic right of
the affected population to freely decide on their government been respected.
But the opposite occurred. The principle of political and national
self-determination was practiced flawedly and inconsistently. New states were founded
and their borders decreed based on incomplete, distorted, and tendentiously
interpreted linguistic statistics.
Supposed nation-states were created that, in fact,
turned out to be multinational, and other quasi-national states, encompassing
large and discontented minorities, were created—states incapable of organizing
good governance.
The extent to which linguistic criteria clashed with
democratic rights is demonstrated by the result of the almost forgotten
plebiscite held in Carinthia, a province of Austria, in accordance with one of
the clauses of the Treaty of St. Germain. The population of southern Carinthia
had to choose between the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the
small, impoverished Austria.
According to pre-war official statistics, which,
incidentally, did not favor the Slovenes, more than 70% of the population in
the so-called zone spoke Slovene. A Yugoslav victory was considered a foregone
conclusion. But in the plebiscite of 11/10/1920, Austria obtained 22,625 votes
and Yugoslavia 15,278.
This surprising result, later interpreted in
Yugoslavia as a reaction against the behavior of Serbian troops stationed in
Carinthia, includes the recognition that Central European cultural and
political tradition prevailed over Pan-Slavic nationalist agitation in favor of
a Balkan country like Serbia.
Subsequent elections in the Yugoslav regions that had
formerly belonged to the Habsburg Empire demonstrated that, had the right to
self-determination been properly applied, the overwhelming majority of the
population would have voted against inclusion in a Balkan state. H. Seaton
Watson, one of the foremost experts on Yugoslav affairs, observed 12 years
later that "the people of the former Monarchy—and not only the Croats but
almost everyone without exception, even the Serbs of the Banat—embrace the
slogan:
Return to November 1918." [30], That is to say, the situation when an independent
government was established in Zagreb for all the territories formerly part of
Austria-Hungary, which on December 1, 1918, were "united" with the
Kingdom of Serbia without consulting the affected population. While in the
cases of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the union of distinct peoples was
forced based on linguistic similarity, Austria, a German-speaking country, was
denied the right to decide on its potential incorporation into Germany.
This right was unnecessarily denied, as the majority
did not desire such unification. The Sudeten Germans were also deprived of the
right to national self-determination, even though they formed a cohesive group
of more than three million and lived in territorial continuity with their
ethnic roots.
Nevertheless, when the democratic powers opposed
Hitler's demands for the unification of all Germans, they based their
opposition "on moral grounds as dubious as the denial of the Sudetenland's
right to self-determination." The program of annexing the Sudetenland,
Austria, and Danzig was consistent with the national principle. "Hitler
had completed the work begun by Frederick the Great and Bismarck by finally
achieving the unity of Greater Germany."[31].
Hitler, it should be noted, applied the national
principle using undemocratic methods. He hastened the forced annexation of
Austria—the Anschluss—to prevent the plebiscite announced by Chancellor
Schuschnigg. Of course, we have seen that the architects of the so-called
Treaty of Versailles also failed to respect the right to self-determination, a
fundamental democratic principle.
Furthermore, they supported several dictatorial
governments that practiced a policy of outright national oppression. It is
regrettable, but true, that by acting in this way, the democratic powers were,
from a moral standpoint, in a very awkward position vis-à-vis the Third Reich,
which, in the aforementioned cases, could at least invoke the national
principle..
V. THE DERIVATIONS OF PAN-SLAVIC NATIONALISM
Pan-Slavism, that is, the ideological and political
current that, during the era of nationalist movements, advocated for the
political solidarity of all Slavic peoples, based on the linguistic factor,
proved detrimental both in the realm of international relations and for the
Slavic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe themselves. Therefore, the problem
of Pan-Slavism deserves separate consideration.
Pan-Slavism, a derivation of modern nationalist
movements, is founded on the prejudice that such a close kinship exists among
Slavic peoples that Slavic solidarity with other peoples—above all ties of
neighborliness, history, religion, and culture—constitutes a patriotic duty. It
is, therefore, a completely false theory. "The Slavs do not represent a
racial, historical, cultural, or political-ideological unity. Only linguistic
kinship exists among them. While the Latin and Germanic worlds are cultural and
historical concepts, the so-called Slavic world is merely linguistic and, to a
certain extent, ethnological."
Consequently, no analogies can be drawn, for example,
between the Latin and Slavic worlds. Whereas the peoples of the Neo-Latin
linguistic group form a linguistic community while also exhibiting common
traits resulting from their unique cultural and historical development, the
peoples of the Slavic linguistic group have developed in such a way that they
are currently divided into two distinct, if not antagonistic, groups.
At the root of this differentiation lies the cultural
dualism of Europe, which, however, does not affect the Latin or Germanic
peoples, since these, despite linguistic, political, and, in part, religious
differences, belong to the same cultural sphere. "This difference exists,
however, not only between a Russian and a Portuguese, but also between a
Russian and a Pole, and even between a Serb and a Croat."
As a result of this division, the possibility of a
policy of solidarity among Slavic peoples is very limited. Politics, state
organization, and legal order are simply one aspect of culture. Therefore,
where there is no shared set of value criteria, which are the essence of
culture, it is impossible to organize a lasting political agreement.
The emergence of Pan-Slavism and its acceptance by
certain political figures, as well as by some Western powers—during the two
world wars, the "slogan" of defending Slavic peoples from the German
threat was wielded as a political weapon—must be attributed to the historical
process during times of national rivalries.
On the one hand, in the West, precisely during its
greatest period of external expansion, the sense of belonging among its peoples
to the same cultural community had almost disappeared. On the other hand, due
to the particular conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, the national
movements of the Slavic peoples arose and took hold in the context of the
struggle against the linguistic supremacy of the Germans, Hungarians, Italians,
and Greeks, respectively.
The defense of the "sweet mother tongue" was
identified with the struggle for nationality. According to the theories that
took shape in an environment where state power was exercised by large
multinational empires and where the national idea was not a corollary of the
prior constitution of states, peoples were defined as ethnic rather than
political units. Simultaneously, J. G. Herder, author of the famous work
*Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, extolled the Slavic peoples, considered
primitive, to whom he assigned a grand historical mission.
Even today, prominent professors of Slavic philology
are influenced by "German linguistic racism, which is based on the
prejudice that links race, language, culture, and people as if one were passing
from one to another along an uninterrupted path," although "the study
of languages easily shows that they are formed, evolve, and
spread according to causes independent of race." [32]. Indeed, Slavic peoples are essentially of mixed
ancestry.
The national movements of the Central European Slavs
were conceived with a liberal and humanist spirit, typically Western. The Slavs
who comprised the Austrian Empire saw the Danubian community as their natural
protector, both against Pan-German nationalism and Russian expansionism. The
participants in the First Slavic Congress of Prague in 1848 formulated their
declarations in this sense.
Later, disillusioned by the Habsburgs, the Slavic
peoples of Austria viewed the Pan-Slavic policy propagated by Russia with
suspicion. T. G. Masaryk, although a declared adversary of Austria-Hungary,
maintained that Russia was not a Slavic empire, but a Byzantine one. [33].
Despite all the antagonisms and discord among the
nations of the great family of European peoples, the Western Slavs realize that
they are bound by higher-order solidarity interests with their western
neighbors and that Pan-Slavic policy is nothing more than an instrument of
their absorption by Eurasian Russia.
Lately, they have also noticed that the propaganda
peaks of Pan-Slavic nationalism regarding the powerful world apart, from
Trieste to Vladivostok, cause fears of a "Slavic threat" among
Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, and Austrians and can be exploited to justify
a policy of oppression against Central European Slavs. Even powers without
territorial ties to the Slavs, such as Great Britain, are indignant to see all
Slavic peoples, without distinction, as potential Russian clients, even when,
allied with Russia, they fought alongside the Slavs against Germans or Italians,
as happened in the two world wars.
The primary beneficiary of these confusions and
missteps was Russia, both Tsarist and Soviet. Prejudices, hatreds, and
conflicts between the Western Slavs and their neighbors of the same culture
were knowingly deepened and exploited. At the same time, the illusions of the
West that Russia, after all, is a European and Christian country and that, with
the passage of time, it would become equal to other European nations were
skillfully nurtured. As an ad hoc argument, the Baroque palaces of Saint
Petersburg were brandished in the 18th century; in the last century, the great
novelists and composers were cited; and in our century, the Russian Revolution.
In the last war, the Soviets cynically exploited the
contrasts between the Slavic peoples and their Western neighbors in order to
forge a lasting enmity between them and Germany, for example. The massacres and
the expulsion of the Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were
designed to force Poles, Czechs, and Serbs to remain forever bound to Russia,
their sole protector. Hitler's classification of peoples as superior and
inferior served as an excellent pretext for promoting these designs of
Pan-Slavic nationalism.
The persecutions of the Catholic Church, the
liquidation of the hierarchies of the Belarusian and Ukrainian Catholic
Churches, and above all, the efforts to establish national Catholic Churches,
all share a similar tendency, with the aim of separating Poles, Czechs,
Slovaks, Croats, and Slovenes from other Western Christians.
It is more than evident that Soviet interference and
the emergence of Russian armies and satellite governments cured, after the last
war, all those in Central Europe who might have had any kind of illusions about
the benefits of communism: The same applies to Pan-Slavic illusions.
VI. IS IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME POLITICAL ANTAGONISM
WITHOUT SUPPRESSING NATIONAL RIGHTS?
From this necessarily incomplete analysis, it can be
deduced that Central and Eastern Europe does not constitute a geographical,
political, or cultural unit. Nor is it an economic unit, as it lacks natural
communication routes and its economy, being primarily agricultural, is
supplementary rather than complementary.
The insistence of certain German authors on presenting
Central and Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe as economic units
corresponds above all to the concept of viewing this area from the outside as
fertile ground for commercial expansion, without duly considering that Central
and Eastern Europe cannot currently be defined as an area of gravitational
pull, from an economic point of view, exclusively towards either Germany or the
European Common Market.
The USSR, having become a major industrial power,
represents an important center of attraction, culturally, politically, and
economically. Generalizations should be avoided, even when it comes to how to
confront the current communist domination. The peoples of Central Europe, in
accordance with their humanist traditions, react to Soviet supremacy differently
than the Orthodox Slavic peoples of the Balkans, potential exponents of Russian
influence, in whatever form it may take. From now on, the Western powers, as a
consequence of the ongoing process of European and Western integration, will
rely primarily on those peoples who share their cultural and political
ideology.
Today it is obvious that the West, while divided into
two antagonistic blocs of great powers, undermined its own foundations and
acted in favor of Russian-Soviet imperialism. The warring factions sought to
consolidate their positions, securing the favor of the Soviet Union, without
considering ideological differences. This betrayal of their principles had
fatal consequences.
Meanwhile, the small nations of Central and Eastern
Europe, surrounded by totalitarian regimes and lacking territorial ties to the
democratic powers, had to find ways to safeguard their national interests,
setting aside ideological differences.
Furthermore, certain actions of the Third Reich, both
before and during the war, nevertheless seemed more aligned with the national
aspirations of the subjugated peoples and minorities—who had lost hope that
democratic governments would rectify their mistakes by revising the Peace
Treaties—than with the conditions upheld by Western democracies.
"The movement that led to the dismemberment of
Austria-Hungary and the creation of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia had to be
followed by the movements of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia. Once the premises of nationalism were accepted, its evolution
became natural and legitimate and could not be stopped."
The establishment of the Slovak Republic (1939) and
the restoration of the ancient Croatian state (1941) undoubtedly implied the
rectification of the injustices committed at the end of the First World War.
Similarly, the arbitration between Romania and Hungary regarding Transylvania,
as well as the rectification of borders in favor of Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Albania after the collapse of Yugoslavia (1941) and the return of Bukovina and
Bessarabia to Romania that same year, can be considered progress.
"Hitler's Europe," as far as certain small countries of Central and
Eastern Europe were concerned, was formally more in accordance with the
national principle than the pre-war situation. Comparisons are impossible with
the situation created at the end of the Second World War, when almost all the
countries in that region were included within the sphere of Soviet interests
and when the nation-states of Croatia and Slovakia disappeared from the map,
while three Baltic republics were annexed by Russia, as were large areas of
Poland, Finland, and Romania.
Once the crisis arose in the relations of the
circumstantial allies, victorious in the previous war, accusations intensified
against politicians and entire governments of having acted in premeditated
complicity with international communism. In reality, the true nature of Russian
and Soviet imperialism was unknown. In vain did Western thinkers and statesmen
such as Napoleon, De Maistre, Tocqueville, Renan, and Michelet draw attention
during the last century to the threat emanating from the Eurasian Russian
empire.[34].
The future peace was to be backed by a group of major
powers called the "nuclear alliance," comprised of the United States,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and, if possible, China. Europe was excluded
from these plans. Walter Lippmann presented Russia as a "potential friend
in the rear of potential enemies," that is, Germany and Japan, two powers
that constitute the essence of Europe and the other that serves as the main
vehicle of Western influence in Asia.
For the sake of Soviet friendship, it was necessary to
abandon "the basic concept of the Treaty of Versailles, which considered
the border region (with Russia) as a military barrier, as a cordon sanitaire
between Russia and the rest of Europe." The independence of the nations of
Central and Eastern Europe could not be sustained "unless Russia allows
them to exist as independent states." Lippmann attempted to explain the
subsequent surrender of these nations to Soviet domination by pointing out that
"they are by no means homogeneous or united," so that aid to one of
them would automatically push others into the Soviet bloc.
Starting from this premise, which was certainly accurate,
Lippmann arrived at the least realistic conclusions. He believed, and it seems
that this reflected his country's official position, that the best way to
safeguard the interests of these nations was to declare them neutral and that
Russia would respect the neutrality of its weak neighbors. The Yalta
agreements, so heavily criticized later on, were negotiated on this erroneous
assumption. Only by assuming that the Crimean agreements fell within the realm
of possibility and feasibility could it later be argued that what had been
agreed upon was favorable, yet the Soviets failed to uphold the famous
agreements.
With the collapse of the political and geographical
status of Central and Eastern Europe, and the unjust and extremely dangerous
Soviet expansion, criticism arose against the system of small nation-states.
While the right to national self-determination is acknowledged and emphasized,
and political practice favors the formation of numerous new or quasi-national
states in Asia and Africa, reservations of both theoretical and practical
nature are raised regarding the future of nation-states in Central and Eastern
Europe.
It is stressed that peoples are cultural communities,
not identifiable with the institution of the state, a political entity. The
nation-state, as an instrument of the power of the people who rule it, is often
almost synonymous with statism and the nationalist extremism that led to the
"Balkanization" of that region. Whereas in the last century the
national principle in Europe acted as an integrating factor—as seen in the
unification of Italy and Germany—in our time of concentrated economic and
military power, the same principle has a divisive effect.
Regarding the past, the value of such an argument
cannot be denied. However, these objections seem anachronistic today when,
instead of the principle of the total independence of states, the principle of
interdependence of Western, and above all European, countries is being
affirmed, and the very concept of sovereignty is gradually being revised.
While the system of nation-states presents significant
challenges in ethnically diverse regions, the right to self-determination
remains a prerequisite for good democratic governance.
Nationalist conflicts and antagonisms cannot be
overcome by condemning national patriotism itself—a sentiment so intrinsic and
intense that, in the contemporary world, human rights and freedoms cannot be
realized if national rights are restricted. Supranational integration
guarantees the national rights and freedoms of minorities.
Should such a necessary security system for the West,
and especially for Europe, be established in the form of supranational
collaboration, national borders would have to disappear as military and
economic obstacles. Nation-states would no longer hinder relations between
peoples or impede the integration of economic and defensive power.
Simultaneously, this would create "ample room for the development of that
community of national thought and feeling, of political and cultural tradition,
which are the constructive element of nationalism."[35].
At the same time, when the national idea, a result of
the specific socio-political evolution of Western society, bursts into the
realms of ancient Asian civilizations and among the newly civilized African peoples,
it would be detrimental if the West, under the pretext of the
"international common good," were to deny European peoples the right
to constitute nation-states. Such an attitude would set a precedent with
negative effects on future developments within the Soviet empire. The Soviet
Union does not constitute a Russian nation-state. It is an empire in which more
than half the population is not Russian.
In time, the peoples of the Russian-Soviet empire will
imperatively demand the right to self-determination. The solutions that the
communists are forcing in Asia and Africa in order to undermine the positions
of the Western world will necessarily turn against Russian-Soviet imperialism.
While the future of Central and Eastern Europe, after
the defeat of communism, should not be a return to the previous status quo, it
remains true that opposition to Soviet domination is based not only on demands
for political and individual freedoms, but also national ones.
Therefore, any political action aimed at containing
Russia within its natural borders must take into account the national ideal,
and consequently, must include the right to self-determination. It is not only
the right of peoples with different cultural and political traditions to
integrate as free nations into the European community, but also the right of
peoples of the Byzantine-Russian tradition to develop freely according to their
own idiosyncrasies, including the right to associate with Russia.
It is often said, with good reason, that the
precarious peace that currently exists rests on two fears: on the one hand,
responsible Western statesmen fear the unknown of atomic war, and on the other,
Soviet leaders are concerned about the discontent of oppressed peoples, which
has already manifested itself in East Berlin, Poznan, and Budapest. Therefore,
the political problems of Central and Eastern Europe, the epicenter of both
world wars, and the region where the current situation is fraught with even
greater dangers, deserve special attention.
VII. CROATIA: AN IRREPLACEABLE FACTOR IN THE BALANCE OF THE
ADRIATIC-DANUBIAN-BALKAN REGION
In our synthetic overview of the general development of Central and
Eastern Europe, Croatia was given its due. However, because Croatia does not
appear on the map as a political unit, and is the subject of misunderstandings
and mystifications, we consider it appropriate to point out the causes and
consequences of this situation.
This is all the more important given that the possibilities for making
its points of view and criteria known are very limited for a relatively small
and politically dependent people, while at the same time, official propaganda
from Belgrade tries to silence the Croatian contribution to the general
development of Central Europe and conceal the current positions of the Croatian
people. Furthermore, professors of Slavic philology, who teach at Western
universities, often settle for presenting Croatia as part of the Slavic world,
thus obscuring its historical and national identity.
The drawbacks of the complex nomenclature of political geography must
also be considered, since, as a consequence of the defensive wars against the
Ottomans, the ethnic and political designation of Croatia in contemporary times
is linked only to two of its six provinces: the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia,
which until 1918 was governed by the Croatian ban (prorex) and the Croatian
Diet (Sabor), with the status of a kingdom associated with Hungary, possessing
sovereign attributes.
The other Croatian provinces, during the Turkish invasions, were
dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, on the Ottoman Empire and the
Republic of Venice, respectively. Only by decision of the Congress of Vienna
(1814-15) did Dalmatia, along with the territory of the Republic of Dubrovnik
(Ragusa) and the Venetian part of Istria, come under the rule of the Emperor of
Austria and King of Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in turn, were occupied by
Austria-Hungary by virtue of the resolution of the European powers at the
Congress of Berlin (1878).
However, even then, these provinces were not incorporated into the
Kingdom of Croatia, but rather administered by the joint Austrian and
Hungarian-Croatian Ministry of Finance, while Dalmatia and Istria, by virtue of
the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which inaugurated the dualist system,
remained within the Austrian half of the Monarchy as autonomous provinces.
Although the Habsburgs had pledged, since 1527 when the Croats elected
Ferdinand I—brother of Charles V and his successor to the imperial throne—as
their king, to contribute to the liberation and unification of Croatian lands,
the second part of that solemn pact, subsequently ratified so many times, was
not fulfilled. Within the dualist system, Austria's status as a great power
depended on its possession of the Croatian Adriatic coast. For this reason,
Dalmatia was never returned to Croatian rule.
Thus, the aspirations of the Croatian national movement were thwarted,
which was one of the causes of the fall of the Habsburg Empire. Austria-Hungary
entered the war of 1914-1918, which ended in its dismemberment due to the
unhealthy situation prevailing in its southern part, that is, Croatia.
While the vast majority of Croatians clung until the very end to the
hope that their aspirations would be fulfilled within a trialist system—the
system championed by Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who was precisely for this
reason assassinated in Sarajevo in the well-known attack orchestrated by Serbia
and Russia—the conviction that Austria-Hungary was inextricably linked to the
German Drang nach Osten policy gradually took hold among the Croatian ruling
class. Ultimately, even the proverbial loyalty of Croatian soldiers to their
kings of the ruling House of Austria faltered.
In this historical process, the transfer of Croatian
political leadership to the new ruling class—largely composed of the
intelligentsia—had decidedly negative effects. This intelligentsia was the
inexperienced successor to the nobility, a capable, numerous, and experienced
ruling class, but one impoverished and decimated by centuries of struggle
against the Ottomans. The new political leaders lacked the means to impose a
viable compromise on the rulers of Austria-Hungary, that is, the imperial court
in Vienna, where the influence of the Austrian and Hungarian aristocracy
predominated.
There is no doubt that the inherent inability of the
Austro-Hungarian ruling class to understand and satisfy the justified demands
of the Slavic majority within the Monarchy proved to be the primary cause of
its demise. Fears of the Slavic peoples were the driving force behind political
missteps, fostering intrigues and subversive activities in favor of Russia's
Byzantine ambitions on the one hand, and on the other, leading Austria-Hungary
to become increasingly dependent on Prussianized Germany.
Thus, the Habsburg system, by failing to transform
itself in time into a community of free nations and thereby become a
constructive factor in the European balance of power, condemned Austria-Hungary
to play the thankless role of brilliant second fiddle to Wilhelm II's Germany.
It lost its freedom of decision in international affairs, and finally, after
much hesitation, the victorious powers of the First World War resolved to
dismember it.
The pressure from liberal and nationalist Italy
contributed significantly to the end of the Habsburg Empire, which later proved
detrimental to Italy itself. Instead of insisting on the feasible
transformation of that empire and its emancipation from Prussian dominance,
thereby creating the conditions for fruitful coexistence with its neighbors on
the Brenner Pass and the Adriatic coast, Italy, guided by Mazzini's romantic
illusions about the peaceful intentions of the Balkan Slavs and blinded by the
prejudices of the Risorgimento regarding Austria, had established a program
that envisioned supposed strategic borders in the remnants of the Danubian
Monarchy, extremely detrimental to its neighbors.
The shattering of these illusions triggered a profound
political crisis in Italy, unfolding in successive stages: the end of liberal
Italy, the presence of the Third Reich at the Brenner Pass and its political
dependence on Germany, the impossibility of severing ties with its German ally,
the loss of territorial gains in the Adriatic, the fall of the House of Savoy,
Russian domination of the Danube basin, and the establishment of communist
regimes in the restored Yugoslavia and Albania, which had broken away from
Italy.
This situation posed a constant threat to Italy's
Adriatic coast from the proponents of the communist empire, stretching from
Beijing to Trieste. In 1945, Italy itself was in danger of being engulfed by
the Russian-communist tide. It was saved by the presence of the Allied
occupation troops.
Nevertheless, Italy's ambitions to replace Austria's
influence in the Danube basin and the Balkans were not entirely unrealistic.
Italy squandered this opportunity because Rome, like Vienna before it, failed
to distinguish between Slavs of Western culture and those of Byzantine-Russian
orientation.
While the former gravitated toward their western
neighbors and, therefore, despite all national differences and misgivings,
could become their natural allies, the latter were potential clients of Russia,
even when, due to exceptional circumstances, they acted as protégés of one of
the Western powers. Failing to grasp the significance of this fundamental
difference, the Habsburgs, during the era of national movements, inaugurated a
policy of distrust toward their Slavic subjects, thus becoming dependent on
Germany. For the same reasons, Italian policy regarding the Danube basin, the
Adriatic, and the Balkans was confused and contradictory from the outset, so
that Italy, in turn, became the Third Reich's brilliance second.
While both the left and right wings of liberal Italy
adopted different positions toward the Slavic peoples, both currents shared a
lack of understanding of their cultural duality. Those devoted to Mazzini saw
the Balkan Slavs as their natural allies against the hated Austria. Politicians
faithful to the Mazzini tradition believed that loyal collaboration with
Orthodox Serbia was possible, which, in turn, considered Italy and the Catholic
Church itself as "hereditary enemies" of all Slavs, identifying the
Slavic world with "Orthodoxy" in the same way as Russian Slavophiles.
The Italian nationalist movement, for its part, lacked
such illusions. For it, all Slavs, without distinction, were barbarians, a
threat to civilization, and a tool of Austria or Russia. Therefore, they had to
be contained by conquering the supposed strategic borders while simultaneously
fomenting and exploiting their conflicts and mutual rivalries.
