STUDIA CROATICA
Year II, Buenos Aires, January-March 1961, No. 2
SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV COLONIALISM 2
TITOISM AND CASTROISM IN NORTH AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE 5
JULIO CLOVIO CROATA, PROTECTOR OF THE YOUNG GRECO 12
ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND SIGNIFICANCE OF WORKERS'
SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA 16
THE RELEVANCE OF BOSCOVICH TODAY 28
THE MIHANOVICH BROTHERS, FOUNDERS OF THE ARGENTINE
MERCHANT FLEET 31
CHRISTMAS CUSTOMS IN CROATIA 35
THE BLACK LEGEND ABOUT CROATIA IN "PREUVES"
41
DOCUMENTS - MEMORANDUM FROM THE CATHOLIC EPISCOPATE TO
TITO 51
CHRONICLES AND COMMENTARIES 57
NEGOTIATIONS ON "MODUS VIVENDI" BETWEEN
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE HOLY SEE 57
THE ARCHBISHOP OF SARAJEVO DIED IN EXILE 60
DIFFICULT SITUATION OF MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 62
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CROATIAN-LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF CULTURE 65
While Soviet
colonialism faces moral pressure and unanimous criticism from the free world,
many fail to realize that another form of colonialism, albeit smaller, is no
less cruel and oppressive, currently exists in Europe. This is Yugoslavia, a
heterogeneous conglomeration of nations, where tiny Balkan Serbia, representing
barely a quarter of the total population, maintains a policy of colonial
exploitation of the wealthiest and most advanced peoples, primarily Croatia and
Slovenia. These are not mere rhetoric, but a tragic reality. From the very
establishment of the Yugoslav state, all economic policy was geared towards
maximizing the exploitation of non-Serbian regions. The currency of the
Austrian Empire was replaced by the dinar and exchanged at a rate of 1:4, to
the detriment of the Croatian and Slovenian populations. For many years, these
regions paid taxes two to ten times higher than those paid by Serbia. The
Croatian economy was systematically destroyed. Administrative and military
positions were reserved almost exclusively for Serbs. An unavoidable
consequence was the decline in the standard of living and culture in Croatia
and Slovenia, countries endowed with all the necessary resources for
progressive development.
Communist Yugoslavia
continues the same policy of economic exploitation, on an even larger scale,
since free enterprise does not exist and the entire economy is under the strict
control of the State. Franc Jeza,
a Slovenian economist and former collaborator with the communists, recently
published an interesting book in Trieste, filled with data and statistics taken
from communist publications, demonstrating the total exploitation of Slovenia
and Croatia in favour of Serbia and Montenegro.
Therefore, while
Khrushchev's fallacious propaganda was successfully stopped in the General
Assembly, it is regrettable that the Yugoslav dictator was able, without
adequate rebuttal, to attack the Western powers as colonialists and
imperialists, while his government has enslaved and exploited Croatia and
Slovenia. It so happens, in our age of paradoxes, that nations that relinquish
their colonial territories, obeying the inescapable law of historical
evolution, by providing significant economic and military aid, ensure the
survival and consolidation of the colonial system in Yugoslavia. Tito, in
return for the aid received, offers loans to Afro-Asian countries—or rather, to
the extremists in those countries who aspire to eliminate all Western influence
and provoke chaos that, ultimately, can only benefit the Soviets.
In this age of prevailing
contradictions and confusion, there are genuinely democratic people who believe
that the Yugoslav communists are defending national independence against
Russian-Soviet imperialism. The truth is that the Yugoslav communists care
about national independence insofar as it means the State and Power; that is,
they are defending their personal prerogatives and their lives. Regarding the
form of government, loyalty to communist doctrine, and the maintenance of
Serbian dominance over the other peoples of Yugoslavia, the communists in
Belgrade do not differ from their counterparts in the Kremlin. In international
politics, Belgrade almost always supports the positions held by the Muscovites.
Regarding the policy
of national oppression and economic exploitation, the case of Yugoslavia is
more blatant than that of the Soviet Union. The Russian Empire is the product
of centuries, the result of a long socio-political evolution. It forms a world
apart as the repository of the tradition of Eastern European civilization, the
legitimate heir to the political and cultural forms of the Byzantine Empire.
The Russian people formed a vast empire not only through their numerical,
military, and economic superiority, but also by being the bearers of progress
in the vast Asian regions. The Russian Empire—with the exception of the Baltic states, former Polish territories, and to some extent
Ukraine—presents a relative homogeneity from a cultural, political, and
religious point of view. Furthermore, the Soviet government renounced the
drastic methods of direct Russification, although it
maintained the autocratic system to which its subjects were accustomed, and who
never experienced democratic freedoms.
Yugoslavia, compared
to the Soviet Union, is a young state, born from the disintegration of the Danubian monarchy. It is not the product of an evolutionary
process, but rather an improvised state, lacking geographical, economic, and
cultural unity. Serbia's role within Yugoslavia cannot be compared to Russia's
role within the USSR. There is no numerical, economic, or cultural superiority
of Serbia over the other peoples that make up Yugoslavia. While the Russian
Empire is, to a certain extent, homogeneous in terms of culture and religion,
Yugoslavia constitutes a heterogeneous territory from a cultural and religious
point of view. It simply implies the domination of a Balkan country over the
countries that for a millennium developed within Western European society.
While Croatia and Slovenia, as well as all the former Austro-Hungarian
territories annexed to Serbia in 1918, are predominantly Catholic
countries—with a large Muslim minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina—Servia is an Orthodox country, where the national church
exerts a decisive influence on national political life.
While the Bolshevik
system represents, to a certain extent, the continuation of Tsarist autocratic
traditions, the dictatorial governments of Yugoslavia, first monarchical, then
communist, paralyzed the natural progress in Croatia and Slovenia, caused
stagnation, if not backwardness, in those European areas, and hindered the
evolution toward democratic forms, as practiced in the West, throughout the
Balkan region, including Serbia itself. The fact that Serbia, representing a
quarter of the Yugoslav population, was able to impose its domination on the
other peoples and the numerous national minorities favored and facilitated the
maintenance and consolidation of dictatorial and colonial regimes. Yugoslavia,
therefore, can only exist as a dictatorial state; the introduction of
democratic freedoms would imply its immediate disintegration.
Dwarf imperialisms are, in certain
circumstances, more dangerous than giant imperialisms, whose expansion rests on
a real foundation. Small nations with imperialist ambitions can only realize
their excessive pretensions through a policy of intrigue, subversion, and
adventure, which poses a great danger to other nations and can even threaten
world peace. The imperialist expansionism of tiny Serbia proves this assertion.
Serbian nationalist agitation against Austria-Hungary provoked the First World
War.
The voracious
ambitions of Serbian imperialists remain a constant source of unrest and
potential conflict. They pose a latent danger in the Adriatic, Alpine, Danubian, and Balkan regions proper. They are harmful to
the Serbs themselves, as they dilute their national identity and provoke backlash
and violent reactions. The Serbs include within their national territory even
areas densely populated by ethnic groups from other countries who, moreover,
live in territorial contiguity with their fellow Serbs and compatriots. Thus,
for example, "Old Serbia" encompasses the regions adjacent to the
Albanian border where large Albanian populations reside.
Serbian nationalists
refer to the Yugoslav part of Macedonia as "Southern Serbia," even
though it is a region with hardly any Serbs, the vast majority of the
population being Macedonians, who are closer to Bulgarians than to Serbs due to
their national sentiments and traditions. In the northern regions of the
present-day "People's Republic of Serbia," which they call
"Serbian Voivodeship" or "Serbian
Banat," Serbs are, even today, after the expulsion and extermination of
500,000 former German settlers, a minority, while in the areas bordering
Hungary and Romania, Hungarians and Romanians live in dense communities. This
agricultural and livestock-raising region, the most fertile in all of Europe,
was ruined by Serbian colonization. German, Hungarian, and Romanian farmers,
who, working the land with rational methods, produced most of Yugoslavia's
agricultural products, and even had exportable surpluses, were expelled, if not
murdered, from the land of their ancestors. Their place was taken by the
primitive and backward pastoralists of the Balkan interior, and the logical
consequence was a rapid decline in agricultural production that led to a true
famine after the war, only alleviated by substantial American aid.
From the above, it follows that
the chronic scarcity suffered by Yugoslavia is not solely due to the
destruction and devastation of war, and that the permanent tension in
Yugoslavia is not a consequence of the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade,
but rather a result of the relentless pressure of Serbian expansionism on the
non-Serbian majority of the Yugoslav population.
Tito was able to withstand the
Kremlin's pressure to replace him with more subservient communist leaders
because Yugoslavia, thanks to the tenacious intervention of the Western Allies,
was not occupied by the Red Army. Washington, at that time, inaugurated a
policy of "calculated risk" with Tito, providing him with substantial
aid. It was expected that the United States would, at the most opportune
moment, condition its aid and demand that Tito implement a democratic
transformation of the country, or that Tito's example would be followed by
another satellite government. However, neither of these things happened.
Instead, Yugoslavia increasingly behaved as an agent of international
communism, and, under the guise of a neutralist country, a so-called
third-position nation, penetrated the Afro-Asian sphere more easily than the
Kremlin's declared agents.
In their policy of
"calculated risk," it seems that the responsible circles in
Washington have not included the disillusionment of subjugated peoples and the
moral effects on the nations that the US considers the leader of the free world
and guardian of international freedom and morality. If the US, even risking
certain strategic positions, is pressuring its allies to grant independence to
colonial territories, which sometimes for the "liberated" colonies
means a return from civilized life to the chaos and primitivism of the jungle,
the motives that lead it to come to the aid of Yugoslavia, where the dwarfed
colonialism of Serbia reigns, are unclear. It is incomprehensible why, on the
one hand, millions and millions of dollars are invested to liquidate the
remnants of colonialism and, on the other, hundreds of millions of dollars are
given to Tito to save and consolidate the dwarfed Serbian colonialist
imperialism.
The liberation of
captive peoples is an international moral obligation and is demanded by the
inalienable right of those nations, since freedom and ethics are indivisible.
It would be catastrophic to expect the Soviets, in view of Western passivity,
to decide to denounce Serbian imperialism in order to gain the sympathies of
the exploited peoples in Yugoslavia.
With the creation of
Yugoslavia, the continuity of Croatian national sovereignty was interrupted by
violent means. If African peoples, who sometimes lack history, name, and
national borders, have the right to national independence and individual
freedoms, all the more so does that same right belong to the old European
nations, with their rich historical and cultural heritage.
US political science
believes it must be objectivist and positivist. It still underestimates
political fluctuations as they arise in history and tends to consider all
problems through an economic and materialist lens. According to the American
scholar's views, economics is the safest way to approach and focus on any
situation. This path, as outlined by Charles Beard, has much in common with the
conceptions of Marxist theorists, even if he doesn't acknowledge it. This path,
without a doubt, is the easiest and most superficial, since by accumulating
facts, arranging them horizontally and superficially, in a mathematical
fashion, one arrives at convincing results. The path of imagination and
intuition, the path of historical imponderables that have always been key to
knowing and understanding historical phenomena, especially in the fluctuating
periods of revolutions, is unknown to the American scholar. He, as if fearing
all those elements that have shaped European political figures through the
force of political events, prefers to remain on a restricted plane of studying
mere facts, without investigating their remote and immediate causes. His main
purpose is to be objective in times when objectivity does not exist, since the
revolution is in full gestation and the globe is enveloped in flames and
chaotic fog, from which a new, as yet undefined, world will be born.
The result of such an approach to
the contemporary revolution is neither certain nor reassuring. This is why
American politics is as indecisive as it is indeterminate, since it too seeks,
first and foremost, objectivity. In contrast, communist-style Marxism, while
objectivist and realistic, is endowed with imagination and intuition,
introduces passion and faith into political life, and ultimately bases its
entire philosophy and action on the principle of the "inevitability" of
the collapse of capitalism and Western-style democracy, using the masses led by
restricted, cruel, cold, and Machiavellian elites. Thus, at Harvard and Yale
universities, the development of communism is studied down to the smallest
detail, and while it is believed that the key to solving or understanding the
crisis in which we live has been found, communism surprises us with its leaps
and turns that defy the frameworks established by American political science,
which is prone to systematization and classification.
Let's take the case
of George Kennan, undoubtedly the most insightful American analyst of
Russian-communist political strategy, whose analyses are considered the most
authoritative contribution to American political science. This author, with his
excessive rationalization of phenomena, not only creates confusion in the
concepts but also undermines the will to undertake political action, which is
especially necessary for the United States. The objectification of a revolution
in progress paralyzes the counter-action of those who should counteract it in
order to maintain their place in history, even to preserve their position on
the world stage.
Because complacency,
complacency in the face of the enemy, and the firm belief that the enemy is not
as terrible or as dark as it is portrayed are fundamental characteristics of
this nation, Kennan, through his framing and development of the American-Soviet
problem, disarms, discourages, and disorients public opinion and the American
man of action. A fundamentally non-expansionist nation, which still believes in
understanding with the Soviet Union and the communist world, and which
therefore let slip some decisive moments when, possessing far superior nuclear
weapons, it could have contained the Soviet Union and communist imperialism
within its borders, found itself morally disarmed by the effect of scientific
rationalization, whose main spokespeople are George Kennan and Walter Lippmann.
Although of opposing views, they and their ilk did everything to morally disarm
public opinion, starting from the premise that communism is not as dangerous as
Nazism. While demanding radical measures against National Socialism, they
adopted the attitude of an observer seeking compromise when it came to
Communism. Those who emerged in North America as radical
opponents of Communism, identifying it with Nazism, lost ground as politicians
and scientists. The cases of McCarthy, Senator Knowland,
General MacArthur, and a good number of publicists and university
professors—many of the latter being liberals—are highly significant, as they
were swept away by the wave of anti-Communist liberalism.
American liberal intellectuals
assigned Communism a place in historical evolution opposite to that which they
attributed to Fascism and National Socialism. They considered Communism an
inevitable phenomenon in the evolution of those countries where the conditions
for democratic, economic, and national progress did not exist. Their opposition
to Communism was reduced to defining its geographical boundaries. Kennan's
policy of containment, aimed at halting communism and preventing its spread
throughout the free world, is one of the most evident pieces of evidence of how
the current crisis is being approached.
This perspective influences
American politicians and the intellectual elite to view Russia coldly,
objectively, and rationally, which in turn paralyzes the momentum of an
anti-communist stance that could otherwise gain greater and more vigorous
traction. If communism is a new religion, as is often claimed, then democracy,
too, would have to return to its irrational roots and, instead of behaving as a
passive observer, incite the masses with new beliefs and new proselytizing. The
same situation that prevailed in France between the two world wars, when Julien Benda demanded the irrational awakening of democracy
in the face of National Socialism and Fascism,
currently prevails in the United States in relation to irrational communism.
The objectification of the irrational creates a predisposition for passivity,
and thus the U.S., instead of being the leading force of the democratic
revolution in the world, limits itself to hindering the democratic movement in
certain countries, which arose for national and economic reasons.
The economic
difficulties in underdeveloped countries undergoing national awakening, where
the masses are mobilized, are not resolved by North America, but rather allowed
to be exploited by Soviet communism.
Meanwhile, American
scholars observe, investigate, and analyze the data provided by science, yet
they refuse to take sides, even though the communists blame them for the
world's backwardness.
The United States of America is
not like the European colonial powers of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, as
its main strength stems from its own territory. Therefore, Soviet communism is
in a favorable position, able to operate effectively in various parts of the
globe. All of this, however, does not mean that the U.S. is incapable of
resisting and repelling aggression. But the weakest point is that the U.S., in
the face of Soviet-communist imperialism, only considers the enemy's
aggression. A radical confrontation with communism, even an ideological one, is
seen in the U.S. as the inevitable path to war.
This is the argument made by Kennan
and Lipfimann, followed by a long cohort of
publicists and political analysts, who, instead of seeing that communist
aggression is not always synonymous with war, argue that communism employs a
political strategy with which it can, while avoiding war, mortally wound the
enemy. The fundamental difference between communist and National Socialist
strategy lies in the fact that communism conquers without war. The American
strategy, on the other hand, consists of accumulating weapons, the use of which
will be decided politically. This political decision is paralyzed by the
actions of political analysts who respond to the skillful manipulation of
communist strategy with concessions and rationalization. Rationalizing the
irrational inevitably leads to war or capitulation, which amounts to the same
thing, since there can be no capitulation without war.
II.
Titoism was and remains one
of the utopian ideals of American political science, which believes it can
counteract the Soviet-communist strategy. The idea that Tito would first divide
the communist bloc and then weaken it became almost a central element of
American political science and strategy: Month after month, new books and
studies on this topic appear in American political literature, while this grand
illusion has already cost U.S. citizens more than $2 billion. I have before me
the books published recently by qualified political authors who resided in
Belgrade for study or held official positions. There is no reason to suspect
them of being communist sympathizers. They were guided to dedicate themselves
to the study of the Yugoslav communist problem by scientific motives and also
by the desire to glimpse, through the study of the state structure and Tito's
political system, in its phases of development after the split with Moscow and
up to the present day, a possible "democratic evolution" of
communism, as a political doctrine and practice.
The first to propose this thesis
was H.F. Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs, the most authoritative organ of
American foreign policy, a conservative by nature, who believed that Tito would
organize a state that would serve as a model for dismantling Stalinism, thereby
weakening the communist bloc. This thesis was supported by Cyrus Sulzberger in
his articles for the New York Times, who believed in the great thaw after the
death of the dictator Stalin. If we add the name of John Gunther, we have the
main forays of these journalists into the supposedly disintegrating communist
world. Their observations and proposals turned out to be superficial and
somewhat naive. They dissected the living body of the Yugoslav people as if it
were material with no relation whatsoever to a living organism. The national
problem that Tito failed to solve left them indifferent.
Yugoslavia was necessary to them
as the antithesis to Stalinist ideology. This determined the American policy of
considerable material aid to Tito's regime, a policy still in effect today. In
this way, American capitalism became—history will tell us—the main economic backer
for the "building of socialism" in Yugoslavia. Not even Karl Marx
could have foreseen such contradictions in communism and capitalism, but these
contradictions do not affect American statesmen and publicists, while Tito
continues to exploit them as much as he can. In reality, while the American
apparatus waged a tenacious struggle against Stalin, Tito consolidated his own
position and demanded expressions of gratitude from the Yugoslav people for
having freed them from the direct pressure of the Kremlin. Tito was playing
that old Balkan game between Moscow and Washington, the same game his
predecessors had played on the same ground in ancient times, between Byzantium
and papal Rome. Opposition to Tito, both within the country and among the
exiles, if it relied solely on Western policy, would inevitably grind to a halt
and ultimately disappear.
As if no one saw this
aspect of Tito's political game. One of the most serious American economists,
John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics at Harvard University, in his
travelogue of Poland and Yugoslavia, *Journey to Poland and Yugoslavia*, offers
us a tragic, if not ludicrous, picture of the "building of socialism"
in Yugoslavia. Objective, dispassionate, and possessing a typically Anglo-Saxon
sense of humor, this professor converses with Polish and Yugoslav economists,
convinced that their sole purpose is to build a society in which the people
live better than between the two world wars. Although an economist, he doesn't
question how it's possible that after 15 years, and with $2 billion in American
aid, Tito's subjects are far from achieving the standard of living, not of a
West German citizen, but, say, of an Italian, to whose country the U.S. gave
far less capital for its economic recovery. No one questions how the US can
continue sending food to a country that, between the two world wars, exported
grain and other foodstuffs, products of its own land. In his lectures to the
regime's economists, this Harvard University professor insists on explaining
how the affluent American society also tends toward socialization. History
doesn't repeat itself. The communists in Belgrade and Warsaw rub their hands
together, while the long-suffering and sacrificed population is left bewildered
and beside itself.
To make the matter
even more ridiculous, the book by political analyst Fred Warner Neal, titled *Titoism in Action*, appears, full of strange
considerations. First of all, the author, who has access to all the
documentation on Tito, Kardelj, Kidric,
Djordjevic, Gerskovic,
etc., wants to shock us with his findings. He believes that Titoist
communism is returning not only to Bernstein, but also to British Fabianism. Neal refers to the forced concessions made by
the communists to the peasants as "Fabianist."
According to him, the
workers' councils are the clear example of "social ownership" and a
sure path to the democratization of capital and property. While the Titoists frequently make mistakes and don't know what they
want, they have a clear idea: Yugoslavia is surely headed toward socialism. The
author is careful not to leave his ivory tower and confront reality; he doesn't
deem it appropriate to talk, for example, with peasants in the private and
collective sectors, to interview workers, with members of workers' councils,
and to inform us when and where the workers divided the company profits among
themselves, thus experiencing firsthand that the factories are their exclusive
property.
The author doesn't tell us what
the relationships are between factory managers and the workers. Nor does he
mention the revolutionary strikes that broke out in Trbovlje
(a coal mine in Slovenia) and in Dalmatia (a Croatian province). When he refers
to "economic regionalism," he fails to explain that it stems from
discontent based on national exploitation of Croatia and Slovenia. He even believes in
"democratic centralism."
Mr. Neal's excursions
were funded by American institutions and foundations. He considers his findings
so important and his efforts so successful that the "Twenty Century"
Foundation sent him to study the differences between Soviet and Tito's
communism. These epoch-making "discoveries" are enormously expensive;
it would be better to use that money to build a model American-style village,
which would better serve the people and increase the prestige of the United
States, than to squander it on an artificial and fictitious objectification of
Yugoslav political and economic reality.
Charles P. McVicker
develops a similar thesis, using a different approach, in his book *Titoism: Pattern for International Communism*, where he
emphasizes how Titoist communism, detached from
Soviet dogmatism, moves toward "liberalization" or even "social
democracy." McVicker, who lived in Zagreb and
worked at his country's consulate, was able, in addition to theory, to study
reality as he saw it daily. Limited exclusively to theoretical study, he
developed his thesis on the premise that, from 1949 and especially 1950 onward,
Tito's conception of a monolithic state was gradually transforming into the
"broadest representation of the people."
According to him, the communists,
in exercising power, had "recognized individual rights," and since
for Western liberalism "individual rights" constitute the fundamental
law, then Titoist communism
inevitably leads to democracy. Titoism, therefore, is
nothing but a "halfway house to freedom" between Stalinist tyranny
and "democratic socialism." The new Yugoslav
"constitutionality," as it emerged from the last two congresses of
the Communist Party, that is, the League of Communists, foresees
"decentralization," which, through the communes, would eventually
lead to "full freedom of the functioning of power."
The distribution of economic
resources and the application of workers' self-management also constitute, for this
author, not only signs of the undeniable separation of Yugoslav communism from
Soviet communism, but also the beginning of a general
"democratization," which will grant the people "the broadest
freedoms." By reforming the judicial system and limiting the activities of
the secret police, the "Titoists" discover
that in Yugoslavia "the socialist individual was the most important factor
in the community." To further highlight this picture, it is worth quoting
the following: "The Titoists seek to establish a
synthesis of fundamental Western liberal thought with the erroneous Marxist
axiom according to which all human relations emanate exclusively from the
"material causes".
In raising the
national question within the multinational Yugoslav state—a question avoided by
American analysts—McVicker discovered, for example,
that "mutual hatred between Serbs and Croats" is felt much more
strongly among exiles than within the country. He noted, with great surprise,
that in his conversations with Croatian Catholic dignitaries, held between 1950
and 1952, he perceived that they advocated for Croatia's separation and
integration as a sovereign state into the European Union, something that would
be feasible with US economic aid. Neither he, nor Neal, nor Galbraith address
the national question, which the Soviet Union, in contrast, still considers the
most powerful instrument in its strategy against Titoism.
McVicker, like Kennan, ignores national issues while
analyzing the internal situation of the USSR, remaining unaware not only of the
national struggle of the Ukrainians but also of all the other nationalities
incorporated into the Soviet Union. Both official propaganda and American
diplomacy adhere to the same political principles with respect to Russia and
Yugoslavia. This more effective means of dislodging communism is unknown to
American science and politics.
The only exception is the
historian Kohn, who, in his work PanSlavism and in
the prologue to the book The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy 1948-58: A Documentary
Record, published by Robert Bass and Elisabeth Marbury at The East Europe
Institute, delved into the problem and emphasized that the old national
struggle persisted in relations between Yugoslavia and Russia, a struggle that
had previously also been waged in the Balkans. He argued that the existing
conflict, albeit in a communist version, between Serbia on one side and Albania
and Bulgaria on the other, was nothing more than the struggle between rival
nationalities, manifested identically in other circumstances, without the
communist leadership, whether Greater Russian or Greater Serbian, managing to
resolve this irreconcilable antagonism. According to these premises and
arguments presented in the works of American political theorists and
economists, the fate of the peoples of Yugoslavia remains uncertain. Not only
does US political science fail to contribute to the liberation of these peoples
from the communist yoke, but it also fosters prejudices and false convictions
among the American public, suggesting that the struggle for liberation would be
futile and fruitless.
According to this view, the fate
of these peoples is left to the historical process. It fails to recognize that
revolution generates counter-revolution, since if the dialectical process is
one of incessant change, then communism, too, has its limits in time (it can be
superseded by a new, stronger phenomenon). With such approaches, political
science lulls Americans into complacency, depriving them of the will to
constantly threaten communism and force it to defend itself by taking advantage
of the same dialectical process; it deprives them of initiative, the only force
capable of preventing war and simultaneously exposing communism to the danger
of weakening itself.
III
Lately, I had the
opportunity to travel through Africa, the Near East, the Soviet Union, and
Cuba. My trips were primarily scientific and informative, with a minimal focus
on tourism. My mission was to investigate the influence the U.S. exerts in the
world today, and in that sense, my trip fit perfectly with a typical American
research project.
Paradox is the best
term to use when speaking with representatives of the ruling class in the parts
of the world straddling the U.S. and the USSR. In the streets of Khartoum,
photos of Tito hang on the walls, and people speak of him with truly
incomprehensible enthusiasm. No one asks: How are things in Yugoslavia? Why do
the national problems remain unresolved and threaten to destroy the edifice
Tito built, as if it were a house of cards?
So where does this
great interest in Tito come from?
Because he showed the
politicians of these underdeveloped countries the best way to operate between
the two great powers. In both Sudan and Egypt, everyone is aware of the
conflict between Washington and Moscow and fears they could be crushed in it.
People believe Tito was right to steer his country's policy in a neutral
direction, hoping to side with the victorious party.
The fact that Tito
remains a staunch communist and hasn't altered his internal regime in the
slightest doesn't concern anyone. They are drawn to Tito's success in
maintaining power and even strengthening it in the conflict between the two
global blocs. Every attempt I made to place Tito in his proper context was
rejected by my interlocutors with the arguments presented about Tito in the
aforementioned American political literature. I dare say that American
political science has contributed more to elevating Tito in the imaginations of
these intellectuals than all communist literature. Even official Washington
policy, which provided substantial financial support for Tito's experiment,
increased his prestige in these parts of the world. When Tito grants loans to
Sudan and Abyssinia, when he builds ports on the shores of Syria and Abyssinia,
or sends his missions to Asia and Africa, no one asks where he gets the
financial means, no one points out that Tito does all this with American money.
Those in Washington
who believed that by giving billions of dollars to Tito they would destroy
Stalin's empire were wrong. With the gifted money, Tito destroys American
positions on all sides: He penetrates that colonial and backward world as a
mentor and advisor. Abyssinian and Sudanese pilots, instead of training in the
U.S., are trained in communist Yugoslavia with American money and American
planes. While every American working in those countries sees all this, neither
London nor Washington does.
Tito taught the ruling class of
those countries how to exploit the West using the very means that the West gave
them. For us Westerners, this is a very painful realization. It would be even
more bitter if we didn't know that in Tito's "house" everything is
not going well and that there are symptoms that reveal dangerous cracks in the
communist edifice.