For these reasons, Italy's war aims in the First World
War, with regard to the Adriatic and Balkan regions, were defined with a
surprising lack of vision and ignorance of the true situation and the balance
of power, given their immediate proximity. The aim was to solve the Adriatic
problem, which was of vital importance to Italy and the other peoples of the
Adriatic and its extensive hinterland, at the expense of the Croats and
Albanians—legitimate possessors of the eastern Adriatic coast since the early
Middle Ages—and in complicity with Serbia, a country without access to the
Adriatic.
An illusory friendship was forged with Serbia instead
of finding a just solution in agreement with Croatia and Albania and in view of
the general interests.
The misguided Italian foreign policy regarding the
region in question was also due to an erroneous and anachronistic
interpretation of nationalist romanticism, which considered Italy the innate
successor to the role played by Venice.
The Republic of Saint Mark, although its political
center was on Italian soil, was a supranational political creation in the
modern sense of the term, whose purpose was to organize the common defense of
the Christian maritime nations of the eastern Mediterranean basin against
Turkish invasion, playing a role at sea similar to that of the Austrian Ghasrad
system on land.
The initial, misguided, and adverse step was taken
with the secret Pact of London of 1915, by which France, Great Britain, and
Russia pledged to reward Italy for its entry into the war against the Central
Powers with the cession of Croatian and Slovenes. Italy was assigned the
northern and central part and Serbia virtually the southern part of the
Croatian coast.
This promise could only be partially fulfilled because
President Wilson, invoking the national principle, opposed such transactions
involving foreign territories and populations. Thus, Italy failed to achieve
its main objective and also had to bear the negative consequences of the London
Pact. The Croats and Slovenes, as soon as they learned of the pact's clauses,
mounted a fanatical resistance on the Austro-Italian front, where Italy
suffered tremendous losses.
With the Habsburg Empire defeated, the Croats, faced
with Italian ambitions, had to seek, albeit reluctantly, support in the
Balkans. On the eastern Adriatic coast, with the disappearance of Austria, its
place was taken by Yugoslavia, a relatively strong and militarized country
which, in the opinion of the Serbs, was destined to be "the knife in
Italy's back." All of Italy's enemies could count on the support of
Yugoslavia.
Thus, Italy failed to gain control of the Adriatic
and, at the same time, lost the potential friendship of Croatia and Albania. By
not properly valuing Croatia as an irreplaceable factor in the
Adriatic-Danubian-Balkan region and by not adequately appreciating its age-old
role as a staunch defender of Western values in this area, Italy
was deprived of the opportunity to consolidate its influence in the Balkans and
the Danubian basin, with the prospect of extending it to the Baltic.
Other major powers, primarily France, had also
underestimated the value of Croatia's position in this sector, considering the
new Yugoslav state, conceived as an expanded Serbia, the cornerstone of a
system of alliances aimed at preventing potential German or Soviet dominance in
Central and Eastern Europe.
The Third Republic did not hesitate to unconditionally
support all the pan-Serbian dictatorial governments that pursued a policy of
undisguised national oppression against the vast majority of the non-Serbian
population.
The venerable French tradition of protecting the
Christians of the Near East and its sentimental attachment to Serbia, its small
and self-sacrificing ally in the First World War, were so deeply ingrained that
the warnings of politicians and experts that Yugoslavia, ruled by Serbs,
deprived of political freedoms, torn apart by internal conflicts, and at odds
with neighboring peoples—victims of Serbian pygmy imperialism—could not be a
reliable and efficient ally, were rendered ineffective.
However, what transpired during the European crisis
before and during the Second World War surpassed even the most pessimistic
predictions. Yugoslavia proved incapable of resisting the political ambitions
of both the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Its dictatorial governments,
practicing pan-Serbian expansionism, forced many politicians to seek refuge and
support in neighboring countries.
Certain revolutionary groups, in their desperation,
resorted to terrorist methods, thereby merely imitating the Serbs themselves.
Subsequently, the Belgrade governments, in order to counter the actions of
Croatian and Macedonian exiles, adopted a policy of appeasement toward Fascist
Italy and Hitler's Germany.
Furthermore, at a time when it became necessary to
curb Hitler's projects in the Danube basin, it turned out that the Serbian
rulers of Yugoslavia were more wary of small, impoverished, and unarmed Austria
than of the aggressive and powerful Third Reich. For the Serbs, Austria
remained the "hereditary enemy," the homeland of the Habsburgs, a
potential ally of the Croats and Slovenes against Pan-Servianism, and a state
linked to Italy and Hungary. During the Austrian crisis, German diplomats were
able to report with satisfaction to their government that Yugoslavia "had
categorically rejected the French government's invitation to join the protest
lodged in Berlin against the proposed annexation—Anschluss—of Austria to the
Third Reich.
The dictatorial government in Belgrade, a typical
example of the policy of national oppression, cynically invoked the right to
self-determination and concluded that the question of Austrian independence
'was an internal German matter' and 'that the Yugoslav state, respectful of the
principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, could not take a
position against that principle.' And, to top it all off, 'Yugoslavia
congratulates itself on having within its borders, as a consequence of its
policy toward Germany, not 80 million enemies, but 80 million friends.'" [36].
Yugoslavia, therefore, had renounced its allies of the
Little Entente and, in turn, its great protectors.
Although Serbia was liberated in 1918 with the blood
of the poilus d'Orient, in 1940 Serbian politicians impassively witnessed
France's military defeat. The Serbs adopted a different attitude when it came
to Russia. The much-touted coup of March 27, 1941, proved beneficial only to
the Soviet Union, as did the communist guerrillas unleashed months later.
The coup, supposedly anti-Nazi in nature, had some
impact among the Serbian masses, who primarily demanded the abolition of the
limited autonomy granted in 1989 to Banovina Hrvatska (the Banat of Croatia)
and believed in the imminent arrival of Soviet aid. Despite its Bolshevik
system, Russia always exerted a seductive power over the Serbs, the vast
majority of whom are not communists. Serbia entered the First World War, which
it had in fact provoked, as a Russian protégé and not as an Entente ally.
Between the two world wars, its protector was France,
only because Tsarist Russia ceased to exist. But the new generation was not
Francophile but pro-Soviet. The Croats believe, and with good reason, that
because of their forced union with Serbia in 1918, they now have to endure
communist tyranny.
It was the Russians who, better than Western
statesmen, understood the character of Croatia. Even Tsarist Russia, in its
program of expansion in the Balkans, distrusted Croatian influence and never
supported its union with Serbia. Stalin did not desire such a union either.
From the moment of Yugoslavia's disintegration in
1941, he viewed the Yugoslav Communist Party's plans for its restoration with
suspicion. Instead, Stalin envisioned dividing Yugoslavia into two spheres of
influence, with Croatia and Slovenia gravitating towards the West and Serbia
towards the Soviet Union. Given Croatia and Slovenia's Central European and
Mediterranean location, Stalin realized that the Allies would never allow all
of Yugoslavia to be occupied by Soviet troops.
With a thorough understanding of the national problems
of Central and Eastern Europe, Stalin could easily imagine that Kremlin control
of Yugoslavia, once restored without Soviet military intervention, would be
very difficult due to the natural westward inclination of the Croats and
Slovenes and the chronic rivalry between the Serbs and Bulgarians regarding
Macedonia. Subsequent events justified these fears.
At the same time, the democratic powers, by insisting
on their support for the Yugoslav government of King Peter in exile with its
marked pan-Serbian tendencies, found themselves powerless in the face of Soviet
designs to conquer Central Europe.
With an Allied landing on the Croatian coast in the
final phase of the war—a political-military operation easily executed because
it would have been supported by the armed forces of Croatia, Hungary, and the
resistance fighters of Austria and Poland—Russian plans could have been
thwarted, at least in those countries. An operation to that effect was being
prepared in Croatia.
The Hungarians notified Allied agents of their
willingness to cooperate. The Warsaw insurgents, betrayed by the Soviets,
desired nothing less than to take the same course of action.
The importance of this contingency had not escaped
Churchill's perspicacity, but Roosevelt's circumspection in the face of
Stalin's proverbial misgivings, as well as his reservations about the Croats,
who opposed the restoration of Yugoslavia, came into play.
The political and social development of Croatia
coincided with that of the other peoples located on the eastern border of our
Western society. This process was conditioned by Croatia's location. In the
extreme south, between two European civilizations that the historian Toynbee
identifies with the line running from Finland to the Croatian province of
Dalmatia.
Although Croatia, according to the assessments of the
historian Rambaud[37], By the 10th century, Croatia already had over 1.5
million inhabitants and powerful military forces. Its development was hampered
by political pressures and invasions from Eurasian empires: the Byzantine, the
Mongol, the Ottoman, and the Russian-Soviet.
Although fiercely protective of their sovereign
rights, the Croats allied themselves with other nations of Western culture for
the purpose of common defense. Hence their ties to the empire of Charlemagne,
Pope Gregory VII, and later, the personal and real union with Hungary. This
union, in turn, became part of a broader community of Danubian peoples, a
consequence of the Turkish threat. Even in the contemporary era of national
movements,
Croatia, suffering new pressures, now from Serbia,
which had become an exponent of Russian expansionism in the Balkans, sought
support from its neighbors of Western culture. It failed in this endeavor
because both Italy, its Adriatic neighbor, and its Danubian partners, Austria
and Hungary, feared the Croats simply because they belonged to the Slavic
linguistic group. The Russians, on the other hand, saw Croatia, a predominantly
Catholic country, as an agent of Western influence and interests.
In the era of sacred egoism, Croatia's Western
orientation could be interpreted as anachronistic: both backward-looking,
echoing the old days of Western Christian solidarity, and forward-thinking,
coinciding with the aspirations for Western, and primarily European, integration,
which fortunately is no longer a utopia.
The Croats, true to their character, will not accept a
future within a Balkan state, but rather wish to live within the community of
free European nations. Croatia, a country that for 800 years, in the interest
of the international common good, participated in supranational communities,
sacrificing parts of its territory and sovereignty, and contributing great
offerings of blood and material goods, has the right to have the injustice
committed against it in 1918 and 1945 rectified.
At that time, it was subjected to Serbia and,
consequently, stripped of the attributes of a sovereign nation, exploited as a
colony, exposed to the bloody political upheavals in the Balkans, and finally
subjected to communist domination due to Serbia's pro-Russian orientation.
Buenos Aires.
This type of nationalism
gained momentum in Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the mid-20th century
onwards, while in certain Asian countries and especially in Africa, it only
took hold in the 20th century. The reason for this delay is that the
disintegration of feudalism and colonialism, as well as the formation of an
intellectual class with national consciousness, occurred a century or more
later than in Western Europe.
In some regions of Eastern
Europe, Asia, and Africa, nationalism is now in its initial phase, since the
definitive elimination of feudal vestiges, the collapse of the colonial system,
and the formation of the national intelligentsia have only recently taken
place. Under these conditions, several factors, primarily tribal loyalty,
hindered the rapid progress of a common national consciousness, as many cases
currently occurring in African countries demonstrate.
Therefore, in our times of
the definitive extinction of feudal vestiges and the final collapse of
colonialism, the surest indicator for assessing the problems of national
identity of an ethnic group, both now and in the near future, is reflected in
the orientation of the intelligentsia of that group. For, sooner or later, this
same national identity will extend to the peasant, working-class, and bourgeois
masses.
And not precisely because
the popular masses see their intelligentsia as the sole and exclusive leaders,
whom they must follow blindly, but rather because this intelligentsia,
originating from and identified with a particular ethnic group, champions a
national ideology that aligns with the cultural and other values
of the popular masses, with their way of life and thought, with
their aspirations and dreams, with their philosophy and ethics, with their
beliefs and hopes.
The intelligentsia, that is,
a group of individuals specialized in formulating ideas, knows how to express
in words what the people think and feel. In other words, the better the
intelligentsia can express what the broad masses of the people yearn for and
expect, the more quickly the formulated ideology will be embraced by the entire
population. Therefore, when formulating an ideology, it is of paramount importance
to know how to combine local and other traditions with national values and
aspirations, as well as how to integrate local loyalties into national
allegiance.
If we analyze the situation of the Muslims of Bosnia
and Herzegovina from this perspective, we see that the intelligentsia began to
form towards the end of the last century, formulating its national ideology,
which gradually spread and penetrated the masses of the Muslim population.
Historical and political factors slowed this development without halting it.
However, this delayed evolution was the cause of the confusion and lack of
understanding that existed abroad regarding the Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The Kingdom of Serbia, in its expansionist policy
before the First World War, pursued the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and strove to propagate in the Western world the idea that the Muslims of these
provinces were, from a national perspective, Serbs and that, consequently,
Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to Serbia.
At that time, Croatian intellectuals had no way to
refute this propaganda abroad, as they lacked diplomatic missions and other
external propaganda institutions, unlike the Kingdom of Serbia. Furthermore,
the Western powers were generally lenient toward Serbia's expansionist
ambitions due to the prevailing international situation, dominated by the
conflict between the Allies (England, France, and Russia) and the Central
Powers (Germany and Austria).
Shortly after the First World War, just as today, all
objective scientists and other public figures on the international stage
realized that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not identify as Serbian.
Do they identify as Croatian, or perhaps as "Yugoslav"? As for
"Yugoslavism" or "Yugoslav national consciousness," it is
generally understood that this ideology was completely discarded, since the
various South Slavic peoples (Croats, Slovenes, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs,
etc.) are entirely different from one another.
Each of these peoples was formed differently, under
different conditions and diverse influences; each forged its own cultural
individuality over centuries and, ultimately, its profound national
consciousness, which demands its own nation-state and, therefore, could not be
diluted by "Yugoslavism."
For the same reason, the Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina cannot be "Yugoslavs." Consequently, the appropriate
answer to the question posed concerning the national affiliation of the Muslims
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is obtained by examining the national sentiments and
expressions of the Muslim intelligentsia and verifying whether their national
affiliation aligns with the cultural values, feelings, and aspirations of the
Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the history of the formation of national consciousness
in all peoples, writers, poets, and historians have played the most important
role. Let us examine, then, what national sentiments Muslim writers and poets
expressed. First, they used almost exclusively Latin script, not Cyrillic.
They wrote in the Croatian language and literary
style, not in the language and style typically used by Serbian writers and
poets. In most cases, they declared their Croatian, not Serbian, nationality,
considering themselves an integral part of the Croatian people and literature,
to which they made a significant contribution.
They saw themselves as called to fulfill a special
mission for the Croatian people and the Western world: to unite the cultural
values of the West and the East. Thus, for example, the
well-known Muslim poet Safvetbeg Basagic wrote: "The sounds of the Croatian
language can ennoble and unite East and West, heart and mind."
These words were frequently quoted among Muslims and
adopted as a motto in the magazine Osvit, published in Mostar.
We have the same situation now, setting aside the rare
individuals who, out of opportunism and for material gain, gravitate towards
those in power. Given that all power, both in communist and monarchical
Yugoslavia, was and remained in the hands of Serbian professional politicians,
it is commendable that very few Muslim intellectuals succumbed to seductive
promises.
Thus, for example, today, as in monarchical
Yugoslavia, Muslim religious leaders, ulema, prominent figures, and professors,
with few exceptions, emphasized and continue to emphasize their Croatian
identity, even though the ruling circles viewed this attitude with suspicion
and almost equated it, then and now, with treason. Let us also consider which
side the political leaders of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were on at
the beginning of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, at a time when national affiliation
was tolerated, despite political and psychological pressures.
In the 1927 elections, of the 17 national deputies
from the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 declared themselves
Croats, 5 were undecided or declared themselves as such, and only one declared
himself Serb, even though the opportunistic possibilities and economic
advantages of identifying with the Serbs were as great in monarchical
Yugoslavia as they are today under the communist regime.
Svetozar Pribicevic, a prominent leader of the Serbian
minority in Croatia, a great Serbian nationalist, and one of the founders and
architects of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, clearly perceived the level of
national consciousness among the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his book
on the dictatorship of King Alexander, he wrote: “Where to count the Bosnian
Muslims, who are disputed by Croats and Serbs, who speak the literary language,
and number around 700,000? Their intellectuals are, for the most part, of
Croatian origin. The popular masses, in all political actions, blindly follow
the intellectuals. There is no room for deception here. In particular, the
hegemonic system of Serbia—according to which all state power is in the hands
of the Serbs, that is, their representatives, without their authorization—led
Bosnian Muslims to identify completely with the Croats in their aspirations and
visions for the future.”[38].
As can be inferred from the preceding quote, Svetozar
Pribicevic astutely perceived that hegemony intensifies latent feelings,
fosters the integration of oppressed ethnic groups, and strengthens their
national consciousness. Had the latent feelings and cultural values
of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina been oriented toward
Serbia, the Muslim masses in those provinces would have identified with Serbian
hegemony, which would have brought them economic and political benefits.
On the contrary, Serbian hegemony strengthened their
Croatian feelings and their Croatian national consciousness. We find the same
case with the hegemony of Serbian communist professional politicians and
opportunists, who govern with dictatorial methods.
Currently in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a Muslim and
Catholic majority and a Serbian minority, power rests entirely in the hands of
Serbian professional communists, assisted by a handful of Catholic and Muslim
opportunists, denationalized and oriented as either "Yugoslavs" or
Serbs.
It is evident that this communist hegemony, even more
brutal and blatant than the previous monarchical one, will strengthen the Croat
sentiments of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provinces which Muslims
consider their homeland, inherited from their ancestors since ancient times.
The hegemony of Serbian-communist politicians and professional
opportunists in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a continuation of Serbian
irredentism, which began its propaganda campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina
after the accession of the Karageorgevich dynasty to the Serbian throne.
In this propaganda campaign, whose aim was the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of Serbia, the notorious
Serbian terrorist and conspiratorial organization "Union or Death,"
also known as "The Black Hand," played a particular role. This
irredentist movement did everything possible to win the sympathies of Muslim
intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, awarding numerous scholarships.
The proponents of the Greater Serbian expansionist
idea knew full well that, without the support of the Muslim population, they
could not annex Bosnia and Herzegovina and proclaim them Serbian provinces.
Then, when neither the propaganda nor the scholarships proved effective, the
Greater Serbian irredentists resorted to mystification, declaring that the
Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were "pure Serbs."
But if even a glimmer of latent pro-Serbian sentiment
had existed among the Muslims of those provinces, it would have manifested
itself under favorable circumstances. This did not happen, however, since the
overwhelming majority of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as mentioned above,
did not declare themselves Serbian in the elections, which were run by the
communist authorities.
II
It is a proven fact in contemporary psychology that
latent and subconscious feelings, deeply rooted, erupt during times of social
crisis, collective revolts, revolutions, and wars. In the Second World War, for
example, the latent national sentiments of the Muslim population in Bosnia and
Herzegovina manifested themselves unequivocally.
During that war, the Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, almost without exception, refused to participate as volunteers in
any Serbian nationalist group or organization, and especially not in the units
of the Chetniks, the quintessential Serbian nationalist guerrillas.
There were some exceptions regarding the communist
guerrillas, but it should be emphasized that the Muslims who fought in the
communist ranks, composed mostly of Serbs, had to conceal their Islamic faith
and pretend to be Orthodox. Furthermore, entire Muslim villages, including
women, the elderly, and children, were exterminated and razed by the Chetniks.
Dr. Zivko Topalovic, an associate of General Draza
Mihailovic, confirmed these atrocities committed by the Chetniks against
Muslims in his recent book (3).
These outrages constituted a repeat of the same crime
perpetrated against defenseless Muslim populations after the First World War,
when Orthodox fanatics burned several Muslim villages and slaughtered their
inhabitants. It is true that the communist guerrillas during the Second World
War, despite their supposed "Yugoslavism," did not behave any better
than the Chetniks toward Muslims.
They, too, exterminated the Muslim population without
mercy at the slightest resistance, showing no pity for women or the elderly.
The Serbian writer Branko Copic, in his recent novel The Silent Gunpowder
(Gluvi barut), vividly and in detail recounted the massacre of a Muslim village
by communist guerrillas, while the Montenegrin politician and writer Milovan
Djilas movingly described in his autobiographical book Bezsudna zemlja (Land
Without Justice), New York; 1959, the horrific extermination of the Muslim
population by Orthodox fanatics. There is no doubt that in all these cases, the
centuries-old antagonism, born of religious and political differences between
Orthodox Christians and Muslims, culminated.
The question naturally arises: Why do Muslim
intellectuals and the Muslim masses nationally orient themselves toward Croatia
and not Serbia, and why have official pressure, various seductive promises, and
brutal oppression failed to alter this orientation in favor of Serbia? The
answer to this question can be found in the first part of this article.
That is to say, only a national ideology conceived and
formulated by intellectuals in accordance with the cultural values, feelings,
aspirations, and principles of the broad masses of the people can succeed. Let
us take, for example, Serbian nationalism. One of the fundamental features of
this nationalism is the identification of religion with nationality.
In this national ideology, as in the ideologies of
other peoples of the Eastern Orthodox Church, religion, people, and state are
completely identified and integrated. Religion and church, in these cases, take
on the character of national and political institutions. Religion and church,
in these cases, must be completely at the service of the state. That is why
Serbs call their religion "Serbian Orthodox." The same applies to the
"Russian Orthodox," "Bulgarian Orthodox," and other religions.
Non-Muslim Croats who profess the Catholic faith
cannot even speak of identifying religion with nationality, since the Catholic
Church, by its very ideology, is supranational and universal.
It is of utmost importance to emphasize here that by
identifying religion, state, and nationality, tendencies arise to consider
those who do not profess the state religion as strange, foreign, and unreliable
elements, whose loyalty can never be fully trusted. Thus, for example, in the
aforementioned lexicon of the "new class" elite in Yugoslavia,
although some Muslims declared themselves Serbs, the number of Muslims promoted
to the ruling class is very small compared to the relative numerical strength
of the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Yugoslavia in
general.
Of the 6,000 names contained in this lexicon, only 115
correspond to Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, or 1.1%, while their
numerical strength would suggest they should represent at least 6%. In that
lexicon, a total of 182 Muslims are listed, representing 3% of the entire
population of Yugoslavia, although their numerical strength (nearly 2,000,000)
would suggest they constitute 12%. This means that even if a Muslim declares
himself Serbian or communist, he is not considered entirely equal to the
Orthodox Serbian communists, who are the ones who truly wield all the power in
communist Yugoslavia.
Such discrimination inevitably breeds political and
religious intolerance, and even religious and political fanaticism. It goes
without saying that the communist authorities did not even attempt to diminish
this religious fanaticism; on the contrary, they sought to exploit it for their
political ends and even exacerbate it.
Texts that address the problems of communism know that
entrenched hatred is one of the main instruments of political power,
propaganda, and the psychological warfare of the communists. Communist
educational manuals, as well as their literature and political ideology, openly
advocate the necessity of hatred. The very concept and practice of class
struggle are steeped in hatred of those who do not follow the communist path.
However, such conceptions directly contradict the
religious and ethical values of Muslims, as the Muslims of Bosnia
and Herzegovina demonstrate a high degree of religious tolerance and altruism.
Religious tolerance is not only highlighted in the principles of the Quran but
is also put into practice. Thus, for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
was dominated by Muslims for several centuries, the non-Muslim population not
only did not decrease but actually increased.
The same did not occur in Serbia and Montenegro, when
those states were ruled by Orthodox Christians. In those states, Muslims were
gradually eliminated from the end of the 19th century onward. The epic poem
*The Mountain Garland* (Gorski Vijenac), considered by Serbs to be one of the masterpieces
of their literature, deals with the struggle and total extermination of the
Muslim population.
Njegos, the author of this work, was both a religious
leader and the ruler of Montenegro, an Orthodox country. Njegos was influenced
by Serbian epic poetry, whose protagonists are chieftains, warlords, and
haïducs (part guerrillas and part Balkan bandits) and whose main merit was the
bloody and cruel struggle against the Muslim "infidels." Serbian epic
poetry also influenced the Croatian writer Iuan Mazuranic during the Romantic
period, particularly in his poem "The Death of Smailaga Cengic," in
which he idealized the fighters for orthodoxy and glorified their struggle
against the Muslims.
From the perspective of physical and cultural
anthropology, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina largely belong to the
so-called "Baltic racial type," characterized by blond pigmentation.
The majority of the Croatian population in various regions also belongs to this
same physical type. Similarly, the indigenous culture of the Muslims of Bosnia
and Herzegovina is of the agricultural type (communal culture), to which a
large portion of other Croats also belong.
Linguistically, the Muslims speak the Ikavski Croatian
dialect, which is spoken only by Croats in certain regions. Furthermore, the
folk art of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina is identical to that of other
Croats. To give an example, Muslim folk songs are primarily amorous,
sentimental, and humanistic, addressed to humanity and nature, and then,
secondarily, heroic in nature.
The popular musical instrument of Muslims, as of the
vast majority of Croats, is the tamburitsa, which is understandable, since this
instrument is very appropriate for expressing feelings of love and other songs,
while the gusle (monochord) is the ideal folk instrument for singers and
reciters of epic poems and legends. The social organization at the grassroots
level of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the principles of
equality, mutual aid, philanthropy, and human dignity, very similar to the
communal culture that was maintained in other areas of Croatia.
Within this culture, family relationships, for
example, are ordered according to democratic principles, women are highly
esteemed, and the treatment given to children, the elderly, and all those with
disabilities is based on humanitarian and charitable principles.
Like other Croats, the Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, from a cultural and political standpoint, are much more aligned
with the West than with the East, as Safvetbeg Basagic has already pointed out.
They consider their historical role to be uniting, on the western border of the
Muslim world, and as an integral part of the Croatian people, the cultural
values of the Muslim East with the cultural values of the West.
Indiana University, U.S.A.
It cannot be said with certainty when the Bible began
to be translated into the living Croatian language, but the oldest texts in
Croatian are precisely the biblical texts found in the Gospel books and
lectionaries. The oldest surviving lectionary is that of Korcula and dates from
the 14th century. The lectionary of Friar Bernardino Spalatense is the first
printed Croatian biblical text and, at the same time, the first Croatian book
printed in Latin characters.
The well-defined purpose of translating the entire
Bible into Croatian and publishing it arose at the beginning of the 16th
century, in the years following the Complutensian Polyglot Bible. The
initiative was due to the illustrious Prince Bernardino Frankopan who, in 1521,
commissioned five Croatian Glagolites to translate the entire Bible into
Croatian.
The Croats thus anticipated the Reformation in their
appreciation of biblical texts for the education of the faithful, and it would
later be the Protestants themselves who recognized these Croatian Catholic
efforts and used them for their propaganda among the South Slavs. However, this
attempt by Prince Bernardino was never realized, probably due to the Ottoman
invasions that deprived the elderly aristocrat of his finest possessions.
Despite the wars with the Turks, biblical studies in
Croatia were not abandoned, and a hundred years after Prince Frankopan's
attempt, the Jesuit Bartolomeo Kašić translated the entire text of the Old
and New Testaments into the living Croatian language, but he was unable to have
it printed because the Glagolitic traditions were too strong and the priests
preferred the archaic ecclesiastical language for the sacred texts.
Numerous partial translations followed until 1831
when, finally, the complete text of the Bible was published in Croatian. Since
then, there have been several subsequent editions, always by new translators
who refined the language of the translation and the critical apparatus,
according to the latest findings in biblical scholarship.
However, there is a facet of the Croatian people's
biblical tradition that distinguishes them from other peoples and brings them
closer to the Spanish. It is the missionary zeal, common to both Spanish and
Croatian Catholics. It has already been mentioned that the Spanish were ahead
of the Reformation in the cultivation of biblical studies, as were the
Croatians, at least with respect to translations and the reading of Sacred
Scripture.
In this respect, the case of the Croatian Dominican
Father Benjamin is very significant. He traveled to distant Russia and there
produced a complete translation of the Bible into Church Slavonic for
Archbishop Gennadius of Novgorod, incorporating existing parts and completing
it with the remainder translated from the Vulgate. Thus, in 1499, the first
complete text of the Old and New Testaments in Russia was born.
It remained, incidentally, in manuscript form, but it
was used by later translators and editors, serving as the basis and model for
the famous Ostrog Bible, the first Bible in Church Slavonic (1581), from which
all modern Bible versions of the East Slavs would later derive.
Another Croatian missionary in Russia, the celebrated
father of Pan-Slavism, Georg Krizanić (d. 1683), offered his services to
Tsar Alexander Mikhailovich to prepare a new and corrected edition of the Bible
in Russian. He argued that the existing edition by Francis Skorina (Prague,
1517–1519) had been produced under Protestant influences, and the Ostrog
edition was outdated due to its Old Church Slavonic language. Krizanić's
initiative, like the rest of his mission, was unsuccessful because it was Catholicizing.
Like other European Christian literatures, Croatian
literature in its medieval period also consisted of a large number of mystery
plays, poems, and stories with biblical themes, generally anonymous works by
devout monks and priests. The first poem of the new Croatian literature is
Judith (1501) by Marcus Marulić (1450–1524), a writer also known in Spain
for his Latin works.
The psalms were particularly favoured for translation
and paraphrasing. The earliest known Croatian psalter dates from the late 14th
century, and the finest poetic paraphrases were produced by the great poets of
Ragusa's Golden Age of literature, Gundulic and Gjurgjevic. The biblical
tradition also remains a constant presence in Croatian literature in modern
times, and its last great poet and writer, Vladimir Nazor (1875–1949), included
among his poems the cycle Biblical Legends.
At the same time, biblical motifs also find expression
in the Fine Arts, so that the entire Croatian national culture is permeated by
Holy Scripture. Its cultural creation, writing, and literary language begin
with it, and it culminates in the present day: the series of several
magnificent wooden reliefs with New Testament motifs by Ivan Mestrovic, which
is the finest and most accomplished example of contemporary Croatian art,
worthily crowning a millennia-old biblical tradition.
Commissioned by the Croatian Episcopate, Bishop Saric
translated the Old and New Testaments directly from the original, also using
the Vulgate and earlier Croatian versions. The language of his translation is
the purest modern Croatian literary style, interspersed with archaisms
characteristic of liturgical texts, which lend the work a profound,
supernatural air. The first edition, complete with notes, commentaries, and
practical advice for parishioners, appeared in Sarajevo in 1942 and, despite
the war, quickly sold out.
The second edition, published in Madrid in 1953 by
order of the Croatia Academica Catholica, covers, as already mentioned, only
the New Testament, with the same text as the 1942 edition, from which it
differs by its Prologue and magnificent plates by the finest Croatian artists.
Following the title page is a color reproduction of a
miniature by Giulio Clovio (1498-1578), a friend and patron of El Greco. The
text includes eight plates with photogravures in relief depicting biblical
scenes, carved in wood by the renowned Croatian sculptor Ivan Mestrovic. This
edition of the New Testament, well-received by Croatian emigrants, prompted the
Osvit publishing house to undertake the arduous and challenging task of
re-editing all the books of the Old and New Testaments.
Thanks to the patronage of the distinguished Spanish
intellectual, Dr. Mariano Aguirre Martinez, and the tireless work of the
founder and director of Osvit, Croatians now have a complete and modern Bible,
written in a vibrant and up-to-date Croatian language, and provided with notes
and clarifications that present the reader with the latest findings in biblical
scholarship.
THREE MEDITATIONS ON COMMUNISM
George Uscatescu
Generally, the testimonies
offered by those disillusioned with communism, even the most intelligent, tend
to be pathetic. A personal drama almost always resonates within them, the drama
inherent in the discovery of the abyss between revolutionary, pure, and utopian
ideals and a cruel and merciless reality, aimed at annihilating human dignity
and the natural yearning to attain two imperative elements of existence today:
bread and freedom.
Faced with these personal
experiences—thousands upon thousands of experiences lived with singular
intensity—free opinion is moved, and each one adds a new note of infamy to this
degrading and cruel human experience of vast proportions that bears the name of
communism.
Another noteworthy aspect of
these testimonies is that they belong to fortunate survivors who have managed
to escape the enormous communist concentration camp universe. His messages thus
become documents launched from the outside and after the fact, since the
communist system itself is utterly intolerant of any criticism made to the
world from within its own borders.
Given these general characteristics of personal
adventures and widely publicized testimonies aimed at denouncing the errors and
crimes of communism, or simply at subjecting communist reality to relentless
criticism, the personal journey and critical testimonies of the Yugoslav
communist leader Milovan Djilas acquire truly unique characteristics. Anyone
who utters the name Milovan Djilas in the communist world, or rather, anyone
who uttered it until a few years ago, thought of one of the most exalted
figures of that elite of communist leaders, whom the myths and propaganda from
beyond the Iron Curtain relentlessly extol.
A first-rate communist intellectual, the second most
important Yugoslav personality after Tito, consulted by Stalin himself during
critical moments for international communism, a hero in the partisan war, and
the architect of the new communist state in his country, Djilas represents the
unique case of a communist leader who comes to the conclusion that the system
is in a crisis with no possible solution, while still holding important
government positions.
No means,
among all those employed by Tito and his enemies—from persuasion and
sentimental recollections of years of shared struggle to threats,
condemnations, and imprisonment—can stop the great "heretic" of
Belgrade in his merciless critique of the communist system, carried out from
within the communist experience itself. His adventure cannot be compared to
that of Trotsky and other communist "rebels," generally adversaries
of Stalin, who offered a particular interpretation of communism and combated
Stalinist methods.
Djilas
offers us the curious case of a communist who remains within the communist
sphere, who continues to be communist in essence, but who subjects communism to
the most profound criticism, sparing neither prophet nor demagogue. Marx and
Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, Tito and Khrushchev, permanent revolution and
national communism—nothing escapes his cold and well-documented dialectic,
which inevitably leads us to the conclusion that communism, from beginning to
end, from its earliest prophets to its vulgar epigones of today, who manipulate
ideas with boorish arguments, from the grand initial utopia to the degrading
and cruel reality of today in its means and ends, in the constant interplay
between its ideals and its realities, has been an enormous failure, a latent
revolutionary agony, despite its enormous display of forces and deployment of
energies.
But
if Djilas's personal adventure is singular, his critical testimony is no less
new and interesting. It is not a pathetic document. It is a concrete, cold,
intellectual explanation, delivered without polemical passion, without it
seeming for a single moment that the person offering us this spectral analysis
of communism was until yesterday one of its protagonists and that he is
currently suffering in his flesh and spirit the direct consequences of his
critical stance.
For
all this and perhaps much more, Milovan Djilas's latest book, published with
enormous success throughout the West, is a sensational book. Its title, The New
Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, in itself indicates a new element
at the very root of its diagnosis, in that it attributes to a political caste
resulting from the revolution and the communist state experience the
preponderant role in the expansion, power, and ideological and revolutionary
agony of communism.
Subsequently,
Djilas himself evolved in such a way that, in his book *A Country Without
Justice*, the ideological agony of the doctrine he had once championed led him
to the exaltation of a tribal and primitive mentality, considered in romantic
terms.
From
the outset, Djilas wanted to emphasize that his attitude was not the result of
disillusionment, after having climbed the entire communist hierarchy and
contributed to the establishment of so-called socialist society. He sought,
therefore, to separate his personal problems and adventure from his
observations and the diagnosis he formulated regarding contemporary communism.
"These are," he writes, "simply perspectives and ideas about the
world in which I live. I am a product of this world. I contributed to its
birth.
Now
I am one of its critics. I have fought in the past, I am fighting now for a
better world. This struggle may not produce the desired results. However,
the logic of my actions lies in the duration and continuity of this
struggle."
No revolution in history has presented such a vast
chasm between the promises made to hopeful masses and what has been achieved in
the political, social, and economic experience following its triumph.
Almost
nothing that the communist revolution promised has been realized. Instead, one
of its most significant outcomes has emerged that no one had foreseen. Neither
Marx, nor Lenin, nor even Trotsky, harbingers of a classless society, had
predicted the emergence of a new class, with caste-like characteristics,
unknown to history. Its origin is simultaneously political, social, and
economic.
It
is a political bureaucracy, the ultimate expression of the party's actions once
it has seized power and established the new state. Symbolizing a latent
conflict between society and the state, it nevertheless finds its origin in the
myth of the proletariat and in the initial impetus provided by the support of
the masses swept along in the revolutionary process. Economically, its
emergence is justified from the moment it enjoys unlimited, in the form of
personal monopoly and privileges, all the property of the nation.
This new class is formed from the ranks of
professional revolutionaries within the party after the conquest of power. Its
true creator was Stalin in Russia, and his imitators outside Russia. In his
time, Trotsky had observed that the professional revolutionaries of the
pre-revolutionary era were the origin of the Stalinist bureaucracy, but what
Trotsky had not grasped was that this same political bureaucracy, growing in
tandem with industrialization and collectivization, constituted the basis of a
new class of owners and exploiters.
When this class emerges, revolutionary ideals and
genuine ideological concerns are mere slogans and lifeless schemes. It is
symbolized by the generation of practical men, driven by an unbridled passion
for command and power. Not all party members belong to this new class. As its
character becomes clearer and more definitive, the role of the party itself diminishes,
transforming it into a traditional oligarchy. The party creates the class, but
the class grows using the party as its foundation, breaking the classical model
that makes parties the product of a class and not vice versa.
If
this new class were stripped of its property rights over all the nation's
material goods, it would cease to exist as a class, and with it, communism,
conceived as a monopoly and totalitarian system, would collapse. Stalin
destroyed the party as an ideological reality, transforming it, through the new
class, into an impersonal and colorless caste of privileged individuals.
He
made this class directly invested in the process of industrialization, the only
thing capable of justifying its existence and continuity. Trotsky believed that
the new bureaucratic class would disappear with Stalin through a "palace
revolution." Djilas demonstrates that, even after Stalin's death, the new
class endures and can only disappear along with the monolithic edifice of the
communist system.
The
world dominated by the new communist class is a world in crisis, riddled with
insoluble contradictions. Only with the disappearance of this monstrous caste
and the system that sustains it can communist society regain the
characteristics of a free society. Milovan Djilas has rediscovered the true and
necessary meaning of the idea of freedom.
Not
through revelation, nor because the caste to which he belonged forcibly
deprived him of his privileges, but through uncompromising logic and the
conviction that communist society cannot achieve freedom on the given terms of
its own revolution.
II
The sensibility of our time has proven increasingly
averse to global perspectives. In the manifestations of the spirit—such as
cultural diagnoses, literature, and innovative approaches in art—the propensity
to reveal the arcane meanings of things, the virtuosity of detail, and the
magic of the fragmentary has become evident.
However, the very situation of our time suddenly
places us, without anyone having foreseen the tragic alternative, without
anyone's prophetic anticipation, before the necessity of addressing globally
the problem from which all other problems inherent to humankind emerge: the
problem of humankind's very existence on Earth.
The lack of foresight among the most brilliant minds
regarding this definitive possibility, which implies, through the destruction
of human life on the planet, the exclusion of humanity's very spiritual destiny
and cultural presence, is truly astonishing. In a recent work by Karl Jaspers,
entitled *The Atomic Bomb and the Future of Man*, the German philosopher
highlights the "sorcerer's apprentice" role played by the scientists
of our time in the face of the consequences of their important scientific work.
The attitude of the scientists who have had a decisive
impact on the development of atomic technology is one of genuine perplexity.
"When
we heard talk," Jaspers writes, "back in the 1920s and 30s about
atomic energy, we thought it was just a theory. They told us about wondrous
things, and we found them extremely interesting in terms of our understanding
of matter. But they seemed to us to have no practical importance. Today they
are already inscribed in reality."
The documents relating to the last war reveal how
Einstein and the American atomic scientists urged Roosevelt to develop the
atomic bomb before Hitler and the German scientists. Einstein and the American
scientists placed themselves unconditionally at the service of politics, and
the first practical consequence of their attitude occurred on August 6, 1945,
in Hiroshima and on August 9 in Nagasaki. Then, these same atomic scientists,
with Einstein at the forefront, warned humanity that the atomic bomb could
bring about the end of the world.
What,
in reality, is the role played by these scientists in the face of the terrible
consequences inherent in the results of their research? Jaspers outlines their
situation in the work we have just cited. "Scientists have become, as
skilled labor, instruments at the service of governments that desire weapons of
maximum destructive capacity so as to always be better armed than their
adversaries. Some scholars, in their hearts and consciences, have scruples.
They
hesitate. Most of them are immersed in the study of the technical problems they
have to solve. They do what is asked of them, without wanting to reflect on the
problem. There is a chasm between the ingenuity of their technical creation on
the one hand and their political naiveté on the other. Horrified by what they
have created, they demand a solution, stirring up ideas of peace and pursuing
their research. These men of such intelligence both want and don't want, they
behave like children and speak of tragedy."
In reality, the problem presents far more serious
aspects than the eventual crises of conscience and moral confusion of atomic
experts. In the game of political forces, in the grand game surrounding atomic
weapons, in which the fate of our world is at stake, the role of these atomic
experts, secondary advisors to today's leaders, is significantly less important
than that played by soothsayers and astrologers in so-called primitive
societies.
The atomic bomb has come to occupy an indisputable
objective position in the grand game of political forces. Blackmail, cunning,
and threats have always been instruments of politics, but always limited ones.
As long as what was at stake was not the total destruction of the adversary,
much less the destruction of human life, these instruments possessed persuasive
power up to a certain limit, established by expediency or by war.
Today, politics, with its forces roughly concentrated
in the hands of two blocs, has truly reached what a certain philosophy calls a
critical situation. Namely, an extreme dividing line, beyond which no limits
exist.
The
great game, what in traditional politics has been called by this name, is today
identified with a singular form of blackmail. This is, in essence, the problem.
The dialogue about the destiny of humanity is currently taking place between
these two colossi. One of them has transformed the idea of
freedom, as it has been understood and used for the last few
centuries, into a mere formula, in which ancient and deeply rooted paradoxical
situations have led to a huge trap.
According
to the language of the totalitarian dialoguer, essentially cynical, since such
an essential disturbance of man's moral conscience is impossible, slavery is
freedom; a country dominated by the tanks of the occupier is sovereign and
cannot admit external interference; the total rebellion of masses desperate
from tyranny and hunger, carried out by communist or ex-communist cadres, is
sabotage by reactionary spies in the service of the adversary; the rule of a
ruthless caste over hundreds of millions of starving people is true democracy
from the moment its ideologues decided to call it "popular."
What
is the attitude of the other person in the dialogue? What can they do when
answered in their own language, distorted, disguised, perverted to the extreme?
In pure dialectic, their attitude is, at first, one of genuine astonishment.
How is it possible, they ask themselves, to manipulate concepts that, for them,
are ideals for life? But the dialogue continues.
Astonishment
is followed, after the initial psychological shock and once their own tendency
to live in peace has strengthened, by a certain propensity to "understand
the adversary's attitude." But here's the thing: the adversary... Having
partially won the dialectical battle, while the other side tried to understand,
in addition to following its methods in its own field of action, the threat
against the other's positions increases.
In
this absurd and tragic dialectical game, relations between Russia and the
United States have developed thus far, pushing both powers to complete their
stockpiles of atomic bombs to a degree sufficient to destroy life on the
planet. Thus, the great blackmail of the tragic alternative facing humanity has
been reached. The atomic bomb, with equal destructive potential held by Russia
and the United States, has created a completely new situation in the game of
political forces. In less than two generations, humanity has had two world
wars.
Now
it faces a possible third world war, which could be the final one. By not
reacting at the moment of astonishment at the "rediscovery" of Soviet
methods, the United States has definitively lost the opportunity to address the
problem according to classical methods. In this way, the threat of the atomic
bomb has a violent impact on the classical methods of Politics. The dilemma is,
in reality, posed by Russia, which has not for a single moment relinquished the
initiative in matters, from 1945 to the present day.
The impact of the atomic bomb is already, long before
it explodes, a violent reality and a decisive political factor. We are, therefore,
faced with the unique alternative in history: choosing between slavery and
death. We find ourselves in what is already being called the age of blackmail.
If the atomic bomb means death, the first natural reaction is: "Anything
but the atomic bomb."
But this "anything" means slavery, the
absolute degradation of humanity, without thereby eliminating the fear of the
future among those who still live in freedom. Freedom, therefore, ceases to be
a sine qua non of life. But behind this initial attitude, inspired by the
essential reflexes of the instinct for self-preservation, another attitude
emerges, born from reflection on the destiny of humankind.
There are millions of people in the world today who
prefer the risk of the atomic bomb, of physical death, to slavery and the
material and moral misery in which they live. There, still fresh, is the
example of the Hungarian Revolution, which, faced with the attitude of those
who exclaim "Anything before the atomic bomb" and quickly forget the
dead of Budapest, opposes its own attitude, even more categorical, since it was
sealed in blood: "Anything before this, what we lived through."
But
the situation is not reduced to this stark alternative, determined by the
blackmail of atomic war. If that were the case, if the matter were presented so
radically, the alternative would destroy, as long as the blackmail and the
threat remain in effect, any form of conflict. And, in reality, that is not the
case. In reality, the war continues. The two colossi are confronting each other
in what is called proxy warfare.
They
have already done so in Korea, in Indochina, in the Middle East. They will
probably do so in other places, without the war, with its multiple fronts,
implying a kind of total destruction. Jaspers is right to define the situation
as paradoxical. He is not, however, right in establishing the diagnosis.
He
views these conflicts as local wars and argues that war is becoming a
"horrific" privilege of small states. Jaspers writes that this leads
to a strange conclusion: "The more powerful the states are because of the
atomic bomb, yet they seem momentarily paralyzed, while the small ones
perpetrate their acts of violence."
In reality, war remains the privilege of the Great
Powers. These local wars are, first and foremost, tentative steps and acts of
aggression, as well as a natural consequence of a lack of world order.
Meanwhile, numerous solutions are suggested and various hypotheses formulated.
The first is the destruction of atomic bomb stockpiles through reciprocal
control and a necessary modification of the old concept of sovereignty. At the
same time, England is manufacturing its own atomic bombs to achieve a kind of
strategic independence.
France, in turn, as Marshal Juin stated in a recent
study, also wants its own atomic bombs, the only means, he asserted, to ensure
the defense of Europe and the continued viability of NATO's strategic
apparatus. There is also much, and perhaps justified, insistence that, if both
sides possessed the atomic bomb, it would not be used, citing as an example the
fact that Hitler, in his most desperate situation, did not resort to total war.
But all of these are mere conjectures. Meanwhile, what
gains validity is the alternative to which the German philosopher alludes:
using the atomic bomb or accepting communist totalitarianism, which deprives
the world of freedom.
"The
atomic bomb, once used, would probably, though perhaps not certainly,"
Jaspers concludes, "destroy all life on Earth. Being deprived of freedom
by totalitarianism would render life worthless, even if we were not certain
that totalitarianism would last forever. Faced with the threat of the atomic
bomb, which risks destroying all life on Earth, rises the threat of
totalitarianism destroying all freedom.
The
moment to make a colossal decision may arise. No one can foresee it. But
examining this matter of conscience is justified: we must not allow ourselves
to be blindly driven toward such a choice. Reflection that anticipates possible
situations can have consequences for the decision itself."
The
extreme situation reveals itself in all its irreducible rigor, inscribed in a
reality that defies all finite thought. The very impulses necessary for
politics today find in this a stimulus.
III.
In such turbulent times, in terms of political and
social events, as the one we are living through, there has been no shortage,
from an intellectual perspective of the problems, of what is usually called a
diagnosis. The term itself, borrowed from Medicine, indicates a pathological situation.
As often happens in Medicine, accurate diagnoses have been mixed with false
ones, and the patient—namely, European-type society—has suffered what usually
happens to patients in general: dying little by little, regardless of whether
the diagnosis was accurate or false.
Nothing is more curious, more anticipated, and at the
same time more shocking, therefore, than the appearance—"rari nantes in
gurgite vasto" amidst today's abundant commentary on the merely
everyday—of some authentic work aimed at deciphering the perspective and the
distant meaning of events. Without a doubt, the most interesting aspect of all
that has happened in the field of political and social events in recent years
has been the symptoms of vast popular rebellions against communist tyranny.
The abundant commentary on daily life has devoted
enormous journalistic space to them, but little significance, since, once
drowned in blood by violence, their place in the headlines has been
irremediably reclaimed by the extravagances of movie "stars" and the
course of sporting competitions.
Therefore, a commentary such as the one Thierry
Maulnier recently dedicated to these rebellions, which he considers the true
revolution of the 20th century, in a small book published by Plon in Paris, in
an interesting current affairs collection entitled Tribune Libre, deserves
special mention. While it is not a diagnosis, and perhaps not an entirely
accurate one, Thierry Maulnier's work does offer us a concrete foundation, a
few ideas that no one has yet properly emphasized.
Thierry
Maulnier is a quintessential French intellectual. Ideologically, he comes from
the intellectual right, a right wing that is as minimally reactionary as
possible, stemming from his initial adherence to the ideas of Action Française.
Born in 1909, he entered the École Normale Supérieure in 1928, a breeding
ground for the most distinguished French intellectual elite, where he was a
classmate of such ideologically diverse minds as Robert Brasillach, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Soustelle, and Simone Weil. A critic,
essayist, and philosopher, he is best known for two works written in his youth,
just a few years before the last war, born from disparate concerns: Beyond
Nationalism and Introduction to French Poetry.