However, it is comforting
to know that everywhere there are true friends of the West who reject the
assumptions and foundations of American political science. When they criticize
the U.S., they are not opposing its recent socio-economic achievements. They
criticize North America for not properly taking advantage of its unlimited
potential to carry out a profound socio-economic revolution in those countries
where its economic and political influence is felt.
These errors of the U.S. are felt
throughout the world. I would say that they consist of a lack of understanding
of the great social and economic changes taking place in the world, changes
that were previously so successfully addressed in North America. The
squandering of vast material subsidies to various parts of the world without
the accompaniment of a broad and well-defined policy with specific
socio-economic objectives, which would have a positive impact on the
discontented classes, especially intellectuals, causes serious harm to the U.S.
I would say that this is precisely
where the fault of American intellectuals lies, due to their passive attitude
regarding their country's foreign policy. What I just said is largely reflected
in Cuba. For me, my encounter with Cuba was more than a surprise. Less than
three hours from New York, I was confronted with a situation that more closely
resembled Tito's Yugoslavia in 1945 than what I had expected. While there were
doubts about whether Fidel Castro was a communist, I clearly saw that his
entire experiment was directed by Marxists, following in the footsteps of the
Soviets and Tito. I believe it was imperative to improve the situation of the
rural population.
However, it seems to me that the
path of collectivization is misguided and unnecessary. The United States
invested large sums of money in Cuba, and the standard of living is not as low
as the official propagandists describe it, who make anti-Americanism a matter
of life or death for their revolution. Every country in northern or
southeastern Europe would be very happy to have a nation like the U.S. in its
neighborhood. What wouldn't Poland or Finland, for example, give in such a
situation?
Castro, on the other hand, is
creating a psychosis of hatred against the U.S., reorganizing the defense, and
keeping the country and its peaceful people in a state of tension, as if the
U.S. were about to launch an armed attack at any moment. If, for example, the
president of Finland were to provoke the Soviet government in this way every
day, he certainly wouldn't last two days in power. Castro, however, continues
with threats, provocations, slander, and challenges, organizing the army and
militia as if some armed conflict were about to erupt, and, what is even more
tragic, he requests the help of the Soviets, who thus entrenched themselves
twenty miles from the shores of the United States.
In Cuba, Russian,
Chinese, and Yugoslav communists are operating, each offering their own
communist recipe. Today, many paradoxes exist, but this one surely surpasses
them all. Cuban intellectuals are completely unaware of the US economic and
social experiment. Moreover, they reject it without even understanding it.
Previously, intellectuals in smaller countries looked to Paris, London, Berlin,
and Washington, seeking not only political experience but also the paths to
social, economic, and cultural progress. Today, they look to what Tito,
Khrushchev, and Mao Zedong are doing. And to complete the tragedy, these
attitudes are based on what is said and written in London and Washington about
Tito, Khrushchev, and Mao Zedong.
Speaking in Cuba with
Castro supporters, I had to listen to unbelievable stories about Tito,
disseminated not by Tito's emissaries, but by American scientific publications.
When I tried to correct these misguided and false opinions, I was then
confronted with the pronouncements of some renowned American political author,
read in prestigious journals such as Foreign Affairs and even Problems of
Communism—publications that cannot be considered leftist, since they reflect
the most authoritative opinions and viewpoints in the United States. This is
how the U.S. undermines and destroys the foundations of its own policies. In
fact, one can be less critical of the American businessman for seeking profit
in the classic capitalist style, something now impossible in his country, than
of American intellectuals when they write and discuss problems they do not
understand.
It is necessary to
reflect on and write about this illogicality, which not only harms the U.S.,
the people of Yugoslavia, and the people of Cuba, directly affected by Titoism and Castroism. There is
danger for other countries as well, including Latin America. In Cuba, it became
clear that Tito's emissaries advise Castro's propagandists to support similar
revolutionary movements, which the Yugoslav press follows closely, encourages,
and openly sympathizes with.
I have previously
pointed out the fatal errors of American political science in its assessment of
Russian and Yugoslav communism, but I have never before realized how terrible
these errors are as on this journey from West Africa, through the Near East,
and to Cuba, which is on the doorstep of the United States.
American society, from
Roosevelt's New Deal to the present day, under both Democratic and Republican
administrations, has carried out a profound economic and social revolution,
guaranteeing the working masses a standard of living that no other system could
offer them. However, these gains for the working class are unknown in Cuba, and
even less so in Ghana or Sudan. What is known about this revolution is
superficial and distorted, since American intellectuals are more interested in
how Tito's "workers' councils" operate than in workers' gains in the
US.
Finally, the biggest mistake made
by official US propaganda is presenting capitalism as an alternative to
communism, instead of freedom and social justice, as if the classic capitalist
system were not already dead, even in the United States. Regarding Cuba, we can
also say: if the social revolution it intends to carry out under the Marxist
banner has repercussions throughout Latin America, it would be tragic if this
were done solely to oppose the United States, since it is obvious that
communists from across South America, concentrated in Cuba, will not be able to
offer the masses the political and economic liberation they need. Furthermore,
if such a revolution is carried out under the tutelage of the Soviet Union and
with the support of global communism, the Cuban people will be exploited and
sacrificed to the calculations of the grand game of international politics,
their interests subordinated to the struggle between the great powers. Russia
does not give its money in vain. It penetrates wherever the revolutionary
climate is favorable; it is not guided by idealistic or altruistic motives, and
these countries serve as instruments for its global policy, aimed at excluding
the United States and the Western bloc. In this way, the aspirations of
underdeveloped countries for better economic conditions and social equilibrium
are sacrificed to the interests of world politics. Those who view these
relationships with fanaticism, like Castro, undermine the foundations of what
could have been a beneficial social and economic reform.
IV
Before concluding, I
would like to highlight the article by Lewis S. Feuer,
professor of philosophy at the University of California, published in the
magazine New Leader, in which he critically addresses some basic views of
American analysts on Soviet politics. "During the past generation,
sociologists endeavored to paint a picture of the Soviet Union for us. Whatever
their differences, their analysis of the Soviet Union proceeded from a
fundamental premise. They assumed that the evolution of Soviet society was
essentially determined by internal needs... What was the impact of such a
picture of Soviet reality on American foreign policy? A false picture,
presupposing reality, prevents us from addressing a problem in accordance with
our own interests. Sociologists created a picture of the Soviet Union as if it
were a kind of All-Powerful Totality, a political cosmos, like the Hegelian
Absolute, immobile and immanent... A certain essential sense is derived from
the writings of our specialists on Soviet affairs. They do not dwell on the
fact that the immanent character of the Soviet revolution precludes the
possibility of a creative foreign policy. They deny that American foreign
policy can contribute to guiding Soviet society toward a more liberal
alternative. In the opinion of our analysts of Soviet affairs, there are no
alternatives." "Real historical
facts."
It seems to me that
no one in the U.S. has posed this problem better than Feuer,
getting to its heart of the matter. American sociologists, political writers,
and economists, lost in the winding meanders of communist dialectics, without
realizing the difference between communist theory and reality in countries
under the rule of the hammer and sickle, renounce the possibility of proposing
an alternative to communism. Anyone somewhat initiated into the process of historical
events knows that without adequate alternatives, no changes occur in the world,
and without them, it is impossible to safeguard one's own national interests.
This applies not only
to times of peace but especially to revolutionary periods. The strength of
communism does not stem from its intrinsic value but from the absence of new
ideas and action from the West, from the impotence of the intellectual and
political elite to devise new alternatives. Therefore, it cedes the
initiative—both the initiative and the alternative—exclusively to the communist
leaders. Corroded by historicism and prone to objectifying every irrational
phenomenon in history, American political science is mired in crisis. Until
this crisis is overcome, it will be difficult to believe that we will regain
the initiative and the alternative.
The present picture, negative and
bleak, changes abruptly upon arriving in Russia. Had I not visited the Soviet
Union after the aforementioned trip, I would have remained convinced that the
end of the 20th century could be called the communist era and that the forces
of freedom had reached their end. During my month-long stay in Russia, speaking
with ordinary people and intellectuals in their own language, I realized that
communism in the Soviet Union is practically dead. In my conversations with
Russians, I saw that communism, both as a philosophy and as a reality, awakens
no illusions or enthusiasm and satisfies the aspirations of the inhabitants of
the Soviet Union. My research confirmed my previous convictions that communism
is an aberration that can excite intellectuals who have not tried it in
practice, and not the people with whom communism is experimented on.
Furthermore, in the
Soviet Union I realized that the American experience is sought after, studied,
and imitated there more than the communist experience. When we in the West hear
not only communists but also neutrals telling us that the American system is
outdated and no longer suited to the economic and social aspirations of
contemporary man, we must go to Russia to experience the opposite. The Russian
and Soviet man demands only one thing: to achieve the standard of living of the
American man. We knew that the European peoples occupied after the war by the
Soviets—those currently under communist rule—constitute the most dangerous
potential adversary for Soviet imperialism.
However, knowing that
the peoples of Russia reject communism has encouraging effects. The subjugated
peoples, victims of Soviet imperialism, cannot understand why the US, with its
unlimited forces, is unable to expose the lies of communism. The essential
point is that the Russian man does not understand this either. When the
barriers are torn down and the iron curtain separating two worlds is removed, I
am certain that daylight will dispel the shadows and the ghosts will vanish.
Then someone will remember and cleanse the libraries of all the theses and
antitheses, all the doctoral dissertations on the problems of a world that is
paying with its blood for the errors of Western intellectuals, their arbitrary,
senseless, and unrealistic constructions.
Andrea Medulic (Andrea Meldolla Schiavone) – born in Zadar,
Croatia, around 1503 and died in Venice in 1563 – occupies a place of honor in
Venetian painting of the Cinquecento. For his significant innovations in the
interpretation of light, atmosphere, and pictorial matter, Medulic
is considered a precursor, in certain solutions, of Tintoretto, Basano, and El Greco. Both Medulic
and Culinovic appear in the history of painting under
the name Schiavone. At that time in Italy, people
from Croatia were referred to interchangeably as schiavone,
Croat, Dalmatian, or Illyrian.
In addition to the
four aforementioned creators of the Renaissance, it is worth noting the
magnificent work of the architect Luciano Pranjanin (Laurana), author of the palaces of the King of Naples and
the Duke of Urbino, and the sculptures of Giorgio da Sebenico (Giorgio da Sebenico),
among which the municipal loggia and the beautiful portals of the churches of Sant'Agostino and San Francesco in Ancona
stand out.
In this gallery of
illustrious Croatian masters during the Renaissance, the miniaturist Giulio Clovio Klovic
(1498-1578), a painter of unparalleled talent and a patron of El Greco,
occupies a special place.
Giulio Clovio Klovic was
born in 1498 in Grizane, on the Croatian coast. He
was baptized Giorgio, which he later changed to Giulio
in Italy. It is almost certain that Klovic acquired
his early humanistic and drawing skills in a Croatian monastery. At a young
age, he moved to Venice, where his exceptional talent earned him the admiration
and patronage of Cardinal and great patron Mariano Grimani.
In Venice, he became intimately acquainted with the paintings of Titian.
During the three years he spent
in Venice, Klovic decorated numerous seals, shields,
and medals, devoting himself entirely to the art of miniature painting. Then,
in 1524, after spending several years in Rome, he was summoned by the
Hungarian-Croatian King Lodovico II of the Polish Jagiellonian dynasty, who was married to Maria, sister of
Emperor Charles V. At his court, he executed several exquisite miniature works.
He took part in the catastrophic Battle of Mohács
(1526), in which the Turks defeated the Christian troops, and King Władysław himself fell on the battlefield.
All of Central Europe was
devastated and gripped by terrible panic due to the unstoppable advance of the
Ottoman conquerors. Klovic decided to return to Italy,
the only refuge for artists and writers. Upon arriving in Rome, he witnessed
its sack by the German, Spanish, and Italian troops of Charles V. Even Klovic was mistreated, robbed, and stripped of everything.
He went to Mantua, where he decided to enter religious orders. In 1531, he
renounced his vows and, with papal authorization, returned to the life of a
secular priest. In Mantua, he decorated the Gospel Book, the Liber commentariorum in epistulam S.
Pauli ad Romanos, and the rhymes of the poet Petrarch
with miniatures for his patron, Cardinal Grimani.
In 1538, he returned to Rome,
summoned by Pope Paul III. He formed friendly relationships with Vittoria Colonna and other prominent humanists. His
miniatures in the Codex priscae romanae
psalmodiae date from this period. He studied under
the renowned Portuguese painter Francisco de Holanda,
who compiled an index of his works. From 1546 onwards, he was in the service of
the powerful and influential Cardinal Alessandro Farnese. He lived in his
magnificent palace, built by Michelangelo, and mingled with all the illustrious
Renaissance and humanist figures of the time residing in Rome.
In the same year, he
illustrated a Latin missal for his patron with numerous and fantastical
miniatures and, after nine years of assiduous work, finished the devotional
book Horae Beatae Mariae virginis, his masterpiece,
"which remains one of the most precious monuments of the arts admired in
Europe." At the end of this book of offices is the dedication to Cardinal
Alessandro Farnese: "Julius Clovius Macedo dedicated this monument to Alessandro Farnese Cardinali, his Lord. 1546."
Klovic usually signed his paintings as Clovio, Glovis, Clovius, Croata, Croatus, Croatinus, de Croatia,
and sometimes Illyricus and Macedo.
For greater clarity, it is worth noting that his patron and sponsor, Cardinal
Farnese, was a great classicist and passionate admirer of Alexander the Great
of Macedon, and referred to Klovic as a
"Macedonian," mistakenly identifying the words "Croatian"
and "Illyrian" with "Macedonian." Cardinal Farnese
sponsored the Collegium Illyricum, a Croatian hospice in Rome, from 1565 to
1568. The devotional book Horae Beatae
Mariae virginis, a jewel of
European illumination, is preserved in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York.
During his stay at
the Farnese Palace, Klovic illuminated and decorated
several books and manuscripts, including Dante's Divine Comedy, the life of
Francesco Maria da Montefeltro della
Rovere IV, and the life of Federico da Montefeltro written by the Croatian Jerónimo
Mucijo. At the same time, with the help of his
students, he decorated Paolo Orsini's Roman history.
In 1551, we find him in Florence, at the court of Cosimo
de' Medici, who did everything he could to have such a famous illuminator as Giulio Klovic in his service.
His life was quite itinerant,
subject to political vicissitudes. In 1554, he was living in Parma and carrying
out works for Emperor Charles V and Philip II. Three years later, he returned
to Florence, and in 1560, he was once again in Rome, in the service of Cardinal
Farnese. Many of Klovic's works of a religious,
mythological, and secular nature date from this period, including the painting
of Judith, painted for Margaret, Duchess of Austria, and the biography of
Charles V, decorated with miniatures commissioned by Philip II.
By then, he was very famous and
highly sought after throughout Europe, receiving numerous commissions and
carrying out works for John III, King of Portugal. Working tirelessly, with
impaired eyesight and exhausted, after having traveled from city to city,
teaching, painting, and doing charitable works, he died in Rome in 1578, at the
age of 80, Julio Clovio de Croatia, pictor nulli secundus,
in quo diligentia in minimis
maxima, according to the inscription on his black marble tomb and white statue
in the Roman church of San Pietro in Vincoli.
The work of the
miniaturist Julius Klovic is extensive and rich in
thematic variety. In his time, he was considered the best illuminator. His
contemporary, the renowned historian G. Vasari, in his work on the lives of the
most excellent painters, sculptors, and architects of the Renaissance, defines
him as "the little and new Michelangelo." Klovic's
miniatures signify the apogee of painting in minuscule forms and, at the same
time, its decline. With the invention of printing, the decoration of
manuscripts, missals, codices, devotional books, etc., lost its importance, and
miniature painting gradually disappeared during the 17th century. Contemporary
historians, while denying the authorship of a number of works previously
attributed to Klovic, recognize that he was a perfect
technician, with a fertile imagination and inexhaustible invention, and that he
achieved marvelous decorative effects.
Klovic, whose drawings were reproduced
by the most renowned engravers in Europe, often drew inspiration for his
paintings from the canvases of Michelangelo and Raphael, transposing their
monumental compositions into the minuscule format of his miniatures. The florid
decoration and exuberant ornamentation mark the beginning of the Baroque style
and imply the decline of the genuine art of miniature painting.
When, around 1560, Domenico Theotocopuli, later
known as El Greco, arrived in Venice, the septuagenarian Titian was enjoying
his triumph, and Venetian painting was dominated by Veronese, Tintoretto, the
Dalmatian Andrea Medulic (Schiavone),
known for his pathetic and tormented forms, Jacopo da Ponte, and Bassano. El
Greco shared with A. Medulic a passion for music,
and, along with other painters, they formed a close-knit circle of friends.
According to J. F. Willumsen, Medulic's
influence on El Greco is particularly noticeable in the following paintings:
Death of John the Baptist, Adoration of the Magi, and Miracle of Pentecost, due
to their elegance, spontaneity, and freedom of expression. We have little
precise information regarding the young Candiot's
life in Venice and the route Domenico took to reach
Rome. Nor is it known when or where he met Klovic,
his future patron. The truth is that on November 16, 1579, Klovic
wrote from Rome to his patron, Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, who was then
residing in Viterbo:
"A student of Titian, a
young Candio, has just arrived in Rome. In my
opinion, he is among the very few who excel in painting; and among other
things, he has painted a self-portrait that has filled all the painters present
in Rome with admiration. I would earnestly like to place him under Your Most
Illustrious and Reverend Protection, it being only necessary to help him live,
lodging him until he manages to overcome his poverty. I also beg and implore
you to be so kind as to write to your steward, Co Ludovico,
so that he may arrange for him to have one of the upstairs rooms in that
Palace. Your Excellency will thus be doing a good deed, worthy of it, and I
will be most grateful. Kissing your hands with reverence, I remain Your Most
Illustrious and Reverend." Your Eminence, the
most humble servant, Don Julio Clovio."
The work of the
miniaturist Julius Klovic is extensive and rich in
thematic variety. In his time, he was considered the best illuminator. His
contemporary, the renowned historian G. Vasari, in his work on the lives of the
most excellent painters, sculptors, and architects of the Renaissance, defines
him as "the little and new Michelangelo." Klovic's
miniatures signify the apogee of painting in minuscule forms and, at the same
time, its decline. With the invention of printing, the decoration of
manuscripts, missals, codices, devotional books, etc., lost its importance, and
miniature painting gradually disappeared during the 17th century. Contemporary
historians, while denying the authorship of a number of works previously
attributed to Klovic, recognize that he was a perfect
technician, with a fertile imagination and inexhaustible invention, and that he
achieved marvelous decorative effects.
Klovic, whose drawings were reproduced
by the most renowned engravers in Europe, often drew inspiration for his
paintings from the canvases of Michelangelo and Raphael, transposing their
monumental compositions into the minuscule format of his miniatures. The florid
decoration and exuberant ornamentation mark the beginning of the Baroque style
and imply the decline of the genuine art of miniature painting.
When, around 1560, Domenico Theotocopuli, later
known as El Greco, arrived in Venice, the septuagenarian Titian was enjoying
his triumph, and Venetian painting was dominated by Veronese, Tintoretto, the
Dalmatian Andrea Medulic (Schiavone),
known for his pathetic and tormented forms, Jacopo da Ponte, and Bassano. El
Greco shared with A. Medulic a passion for music,
and, along with other painters, they formed a close-knit circle of friends.
According to J. F. Willumsen, Medulic's
influence on El Greco is particularly noticeable in the following paintings:
Death of John the Baptist, Adoration of the Magi, and Miracle of Pentecost, due
to their elegance, spontaneity, and freedom of expression. We have little
precise information regarding the young Candiot's
life in Venice and the route Domenico took to reach
Rome. Nor is it known when or where he met Klovic,
his future patron. The truth is that on November 16, 1579, Klovic
wrote from Rome to his patron, Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, who was then
residing in Viterbo:
"A student of Titian, a
young Candio, has just arrived in Rome. In my
opinion, he is among the very few who excel in painting; and among other
things, he has painted a self-portrait that has filled all the painters present
in Rome with admiration. I would earnestly like to place him under Your Most
Illustrious and Reverend Protection, it being only necessary to help him live,
lodging him until he manages to overcome his poverty. I also beg and implore
you to be so kind as to write to your steward, Co Ludovico,
so that he may arrange for him to have one of the upstairs rooms in that
Palace. Your Excellency will thus be doing a good deed, worthy of it, and I
will be most grateful. Kissing your hands with reverence, I remain Your Most
Illustrious and Reverend." Your Eminence, the most humble servant, Don
Julio Clovio."
On the other hand, it
was necessary to get rid of the Soviet model for purely practical reasons. A
strict application of Soviet economic models, as well as the inherent contradictions
and errors of a collectivist and centralist economy, led the Yugoslav economy
to collapse. The national budget could no longer cover the waste and
spectacular losses of industry, while collectivization produced a catastrophic
decline in agricultural production. By 1950, famine was looming, averted at the
last minute by American aid.
According to
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, practice is the best judge of theory, which in
Yugoslavia proved disastrous. Consequently, the theory had to be modified in light
of negative practice, without affecting the foundations of totalitarian power.
The problem posed was inherently contradictory. How to reconcile the
decentralization of the economy and power with the totalitarian prerogatives of
the Party and the dominant role of the State—"the apparatus of
oppression"? How, moreover, could a collectivist-totalitarian regime be
democratized without simultaneously undermining the absolutism of a single
party?
This problem
dominated the Sixth Party Congress held in Zagreb in 1952. Later, a new split
within the Party arose around this same issue. While Milovan
Djilas and others conceived of the newly created Workers' Councils as the
beginning of a general process of liberalization and the abandonment of party
absolutism, Tito, Rankovic, and the others considered
these Councils a "conveyor belt" for the Party and the State,
adjusted to the new circumstances. The censure and subsequent condemnation of
Djilas were meant to be conclusive proof that the Party wanted to govern in a
totalitarian manner as before, albeit in a modified atmosphere of
"decentralization," "social self-management," and
"withering away of the State." According to this conception,
"workers' self-management" should have remained, and did remain,
under the rigid control of the Party, which sets its limits and dictates its
content. Even so, at the beginning there were hesitations in defining the
limits of "coexistence" between the Party and workers'
self-management.
Tito himself, at the
Sixth Congress, stated in this regard that "the Party's duty is to provide
ideological education and ensure that social self-management develops
naturally." However, since 1955, the Party has been increasingly
infiltrating workers' councils through the growing participation of communists
in the organs of workers' self-management. During this period, the number of
communists in enterprises reached 13%, while their participation in the organs
of self-management reached 40%.
This trend prevailed
in the new Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists, approved at the
Seventh Congress, held in Ljubljana in 1958. In that program, the appropriate
place for the trade union organization in each company was determined, where it
should "act with greater intensity than before," and above all,
"coordinate the interests within the working class itself." The trade
union organization, as will be seen later, becomes the representative of the
Party within each company. Through it, the Party closely monitors the
development of the workers' councils to ensure that they do not stray from the
established channels and limits set by the Party itself. In this sense, the
1958 Program clearly defines the limits and powers of workers' self-management.
Another instrument
the Party uses to control workers' self-management is the so-called commune,
simultaneously an organ of state power and the basic economic and social cell
of the Yugoslav communist system. Just as the trade union is the Party's
political and governing body for workers' self-management in the enterprise, so
the commune is its superior legal and administrative organ.
Since 1950, several
dozen laws, decrees, and resolutions have been promulgated, by virtue of which
the communes and the central government are responsible for directing
"workers' self-management." The most important laws and decrees are:
the Fundamental Law on Management in State Economic Enterprises, of June 26,
1950 (Official Gazette, 43/50); the Law on the Management of the Planned
Economy (ibid., 58/51); and the Law on the Election of Workers' Councils
(ibid., 1/52), amended twice (ibid., 5/52 and 8/56). Constitutional Law on
Social and Economic Organization (ibid., 3/53);
Decree on the
Establishment of Companies (ibid., 5.1/53), renewed several times (ibid., 3/54,
43/54, 47/54, 13/55 and 19/56); Decree-Law on the Liquidation of Companies,
promulgated in 1953 and amended in 1956; Decree-Law on the Administration of
Basic Capital (ibid., 8/54), renewed repeatedly (ibid., 25/54, 32/54, 7/55,
etc.); Law on Economic Courts (ibid. 31/54); Decree on the Distribution of
Total Company Income (ibid., 10/56), amended (ibid., 55/57); Decree on workers'
wages (ibid., 11/56 and 18/57), later amended (ibid., 55/57); Decree on the
administration of working capital (ibid., 24/57);
Law relating to fixed
capital (ibid., 52/57); Law on the contribution to the community of the income
of companies (ibid., 52/57); Law on the resources of the company (ibid.,
52/57); Law on the contribution of workers' personal income to the budgets
(ibid., 54/57), later renewed (ibid., 14/58 and 25/58); Law on the workers'
contribution for housing (ibid., 57/55), later renewed (ibid., 54/57); Decree
relating to the distribution of the net income of the company (ibid., 14/58);
Law on Labor Relations (ibid., 7/58); Resolution on the Minimum Wages of
Workers (ibid. 52/58); Decree on the Wage Scale and the Workers' Ranking System
(ibid., 6/59). Likewise, many more decrees are in force, concerning banks,
social programs, foreign trade, prices, etc., which directly affect workers'
"self-government."
The mere enumeration
of the decrees, laws, and resolutions demonstrates the extent to which the
State is controlling "workers' self-management" and how illusory the
term "decentralization" is, since all the aforementioned laws and decrees
were promulgated by the central power of the State. Therefore, there is no
possibility of the "decline of the State." On the contrary, laws and
decrees from the central power are multiplying more and more. Not long ago, a
new bill on income distribution was presented to the "parliament" of
Belgrade (see the Communist Party organ "Borba"
of 2/16/60), that is, the most sensitive problem of every economic system and
especially under the conditions of "self-management".
However, according to the
constitutional law of 1953, there is the possibility of direct decision by the
working class, as a whole, in all legal instruments referring to the economic
sector, both at the local levels and at the supreme level. This law established
Producers' Councils at all levels, from the commune to the Federal National
Assembly. These councils were intended to fulfill the function of the
"upper house" in all bicameral parliamentary systems.
They are elected by the workers
of each enterprise through direct vote, and thus, from a constitutional and
administrative standpoint, the working class decides directly on
"self-management," even at the level of the central legislative
power. However, this parliamentary chamber, like the other within a
totalitarian government system, functions as a voting machine. They vote for
candidates proposed by the federal executive branch, and its president is
simultaneously the general secretary of the Party and supreme commander of the
armed forces. A quick glance at the official press and other publications
confirms this.
Thus, for example, the October 8,
1960 issue of the journal "Ekonomska Politika" reveals that "the deputies of the
Producers' Council had raised the issue of discussing the law concerning the
new five-year plan while it was still in its preparatory phase, in order to
potentially influence its final structure" (emphasis added). Regarding
these relationships at the lowest levels, i.e., commune-enterprise, we find
many identical cases in the official press. In the October 8, 1960 issue of the
newspaper "Borba" (the organ of the
Communist Party), one can read that "the members of the Workers' Councils
of many enterprises declare that they have nothing to discuss at meetings,
since all their resolutions concerning investments and wages must conform to
the criteria of the communal bodies." These cases are not exceptions; they
are widespread practice.
All the political,
legal, and administrative circumstances surrounding the development of
"workers' self-management" demonstrate that the evolution of the
Workers' Councils does not tend toward democratization and the "withering
away of the State." These circumstances contradict the principles of
self-government and democracy. Totalitarianism and "direct democracy"
are incompatible; dictatorship and autonomy are irreconcilable, since
"self-management" cannot exist without the real and effective power
of autonomous bodies. The Communist Party, however, has never shared power with
anyone, not even in the so-called "workers' self-management" in Yugoslavia.