The
current commentary on anti-communist popular rebellions, defined as a prelude
to the "20th-century revolution," is closely related to the ideas in
Thierry Maulnier's widely circulated book, particularly among nationalists in
Europe and America, entitled Beyond Nationalism. The ideological and political
contradictions of Marxism and Communism, upon which Maulnier based his critique
at that time, are partly revisited in this new commentary.
This
new commentary draws on concrete events of enormous significance within "a
gigantic concentration camp where a shadowy multitude of men paid with their
servitude and misery for the fanatical will to power of the masters and the
squandering of irresponsible bureaucrats, the reign of terror and silence, of
poverty, ugliness, and despair."
Everyone
was accustomed to the idea that anything resembling great collective rebellions
could possibly occur within this bleak, lunar world. But from 1956 onward,
these collective rebellions began. East Berlin, Vorkuta (in the Siberian
steppe), Poznan, and Budapest demonstrated that what had seemed inconceivable
became a series of realities.
For
the people of the Soviet world, the masses to whom so many promises had been
made, "had reached a point where the only remaining promise was that of a
third world war and nuclear apocalypse." This level of despair explains
the Hungarian Revolution, a veritable "hurricane of passion and
hope," an unparalleled "heroic madness," especially considering
the impregnability of the Soviet state's repressive apparatus.
Thierry Maulnier refutes from the ground up the claim
that these were reactionary uprisings. The cadres and combat troops of this
insurrection, he asserts, were formed almost entirely by communist or
ex-communist intellectuals, by students educated in Marxist doctrine, by a
youth who had known nothing but the communist regime, by the workers of Csepel,
who were the last to lay down their arms, and by the entire working mass,
organized in their "councils" and "soviets."
While
Djilas goes so far as to define the formation and structure of the new
communist oppressor caste as a "new class," and with it the crisis of
communist society, Thierry Maulnier takes his diagnosis further and examines
the active role of the enormous masses of communist society in crisis. For
Djilas, a mind formed in the Leninist school, according to which a revolution
is impossible without organization, without command "cadres," and
without perfected techniques.
Revolutions
like those now shaking the communist edifice are inconceivable. Thierry
Maulnier, however, possesses a different perspective, free from ideological
dogmatism. According to Maulnier, the profound rupture between the "new
class"—the privileged caste and a ruling and intellectual minority—and the
popular proletarian masses leads to a far-reaching phenomenon of rebellion. In
Hungary, therefore, we are witnessing not an end, but a beginning; not the last
pre-Marxist rebellion, but the first post-Marxist one.
Marxism
and communism, where they have played out their experiments, cease to be merely
a prospect for the future and become, definitively, in the eyes of the
oppressed, a barrier of interests and privileges that must be torn down. This
fatal consequence was inexorably inevitable due to the fundamental
contradictions of Marxism and Communism.
A
century ago, Marx offered the proletarian rebellion against capitalist modes of
production and wealth distribution a definition and an active direction. In the
collectivist society born of the Marxist revolution, with far more oppressed
people than a century ago, and more desperate, the slaves, in the midst of
rebellion, seek an ideology, a meaning, an active direction for their
liberation struggle.
In
this society, class antagonisms have perhaps become stronger than ever. Following
Djilas's thesis, Thierry Maulnier believes that the primary cause of this state
of affairs was that the dictatorship of the proletariat was merely a mystifying
formula in the hands of a new political oligarchy. Berdyaev asserted, years
ago, that instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Communism had
established "the dictatorship of the idea of the
proletariat."
This
new oligarchy wields unprecedented absolute power. It holds a monopoly on power
over people and things, over goods and ideas, over well-being, the distribution
and consumption of wealth. By increasing the power of the state, the "new
class" expands its own power without limit, keeping the masses' purchasing
power low through the infamous policy of "priorities"—prioritizing
investment in heavy industry over light industry, in industry over agriculture,
and in armaments over peacekeeping projects.
Examining
the figures reveals that the Soviet economy is on par with the American economy
in terms of military investment; the ratio is two to one in favor of the United
States in heavy industry and the production of energy and steel, four to one in
terms of total economic output, and eight to one in terms of the purchasing
power of workers' wages. Soviet investments in workers' welfare are minimal and
represent the portion of production not essential to these priority
investments.
But the contradictions of communism go even further.
Marx and communism combat capitalist surplus value but fail to eliminate it in
collectivist society for the simple reason that "surplus value is inherent
in machine civilization": the machine worker cannot receive remuneration
equivalent to what he produces through the machine, for the simple reason that
production must also pay the machine.
Besides continuing to live in the same sin as
capitalist society, collectivist society itself excludes the worker far more
from the formation of capital and the concentration of power—a monopoly of the
State and its oligarchy—than in capitalist society.
The fact is that both the Marxist and capitalist
economic conceptions are superseded by a series of events that escape both
ideological frameworks. Thierry Maulnier emphasizes this crucial fact, decisive
in the future development of society, the true basis of the revolution of the
future. However advanced they may seem, not even the revolutionary Marxist and
communist schemes could foresee this crucial fact: that a moment would come
when the worker and the consumer would cease to be two different individuals,
but rather one and the same person.
This truth was intuited years ago by Ford, when he
invented the policy of high wages, and by Schacht, when he invented the policy
of consumer finance. Since then, what Thierry Maulnier calls the revolution of
the 20th century has continued to accelerate, "driven by the irresistible,
irreversible law of technical evolution," automation, and the new
structure. Today's consumer is paid to consume, more than the worker is paid to
work.
The
forces of economic expansion have propelled society toward this essentially new
situation. Under the impetus of this reality, a new society is taking shape.
Without fully accepting the perspective offered by the French writer, since
many other factors that he ignores in his scheme (among them the fact that large
geographical and human areas are still far from the direct action of these
forces of economic expansion pushed to the extreme), it is undeniable that,
faced with the prospects of this revolution, collectivist society remains
closed in rigid schemes that will necessarily determine its agony.
Because
beyond the capitalist economy based on the doctrine of profit, and beyond the
collectivist-Marxist economy of enslaved labor, an economy based on the
distribution of purchasing power is emerging, the indisputable foundation of a
new type of society.
Madrid.
The coastline comprises approximately 400 ports with
docks; however, most of them are only of local importance for coastal shipping
and fishing. Few ports have rail connections to the interior and are therefore
more important for the country's foreign trade. These are mostly medieval
ports, and several of them played a more significant role in the past than they
do today.
Present-day Yugoslavia's foreign trade consists mainly
of raw materials and semi-finished products; manufactured goods, on the other
hand, are scarcely represented. Semi-finished products and raw materials are
very cumbersome to transport and require the shortest possible voyage to the
sea.
Therefore,
it is difficult to concentrate cargo for shipment. Modern maritime traffic, for
its rational development, requires that the movement of goods to sea be
concentrated at a geographically and transit-friendly crossing point.
Decentralization requires even greater capital investment for costly port
facilities. The country's capital shortage gives this problem extraordinary
importance.
Conversely,
the need to achieve, even partially, a concentration of maritime traffic is an
economic imperative. Ports generally lack extensive infrastructure, and the
Belgrade government has done very little to date in terms of technical
equipment and adapting ports to current traffic demands. The outdated nature of
the ports is glaringly obvious, especially when compared to competing ports.
The significant lack of storage facilities, cargo handling equipment, and fire
protection systems is evident.
II. THE MAIN
PORTS
The economic sphere of influence of the ports is
limited. Only the spheres of influence of Rijeka, Sibenik, Split, Ploce, and
Dubrovnik (all located in Croatia) extend further inland. The other ports, on
the other hand, cover only their immediate surroundings.
The economically developed regions of the country are
situated in relation to the coast in such an unfavorable way that considerable
effort is required to direct traffic toward the national ports.
The most significant problems with domestic traffic
relate, on the one hand, to the aforementioned technical and natural obstacles
and, on the other hand, to the utilization of various existing railway lines,
built long ago according to external interests, which no longer meet current
needs. These problems can only be solved by fundamentally improving the
connection between the ports and the interior of the country.
Rijeka
(Fiume), in addition to being well-equipped, is the main port and the only one
with favorable rail connections to the interior. Moreover, in the geographical
and traffic sense, it is the most appropriate port for both the Croatian and
Slovenian interior, as well as for the transit of goods from Hungary, Austria
and Czechoslovakia.
At the northernmost point of the coast, in Kopar
(formerly Kapodistria, now part of the People's Republic of Slovenia), in the
immediate vicinity of Trieste, new piers with a length of 270 meters have been
built in recent years for ocean-going vessels.
However, since this port—clearly intended as a rival
to Trieste—currently lacks rail connections to the interior, its traffic is
hardly worth mentioning. Pula, an excellent southern port on the Istrian
peninsula, serves primarily as a shipyard and military base. The other
important ports, located in the central part of the coast, are Šibenik, an
extraordinary natural harbor with unlimited potential for expansion, and Split,
the second most important in the country.
Both are connected to the interior by two
standard-gauge railway lines, but with limited capacity. Various industries can
be developed in the coastal cities of Rijeka, Šibenik, and Split. A new port,
Ploce, has been built at the mouth of the Neretva River, impacting a portion of
Bosnia's economy. Given the existence of numerous natural harbors with
considerable potential for development, the construction of new ports
represents a pointless waste of resources.
The disadvantage of this new port lies not only in its
location in a marshy region but also in the fact that the Pelješac peninsula
blocks its access to the south and southwest. The new port, connected by rail
to the interior, will attract some of Dubrovnik's maritime traffic and
completely absorb that of Metković.
The
southern part of the coast has a larger inland area, but is separated from it
by an impassable mountain range. Constructing a railway line through the
mountains between Serbia and the southern part of the coast is extremely
difficult and costly. Nevertheless, construction has begun on the extremely
expensive and economically unjustifiable Belgrade-Uzice-Bijelo Polje-Bar
railway line, as well as the complete reconstruction of the port of Bar.
It is hardly conceivable that this railway line,
traversing mountains and known as the "North-South-Adriatic Main
Line," which is primarily of military and political importance to Serbia,
and whose route touches the sparsely populated Montenegrin mountains, barren
for traffic, will be beneficial for the transport of people and goods.
Previously, the bay of Kotorska in southern Dalmatia,
undoubtedly the largest natural harbor in the Mediterranean basin, had been
planned as the terminus of this line. However, now this line will terminate at
the open and as-yet-unbuilt port of the Montenegrin village of Bar.
Simultaneously, Belgrade decided not to build the Split-Sarajevo line, which had
been planned for several decades.
This shipping line would have facilitated not only the
transport of raw materials and products from the important industries in these
regions, but would also have enabled the exploitation of the significant
natural resources of the Livno-Duvno area, which until now have remained
untapped due to their distance from transport routes.
These factors, coupled with the neglect of existing
ports—for example, the docks of Rijeka's main port, damaged during the war,
have still not been repaired—have provoked considerable discontent in Croatia,
repeatedly reflected even in articles published in Pomorstvo (Rijeka), the main
publication for maritime traffic issues in communist Yugoslavia, as well as in
the newspapers Vjesnik (Zagreb) and Slobodna Dalmacija (Split).
The ports of present-day Yugoslavia must compete
desperately, especially with the port of Trieste, which is far better connected
to Central Europe by rail and much better equipped. To compete successfully,
the ports must be modernized and expanded. Furthermore, very instructive
measures should be taken to attract traffic from neighboring Central European
countries.
The unfavorable situation of the ports is further
aggravated by competition from foreign ports, the Danube waterway,
well-constructed railways to Central Europe, and the country's foreign trade
directed towards the continent. The precarious situation of the ports strongly
demands the application of port tariffs to railway tariff policy, since only
through maritime tariffs can the interior be economically linked to the
majority of ports.
From
the foregoing, it is clear how difficult the task is for those responsible for
maritime navigation policy. If this policy is to become a factor in promoting
all the economic interests encompassed by maritime navigation, it must first
and foremost be carried out methodically and consistently. This has not been
the case in either pre-war or post-war Yugoslavia. In all political and
economic measures, it must never be forgotten that Yugoslavia, that is, the
Federal Republic of Croatia, is a maritime country that has natural conditions
favorable to the progress of maritime navigation.
III. MARITIME NAVIGATION AND FOREIGN TRADE
The portion of Yugoslavia's foreign trade that is maritime
shows a continuous upward trend; in 1959, this portion represented 53%; in
1934, however, it was only 39.4%. Since foreign trade continues to make greater
use of sea routes through its own ports, the importance of maritime navigation
to the national economy will undoubtedly continue to grow. The dispatch of
goods from the ports to the sea continued to increase considerably after the
war, almost doubling in 1959 compared to 1939.
Movement
of goods by sea (in 1000 T)[39]
|
|
Total |
Internal
traffic |
Exports |
Importa |
Transio |
|
1922 |
1.003 |
189 |
691 |
123 |
- |
The
table reflects the current development and volume of maritime freight movement.
The majority of all goods shipped—up to 78.4% in 1959—corresponds to
international traffic. It is significant that this international traffic
largely consists of imports. In 1959, the volume of imports was twice that of
exports.
Due
to the country's pre-war foreign trade structure, this ratio has been exactly
the reverse. The unfavorable ratio of incoming to outgoing goods is the major
weakness of the country's maritime trade, as most ships must leave ports in
ballast, resulting in unfavorable freight costs. The numerical table of
maritime imports clearly demonstrates their one-sidedness. Coal, minerals, oil,
and grains represent a full 75% of all maritime imports. Before the war,
Yugoslavia was a major grain exporter.
In
contrast, in recent years, grains have become the leading maritime import as a
consequence of misguided communist agricultural policies. It is noteworthy
that, despite the country's largely agrarian structure, the export of
agricultural products through national ports is barely worthy of mention.
Exports of cement, timber, coal, and minerals regularly constitute the main
categories of maritime exports. These items accounted for 67% of total exports,
demonstrating the policy's unilateral nature.
Maritime
freight traffic is concentrated in the five main ports, a figure that is high
for the country's needs. This concentration is much greater for imports than
for exports, which suggests that the main imports are carried out through ports
with good rail connections to the hinterland or to industry. The share of total
freight traffic handled by the five main ports regularly exceeded 80% (80.7% in
1959, 81.2% in 1958).
The
share handled by numerous other ports is therefore very small. [40] (4). The movement of goods in different ports shows
varying development trends. Rijeka shows the greatest increase; its movement
during 1959 – 43.1% of the total movement – exceeded that of the four main
ports combined. [41] (5).
Rijeka
is also the most important transit port. Even so, it has an unfavorable balance
of shipments, since inbound operations are much greater (in 1959, almost six
times) than outbound operations. All the main ports, with the exception of
Dubrovnik, have experienced a significant increase in cargo traffic, albeit on
different scales.
Almost
all traffic passes through Rijeka. Austria held first place in 1959, with 45.5%
(38.6% in 1958, 27.5% in 1957), followed by Hungary with 30% (18.7% in 1958,
36.3% in 1957), and then Czechoslovakia with 21.9% (41.5% in 1958, 34.7% in
1957). [42].
The
participation of other countries in transit traffic is negligible. In 1959,
transit volume decreased by 9% compared to the previous year. The Belgrade
government attributes this decline to the People's Republic of China, arguing
that when China concluded its purchase contracts with Austrian, Hungarian, and
Czechoslovakian exporting firms, it stipulated the ship's flag and the port of
transit for the goods purchased. Consequently, Beijing's hostile attitude
toward Tito is also reflected in the transit traffic at the port of Rijeka. [43].
Although maritime trade itself is of paramount
importance, the flags under which freight is carried out have great economic
significance. Just a few years ago, this situation was by no means satisfactory
for the country. The national merchant fleet's share reached 34.9%. This
percentage increased considerably in the interim, reaching 52.6% in 1959. [44]. Before
the war, this percentage was even higher; in 1936 it accounted for 54.57%.
The
maritime passenger traffic is constantly increasing; its growth is due to the
well-developed domestic traffic, which is reserved, in effect, for national
flags. In contrast, the international passenger traffic is of lesser
importance. Apparently, this trend is the opposite of that seen in the movement
of goods.
Maritime
passenger traffic (in 100)[45]
|
|
Total |
Movimiento
al exterior |
|
1939 |
1.421 |
44 |
IV. THE MERCHANT FLEET
During
the Second World War, not only port facilities but also the merchant fleet and
maritime navigation organizations suffered serious losses. The ships that were
not sunk were under the administration of the British Ministry of War
Transport.
At
the end of 1946, it had more than 86 ships with a total gross tonnage of
141,000. The ships' service life had been fully utilized, and most of them no
longer met the requirements of maritime navigation, thus necessitating complete
overhauls.
The
increase in the fleet was achieved gradually and primarily by repairing wrecked
ships or purchasing old foreign vessels. Yugoslavia also received a number of
German and Italian ships for repairs. In 1949, the situation improved somewhat
with the acquisition of new vessels.
That
same year, construction began on the first larger ships in its own shipyards.
The first Five-Year Plan had projected a merchant fleet tonnage of 600,000 GRT
by 1951. However, this figure was only reached in 1960. Yugoslavia's merchant
fleet ranks second among the communist states. According to the most recent
data, this tonnage reached 711,928 GRT as of August 1, 1960, placing it
nineteenth in the world shipping rankings. [46].
The
current tonnage differs from the pre-war fleet in its composition and
structure. While routeless voyages prevailed before the war, today regular
steamship service is relatively well-developed. A significant portion of the
tonnage is dedicated to regular cargo and passenger service; in several cases,
it serves both purposes simultaneously.
A
part of the fleet is dedicated to international voyages without a fixed route
and consists of vessels ranging from 3 to 7,000 GRT, meaning steamships capable
of sailing all the world's oceans, fulfilling orders for economical freight.
Although, due to the rugged coastline, smaller vessels represent the numerical
majority, at the beginning of 1960, 81.15% of the total tonnage corresponded to
steamships of more than 1,500 tons. [47].
If
the merchant marine is divided into passenger ships and cargo ships, it turns
out that passenger steamers, with 64 vessels, constitute 22% of the fleet and
barely 5% of the tonnage. The development of passenger traffic is extremely
unfavorable and has been one of the most serious problems for many years.
In
1939, the fleet had 72 passenger vessels totaling 50,000 GRT, and in 1959, only
64 vessels totaling 28,000 GRT, although the number of passengers carried has
more than tripled. This irregularity in maritime passenger traffic is
criticized not only by the technical press but also by the daily press. [48].
The
composition of the fleet, based on the age of its vessels, in no way meets the
requirements imposed by increasing competition. According to official reports
from the "Yugoslavian Maritime Union," 49.1% of the naval inventory
is outdated and 15% requires urgent renewal. [49].
The advanced age of the vessels is a major factor
affecting coastal shipping. Of the 65 steamships of the
"Jadranska-Linijska Providba" (Jadranska-Linijska Providba), 15 are
over 50 years old, 5 are over 60, and one is up to 69 years old. Furthermore,
the propulsion systems of most coastal vessels are completely outdated, with a
large proportion—38 units—running on coal with entirely worn-out boilers. The
advanced age of these steamships is even more striking when compared to foreign
fleets. For example, the average age of all German ships in the summer of 1960
was no more than ten years.
The
most important task for the fleet after the war was, first and foremost, the
re-establishment of coastal shipping routes, which are vital for the coastal
and island populations due to the configuration of the coastline. The problem
of coastal shipping is difficult to solve; The coastline is sparsely populated,
so ships' capacity is only utilized at about 10% in winter, while in summer,
the tourist season, it is usually very quiet.
The
population's limited purchasing power prevents an adequate increase in fares.
Coastal shipping is also of great importance to tourism, which is providing the
country with an increasing amount of foreign currency. Given the numerous small
towns, several routes with many steamships are needed for the proper
functioning of the traffic. It is understood that on most of these routes,
traffic cannot be carried out with sufficient intensity to ensure
profitability. This is why coastal steamship companies operate at a significant
loss, which is offset by state subsidies.
With
coastal shipping re-established, attention shifted to organizing international
routes. The unfavorable ratio between incoming and outgoing cargo at ports
undoubtedly hinders the development of regular steamship service. As noted,
imports through ports are considerably more frequent than exports.
The
lack of return freight makes the profitability of regular steamship service
even more precarious. The growing development of foreign trade by sea, as well
as the need to avoid foreign flags and ports, necessitates the promotion of
regular domestic steamship service and the establishment of direct routes with
countries with which intensive foreign trade is maintained.
Yugoslav
shipping companies maintain, in addition to cargo and passenger routes to
Italian, Albanian, Greek, and Turkish ports, cargo routes to ports in Western
and Northern Europe, using coastal vessels. Thus, of the 65 steamships of the
"Jadranska-Linijska Proposed for the Near, Central and Far East."
However,
some service lines still lack the required traffic density. While the shipping
network involves practically all countries with which there is significant
trade, it is not sufficient to meet all the demands of commerce, making an
intensification of regular steamship service necessary..
The
development of the merchant fleet. - Ships over 100 GRT [50]
|
NUMBER OF UNITS |
BRT CAPACITY IN 1,000. |
|||||||
|
Year |
Total |
Passengers |
Cargo and tankers |
Motor vessels and sailboats |
Total |
Passengers |
Cargo and tankers |
Motonaves y veleros |
|
1925 |
126 |
57 |
59 |
10 |
145 |
20 |
124 |
1 |
SHIPPING
COMPANIES
The
entire fleet was nationalized after the war. As in other companies, worker
self-management was imposed in the shipping companies, which faces significant
difficulties in this branch of the economy. The mere fact that two-thirds of
the members of the workers' and administrative councils must be crew members
makes the work economically challenging, since the ships are rarely in port, the
headquarters of the shipping company. Furthermore, each ship has its own
council, which, along with the captain, is formally responsible for the
administration of the respective vessel.
Shipping
companies are grouped into the following unions: "Union of Maritime
Shipowners," "Union of Seaports," "Union of the
Shipbuilding Industry," and "Union of Sea Fishing." The
"Secretariat for Traffic and Communications of the Federal Executive
Council" (the Central Government) in Belgrade is competent for all matters
concerning maritime navigation.
Even
the communist daily and specialized press indicates that maritime circles are
dissatisfied not only with the current organization and work, but also with the
government's shipping policy in general, and are demanding its reorganization.
Among the shipping companies, the largest is "Jugoslavenska Linijska
Plovidba," headquartered in Rijeka.
Its
fleet consists exclusively of large vessels and is mostly dedicated to regular
steamship service. The second largest shipping company is "Jadranska
Linijska Plovidba," whose ships provide regular service on the sea. The
ships sail the Adriatic, Ionian, and Aegean Seas, and also operate cruises for
German tourism companies in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the North
Sea.
The
vessels of the "Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba" of Split engage in
itinerant voyages and also provide regular steamship service between Adriatic,
Near Eastern, and Red Sea ports. The salvage and towing company
"Brodospas," based in Split, has also been established and has
achieved notable success in both domestic and international waters.
Until
1955, the entire fleet was grouped into these three shipping companies. Due to
the strong insistence of the People's Republics of Slovenia and Montenegro, a
large part of the tonnage of the "Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba" of
Rijeka, Croatia, was assigned to the newly formed shipping company,
Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plovidba, of Kotor. (formerly Croatia, now Montenegro),
"Splosna Plovba", from Piran (now Slovenia) and "Atlantska
Plovidba", from Dubrovnik. In addition, "Jugoslavenska Tankerska
Plovidba" was established in Zadar (Croatia), which at the beginning of
1960 had tankers with a total of 35,307 GRT.
Of
the other shipping companies, only "Kvarneska Plovidba" in Rijeka,
which operates regular steamship service to ports in Israel and the Gulf of
Mexico, and "Slobodna Plovidba" in Sibenik, whose ships undertake
voyages without a fixed route, are worth mentioning. A competitive struggle has
already begun among the various shipping companies.
Last
year, an unusual case arose when the Slovenian shipping company "Splosna
Plovba" inaugurated a new route between Yugoslav ports and those in the
United States, even though "Jugoslavenska Linijska PLovidba," based
in Rijeka, Croatia, had been providing regular and sufficiently frequent
service between these ports for many years.
This
occurred despite the fact that the "Union of Maritime Shipowners of
Yugoslavia," the competent body, had strongly rejected this new route as
completely useless and detrimental to the interests of the country's maritime
industry.***
The
remarkable results achieved by the Yugoslav fleet and maritime traffic should
not mislead us, as its vessels are outdated and overused, and port facilities
and equipment are woefully inadequate. The fleet—especially the coastal
vessels—has fallen far behind in terms of operation and performance compared to
global technological advancements due to its extraordinary and intense activity
in recent years.