The first signs of
workers' self-management appeared in 1945. These were workers' commissions,
created by government decree (Official Gazette, 54/46). Their powers were
limited to advising company management with a view to increasing production. The
Fundamental Law on State Economic Enterprises of 1946 (ibid., 62/46) also
refers to workers' commissions and their right to strive for better living and
working conditions.
According to the
aforementioned law, the State appoints the director of the enterprise. This
director manages the enterprise in accordance with the State's centralist plan,
the laws of the executive branch, and the instructions of the relevant
ministry. The director is responsible for fulfilling the predetermined and
detailed plan in all its aspects of production and marketing: the production
volume, price, quality, variety of products, labor, wages, etc., were all fixed
in advance, even the suppliers of raw materials and the buyers of finished
products were designated.
The plan had to be
executed in its entirety, both in volume and value, which led to absurd
situations during the manufacturing process (for example, a cement factory, in
order to execute the predetermined plan in its "value," brought sand
from the most distant locations). Simultaneously, the number of unproductive
workers grew, as peasants were forced to seek employment in factories. At the
same time, agriculture was stifled by forced collectivization, which brought
about the aforementioned consequences and determined the inevitable change in
the country's economic life.
Following the instructions of the
Economic Council and the Trade Union Federation, the first Workers' Councils
were founded at the end of 1949 in 215 large companies, comprising 8,000
workers. By mid-1950, these figures had risen to 520 and 14,328, respectively.
Around the same time, the fundamental law (June 26, 1950) concerning workers'
management in state-owned economic enterprises was promulgated "in
accordance with socialist principles, according to which the producers
themselves must manage the economy and in accordance with the principles of
democratic self-government" ("Borba,"
June 29, 1950). According to this law, the director and the workers' collective
(collectif ouvrier) manage
the enterprise through their respective bodies: the Workers' Council and the
Executive Committee. The production process is overseen by the director,
advised by technical experts.
A. - WORKERS'
COLLECTIVE
According to the
aforementioned fundamental law, "state economic enterprises, as well as
all national wealth, are managed, in the name of the social community, by
workers' collectives within the state economic plan and based on the rights and
duties established by laws and other legal instruments" (Art. 1). It further
states that "the workers' collective exercises this management through
workers' councils and the executive committees of the enterprises," and
that the workers' collectives elect and dissolve the workers' councils. In
enterprises with up to 30 workers, the workers' collective also constitutes the
workers' council.
These rights of the
workers' collective take effect from the founding of the enterprise and are
legally inalienable, except in the cases provided for, such as, for example,
the bankruptcy of the enterprise, etc. Apart from the right to elect and remove
the workers' council, the workers' collective also has the right to vote in
referendums within the company and the right to a consultative vote in the
Producers' Assembly. All the workers' rights are thus enumerated.
According to the
letter of the law, therefore, the "workers' collective" directs and
manages "the state economic enterprise" and "national
wealth" in the name of the social community. The question arises: who is
the owner? The people, the state, or the social community? What is the legal
relationship of the workers' collective to the owner? What is the legal
relationship of the workers' collective to the company?
The basic legislation
of Yugoslavia does not define all these legal concepts. It is unclear who is
the owner, who is the agent, who is the usufructuary,
etc. Apparently, this imprecision is intentional, since it was necessary to
specify in legal terms that the owner is the State, thereby implicitly and
formally acknowledging the state-capitalist character of the social order.
Thus, the legal position of the working class is not defined by law, which has
its reasons, since otherwise a clearly defined and specified legal position for
the working class would diminish the possibility, at least in its formal
aspect, of the arbitrary procedures to which state bodies resort.
The working class is,
therefore, neither owner nor agent, and, most importantly, it does not enjoy
the status of a legal person. Only the company possesses legal personality. If
self-management were true self-government, then the working class should enjoy
much broader and more precise rights, something similar to the rights of
shareholders in corporations and of members in cooperative societies.
Furthermore, the Workers' Council, as soon as it is elected, becomes
independent of the workforce, and therefore, one cannot speak of "direct
democracy" in companies. Moreover, this is incompatible with the complex
management of the company, and insisting on "direct democracy" becomes
mere demagoguery.
Regarding the right to vote, the
fundamental law states "that the Workers' Council is elected by equal,
direct, and secret ballot" (Art. 11), "based on a single list of
candidates, proposed by the trade union or by a specific number of
workers" (Art. 12). The right to vote, both active and passive, belongs to
every worker who has reached the age of 18. Lately, there has been a noticeable
trend toward granting the same right to those under 18. The number of workers
proposing the list of candidates must comprise at least 1/10 of the workforce.
Although the law allows for two
or more lists of candidates, in practice, the trade union almost always
proposes the list. In the 1953 Workers' Council elections, 573 of the 4,758
companies had two lists of candidates; in 1954, this figure rose to 689 of the
5,324 companies; in 1956, to 862 of the 5,989 companies; in 1957, to 198 of the
6,314 companies; and in 1958, to 189 of the 6,618 companies. There were no
elections in 1959, nor in 1955. The final data for 1960 has not yet been
compiled. In all other cases, the list of candidates was submitted by the trade
union, reflecting its increasingly important role in the Communist Party's
control of the company.
Regarding the right
to a referendum, the workers' collective can only approve or disapprove the
proposal. They lack the right to initiate a referendum. The result of the
referendum vote is binding on all the company's governing bodies. Precisely for
this reason, referendums are rarely held and are gradually disappearing.
According to Djuro Salaj's
statement, given in 1957 at the Congress of Workers' Councils in Belgrade, only
160 referendums were registered in Yugoslavia during 1956, and these "were
always justified," Salaj added, meaning they approved
everything the Party demanded. Regarding referendums and their use, "Ekonomska Politika" of May
30, 1960, wrote:
"The extensive
survey organized by the Zagreb Institute of Social Self-Management conclusively
demonstrated that referendums in the form they were initially conceived are
very rare and that this form of direct decision-making is declining year by
year. Of the 432 companies where the survey was conducted, referendums were
held in only 104, namely: 116 in 1956, 155 in 1957, and 95 in 1958. Furthermore,
few companies have regulations governing the organization of referendums.
The trade union is,
as a rule, the initiator of the referendum: the most sensitive issues, such as
wages and the distribution of the company's net profits, are not usually
included in the respective referendum. However, such a case did occur once at
the Sisak foundry in..." In 1958, the Board of
Directors decided to invest net profits in building homes for the company's
executives. This decision provoked discontent among the workers, who for more
than four years had not received a single dinar from the undistributed wage
fund. The Workers' Council resolved to put the matter to a referendum, and the
workers voted for the equal distribution of available funds. The resolution was
approved, and the process was carried out accordingly. Subsequently, the
Party's central organ, "Komunist," in its
February 23, 1958 edition, harshly criticized the foundry's Workers' Council
for having yielded to pressure from "bourgeois tendencies within a segment
of the workforce."
As can be inferred,
the referendum is undesirable and is therefore disappearing. In contrast, the
Producers' Assembly is convened more frequently, and its resolutions and
conclusions are not binding on the governing bodies. According to current
regulations, it should be convened every three months. However, this does not
happen. and it does not encompass all companies.
In three years
(1956-1958), Producers' Assemblies were held in only 674 companies, namely:
1,238 in 1956, 1,541 in 1957, and 1,196 in the first half of 1958.
Commenting on these
figures, "Ekonomska Politika"
(No. 374, p. 543) writes: "When it comes to the Producers' Assembly, it is
difficult to find a company where all matters within its jurisdiction are regulated.
The Assemblies are generally convened by trade union organizations and
sometimes by self-management bodies." It is evident that the more frequent
convening of these Assemblies—which practically means expanding the workers'
more direct participation in the management of the company—would contribute to
strengthening workers' self-management, if the bodies of this self-management
were obligated to convene them and if it were stipulated, at least in the
regulations of each company, which issues should be debated and who should take
the initiative. The cited article is titled "Referendums Disappear, the
Number of Producers' Assemblies Grows."
However, it cannot be
inferred from this article that the powers of the Producers' Assemblies
increase simultaneously. Therefore, it is not to be expected that their number
and powers will grow in tandem, as these are contradictory.
The fourth and final
right of the working class is the power to revoke the Workers' Council. It is
related to the right of election, but even more arbitrary. Here, too, the trade
union plays the main role. One of the characteristic cases was the revocation
of the Workers' Council at the Ghetaldus factory in
Zagreb in 1957. The Workers' Council of that company had dismissed several
superfluous, incapable, and unpopular workers—all Party members—with the
consent of the trade union.
The Party, therefore,
tolerated this practice in order to rid itself of troublesome individuals,
although perhaps meritorious as guerrillas. However, when this practice
escalated against Party members in the companies, the trade union, on the
express orders of the Party, hastily convened the Producers' Assembly, where,
of course, the resolution to dissolve the Workers' Council was adopted. From
all of the above, it follows that the working class can only exercise its legal
powers insofar as they align with the party line, which is the responsibility
of the union organization.
It is worth
emphasizing the futility of the union organization in a system of workers'
self-management, however formal. The members of the working class are also
affiliated with the union. They elect the workers' council and the union
leaders. "Therefore, there are two bodies of the same working class and
within the same jurisdiction."
According to the law,
the trade union does not constitute a self-management body, but it practically
and politically directs the company, because, as Bozicevic
continues, "however, they can have, and this frequently happens, divergent
opinions on certain questions concerning the company." (Op. cit.) If it is
true that the workers' collective, through the Workers' Council, directs the
company, and if it is also true in practice that the Workers' Council depends
on it, then it is up to the workers' collective to decide whenever a conflict
arises between it and the Workers' Council, its body. The mediation of the
trade union is not necessary. The initiative could be taken by a certain number
of members of the workers' collective. This is, in fact, the procedure in many workers'
companies in capitalist countries, especially in France.
These workers'
communities (communité de travail) are not affiliated
with trade unions, as this is entirely unnecessary, although, due to the
"capitalist encirclement," they feel solidarity with many political
actions of the working class and the unions. The community owns the means of
production and, as such, makes all sovereign decisions and administers them
through its elected bodies. No other trade union organization is needed to
protect the interests of the community members before the governing bodies,
since these are dependent on the community. When a conflict arises, the
community members vote, and the will of the majority is respected not only by
the governing bodies but by all the community members.
Why, then, in
Yugoslavia—where workers formally govern themselves—do the workers' collectives
not ultimately decide on contentious matters, while also respecting the will of
the majority? The Party, however, cannot allow this, since it only has 13% of
the members of the workers' collectives as supporters and would therefore
always remain in the minority. It is true that the Party can also be in the
minority when, through the trade union organization, it holds a referendum or
convenes the Producers' Assembly.
But it must not be
forgotten that the workers' collective cannot convene these bodies and that
behind the trade union organization are the Party and the State—the apparatus
of oppression. The trade union organization is not a legal factor, just as the
Party is not, constitutionally, the organ of state power. However, the trade
union organization directs company policy as a "conveyor belt" for
the Party—that factor not declared in the constitution. The workers' collective
must choose, recall, and debate what the Party wants and how it wants it, just
as in parliamentary elections or other elections in Yugoslavia.
B. - WORKERS' COUNCIL
According to the
fundamental law, the number of members of the Workers' Council varies between
15 and 120, depending on the structure and size of each company. In companies
with fewer than 30 workers, all personnel are members of the Workers' Council.
The Council members elect the president at the first meeting after the vote.
Meetings are held at least every six weeks.
The president is
obligated to convene the Workers' Council at the request of the trade union,
the director, the executive committee, or one-third of the Council members
(Articles 10-12 of the Fundamental Law). A quorum is 51%, and resolutions are
adopted by a majority vote. The manager and directors may participate in the
meetings. According to Article... 23: "The Workers' Council approves the
basic plans and the balance sheet, makes resolutions regarding the
administration of the company and the execution of the economic plan, elects,
removes, and acquits the company's board of directors..., approves the
management of the board of directors, and distributes the funds available to
the company, that is, to the Workers' Collective."
The 1957 Labor
Relations Law includes labor relations among the powers of the Workers'
Council. In this regard, the Workers' Council decides directly or through an ad
hoc committee. Its powers were repeatedly expanded with respect to
participation in setting investment policy, decisions regarding mergers with
other companies, the purchase and sale of fixed capital, the establishment of
new companies, the right to determine workplaces, and the approval of the
company's salary scale and workers' ranking system.
The preceding
paragraphs describe the election process for Workers' Councils and highlight
the disproportionate representation of communists in these bodies, three times
greater than their relative number in the companies. However, in companies with
fewer than 30 workers, this disproportion does not exist for the simple reason
that they often lack party organization.
Eduardo Kardelj, Vice President of the Yugoslav Federal Government,
in a speech delivered in Zagreb, criticized the absence of party organization
in 1,228 companies in Croatia proper. This means that the Party must control
each Workers' Council, as otherwise it would be deprived of its prerogatives
within the company.
Moreover, in recent years, the
trend has been growing that once elected, communists become permanent members
of the Workers' Councils, even though, according to the law, their term is only
for one year, and only one-third of the previous Council members are eligible
for reelection. The number of those re-elected, mostly affiliated with the Party,
varied between 30 and 40% in the early years.
In recent years, the
number of re-elected members has been growing. For example, "40.2% of the
members of the Workers' Councils elected in 1957 had previously served on that
body repeatedly; in 1958, 44.1% of the members of the Workers' Councils were
'long-serving'; the still incomplete data collected after the 1960 elections
confirm that the trend has gone even further: 48% had served on the same
self-management body in previous years." Furthermore, the participation of
direct producers on the Workers' Councils, which legally should comprise
three-quarters, is gradually decreasing. "In this body of workers'
self-management, the number of members directly employed in production is also
noticeably decreasing each year: 76.4% in 1957, 75.5% the following year, and
in the last elections, it did not reach three-quarters."
The powers of the
Workers' Council are extensive, and yet it does not manage the company.
Practically speaking, this would be impossible given the number of members and
the frequency of meetings. The Council should act as a kind of
"legislative" and oversight body within the company. It approves or
rejects proposals from the management bodies. Legally, it primarily influences
the company's direction without actually directing it. Therefore, according to
the legal text, even at the level of the Workers' Councils, there are no
elements of direct democracy, only the possibility of retroactive approval or
disapproval.
The exercise of legal
powers is subject to real, administrative, and other limitations. For example,
the company's basic plan, i.e., the production plan, is meaningless if the
company lacks the resources to implement it. All financial resources are
centralized in Belgrade, in the National Bank, the Investment Bank, and the
General Investment Fund. For any loan, the company must first obtain approval
and a guarantee from the people's committee of the respective commune and then
submit an application to the lending institutions. However, the banks'
resources are also limited, since the state economic plan had already allocated
them by sector and enterprise.
In 1958, the Investment Bank
received 13,302 loan applications and approved only 7,675, meaning that credit
was granted to the sectors and enterprises already designated in the economic
plan. Furthermore, the onerous financial burdens of the enterprises prevented
them from achieving any financial autonomy. In 1958, the total financial
resources available to industrial enterprises amounted to 42.3 million dinars,
and there were 2,710 such enterprises (Index, 4/60), which translates to 15.5
million dinars per enterprise. However, as will be seen later, this same fund
had to cover other expenses.
The situation for businesses is
worsening with regard to the purchase of raw materials and other supplies.
According to a survey conducted by the National Bank in April 1959, of the 508
companies surveyed, 344, or 70%, were unable to repay the loans they had
obtained for raw materials with the income remaining available to the company.
There are many similar cases, and all of them demonstrate that there can be no
worker self-management without financial autonomy.
As for the company's
balance sheet, its approval depends on the Producers' Council, that is, the
upper house of the Federal National Assembly, whose workings we have already
discussed. Furthermore, the president presents the balance sheet and can, as
will be seen later, suspend any resolution of the Workers' Council. A similar
situation exists in the distribution of company funds, investment policy,
decisions regarding mergers with other companies, and so on. With respect to
mergers with other economic organizations, a law on associations in the economy
was recently enacted. According to this law, permission to associate depends on
the chambers of the respective economic sectors. For industry, for example, the
competent body is the Federal Chamber of Industry, headquartered in Belgrade.
Of course, the
Workers' Council has certain real powers, such as ensuring that the
predetermined plan is executed perfectly and completely. However, this entails
obligation and duty rather than a managerial function. The real power
attributed to the Workers' Councils pertains to labor-related matters. In most
cases, such problems are handled by special committees, influenced by the
company director. This is reflected in the data published by Vjesnik in May 1960, according to which, in 1959/60, in 23
districts of Croatia, totaling 127,000 workers, 31,000 were laid off, 10,000 of
whom were dismissed at the director's request, although these dismissals were
not legally justified.
Furthermore, wage
setting also falls under the purview of the Workers' Council, although it is
subject to two fundamental limitations. The first is the resolution on minimum
worker income, issued in 1958, which established the average wage for all
economic sectors, guaranteed by the State, even if the respective company is
operating at a loss. The general average reaches 12,000 dinars per month (20
dollars, according to the official exchange rate). The same resolution affects
pay scales and salary levels, which must be linked to the established minimum
wages.
Another restriction
is even more radical: the people's committees of the communes approve or reject
all salary scales of the enterprises under their territorial jurisdiction. This
problem became particularly acute last year (1959), when the people's
committees rejected all the proposed salary scales. In some factories, the
atmosphere became very tense, and there were threats of work stoppages (the Prvomajska factory in Zagreb). Lately, these salary scales
are being gradually replaced by performance bonuses, which are simply work
performed according to predetermined standards.
A new draft law concerning
the distribution of income between the enterprise and the community is
currently being prepared. The excessive number of these laws, decrees,
resolutions, and regulations already hinders the normal functioning of both the
enterprise and the workers' councils. These changes are constantly evolving,
but not in a way that expands autonomy and satisfies genuine workers'
aspirations.
In this regard, the
resolution adopted at the First Congress of Workers' Councils, held in Belgrade
in 1957, is characteristic. It demands, among other things:
- That the Workers'
Councils distribute company income independently;
- That they be
granted greater freedom in the administration of basic capital and
amortization;
- That the Producers'
Councils (upper chambers) be able to participate directly in decision-making
regarding the distribution of national income and state profits, the setting of
economic policy objectives, and all matters affecting workers.
The same resolution
also calls for the codification of labor legislation and, finally, the legal
delimitation of the commune's rights with respect to economic enterprises.
During the last three years, not
a single one of these demands has been met. Perhaps the proposed law on income
distribution will bring innovations in this regard. Based on past experiences,
this law will be new in form, but its content will remain the same, since a
totalitarian structure necessarily leads to centralism, which in turn is
incompatible with the principles of autonomy.
C. - COMPANY BOARD OF
DIRECTORS
In addition to the
functions and powers already indicated, the Workers' Council has the right to
elect the Board of Directors, another body of worker self-management.
In its first session,
the Workers' Council elects, by secret ballot, the Board of Directors, composed
of 3-11 members including the Director (manager). The Director is legally a
member of the Board of Directors. Two-thirds of the members must be direct
producers. The term of office is valid for one year, and only one-third are eligible
for reelection. No one, except the Director, may serve on the Board of
Directors for more than two years. The Director is thus guaranteed continuity
in relation to the other members of the Board of Directors, which is very
important for the company's operation. The Board of Directors elects the
President from among its members, who cannot be a Director. A simple majority
constitutes a quorum, and decisions are valid with a simple majority plus one
vote.
According to the
Fundamental Law, the Executive Committee drafts, on the one hand, all proposals
pertaining to the Workers' Council and related to the basic lines of company
policy.
Thus, the Executive
Committee develops the drafts of the basic plans, the internal organization of
each company, proposes job positions, decides on the claims of dismissed
workers, proposes technical staff, etc. On the other hand, the functions of the
Executive Committee are concentrated on production, productivity, and working
conditions. It deals with the rationalization of work, the reduction of costs,
the suppression of waste, and is responsible for technical and hygienic
protection in the workplace, etc. Furthermore, it bears the responsibility for
"the execution of the plan and the proper administration of the company"
(Art. 27 of the Fundamental Law).
It is a
characteristic sign that fewer and fewer direct producers are represented on
this body. In the Executive Committees elected in 1957, 67.5% were direct
producers. The proportion of Communist Party members on the Executive
Committees is even higher than on the Workers' Councils. Therefore, the
Director's presence on the Executive Committee can and does strongly influence
its actions.
The Executive
Committee functions as a kind of secretariat in drafting proposals to present
to the Workers' Council. This is more or less the work carried out by
specialists, and everything depends on the degree of freedom the Workers'
Council has to make decisions. Furthermore, all proposals from the Executive
Committee can be rejected by the Director, who ultimately rules on the legality
of all company actions. Therefore, if in the Director's opinion the Executive
Committee is functioning slowly and irregularly, the Director can assume its
powers.
The other functions
of the Executive Committee are limited to striving for greater and better
production, and in this regard, it must demand the maximum effort from the
workers. However, it also plays a significant role in deciding on the claims of
dismissed and rejected workers. Of course, here too the Director has the right
to appeal to the Board of Directors, and it is understood that their appeal
will prevail over the complaint of the dismissed worker.
The Board of
Directors is also in charge of "the proper functioning of the
company" and "is responsible for the execution of the plan." The
first statement is very broad and imprecise; it encompasses much and nothing.
The second is incomplete, since whoever bears the responsibility for the
execution of the plan should hold all the powers during the process of its
implementation. Both statements do not refer to the overall development of the
company, but only to the internal production process. All other technical,
commercial, and financial matters fall under the Director's purview.
Legally, therefore, the Board of
Directors participates in the management of the company, although this right is
not expressly guaranteed by law. The Director's powers are intertwined with the
rights of the Board of Directors. The law is very vague regarding the delineation
of powers, which allows the Director to arbitrarily "judge the legality of
all acts" of the Board of Directors, invalidate, if necessary, its
decisions and, therefore, he alone directs and manages the company.
D. THE COMPANY
DIRECTOR
In fact, the Director
does not constitute an organ of workers' self-management, but rather a state
organ within the company, which is clearly deduced both from the method of
their election and from their powers.
A joint commission,
composed of an equal number of delegates from the Workers' Council and the
People's Committee of the commune, calls for applications to fill the position
of Director. This commission proposes its candidate to the People's Committee
of the commune, which approves or rejects them. If the application process is
unsuccessful, then the People's Committee of the commune appoints the Director.
If the Director fails
to manage the company according to current regulations and laws, or if the
company fails to meet its obligations to the State or incurs significant losses
due to the Director's incompetence, then the Workers' Council may propose the
Director's dismissal to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, of
which the Director is also a member, may approve or reject the Workers'
Council's proposal. If it accepts, then the joint commission decides, just as
in the election of the Director, and the final and unappealable
resolution is made by the commune's People's Committee.
The astonishing thing
about this procedure is that the Executive Committee can reject the proposal of
the Workers' Council, even though legally it is an organ of that Council. This
means that "the executive branch" can reject the proposal of the
"legislative branch," which is not the norm in parliamentary
practice, and even less so in an autonomous entity.
In both cases, then,
the commune's People's Committee has the final say. The Workers' Council is not
empowered to complain or appeal. On the contrary, if the commune's People's
Committee does not approve the joint commission's proposal and believes that
the conflict between the Director and the Workers' Council could harm the
company, then it is empowered to dissolve the Workers' Council and call for new
elections. In this way, the rights of the Workers' Council are at the mercy of
the arbitrary criteria of the commune, which is a political-administrative
body. The described procedure for the election and removal of the Director
contradicts the principles of autonomy and democracy. Why are the State and the
Party afraid to entrust the election of the Director to the Workers' Council?
From a class
perspective, all such fear should be unfounded. The Workers' Council is the
organ of the workers' collective, of the working class. Therefore, there is no
room for social and economic disparities within the same class. The Workers'
Council is elected based on the trade union's list, and on average, 40% of its
members are Party members. They certainly constitute a numerical minority, but
the remaining 60% do not share the same aspirations, are not organized, and do
not feel supported by the State, the Party, and the police, as the communist
minority does. There are, undoubtedly, important reasons for not having
proceeded otherwise.
Firstly, the broad
legal basis for workers' self-management could serve as legal cover for
anti-communist tendencies within the workers' collective. This trend would be
all the more dangerous because it would spread within the bounds of legality,
and every repressive measure would become highly unpopular and detrimental to
the regime's internal and external propaganda. Therefore, the Party had to
restrict even the merely formal powers of the Workers' Councils.
There is no hope of
liberal innovation in this area, since "while one should consider
expanding the rights of workers' collectives, the community's interference
should also be kept in this area," wrote "Ekonomska
Politika" in its December 5, 1959 issue. Norbert
Veber, a member of the Federal Council of Producers,
had already written in 1952 in the communist newspaper "Borba" that "the Director cannot be elected by
the workers' collective, but only by the Workers' Council." In the seven
years since then, not a single step forward has been taken.
Secondly, the leaders
of the Communist League are aware that their party is no longer what it once
was: a combative, revolutionary, and selfless political organization. There is
an ideological and moral collapse. The struggle for positions has replaced the
class struggle; the bourgeois mentality has supplanted proletarian solidarity.
In businesses, this laxity manifests itself in the simmering and overt
antagonisms and extreme rivalries among communists for positions.
The economic factor
prevails over "the party line." Personal interests dominate those of
the Party; local interests prevail over general ones, and those of each
nationality over "federal" ones. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the
Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist League, held in 1956, Mato Dugonjic complained that the
communists had mastered the technique of running a business with relative ease,
but had completely neglected the political aspect of self-management.
For all the reasons
stated above, the Party could not leave the election of the Director to the
workers' collectives or the Workers' Councils, since the "conveyor
belts" of state power are more reliable than those of the Party. In this
mechanism, the Director is the most important link and a decisive factor. This
factor must remain securely and infallibly in the hands of the Party and the
State, which does not relinquish its totalitarian power. At the beginning of
workers' self-management in 1952, 92% of all Directors were Party members; this
percentage, incidentally, did not decrease afterward.
Just as the method of electing
the Director clearly demonstrates that he is not the organ of workers'
self-management, so too do his powers refute this claim of official propaganda.
According to the Fundamental Law, the Director directs, in the production
process, the execution of the predetermined plan and manages all the business
of the enterprise, adhering to decrees and laws, the orders of higher
authorities, and the instructions of the Enterprise's Management Committee. He
is responsible for "compliance with laws, decrees, and other legal regulations
and orders from state bodies" (Art. 36).
The Director negotiates and signs
contracts and agreements, and distributes circulating capital (raw materials,
short-term funds, etc.). Each contract is valid as soon as the Director
approves it. "The Director represents the company before state bodies, as
well as in legal matters with natural and legal persons" (Art. 37). The
Director proposes the appointment and dismissal of workers and employees to the
Workers' Council. If he disagrees with the decision of the Workers' Council, he
may appeal to the Board of Directors. In both cases, it is the Director who
stipulates the agreement with the workers. "The Director determines the
position and type of work for each worker and employee.
They are responsible to the
Director for their performance in the company" (Art. 39). "The
Director may suspend any decision of the Workers' Council or the Board of
Directors if it contradicts the law and must inform the competent state body
accordingly" (Art. 40). "The Director may take all measures
conducive to the execution of the plan and assume the powers of the
Board of Directors, if the latter
did not take
them in time" (art. 40).
According to the
aforementioned section of Article 36, "the Director is responsible for
compliance with laws, decrees, other legal regulations, and orders issued by
state bodies," meaning that he is not responsible for compliance or
non-compliance with the instructions of the Board of Directors or the
resolutions of the Workers' Council. The exclusive right to enter into
contracts and agreements and to represent the company before third parties
empowers the Director to manage all the financial and commercial affairs of the
establishment at his discretion, without any obligation to report to the self-management
bodies.
No contract is
subject to "ratification" by the self-governing bodies. Furthermore,
the Director can assume the functions of the Board of Directors and rule on the
legality of all the company's acts and decisions. Here, the Director's
discretionary power is absolute. In case of conflict, neither the Board of
Directors nor the Workers' Council has any legal recourse other than filing a
claim with the People's Committee of the commune. Only one important power is
not in the hands of the Director, namely the power to appoint and dismiss
workers. However, as explained in the chapter on Workers' Councils, in practice
the Director also exercises this right.
All these powers assigned to the
Director excessively interfere with the duties and responsibilities of the
legitimate bodies of workers' self-management. Although there are numerous
regulations concerning self-management, the functions of each body have never
been clearly defined. This is not a casual omission, but an inevitable consequence
of the Director's powers as the principal agent of self-management. The
Director is neither dependent on nor equal to the other bodies.
The Director is above them, and
for this reason, it has not been possible to simultaneously establish the
Director's position as a self-managing body with equal rights while retaining
its crucial administrative functions. Hence the imprecision of all legal texts
on labor matters. Confirmation of our opinion can be found in official
specialized publications. "Although the company is an integral part of the
community, and although the workers' councils manage the company, taking into
account the interests and goals of the whole, attempts to act selfishly, to
circumvent the law, and to disregard the community's interests occasionally
arise.
The Director must prevent such
attempts, even though the self-management bodies or the workers' collective as
a whole bear collective responsibility. The Director is responsible for the
legality of all actions and, consequently, is not only the most responsible
executive body in the company but also the public official."
DISTRIBUTION OF
INCOME
Throughout this
exposition, we have outlined the actual legal limits of workers'
self-management, its practical functioning, and the political framework in
which it operates. To complete this analysis, it would be necessary to examine
in detail all other circumstances surrounding the activities of the Workers'
Councils in the economy of communist Yugoslavia.
First and foremost,
the price system and the role of the market within a planned economy would need
to be analyzed, followed by other formal restrictions regarding the acquisition
and use of raw materials, obtaining credit, foreign trade, etc. All these
factors are of great importance in workers' self-management. Furthermore, the
role of various services should be examined, such as labor inspection, market
control, financial control, auditing of accounting records, etc. In short, the
entire vast machinery of a centrally planned economy would need to be analyzed.
While a detailed
analysis of all these factors would contribute to a comprehensive understanding
of the role of the Workers' Councils, the scope of this study does not permit
it. On the other hand, any study of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia,
however concise, would be far from informative without an analysis of the
elements and instruments of national income at both the global and enterprise
levels.
This topic requires a
separate study which, as such, exceeds the scope of this work. Therefore, we
will address the fundamental features of this problem in direct relation to
workers' self-management.
The distribution of
income constitutes the basic problem of the political economy of any society.
Its nature depends on objective factors, such as the degree of economic
development and its structure. It also depends on subjective factors, that is,
on will, the principal factor of distribution. In our case, this factor is the
State, while in other cases it is the State and a social class together, or a
single social class, as was the case in the early decades of the capitalist
system.
Since in our case the
overall distribution depends exclusively on the State, the first thing we will
address is the general distribution of national income in Yugoslavia. For the
analysis of this distribution, we will use the year 1958, as the data for
subsequent years are not yet systematized. The table is presented to us as
follows, in round figures:
Total National
Income................1.834 trillion dinars
Net Personal
Income...........809.4 trillion dinars
State and Other
Funds.............927.3 trillion dinars
Private Sector
Taxes.......97.3 trillion dinars
Consequently, almost
44% of total national income is available to the population, while the
remaining 56% is controlled by the State. In the same year, the population was
18,000,000, meaning that per capita disposable income amounted to 45,000
dinars. Converting this sum to dollars, without following the official
International Monetary Fund exchange rate of 1 dollar = 300 dinars, but rather
the rate of 1 dollar = 400 dinars, corresponding to real purchasing power
according to the analyses of Yugoslav economists, these resources amount to
$112.50 per year. This includes the subsistence of the peasantry. Therefore,
the purchasing power per capita did not reach $112.50 per year.
The overall
distribution of national income accurately reflects the role of the State in
this area. Of the State's available resources, approximately 800 trillion are
reserved for the central government, not counting the 165 trillion collected
for debt repayment, which is available to the central government. The remainder
corresponds to local budgets and funds, with 42.684 billion allocated to
corporate funds.
The distribution of
total income from the socialist sector of the economy from 1957-60 (first half
of the year) is shown in the following table:
1957 1958 1959 1960
(first half of the year)
State 57% 64% 59% 57%
Salaries 27% 22%
23.6% 23%
Social Security 10.5%
8% 8.5% 8%
Company Funds 5.5% 6%
8.9% 12%
100% 100% 100.6% 100%
(Total income represents total
revenue from goods sold and services, less material expenses and less
depreciation).
To have a complete
idea about the distribution and economic development of communist Yugoslavia,
it is necessary to establish the impact of wages on the overall price structure
of the state sector economy as a whole. This is the respective scheme:
Incidence of net
wages in price structure
Incidence of gross
wages (plus social security) in price structure
Incidence of social
security in gross wages
1953 6.1% 6.8% 11%
1954 6.7% 9.2% 27%
1955 5.9% 8.4% 30%
1956 6.0% 8.6% 31%
1957 6.1% 8.4% 28%
1958 6.2% 8.4% 27%
1959 6.9% 9.3% 26%
1960 (I-VIII) 6.1% 8.2% 26%
The structure of sales prices is
a very important indicator of distribution policy. Its analysis always
attracted the attention of economists, including Marx. In the case of
Yugoslavia, this analysis reveals that the incidence of wages is very low,
five, six, and even seven times lower than the same incidence in the economies
of the most advanced capitalist countries. It is true that the low incidence of
wages is conditioned by economic development, but in our case, the political
factor is of paramount importance.
The distribution of
total income, reflected at the enterprise level, yields the table on the
following page.
According to this
distribution table, each enterprise would receive 6,800,000 dinars, assuming
that at the end of the respective year there were 16,560 enterprises in the
socialist sector (Indeks, 4/60). Considering that the
total number of employees in the socialist sector in 1959 reached 2,263,000 (Indeks, 8/60), and if we divide the wage fund for the same
year by this number, the average monthly salary is approximately 17,400 dinars.
This amount includes all income from the "undistributed wage fund,"
that is, the portion of enterprise profits distributed among the workers, as
well as the sum earned for overtime.
From the data
presented, it is clear that:
a) the overall
distribution is dictated from the center and does not favor the personal
consumption of the working masses;
b) the distribution
at the level of each enterprise is established in advance by the plan and other
economic and financial instruments;
c) social
accumulation and the credit system are distinctly centralized;
d) consequently,
so-called workers' self-management lacks the essential financial autonomy, one
of the fundamental requirements of any kind of autonomy.
That such a
distribution does not incentivize workers or stimulate greater productivity is
proven by the fact that the relevant regulations are constantly changing.
Structure of Expenditures of Economic Organizations in 1959 (in Millions of
Dinars)
Expenses for the
Acquisition of Materials 5,304,374
Amortization 158,968
Salaries and Wages
472,142
Social Security
158,270
Interest on Loans for
Working Capital 63,211
Interest on Basic
Capital 39,887
Interest on the
Working Capital Fund 27,392
Land Income Tax 4,338
Tax on the Amount of
Transactions 199,439
Contribution to
Special Funds 16,642
Contribution to
Housing Construction 39,552
Contribution to the
General Expenses of the Nation 268,340
Income Tax 79,138
Other Expenditures
9,822
Contribution To the
reserve fund 31,077
Contribution to company funds 113,910
________________________________________6,986,502
In Vienna, he also
dedicated himself to solving some technical problems posed by the imperial
architects, and it was there that he published his most important work: Philosophiae naturalis theoria redacta ad unicam legem
virium in natura existentium (1758), which we will discuss later.
Two years later, he
visited France and then spent some months in England, where he was elected a
member of the Royal Society. During this time, he wrote a scientific work in
verse: "De solis ac lunae
defectibus," which he dedicated to the Royal
Society. He then traveled to Poland and Turkey to make astronomical
observations and published a journal of his travels.
In 1763, he became a
professor of mathematics at the University of Pavia; but he soon accepted an
invitation from the Austrian governor of Milan, where he dedicated himself to
the construction of the Brera Observatory and taught
courses in astronomy and optics. In Milan, he conceived the idea of
an optical experiment that would determine the compatibility of
the two theories attempting to explain the nature of light: the corpuscular and
the wave theories, which were then, and remain to this day, in conflict.
He never carried out
this experiment, as for personal reasons he left Milan and in 1773 settled in
France, acquiring French citizenship. Until 1782, he served as director of
optics for the French Navy, but in that year, due to health reasons and
disagreements with the Encyclopedists, especially D'Alembert, he returned to Milan. There he dedicated
himself to writing a work on optics and astronomy. He died in 1787 without
finishing it.
The few titles cited,
from his much more extensive body of work, indicate that all the current
problems of the physical and mathematical sciences of the 18th century are
addressed in his writings. But Boscovich was not
merely a "man of science" in the sense imagined by our century. His
personality was much richer. Thus, his willingness to write Latin verses on any
subject marks him as a humanist, undoubtedly one of the last.
A. Huxley designates
him as a court astronomer. It is true that Boscovich
frequented courtly and diplomatic circles, but this circumstance cannot
diminish his scientific prestige. Wasn't this same disposition a trait of one
of the greatest geniuses, G. W. Leibniz?
In any case, this anachronistic
Latinist and man of the world was able to conceive ideas that exceeded the
horizons of his contemporaries. Indeed, the concepts expressed in his "Philosophiae naturalis, etc."
are still relevant, or rather, became relevant almost two hundred years after
its publication.
While Boscovich's
other works may today only interest the historian of science, the
aforementioned work develops ideas that, as Niels
Bohr states, profoundly influenced new ideas about the constitution of matter.}
Strictly speaking,
this work does not present a physical theory in the modern sense, because it
lacks experimental support. The elementary particles Boscovich
discusses could not be subjected to laboratory experiments until our century.
In the 18th century, even the existence of such particles could not be
demonstrated. Nor were 19th-century physicists in a position to judge the
extent to which Boscovich's ontological-mathematical
speculations corresponded to physical reality. Only in our atomic age could we
appreciate the scientific value of his achievement.
Boscovich is by no means a popularizer of Newtonian physics, as some encyclopedias
claim. His conclusions, whether accurate or not, are outside the scope of
Newtonian physics, since Boscovich states:
a) That Newton's law
of gravitation is valid only for terrestrial distances encountered in our daily
lives and for astronomical distances, but not for the minuscule spaces
corresponding to the size of the supposed particles. According to Boscovich, these particles are subject to alternating
repulsive and attractive forces depending on their distances, provided these
distances are at the atomic level. At distances of the macroscopic order, the
particles exert only an attractive force, in accordance with Newton's law. This
behavior is mathematically defined by the "Boscovich
curve."
b) That the supposed
elementary particles do not possess spatial extension, but are instead virtual
geometric points from which the force of repulsion or attraction acts.
c) That all motion is
relative and that it is impossible to differentiate between absolute and
relative motion.
As already mentioned,
these propositions lacked experimental support in the last century and therefore
could not be considered scientific principles. Thus it happened that certain
ideas of Boscovich were accepted and praised long
before the atomic age, not by physicists, but by a philosopher who hated
matter: Friedrich Nietzsche. In his work "Beyond Good and Bad,"
Nietzsche assigns Boscovich the same transcendence as
Copernicus because, as he says, while Copernicus taught us not to believe in
our senses, tearing the earth from its apparent immobility, Boscovich,
by dematerializing the atom, freed us from the last illusion of our senses:
matter.
Among physicists, the
first was Lord Kelvin who, at the beginning of the century, pointed out the
importance of Boscovich's concepts for the physics of
the atom in his "Baltimore Lectures," emphasizing: "We must return
to Boscovich and ask him to explain to us the
qualitative diversity of different chemical substances by means of different
laws of force between different atoms." This assertion, made at the dawn
of atomic physics, was confirmed half a century later by the fact that Boscovich's principal works are currently being translated
into English at the request of many physicists. As L. L. White, a member of the
Royal Society, states, Boscovich's methods possess
characteristics more akin to the 20th century than those of the 18th and 19th
centuries, and therefore can only be understood and appreciated today. For this
reason, Boscovich belongs to the class of great
thinkers who, on the tortuous path of human thought, managed to take some steps
in the right direction.
La Plata
Nicholas, the eldest
of the Mihanovich brothers, was born on January 21,
1848, in Doli, a small and picturesque village near
Dubrovnik, into a modest family of sailors and winegrowers. Even as a child, he
skillfully learned to handle the oars, maneuver the helm, and furl the sails;
he also learned to operate engines, as well as careen and build boats. He
weathered Adriatic and Ionian storms, learned to distinguish favorable from
adverse winds, and forged his strong character in the harsh work of the sea.
Before turning
thirteen, he embarked as a cabin boy, sailing the Adriatic and the
Mediterranean, and in 1867 arrived in Montevideo as a crew member of the
British frigate City of Sydney. Upon disembarking, and finding no better
employment, he left for Paraguay, which was at war at the time, a circumstance
favorable to river traffic due to the intense movement of troops, equipment,
and provisions. The Argentine government did not decree the requisition of
floating equipment; instead, all travel and supply services were provided by
contract.
The young Mihanovich dedicated himself to buying and selling goods on
the Upper Paraná River, transporting provisions in a small boat. He saved a few
pesos, with which he arrived in Buenos Aires in 1868, staying at the Adriática inn, owned by a fellow countryman from Dalmatia.
His initial intention was to return to his hometown and buy a larger vessel
than the one his father owned, a ship called Trabakula
Fortunata. His fellow countrymen, all seasoned
sailors, dissuaded him, presenting him with the unlimited possibilities that
the Argentine Republic, a land of promise, offered to men of perseverance and
entrepreneurial spirit.
Argentina entered a period of
significant progress, and although foreign flags were permitted on the various
river routes under equal conditions, national coastal shipping with regular
services and substantial capital investment emerged. Buenos Aires, today one of
the world's most important ports, with its vast and deep docks, numerous
landing stages, and ample warehouses, was at that time a wooden pier dating
back to the colonial period. Ocean-going ships anchored in the harbor, far from
the city, and the transfer of passengers, luggage, and merchandise was carried
out in two-wheeled carts, called "carretillas,"
during periods of low water, or in canoes, feluccas, whaleboats, and barges,
when the river level allowed.
Our future great shipowner struck up a friendly relationship with the
Genoese Juan Bautista Lavarello, who handled
passenger transport from the outer harbor using boats called whalers, and soon
became his partner. He worked for some years as a launchman
and tugboat captain until 1875, when he began his career as a shipowner, leasing three tugboats ("Buenos
Aires," "Kate," and "Jeny")
from the firm Antonio Matti and Piera.
After the tragic death of his partner, Juan B. Lavarello,
N. Mihanovich married his widow, Catalina Balestra de Lavarello, the mother
of six children.
They established a
patriarchal and Christian home, which, over the years, would be joined by six
more children, making a total of twelve: some named Mihanovich,
others Lavarello. In addition to mutual affection and
understanding, the ships join together, thus increasing the potential of the
flotilla commanded and directed by Nicolás Mihanovich, assisted and supported by his brother Bartolo. The historian of the Argentine merchant fleet,
Vice Admiral T. Caillet-Bois, in his historical essay
Our Merchant Marine (Bulletin of the Naval Center, Nos. 477, 478 and 479,
Buenos Aires, 1929), describes the assiduous and tireless work of the man who
would soon become a great shipping entrepreneur and owner:
"A picturesque
detail of the port activities of that time gives us the key to Mihanovich's success. Outside the docks, where only
shallow-draft vessels could berth, Buenos Aires was nothing more than a large
roadstead, with no coastal port other than the Riachuelo;
dredging of the Riachuelo was beginning, but its bar
still had little water and only allowed access to ships during high water. It
was, therefore, common to see many pataches and pailebots piled up in front of the bar waiting for water.
When the river rose, the wind was southeast, that is, against the entrance, so
the entrance had to..." Towing across the sandbar and then towing under
towline (for which the south bank of the Riachuelo
was kept clear for a long time). The tugboats, for their part, were attentive
to changes in the weather to come to the service of the pataches.
"Well, Don Nicolás, who was then the captain of one of those pataches and who always lived on the shoal, facing the
water, invariably woke up at two in the morning to observe the weather. If his
instinct told him the tide was rising, he went to the shed that served as
headquarters for the tugboat crews, silently woke his boatman, moved no less
silently aboard, built up pressure, and was the first to appear before the school
of pataches.
By the time his
rivals arrived, he had already secured two or three trips, and it goes without
saying that this earned him recognition among the sailing ship clientele, for
whom it was of the utmost importance to get in to unload as soon as
possible." "Immigration became important around that time, and there
were periods with more than a thousand passengers per day, who were taken to
the dock in small steamers and tugboats. The service was paid in gold pesos per
person, until Mihanovich made a deal with the
government for 0.60."}
"The fact was
that before two years had passed, the leased steamers had become his property. Matti and Piera had gone
bankrupt, and the tugboats were briefly seized and immobilized by the creditor
bank. The losses were widespread, and the situation was resolved to everyone's
satisfaction, with the aforementioned man, Don Nicolás,
taking charge of the ships. He had to become, almost by force, a financier,
with other capital joining in, including that of the Carabassa
Bank, which was his firm supporter."
He partnered with his
compatriots Gerórimo Zuanich
and Octavio Cosulich, and with the contributed
capital, they purchased the steamers Sol Argentino,
Montana, Satélite, and Enriqueta.
The company operated under the name Nicolás Mihanovich y Cía. until 1888,
when Don Nicolás paid his partners their shares and
became the sole owner. With the Conquest of the Desert (1879), the vast
Argentine territory was expanded for agricultural and livestock exploitation,
and the railway was built to Bahía Blanca. N. Mihanovich,
a visionary and pioneer, organized regular merchant shipping along the southern
coast to Bahía Blanca and Patagones, allocating the
500-ton steamship Toro for the new bi-weekly service. He soon added the
1,500-ton Watergeus for transporting materials for
the construction of the temporary pier of the Southern Railway (today General
Roca).
In successive stages,
Mihanovich absorbed most of the various established
fleets. Launches and tugboats came under his control. He commissioned new
steamships: the Dalmacia (500 tons) and the Austria
(1,000 tons). In 1887, with the small steamship Ráibido,
he established his first passenger service to Colonia and Carmelo, Uruguayan
cities. During that time, a sharp rivalry arose between shipping companies,
which compromised the economic resilience of your company. We turn once again
to the documented account of Vice Admiral T. Cailelet-Bois:
"Around that
time, a period of spectacular and ruinous competition began, imitating the
famous Hudson River races, between two powerful companies that dominated river
traffic: Mensajerías Fluviales
and La Platense. For one or two pesos, one could
travel from Buenos Aires to Montevideo in luxurious conditions, with a lavish
banquet, liquors, and generous wines at will, treated like a nabob, etc."
"The first to
collapse was La Platense (1894), which, with a
capital of 1,250,000 gold pesos, went into liquidation. It was largely acquired
by Nicolás Mihanovich for
92,000 pesos and began to compete not only with Mensajerías
Fluviales, but also with other companies such as
those of Giuliani and Balparado. Its most formidable
adversary was Saturnino Ribes,
owner of Mensajerías Fluviales,
who had acquired a new and luxurious steamship especially for this war."
"Head to Head The two
gladiators, Mihanovich, who wouldn't sleep, and Saturnino Ribes, who wouldn't
close his eyes; the former had the brilliant idea, since trusts and cartels
were still unknown, of proposing an arrangement in which both would benefit. And
so it was done: Mihanovich relinquished the Río
Uruguay and Ribes abandoned the waters of the Paraná.
"Shortly after, Ribes died, and his heirs, dissatisfied with the agreement,
reopened hostilities. But by then, Mihanovich had
consolidated his position, reinforcing his fleet with Giuliani's, purchased for
40,000. The war proved disastrous for his adversaries, and the fleets of the Mensajerías and Balparado were in
turn incorporated into the Mihanovich company. The
former cost 450,000."
With the general progress
experienced in Argentina at the end of the 19th century and the era of
prosperity that marked the beginning of the 20th, river and maritime cabotage became extremely important. New ports were built,
traffic became more intense, and Mihanovich's activities
steadily increased. By 1909, he had increased the fleet's capital to 1,800,000.
The large shipping company transformed into the Nicolás
Mihanovich Navigation Company, Ltd. It is an
Anglo-Argentine company, with boards of directors in London and Buenos Aires,
both chaired by the founder. It now has 350 steam or motor vessels and operates
various routes for cargo, passengers, excursions, etc., on the Río de la Plata,
Paraná, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Upper Paraná rivers. It operates without any
noteworthy competition and also has 68 tugboats and 200 launches of varying
tonnage.
Don Nicolás's activities were not limited solely to shipping;
he also served on the boards of several companies, including "Campos y Quebrachales de Puerto Sastre,"
"Grandes Molinos Porteños," "Introductora
de Productos Austro-Húngaros,"
"Banco de Italia," "La Positiva," "La Orhídrica,"
"Frigorífico La Blanca," and others. In
October 1918, he retired from business and sold his shares (1,400,000). At that
time, the shipping company he had founded and developed also owned several
ocean-going vessels. The staff consisted of 5,000 crew members and employees,
mostly from Dalmatia, a Croatian province on the Adriatic. Mihanovich
hired them for being skilled and capable sailors, hardworking, enterprising,
and honest.
The company's
insignia, a well-known symbol in the Río de la Plata region, was displayed on
the funnel of every ship. He had finally fulfilled the youthful dream of Nicolás Mihanovich, which, in his
old age, he used to tell his grandchildren. Once, he fell asleep on a passenger
service and dreamed: the gray waters of the estuary were streaked in all
directions by large ships, whose funnels bore the letter M, and they were his.
With unwavering will and tireless work, he managed, after many years, to
transform his dream into reality, laying the solid foundations of what is today
the Argentine merchant fleet.
Miguel Mihanovich, born on October 6, 1862, in Doli,
was summoned by his brother Nicolás and, at just 12
years old, arrived in Buenos Aires in 1874. He spent his first years working
and studying at night. Later, he embarked as a purser aboard a steamship owned
by his brother, which traveled from Buenos Aires to Bahía Blanca. In 1889, he
founded the shipping company La Sud Atlántica, dedicated to traffic between Buenos Aires, Bahía
Blanca, and Patagones, which constitutes the The oldest Argentine coastal shipping line outside the Río
de la Plata estuary. In 1907, this company built a major pier in Carmen de Patagones and a few years later had nine steamships, 18
launches, and two tugboats.
This company
contributed greatly to the development of Patagonia, establishing the first
regular services between the Argentine metropolis and the Patagonian regions.
In 1909, La Sud Atlántica became
a public limited company, establishing the first Argentine passenger and cargo
services to Rio Grande and Porto Alegre in southern
Brazil. They also operated the first Argentine ships to carry wheat and flour
to Rio de Janeiro and return with cargoes of yerba mate, timber, and bananas.
In mid-1920, Miguel Mihanovich transferred all his
shares to the Compañía Argentina de Navegación Nicolás Mihanovich and retired from business.
He then completely
disassociated himself from the shipping business, in which, from modest
beginnings, he had held a position of power. From the beginning, through 81
years of arduous work and intense dedication, he and his brother rose to a
leading position in the Argentine merchant marine, as one of its founders and
architects, bringing progress to many towns and creating considerable sources
of employment and production in the country. Having forged his own path through
hard work, he generously rewarded his staff and, upon selling the steamship
company, distributed the sum of 75,000 gold coins among his employees and crew
as bonuses and extraordinary compensation.
***
It is fitting, then,
to highlight another characteristic of the Mihanovic
brothers: their integrity, chivalry, and generosity. Nicholas, stern and
upright, rather taciturn and introspective, donated the necessary funds for the
establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Mutual Aid Society and the building of
his country's legation. When the Bishop of Temnos,
Monsignor Miguel de Andrea, organized his great charity collection, he financed
the construction of the houses in the working-class neighborhood that bears his
name, using his own money. He was a frequent and generous benefactor of many
charitable organizations in Buenos Aires.
His brother Miguel,
although self-made, learned, in addition to Croatian and Spanish, Italian,
Portuguese, French, and English. He acquired a broad general knowledge and, due
to his modesty, discretion, and nobility, was highly esteemed in the social
circles of the Argentine capital. He served on the boards of the following
institutions: Patronato de la Infancia
(Children's Welfare Board), Liga Argentina contra la
Tuberculosis (Argentine League Against Tuberculosis), Sociedad
de Educación Industrial (Society for Industrial
Education), Institución Mitre
(Mitre Institution), Centro Naval (Naval Center),
etc.
Furthermore, Don
Miguel made significant donations to cultural, health, and charitable
institutions in Croatia. He also contributed a substantial sum of money to Hrvatski Radisa—a Croatian organization
dedicated to the protection, promotion, education, and vocational guidance of
apprentice workers—of which he was an honorary member. In 1923, he established
a significant endowment for the cultural, health, and economic improvement of
his hometown, Doli, and other villages in the Ragus region, to which his brother Nicolás
later contributed.
He died on March 6,
1938. Don Nicolás, due to his work and personal
qualities, received many distinctions. Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria
appointed him Honorary Consul and granted him the title of Baron, transmissible
to his heirs. The sovereigns of Russia and England also decorated him. The King
of Spain conferred upon him the Second Class Cross of the Order of Naval Merit
and the Commander's Cross of the Order of Alfonso XIII. In 1929, at the age of
83, Nicolás Mihanovich
died. There is a town in Paraguay that bears his name.
Recently, the
Argentine government commissioned a river vessel that will be used for traffic
between Buenos Aires and the Uruguayan city of Colonia. It will be able to
transport up to 700 passengers and 50 automobiles. The new vessel will bear the
name Nicolás Mihanovich, in
homage to the creator of the river fleet, who, according to the official
statement, "embodyes the efforts of shipowners and crews to consolidate Argentine interests in
the maritime sector."
In short, the Mihanovich brothers were tireless workers, entrepreneurs,
true pioneers, as well as good men, consummate gentlemen, and patrons of the
arts. They were good Croatian patriots and builders of Argentina. They honored
both their homeland, Croatia, and their adopted homeland, Argentina.
Buenos Aires.
Christmas and its celebration in Croatia hold great religious, moral, and
social significance. At the Christmas Eve table, not only family members sit,
but also servants, laborers, and shepherds, as well as the occasional beggar or
traveler, because before the humility of the Lord who chose to be born in a
stable, there is no place for social differences, at least not on this holy
night. In many places, for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, former enemies
reconcile, spontaneously shaking hands and kissing, forgetting past quarrels
and injustices. The poor receive gifts. If someone doesn't have meat to roast,
they will always find a neighbor or relative to bring it, because Christmas is
a festival of love and abundance.
The cycle of Christmas customs generally begins with the feast of Saint
Catherine (November 25), when the noisy and opulent celebrations cease so that
the faithful can properly prepare for the arrival of the Lord. Fasting and
abstinence are almost always observed in their original purity and austerity.
During Advent, there are some minor feasts with a truly familial flavor and others
that mark stages in preparation for the main feast.
Of the former, the most characteristic are the last three Sundays of
Advent, which the Croatian people of Bosnia and Dalmatia dedicate successively
to children (Djetinci), mothers (Materice),
and fathers (Ocici). The custom also exists in some
other Croatian regions and predates the recently introduced "Mother's
Day." On this day, those being honored receive congratulations from their
relatives and must redeem themselves with small gifts: children with fruit,
mothers with fruit and cakes, and fathers with schnapps and meat. On Saint
Barbara's Day (December 4th), the home preparations begin.