With
the exception of Rijeka, the other ports suffer from insufficient rail
connections and are equipped with faulty technical facilities. Improved port
technical equipment is an urgent problem, without which all efforts to increase
port traffic and movement are doomed to failure.
Only
a radical change in maritime policy, promoting tonnage modernization and
improving port efficiency, can alleviate the unfavorable state of the country's
maritime navigation. It is highly doubtful, however, that the directors of
shipping companies and ports can resolve the aforementioned maritime navigation
problems in the foreseeable future, due to the neglect and lack of
understanding they encounter in competent circles in Belgrade.
Hamburg.
The
doctor usually examines the detainees once a week, allowing only emergency
medical attention. A few years ago, a special hospital for detainees was opened
in Zagreb on Sarengrad Street, where the doctors and all the staff are highly
trusted, to prevent detainees from having any uncontrolled contact with the
outside world. It is almost standard practice to assign agents provocateurs to
every four detainees. These are generally minor offenders who are promised
release if they extract information of interest to the investigators from the
designated detainees, or often, these agents provocateurs are UDBA officers who
spend a few days in the cells "provoking the detainees."
The
UDBA cells in Zagreb are located at Savska cesta 60 (UDBA for Croatia) and at
Petrinjska 18, where the UDBA headquarters for the city of Zagreb is located.
Once the preliminary investigation is complete, which can take an undetermined
amount of time, the detainee is released, or, more often, transferred to the
judicial prison. Until 1950-52, numerous political "criminals" were
tried by military courts, even though their alleged crimes were not of a
military nature, nor were the accused military personnel.
The
criterion adopted was that they were guilty of "subversive activities"
directed against the "security of the State," and therefore the
trials were held in military courts, known for their cruelty. Furthermore,
military courts operate in secret; hearings are held behind closed doors, and
the accused cannot choose a defense attorney but is assigned one, merely to
"maintain a formality."
Generally,
this is an officer whose role is to assist the court in ascertaining "the
material truth"; in other words, to assist the military prosecutor. The
Zagreb military court jail is located in Nova Ves and consists of spacious
cells that housed between 80 and 140 detainees. The beds are wooden bunks;
defecation is done in two large wooden buckets that emit an indescribable
stench.
The
Zagreb civil court jail, or district jail, is located at Petrinjska Street 12.
Political prisoners and common criminals are imprisoned together there. The
prison regime is not as harsh here as in the military or UDBA prisons. Smoking
is permitted, the food is somewhat better, and detainees are allowed a half-hour
walk in the prison yard once a day, although regulations stipulate an hour.
During
the walk, conversation is prohibited, and hands must be kept behind the back.
Once the preliminary hearing is complete, the detainee is allowed to speak with
their lawyer and closest relatives (in the presence of the warden).
For years, the director of Zagreb's judicial prisons
was a man named Korac, a Lika Serb and police officer from monarchical
Yugoslavia, a psychopath, a brutal individual, and a chronic drunkard. For the
slightest disciplinary infraction, detainees were punished with heavy chains
weighing 8 to 20 kilos, which remained fastened to the unfortunate man's bare
feet for 14 days. Furthermore, this same Korac was responsible for the brutal
mistreatment of those condemned to death.
On the first floor of the Zagreb District Court jail
was cell number 26, where those condemned to death awaited execution. The night
before, relatives could visit the condemned man, and the executions took place
at night, before dawn. After the relatives' visit, Korac would usually arrive
with a group of militiamen, who would beat the condemned man and brutally
torture him (if he was a political "criminal"). The screams of the
tortured man echoed through the building, and in the morning, the inmates
responsible for cleaning removed the bloodstained and torn clothing of those
condemned to death from cell F26.
If,
during the proceedings, the detainee complained about the coercion and torture
inflicted by the police and militia, the prosecutor would request an amendment
to the indictment because the accused was "slandering the national
authorities," and therefore, the sentence would be even more severe. For
this reason, most defendants do not dare to report that they were mistreated during
the investigation, for fear of worse reprisals.
The
lawyers, that is, the defense attorneys, also do not want to dwell on the
torture of their client, knowing that doing so will only cause them further
problems. As already mentioned, in recent years physical torture is not as
frequent, but it is still inflicted, and the competent judicial and
administrative bodies are aware of it. Torture of common criminals is not as
frequent as that of political prisoners.
Once
the judicial process is complete and the sentence is handed down, the convicted
person is transferred to a Reformatory Penal Home to serve their sentence.
There are several such homes in Yugoslavia; each republic has its own, and they
are under the direct control of the "Department for the Execution of
Sentences" of the respective republic's Ministry of the Interior. In
Croatia, these institutions are located in Lepoglava, Stara Gradiska, and
Slavonska Pozega (for women).
There
is also the correctional-educational institute for minors in Glina and a sort
of concentration camp in Goli Otok, near Rab Island, off the Croatian coast.
Penitentiaries in Serbia are located in Niš, Zabela, near Požarevac (for
women), and in Srijemska Mitrovica. In the town of Indjija, in Srijem, there is
a federal home for convicted women who are pregnant or have children under six
months old.
In
Sarajevo is the central military prison, that is, the penitentiary for
officers. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are penal institutions in Zenica,
Bileci, and Stolac. In Slovenia, they are located in Maribor and Ljubljana; in
Macedonia in Skopje; and in Montenegro in Titograd.
At
the head of these penitentiaries is the director, generally a proven communist
UDBA officer and an unscrupulous man. Next come the deputy director and the
assistant. The assistant director is the position reserved for the head of the
UDBA in each penitentiary.
Under
their command are two or three subordinates, obligated to work in the
penitentiary's "intelligence sector," that is, to gather information
from informants operating among the detainees about the conduct, statements,
and intentions of political prisoners and other convicts.
A
very important figure in the administration of the penitentiary is the one in
charge of "the re-education of the convicts," whose task consists of
tenaciously and constantly disseminating communist propaganda. Aside from these
"civilian" officials, a very important position is that of the
militia commander in the prison, usually held by a captain or major. (It should
be noted that in the Lepoglava and Nova Gradiska prisons, this position is
always held by Serbs, originally from Lika or Kordun.)
Then,
in each penal institution, there are a certain number of prison guards and
militiamen, watching over its security. Among them, two classes can be
distinguished: militiamen, affiliated with the Communist Party, trusted
individuals, who occupy positions that allow them to be in daily contact with
the detainees, and rank-and-file militiamen, younger, not affiliated with the party,
who guard the entrance or man the machine gun nests in the "bunkers"
and in the prison towers.
The
former, party members, are "keyholders," "commanders" of
workshops, etc. They perform hierarchical functions and can do great harm to
the detainees if they so choose.
Upon
arrival at the prison, the detainee is placed in "quarantine." This
is the first stage of serving their sentence. "Quarantine" is a large
barrack where 200 to 300 convicts spend the first three or four weeks. Here,
too, the beds are stacked one on top of the other, with two people sleeping
together on each bed, regardless of age, health, education, etc.
There
are no mattresses, so everyone sleeps on whatever they have. There is no
heating, not even during the harshest winter. Here, the convict begins their
journey into prison life. Both "quarantine" and each individual cell
are under the supervision of the "guard." This is a convict, or
rather a criminal, who has been serving his sentence for some time. He is, by necessity,
an informer, a trusted confidant of the administration, that is, of UDBA.
His
duty is to enforce discipline, inform the police, and intimidate new inmates.
Several times a day, he reads the internal regulations aloud so that the
inmates memorize them. According to these regulations, very few things are
permitted. The warden immediately reports every infraction, however minor, to
the militiamen, who, depending on the severity of the "crime," decide
whether the offender will be brought before the Director or punished with
lesser penalties, such as excessive cleaning of the floor, bathrooms, etc.
The
warden can inflict great harm on the prisoner, since if he denigrates him from
the outset before the militiamen or the internal police, his life becomes
unbearable due to the subsequent, relentless mistreatment. An uninitiated
observer can hardly comprehend the "power" of these wardens or how
much harm they can do if a prisoner is not to their liking or their liking.
As
mentioned, these wardens are recruited from among criminals, people of ill
repute, prone to all kinds of evil. They are present when the food parcels that
the prisoners receive from their families are inspected. It is an unwritten
rule that the guard receives a share of the commissary, especially meat, pastries,
and cigarettes.
Sometimes
this escalates to blackmail, and woe betide any prisoner who complains about
the guard. The inmates know them and tolerate their cruelty because they are
the prison administration's loyal agents. Many of these guards come from the
ranks of guerrilla officers, convicted of crimes, often murder. Nevertheless,
the administration considers them more valuable and less dangerous than
political prisoners, since they are "ex-combatants," party members,
and therefore not "bandits," as opponents of the communist regime are
often labeled in Yugoslavia.
Having
completed the first stage of the sentence in "quarantine," the
detainee is bathed again, all his belongings are thoroughly searched, and he is
sent to the "cell," his final resting place. During the search, all
valuables are usually taken: pens, watch, ring, lighter, etc. These items are
deposited, but are rarely found upon release.
Few
dare to make a fuss about this theft, fearing further complications and
reprisals. In the "cell," the prisoner encounters the warden, his
immediate superior. The warden assigns him a bed and tasks him with cleaning
floors and bathrooms. The cells, previously designed for one prisoner, now hold
six (in Lepoglava).
The
beds are arranged in three superimposed rows, with two people sleeping in each
bed. In this confined space, the excrement bin is placed and emptied two or
three times a day. Sometimes the militiaman in charge of the "squad"
forgets to open the door, and it's easy to imagine the suffocating air the
prisoners must breathe and how this affects their health.
There
are larger cells, but all are crammed with convicts in far greater numbers than
allowed by basic hygiene and sanitation standards. Prisoners who work in
workshops have somewhat better hygienic conditions, as at least they can use
the toilet that day.
Those
who don't work must remain lying down all day in a stale atmosphere. According
to the internal regulations, prisoners are allowed two fresh air sessions a
day, meaning a walk in the yard. However, this is very rarely the case, as they
are taken to the yard once, and if it rains or the weather is bad, they remain
locked up all day. The walk is sometimes a true torture.
During
the morning "dead" walk, talking is not permitted. Hands behind back
and mouths closed. If the militiaman, who watches the prisoners, thinks someone
has moved their lips, that's reason enough to take them before the warden.
That's why many refused to go for walks, fearing they would be denounced for an
infraction they hadn't committed, even though no argument was valid. Being
taken before the warden meant receiving punishment, and so they avoided giving
the warden or militiaman the slightest reason to do so.
The
disciplinary punishment system is very severe and medieval, brutal to the
extreme. The most lenient punishment is the prohibition of receiving mail and
packages for a month or two. During that time, the prisoner goes hungry, but at
least he is free from mistreatment, which is harmful to his health.
The
next disciplinary punishment is solitary confinement. It's not just about
spending 14 days completely isolated. There's more to it. In winter, the
condemned man is taken to the solitary cell, with a cement or brick floor, a
large window without glass, no bed or other furniture, and no container.
Several prisoners are put in there wearing light, flimsy prison clothing.
Before
being taken to the solitary cell, the guard checks if anyone is wearing two
layers of clothing or two pairs of socks. That is strictly forbidden. They
spend 7 to 14 days in such a cold cell, sometimes longer. Since there are no
beds and lying on the concrete in the dead of winter means ruining your health,
these unfortunate souls are forced to squat or lean against each other for long
days and nights. I know several young, healthy men who, after such punishment,
completely lost their health.
The
food, already bad, is reduced to a minimum, so hunger is added to the cold and
physical exertion. Many are also required to wear chains on the warden's
orders. Their situation becomes even more unbearable, as the weight of the
chains, which varies from 8 to 20 kilos, is added to the hunger and cold.
At
night, militiamen often visit them, mistreating and beating them. Infamous for
their tortures at Lepoglava Penitentiary were Ilija Vujic, a Serbian militiaman
from Kordun who controlled the solitary confinement cells, and his accomplice
Ilija Solic, from Knin, a former Chetnik.
Many
former prisoners of Lepoglava from 1945-49 can testify about the torture
inflicted by this duo on the prisoners, including the cold-blooded murder of
several inmates, among them Zvonko Panic in the summer of 1949, without anyone
holding them accountable for their crime. During the summer, the convicts were
not sent to solitary confinement but to the punishment battalion, where they
performed the most arduous labor, exposed to the sun and heat until exhaustion.
They
loaded or unloaded coal or firewood from wagons, carried bricks at a run,
worked the land, and so on. They worked up to 18 hours a day, that is, until
physical exhaustion. Often such prisoners collapsed from exhaustion, and the
case of an elderly man is significant, who fainted from physical exertion, just
18 days away from being released from Lepoglava in 1948. In this case too, no
investigation was carried out nor was anyone held responsible.
This is how disciplinary punishments in Tito's prisons
actually work, and the reasons can be trivial and insignificant, such as: a
word uttered during "dead man's walk," smoking during prohibited
hours, complaints about the food or treatment, an unverified accusation,
conversation with prisoners from another group, and so on.
A large number of criminals, especially former
communist guerrillas, are in the service of UDBA (the prison's intelligence
unit). Based on their data and information, the "profile" (criminal
record) of each prisoner is compiled, a very important document, since it
determines whether a pardon request is considered and the prison administration's
attitude toward each individual. It is understandable that the prisoners, and
especially the political prisoners, fear these informers, on whom their lives
sometimes depend. As a rule, these individuals are known, but there are cases
where it is difficult to identify them.
For this reason, the prisoners refrain, as a
precaution, from discussing political matters. Political prisoners share the
same cellblocks with common criminals, regardless of whether they are
intellectuals or not. There is no room for "honest custody" there; on
the contrary, political prisoners receive worse treatment than criminals, who
are not "against the people," as the administration often emphasizes.
Minor political prisoners are sent to penitentiaries,
not reformatories, and must share the same cells with criminals, often
murderers. In Lepoglava, the warden of the minors was a certain Ljustina, a
Serb from Lika, convicted of homicide. His duty was to "re-educate"
the minor prisoners because he possessed the "necessary faculties"
for this mission. He had served in the communist army during the major war and
was also an informant for UDBA: He had to make "good citizens of the
socialist community" out of these minor offenders.
The
food in the prisons is meager and insufficient in both quality and quantity.
Many inmates suffer from hypovitaminosis, especially vitamin C deficiency, and
from other illnesses, primarily tuberculosis. Those who receive food parcels
from their families are fortunate in this regard (two parcels per month,
weighing 7 kilos each, are permitted).
Meat
is scarce, and when it is provided, it is of very poor quality. The food is
unchanging, especially in spring, when only sauerkraut and turnip, without
seasoning, are distributed for lunch and dinner. The portion of bread, usually
cornmeal, is insufficient. Vegetables, legumes, and salads are rare exceptions.
Fruit
and desserts are practically nonexistent, although all prisons have extensive
farms that inmates cultivate for free. In recent years, canteens have been
established in the prisons, where certain items can be purchased occasionally.
As a
rule, all inmates are required to work, but many are prohibited from doing so
to break the monotony of prison life, especially political prisoners,
considered highly dangerous. They are kept confined to their cells for months
and years, inactive and bored; they are isolated from other prisoners to avoid
"harmful influences."
There's
no need to mention the mental and physical state of these prisoners, who suffer
so much. Work is generally done in workshops. Each prison has its own
"economic enterprise," with its own administration and, in theory,
independent of the prison administration.
The
convicts provide free labor, thus generating substantial profits for the
enterprise, which sells its products in markets both domestically and
internationally. The wooden products and objects made in Lepoglava are sold in
the United States. This penitentiary has workshops for carpentry, basketry, and
leatherwork.
The
prisoners receive a "symbolic wage" for their work, part of which
they can spend in the canteen, and part of which is "deposited" with
the administration, to be given to them upon release. Those prisoners who have
served half or two-thirds of their sentence and have not been punished for
disciplinary infractions work on the farms.
They
work all day and move around the farm with relative freedom, only to be
confined to the barracks at night. They receive a decent meal; better than the
other prisoners, they can receive more visitors, smoke freely, etc. A penal
institution is never exclusively inhabited by its own inmates. In addition to
working on the farms, which are very close to the prison, a large number of
prisoners are transferred to work sites quite distant from it.
A
large part of "New Belgrade," the suburb stretching between Belgrade
and Zemun, was built by prisoners from all over Yugoslavia. Many work in the
mines, namely: in Novi Golubovac, near Lepoglava; In Ivanec, Rasa, Idrija (a
mercury mine), and a large number in the copper mines of Serbia, they work in
appalling conditions, with primitive tools, without the protective equipment
afforded to other miners. As a result, many prisoners become seriously ill due
to exhausting work, lack of hygiene, and unsanitary housing.
Many
convicts worked on the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, although Titoist propaganda
claimed it was built by volunteer youth brigades. In the sawmills of Gorski
Kotar, Fuzine, Delnice, and Lokve, only convicts work. Near Makarska, in
Tucepi, a beautiful hotel was built in 1949 for members of the secret police.
It
is called "Jadran." It was built entirely by the convicts (and
currently houses not only police officers but also tourists). On the Brioni
Islands, Tito's luxurious Adriatic residence, most of the work was carried out
by prisoners. The canalization and improvements at the Lonjsko and Jelas camps
were primarily done by convicts.
The
Novi Vinodol, Jablanica, and other hydroelectric power plants were built by
prisoners. The hardest and most unhealthy jobs were reserved for the inmates.
Many were left disabled because safety and protective measures were minimal and
the work was manual. Tito's villa and vineyard in Samobor, near Zagreb, were
maintained by prisoners.
It
is impossible to list all the places where prisoners worked, as prison labour
was fully utilized in communist Yugoslavia. It is worth noting that many
prisoners were employed in the iron foundries in Vares and Zenica.
As
we have already mentioned, many prisoners work outside the penitentiary (which
is why a foreign observer visiting it believes there are very few), the regime
is more lenient, the food better, and then comes the false promise: "If
you perform well at work, you will gain your freedom sooner."
Very
soon, the prisoner realizes that this is a false incentive to obtain the
highest output and that the sentence is not shortened. This is the two sides of
"work" as a method of "re-education" of prisoners. There
are cases of escape from the workplace, but woe to those who are caught! The
militiamen beat them mercilessly, a practice tolerated by the prison
administration and known to the inmates.
If
the escape fails, there are beatings, then chains, total isolation, and other
disciplinary punishments. Many escapees end up riddled with bullets, and there
were cases, in 1947-48, in which escapes were staged by the prison
administration to eliminate some undesirable convict without having to answer
to anyone.
Along
with manual labor, the "re-education of prisoners" plays an important
role in prison life. A special officer is in charge of re-education and, in
that capacity, organizes purely propagandistic events, celebrates important
dates of the Communist Party and the State, and once a week the prisoners
attend a film screening.
Until
1949, only Soviet films were shown. After the break with Moscow, other films
were also shown, but mainly those produced domestically or by communist
countries. Each film is subject to censorship by the officer in charge of
re-education, although the central censorship office in Belgrade has already
reviewed all films.
Likewise,
each performance must be approved by the censor, who removes many paragraphs
from the text (poetry, plays, literary compositions) without regard for logical
continuity, which often leads to absurdity. Prisons often have choirs and
orchestras, made up of inmates, who must provide the instruments, sheet music,
and other materials. The library's books are 90 percent propaganda texts,
Marxist texts, and, as for literature, books by writers.
Partisan
works and some classics are available. The librarian decides when and which
book to give to the requester. Thus, for example, prisoners who do not work for
any reason are deprived of reading material and forced to spend their time
without any entertainment, staring into space. Books from outside are not
allowed, even professional manuals. In exceptional cases, a book is admitted,
reviewed, and often not given to the requester because the censor—an uneducated
militiaman—deems it subversive and counter-revolutionary material. Courses in
accounting, foreign languages, etc., are offered.
However,
due to the transfer of prisoners, disciplinary punishments, and the absence of
the teacher, few courses are successfully completed. Nevertheless, the prison
administration boasts of providing a wide range of knowledge. All inmates who
work in a workshop are considered apprentices and must attend the school of
arts, crafts, and agriculture.
Absurd
cases arise, for example, that lawyers, economists, and certified teachers, or
the High school graduates, even if elderly, must continue their apprenticeship
courses. Each penal institution has "cultural promotion teams"
working in this area. They are usually intellectuals and musicians, but there
are always two or three agents monitoring to ensure there is no "deviation
from the established line."
Militiamen,
members of the administration, and the person in charge of
"re-education" attend every event or conference. There is usually an
"arts section," made up of painters and sculptors. Their work
consists of drawing the various "slogans" for party celebrations or
creating designs for wooden objects, etc., which are then produced in the
workshops.
There
is also a modest infirmary, staffed by prison doctor-inmates, whose powers are
very limited. The resources are also minimal, so even simple operations like
appendectomies sometimes cannot be performed. In recent years, the doctors in
these institutions have been employed by the party, but always as party members
who primarily look after the interests of each prison. of the communist regime
and then of the patient. The imprisoned doctors work as assistants.
Offenses
against human dignity are frequent and commonplace in prisons. The warden
himself, as a representative of the authorities, is often insolent and abusive
toward the prisoners. Josip Spiranec, nicknamed Jura, the director of Lepoglava
prison, used to call inmates "thieves and swindlers" if they were
political prisoners.
It
is common in Yugoslavia, and especially in prisons and penal institutions, to
label prisoners "bandits" and "criminals" for being
"against the people." The militiamen receive and control the contents
of the packages. They handle them in such a way that the provisions are mixed
up or torn to shreds, and if there is a photo of the wife, sister, or
girlfriend of the person receiving them, the militiaman usually tears it up,
accompanying the gesture with the insult:
"What
kind of whore is this?" Complaining is counterproductive, since no one
believes the prisoner. Religious worship is not permitted. All the chapels
inside the prisons that existed before have been destroyed or transformed into
storage rooms, cells, etc. The inmates fear that someone will see them praying,
as it is considered reactionary. Clerical, an incorrigible enemy. Breviaries,
rosaries, crucifixes, or other religious symbols are not allowed. Catholic
priests are under close surveillance.
Correspondence
with family is permitted once or twice a month, depending on the institution.
If an inmate receives more letters than prescribed, they are simply torn up and
thrown away. The censor crosses out all paragraphs deemed inappropriate. Often,
the letters are not delivered to the recipient. If an inmate is prohibited from
receiving packages as a disciplinary punishment, he cannot inform his family,
and if a package arrives, it is returned to the sender.
This
incurs expenses for the prisoner's family, as food, especially in summer,
spoils. Family visits are allowed once a month for 10-15 minutes. Prisoners
stand against the wall, hands behind their backs, and next to each one stands a
militiaman who listens to every word of the conversation. Shaking hands is
forbidden. If the The prisoner, who is serving a disciplinary punishment, is
unable to receive the visitor, despite the distance the visitor had to travel.
The family's requests to the warden are futile.
Some
inmates, usually those sentenced to longer terms or considered "very
dangerous," were isolated and separated from the other prisoners. Their
warden was a criminal, a henchman at the same time, who made their lives
miserable.
Such
special sections exist in Stara Gradiska (section one, the famous Tower), and
in Lepoglava, in the first wing of section two, called "the black
battalion" by the prisoners. In these separate pavilions, discipline is
more rigid; punishment is inflicted for the slightest infraction; the warden
(the prisoner himself) can even prohibit the receipt of packages and confine
prisoners to solitary confinement without the warden's intervention.
Torture
is commonplace in these pavilions. All priests serving their sentences are held
in the "tower" of the Stara Gradiska prison.
The
situation in the women's detention center in Slavonska Pozega is no better. The
female prisoners perform arduous physical labor, are confined to solitary
confinement, and are tortured; etc. Nuns and prostitutes are imprisoned
together. It is known that in the aforementioned detention center there were
cells with flooded floors, where they housed the condemned women, even those
who were menstruating. A certain Radic, the director of that prison, was
particularly notorious for such brutality.
In
the summer of 1948, following the Informburo resolution, the concentration camp
for pro-Moscow communists was opened on Goli Island, off the Croatian coast.
There, they were held indefinitely without trial, by order of the UDBA (United
Socialist Party of Croatia). Currently, other condemned individuals are also
confined on this island, as the orthodox communists have practically all been
released.
Many
students who held demonstrations in Zagreb in May were imprisoned there, mostly
without legal proceedings. Living and working conditions are extremely harsh,
as the island is inhospitable, barren, without water or vegetation, battered by
strong winds and heat, and the work consists of breaking rocks.
It
is a true concentration camp according to the Soviet-Nazi model, except for the
gas chambers. In closing, this report highlights that the majority of
militiamen, prison guards, and officials in the penal institutions located
within the territory of the People's Republic of Croatia are Serbian nationals
and treat prisoners of Croatian origin with undisguised hatred.
In
Serbia, a large number of political prisoners at the end of World War II were
released very quickly. In contrast, in Croatia, even today, 16 years after the
"liberation," there are many prisoners whose crime is having served
in the Croatian army or held an important position in the Croatian state
administration.
They
are not eligible for pardon; instead, they continue to be treated as
"bandits," reactionaries, enemies of the people, and so on. Some were
20 or 30 years old in 1945 and have been imprisoned for sixteen years without
hope of early release, even though there is no justification for their
imprisonment under international criminal codes. The lives of these people have
already faded; they are old, sick, and desperate.
It
must not be forgotten that in Yugoslavian prisons there is no heating in winter,
food is insufficient, the work is grueling, and the treatment is brutal, all of
which contributes to released prisoners returning home battered and sick,
broken men. The term "forced labor" is strictly forbidden in
Yugoslavia.
The
communists argue that forced labour exists only in a capitalist system and that
prisoners in Yugoslavia are not convicts, but are being
"re-educated." Those who have endured chains, solitary confinement,
disciplinary battalions, torture, or other appropriate means of "re-education"
can attest to the emptiness and absurdity of these claims.
It is difficult to establish the exact number of
prisoners in Yugoslavia, especially political prisoners. The main reason is
that these figures are considered "confidential," and furthermore, as
already mentioned, not all inmates are ever actually in the penal institution
to which they belong, as many of them work outside the prison, often at a great
distance.
Tourists
and observers from free countries who sometimes visit a prison cannot gain an
objective impression of the prevailing situation, since the administration
manages to show them only the positive aspects, and moreover, for reasons
already stated, most of the prison population is absent. No observer or visitor
from democratic countries ever saw the prisoners held in isolation,
incommunicado, in chains, mistreated, and tortured. However, this is the true
picture of Tito's prisons and his "people's democratic penal system."
One of the most blatant forms of popular discontent is
the struggle against Belgrade's centralist measures—that is, Serbia's—which
manifest themselves in all areas, from sports, culture, and education to the
economy.
In a state that tends toward rigid control of all
economic activities, national antagonisms inevitably manifest themselves in the
daily struggle over the distribution of national income and the investment of
available funds, which are entirely dependent on the central government.
These controversies have become so acute that even the
main communist leaders participate, partly to counteract the facts and ensure
their own success—that is, the success of the company or institution they
lead—and partly driven by the undisguised discontent of the workers, who
rightly see the exploitation of Croatia as the main cause of their very low
standard of living, and by all the popular classes who blame the communists for
the loss of national independence.
The communists, of course, try to reject these
accusations within the bounds of party discipline. All of this takes on the
character of a silent and tenacious struggle for national rights, so latent
that even the main leader in Croatia, the president of the Socialist Federation
of the Working People of Croatia, had to admit it in his report presented to
the Federation's Fifth Congress, held in Zagreb at the end of last year.
However, the Tanjug news agency report of December 20,
1960, when referring to this debate, condenses it into two cautious sentences,
barely intelligible to a foreigner. "Speaking about the planning
system," the report states, "Dr. Bakaric emphasized its relative
connection with the social phenomena we previously called particularism,
localism, etc. He also addressed the problem of nationalism in the economic
sphere, which certain elements invent and promote in the form of a struggle for
investment."
The reference to the phenomenon of economic
nationalism is intentionally imprecise, as if it were referring to dirigiste
and autarky economic nationalism. Instead, it concerns the struggle against the
economic exploitation of Croatia and Slovenia by Serbia, which Bakaric labels
as chauvinism.
However, this reality cannot be hidden in the country,
and Bakaric addressed this issue to refute before the public the accusation
that the government of the People's Republic of Croatia surrendered to
Belgrade, behaving as a mere Serbian satellite. For this reason, the text of
his report was published, in its official version, in the newspaper Vjesnik on
December 21, 1960.
Bakaric reiterated the official denials regarding the
colonial exploitation of Croatia, justifying it with the Yugoslav communist
government's theory that economic equality between individuals should also
apply to peoples, that is, to equalize the standard of living of all the
people's republics.
According to this theory, the surpluses of companies
in Croatia and Slovenia, economically more advanced republics, cannot be used
primarily to improve wages or for the progress of their less developed regions,
but must be invested mainly in Serbia and Montenegro and, to a lesser extent,
in Macedonia and Bosnia.
Advocating
once again for "aid to the underdeveloped," outside of Croatia,
Bakaric criticized those who thought the opposite:
"It is well known that in previous years we have
often pointed out particularism, localism, and other chauvinistic phenomena in
the economic sphere, and condemned corruption and similar errors. To suppress
these phenomena, we did much by highlighting the subjective factors behind
these tendencies, and how incorrect and harmful such approaches are. It seems
that these phenomena are disappearing, but some are reappearing in new forms
and continuing to operate. I am referring especially to certain new elements
that fuel nationalist and chauvinistic sentiments."
Consequently, the main communist leader of Croatia
knowingly reverses the terms. The chauvinists are not his Serbian comrades who
are exploiting Croatia and Slovenia, but rather the Croats and Slovenes who
condemn this plunder.
"A new stimulus to nationalism," Bakaric
continues, "arises because of the weaknesses of the current system. It
also arises from the struggles surrounding investments, development issues, and
the forms established by the existing system. Therefore, no serious problems
have arisen, although not everything is being done to eliminate them in their
early stages or to channel them.
Just now, in these last few days, we have had occasion
to hear and read in the press reports about the grouping of political sectors
and factors, such that those from the advanced communes or republics support
decentralization, while those from the backward republics advocate centralism;
those from the backward republics are in favor of the old system, those from
the advanced ones are for the new. If we delve a little deeper, we will
perceive the different national criteria."
Taken in their true sense, Bakaric contradicts himself
in the same report when he states that the regime, through its achievements,
"has totally defeated the last nationalists and chauvinists," and
that the opposition, both in exile and underground within the country, has
failed ideologically and is "constrained" only to formulate vulgar,
verbal, empty, and abstract attacks against communism as such, and to make
verbal and formal chauvinistic demands concerning Croatia's borders and the
like.
The communist leaders, however, fear this
"vulgar, formal, and abstract" criticism so much that they strictly
prohibit even the slightest freedom of speech and of the press. As proof of the
supposed "total ideological failure" of the Croatian patriots,
Serbia's communist satellites in Croatia claim that the political police have
learned that the underground opposition in Croatia advised exiled politicians
Refrain from any statement regarding "Serbian rule in Croatia," as
this constitutes a counterproductive slogan.
Such
an argument, put forward by Bakaric, proves to those who still doubt: 1) that a
clandestine opposition operates in Croatia despite all repressive measures, and
2) that the communists censor correspondence. As for the alleged "total
ideological failure" of the Croatian opposition, the supposed revelations
of Bakaric's political police prove the contrary.
While
Bakaric and the Croatian communists came to power only as "Quislings,"
that is, by subordinating themselves in everything to the Serbian communists
and acting alongside them against the vast majority of Croats, who fought for
their independence in the most difficult circumstances, Croatian patriots,
despite these facts, consider it necessary to reach a level of coexistence with
the Serbian minority that makes possible the common struggle against the
colonial exploitation of Croatia. This is not a matter of ideological defeat
but of the correct orientation according to the The struggle for national
freedom does not exclude the rights and freedoms of minorities in Croatia. That
is something very different from what Bakaric and his ilk tried to suggest.
The
desire of Croatian patriots to establish good relations with the Serbian
minority in Croatia does not equate to approving of the "Quisling"
role played by Bakaric, facilitating Belgrade's colonial domination of Croatia.
That a negligible minority of Croats embraced communist ideology is not
surprising, given the existence of active communist groups in all Western
countries.
Despite
all this, and despite all the theories on proletarian internationalism, no
communist party seeks the liquidation of its country's sovereignty in a
political or economic sense. Nor do the communist leaders of the Kremlin's
satellite states. For example, Albania, a small and poor country, vigorously
opposes Serbian imperialism, and recently the Albanian communist leaders even
dared to defy the Russian ukases. In Hungary, too, the communists rose up
against the Soviet occupation.
Gomulka
is as much a communist as Bakasic, and yet Khrushchev, too, doesn't dream of
incorporating Poland into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, formally
liquidating its sovereignty. Furthermore, no communist, least of all the Poles,
currently considers the defense of national sovereignty a chauvinistic itch,
except for the Croatian communist leaders. The same reasons that argue for
Russia and Poland to be two separate states within the communist bloc also
speak in favor of separate Croatian and Serbian states.
Croatia
and Poland were established in the Middle Ages as kingdoms, and their cultural,
social, and political development took place within Western society. In
contrast, Russia and Serbia are countries with Byzantine traditions.
Consequently, there are no reasons of international common good that justify a
forced association of Croatia with Serbia, in which, moreover, the leonine part
belongs to Serbia.
The
sole cause of Croatia's current subordination to Serbia is Serbian imperialism
and the role of "Quisling" played by the Croatian communists. Their
actions have revealed them to be mere puppets—those who rose up against their
nation-state, allying themselves with Croatia's enemies, without whose support
they could not have seized power in Croatia.
These
few communists now claim they rose up against the dictatorship imposed on their
country, even though it was obvious that the regime in power in Croatia during
the war was imposed by circumstances and that, once the storm of war had
passed, a democratic government would be formed. The fact is that they did not
fight against a specific regime, but against the Croatian state itself and for
Croatia's subjugation to Serbia. To achieve this end, the communists orchestrated
the massacre of tens of thousands of Croatians who did not share their agenda.
Therefore, in Croatia, in addition to being exponents of tyranny, they act as
agents of foreign domination.
According to confidential information, even certain
communist leaders in Croatia are aware of their sorry role as
"Quislings" and fear popular anger, hence the warnings and threats
that Bakaric directs primarily at these discontented individuals. Resorting to
hackneyed phrases about the chauvinistic nature of the opposition, he seeks to
intimidate the disheartened leaders.
It
is truly a thankless task for Bakaric, who also aspires to be considered an
intellectual and is more than likely aware of the weaknesses in his reasoning.
To appease both sides, while attacking supposed chauvinism, he advocates
decentralization and at the same time tries to argue that it would not harm
Serbia, that is, the regions that are industrializing with funds taken from
Croatia.
Bakaric
expresses himself in terms that reflect the ungrateful position of the Croatian
communists and the anguish they experience over "their total ideological
failure." "We all want," says Bakaric, "a major step
forward in improving the economic system. This means that the current system,
at least in part, is not suited to progress and, as such, must necessarily have
several flaws and shortcomings. Therefore, every argument (regarding the
colonial exploitation of Croatia) contains a grain of truth and many outdated
prejudices."
"Rectifying the system according to these
arguments would amount to maintaining what is obsolete and clinging to the very
foundations of the difficulties that motivate these conceptions. (The real
basis of the difficulties is none other than Serbian hegemony. Editor's note.)
We are not fighting for decentralization so that the rich republics can become
even richer, but because this system is today more appropriate for the
development of the productive forces and socialist relations, more effectively
eliminating the root of poverty in the backward republics." Et
cetera, et cetera.
Bakaric,
with this play on words, neither avoids the fact that Croatia is economically
exploited nor can he prevent the growing popular resistance against this state
of affairs. Bakaric claims in vain that he and his comrades are governing
Croatia, since all important measures are dictated by Belgrade against
Croatia's vital interests.
That
these are not "vulgar, verbal, abstract, and formal attacks" issued
by supposed Croatian chauvinists, but rather a stark reality, is demonstrated
by the figures contained in the table prepared by our contributor and economic
expert, Tihomil Radja. The data below refers to the distribution of investment
funds by republic during the period 1952-1959 and is clear proof of the colonial
exploitation of Croatia and Slovenia in favor of Serbia:
|
|
In trillions of dinars at current prices |
||
|
People's Republics |
Accumulation + amortization |
Gross investments |
Percentage of investments |
|
Serbia (including Vojvodina and Kosmet) Croatia Slovenia Bosnia and Herzegovina North Macedonia Montenegro |
|
|
|
(See:
The Monthly Statistical Bulletin, No. 115, Belgrade, Index, No. 4, and 12/1960;
The Statistical Bulletin of the National Bank, Belgrade, No. 5, 1960, and
Investments 1997-1958, Ed. Investment Bank, Belgrade, 1959.)
It
follows from the preceding table that the amount of investment placed in Serbia
is double that allocated to Croatia. It should be noted that the majority of
these investments are in Serbia proper, and that the relatively advanced
autonomous region of Voivodeship is being exploited to a very high degree. This
region, which until the end of the First World War belonged to the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, is now incorporated into the People's Republic of
Serbia, along with the eastern part of Srijem, separated from Croatia. 500,000
German farmers were expelled, relocated, or exterminated from Voivodeship.
Yugoslavia is often spoken of as a country that
practices national communism and whose government, vigorously fighting for
national independence, does not accept Soviet interference.
However much this may be a matter of safeguarding
their own lives and perpetuating their hold on power, it is obvious that the communists
in Croatia do not practice national communism. They still label as national
chauvinism the aspirations of the working masses in Croatia for better wages
and to avoid exploitation by Serbian imperialism.
Foreign
observers who address the problems of Yugoslavia without considering the
existence within Yugoslavia of an absurd form of colonialism—that is,
colonialism practiced by a backward Balkan country against the more developed
regions of Central Europe—are deluded and mislead their readers.
FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND THE HOLY
SEE TO REACH A MODUS VIVENDI
When, last year,
spokespeople for Tito's government announced that negotiations had begun to
reach a modus vivendi with the Holy See, those intimately familiar with the
internal situation in Yugoslavia and communist methods clearly saw that this
was primarily an effort by the Tito regime to gain propaganda value in Western
public opinion. The economic situation of communist Yugoslavia is so disastrous
that only extensive aid from Western countries can save it from financial and
economic collapse.
By providing incomplete and
biased information to the public in free countries and abusing the
understandable discretion of ecclesiastical circles, the communists partially
achieved their desired effect. However, when the expected failure of the
negotiations occurred, they resorted to their old tactics and placed all the
blame on the Holy See.
The representative of the Foreign Ministry, at the
press conference held on March 31, confirmed the Associated Press report
regarding the breakdown of contacts established with the Holy See through the
Catholic bishops. The communist spokesman stated
that the talks were not continuing "because the bishops had not obtained
the Vatican's approval."
The truth is that the bishops never requested such
"conformity," maintaining the position, already expressed in the
Memorandum addressed to Titus on September 23, 1960, that the episcopate
"is not competent to enter into decisive negotiations, much less to reach
a definitive agreement.
By the divine constitution of the Church, that belongs
exclusively to the Apostolic See" (Studia Croatica, Year II, Vol. I, p.
81). The bishops can only "take part in rectifying the situation."
However, the communists persist in their biased approach as if it were a matter
of relations between the Catholic episcopate and the government, in which the
Vatican arbitrarily interferes, and not a bilateral agreement between two
sovereign powers.
The reasons for such conduct must be sought in the
mentality of the Belgrade leaders, formed not only in communist doctrine but
also in the spirit of Byzantine conceptions regarding Church-State relations.
As such, they can only reach a modus vivendi with
religious communities organized on a national basis; that is, they do not
recognize ecclesiastical authority outside the country. In such cases, the
all-powerful state imposes an arrangement on religious communities and their
subjects without restraint, without the need to negotiate an agreement between
two equal parties, as is the case with the Holy See.
A
similar view was also expressed in the report that the Federal Executive
Council (the federal government in Belgrade) presented on April 7 to the
parliamentary committee for internal affairs. The report emphasizes that
relations between the state and religious communities are being normalized.
"This process is not evolving in the same way in all religious
communities.
The
Serbian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community, as well as Protestant
communities and other smaller ones, are finding their place in our society
where they carry out their activities." Regarding the Catholic Church, the
report states only that "there were fewer negative incidents than in
previous years" and expresses hope for improved relations.
It
should be noted that this report confirms our information that the government
initiated the negotiations for propaganda purposes. "The Federal Executive
Council proposed the negotiations to exchange opinions and gradually resolve
specific problems." The Communists reiterate that these were negotiations
between the government and the episcopate, not between the government and the
Holy See.
The Times of London, in its April 12, 1961 edition, reported that "The Vatican refused to
negotiate directly or allow the bishops to negotiate."
According to our
confidential sources, the reasons for this breakdown are both formal and
substantive. On the one hand, the Belgrade government did not respond to the
conditions formulated by the bishops with proposals that the Holy See could
accept as a basis for negotiations.
The Vatican Secretariat of
State, in a note addressed to the Belgrade government (Studia Croatica, Year
II, Vol. I, p. 89), defined the rights of the Church, "which the Holy See
cannot renounce and whose ignorance would render any eventual talks with the
Yugoslav government fruitless."
Such was the case in this
instance. On the other hand, Tito's government insisted that any possible modus
vivendi had to be negotiated between the government and the episcopate and
would not entail an agreement between the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Holy See on an international scale. After the failures of
similar agreements between the government and the Yugoslav episcopate,
solutions of this kind were ruled out, especially since the Catholic bishops in
Yugoslavia shared this view and followed the line established by Cardinal
Stepinac.
Relations between the State
and the Church, particularly in a nationally and religiously heterogeneous
country where the Catholic minority is marginalized and where the communist
government combats religion, cannot be viewed as a purely internal problem. In
such a case, ecclesiastical representatives—in effect prisoners of the
communist authorities—risk becoming defenders of an atheist government by
renouncing the support of the Holy See. Therefore, blaming the Holy See for the
failed negotiations proves once again that the Yugoslav communist leaders are
not acting in good faith.
To complete the picture, it is worth adding that
the Catholic bishops of Croatia, in particular, resolutely rejected all
attempts by the government to enter into negotiations directly with the
communist authorities, bypassing the Vatican, as had occurred in Poland. Catholics
in Croatia, both clergy and laity, resist the insidious efforts of the
communists who advocate the establishment of a national church.
It
is regrettable that a portion of the world press contributed last year to Tito
achieving his desired propaganda effect by publishing incomplete information
and failing to properly clarify the content of the bishops' memorandum. While
the document itself is moderate and measured in tone, devoid of recriminations
and protests, and offers a balanced account of the difficulties faced by the
Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, the fact that it was officially accepted by the
Yugoslav government as a basis for negotiations implies recognition of the
veracity of its content.
The
memorandum (Studia Croatica, Year II, Vol. I, pp. 80-86) clearly demonstrates
the tragic situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia under the communist
regime, which now seeks to portray itself as a victim of Vatican
diplomacy—diplomacy which, according to Belgrade, is at the service of
Yugoslavia's enemies. By distorting the facts in this way, the Belgrade
government seeks to achieve certain political effects after the fact,
especially in Serbia, where there are deep-rooted prejudices against the Holy
See.
Furthermore,
the communists strive to conceal the true situation of Catholics from the
public and to present a distorted picture of Yugoslavia, where the majority of
the population opposes the regime and the state itself, without any evidence of
external pressure. Yugoslavia, as is well known, is a conglomeration of
countries where national and religious discrimination is practiced to the
detriment of the majority of the population.
MINIMUM WAGES AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN COMMUNIST
YUGOSLAVIA
The reforms introduced this
year to the wage system in Yugoslavia reflect the standard of living of workers
and employees in that communist country. The purpose of these reforms is to
achieve greater productivity, both in factories and collective farms, as well
as in offices, through the new distribution of wages.
Under the previous system,
the salaries of administrative personnel were determined by competence,
personal qualifications, and seniority. Now, the following criteria apply: the
task performed by the employee and their performance. Salaries consist of a
fixed base and occasional supplements.
The fixed base salary is
determined for each task, while the occasional supplement, that is, "the
bonus," is distributed monthly or quarterly from a special fund only to
those who "exceeded" the predetermined standard. The bonus fund
consists of 5% of the total wages contributed by each company. The Communist
Party organ "Borba" writes in its December 18, 1960 edition:
"This practically means that employees will not be guaranteed the salary
they have received until now, but they are offered the possibility of earning
more if they are more productive and if their company is rationally
organized."
This conditional form is
very important, and it will be interesting to see how "performance-based
pay" will affect organizations such as the "Directorate of National
Security," the army, the People's Committees, social security offices,
etc. Another problem arises, namely: who will determine, and on what basis,
whether a worker or employee has "increased their productivity"? It
is obvious, then, that the new system will lend itself to...
Greater abuses and arbitrary
actions by managers, who will assess each individual's performance according to
political criteria, will also lead to increased bureaucratization if true control
of each worker's work is implemented.
The payment method for
workers and employees in companies also underwent essential changes. Salary
scales and pay grades were eliminated, and instead, each company sets wages
according to the task, each worker's performance, and the company's profits,
after deducting all expenses, including federal taxes and contributions to
various municipal funds. In addition, 15% is deducted from wages for the
municipal and district budget, 4% for the housing fund, and 24% for social
security.
To facilitate the control of workers and individual
performance, so-called "economic units" have been established in all
large companies. These units decide on the distribution of available income. In
the event that the company does not have sufficient funds for payment...
Regarding wages, which will surely occur frequently, the federal government
established, on March 31 of this year, a minimum wage fund to be managed by
each municipality. Under that decree, all companies are classified into four
categories:
|
|
Average monthly salary |
Per hour |
|
|
|
In dinars |
In dollars |
In dollars |
|
I II III IV |
14.300 16.000 17.500 19.000 |
$ 19. $ 21.30 $ 21.30 $ 25.30 |
$ 0.09 $ 0,10 $ 0,11 $ 0,12 |
(The figures given refer to gross wages, that is,
without the various deductions which, added together, amount to 43%. The data
are taken from the Yugoslav newspaper "Vjesnik" of April 1, 1961.)
The
minimum wage fund is thus comprised of the average wage for the respective
category, multiplied by the number of workers. This fund is then distributed
according to the internal decisions of each company, provided that the average
net wage is not less than 9,500 dinars or $12.70 per month, or $0.06 per hour.
(Salary
amounts calculated in dollars were obtained using the official exchange rate of
750 dinars to 1 dollar, in effect since January 1 of this year.) It is not yet
possible to accurately determine the purchasing power of wages, as official
cost-of-living data for the period following the salary and wage adjustments and
the new exchange rate of the Yugoslav currency are not yet available. As a
guide, official statistics on average prices in 1957, when the dinar-dollar
exchange rate was 400:1, can be used. According to these data (Yugoslav
Statistical Yearbook, Belgrade, 1958, pp. 228-29), the prices of some items
were: 1 kg of rice, 45 dinars (US dollars 0.12); 1 kg of beef, dinars. 198 -
265 (dollars 0.50 - 0.65); 1 kg of bacon, din. 353 - 470 (dollars 0.90 - 1.60);
1 liter of milk, din. 50 (dollars 0.12); 1 kg of butter, din. 600 (dollars
1.50); 1 kg of sugar, din. 145 (dollars 0.36), and 1 meter of
domestically produced men's suit fabric, din. 4,485 - 5,333 (dollars 11.20 -
13.33).
Given that prices have doubled due to currency
devaluation, it's easy to imagine the cost of living for employees and workers
on the minimum average monthly salary of 9,500 dinars, or $12.70.
Furthermore,
it should be emphasized that the decree on the minimum wage fund is
incompatible with the principles of workers' self-management, primarily due to
the extremely low level of the guaranteed wage fund. Therefore, if a company is
struggling, it cannot balance its finances by withholding its contributions to
the state, but only by reducing wages and salaries. In free-market countries,
during times of crisis or recession, profits are much more flexible than wages
and salaries. In communist Yugoslavia, the situation is reversed: the state can
reduce wages and salaries to the bare minimum, or even below it. This is the
nature of the regulation, which makes no mention of the different forms of
state profits and sets no limits on them.
"THE
CROATS AND AUSTRIA" - AN OPINION BY A SERBIAN POLITICIAN
In the last issue of "S.C." we extensively
analyzed the unfounded claims of Mr. Manes Sperber, published in the magazine
Preuves. The Austrian writer repeated the invectives of Engels and Marx against
the Croatian people who, according to them, did not fight for their national
freedom in Austria. In contrast, Mr. Sperber highlighted the conduct of the
Serbs, who supposedly fought against the Austrian Empire, which the Croats
faithfully served.
To complete our arguments, we transcribe below what
Adam Pribicevic, a prominent Serbian politician who died in exile in 1957,
wrote on the same subject. In 1955, Pribicevic published an article entitled
"The Croats and Austria" in Poruka (The Message), No. 27, the
bulletin of the Yugoslav National Committee of London. We reproduce the main
paragraphs of that article and, for informational purposes, note that its
author was one of the representatives of the Serbian minority in Croatia and a
typical Serbian nationalist. In the last years of his life, he wrote frequently
and controversially about Croatian politics.