The pig or sheep to be slaughtered for the holidays is set aside and from
then on, it is better cared for and fattened. On the same day, a little wheat
is sown in some dishes so that there will be some fresh greenery in the house
on Christmas Eve. In some places, the same is done on Saint Lucy's Day. With
the feast of Saint Lucy (December 13th), the "twelve days" leading up
to Christmas begin. Each of these days is designated for a particular task and
a special practice.
The number twelve itself already possesses a magical significance. The
weather prediction for the following year is deduced from the weather during these
twelve days, each of which... which corresponds to a month of the coming year.
On the same day, various divinations are performed to predict the future,
especially regarding the marriage of young women of marriageable age. On this
day, women should not sew because, according to beliefs in some regions, their
fingers would hurt. Saint Lucy's Day is also the occasion for cutting the
firewood that will be burned on the festive days.
Saint
Thomas's Day (December 21st) is dedicated to the slaughter of the previously
selected cow and to sifting the flour with which the cakes and ritual sweets
will be made. Each family tries to prepare as many meals as possible because
some will be given to the poor and needy.
Christmas Eve is
filled with household chores, preparations, ceremonies, and prayers. Everyone
gets up before sunrise, then a long prayer is said, and everyone wishes each
other Happy Holidays, all accompanied by ritual phrases and small libations of
brandy. Then everyone gets to work, because in a large family there are tasks
for everyone, even the children. While the women work in the kitchen, the men
attend to the tasks proper to their sex.
First, they decorate
houses, stables, fields, and cemeteries with green sprigs of mistletoe, ivy, or
laurel, or any other shrub or tree that has green leaves at this time of year.
The meaning of this fresh green is symbolically explained as carrying the
youthful strength that will be passed on to men and animals. The custom was
already known in remote Roman times.
As you can see, the
customs of this day bring together components of ancient origin and very
diverse origins. According to the most recent research, the main and most
numerous traditions are those related to ancestor worship. This includes the
candles solemnly lit in memory of the deceased during Christmas Eve dinner. The
head of the family, after dinner, dips a piece of Christmas bread into the wine
and lets a drop fall onto the candle flame. The direction of the smoke is used
to determine who will be the first to die in the coming year or whether there
will be a death in the family.
But light, like fire,
which once possessed the defensive power against evil spirits, can become a
Christian symbol of hope and joy for the Light of Redemption that Christ brought
us. The elderly Simeon received Jesus as "the light that will enlighten
the Gentiles," and the Holy Fathers Cyprian and Ambrose call Jesus Christ
"the Sun." The Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who during Ottoman
rule were instructed by the sons of Saint Francis and preserved Christian
doctrine with extraordinary purity, light three candles instead of one on
Christmas Eve and call them "Trinity" as a symbol of the Holy
Trinity.
Since ancient times,
dishes with funereal connotations have been served on Christmas Eve: beans
(which existed as such in ancient Rome as well), honey, nuts, and fish. In some
Croatian regions, a portion of the dinner and drink is expressly left for the
deceased.
The use of straw as an element of
Christmas traditions is widespread throughout the Slavic world, especially in
those regions where badnjak (a type of straw) is not
used. The head of the household brings straw home and scatters it on the floor,
the table, the chairs, and other furniture. She accompanies her movements with
magical formulas related to the health of family members, the fertility of
livestock, and the fertility of the fields, but nowadays the straw is given a
Christian significance, and it is believed to be the straw on which the Christ
Child rested in the manger. Many eat and sleep on this straw tonight or for
several days and nights at a time, and children play happily on it, because it
is thought to bring health and good luck.
After the main holidays, the
straw is placed under the livestock in the stables or scattered in the fields
for the same purpose. The origin of this custom, which is well known to some
other European peoples, is not yet satisfactorily clear. Some see in it a
remnant of the cult of the dead, who rest that night with their living relatives
on this straw, while others see it as the residue of the grass that was once
offered to divine spirits to eat alongside their relatives, which seems
unlikely.
One of the most
characteristic customs of the Croats and other South Slavs, as well as some
European peoples, is that of bringing and lighting the badnjak.
There are two types of badnjak: one made from a tree
branch placed against the exterior wall of the house or under the eaves, and
the other made from logs about a meter or a meter and a half long, which are
brought into the house and lit in the hearth. The first type is common in the
North, the second in the South.
The tree from which
the badnjak is cut is generally oak. The head of the
family places and lights it with a solemn ceremony. The badnjak
burns every day until New Year's Day or Epiphany. Sometimes the badnjak is treated as a living being, and bread and water
are placed beside it. It is sprinkled with wine and wheat, anointed with oil,
and spoken to. For this reason, some ethnologists considered it a kind of
fetish. Others explained it from the perspective of sun worship: the badnjak (log) is meant to provide light and warmth during
the time when the sun is weakest.
Still others explain
it as a phenomenon analogous to the Maypole, known among the Germanic and
Slavic peoples, who received it from the Germans. Finally, there are those who
see in this custom the veneration of the dead. The souls of the deceased will
come to the house tonight, gather, and warm themselves around the fire. Hence the
placement of food and drink beside it.
In any case, the badnjak custom was adopted by the southern Slavs after the
arrival in the South of other Mediterranean peoples who already knew it, such
as much of Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Interestingly, the first mention of this
custom appears in a document by the Spanish bishop Martin of Braga, from the
second half of the 6th century, which prohibits the log in the hearth from
being sprinkled with wine and covered with fruit on Christmas Day.
This custom existed
in southern France, England, and Germany, as well as in the rest of the
Balkans, while it is unknown among the Eastern and Western Slavs. In the
northern provinces of Croatia, the trend toward the disappearance of the badnjak (traditional Christmas tree) can be observed,
replaced by the Christmas tree.
The use of the
Christmas tree first appeared in Germany at the beginning of the 17th century,
and from there it spread throughout all Protestant countries, then to Bavaria
and Austria. It later reached the Catholic Slavs, but not before the beginning
of the 14th century. From them it spread to Russia and Serbia. Previously, it
was decorated with wafer-shaped cakes, which symbolized the Eucharistic gifts,
and with fruit, as a symbol of life.
Today, industrially
produced decorations prevail in cities, but in the countryside, fruit and
sweets still persist, and in some regions, gifts are also used, which are later
taken down. Generally, a Nativity scene made of die-cut cardboard is placed
under the tree. Artistic or homemade nativity scenes are rare. Gifts for family
and friends are placed next to the nativity scene, if they aren't hanging from
the tree. The Christmas tree is also placed in churches above the nativity
scene and sometimes on both sides of the main altar, where it remains, just as
in private homes, until Three Kings' Day (January 6th).
Pious legend sees the
Christmas tree as the tree that sprouted from Adam's mouth and later became the
cross of Redemption. In reality, it is an old tradition symbolizing vital
energy that is renewed each year. Some ethnologists explain it as a remnant of
ancient agrarian rites, while others consider it a continuation of the custom
of the ancient Romans, who, at the end of the year, to celebrate the Kalends, placed green trees in their homes, hanging lights
and agricultural products from them. However, this Roman custom of celebrating
the Kalends has been preserved among all Slavic
peoples, and under the same name, in the form of Kolede,
among the Croats. In Croatian, this word refers to the procession through the
village and the ritual song sung on that occasion.
The custom, in its
essence, is a legacy of the late pre-Slavic period, later developed separately
in each Slavic village, taking on a religious or popular character, depending
on cultural influences. It consists of rounds made by the young men of the
village, going from house to house and singing ritual songs as a form of
congratulations and good wishes for the prosperity of the house, livestock, and
fields. For their performance, they receive gifts, generally in kind, rarely in
cash. The homeowner must entertain them with food and drink and bless them.
The same custom has
been observed in some provinces of France and shares a common Roman origin.
According to ethnologists, the idea behind this custom is the desire for
abundance, health, and prosperity for the family and all that a family
possesses, while for others, the rotation of young people represents the
changing of the generations and the renewal of solidarity among the people in
the same territory. In northern Croatia, these rounds are called betlehemari – nativity scene makers – and are performed by
children, also called shepherds, because they carry a nativity scene
illuminated with a star and the figures of the Nativity, while they themselves
act as shepherds, carrying tall staffs and singing carols. They also offer
Christmas greetings and therefore receive gifts.
All these customs and
traditions we have been discussing can also be celebrated on Christmas Day, the
following days, or New Year's Day, and can even be repeated until the Epiphany.
The reason for this variability is that many Christmas customs predate the
celebration of Christmas, dating back to the New Year's celebration, and since
these holidays have changed dates throughout history, several elements
associated with them have become intertwined.
Returning to the
description of Christmas Eve, we arrive at the moment of dinner. This is
preceded by long and exceptional prayers for the living and the dead. The dead
are sacrificed, both for livestock and crops. Then they eat. The dishes are all
prepared after fasting or abstinence, and include typical Slavic dishes of
beans, nuts, honey, and fish.
The animals also have to eat well
tonight. Their food is blessed, as are the stables. Sometimes ritual loaves of
bread are prepared for them in the shape of animals. There is a widespread
belief, also common in France, that animals speak on this night, but it is not
wise to listen to them. Some misfortune may occur. The owner will ensure that
they are treated and cared for well during these days.
After dinner, the lamb or pig is
roasted for the following day while the children play with the gifts and the
women amuse themselves with various magic practices. These involve divining the
weather for the coming year, to see if any young woman will leave the house
married, if there will be death or illness in the family, etc. In some regions,
the girls melt lead and try to discover what awaits them in the coming year
from its shapes. In other provinces, this is done on the eve of Epiphany or on
New Year's Eve.
There are ring-shaped cakes, just
as in Spain; whoever finds an object with magical power kneaded into it will be
happy all year and have a lot of money. The length of the straw pulled out from
under the tablecloth indicates the height of the ears of wheat or hemp. On the
back of the lamb or pig The secret to everything awaiting a family in the
coming year lies within the sacrifice, and the head of the household explains
it as best he can, using a few magical formulas.
To see the fertility of domestic
animals, sparks are made to fly from the badnjak (a
type of fire), and the more sparks fly, the more they will multiply. The embers
of the badnjak have protective power against evil
spirits, as do loud noises, such as the crack of a whip, a shotgun blast, or a
cannon shot. The same applies to strong flavors. That's why so much garlic is
eaten. All of this, of course, is not taken seriously; it's more for fun, but
it is practiced because that's how the ancestors did it, and traditions are
deeply rooted in the Croatian people. However, soon the singing of Christmas
carols begins, and preparations are made for Midnight Mass.
It is almost a rule
that the whole family must attend Midnight Mass. Only the elderly and very
young children with an older man remain at home. It is a uniquely beautiful and
indescribable sight to see how people approach the parish church. The landscape
is usually covered in snow, and along the narrow paths, people approach in
groups from all directions, each carrying a torch or a lantern. Christmas
carols and gunshots can be heard, drowning out the whispers of the women
praying the rosary.
Inside the church,
they continue singing carols, holding lit candles or lanterns. After Midnight
Mass, in many regions with deep Catholic traditions, most people stay to attend
the next two Masses, and then head home, wishing friends and relatives a Happy
Easter along the way. People kiss each other, congratulate each other, and ask
forgiveness for their sins of the past year. They wish each other that the
peace of God may reign among us.
Little by little, as
one approaches home, the big day dawns, filled with many sincere
congratulations and well wishes, expressions of gratitude, and gifts for
everyone. On this day, no one goes without a present or attention from others.
At home, after a long
fast and so much exhausting work and preparation, calm reigns. The head of the
household shares the first bites of the Christmas roast with his family. On the
first day, visits are generally not expected, nor are visits to other houses
made. It is the day of greatest family intimacy.
However, there is one
person, the first visitor and bestower of
congratulations, who must come to each house and is received ritually with
established ceremonies. He is a man—it would be a bad omen if the first visitor
were a woman—who is healthy, strong, and designated by the father of the
family, or who himself has offered for the role. He comes to the house as a
bearer of happiness and good fortune. As soon as he enters and utters the first
words of congratulations, he must sit in a chair by the door; otherwise, the
hens won't lay eggs. Then the master scatters grains of wheat on him, presents
him with gifts, and for all the days that follow, he is the guest of honor.
The following days
are spent in the countryside as holidays. It is winter, and there is no heavy
work to be done. Furthermore, many countrymen are named Stephen and John, and
therefore celebrate their name day. These days are dedicated to visiting one
another and to large, lavish meals.
On Saint John's Day,
straw is taken out of the house and placed in the stables, fields, and
orchards, and also on the branches of the fruit trees, so that the harvest will
be abundant.
Holy Innocents' Day is the feast
of children. In some regions, this day is celebrated instead of the second
Sunday of Advent. Children are tapped on the soles of their feet with a stick.
This is usually done by an elderly neighbor, who is rewarded for this service.
While the child receives the ritual blows, they say to him: "grow,
grow" or "grow taller and taller," which perfectly explains the
meaning of this custom. "April Fools' Day" pranks, in the Spanish
style, are not practiced on that day, but on April 1st. On New Year's Eve, most
of the customs and magical practices of Christmas Eve are repeated, as well as
on New Year's Day, which is very similar to Christmas. The Christmas roasts and
cakes gradually disappear, the joy spills out of the home and spreads
throughout the town and public places.
The Christmas cycle
ends with Epitanía, or the Feast of the Epiphany. The
night of the Epiphany does not have the same significance in Croatia as it does
in Spain or as Befana in Italy. Children and adults
received their gifts on previous occasions. They were brought by Saint Nicholas
or Saint Lucy, or by the Christ Child himself on Christmas Eve.
Parishioners also
attend the blessing of the water and bring it home in jugs to sprinkle and
bless the house, stables, domestic animals, garden, and fields. A little holy
water is given to the livestock to drink, and in some regions, people also
drink it.
Thus ends the period
of the most intense festivities of the year in Croatia. The time is auspicious:
houses are full of food, products of their own economy, and winter prevents
working in the fields or forests. It is a time for rest, tranquility, and
family life. In our outline of Croatian Christmas customs, we have highlighted,
according to our purpose, only the most typical and widespread ones.
Naturally, there are
many other customs worthy of mention and description because, even if
insignificant and with a naive pagan flavor, they carry within them the memory
of a now distant childhood and its poetry, which, for us who are outsiders,
will never return, and which there, in its own land, survives even at the cost
of many changes and innovations. Thus, in Backa,
among the Croatian Bunjevci, the future son-in-law
visits his fiancée's house for the first time on Mother's Day, and the future
mother-in-law gives him a towel. In Dalmatia, fresh greenery cannot be that of
the poplar, because, according to legend, Judas hanged himself from this tree,
nor from any thorny bush, because Jesus' crown was made of thorns. Such customs
and beliefs are endless and it is impossible to list them all.
It is clear from our
discussion that all these customs, beliefs, spells, and practices of the
Croatians during the Christmas season come from very diverse sources, of
varying antiquity, and that originally sometimes had other meanings; that is to
say, it is a syncretism whose existence is generally agreed upon by
specialists. Disagreements arise when they attempt to explain these phenomena.
Some affirm Manism, that is, the prevalence of the cult of the dead;
others lean toward Magism, especially the elements of
so-called primal magic, which is so important at the beginning of the year. A
very few others look for lunar elements in this complex, and still others point
to solar elements, precisely on the days when the sun is born young and
unconquered. There will be a bit of everything, but it is undeniable that above
all superstitions is the Christian faith in the newborn Child Jesus who came to
redeem humanity from the darkness of sin.
Most Croatian
Christmas customs already have a Christian meaning, even if it is secondary,
but religious instruction tends to respect all popular traditions without
needing to suppress them, because if these customs, through symbols, express
the desire to protect oneself from evil and seek God's blessing, especially at
Christmas time, they are acceptable according to Christian doctrine.
Christmas
celebrations in Croatia are marked by a strong sense of cordiality. These are
days of family and fraternal joy. This joy embraces everyone, and no one should
feel excluded, not even enemies. They are days of spiritual comfort. Family
love is emphasized, friendships strengthened, and the entire village becomes
one large Christian family, with neighbors forgetting their differences.
This rhythm of noble
Christmas love extends to domestic animals, which are treated with special care
bordering on tenderness. Particular emphasis is placed on the well-being of
humankind, the fertility of animals, and the fertility of the land. A concern
of great educational value is this concern for the future, the antithesis of
laziness and apathy, which requires a thinking mind and working hands. The
harmonious work of all members of the community or extended family leads
everyone to well-being. These high qualities of Croatian Christmas traditions
rejuvenate and comfort people in their daily sufferings and struggles.
Just as in other
Christian peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe, Christmas themes have been an
inexhaustible source of inspiration for art among the Croatian people. Medieval
Croatian literature is full of short poems and mystery plays that were
performed in cathedrals or in the cloisters of monasteries and convents.
Legends and visions, poems and dramas with Christmas themes were sometimes the
first literary works to pass from Latin into the vernacular and mark the
beginning of national literature.
Songs and carols are
numerous and generally date back to ancient times. In Croatia, they originate from
Roman chorales and folk melodies. The melodies originating from the influence
of Roman chorales are serious and solemn, with a clear artistic character,
while the folk melodies are freer, livelier, and more flexible. But all of
these songs are distinguished from other religious songs by a tenderness and
naiveté characteristic of the Croatian people's lyrical nature.
Alongside these songs
is another group, those originating from the musical influences of other
Western European peoples, some of which are truly majestic. Many poets and
writers from all periods of Croatian literature have magnificently described
and sung about Christmas. Painting, the plastic and decorative arts, from the
monumental Romanesque cathedral of Trogir in Dalmatia
to the new cathedral of Djakovo in Slavonia, testify
to the Croatians' predilection for Christmas motifs. This same artistic
interest, which has endured through the centuries, reaches its peak in the
marvelous series of reliefs with biblical themes of birth and motherhood carved
in wood by the brilliant Croatian sculptor Ivan Mestrovic.
These are the
memories of Croatian Christmases. The deadly Iron Curtain prevents us from
having direct contact with the Croatian people in the country and observing
their private lives during these major Christian holidays. Nevertheless, we
know that most customs continue to be practiced and that, faced with the forced
industrialization and modernization of life in Croatia, a country that has been
predominantly agrarian until now, popular beliefs and superstitions are tending
to disappear. However, the profound Christian faith in the one Almighty God, in
His Justice, and in the final victory of Good over Evil is growing ever
stronger.
The people, who have
preserved their traditions and their faith throughout the centuries and during
great historical calamities, will also emerge victorious from these recent
sufferings and will then be able to freely exclaim aloud:
"Glory to God in
the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will!"
"Glory to God in
the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will!" Madrid
LITERATURE
Meyer, A., Das Weihnachtsfest, seine Entstehung
und Entwicklung, Tübingen,
1913.
Laufer O., Den Weihnachtsbaum
in Glauben und Brouch,
Berlin, 1925.
Schnneeweis, E., Die Weihnachtsbräuche der Serbokroaten,
Vienna 1925.
Gavazzi, M., Godina dana hrvatskih
narodnih obicaja, II,
Zagreb, 1937
Gavazzi, M., Badnak; Bozicni obicaji, in Hrvatska Enciklopedija, ts. II-III, Zagreb, 1941-42
Markovic, T., S.J., I costumi natalizi in Bosnia ed in Herzegovina, in Croazia
Sacra, Oficium Libri Catholici, Rome, 1993.
We recall the author,
an Austrian Marxist and proponent of a school of modern psychology from the
pre-World War II era, when he visited Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. Our
"armchair communists" celebrated him and praised him in an unusual
manner. It can be inferred from his article that on that occasion his
informants included, among others, authorized representatives of the Yugoslav
Communist Party.
We also know Manes Sperber as the author of essays in which he approaches
problems more as an ideologue and moralist than as a political commentator.
This characteristic implies the danger of selecting and interpreting facts in
support of a particular ideological position. Therefore, in his note on
Croatia, the author tends to readily accept certain accusations fabricated by
communists and Great Serbian circles, whose aim is not to settle scores with a
deceased politician and a transient regime, but to discredit the Croatian
people, their true adversary, who are fighting for their freedom.
The Croatian people
are politically disinherited, deprived of their own government and diplomatic
representatives. Their history and current reality are sometimes described
intentionally and inaccurately. But no one, like M. Sperber,
has yet formulated such a negative judgment. The author ignores the fact that
Croatians are currently deprived of their fundamental rights and freedoms by a
totalitarian regime. While, when referring to Cardinal Stepinac,
despite his ideological stance, he hesitates to accept the communist and
Serbian calumnies as proven and true, he does not proceed with the same
criteria when referring to the oppressed Croatian people. Behind Cardinal Stepinac was the great moral influence of the Catholic
Church, while the Croatian people are almost alone in their great tragedy.
By accepting without
reservation the Black Legend about Croatia—fabricated and fostered, like all
black legends, by those who persecuted the victims of those legends—the author
supports one of the most terrible forms of oppression: the Great Serbian and
communist one; he is backing the worst kind of dwarf imperialism, which the
very editor of Preuves, François Bondy,
described in a lecture given in Buenos Aires (November 1960), as the main cause
of the tragic situation prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe, with all its
implications for the alarming European and world situation. F. Bondy rightly pointed out that these dwarf imperialisms had
inherited all the defects of their predecessors, the Austrian and Ottoman
Empires.
M. Sperber's predisposition to believe the "black
legend" stems from his mindset, which makes him susceptible both to the
outdated prejudices of the European left of the mid-20th century and to the
current propaganda of the Yugoslav communists (who, incidentally, act as
supporters of Serbian imperialism). At the same time, he is perhaps under the
influence of the prejudices of certain Viennese circles regarding Croatia,
prejudices that Austrian experts have frequently misinterpreted.
The most regrettable
aspect of all this is that M. Sperber is perhaps
convinced he has shed all the prejudices of the ruling class of imperial Vienna
and considers it appropriate to quote Engels, who criticized the Croats
primarily for having helped save Austria in the revolutionary year of 1848. In
fact, Engels had repeated, somewhat softened, the invectives of his fellow
believer Karl Marx launched against Russia and especially against the
"Austrian Slavs," considering them supporters of Pan-Slavism for
anti-German purposes.
In quoting Engels,
Manes Sperber adds some of his own interpretations,
labeling the Croats not only as counter-revolutionaries and liberty-killers,
but also attributing to Engels and Marx, respectively, the epithet of
"fratricides" for opposing—as is evident from the subsequent course
of his argument—the forced and undesirable union with their "Slavic
brothers," the Serbs. Marx, as a German patriot, abhorred Russians and all
Slavs, considering them, without exception, as exponents of Russian
imperialism, and, moreover, as a revolutionary, he profoundly despised
autocratic Holy Russia on an ideological level.
He attacked the
Austrian Slavs both because he saw them as potential Russian allies and because
of the support they lent to Austria in its opposition to the Pan-German
national movement. Therefore, neither Marx nor Engels could accuse the Croats
of fratricide for their opposition to great Russian imperialism and Serbian
dwarf imperialism, since they thought the opposite and considered the Austrian
Slavs as potential, even active, clients of Tsarist Russia. In the pursuit of
truth, it is worth noting that Engels and Marx were not alone in judging the
role played by the Austrian Slavs in this way.
Even today, one can
find the occasional prominent German Slavist who,
regarding the peoples that make up the Slavic linguistic group, starts from the
premises of linguistic racism. From linguistic similarity, they deduce a shared
origin and culture, and in our time, based on the same assumptions, they
develop the theory of a community of political interests. Thus, even the Slavic
peoples of Western tradition—culturally and politically much more akin to their
western neighbors: Austrians, Hungarians, Italians, and Germans were viewed
more favorably than Russians and Serbs—as dangerous allies of Russian imperialism,
which then wielded religious (Orthodoxy) and national (Pan-Slavism) arguments
as skillfully as it currently employs the communist ideology. Because of these
deep-seated prejudices, the evolution of relations in Central Europe took a
wrong turn, to the detriment of all of Western Europe.
Marx and Engels, attacking the
Austrian Slavs as "counter-revolutionary" and
"liberty-killers" for defending Austria against Prussian militarism,
could not foresee the course of events once the Danubian
community was dismembered. But in our times, while European socialists are
revising the very foundations of Marxism, the question arises: whom does it
serve if, in light of accumulated experience and in the presence of the great
imperialism of Russia and the dwarfed imperialism of Serbia, Marx's accidental
judgments about the Austrian Slavs are still insisted upon?
How can the
invectives of Marx and Engels be repeated when it has been proven that the
Croats neither are nor can be exponents of Russian policy? It is even more
absurd to call the Croats "fratricidal" for opposing the
"fraternal" embrace of Russia or Serbia, contrary to Marxist
predictions.
Isn't that upholding
the premises of Russian and Serbian expansionism, and following the erroneous
deductions of certain authors about the supposed common origin and culture of
the Western and Eastern Slavs in the very examples where enlightened minds are
rectifying the inaccurate assertions of historiography, affected by nationalist
prejudices, and for which purpose international commissions are formed?
Is it fair and
reasonable to uphold the theories about a peculiar Slavic brotherhood, which
Russian and Yugoslav communists so abuse to justify their policy of oppressing
entire peoples? How can we ratify the unjust and specious judgments made under
the banner of these outdated theories about a people currently stripped of all
their rights and represented in international forums by their oppressors?
The most revealing
aspect of all this is that the ideologue M. Sperber
launched his invectives against a humiliated and oppressed Croatia, seemingly
driven by the desire to find arguments to deny Cardinal Ottaviani
the right to protest against the current policy of coexistence in the world,
which means enslavement for so many peoples, so that one cannot speak of peace
but only of consent and coexistence with the unpunished murderer.
The pious death of
Dr. Ante Pavelic in Madrid and the sensationalist
news reports about the almost nationalistic funeral, with the alleged
participation of several Spanish ministers, serve as a pretext for him to
portray the events that occurred in Croatia during the last war in the most
grim way possible, imputing to the Catholic Church its involvement in those
events, and to comment on Cardinal Ottaviani, Secretary
of the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office, while the latter protests
against coexistence with communist criminals: "That is desperately true,
but it is not serious, since the cardinal speaks in the shadow of his Pavelics and his Francos."
We do not wish to
enter into the controversy between Catholics who uphold the principles of
theocentric humanism and agnostics, proponents of anthropocentric humanism,
which demonstrates what the English historian and philosopher Christopher
Dawson calls "the internal division of Europe, produced by an intense
process of revolutionary criticism that grips all aspects of Western
culture," and which all the adversaries of the West thoroughly exploit.
The Croatian exiles
deeply regret if, in this discussion, in pursuit of controversial effects, the
entire Croatian people were held responsible for events that constitute a
relatively insignificant episode in the overall picture of the last world
conflagration, during which appalling crimes were committed in the great
European countries, which for centuries have led general progress, but under
the impact of the nihilistic revolution went through incredible aberrations.
II.
How biased Manes Sperber is in adopting the arguments and ploys of Croatia's
and the free world's adversaries is clear from his assertions that Croats
systematically killed "unarmed minorities" during the last war, even
though it is known that these were acts of revenge and reciprocal reprisals
during the fierce fighting between well-armed adversaries. To call Serbian Chetniks or communist partisans (guerrillas) "unarmed
minorities" is certainly not serious.
The blame cannot be
entirely attributed to the Croats, given that these struggles and their
lamentable excesses were a direct consequence of Croatia's forced inclusion in
a Balkan state in 1918. The same author cites some facts regarding Serbian
oppression between the two world wars—that is, in times of peace—but his
prejudices prevent him from characterizing that Croatian resistance to the Great
Serbian policy of physical and mental genocide as a struggle for the freedom of
peoples.
At that time, the
Croats had organized, under the leadership of Stefan Radić,
a magnificent democratic and humanitarian movement, unique in its kind in
southeastern Europe. The autocratic Serbian governments sought to crush this
movement with fire and sword. It is not surprising, then, that the Croats later
reacted vigorously and, therefore, cannot be labeled
"liberty-killers" if they truly fought for freedom.
Nor can they be
labeled "fratricidal" for opposing the oppression of "their
Slavic brothers," the Serbs, given that the Croatian democratic leader
Esteban Radic, fighting against the dictatorial
governments of Belgrade, was simultaneously fighting for the freedom of Serbian
peasants and workers, and was also assassinated by the Serbian rulers during a
parliamentary session in Belgrade for this very reason.
We will refrain from
rebutting M. Sperber's many inaccurate assertions
regarding the war period, as we do not wish to glorify certain individuals and
factions. We mention them only because they should serve the author as evidence
that they were the genuine expression of Croatian nationalism; indeed, "of
the long-standing Croatian national revival."
These arguments,
drawn from the Serbian and communist propaganda arsenal, lend themselves to
biased interpretations of Croatian history, suggesting that Croatian national
consciousness and struggle are recent developments, or rather the work of
foreign propaganda directed against Yugoslavia and, more specifically, against
Slavic peoples—the work of fascism and German socialism.
The only concession,
albeit merely verbal, that the author makes to the Croatians is when he speaks
of a Croatian national renaissance—delayed, certainly, but a renaissance
nonetheless. A renaissance, since there is clearly a history of a golden age,
of the grandeur of a thousand-year-old kingdom. Consequently, Croatian national
consciousness is not the work of foreign propaganda.
The author then cites entirely
inaccurate and insulting commonplaces about the Croatian past, disseminated by
the oppressors of the Croatians—primarily Serbs and communists—to support his
thesis on his supposed liberating role for the Croatians. Both Russians and Serbs
conceive of Slavism according to the messianic and anti-Western theses of
Russian Slavophiles.
For them, the only authentic
national Slavism is the expression of Russo-Byzantine and Serbo-Byzantine
cultural and political traditions. When Slavs of Western tradition—Poles,
Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes—assert their national cultures as a distinct,
national variant, a reflection of Western culture, in the opinion of Russians
and Serbs this signifies a deviation from and departure from authentic Slavism;
even more, a betrayal of their brethren and a service to the enemy, that is, to
the West.
According to these
interpretations of Slavism as an irreconcilable antagonism between Eastern and
Western Europe, the past of the Croatian people is reduced to the continuous
service of enemies until the happy day when the Croats, having eliminated the
"hereditary enemy"—the Austro-Hungarian Empire—were
"liberated," first by the Serbian monarchy in 1918 and then, in 1945,
by the communists, supported by Russia. This is termed "liberation,"
even though in both cases it involved a policy of oppression and subjugation
aimed not only at dominating the annexed regions but also at denationalizing
them, which can be described as a form of mental genocide. Denationalization must
be achieved by eliminating all Western traditions and conceptions of the Croats
and imposing a foreign cultural ideal through coercive measures.
We do not wish to
suggest that Russians and Serbs act perfidiously in interpreting their
relations with the Western Slavs in this way. "The Russian believes he
liberates when he conquers, and serves higher ends when he subjugates,"
states one author, who, on the other hand, displays great sympathy for the
Russians.
However, a Western
author like M. Sperber should not share the Russian
and Serb opinion regarding the oppression of other peoples, notwithstanding his
eventual ideological sympathies for the "revolutionary role" of
Russia and Serbia.
His account of
Croatian history implies the true "black law," fabricated to justify
the usurpations of Vienna and Budapest, and later those of Serbia, over which
he weaves a moving "golden legend," as a contrast to Croatia's
historical role. In truth, writes M. Sperber, that
kingdom which existed from 924 to 1202 would almost never have been
independent, given that the Byzantines—Hungarians, Venetians, Austrians,
depending on the era—were its sovereigns or suzerains, sometimes protectors,
sometimes oppressors. The Croatian feudal lords acted, in most cases, in the
service of foreign powers. The Croatian population was no different.
The words Croats and Pandurs everywhere meant warriors who fought fiercely for
kings and emperors and for causes that were by no means their own. The Croats
were also subordinate to foreigners in the cultural sphere. The ruling class
was not bilingual. In addition to Croatian, they spoke and wrote in the
language of the dominant nation: Italian, Hungarian, or German. Sperber concludes that it is understandable that, due to
the long Hungarian domination, a supposed hatred of Hungarians and Austrians
arose in Croatian hearts, but he does not understand the hatred of Serbs.
What, then, separates these
peoples who share a common origin, a common language, and, for centuries, the zadruga, a fundamental communal institution of these
peasant societies? By all accounts, they seem destined to form a single nation,
although the Croats—like the Slovenes—are Catholic and not Orthodox like the
Serbs, whose Church has retained autocephaly since 1220. M. Sperber
finds the explanation for this "incomprehensible" attitude of the
Croats not only in the supposed liberty-suppressing role of the Croats in
accordance with Karl Marx's anti-Russian and anti-Austrian stance, but also in
the supposed fratricidal role of the Croats in the sense of Slavophile
and anti-Western conceptions.
III
Before addressing
this chapter of M. Sperber's review, we believe it
necessary to point out at least the most significant inaccuracies contained in
his brief exposition. Had he consulted any documented work on the history of
Croatia, even history textbooks published in communist Yugoslavia, he would
have found that the Kingdom of Croatia did not last until 1102, but rather
until 1918, since within the dualist system of Austro-Hungarianism,
Croatia had preserved its sovereign rights, albeit limited. It was in a state
of complete, almost colonial, dependence that it only entered Yugoslavia as the
principal victim of Serbian imperialism. Nor were the Croats of the Islamic
faith so subordinate in the Ottoman Empire, since the Bablate
of Bosnia enjoyed special privileges.
The Croats arrived in
the Roman province of Dalmatia at the beginning of the 7th century as foederati of the Roman Empire. Then, for a short period,
they were vassals of Charlemagne's empire, but very soon they organized their
own independent kingdom with national kings of the Trpimirovic
dynasty, as independent as the other kingdoms of the time.
At that time, no
vassalage relationship could have existed with Austria or Hungary, since the
Hungarian kingdom was formed two centuries later and Croatia only associated
itself with Austria in the 16th century. Nor was Croatia dependent on or under
the dominion of Venice.
The Venetians
periodically exercised supreme power over one or two free cities on the
Croatian coast, and later, during the Ottoman Wars, the inhabitants of Dalmatia
joined forces with Venice in the fight against the Ottomans, recognizing
Venetian authority to the same extent as parts of Montenegro, Albania, and
Greece. In its relations with the Byzantine Empire, before Europe fragmented
into political, cultural, and religious areas, Croatia constituted, according
to medieval standards, an independent kingdom.
Later, Croatia, like
Hungary, was not part of the Holy Roman Empire, its connection to the empire
being limited to the monarchy itself: first Sigismund I of the Luxembourg
dynasty (1487-1587), and then a series of monarchs of the Habsburg dynasty
(1527-1918). With the extinction of the national dynasty, Croatia entered into
a personal union with Hungary in 1102, based on a freely negotiated pact called
the Pacta Conventa.
This relationship,
over time, evolved into a de facto union, although the Croatians were never
Hungarian subjects. Furthermore, this bond was so balanced that, after the
extinction of the Hungarian Árpád dynasty, the
Croatians enthroned the kings of the Angevin dynasty
of Naples (1901-1986), who were later recognized by the Hungarians, Poles, and
Lithuanians.
With the defeat in
1526 of the armies of the Croatian-Hungarian kingdom, which for a century had
held back the onslaught of the Ottoman Empire seeking to reach the Tiber and
Rhine, the Croats elected Ferdinand I, brother of Charles V, as their king in
1527, seeking support in Central Europe and Spain. In their election, they
proceeded independently of the Hungarians, who were pushing for their own
candidate, John Zapolia, but the supporters of
Ferdinand I, Archduke of Austria, King of Bohemia and Croatia, prevailed. Thus,
the Danubian Monarchy was founded under the Habsburg
crown.
This coalition of
peoples of Western culture, with the maritime support of Spain, Venice, and the
papacy, managed to contain the Ottoman advance, successfully fulfilling its
historical mission. In the times when the modern State was already being formed
and national consciousness was being forged, that community constituted the
model of a constructive supranational collaboration in service of the higher
international good.
In the bloody
struggles against the Ottomans, which lasted 400 years, Croatia and Hungary
were the countries most affected. The Hungarian capital was the seat of the
Turkish pasha for 150 years, and it is absurd to claim that the Hungarians
exercised dominion over Croatia.
Turkish horses never
set foot in the Croatian capital, yet Croatia was reduced to relics of the
former illustrious kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia. Croatia had
lost most of its national territory; hundreds of thousands of combatants fell;
many were taken captive by the Turks; and the wave of refugees reached as far
as Dunkirk, France.
Even today, Croatian
communities exist in southern Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia. At the
same time, certain regions of Croatia were populated by nomadic Balkan Orthodox
groups, from whom the current Serbian minority in Croatia was formed. A number
of Croats, adherents of the Patarena sect, embraced
Islam upon falling under Turkish rule, thus becoming part of the ruling class
in the Ottoman Empire, occupying the highest military and administrative
positions.
After the reconquest, Croatia was no longer the nationally and
religiously cohesive country it once was, a country from which, during the
Renaissance, emerged a whole host of distinguished humanists and artists of
European renown.
Despite all the
adversities, the Croats preserved their constitutional freedoms. The monarchs,
formerly Hungarian-Croat (1102-1526) and later the Habsburgs, resided outside
of Croatia. Direct power was exercised by the ban (viceroy) and the Croatian
Diet, composed of the nobility, representatives of the Church, and
representatives of the free cities.
The Diet enacted
laws, decided on matters of peace and war, and levied taxes. The ban was head
of government and supreme commander of the army and was required to be a
Croatian citizen. With the king away, it was quite rightly said: the ban is
king of the Croats.
In Croatia, as
throughout the Christian West, Latin was for centuries the language of the
Catholic Church and of culture, and at the same time the official language for
Hungarians and Croats, and later for the countries associated with the Habsburg
monarchy.
Latin was used in the
Croatian parliament until 1848, the year in which Croatian was declared the
official language. From the Renaissance onward, Croats cultivated literature in
their national language as well, reaching its golden age in Dubrovnik.
Furthermore, the Croats enjoyed the unique privilege granted by the Holy See:
for more than a millennium they have used the ancient Slavic language in the
Roman Rite liturgy in several dioceses on the Adriatic coast. It is worth
noting that even within the Ottoman Empire, Croats of the Islamic faith used
the Croatian language, so much so that in Constantinople itself, Croatian was
sometimes the diplomatic language.
The following is a
true account of Croatia's relations with its allied countries up to modern
times, which gave rise to the "Black Legend," also appropriated by
Manes Sperber.
The Habsburgs began to infringe
upon Croatia's constitutional rights at a time when, throughout Europe, the
central power of the territorial state was strengthening at the expense of
feudal lords. The Croatian and Hungarian nobility, and sometimes the Austrian
nobles as well, unitedly opposed this centralizing
trend.
The Croatian and Hungarian nobles
simultaneously defended their privileges and prerogatives as well as the
constitutional rights of their respective kingdoms, invoking, among other
documents, the Golden Bull (1222) of the Hungarian-Croatian king Andrew II,
which was the true Magna Carta of Liberty for those
two kingdoms. Even today, both Croatians and Hungarians glorify as their
national hero the Croatian ban, Count Peter of Zrin,
beheaded in 1671 for opposing dynastic abuses.
The resistance to the centralist
policies of Joseph II, the most prominent representative of enlightened
absolutism in Austria, was extremely energetic and successful. He attempted to
impose German as the official language of all the countries under the Habsburg
rule.
IV.
The Croatian national
epic was, in fact, lived out in modern times, during the wars with the Ottoman
Empire, which sometimes took on tragic characteristics because Croats often
fought on both sides: Catholics against Muslims. The most moving scene of this
drama unfolded in 1566, when the Croatian ban Nicholas Subic of Zrin, known as Leonidas of Christendom, defended the
strategic fortress of Szigeth, opposing Suleiman the Magnificent's march on Vienna. During the long siege,
Suleiman died embittered.
The true commander of
the Ottoman army was the Grand Vizier, the famous Mohamed Pasha Sokolovic (Socobi), of Croatian
origin.
In exceptional cases,
Croats fought outside their homeland, for example, during the religious wars in
Germany, and later in Italy during the Napoleonic campaign. Certain Croatian
contingents from the territory included in the Illyrian Kingdom created by
Napoleon, enrolled in the Grande Armée, earned high
praise from the Corsican, who called them the best soldiers in the world,
certainly not for their cruelty or lack of military discipline.
In the last world
war, a detachment of Croatian soldiers joined the French patriots in the fight
against the Hitlerite invaders, and not long ago, in honour of the fallen Croatians, a memorial plaque was
placed in the Dôme des Invalides,
which should not interest Manes Sperber, but rather
the writers and editors of Preuves.
Croats participated in wars
outside their homeland rarely and always against their will. The Croatian Diet,
the true holder of national sovereignty, consistently protested to the Austrian
military authorities, emphasizing that its obligation was solely to fight
against the Turkish invaders and complete the glorious feat of the Croatian
Reconquista.
However, its periodic
participation in these wars was unavoidable, as the border region between
Croatia and the Ottoman Empire constituted a unique administrative-military
unit, governed directly by the Austrian military authorities. In this zone, all
adults were soldiers by default. Since conscription was not in effect at the
time, Austria could readily mobilize large numbers of seasoned soldiers in this
militarized zone for border engagements with Turkish detachments.
They were employed in more
dangerous operations as contemporary commandos. It is understood that in the
already cruel religious wars, foreign soldiers were not popular in Germany and
that their excesses were tendentiously exaggerated and generalized to tarnish
Austria's reputation. Over time, this denigrating campaign would have
repercussions in Austria itself, especially during the period of enlightened
absolutism, when the Croats vigorously opposed attempts at Germanization.
Furthermore, the Croats, being
Catholic, could not remain indifferent to these struggles, and the policy of
the Croatian Diet at that time was geared towards preserving religious and,
consequently, political unity, so vital while the enemy lurked on their
borders. Later, in defending dynastic interests, the Croats were loyal to their
monarch; that is, they behaved as patriots according to the notions of that
era, even though today they are republicans.
As defenders and guardians of the
eastern "limes" of our Western civilization, they demonstrated
loyalty not only to their homeland but to all of Western Christendom. For its
subjects, the Habsburg monarchy, who were simultaneously emperors of the Holy
Roman Empire, kings of Spain, governors of Italy, and owners of almost all of
America, was a protector of Western interests.
This characteristic
was also intuited by A. T. Toynbee, who expressly states: "...the Danubian monarchy of the Habsburgs, which from the point of
view of London or Paris was but one among other provincial powers in a
politically divided Western world, had all the appearances and properties of a
universal Western state in the eyes of its own subjects and also in the eyes of
those of its non-Western neighbors and adversaries against whom it served as a
'shell' or shield for the entire body of Western Christian Society, whose
scattered members remained ungrateful beneficiaries of the Monarchy's
ecumenical mission."
Consequently, M. Sperber could draw the insulting conclusion that they
fought for morbid pleasure in the cruelties of war, solely due to ignorance of
the Croatian national epic with Crusader-like characteristics, which,
unfortunately, unfolds, in part, in modern times, and due to a
misinterpretation of the historical role of his homeland, Austria.
The fact that Croatia's grim
history is contrasted, in stark contrast, with the "golden legend" of
the Serbs as constant fighters for freedom, compels us to point out a
little-known fact. Despite protests from the Croatian Diet, the Austrian
authorities colonized the militarized zone with Balkan defectors of the
Orthodox faith, whose ancestors now form the Serbian minority in Croatia. These
defectors sometimes comprised entire regiments that fought in Germany under the
Croatian name. The Croatians are held responsible for their excesses, although
it would be more accurate to judge the responsibility of their Austrian
commanders. The Croatian soldiers did not fight as mercenaries, unlike the
subjects of other European countries, and no one, for example, blames an entire
people for the excesses and abuses of the Landsknechts.
V.
Manes Sperber's thesis on foreign domination in Croatia reflects
anachronistic nationalist interpretations and centuries-old supranational
collaborations among the Danubian countries. These
conceptions also resonated in Croatian political literature, although their
current defenders are Russian and Serbian ideologues, Pan-Slavists
and Yugoslavs, formerly monarchists, now communists, all anti-Western.
However, a fierce
antagonism toward their neighbors never arose among Croats, and if conflicts
and struggles occurred in modern times, these were merely expressions of
national antagonisms of the respective eras. Croatian-Serbian relations, and by
analogy, Polish-Russian relations, cannot be considered using this criterion.
All these peoples belong to the same linguistic family.
Therefore, according
to theories of linguistic racism, they should form a separate political and
cultural unit with the other Slavic peoples. According to this criterion, any
potential conflicts would be reduced to national differences, similar to those
that exist, for example, between the Neo-Latin peoples, or between the French
and the Spanish. However, between Croats and Serbs, there are not only national
differences but also a deep antagonism, a reflection of the cultural dualism of
the European continent.
The Serbs are Eastern
Orthodox and have their own national Church, a fact of paramount importance in
understanding their antagonism toward the Catholic Croats. Hence, two different
mentalities, two opposing conceptions of the role of the people, the Church,
the State, and their reciprocal relationships.
The Serbs do not
conceive of the nation-state as a nation-state, as in the West, but as a
Church-nation. The fact that the Croats belong to the universal Western Church
and, in part, to the also universal Islamic religious community, means, for the
Serbs, that Croats cannot be equal members of the same state or of the Yugoslav
nation.
Only those who
profess the Orthodox faith can be full members of the nation. The impossibility
of a political transaction between Croats and Serbs thus stems from their
opposing cultural and political traditions. The same applies
to Russians and Poles.
It is quite clear
that the problem is not limited to religious differences, a reflection of the
different cultural orientations that originated in the religious schism between
Byzantium and Rome, between Western and Eastern Europe, respectively. Religious
differences could not prevent the national unity of Western peoples (Germany,
the Netherlands, etc.).
However, these were
Western nations that, after painful experiences, learned to practice religious
and ideological tolerance. Moreover, Catholicism and Protestantism, despite
their dogmatic differences, are two forms of Western Christianity. National
integration and even supranational collaboration are only possible where common
cultural traditions precede them. In contrast, this is not feasible between
ethnic groups that developed within different civilizations.
Once again, we turn
to A.J. Toynbee, who described the formation of states in the style of
Yugoslavia, under the Western principle of the nationality of nations that have
been nurtured, until now, by two diverse civilizations, as a "bold
experiment in political alchemy." Toynbee wrote these lines between the
two world wars, when the definitive results of the situation created by the
1919 Treaties, which he ironically calls the "new order," were not
yet foreseen.
But now, after so
many misguided experiments, it would be more appropriate to call it the
"new disorder." Croatia is one of the nations most affected by this
disorder, which arose from frivolous and unfounded theories. According to these
theories, linguistic similarity or identity determined, ipso facto, the
cultural and national community of peoples, completely ignoring the
insurmountable cultural differences, or ascribing transcendental significance
to the zadruga, the supposed basic community
institution in Croatia and Serbia, which was of no real importance.
We understand Manes Sperber's enthusiasm for "communal" institutions,
but the theory that presents the cohabitation of several families of the same
kin as typical Slavic institutions belongs to the inventory of European
Romanticism. This institution never assumed widespread proportions among either
Croats or Serbs. It disappeared when the monetary system was adopted in the
villages in place of the barter of natural goods and when the right of
inheritance was introduced according to the liberal notions of the Civil Code
(1853).
"The entire zadruga organization, far from representing the pristine,
original type of the family community of Slavic origin, more likely constitutes
an organization of a purely military character," which had already
appeared on the borders of the Roman Empire and later in the defensive function
against the Turks.
VI.
What M. Sperber
writes about the supposed centuries-long and permanent struggles of the Serbs
against the Turks fits with the legendary narratives of the Romantic era. The
author contrasts this "golden legend" of the Serbian liberation
struggle with the "black legend" of Croatian servility. Subjected to
the Turkish yoke and separated from Christian Europe after the terrible defeat
at Kosovo (1389), these Orthodox Yugoslavs (South Slavs) had never ceased
fighting for the freedom they would reconquer, step
by step, at a high price in their blood.
It is worth noting,
in contrast, that M. Sperber completely ignores the
four centuries of Croatian resistance to the Turks, a rather odd omission,
given that this struggle constitutes an essential chapter in the history of his
homeland: Austria.
The liberation of the
Balkan countries from long Turkish rule was not so much the fruit of their own
resistance as the consequence of Western European military efforts and the
errors of the sultans, who overstepped their bounds in their conquests.
The Ottomans had
organized their military power within the Byzantine Empire, where they served
as auxiliary troops. They then gained such momentum that they assumed the
political inheritance of the Byzantine Empire and established the Pax Ottomanica throughout the
sphere of Byzantine civilization.
Political discord,
ecclesiastical disputes, and total moral decay contributed to the collapse of
Byzantium, which, moreover, preferred Turkish domination to reconciliation with
Rome. "I would rather see Murad's turban above
the door of the Hagia Sophia than a cardinal's
hat," were the words of Archon Notaros a few
years before the fall of Constantinople.
The Turkish party
prevailed not only in Byzantium, but earlier in Serbia. Nicholas Jorga, the Romanian historian, noted that the Serbs fought
in the siege of Constantinople alongside the Turks and that a Serbian soldier
had beheaded Constantine XI Palaiologos and presented
his head to Mehmed II.
It is a well-known
fact that the Genoese and Venetians defended Constantinople more bravely than
the Byzantine Greeks themselves. It is less well known that in the Battle of
Kosovo, the Croats and Hungarians fought more than the Serbs, who made a pact
with the Turks, even though the battle ended inconclusively. The ones they did
not want to make a pact with were the Christian West.
The Serbian historian
Stanoje Stanoojevic writes:
"The Serbian Church recognized the authority of the Turks and made a pact
with them." A solid symbiosis was established between the Turkish
conquerors and the Orthodox Christians, and this resignation and assumed
attitude lasted until the decline of the Turkish Empire. The liberation of the
Balkan countries from the Turkish yoke was primarily the work of Western
Christians and transactions between great powers, and secondarily the
consequence of the emancipatory struggle of those countries. Therefore, the
separation of Serbia from Western Europe is not due to the Turkish occupation.
The legend of the heroic
resistance of the Serbs was created after the fact. Marko Kraljevic,
a symbol of this invented feat, died as a Turkish vassal fighting against the
Western Christians. It was not, therefore, the Serbs who never ceased fighting
for the liberation of Christian countries from Turkish rule, but the Croats,
the Hungarians, and other Western peoples.
VII
If an Austrian author poses the
famous Eastern Question in this way, it is not surprising that he adopts
Serbian and Russian interpretations of the Balkan situation before and during
the First World War. Serbia, which with Russian support had engaged in
extensive conspiracy and terrorist activity aimed at overthrowing the Danubian Monarchy, was presented as an innocent victim of
Austria.
The Croats, on the other hand,
are guilty for having fought in the ranks of the Austrian army against Serbia,
and M. Sperber does not question whether they could
have acted otherwise, nor why so many Serbs, subjects of Emperor Franz Joseph,
fought against Serbia.
The "black legend"
about the Croats would not be complete if the author, limited to declaring that
the Croats were conquerors like their ancestors who had helped crush the
Hungarian revolution in 1844, had added that Croatian regiments serving Franz
Joseph sometimes sowed panic in the land of their brother people, murdering the
inhabitants of the villages and towns they had just occupied.
Accustomed to
witnessing so many atrocities committed by dictatorships of both the left and
the right, the contemporary reader might believe the claims of an Austrian
against the behavior of his country's army in the First World War. However, it
is not difficult to distinguish between Austria and a Balkan country.
Even Serbian authors
speak with more respect than he does about the Austrian army. It would be
appropriate for Mr. Sperber to familiarize himself
with the conduct of the Serbian soldiers who invaded Croatia as
"liberators" after the collapse of Austria-Hungary and as
"Slavic brothers," applying their methods of punishment, brutally
beating more than 100,000 Croats, introducing the official cult of bandits and
assailants, and erecting statues and public monuments in their honor.
VIII
Although our rebuttal
has been somewhat lengthy, before concluding we refer to the "liberticidal
and fratricidal role" that, according to Engels' accusation, the author
attributed to the Croats during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and the First
World War, respectively.
Both problems are related to the
role played by the Danubian monarchy in modern times.
If the Danubian community was able to save Western
Europe from the Turkish threat, could it or could it not play a similar role at
a time when the political balance of power in Europe was about to collapse due
to the rise of Prussia and Russia? Should it serve European interests, for
which it was more useful to aid Prussia against Austria and then foster the
ambitions of Russia and Serbia, which sought the dismemberment of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, or should it strive to preserve that Danubian community and transform it into a true
commonwealth of free peoples?
The answer to these questions
will determine how the attitude of the Croats and other Slavic peoples, who in
1848 defended the Austrian Empire against Pan-Germanism
and fought in the last world conflagration against Russian and Serbian
ambitions, will depend on how they are assessed. Given the experience of the
dwarfed imperialisms of some Austro-Hungarian heir states that emerged between
the two world wars and paved the way for Hitler and Stalin, it is easy to agree
with numerous statesmen and political theorists who believe that economic,
defensive, and political cooperation among the small peoples of Central Europe
was essential after the First World War.
This is confirmed in retrospect
by the wisdom of the Austrian Slavs' stance in 1898. In that year, while
delegates from the German states were deliberating in Frankfurt on the
unification of Germany, representatives of the Austrian Slavs met in Prague and
declared themselves against Pan-Germanist tendencies
and in favor of the Danubian Monarchy. Dr. Prantisek Palacki, a
distinguished Czech patriot and historian of Protestant faith, defined this
position thus: "If the Austrian Empire did not already exist, we should
hasten to create it in the interest of Europe, in the interest of
humanity." The national movements
of the Austrian Slavs were guided
by a humanitarian, liberal,
and democratic spirit, and were constructive from a European perspective.
The revolutionary
European left of that time saw the anti-Austrian movement of German and
Hungarian nationalists as a rebellion against the principle of dynastic
legitimacy. Therefore, they considered the attitude of the Austrian Slavs
reactionary, even though they were fighting for national and democratic ideals.
Above and beyond their motives, those who then advocated for the destruction of
Austria were, in fact, acting for the King of Prussia, just as those who, 75
years later, instead of reforming its internal structure, dictated the dismemberment
of the Danubian monarchy, paving the way for the
invasions of Hitler and Stalin and the establishment of satellite communist
states.
In the opinion of the
Hungarians of 1848, the circumstantial alliance between the dynasty and the
Austrian Slavs was dangerous, and they took advantage of Prussia's victories to
consolidate their dominance, within the dualist system, in the Hungarian part
of the monarchy, even though they constituted barely half of its total
population. Then, out of fear of the Slavs, they fostered the Austro-German
alliance, and in domestic politics, backed by Berlin, they thwarted all efforts
aimed at recognizing the national rights of the Austrian Slavs and
restructuring the monarchy on a federal basis.
The revolutionary
Hungarian nationalists of 1848 presumed that all the territories of the
Hungarian Crown formed the Hungarian nation-state. The very rights they claimed
from Vienna they denied to other peoples. Kossuth, while sending an ultimatum
to Vienna demanding the rights of his homeland, replied to the delegates who
were demanding the rights of Croatia: "The sword will decide." In the
tumultuous year of 1848, it was not only Croats who fought against the
Hungarians, but also Slovaks, Czechs, Romanians, and Serbs. It is also true
that Kossuth later, as a political exile, advocated for the confederation of
the Danubian peoples, excluding Austria.
In 1848, the Croats
also fought for their constitutional and national rights, and that year the
national and democratic revolution triumphed in Croatia.
In that year, the
thousand-year-old Croatian Diet was transformed into a modern parliament. The
Croats appointed their own government in spite of Vienna and Budapest,
emancipated the serfs, introduced the Croatian language as the official language
instead of Latin, broke all political ties with Hungary, except for the person
of the king, and this state of affairs lasted until 1866.