Therefore, his opinions on Croatian-Austrian relations
cannot be considered biased in favor of the Croats. We quote his words without
comment:
"A large part of the Serbian people take as proof
of the political and moral inferiority of the Croats the fact that they
advocated for Austria, that is, for Croatia within Austria-Hungary. That would
be irrefutable proof of the servile spirit of the Croats, of their subservience
to foreigners, and of their lack of a sense of freedom.
Correspondingly, feelings of superiority are
cultivated among the Serbs, feelings that are very dangerous even for normal
social relations and much more so for relations between peoples, whether that
superiority is racial, religious, cultural, or social... Let's examine whether
we Serbs have reason to consider ourselves superior to the Croats simply
because they served Austria and we did not.
"It is undeniable that the Croats had elected
Ferdinand of Habsburg as their king in 1527. The Hungarians and the Czechs did
the same. None of them out of love for Austria, but out of necessity." The
Turkish threat forced them to this course of action. However, Slavonia (one of
the Croatian provinces) opted for Zapoli against Ferdinand.
Even among the Serbs (who lived in southern Hungary)
there was a strong current in favor of the Habsburgs: the Bakic brothers, Tsar
Jovan Nenad, Stefan Balentic, the celnik (chieftain) Radoslav, and others,
while others opted for Zapoli or the Turks, respectively. "We have no
reason to censure the Croats of that era. Nor afterward, nor to this day.
Both Serbs and Croats fought for Austria, that is,
they defended themselves against the Turks with Austrian aid. Whenever the
Austrians invaded the Balkans after 1683, the Serbs of Serbia joined them and
even moved to Voivodeship to settle. The Serbs of the Military Frontier not
only defended the border against the Turks, but also fought heroically for
Austria on every European battlefield.
"If
we want to be objective, we must recognize that the Croatian ruling class
showed greater opposition to Austria than the Serbs: the conspiracy of Zrinski
and Frankopan in 1671, then the Croats' renunciation of certain sovereign
attributes in favor of the Hungarian-Croatian community in 1790 with a view to
defending themselves more successfully against Germanization." Austrian.
The Serbs were firmly with the Emperor of Vienna, since the Imperial Court
protected them from conversion to Catholicism, due to their war merits, and
upheld their privileges.
THE FORCED REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES IN ITALY AND
AUSTRIA
"Hrvatska Revija"
(The Croatian Review) of Buenos Aires, in its June issue of this year (vols.
41-42), published an article entitled "The Tragic Situation of Croatian
Refugees in Austria and Italy," which we transcribe below because it deals
with a serious case that affects refugees from both communist Yugoslavia and
the free world:
"Nearly 16 years after
the end of the war, Europe has still not found a definitive solution to the
serious problem of displaced persons, stateless for political reasons. This is
all the more concerning given that new waves of refugees from countries behind
the Iron Curtain, especially East Germany, Hungary, and Croatia, are increasing
the number of those who left their homes in search of political, economic, and
religious security, seeking to escape fear and oppression and find refuge from
persecution.
In recent years, with the
exception of refugees from East Germany, the largest number of exiles have come
from Croatia. Yugoslavia, as is well known, is under a communist regime, and
there is also blatant discrimination between Slovenes, Croats, and Serbian
Orthodox Christians. Political terror and national, religious, and economic
discrimination lead many young Croatians to risk their lives in search of
freedom, fleeing across the Adriatic to Italy or climbing perilous paths in the
Alps to find safety and freedom in Austrian territory.
"We deeply regret
having to point out that in the last two years there have been frequent cases
of Italian and Austrian authorities handing these exiles over to Tito's agents,
fully aware of the severe reprisals that will befall them." In other
words, Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not being
respected: "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution. This right may be denied only in the case of
persecution genuinely based on common law crimes or activities contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations."
"Such a violation of
human rights by the Austrian and Italian authorities is all the more strange
given their full awareness of the oppressive and terrorist nature of Tito's
regime and the motives that drive thousands of Croats and Slovenes to emigrate.
The attitude of the Italian government is astonishing, considering that it is a
Christian Democratic government, inspired in its governance by Christian
principles and aware of how serious and persistent the persecution of the
Catholic Church is in Yugoslavia, such that no Catholic can be considered safe
from communist reprisals.
"We will now point out some exceptionally serious
cases in the San Sabba refugee camp in Trieste. There, a special section
exists, the political quarantine, where Italian police authorities concentrate
behind iron bars the unfortunate souls who are to be repatriated—that is,
handed over to Tito's political police." "On December 15, 1960, 122
refugees were loaded onto trucks under the pretext of being transferred to
another refugee camp.
Upon realizing they were being taken to the Yugoslav
border, many of these unfortunate souls jumped from the trucks, but were
apprehended by the Carabinieri, handcuffed, and handed over to Tito's communist
militiamen as a 'Christmas present.' Right there, in front of the Italian
police, the militiamen assigned some to forced labor camps, others to prison,
and still others to pretrial detention to be brought before communist
courts."
"Another group, consisting of 35 Croatian
refugees, was handed over to communist militiamen on January 5th. At eight
o'clock that evening, they were loaded onto trucks under the false pretense of
being taken to the camp in Aversa. They were then handcuffed in groups of five
and, with fixed bayonets, taken to the Yugoslav communist militiamen.
"The Italian authorities justify this inhumane
and unchristian practice by claiming that they grant asylum only to the
politically persecuted and not to those fleeing for economic reasons. Framed in
this way, more than 60% (in Austria, more than 80%) of the refugees from
Yugoslavia cannot prove political persecution and therefore cannot benefit from
the right to asylum, while such discrimination is not practiced with regard to
refugees from Russia and other communist countries.
The procedure for refugees from other communist
countries is entirely correct. In none of the communist countries are the basic
rights and freedoms of the human person respected." Therefore, all exiles
are entitled to asylum. In all cases, individuals must be freed from want and
fear. And in Yugoslavia, as in other communist countries, want and fear abound.
Furthermore, there is a complete lack of national and individual freedom and
economic security. Or rather, all these rights are closely intertwined and it
is often difficult to isolate them. Finally, as already stated, the majority of
refugees from Yugoslavia risk their lives in search of freedom.
"The saddest thing is that among those returned
were many persecuted for purely political reasons. Among them was Matija Bucar,
sentenced to 16 months in prison, accused of organizing anti-communist
propaganda. He escaped from prison and sought asylum in Italy, only to be
forcibly returned, along with his wife Magda Cvitak.
"On December 15, 1960, Mijo Dabo was returned
from Trieste, despite the political asylum previously granted to him."
"Ivan Bodrusic's family was awaiting extradition on December 22, 1960. The
husband was already on the truck. They went to pick up his wife, who was in a
maternity ward with an eight-day-old baby. Thanks solely to the doctors'
compassion, this Croatian family was saved and later moved to Australia.
"On
December 26, 1960, mechanic Stjepan Stokic, 26, born on the island of Rab, was
handed over. He had been sentenced to a long prison term for subversive
activity against the communist government, attempted escape, and desertion from
military service. Part of his sentence was served at the Goli Otok
extermination camp, from 1956 to 1958. He was held in solitary confinement for
three months because he was caught studying English. As a result of beatings,
he suffered a nervous breakdown.
When
he managed to escape to Italy, he was denied political asylum and was handed
over to his tormentors." "Jozo Maric, from Makarska, was also handed
over in October 1960. He first took refuge in Hungary, from where he was
returned and sentenced to 8 years of forced labor for having deserted from the
Yugoslav communist army. When he managed to escape to Italy, he was forcibly
handed over.""
On January 5, 1961, Luka Veraja, from Metkovic, was
returned. He had previously been sentenced by communist courts to 15 years in
prison, of which he served six.
"All those mentioned, and many more, were
persecuted for political reasons, so they undoubtedly had the right to asylum.
Despite this, they were handed over by the authorities of a country with a
Christian Democratic government to the communist executioners.
Other human tragedies caused by the insensitivity of
Italian bureaucrats must be recorded, tragedies that weigh on the conscience of
the rulers of that Catholic country." "Fearing extradition, Stjepan
Telsbuh, born on December 16, 1937, in Vocinjci, a bricklayer by trade, escaped
from the camp on December 7, 1960, and made his way to France. He arrived in
Italy in September 1960 in the company of Radisa Ratkovic, from Markovci. To
save themselves, they huddled under a Simplon-Express carriage. But the
unfortunate Telsbuh fell onto the railway tracks near Monfalcone, and the train
severed his head. The Triestine newspaper Il Piccolo reported on this tragic
episode.
"This
tragedy reminds us of other equally serious incidents that occurred in Austria
at the Traiskirchen camp, near Vienna, where in November 1960, the Croatian
exile Ilija Pavicic jumped from the third floor for fear of extradition and
died from his injuries."
"Furthermore, it is a very important fact that
Croatian refugees, upon leaving the country, expose themselves to grave
dangers, which proves that they are the truly persecuted. Many refugees,
climbing the Alps or crossing the Adriatic, lost their lives. For example, the
student Janusic fell into an Alpine precipice and died. The European press
frequently reports other tragic cases of Croatians who met their deaths frozen
under the Alpine snow, such as the Brcic children, whose photographs appear on
Austrian stamps commemorating the Year of the Refugee. In the winter of 1956-57
alone, more than 20 tragic incidents occurred in the stormy waters of the
Adriatic. Many were killed or wounded by Red sentries and bloodhounds while
crossing the border.
"Moreover, the demoralizing effect of
extraditions in Croatia and Slovenia is tremendous." The people, victims
of communist terrorism, despair because they see that neither Italy nor
Austria, neighboring Catholic and democratic countries, show sufficient
understanding towards the fugitives and, moreover, aid communist repression. What
is the point of propaganda against communism in the free world? Oppressed and
persecuted people live on hope. But when this hope is brutally crushed, then
the victims of communism are plunged into deep pessimism. The principles of
human and even Christian freedom and solidarity become empty.
"Invoking,
therefore, human rights, international obligations to protect exiles, Christian
precepts, and humanitarian sentiments, we protest against the crime of
extraditing exiles to the Yugoslav communists. We appeal to the conscience of
both the Italian and Austrian rulers. Croatia, homeland of the martyred
Cardinal A. Stepinac, was for centuries the defensive bulwark of Italy and
Austria, and it remains so. Croatia deserves that its persecuted sons and
daughters be treated as human beings in the interest of its free neighboring
countries. This is also demanded by a sense of human dignity, European
solidarity, and Christian morality."
ERNEST PEZET, COMMANDER OF THE LEGION OF HONOR
It is with particular pleasure that we note
that at the end of last year, the government of the French Republic promoted
our colleague Ernest Pezet, who currently serves as president of the Union of
French Citizens Abroad, to the rank of Commander of the Legion of Honor.
Ernest Pezet has always demonstrated a
steadfast commitment to important causes. With a profound understanding of the
situation in Central Europe, he has not hesitated to raise his courageous voice
in support of the martyred Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac and his homeland, Croatia,
deprived of its national and political freedoms by the communists of Belgrade.
We join his many friends around the world in
expressing our sincerest congratulations on this high distinction.
BOOK REVIEW
Croatian Review. Jubilee Edition on the Occasion of
its Tenth Anniversary. Buenos Aires, December 1960, pp. 305-784.
The jubilee issue of the
Croatian Review (Hrvatska Revija), a quarterly cultural and literary
publication, independent and democratic, produced by Croatian intellectuals
living freely in exile, has just come off the press. It has been published in
Buenos Aires for ten years without interruption.
This issue is a voluminous
book of 480 pages of text and 82 pages of glossy paper, featuring reproductions
of the latest works by exiled Croatian sculptors and painters. This voluminous,
content-rich volume demonstrates the creative vigor and vitality of the new
Croatian immigrants, as the Croatian Review is the joint work of its 141
contributors and its readers, whose contributions and subscriptions form the
financial basis of this great publishing endeavor.
The magazine receives no
support from any political organization or cultural institution, nor does it
have any funds or subsidies. Its sole support comes from the Croatian
immigrants and the inexhaustible energy, work ethic, and organizational skills
of its principal initiator, Vinko Nikolic, who is also its director and editor.
A Croatian poet and
literature professor, and a member of our editorial staff, Nikolic has lived in
Argentina since 1947 and works as a modest civil servant to support his family.
He dedicates all his available time and energy to fulfilling the overwhelming
tasks required for the writing, direction, and administration of a leading
quarterly magazine.
At the same time, Professor
Nikolic is the director of the publishing house Hrvatska Revija, which to date
has published several valuable books of a literary and political nature, and is
about to publish the memoirs of Ivan Mestrovic, who, in addition to being one of
the most renowned sculptors of our century, took an active part in Croatian
politics in exile during the First World War.
It should be emphasized that
the magazine's contributors do not receive payment and that all efforts are
united by idealistic motives and the desire to affirm Croatian culture in the
free world, given that cultural progress is stagnant in the captive homeland
under the restrictions imposed by the communists and the Serbs.
The result of so much effort
and sacrifice is the 40-volume collection, containing works by Croatian poets,
short story writers, critics, economists, politicians, sociologists,
theologians, historians, jurists, scientists, philosophers, and publicists of
all persuasions, including young immigrants who not long ago fled their
homeland in search of freedom and justice. Thus, the pages of this
representative journal have forged true Croatian national unity, for peoples
are—as is well known—cultural entities.
The Croatian Review, due to its political and
cultural influence, has won the sympathies of all exiled compatriots, who, with
justified pride, acknowledge that they were the only ones among European
emigrants to create such a cultural work under such adverse conditions,
affirming abroad the cultural values of a people deprived of
their individual freedoms and national independence.
The
Croatian Review is both material and spiritual proof that the Croatian people
are fully ready to be free and independent and that the Croatian state must be
re-established, as it is supported and demanded by the high national
consciousness of a cultured people and by ancient state traditions, also
reflected on the cover of this jubilee issue.
It
reproduces the 11th-century Romanesque relief of the Croatian king, seated on
his throne and wearing a crown, which is located in the baptistery of Split
Cathedral. The cathedral of the Archbishops of Split, who for centuries held
the title of Primates of All Croatia – Primas totius Croatiae – were successors
to the Roman Archdiocese of Salona, one of the oldest in all of Christendom.
It
was formerly the mausoleum of the Roman Emperor Diocletian, an Illyrian by
origin—the Illyrians constitute one of the main substrata of Croatian
ethnogenesis—and the baptistery is located in what was the Temple of
Aesculapius within the majestic imperial palace. In the Middle Ages,
ecclesiastical synods were held in Split Cathedral, attended by Croatian kings.
While
the Croatian Review demonstrates the creative vitality of the Croatian people,
its cover symbolizes and evokes Croatia's cultural and political past, rooted
in classical, Christian, and national traditions. The outstanding figure of
Cardinal Stepinac, illuminated by various works and illustrations, completes
the profile of Croatian national culture and defines the meaning of our current
struggle.
This
volume of the Croatian Review is an expanded and sumptuous version of its
regular issues. Aside from articles and notes on current political and cultural
affairs, it contains several poems of undeniable artistic value, literary
references, and works by 50 contributors, as well as 32 reproductions of
paintings and sculptures. The Croatian Review also publishes, in each issue, an
editorial in Spanish dedicated to various Croatian issues. Among the prominent
foreign writers who sometimes contribute to the magazine was the late Monsignor
Gustavo F. Franceschi.
The
great merit of the Croatian Review is that it lit the torch of freedom during
the most tragic days of Croatia's thousand-year history, enabling the creative
work of Croatian writers and scholars in exile, while also guiding and
encouraging the numerous Croatian refugees with a patriotic and democratic
spirit, maintaining faith and hope in the victory of justice and freedom.
In
this respect, it exerts considerable influence in captive Croatia, as the main
libraries and cultural and scientific institutions cannot do without this
publication—certainly the most serious and representative one currently
published in Croatian. Furthermore, many copies are smuggled into Croatia and
circulate from hand to hand. Each copy is read by hundreds of intellectuals,
and thus it acts as a beacon and a focal point radiating a love of freedom,
instilling hope for the future, and heralding the end of foreign and communist
tyranny over Croatia.
Buenos
Aires. Ivo Bogdan
Dr.
Vladko Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom, New York, 1957. Robert Speller &
Sons, pp. 280.
Following the treacherous assassination of Esteban
Radic in the Belgrade parliament in 1928, Dr. Vladko Macek was elected, in his
place, as president of the Croatian Peasant Party. He has presided over this
party, the most important and powerful in Croatia, ever since. When the
communists seized power in Croatia in 1945, V. Macek went into exile and
currently resides in the United States.
Macek lived through all the phases of the
development of the Croatian Peasant Party, founded in 1905. He contributed to
its organization and growth, and actively participated in Croatian political
life when, after the First World War, the party became the largest Croatian
force opposing Serbian hegemony. The book *In the Struggle for Freedom*, while
not a strictly historical work, is of great importance, as the author recounts
his memories and observations, highlighting the events in which he actively
participated or played a leading role.
The material presented in this autobiographical work
is so abundant that foreign readers can gain a comprehensive picture of
Croatian political and social life from the beginning of the century until 1945.
Reflecting his deep affection for the peasantry, the author recounts the
successive stages of their political and social emancipation and underscores
the important role they played in the political life of contemporary Croatia.
Until
1848, the feudal system prevailed in Croatia. In that year, the serfs were
emancipated, and the feudal diet was replaced by a parliament. The emancipated
peasantry did not immediately experience all the advantages and benefits of
freedom because they were poor, underdeveloped, and neglected. Due to the
electoral system with limited voting rights, it could not influence political
life in proportion to its numerical strength. Pre-industrial Croatia was
composed of 80% peasants and only 20% urban dwellers and nobility.
It was only towards the end of the last century that
the brothers Antonio and Esteban Radic entered the Croatian political arena,
founding the Croatian People's Peasant Party in 1905. The ideology and program
of the new party upheld the following points:
The peasants are, in and of themselves, the Croatian
nationality, not a social stratum. They have preserved, throughout the
centuries, the language, traditions, folk art, customs, and, through these
values, true Croatian culture and national identity. Any political party that
aspires to defend the constitutional and national rights of Croatia, according
to the Radic brothers, must be based on the peasantry, who, in addition to
being the incorruptible custodians of the patriarchal peasant family and
national traditions, constitute the largest numerical force and, therefore, the
most important social factor.
In the period between the two world wars, communist
propaganda was very intense throughout Europe. The Croatian Peasant Party
repudiates Marxist doctrine, which denies the party's basic principles: faith
in God, private property, and national identity. Its social program aims,
through political, social, and educational organization, to raise the standard
of living in the countryside and preserve the moral values of the
peasant home.
Currently,
the party's ideology and doctrine, while debatable in certain aspects in light
of contemporary sociological science, are not revolutionary. However, in the
days of the party's founding, and in an environment evolving from the feudal
system toward bourgeois democracy, they were denounced as subversive or, at the
very least, unacceptable.
The
bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia could hardly accept the idea that an
uneducated peasant mass could enjoy the same rights or even play a leading role
in political life. For this reason, Radic's party had to endure harsh attacks
and fight tenaciously until, with the introduction of universal suffrage and
the end of the First World War, it became the main political force, leading the
fight for the emancipation of the peasants and the independence of Croatia
against Serbian hegemony in the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes.
In fact, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party had not
recognized the legitimacy and legality of the new state, created in December
1918. Two months later, Esteban Radic convened a meeting of the movement's
leading figures in Zagreb. On that occasion, invoking the right to
self-determination, he called for the creation of "the neutral Croatian
peasant republic." It was decided, to this end, to send a memorandum with
180,000 signatures to the Peace Conference then meeting in Paris. However, the
Serbian police learned of this action, arrested Radic, Macek, and other
deputies, thus interrupting the direct negotiations of Croatian politicians
with the victorious powers.
From that moment on, the history of the new Kingdom
was marked by the hegemonic and dictatorial power of Serbia. Macek spent almost
more time in prison than free. The words concerning his father's death and the
birth of his firstborn son, which occurred while he was imprisoned, are deeply
moving.
During the months following Radic's assassination in
1928, great unrest and discontent spread throughout Croatia. Macek claims to
have done everything in his power to prevent a general insurrection. He
maintains that he did so not only because of his pacifist convictions—he
admired Tolstoy and Gandhi—but also because he considered it foolish to wage an
armed struggle, given that the Croats were unarmed and unable to acquire
weapons. The methods of his struggle against Serbian hegemony were always
democratic and pacifist.
He devoted considerable effort to organizing the
resistance against the monarchical dictatorship. In this unequal struggle, the
Croatian Peasant Party became the most powerful political force, not only in
Croatia, where Macek garnered unanimous support, but throughout Yugoslavia.
However, despite its majority, the vast coalition led by Macek failed to gain
power, as the dictatorship was applying an electoral system that favored the
official candidates and decreed public voting.
To illustrate this procedure, Macek cites the example
of the Klanjec electoral district, where in the 1935 elections his list
obtained 6,693 votes compared to 208 for the official candidate, who
nevertheless was elected deputy. Furthermore, in large regions of Yugoslavia,
such as Macedonia and the Kosovo region, where Albanians reside, voting
practically never took place; that is, votes were automatically counted for the
official candidates.
Macek
was always a firm and convinced supporter of Western democracies, which did not
prevent him from criticizing French policy, which unconditionally supported the
dictatorship at the expense of its own principles of democracy and freedom. The
sympathies of many prominent figures in the West lay with Macek and the
Croatian national struggle.
Besides
prominent politicians, parliamentarians, and labor leaders, many intellectuals,
including Albert Einstein and Heinrich Mann, raised their voices in protest
against the Serbian dictatorship. These protests, says V. Macek, failed to stir
the conscience of the great powers.
To
illustrate the mindset of Serbian rulers and politicians and to reflect
anti-Croatian sentiment in Serbia, Macek cites several interviews with
representatives of Serbian parties who visited him to discuss collaboration and
coalitions against the dictatorship. However, Macek argues, these parties
feared reaching any concrete agreement, as Serbian public opinion would
interpret it as "concessions to the Croats" and accuse them of
"traiting the Serbian cause."
Finally,
in 1939, a compromise was reached with the government sponsored by the Regent,
Prince Paul Karageorgevic. Dr. Macek accepted a restricted autonomy, considering
it an initial step toward complete political and national liberation, and was
also motivated in this decisive act by the desire to save the people from the
calamities of war. The author dedicates a large part of his book to the
preliminary discussions and negotiations that culminated in the agreement.
Since
Macek was the main negotiator for the Croatian side, sometimes the only one,
the recorded data takes on the character of a historical document. However,
this time too his aims were not achieved, because the Serbian militarist
clique, under the pretext of opposing the influence of the Axis powers,
organized a coup d'état on March 27, 1941, primarily to abolish the limited
autonomy granted to the Croats, and thus dragged Yugoslavia into the war, into
which it entered without a fight and disintegrated in eight days, since no one
wanted to defend such a state. The final result of Serbian chauvinist policy
was the establishment of the communist dictatorship.
Macek
seeks to clarify the events of the critical month of March 1941, still the
subject of bitter controversies, by publishing revealing details. Due to his
democratic orientation, Macek abstained from all political activity after the
collapse of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Independent State of
Croatia. From the outset, Dr. Macek was an outspoken opponent of the communist
government imposed in 1945; he sought asylum in France and then in the USA,
without attempting to negotiate or compromise with the communist regime, as did
several representatives of agrarian parties in Central and Eastern Europe.
Due
to the circumstances of his turbulent political life, the author was unable to
preserve his notes, correspondence, archives, and documentation. As he resides
abroad and cannot consult his sources, omissions and inaccuracies in details
should not be surprising; these will be corrected in the Croatian edition he is
preparing, based on recent information.
Because
it is an autobiographical book, in which the exposition of events is approached
in the most subjective way, there is no shortage of exaggerated assessments and
harsh judgments about fellow countrymen who did not always agree with his
opinions and tactics during those turbulent and confusing times, especially
when his policy of collaboration and acquiescence with the Belgrade government,
thwarted by the coup d'état of March 27, 1941, did not yield the expected
results.
The
Croats, therefore, instead of defending Yugoslavia, which they considered their
prison, seized the opportunity to achieve their national independence,
suppressed when the communists took over the government in 1945, and which is
the supreme ideal, shared by all Croats regardless of their party affiliation
or ideological orientation.
The
book under review is neatly presented and printed. It contains several
photographs and a series of historical maps of Croatia.
Buenos
Aires. Angel Belic
Dr. Stjepan Hefer, Croatian
Struggle for Freedom and Statehood, Buenos Aires, 1959. Ed. Croatian
Information Service, pp. 238.
The
author of this work is a prominent Croatian politician. A lawyer by profession
and a democrat by conviction and political education, he was twice a national
deputy for the Croatian Peasant Party in the pre-war Yugoslav parliament, a
member of the Croatian parliament, and Minister of Agriculture and Livestock in
the government of the Independent State of Croatia during the war.
It
was to be expected that a man with such a political background would present
the Croatian nation's struggle for freedom in a comprehensive manner, without
partisan recriminations and with a high degree of historical and political
objectivity. Although the immediate impetus for this work was the slander
spread by communists and their henchmen against the Croatian community in Argentina,
and especially against the organization "Croatian Defense" (Hrvatski
Domobran) and Dr. Ante Pavelic, in connection with the revolutionary events of
1955, the work itself, apart from the respective allusions in the introduction
and conclusions, has no relation to the events that motivated it. Therefore,
its present publication is justified despite the four years that have passed
since the manuscript was completed.
The 34 articles into which
the work is divided cover a brief historical overview of Croatia up to 1918
(pp. 15-35); the political situation of the Croatian people and their struggle
through democratic and peaceful means in pre-war Yugoslavia (pp. 36-130); the
political struggle with the often divergent interests of the Axis powers and
the military struggle with the Serbian aggressors (the Chetniks) and communists
(Tito's partisans), to maintain and protect national independence (pp.
1S1-217), and, finally, the violation of international law by the British armed
forces (Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 on the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
to which Croatia acceded on 20 January 1943), by returning Croatian prisoners
of war, who surrendered to said forces, to Tito's communists (pp. 219-224) and,
as a consequence of the aforementioned violation, "the greatest crime of
the war, about which the international community remains silent," namely,
the massacre of some 150,000 Croatian men, civilians and military personnel,
perpetrated by the communists of Yugoslavia in May of 1945, the world war having
ended (pp. 225-230).
Readers interested in the
political circumstances of southeastern Europe will be able to follow step by
step the tragic events in monarchical Yugoslavia that culminated in the
assassination of Croatian deputies in the Belgrade parliament (June 20, 1928).
These events not only provoked a strong global reaction, documented in this
work, but also gave rise to the organization of a revolutionary liberation
movement.
After twelve years of
tenacious and assiduous preparation, taking advantage of the favourable
political circumstances of the time, this movement proclaimed Croatian national
independence in 1941. Readers will also find abundant documentation on the
negotiations of Croatian émigrés with various international institutions and
organizations in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Serbian-Croatian
conflict, as well as the international press coverage of these negotiations.
The author concludes his
work with a concise description of the current situation of the Croatian people
under the dual Serbian-communist rule in the second Yugoslavia. Apart from a
few observations that could be made to the author, especially regarding
omissions of some facts and the undue emphasis placed on others, circumstances,
or influences, two technical shortcomings must be highlighted that seriously
diminish the value and usefulness of this work.
First, given that this is a
book with numerous bibliographic references and names within the text, an index
of names should not be omitted; furthermore, the fifteen illustrations
contained in this publication would justify an index of illustrations. Finally,
the inexplicable absence of a table of contents makes the publication
technically even more incomplete. Second, the English translation is quite
deficient, especially concerning specific terms of Croatian state or
constitutional law, so characteristic of relations within the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy.
In the preface, John F.
Stewart, president of the Scottish League for European Freedom, with his
profound knowledge of the Croatian cause, highlights Croatia's strategic
importance for the defense of the West, presenting the Croatians as the West's
staunchest allies in this crucial region.
Buenos Aires. Milan
Blazekovic
Journal
of Croatian Studies, vol. I, New York, 1960. Ed. The Croatian Academy of
America, Inc. (P.O. Box 1767), Grand Central Station, New York, NY 17, pp. 212.
After the newsletter
"Croatia Press" and the cultural and political journal "Croatian
Review," the "Journal" is the third Croatian publication in the
U.S. in English. Unlike the first two, which have a political-cultural
character, the third is primarily dedicated to Croatian history and culture, as
it is the Academy's purpose to promote the knowledge and dissemination of
Croatian history and culture through lectures, exhibitions, and publications.
To achieve this purpose,
since they could not limit themselves to purely scientific and social studies,
the editors were obliged to accept contributions that deal with political
topics. This first volume already demonstrates that, publishing the highly
interesting work "The New Class and Nationalism" by Dinko A. Tomasic,
professor of sociology at Indiana University, also published in the first issue
of Studia Croatica.
The other contributions
are of a historical nature, with the editors stating that the next volume
should give preference to cultural issues.
In the article "The
First Croatian Contacts with America and the Mystery of the Croatans," the
author, George J. Prpic, addresses the question of the participation of
Croatian sailors in the discovery of the Americas, the first Croatian
immigrants to North America, and whether or not the Croatan Indian tribe
received its name from Croatian shipwreck survivors near Roanoke Island. This
last problem, or that of the origin of the Croatans and their current living
conditions, was extensively covered in the American press in 1958, on the
occasion of a clash between the Croatans (Indians of Robeson County, North
Carolina) and some members of the Ku Klux Klan.
The anthropologist and
archaeologist Vladimir Markotic addresses the topic "Croats in
Albania," based on the book by Professor Halil Inalcik, published in
Ankara in 1954 in Turkish, entitled "The Copy of the Register of the
Albanian Province Dated 835 (1431 A.D.)," concluding that the Croatian
settlements in Albania at that time prove the prior existence of a Croatian
population there, in accordance with the Croatia Rubea of the Presbyter of
Diocles and the Illyricum of Constantine Porphyrogenitus.
The prominent Croatian
historian, Professor Dr. Dominik Mandic, O.F.M., in his well-documented article
"The Croatian King Tomislav Defeated the Bulgarian Emperor Simeon the
Great on May 27, 927," refutes the opinions of several Croatian,
Bulgarian, and other historians, according to whom this event took place in the
year 925 or 926. The author maintains that the year in question cannot be The
study does not rely solely on data provided by Constantine Porphyrogenet
regarding Serbia, but also on other Byzantine and Western sources. His thesis
is confirmed by the 12th-century "Codex of Korcula," recently
discovered by the Croatian historian Dr. Vinko Foretic.
The article "The
1923 Elections in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," by Matthew
M. Mestrovic, is a comparative study of the electoral results of the main
parties that participated in the November 28, 1920 elections for the
Constituent Assembly, which voted on the Constitution of June 28, 1921, and in
the first general elections of March 18, 1923. This study reflects the
political programs of the parties, their changes during the period under study,
and the reasons for those changes.
In the
"Documents" section, the editor, Jerome Jareb, publishes for the
first time the 27 reports that Le Roy King sent from March 6th onwards to May
16, 1919, from Zagreb; to Professor Archibald C. Coolidge, head of the American
mission in Vienna, regarding the political situation in Croatia. The reports,
sometimes inaccurate, are supplemented in this publication with explanatory
notes and other additional information for the benefit of those interested in
understanding the political situation in Croatia during the first months of its
forced union with Serbia.
All contributions are
well-documented and strictly scholarly. The same can be said of the book
reviews. In reviewing the twelve works, mostly foreign, the authors displayed
restraint and appropriate tone in their critiques, limiting themselves to
pointing out erroneous data and correcting mistaken conclusions.
Buenos Aires. Milan Blazekovic
Stephen
Smrzik S.J., *The Glagolitic or Roman-Slavonic Liturgy*, Ed. Slovak Institute,
Cleveland-Rome, 1959, p. 120.
It is a relatively
little-known fact that, to encourage the spread of Christianity among the
Slavs, Popes Adrian II and John VIII approved the use of the Slavic language in
the liturgy.
The origins of this
Romano-Slavic liturgy are linked to the names of Saints Cyril and Methodius.
Saint Cyril (827-869) is also credited with the invention of Glagolitic, the
alphabet in which the liturgical books translated by him and his brother into
the Slavic language were written.
This script declined rapidly
after the death of the two Slavic apostles, except in Croatia, where it became
the national script and developed steadily from the 11th to the 16th centuries.
Not only were liturgical books written in Glagolitic script, but also public
documents and literary works. Croatia is also the only Slavic country where
liturgical rites in the national language have been preserved to this day in
numerous dioceses, although Glagolitic script was definitively replaced by the
Latin alphabet in 1927.
The particular significance
of this liturgy lies in the fact that it is, to date, the only exception to the
general rule of the Western Church, which prescribes the Latin language for its
liturgy.
S. Smrzík's book is an
excellent introduction to the study of the Romano-Slavic liturgy. The author
presents the evolution of this liturgy clearly and concisely, and discusses and
weighs the opinions of leading Slavic scholars on numerous issues related to
its origin. Controversy still exists as to whether the brothers Cyril and
Methodius brought the Byzantine rite to Moravia in the Slavic language, or
whether they had already adopted the Roman rite in Thessaloniki, in preparation
for their evangelizing mission. The author supports the latter opinion.
S. Smrzík renders a great
service to all those interested in liturgical matters who, due to the language
barrier, lack access to knowledge of this special liturgy.
Buenos Aires. Branimir
Anzulovic
Ante
Kadic, Croatian Reader with Vocabulary, Mouton & Co. Publishers, 1960, The
Hague, pp. 276.
Dr. Ante Kadic was for
several years Professor of Croatian Language and Literature at the University
of California, Berkeley, USA, and currently holds the same chair at Indiana
University. Croatian Reader was published in 1957 in mimeographed form, and the
edition reviewed here has been revised, expanded, and supplemented. The
prestigious Dutch publishers have now printed this book with meticulous
attention to detail.
There was an urgent need to
publish an anthology of Croatian literature with selected texts of prose,
poetry, and folk art, along with appropriate commentary and explanations, and
an accompanying dictionary to facilitate its use. However, this required the
compiler to possess extensive knowledge, teaching experience, discerning
criteria for selection and classification, and, moreover, a long and dedicated
effort to the meticulous work of composition. All qualities that Professor Dr.
Ante Kadic possesses in abundance.
In preparing the Croatian
Reader, the author pursued a dual purpose: to provide his students with a
suitable textbook and to compile a representative anthology of Croatian
literature. By studying the selected texts, students will perfect their
knowledge of the Croatian language, learn about many salient facts of Croatian
history and culture, and, moreover, become familiar with the names and works of
its prominent poets and writers.
Professor Kadic divided his
anthology into four parts: the first contains popular creations of a folkloric
nature; the second comprises selected texts by Croatian prose writers,
beginning with contemporary authors and ending with writers from the mid-20th
century; the third part is dedicated to the poetry of authors living in Croatia
or in exile; Part Four, subdivided into two chapters, contains selected
fragments written in the "cha" and "kai" dialects and
transcribes chosen pieces of classical Croatian literature, respectively.
An extensive dictionary
follows the reading texts. Each Croatian word is accented to facilitate
pronunciation for the foreign student. Both at the foot of many texts and in
the dictionary, the author adds the corresponding idioms, set phrases, and
expressions.
Since this is an anthology,
it is understood that the compiler's subjective criteria prevail in the
compilation of the texts. Except for minor omissions, no serious objections are
warranted, always bearing in mind the nature of the book and its specific
purpose.
Professor Ante Kadic's book,
the first of its kind, represents a significant contribution to the study of
Croatian literature in the English-speaking world. Its author, applying both
scientific and aesthetic criteria, has filled a void with his meritorious work
and, moreover, it is hoped that it will contribute even further to clarifying
Croatian cultural and literary values in the English-speaking world.
Buenos Aires. Branko Kadic.
Historico-Iuridica
Dilucidatio Vitae et gloriae B. Nicolai Tavelic, Incliti martyris Ordinis
Minorum, Splendoris et Protectoris Gentis Croatorum, Canonizationi eius
aequipolenti dicata. Recurrent triplici anniversario a diffusione cultus eius
et gloriae. Auctore P. Antonio Crnica O.F.M. s. Theologiae et iuris utriusque
Doctore, causae canonizationis B. Nicolais Tavelic, Vice-Postulatore. Romae, 1953.
Documenta
Martyri B. Nicolai Tavelic et sociorum eius Ord. Min. Collegit, diggesit
notisques illustrativ. P. Dominicus Mandic, Rome, 1958.
Croatians await with pious confidence the prompt
canonization - God willing - of their first saint, B. Nicholas Tavelic, a
Franciscan martyr in Jerusalem in 1391, would also become the first saint of
the Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land.
The Croatian episcopate initiated the cause, and its
representative, Archbishop Louis Stepinac, leading a Croatian pilgrimage, read
the Postulatory Letters before Pius XII at the solemn audience of November 14,
1939, requesting the equivalent canonization of Brother Nicholas Tavelic.
Father Antonio Crnica, O.F.M., a renowned jurist and author of several works on
jurisprudence, was commissioned to write, from a historical and legal
perspective, an account of the life, martyrdom, and glory of Blessed Nicholas,
so that this critical work could serve as an introduction to the canonization
process. Meanwhile, war broke out, along with the painful event of the
communist invasion of Croatia, so that this documentation could not be
published until 1958.
The book is divided into four chapters, successively
addressing the origins of Blessed Nicholas, his Franciscan life, his missionary
work in Bosnia, and finally, his martyrdom and veneration.
In
the introduction, through a detailed legal analysis, the author provides
important information on the Church's practice regarding the issue of
equivalent canonization, since the Code of Canon Law does not mention it. The
Church, however, practiced it both before and after the publication of the
Code, and the doctors of the Church discuss it. (The reigning Pope, John XXIII,
canonized Blessed Gregory Barbarigo " equipolente - equivalent" this
year.)
For the equivalent canonization of Blessed Nicholas
Tavelic, the author cites several reasons: 1. the Blessed was a true martyr of
Christ; 2. a man of great holiness; 3. his veneration is extraordinary; 4. the
merits of the Friars Minor, to whom the Blessed belonged, in Croatia, and
especially in Bosnia, are of great importance to the Church; 5. likewise, the
merits of the Croatian people in defense of the faith for several centuries are
great; 6. finally, the requested canonization would exalt the Church, comfort
the faithful, and confound the enemies of God in a country so harshly oppressed
by the communist regime.
Regarding
the life of the Blessed, documents are unfortunately scarce for the simple
reason that, shortly after his martyrdom, the part of Croatia where the
Blessed... Nicholas was born and carried out his missionary work in a region
invaded by the Turks, who remained for several centuries, destroying not only
libraries, archives, and convents, but also the towns themselves, thus erasing
all historical traces of the blessed man.
However,
the author, with perseverance and a critical spirit, successfully reconstructed
the main historical data regarding the place and year of his birth and his
apostolate. The author establishes the date of his birth as 1350, in the town
of Velim, in northern Dalmatia.
He
clarifies his surname and his lineage from the ancient Croatian nobility of
Tavelic; the Tavelic family coat of arms is the same as that of the Croatian
Subic banos (viceroys), from whose family he indeed descended. Upon examining
his entry into the Franciscan Order, the author states that he did so at the
age of fifteen, entering the convent of Brihir, where he pursued his studies in
philosophy and theology, being ordained a priest in 1375.
Based
on a document, he conjectures, not without foundation, that for the next four
years Friar Nicholas dedicated himself to higher studies at the Universities of
Paris, Oxford, or Florence. It is certain that missionaries of the time, like
professors in general, pursued higher studies, and Friar Nicholas was assigned
to the missions in Bosnia, where we find him in 1379.
Father
A. Crnica dwells at length on the much-debated and never definitively clarified
spread of the Bogomil heresy (also called Cathar, Albinian, Manichean, etc.) in
Bosnia, and, moreover, on the Holy See's efforts to eradicate it. Nicholas was
one of many missionaries sent to Bosnia for this purpose, where he remained for
12 years, since in 1391 he was in the Holy Land.
The author continues to examine the reasons for this
change, which are not insignificant in the life of a saint. Some cite as the
reason the fall of Serbia under the Turkish yoke in 1389, as the Turks were
approaching the borders of Bosnia. Others believe that the King of Bosnia,
Stephen Tvrtko, had ordered the missionaries not to preach against heretics due
to the greater danger posed by the Turks, but the author is inclined to believe
that the true cause was the sudden death of King Stephen Tvrtko and the
subsequent civil war caused by the succession, which made all missionary work
impractical.
Why did the Blessed choose the Holy Land? His
biographers agree that it was the desire to obtain the crown of martyrdom,
which he truly achieved on November 14, 1391, along with his three Franciscan
companions. What is lacking in biographical data about the Blessed is fully
compensated for by the abundance of documents and eyewitness accounts of his
martyrdom, to such an extent that there are almost no medieval martyrs whose
details are as copiously known as those of Blessed Nicholas and his three
companions.
Regarding the martyrdom, the author divides the
documents into those known and gathered up to the beatification process (in
1889), and those discovered from then until the present day. This gives him the
opportunity to recapitulate the acts of the beatification process as well as to
elaborate on the cause of the martyrdom, proving that he is an authentic and true
martyr of Christ, all of which he supports with new documents, unknown at the
time of the beatification, concluding the chapter with the miraculous signs
during the martyrdom and the spread of his veneration.
The final chapter is dedicated to the spread of the
martyr's glory within the Franciscan Order, in the Diocese of Šibenik, where he
was born, and among the Croatian people. It also describes this spread in the
Holy Land, where in 1937 Archbishop Stepinac consecrated an altar in his honor
in the presence of Croatian pilgrims. The veneration of Blessed Nicholas in
Croatia became widespread, surpassing that of any other saint except the Mother
of God and St. Anthony of Padua.
Indeed, in Croatia, there are more than 800 churches,
altars, chapels, statues, and images erected in his honor, and countless graces
received through his intercession; numerous publications and treatises on his
life and martyrdom (all now banned by the current regime).
Without
a doubt, this work by Father Crnica is fundamental, the most critical and
comprehensive on the life and martyrdom of Blessed Nicholas Tavelić
published to date. Father A. Crnica, in an appendix, transcribes the documents
that refer to the martyrdom, but it is Father Domingo Mandic, O.F.M., the
renowned historian of Franciscan affairs, author of several works that honour
his name, who dedicates his book to the documents on the martyrdom of Blessed
Nicholas and his companions. As early as 1939, Father Domingo Mandic was
commissioned by the Croatian episcopate to gather all the documents concerning
Blessed Nicholas.
Residing
in Rome at that time, as Definitor General of the Order of Friars Minor, Father
Mandic set about collecting and investigating, with a critical method, all the
documents and references relating to Blessed Nicholas and, above all, to his
martyrdom. This was a demanding task, and the author accomplished it perfectly.
His work was published by the Postulator of the cause only in 1958 together
with that of Fr. Crnica and jointly delivered to the cardinal ponens for the
canonization process.
[1] The
course of the national liberation struggle in Yugoslavia in relation to
international events, Ed. Naprijed, Zagreb, 1959, pp. 11-12 (in Croatian).
[2] FAO: Yearbook of Food and
Agricultural Statistics: Production, volume XI, Part I, 1957. Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1958, p. 16.
[3]
See E. Kardelj's report: The Problems of Socialist Policy in the Countryside,
presented at the ninth plenary session of the committee of the Socialist
Federation of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ), on May 5 and 6, 1959,
in Belgrade. The data are taken from the Borba newspaper, May 5 and 6, 1959.
[4] Borba,
Zagreb, 8/4/1959, El desarrollo reciente indica que la proporción de la
población agrícola sigue disminuyendo rápidamente.
[5] Vjesnik, Zagreb,
21/12/1960.
[6] K. Günzel, Planwirtschaft
und Aussenhandelpolitik der F.N.R.J. Osteuropa-Hand-buch: Jugoslawien. Böhlaü-Verlag,
Köln-Graz, 1954.
[7] FAO, Yearbook of Food and
Agriculture Statistics, 1958, Part 1, Production, and Part 2, Trade, Rome,
1958. Statisticki Godisnjak FNRJ 1958. Savezni Zavod za statistiku Belgrade,
1958 (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, 1958, Federal Statistical Institute).
OECE,
4e Rapport sur les politiques agricoles en Europe et en Amérique du Nord,
Paris, March 1960. FAO,
Bulletin mensuel, économie et statistique agricoles, volume IX, November 1960,
N°11,
[8] Ibid.
[9]
Speech given in Zenica, on 8/10/1958..
[10] Hungarian Peace
Negotiations, Budapest, 1920, Note XII, Annex 6, Vol. I, páginas 426-427.
[11] C. A. Macartney, Op. cit.,
Vol. I, pág. 86.
[12]
("Lucharemos con Hungría hombro a hombro por la idea revisionista, haremos
valer nuestra influencia - que no es exigua - en Bachka, Baraña y Banat y
recomendaremos a los islotes croatas allí y en Burgenland para que hagan todo lo
posible a fin de que la Hungría Occidental y Voïvodina se reúnan nuevamente con
Hungría, su madre patria. Vamos a combatir por vosotros, con vosotros hasta la
victoria o la derrota, pero como nación libre e independiente") Dr. Ivo
Frank, La revisión y la nación croata, Budapest, 1933, pág. 20 (en húngaro).
[13] Ullein-Reviczky Antal,
Guerre Allemande-Paix Russe, Neuchatel, 1947, pág. 89. Richard K. Burke, Two
Teleky Letters, Journal of Central European Affairs, abril 1947, págs. 68-73
[14] C. A. Macartney, October
Fifteenth, Edinburgo, University Press, 1957, t. I, pág. 479
[15] Keesing's Contemporary
Archives, Vol. IV, 1940-1948, Londres, pág. 4560.
[16] La
región entre los ríos Drava y Mura desde el punto de vista étnico netamente
croata. De 1867 a 1918 formaba parte de un condado de Hungría, pero en la
jurisdicción eclesiástica pertenecía a la arquidiócesis de Zagreb (N. de la
R.).
[17] John A. Lukács, The Great
Powers and Eastern Europe, Chicago, University Press. 1953, Pág.
451.
[18]
Eugen Kvaternik, From the Vienna meeting to the signing of the Rome Pacts, The
Croatian Review, June 1953 (in Croatian).
[19] Miklos Kállay,
Hungarian Premier, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954, pág. 318-319.
[20] El
periódico Vasvármegye (en húngaro), Szombathely, febrero 24, 1945.
[21] Dr. Ivo Frank, Op. Cit. Pág.
8.
[22]
Christopher Dawson, Hacia la comprensión de Europa, págs. 115-16.
[23]
Fernand Braudel, The
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the time of Philip II, Mexico,
1953, I, p. 872.
[24] Fernand Braudel, op. cit.,
I, pages. 644 45
[25] Carl J.
Friedrich, Teoría y realidad de la organización constitucional democrática ,
México, 1995, pág. 553.
[26] Vojo
Rajcevic, El movimiento estudiantil en la Universidad de Zagreb (1918-41) (en
croata) Zagreb 1959. Reseña del libro y datos suplementarios por el Dr. F.
Nevistic en "Hrvatska Revija" (La Revista Croata), Buenos Aires, año
X, vol. 4, págs. 684-97.
[27] Pablo
Tijan, op. cit., págs. 361-70.
[28] Kurt Von
Schuchnigg, Requiem por Austria, Barcelona, 1949, pág. 94.
[29] J.
Stalin, El marxismo y el problema nacional y colonial, Buenos Aires, 1946.
[32] J. T.
Delos, La nación. La sociología de la nación, Buenos Aires, 1948, pág. 40.
[33] Pablo
Tijan, Crisis del liberalismo en la Europa Central, págs. 213-222.
[34] Gonzague
de Reynold, El mundo ruso, págs. 399-445.
[36] Les
archives secrétes de la Wilhelmstrasse, I, París, 1950, págs. 306, 319, 329.
[37] L'empire grec au
dixieme siècle, París, 1870, page. 459.
[38] Svetozar
Pribicevic, Dictadura del rey Alejandro, 2° edición, Belgrado, 1953, pág. 24.
[39] Statisticki
Godisnjak FNRJ 1960, Belgrado, agosto 1960, pág. 179 (Anuario Estadístico de
Yugoeslavia).
[40] Pomorstvo,
Rijeka. marzo 1960. pág. 117
[41] Pomorstvo,
Rijeka, marzo 1960. pág. 117.
[42] Pomorstvo,
Rijeka, marzo 1960, pág. 118
[43] Pomorstvo,
Rijeka. marzo 1960. pág. 119
[44] Statisticki
Godisnjak FNRJ (Anuario Estadístico de Yugoeslavia), Belgrado, agosto
1960, pág. 179.
[45] Statisticki
Godisnjak FNRJ (Anuario Estadístico de Yugoeslavia), 1960.
[46] Statistik
der Schiffahrt, Bremen, septiembre 1960, pág. 2.
[47] Pomorstvo,
Rijeka, mayo 1960, pág. 190.
[48] Vjesnik, Zagreb,
8/7/I960, pág. 5.
[49] Pomorstvo,
mayo 1960, pág. 192.
[50] Statisticki Godisnjak
FNRJ, 1960, pág. 177.