Distinguished
contemporaries such as Camillo Cavour emphasized at
that time that the Croats were fighting for freedom. Then, the English
historian George Macaulay Trevellyan referred to the
events of 1848 with the following words: "Austria was able to defeat its
rebellious subjects partly with Russian help, partly because the Hungarian
parliamentarians, led by Kossuth, did not want to treat the other peoples of
Hungary any better than the subjugated peoples.
This treatment drove
the Slavs and Romans to the protection of the Austrian despots. English and
American admirers considered Kossuth a hero in his subsequent exile, which in
part he was. But perhaps no one, like him, after Robespierre, has done so much
damage to the liberal cause. He diverted the Hungarian national idea from
liberalism to chauvinism.
The Hungarian
oligarchy, defeated in 1848, made a pact in 1866 with its Austrian enemies,
becoming complicit in the dominance of two peoples, which led the monarchy to
its final abyss." After the glorious Hungarian Revolution of 1956,
unleashed against communist and Soviet tyranny, to speak of the 1848 revolution
without the necessary reservations, as Sperber did,
is incorrect. At the same time, the author overlooks the fact that it was
precisely the Serbs who distinguished themselves fighting against the 1848
revolution, thus allowing him to present them as consistent champions of
liberty in contrast to the "liberty-killers" Croats.
In 1848, the Serbian Patriarch Rajačić blessed the troops of the Croatian Ban Jelačić, appointed by the Emperor as
commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops, when they marched against the Hungarians.
The Serbs of Voivodeship, led by Stratimirović,
engaged in fierce fighting with the Hungarian insurgents, and in recognition of
this, the Emperor granted a special status to "Serbian Voivodeship."
The war of the Serbian minority
in southern Hungary, with strong support from the Serbian kingdom, then a
vassal of the Ottoman sultans, waged against the Magyars, had taken on
"the character of a cruel race war," and the conflict with the Croats
was only a regrettable incident within 800 years of relatively harmonious and
peaceful coexistence.
IX.
From what has been
said above regarding the historical significance of the Danubian
community, it follows that the Croats in the First World War did not fight
"on behalf of others."
Furthermore, the
Croats neither desired nor provoked that terrible war, since after absolutism
(1849-1860) and dualism (1866-1918), a segment of the Croatian intelligentsia
had lost hope in a radical transformation of the monarchy, which was
increasingly acting as a brilliant second fiddle to Prussianized
Germany. Nevertheless, the Croats distrusted the conspiratorial and terrorist
activities of Serbia, which aspired to annex Croatian regions.
The Serbs, encouraged
by Tsarist Russia, sought the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire in order to
seize the Croatian provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been incorporated
into Austria-Hungary by resolution of the Congress of Berlin, as they
constituted, along with the other Croatian provinces, a historical,
geographical, economic, and national unit. Despite a significant Orthodox
minority who, identifying religion with nationality, consider themselves
Serbian, these provinces also have a majority of Catholic and Muslim Croats
today.
Servia also claimed other Croatian
regions and demanded access to the Adriatic, which would have meant the
annexation of distinctly Croatian territories, as well as those of Montenegro
and Albania. Austria opposed these expansionist plans of tiny Serbia, which
would have bordered on the absurd were it not for the fact that Russia, with
its ambitions as heir to Byzantium, was behind them.
The Obrenović dynasty was treacherously liquidated in
1908, a crime whose atrocity provoked universal condemnation. The Karageorgevićs, avowed agents of Russian imperialism,
ascended the Serbian throne, and from then on, subversive activity intensified
in the Croatian regions, culminating in the assassination of Crown Prince Franz
Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, carried out in collusion with the Serbian and
Russian governments. The heir to the Habsburg throne was believed to have plans
to abolish the dualist system and create a third unit (Croatia and Slovenia)
with equal rights to Austria and Hungary.
This would have meant
the consolidation of the existing situation and the end of Russian and Serbian
intrigues. During the First World War, Nicolae Pašić, president of the Serbian government-in-exile,
declared to the Italian ambassador, Count Carlo Sforza, regarding these plans
of the Austrian heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand: "It was the only time
in my life I was afraid." Unfortunately, in recent decades, the monarchy's
policies were dependent on Berlin, provoking a negative reaction from both the
Western powers and the Austrian Slavs.
Therefore, it was not
possible, at decisive moments, to save the Danubian
community, and, moreover, the victorious powers did not fully grasp the danger
looming over Europe in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Croats,
neighbors of Serbia, exposed to Eurasian invasions, were able to sense the
approaching danger better than the statesmen of the Western metropolises. The
same occurred in the First and Second World Wars.
The Croats, due to
their geographical location and political circumstances, with no possibility of
choosing between the two Western blocs, found themselves on the side of the
Central Powers in both World Wars. In these fratricidal wars between European
nations, which ended Europe's leading role in world politics, they fought for
their very existence and for European interests against the Eastern invaders,
while Serbia, due to a confluence of special circumstances and as an agent of
Russian expansionism, found itself on the other side.
Many of Austria's adversaries
clearly saw during the First World War that Croatian soldiers were not fighting
as "conquerors for hire," but in defense of their country, especially
when Russia and Serbia approved the Treaty of London, which stipulated the
cession of the Croatian coast—a shameful act of blackmail that met with the
vigorous opposition of President Wilson.
X
All peoples exhibit
both positive and negative traits; the history of every nation contains both
luminous and dark chapters. Nevertheless, every people has the right to life in
freedom and dignity. Therefore, the Croatian people—neither better nor worse
than any other—have the right and the obligation to repudiate unfounded
offenses and demand that no moral support be given to their oppressors.
What is most
regrettable is the continued insistence on clichés and sloppy interpretations
that contradict the ideals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Slander is hurled
against Croatians for having defended their own ideals and for having
sacrificed themselves for centuries for the greater international good, due to
their unique geographical position on the frontier of the Western world. This
contribution to higher interests is precisely what enlightened minds are
propagating today.
If one advocates for
organized international solidarity to save freedom, then it is essential to rid
oneself of old ideological prejudices and refrain from unjust and insulting
criticisms of other peoples. We can note with satisfaction that the new spirit
of international solidarity, eliminating national prejudices, is steadily
gaining ground in the Western world, thanks also to the laudable efforts of the
intellectuals gathered around the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Why proceed in
reverse when it comes to the occupied and oppressed Croatian people?
We wish to emphasize
that Croats do not hate Serbs. While we highlight our Western orientation and
traditions in contrast to the Byzantine-Russian orbit of the Serbs, we do not
do so as if this division were our own, nor will we pass judgment on other
civilizations. If we have resisted invasions from the East for centuries, with
the support of Western peoples, we have preserved our national and cultural
identity. We do not ask for any special reward for the sacrifices made, but it
is only right to demand that these sacrifices not be interpreted as
"shameful actions for foreign interests."
Finally, we hope that
our relations with the Serbs will improve over time, as has happened with the
Islamic world. Although we fought for four centuries against the invasions and
occupation of non-Osmans, we harbored hatred and knew
how to appreciate the capabilities of the Ottoman Empire, which carried out one
of the most vigorous undertakings of all time.
Many Bosnian Croats
who embraced Islam held high positions in the Turkish Empire and preserved the
Croatian language, as well as a typical Western institution: the hereditary
feudal nobility. The political acumen of the Turks became evident in our time,
when, with the Ottoman Empire dissolved, they adopted the institution of the
nation-state and other political and cultural forms of the Western world, once
their antagonist. Yesterday's most dangerous adversary of Western Europe is
today the staunchest member of the Western community's defense against the
threat of a new, even more powerful Eurasian empire.
The Croats also feel no hatred
toward the Russians, but rather compassion for having never known freedom. Without
the forced union of Croatia with Serbia in 1918 and 1945, it is highly likely
that these two countries would have practiced a policy of good neighborliness
for their mutual benefit.
The undesirable unification of
such heterogeneous elements within the Yugoslav conglomerate, with a
predominance of Serbs, the cause of persistent conflicts and national
dissension, facilitated the communists' seizure of power in 1945. Without this
unnatural and forced union, carried out illegally and without the application
of the right to national self-determination, Croatia would currently be among
the free Western nations. Furthermore, the brutal imposition of cultural and
political forms corresponding to Byzantine-Russian-Serbian traditions acts as a
painful graft on the Croatian national body.
We believe, however,
that the Serbs are not guided by malevolent intentions when they act in
accordance with their traditions and values. The possibility that Western
conceptions will eventually prevail in Serbia, as happened in Turkey and some
other countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa that for centuries belonged to
other civilizations, should not be ruled out.
For the Croats, this
eventuality would bring great relief, as they would escape the current zone of
encounters and conflicts between antagonistic civilizations. Until this slow
historical process takes place, the inalienable right of the Croats is to fight
against their inclusion in a Balkan state governed by foreign political
conceptions and with an opposing cultural ideal. Moreover, this state denies
not only national rights and freedoms, but also individual ones. As long as
this situation persists, the Croatian national struggle is not merely the
struggle of a country disinherited for its independence, but something far more
important: it is the struggle for freedom itself, and as such, it contributes
to the efforts of all of Europe and the entire free world.
We, therefore, as
Croats, Europeans, and members of the West, regret the appearance of the
"black legend" about Croatia in the pages of "Preuves," a publication to which, as victims of
totalitarian communism, we express our gratitude for its consistent and
courageous defense of the values of the free world and for its
open repudiation of all prejudices.
Buenos Aires
Two years ago, the bishops noted in a report the sad events that occurred
in Bacina, near Ploce, in
Dalmatia. There, the two priests who had gone to the parish church to celebrate
Mass were surreptitiously attacked, mistreated, and expelled from the town,
without even being allowed to enter the church. This constitutes a clear
violation of the fundamental principle of religious freedom. We do not know if
any measures were taken to prevent such physical attacks against priests in the
future.
II.
In accordance with the basic principle of religious freedom, Article 16
of the law specifically emphasizes that people "who are in hospitals,
nursing homes, boarding schools, and other similar institutions may, within the
established order, practice their faith and may be assisted by a priest at
their request." A good and reasonable provision! But, unfortunately, this
legal provision, so clear and categorical, is often not put into practice. In
many schools, students are practically unable to go to church.
They can only do so at great risk. Frequently, bureaucratic measures
obstruct and even prevent priests from attending to the seriously ill in
hospitals and nursing homes. Consequently, people often die in hospitals
without religious comfort, even though they ask for it and long for it.
The situation of conscripts in barracks and prisoners in penitentiaries
is even more difficult, due to their subjection to special discipline. There
have been cases where prayer books or other religious objects they kept were
forcibly taken from them, and they were even prevented from individual prayers.
At the very least, when the danger of death looms, prisoners should be
allowed to receive the sacrament of the dying. The most basic humanitarian
sentiment demands that every justified wish of the person be fulfilled in the
face of death. And for the dying faithful, there is no more justified wish than
to be at peace with their conscience before dying. Therefore, at the request of
a seriously ill prisoner, a priest from outside should be summoned to
administer the holy sacraments, or at least the priest detained within the
prison should be permitted to do so.
Soldiers in barracks should be allowed to freely attend religious rites
on holidays if they so wish. Military discipline would certainly not be
affected by this. On the contrary, it would have a positive impact on the
soldiers, their families, and the entire population.
III
Article 13 of the law states that religious rites, practiced
collectively, may be freely celebrated in churches and other public places,
while the preceding article, Article 12, refers to the practice of religious
rites in private homes at the request of the faithful.
Among the rites celebrated in homes at the request of the faithful is the
confession of the elderly, the disabled, and the sick. From ancient times, when
the town lacked a church, such people would gather in a designated house, and
the priest would hear their confessions. Their confession does not constitute a
collective rite, as each person confesses in secret. They all gather in one
house because each person would have to send a family member to accompany the
priest, which would mean a significant loss of work time.
Although this custom of confession dates back to ancient times, certain
judges in the courts of minor offenses, interpreting the existing regulations
in a bureaucratic manner, impose punishments on priests who participate in
these confessions. They arbitrarily consider individual confessions as
collective rites. By proceeding in this way, these judges create discontent among
the faithful to the detriment of the general interest.
IV
Mindful
of the principles of religious freedom and freedom of conscience, we request
that employees, workers, and students be allowed to optionally observe holidays
that do not fall on a Sunday. This applies, first and foremost, to Christmas
Day. This is a very small number of holidays—only ten a year for Catholics. In
factories and the public administration, this could be arranged so that workers
and employees of different faiths could replace each other, and if necessary,
the loss of working hours could be compensated with unpaid overtime.
V
Article 4 of the Law
establishes the principle of separation of church and school. We will not
discuss now whether religious instruction in schools, even if optional, as is
the case in Poland, would better suit the wishes of the overwhelming majority
of parents. However, we must point out that if the law does not permit
religious instruction in schools, then it would be just to prohibit the
dissemination of anti-religious propaganda within them. Schools are the
property of the people, and the majority of our people believe in and educate
their children in religion. It is detrimental to the innocent souls of children
when school instruction contradicts family education. Therefore, especially
primary school teachers, should adhere to their duties and teach students to
read and write, without addressing metaphysical problems, those concerning the
origin and reason for existence, for which they also lack the specific
training.
Although the law does
not permit religious instruction in schools, Article 4... Article 4 expressly
states that religious instruction may be given in churches, that is, in other
premises. The law does not specify that religious instruction is permitted only
in parish churches. There are villages several leagues from the parish church,
and children cannot walk to the parish to attend religious instruction.
Therefore, it must be given to them in their village church. However, some
misdemeanor courts severely punish priests by imposing fines or imprisoning
them for having given religious instruction in village chapels, even though
they do so by order of higher ecclesiastical authorities.
Likewise, in some
localities, judges of misdemeanor courts punish priests who lack the written
consent of the father and mother to give religious instruction to their child.
However, the law, while requiring parental consent, does not specify that this
consent must be in writing. In this way, the judges, by expanding upon the
existing law, arrogate to themselves legislative power. It even happens that
parents deny having given the written declaration, claiming that their child
forged their signature, resulting in the conviction of an innocent priest.
Furthermore, the administration
of some schools does everything possible to obstruct the freedom of religious
instruction, contrary to the law. They resort to threats in their agitation
against religious education. They require students to go straight from school
to home and do not allow them to go directly to the parish church next to the
school, thus saving them time and effort. Those who go from school to the
parish church are reprimanded. It also often happens that during religious
instruction, the school administration organizes various activities to keep
students from attending the class. Such conduct is in clear contradiction with
the principle of religious freedom and violates legal provisions.
VI.
Article 4 of the Law
recognizes the right of religious communities to found and direct seminaries.
The State only controls the work of these schools, in accordance with Article
18 of the Law. It is therefore unjustifiable to require seminaries to adapt the
education of seminarians to the system and curriculum of state schools and
boarding schools. The vocation of those educated in seminaries is completely
different from that of students in state schools. Seminaries have their own
specific character; that is, they prepare candidates for religious service, and
consequently, their education must be imbued with the ascetic principles of the
Church.
For the Church to be
able to exercise the right that the Law, moreover, recognizes, it must possess
the necessary buildings, that is, seminaries. Without seminaries, it is
pointless to speak of the Church's right to found schools for the formation of
priests. Consequently, it is essential that all seminaries be returned to the
Church, along with the sports fields, orchards, and farms that, while the
Church possessed them, served for the formation of new priests and nuns. The
Church cannot and will not renounce the seminaries, as this would mean their
disappearance. Therefore, the return of the seminaries constitutes one of the
fundamental conditions for the normalization of relations between Church and
State.
At the same time,
Article 22 of the law concerning the legal status of religious communities
should be amended. This article provides for the closure of a seminary by court
order following a punishable act, namely the abuse of religious instruction.
To prevent such
potential abuses, other highly effective measures are available without
resorting to such an exceptional measure, which is susceptible to arbitrary
interpretations. Furthermore, it is unjust for the entire community to bear the
consequences of the potential transgression by one or another member of the
educational institution. Nor are state schools closed if one of the teachers or
students commits a crime.
VII
For the same reasons,
the convents and monasteries that were confiscated and used as personal
residences should be returned to the religious orders and congregations, both
male and female. Their existence is inconceivable without these buildings.
Since religious orders and communities are permitted to exist according to the
Constitution and the law, their convents and their respective grounds should
therefore be returned to them.
The same applies to those annexes
of religious schools and hospitals, expropriated or occupied, that served
exclusively as living quarters for monks and nuns. According to housing law,
they have the right to the corresponding dwelling in their own house. It is
therefore unnecessary to verify what, in such buildings, served the specific conventual purposes and what served as living quarters for
the religious, in order to separate the former and make it available again to
the religious communities as their property.
VIII.
In general, all
nationalized or expropriated properties that previously served religious
purposes while the Church had free use of them, such as parish houses, bishops'
and canons' curias, priests' residences, and
catechism rooms, should be returned to the Church as its property. If they are
being used for secular purposes, they should be vacated and made available to
the Church, at least to the extent necessary, according to objective criteria,
also considering their public and representative nature.
The remaining housing
could, by mutual agreement, be made available to popular committees or housing
offices, with the understanding that their sacred character must also be taken
into account in their use, and that they must be made available to the Church
should it need them. IX. Following the same line of thought, the law on the
nationalization of rental buildings and building land of December 28, 1958,
should be defined more precisely and perhaps supplemented so that seminaries
and religious schools cannot under any circumstances be nationalized and,
therefore, are not affected by Article 28 of said law.
By analogy, Article
74 of the aforementioned law should also be interpreted so that buildings that
formerly served as episcopal parish houses and other buildings, if essential to
the Church, not only can but must be returned to it. The same provision should
also apply to seminary and convent buildings, since, as stated above, the
Church cannot exist or fulfill its spiritual mission without these buildings
and institutions. Therefore, the Church will never relinquish these buildings
and institutions that it owns, but will continue to insistently claim them
until it obtains them. In the interest of peaceful relations between Church and
State, the buildings mentioned in the aforementioned law must be exempt from
any nationalization, in clear terms.
X
Likewise, it is
absolutely necessary that all buildings intended for religious worship
(churches and chapels) that previously served that purpose and are currently,
without the Church's consent, being used for secular purposes be returned to
the Church as its property. They must be vacated immediately so that they can
serve their original purpose.
XI
Furthermore, the Church must
enjoy freedom for the repair, enlargement, and construction of churches and
rectories. Subordinate bodies should, in granting such permits, proceed freely,
especially when it comes to churches destroyed or damaged during the war. It
also does not honor the country if foreign tourists, passing by these ruined
churches 15 years after the war ended, photograph them.
XII.
Regarding cemeteries,
even now, when in most republics they have been declared communal property by
unilateral action and without consulting the Church, the Church's fundamental
and traditional rights over ecclesiastical-owned cemeteries should be
guaranteed. Even in new state cemeteries, the traditional custom of allocating
certain sections to recognized religious denominations should be respected, and
the right of priests to access cemeteries to officiate at religious burials
according to the respective liturgy should be guaranteed by law. Likewise, priests
should be permitted to use cemetery chapels to celebrate rites on the
established dates for remembering the deceased.
Therefore, the
prohibition on building such chapels in cemeteries yet to be established, as
stipulated in Article 3 of the Law on Cemeteries of the People's Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of March 20, 1960, should not apply.
XIII.
The Church cannot
properly fulfill its mission without the registers. The confiscated registers
should therefore be returned to the Church as soon as possible, since they
constitute its property. The civil registries had sufficient time to copy the
ecclesiastical registers for their use.
XIV.
The Law on the Legal Status of
Religious Communities, in Article 20, states that those preparing for the
priesthood enjoy the same rights as other students. In accordance with this
article, the Episcopate would welcome the authorities facilitating seminarians'
transportation on state transport and medical care in state hospitals under the
same favorable conditions as other students, since they are mostly sons of poor
parents. The Episcopate would also be pleased if, with regard to military
service, seminarians were given the same status as students in national
schools. Furthermore, the Episcopate rightly expects that seminarians will not
be subjected to any pressure during military service, nor will any attempt be
made to divert them from the vocation they have freely chosen.
XV.
Article 3 of the law
recognizes the right of religious communities to print and distribute religious
publications. The recognition of this right is of fundamental importance for
authentic religious freedom. The press has become a daily necessity for
everyone, and the Church could not successfully fulfill its spiritual mission
without this modern medium.
The Episcopate notes
with dismay that the state of the Catholic press in Yugoslavia is beyond
disastrous. Whereas in pre-war Yugoslavia, which was smaller than the current
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, more than 150 newspapers were published,
currently only a few monthly publications are produced. The little Catholic
literature that is published is done in a rudimentary way, using a mimeograph.
Even the most essential religious manuals can only be printed in limited
quantities and with great difficulty.
For the Church to
enjoy the right recognized in Article 3 of the law, it should at least have a
printing press. Before the war, the Church owned several printing presses, but
all were nationalized. At least one of these presses should be returned to the
Church, or it should be allowed to acquire one abroad, so that it can freely
print liturgical books, religious instruction texts, and ascetic books,
especially devotional books and hymns for the use of the faithful. For such a
press to operate successfully, the Church should be allowed to employ its own
staff, that is, monks or nuns. Since a single press cannot handle all orders,
state printing presses should also accept ecclesiastical commissions under the
same conditions as any other literary material. It should not be tolerated that
certain workers' councils refuse to print religious books when the Church,
according to the law, has the right to do so.
XVI.
The Episcopate notes
with satisfaction that currently no bishop is imprisoned and that the number of
detained priests is small, as well as that legal proceedings against priests
are not as frequent as before. However, in certain regions, judges of the
misdemeanor court often summon and punish priests—at a much higher rate than
members of other professions—and almost always for acts of a purely religious
nature: sermons, catechesis, and the confession of the faithful.
There is a justified fear that
the judges of the misdemeanor court are misapplying the law and issuing
unfounded sentences. Some of these judges act as if they follow the unwritten
rule that a priest is guilty whenever he is accused, and thus, even if the
priest provides much favorable testimony, it is rejected a priori, and only the
testimony of one or another prosecution witness, often highly suspect, is given
credence. Sometimes it can happen that unwitting individuals deliberately
induce priests to bless their marriage without the prior civil marriage
certificate, claiming to have "forgotten the certificate at home and not
be able to wait, as the wedding party is gathered and the reception awaits them
at home, so they cannot postpone the ceremony."
Such cases could not occur if the
law held the individuals responsible first, and then the priest responsible for
having performed the marriage before the civil ceremony, or for having brought
the child to baptism before registering the birth in the Civil Registry. It is
obvious that in certain cases, the judge of the misdemeanor court who sentences
priests to prison for atonement waits until major religious holidays such as
Christmas and Easter, and then issues the summons for the fulfillment of the
sentence, so that parishioners are left without a priest during these important
holidays. Such a procedure provokes understandable discontent and indignation
among the faithful, who feel that they themselves are being harmed. condemned
by being deprived of the usual divine service on such holidays.
XVII.
In particular, all
pressure from state or local authorities regarding so-called "professional
associations of priests" should be eliminated. Priestly discipline falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church, and the matter of priests as
citizens is a question of their personal and free conviction.
XV.
According to the
constitution of the Catholic Church, its supreme head is the Holy Father as
successor of the Prince of the Apostles, Saint Peter. Religious freedom implies
that Catholics can communicate freely with their supreme head on spiritual and
religious matters. This applies particularly to bishops, who are personally
responsible to the Pope for the administration of their dioceses.
It is absolutely
necessary to facilitate bishops' freedom to communicate with the Holy Father,
not only in writing, but also by visiting him personally, especially every five
years, since, according to the norms of canon law, they are obliged to go to
Rome in person and make what is called a "visitatio
ad limina." To this end, passports should be
issued to all bishops without exception each time they are required by official
duty to visit the Holy Father in Rome. We have faithfully observed that in
recent times almost all bishops have obtained passports for their "ad limina" visit.
It would also be
desirable for priests and the faithful to be able to obtain passports without
difficulty to attend major pilgrimages to holy sites such as Jerusalem, Rome,
Lourdes, etc., and to attend major religious events such as international
Eucharistic congresses. All these measures would generally be welcomed.”
The bishops, after
pointing out in 18 points “certain inaccuracies” on the part of state bodies in
the application of legal provisions relating to religious freedom as the main
impediment to the normalization of relations between Church and State, conclude
their memorial by requesting that these inaccuracies “be eliminated as soon as
possible.”
This document was
issued in Zagreb on September 2, 1960, and endorsed by all the bishops.
That statement
prompted one-sided and biased interpretations that present the problem in such
a way that the Church appears to lack goodwill. For the past 15 years, characterized
by the constant persecution of the Catholic Church, the communist government
maintained that the Church did not want to normalize its relations with the
State for manifestly political reasons. Only now, realizing that its supposed
political intrigues have been fruitless, does it want to reach an
understanding, which, in effect, would mean capitulation to the communist
regime and resignation to the Yugoslav State, which favors Orthodox Serbia.
This propaganda
maneuver fits within communist policy, which never ceased to accuse the
Catholic Church as a dark and reactionary force in the service of anti-popular
interests and enemy and imperialist powers. Charges in this regard were leveled
not only against several bishops, but also against the Holy See. The same
arguments were used to justify the break in relations with the Vatican in 1953.
The purpose of the
Yugoslav communist leaders was to present themselves to Serbs and Orthodox
Christians as unconditional defenders of the national unity of Yugoslavia, a
heterogeneous state from a religious, cultural, and national perspective, in
which cultural, national, and political divisions coincided with religious
ones. The Orthodox Serbs, a dominant element, albeit a minority, were staunch
supporters of the Yugoslav community, since they saw Serbia expanded within the
Yugoslav state.
The Croats, on the
other hand, mostly Catholic, simultaneously opposed the totalitarian communist
regime and sought to liberate themselves from Serbian domination and
re-establish their own state, which had existed for over a millennium until
1918, when Croatia was illegally incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes. This kingdom was later renamed the Yugoslav Kingdom
(South Slavs) in 1929 by decree of the dictatorial king, and in 1945 by the
communists, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.
In both monarchical
and communist Yugoslavia, a fundamental disagreement persisted between the
respective governments—dominated by the Serbian element—and Croatian public
opinion. For the rulers, anything that invigorated Croatian national
consciousness was subversive, while for the Croats, anything that favored the
policies of the governments, which were always anti-Croatian, anti-Catholic,
and anti-democratic, was seen as negative.
Undoubtedly, the
situation of the Catholic Church, which in Yugoslavia finds its main support in
the Croatian regions, is becoming very delicate. On the one hand, the Church,
faithful to its traditional doctrine, does not interfere in political
struggles, nor does it create or destroy states. On the other hand, in states
where religious and national discrimination is practiced and civil liberties
are repressed, solidarity movements arise among the persecuted, which
indirectly increases the Church's potential for resistance.
Even so, the Catholic
Church, dedicated to its spiritual mission, strives even with the communist
regime to find favorable conditions for fulfilling its high calling. Therefore,
those journalistic commentaries emphasizing that it was only after the death of
Cardinal Stepinac, the illustrious defender of
freedom and of John XXIII's policy of reconciliation, that it was possible to
pave the way for negotiations, are not true.
Only the Herald
Tribune correspondent, Barret McGurn—as
far as we know—correctly addressed this issue in his dispatch from Rome, dated
November 17, highlighting that Tito refused to release the head of the Catholic
Church in Yugoslavia and that the Vatican could not engage in negotiations
while Stepinac remained imprisoned. It was not the
Vatican nor the Metropolitan Archbishop of Croatia who were creating obstacles,
but rather Tito's communist government, which, during the period between 1945
and 1948, while feeling fully supported by Moscow, not only openly persecuted
the Catholic Church but was obstinate in separating it from Rome or destroying
it completely.
Later, when Tito's
survival depended on Western aid and his henchmen were forced to appease public
opinion, the communist government, while it suited them, could not withdraw
from its policy of persecution against Catholics without seriously risking the
animosity of the Serbs, who shared the communists' policy of persecuting Croats
and Catholics, considered inflexible enemies not only of communism but also of
the state that perpetuated Serbian hegemony. Cardinal Stepinac
became the symbol of resistance to this communist and Serbian policy of
persecution.
Cardinal Stepinac,
a courageous defender of the Church's rights and loyal to his Croatian
homeland, was a prudent prelate and a faithful interpreter of the Holy See's
intentions and doctrine. As a patriot, he sympathized with his people's
struggle for freedom and independence, but as the responsible head of the
Church in his country, he did not hesitate, in accordance with Church practice,
to recognize the established communist government.
On June 4, 1945, he even met with
the dictator Tito in an attempt to find a modus vivendi with the communist
authorities. Upon realizing that the communist government conceived of such
cooperation in a way unacceptable to the Church (they proposed, among other
things, establishing a national Catholic Church without recognizing the Pope's
supreme authority), Catholics prepared to resist. In this silent struggle,
Croatia gave a great number of
martyrs. Since Stepinac was considered
unconditionally loyal to the Holy See, a monstrous trial was orchestrated 16
months after the war ended, accusing him of alleged war crimes. The Holy See
understood and supported the heroic stance of Stepinac
and his parishioners.
To worthily reward his eminent
merits, as well as to demonstrate great benevolence to his entire nation (these
are the words of Pius XIII spoken in the secret Consistory of January 12,
1953), the imprisoned Archbishop was elevated to the dignity of cardinalate. As a result of this exceptional gesture,
Tito broke off diplomatic
relations with the Vatican, revealing that there was a fundamental conflict
between the communist government of Yugoslavia and the universal Catholic
Church, and not merely between a few prelates and the regime. The Yugoslav
communist leaders, that is, their anti-Catholic and anti-Croatian policies, are
solely responsible for this state of affairs.
Cardinal Stepinac,
even during the Trial, had repeatedly declared: "Let no one think that I
want war; let the current authorities enter into conversation with the Holy
See. The Church does not favor dictatorship, but it is not opposed to an honest
understanding with whomever... If there is goodwill, an understanding can be
reached, and the initiative belongs to the current authorities..."
Although Tito
declared on December 16, 1952, "The Vatican pursues an imperialist policy.
The policies of the Vatican and Italy are mutually reinforcing. The Italian government
contributes to Vatican domination by spreading reaction throughout the world,
while the Vatican supports Italy's imperialist aspirations against
Yugoslavia," and the following day announced the break with the Vatican,
six bishops visited the Yugoslav dictator a few days later, on January 8, 1953.
According to the
official statement, he received them to "discuss with them the
government's desire to settle relations between the State and the Catholic
Church in accordance with the Constitution and to discuss various issues
related to the severing of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the
Vatican." There was also another meeting on April 23, 1953. All was in
vain, as the communists did not desire an understanding, but rather capitulation.
The most contentious point was the bishops' demand that negotiations take place
between the Vatican and Belgrade, while the communists pressured for direct
talks with the episcopate and resorted to extorting priests' unions to force
them to dismiss their bishops.
The Yugoslav
communist government pretended to be unaware of the minimum conditions the
Catholic hierarchy required for a modus vivendi. However, these conditions were
communicated to the Yugoslav government in Vatican Secretariat of State note
No. 9414/52, which the Yugoslav government refused to receive on December 15,
1952. The note summarized the charges and positions put forward by the Holy
See. Chapter V of that important document specifies "the rights that the
Holy See cannot renounce and whose ignorance would render any eventual talks
with the Yugoslav government fruitless."
The Yugoslav government was
therefore aware of the Vatican's conditions, but refused to negotiate with the
Holy See, hoping to gain advantages by dealing directly with the episcopate,
which was subject to all kinds of pressure, and there had been no shortage of
it. Bishop Carevic was secretly murdered, and his
body was found in a well.
Bishop Simrak,
a distinguished historian, died in prison as a result of torture and lack of
medical attention. Bishops Cule and Celik succumbed to torture and physical assaults. Cardinal Stepinac also died prematurely in prison. Several bishops
were sentenced to prison. Others were attacked and injured during their
pastoral visits. Bishop Vovk was doused with gasoline
and set on fire. He narrowly escaped death.
Archbishop Saric
and Bishop Garic died in exile. Currently, numerous
prestigious priests are imprisoned, subjected to the harshest prison regime,
tortured, and humiliated. Those who passed through communist prisons—and there
are several hundred of them—have either died or are now human wrecks.
Despite all this, the
bishops did not waver. They remained loyal to the Holy See. They rejected all
suggestions of dealing directly with the government, bypassing the Vatican.
This is also confirmed by Western correspondents in their recent dispatches.
This can also be inferred from the Episcopate's memorandum, which emphasizes in
its first paragraph: 1) that it was the government that suggested the negotiations,
and 2) that the only competent and worthy body to discuss and conclude an
agreement is the Holy See.
The positions and
conditions, summarized in 18 points of the memorandum, coincide almost entirely
with the clarification of the rights that the Holy See cannot relinquish and
whose disregard would render any eventual negotiations with the Yugoslav
government fruitless, as stated in the note of December 15, 1952.
The conditions of the
memorandum are not a draft for a potential agreement, but rather—as the bishops
emphasize—preconditions for creating a favorable climate that would then
facilitate official negotiations to reach an eventual understanding between the
State and the Holy See.
The fact that the
memorandum lists the main violations of the Catholic Church's freedom and
demonstrates that these violations contradict the current Constitution and the
Law on Religious Communities has been intentionally misinterpreted. It is well
known that such abuses are consistent with the practices of communist
governments that formally guarantee freedoms but do not adhere to legal texts.
Therefore, it is a
clear misrepresentation of the meaning of the Episcopate's statements when the
communist government, in its official communiqué, suggests that invoking the
Constitution and the laws implies recognition of the validity of such
legislative texts, since in the same memorandum the bishops request the reform
of certain laws. Following such official reports, the New York Times
correspondent, generally quite lenient with the Yugoslav regime, in his
November 17, 1960, note refutes these assertions: However, it has been
emphasized (in ecclesiastical circles –
Editor's note) that
this step does not mean the bishops are backing down. The Bishops' Council is
demanding, it was declared, that the government enforce its own laws, which
guarantee religious freedom. The bishops complained that local authorities had
been violating the Church's rights, guaranteed by the Constitution. The
implication was that Belgrade had done nothing to stop such violations. It is
not, therefore, a matter of recognizing the laws, but of pointing out that the
government itself, which forms an indivisible whole with the local authorities,
does not respect them.
***
What are the chances of reaching a modus vivendi?
On the occasion of
the Archbishop of Belgrade's trip to Rome, where he was accompanied by four
other bishops, the press reported in mid-November that "despite the
existing difficulties," some outcome could be expected. However, the mere
news of the possible appointment of an Apostolic Delegate to Yugoslavia, who,
as is well known, does not hold diplomatic functions, was dismissed by the
spokesman for the Yugoslav communist government as "unfounded
speculation."
While Tito wanted to
create a favorable impression on Western opinion when negotiating substantial
loans, both in Washington and in European capitals, it is obvious that
"the existing difficulties" are serious, which also aligns with our
confidential and reliable information.
Apparently, the
communist government's primary objective was to achieve an initial success,
that is, to spread the word that there is a possibility of reaching the first
agreement between a communist government and the Vatican. To demonstrate that
Titoist communism was
capable of negotiating with the Vatican—something the Gomulka government could
not—the Yugoslav communist government communicated its position in writing to
Monsignor Ujcic for transmission to the Holy See.
This document, we have learned, was drafted after lengthy discussions in the
special ministerial commission, chaired by Eduardo Kardelj,
the regime's leading ideologue.
We do not yet have
access to the text, but based on confidential information, its content casts
doubt on the Yugoslav communist government's genuine willingness to reach an
agreement. It appears that, for the time being, the government is offering
minimal concessions:
1) It would not
obstruct religious instruction in churches, but would not allow it in schools;
2) It would not close the seminaries that still exist, but neither would it
allow the reopening of those already closed (which are the majority). 3) It
offers bishops, canons, and professors of theology monthly salaries without the
bishops having requested them; 4) The Church would not be burdened with such
onerous taxes as the current ones, which in reality constitute plunder; 5) The
government would refrain from nationalizing ecclesiastical buildings, but
refuses to return those already confiscated, which are many; 6) The government
denies having exerted pressure on priests to participate in trade union-type
associations against the directives of the bishops, and offers social security
and financial assistance, even to priests not affiliated with said
associations; 7) The government would not return the confiscated Catholic
printing presses and would only allow the acquisition of a small printing press
with ecclesiastical resources, which, moreover, could not be installed in
either the capital of Croatia or Slovenia. In general terms, the regime
promises to rigorously observe the laws concerning religious freedom, which
contradicts the objections contained in the seven points cited.
In short, the
communist government offers certain personal advantages, but concedes absolutely
nothing on fundamental issues for the Church, such as the education of youth
and the training of new priests. These are merely promises without any
guarantees. As for the economic advantages offered to the clergy, the
communists clearly want to weaken their ties with the parishioners, who until
now have provided for the economic needs of their priests, and make the clergy
economically dependent on the communist state.
***
Aside from the fact
that normal relations between the Catholic Church and a totalitarian communist
regime are impossible, there are other discouraging precedents in Yugoslavia's
past. This nationally and religiously heterogeneous state is dominated by
Orthodox Serbs who, knowing themselves to be a minority, feel their hegemony
threatened, first and foremost, by Croatian Catholics.
In this respect, the
failed attempt by the monarchical government to conclude a concordat with the
Holy See is more than revealing. With the assassination in Marseille in 1934 of
the dictatorial King Alexander I of the Serbian Karageorgevic
dynasty, the pan-Serbian dictatorship was going through a difficult period due
to the staunch opposition of the Croats. The government, driven by domestic and
foreign policy considerations, deemed it opportune to reach an understanding
with the Vatican. The concordat, signed on July 25, 1935, was only approved by
parliament in 1937.
Although parliament
was a compliant instrument of the government, 264 deputies voted in favour and a strong minority of 128 voted against the concordat.
But the final word rested with the Serbian Church, which openly opposed the
principle of religious equality for Catholics, whose numbers totaled 38%, while
Orthodox Christians comprised 42%, including nearly two million Orthodox
Macedonians and Montenegrins, who opposed the supremacy of the Serbian Church.
The Holy Synod of the
Serbian Orthodox Church, in a letter dated October 13, 1935, addressed to the
regents, expressed the following position: "The Serbian Orthodox Church
must retain its position as the State Church, and any other churches must be
tolerated by the State, as in other neighboring Orthodox countries, Greece,
Bulgaria, and Romania." Of course, the representatives of the Serbian
Church forgot that Yugoslavia is not an Orthodox country like Bulgaria and
Greece (the Romanian Constitution guaranteed Catholics equality with the
majority Orthodox), since the majority of the population is comprised of
adherents of other faiths.
The Orthodox
ecclesiastical hierarchy, like its Serbian parishioners, conceived then and now
of Yugoslavia as an enlarged Serbia and governed the non-Serbian regions as if
they were colonies. When parliament approved the concordat, the Holy Synod
pronounced anathema against the Serbian deputies who approved it. Consequently,
the concordat was never ratified.
At that time, the
prestigious Czech liberal daily "Narodny Politika" (August 6, 1937) made the following comment:
"This (Serbian) Church forgets that the concordat with the Catholic Church
was concluded in the interest of the unity of Yugoslavia. The concordat with
Rome was a necessity for the State. If the high hierarchy of the Serbian Church
is incapable of understanding this, then it is evident that it desires neither
the unity of Yugoslavia nor reconciliation with Croatian Catholics."
That the Serbian
Church is also favored in communist Yugoslavia is conclusively confirmed by the
report of Tito's lieutenant, Interior Minister Rankovic,
presented in July 1956 to the Federal People's Assembly: "Relations
between the State and the Orthodox Church, especially the Holy Synod, are
cordial. Many Orthodox bishops maintain close ties with government authorities,
and Orthodox priests actively collaborate with local authorities...
The only religious
community with which no agreement or collaboration has been possible is the
Catholic Church: there is no understanding on the part of the hierarchy or its
priests... Through its propaganda, received without reservation not only by all
Catholic newspapers but also by certain foreign agencies, the Vatican only
exacerbates this situation..."
***
All these precedents
more than prove the great difficulties, disagreements, and opposing viewpoints
to which the bishops refer in their report. It is therefore very difficult to
reach a truly positive and lasting modus vivendi.
If negotiations
continue despite all this, we must attribute it, in part, to the principled
stance of the Church, which seeks to exhaust all means to improve the
conditions under which its spiritual mission is fulfilled, and, in part, to the
difficulties of the communist government, very weak internally and increasingly
dependent on direct and indirect aid from the West. For this reason, the
Yugoslav communists are compelled to take into account public opinion in the free
world. The era in which Yugoslav leaders underestimated the social influence of
religion in Croatia and the Western world is over.
ARCHBISHOP OF
SARAJEVO DIES IN EXILE
On July 16, 1960, Archbishop Juan Evangelista Saric
of Sarajevo, Metropolitan of Bosnia-Herzegovina, died in Madrid at the age of
89, after 14 years of exile. The deceased prelate was a fervent and meritorious
pastor, a prominent national figure, a man of letters, and a poet.
He was born in Bosnia on September 27, 1871, during the Ottoman period,
seven years before the Congress of Berlin, which authorized Austria-Hungary to
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, then under Ottoman rule. He came from an old
Bosnian family, from Dolac, near Travnik,
the seat of the viziers. He belonged to the first generation of Bosnian clergy,
educated in the teaching institutions founded and meticulously organized by the
newly established Archdiocese of Sarajevo (1881).
In reality, this represented a revival of the ancient Diocese of Bosnia,
dating back to the 11th century, the era of the medieval Croatian kingdom and
later the Kingdom of Bosnia, overthrown by the Turks in 1463, who beheaded the
last Bosnian king, Stephen Tomasevic. Queen Mother
Catherine took refuge in Rome, bequeathing her kingdom to the Holy See (1478).
During Turkish rule (1463-1878), there was no ecclesiastical hierarchy in
Bosnia. The Turks, despite the contrary opinion disseminated in the West,
practiced a degree of religious tolerance, always giving preference to Islam.
The Franciscans, who had remained with their flock, obtained a document in 1482
from Muhammad II al-Ahadnama, limiting their
privileges, which were granted only to sovereign persons. Thus, the Franciscan
province in Bosnia is still called the "State of the Franciscan
Order."
Even so, the situation of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire was difficult,
since the Pope operated outside the Empire's borders, unlike the Patriarch of
Constantinople, a Turkish subject and head of the Orthodox Christians.
Furthermore, the Popes were the main promoters of the Crusades against the
Turks, and the Croats, kin to their Bosnian Catholic neighbors, were among the
most tenacious fighters in the wars between Islam and Christendom.
Thus, the Catholics of Bosnia became a diaspora, and the Muslims, formerly
Bosnian Patarians, became the majority, until the
Orthodox, a Balkan element favored by the Turks to such a degree that they
sometimes forced Catholics, deprived of their clergy, to renounce Catholicism
and become schismatics, settled in Bosnia.
Only during the Austrian administration (1878-1918) did the situation of
the Catholic Church in Bosnia improve substantially. The Catholic hierarchy was
reorganized, composed of the Archbishop of Sarajevo and the suffragan
bishops in Banja Luka and Mostar.
The first Archbishop of Sarajevo, Monsignor Joseph Stadler,
a former professor of philosophy at the Faculty of Theology of the National
University of Zagreb, displayed great organizational activity. He established
new parishes, founded several educational institutions, a minor and a major
seminary run by the Jesuits, and also organized flourishing educational
establishments for women.
His great merit lies in having educated the local clergy in a short
period of time, since he had to begin with the clergy who had come from other
Croatian regions, from Austria, and even from France (the great Trappist abbey near Banja Luka).
His activity in the religious and cultural spheres was considerable, as was his
publishing work. Esteemed in Vienna and a good Croatian patriot, he exerted
considerable influence on public life, so that Catholicism in Bosnia
progressed, which in turn favored Croatian national thought. Thanks to his
tireless activity, as well as the assiduous work of the Franciscans, the number
of Catholics tripled. In 1940, there were more than 700,000 Catholics in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. This rapid increase was mainly due to natural population
growth, one of the highest in Europe (20 per thousand annually).
Monsignor
Saric belonged to the first generation of this
Bosnian clergy; At just 25 years old, he was appointed canon of the
Metropolitan Chapter. His literary talents led to his being entrusted with
several publications, and at the age of 37, he was consecrated as auxiliary
bishop. In 1922—by then a Yugoslav subject—he was appointed Archbishop of
Sarajevo, succeeding Archbishop Stadler.
He
fulfilled his new role as a good shepherd, a faithful son of the Holy See, a
selfless and very active prelate. He increased the number of parishes, built
new churches, strengthened Catholic schools, engaged in extensive publishing
activity, promoted Catholic Action associations, and made Sarajevo an important
center of Catholic life in Croatia.
In other Croatian
regions, he became popular thanks to his literary and patriotic work. He
published a series of poetry books and translated many books into Croatian,
including the Holy Scriptures.
His patriotic work
can only be fully appreciated by considering the turbulent situation in Bosnia,
where the first shots of the First World War were fired, following the
assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, in 1914. Present-day Bosnia is a relatively new geographical entity,
as for almost a millennium, most of Bosnia constituted the central part of the
Kingdom of Croatia.
The territory of
Bosnia, properly speaking, was first part of the Kingdom of Croatia, then the
Hungarian-Croatian vassal kingdom until the Ottoman conquest, which extended
its borders to the Adriatic Sea. As mentioned, Orthodox groups appeared in
Bosnia during the Ottoman Empire, and they currently constitute the largest
minority, at 40%. Although these Orthodox Christians constitute a minority and
Bosnia is an integral part of Croatia from a geographical, historical, ethnic,
and economic perspective, Serbia had stirred up considerable agitation in the
wake of the Congress of Berlin, seeking to convince European opinion that it
had suffered a great injustice by not having Bosnia annexed to it. This issue
gave rise to violent antagonism between Serbs and Croats, who until then had
tolerated and helped each other.
The Orthodox
ecclesiastical leaders, staunch opponents of Austrian policy in Bosnia,
identifying the Church with nationality, and aided by Serbia and Russia, waged
intense propaganda with the aim of converting the entire Orthodox population to
Christianity. In contrast, the Catholic clergy sided with the Croatian patriots
and maintained a loyal attitude toward the authorities, although they disagreed
with the absurd Austro-Hungarian condominium policy in Bosnia, which was
detrimental to Croatian national interests.
With the formation of
the heterogeneous Yugoslav state, dominated by Serbia, difficult times arrived
for both Catholics and Muslims in Bosnia. The Serbian national church was
favored and privileged as the state church, while Croats—Muslims and Catholics
alike—suffered persecution, accused of being Austrian sympathizers. This
accusation was later leveled against them in 1945, with the reunification of
Yugoslavia, by communist Serbs, who added that they were collaborators because
they defended Croatian independence.
In such circumstances, it was
always difficult to distinguish between the national and religious struggles.
The late Archbishop Šarić, a consistent and
courageous defender of the Church's rights, was respected by all Croats as a
great patriot and denounced by Serbs for his alleged subversive activities.
This marked the beginning of the harsh trials that awaited the Church in
Bosnia. During World War II, the Serbs unleashed a violent repression against
the Croats, especially in the mixed-race areas, and the communists did the same
against the Catholics and Muslims of Bosnia.
The program of the Serbian
nationalist resistance was the restoration of Yugoslavia to its role as Greater
Serbia. To achieve this, it was necessary to exterminate the Catholic and
Muslim Croats in the mixed-race areas and thus ensure a Serbian majority in
Bosnia. The genocidal program was in its initial phase of implementation, reaching
such proportions that even the British government had to lodge its strongest
protest, despite its interest in the guerrilla warfare. During the war itself,
numerous Catholic priests were murdered and several churches burned by Serbian Chetniks.
The tragedy reached
its peak with the communist seizure of power, supported by Serbian nationalism.
The reprisals were carried out, in truth, under anti-fascist slogans, but no
less horrendous for it. The situation became so critical that the good shepherd
Saric could no longer remain with his flock, as not
only imprisonment but also torture and terrible humiliations, which would
ultimately lead to his death, hung over his life. He was thus forced to seek
refuge in the Austrian zone occupied by the British and later in Spain, where
he lived modestly, withdrawn from all public life, and dedicated to writing
religious books.
Bishop Garic, O.F.M., Bishop of Banja
Luka, also had to leave his diocese and go into exile in Austria, where he
died. The only bishop remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina was Bishop Cule, of the Diocese of Mostar.
The communists arrested and tortured him repeatedly. In a staged traffic
incident, he broke both legs. Bishop Celik, the new
bishop of Banja Luka, although in excellent health,
was persecuted and repeatedly tortured. Catholic schools were closed and
convents and religious institutes were dissolved.
The press and
Catholic societies were banned. In the Archdiocese of Sarajevo in 1956, there
were 50,000 fewer Catholics than before the war, and that diocese, as we have
noted, experienced extraordinary population growth. Reverend Dragun, in his book *Le Dossier du Cardinal Stepinac* (Paris, 1959, p. 71), published data from which
it can be inferred that the communists killed at least 10,000 Catholics in that
diocese. In the Diocese of Banja Luka, the situation
of Catholics is even more precarious. The number of Catholics dropped from
140,000 to just 40,000.
The death of
Archbishop Saric, a prominent representative of the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, which occurred in exile, far from his flock and his
beloved homeland, symbolizes the sufferings of the Church in Croatia and
especially in Bosnia, where Croats, both Catholic and Muslim, are persecuted
not only for religious reasons, but also for political ones, since the
communist rulers tend to transform this strategic and rich province into a
region with a Serbian national character and a Balkan cultural identity. The
last words of the elderly Archbishop, spoken on his deathbed, take on
particular significance: "I offer all my sufferings to the Lord for my
beloved Croatia."
THE DIFFICULT
SITUATION OF MUSLIMS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Following the
penetration of the Ottoman Empire, strong centers of Muslim population remained
in the Balkan countries. In the nation-states of Eastern Christians, formed
during the last century, these minorities were partly exterminated and partly
expelled. Only in the possessions that Turkey lost in our century (Albania,
Macedonia, Kosovo, and Metohija) were pockets of the
Islamic faith preserved, albeit in a precarious situation, with the exception
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, occupied by Austria-Hungary
in 1818 by resolution
of the Congress of Berlin and later annexed in 1908. In these provinces,
Muslims constitute almost a third of the total population. Among these Muslims,
there are hardly any ancestors of the former Turkish conquerors, since they
belong to the Croat ethnic group and speak the Croatian language. Having been
the ruling political class during the Turkish conquest and having enjoyed
special privileges under the Ottoman Empire, it was very difficult for them to
adapt to the new situation, and mass immigration to Turkey ensued, which
continues to this day. Currently, the largest group of emigrants are Muslims from
Macedonia.
Their misgivings and opposition
to the Austrian occupation gradually diminished, thanks to the unquestionable
administration of the commanding country and the psychological impact produced
by the Balkan Wars (1912-13), so that the Muslims of Bosnia in the First World
War were considered the chosen troops of the army of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, which was then allied with Turkey.
With the Danubian monarchy disintegrated and Yugoslavia established
under Serbian control, these communities faced far greater difficulties. As is
well known, the medieval Serbian state was absorbed by the Ottoman Empire, and
the Serbs were stripped of all social and political rights. As Ottoman power
declined, the emancipatory struggle of the Balkan Christians, who constituted
an overwhelming majority, intensified.
In Serbia, this
struggle was waged under the banner of a vengeful myth against the Turkish
conquerors. The new Serbian state equated religion with nationality and,
therefore, religious minorities were barely tolerated. Muslims, considered
"hereditary enemies," were exterminated or expelled.
Servia integrated into Yugoslavia
without shedding this mentality. There were prominent Serbian politicians who
seriously considered exterminating and expelling all Muslims from Yugoslav
territory. Tragic consequences of such sinister plans were the massacres of
Muslims perpetrated by the forces of the Serbian nationalist general Draza Mihailovic during the last
world war.
Even so, in the
period between 1918 and 1929, under a pseudo-democratic regime and before the
establishment of the real Pan-Serbian dictatorship, Muslims had managed to
organize themselves politically, standing together in solidarity against the
common danger. They won certain rights, but were economically ruined by an
unjust land reform, while their religious institutions endured intense pressure
and rigid control from the government, dominated by the Serbian group.
During the last war,
the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina fought alongside their Catholic brethren
for the Croatian nation-state. Given that they lived intermingled with Serbian
Orthodox Christians, their situation, after the war, worsened to such an extent
that there were attempts to exterminate them outright. In the final phase of
the war, the communists, for proselytizing reasons, offered some protection to
the Muslim population against the massacres perpetrated by Serbian
nationalists.
Furthermore, Bosnia
and Herzegovina were established as "people's republics" within
Yugoslavia. While the other "people's republics" were formed
according to national criteria, Bosnia and Herzegovina were an exception, as
there is no Bosniak nationality. These provinces are
home to an ethnic Croat majority with a sizable Serbian minority, and it would
have been logical to include them in the "People's Republic of
Croatia," granting them a status of autonomy similar to that of Vojvodina, which was incorporated into Serbia.
The communists argued
that this division, detrimental to Croatia's national interests, was a measure
aimed at better protecting the interests of Muslims within a
"republic," where they comprise a third of the population, than if
they had been annexed to Croatia, where they would constitute only 15% of the
population. This was, in fact, a maneuver favoring the Serbian minority in
Bosnia, which holds all the important positions in local political and economic
institutions, with the unconditional support of the central government in
Belgrade. The artificial division of Bosniaks into
Serbs, Croats, and "Muslims"—who are and can only be one religious
group—served solely to ensure the dominance of the Serbian minority over the
artificially separated Catholic and Muslim Croats.
Given the reality,
all the communist promises that the situation of Muslims would improve in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have proven illusory. With all power held by
the Serbian minority, Muslims are persecuted and subjected to all kinds of
pressure due to the traditional hatred of the Serbs. Their situation would be
much more favorable if they were incorporated, enjoying broad autonomy, into
the Republic of Croatia, where Catholics feel national solidarity with Muslims,
so religious differences don't matter. Furthermore, Croats share the
pluralistic ideas of the West, and therefore religious differences do not
hinder national and political integration.
While the influence
of Croats in the "People's Republic of Croatia" is very limited,
since in a communist dictatorship power is held by the central government and
the communist party with a centralist structure—in both instances Serbian
predominance is evident—the situation of the Muslim religious community is even
more difficult, if possible, than that of the Catholic Church.
The repressions were
so violent that, fearing reprisals, a large portion of the Muslim population
declared themselves "nationally undefined" in the 1948 census, since
the communist government equated their Croatian identity with "Nazi
collaboration." This declaration even implied a high degree of civic
awareness, as the few Muslims who declared themselves Serbs were favored and
valued.
As soon as they came
to power, the communists eliminated prominent members of the Islamic religious
community, especially those known for their Croatian ideals and religious
activity. At the same time, the political organization of Muslims was
suppressed, and its representatives fled abroad, were murdered, or forced into
complete inactivity.
Then, leaders
compliant with the regime were imposed on the Islamic religious community. This
was possible because, even in monarchical Yugoslavia, this community operated
under state control and enjoyed very limited autonomy, by virtue of laws
enacted by the state. Muslim religious officials do not hold the same position
as Catholic clergy within their communities. The leadership of these
communities is usually shared by ordinary members of the faithful, which, under
exceptional circumstances, makes it easier for the state to impose its
candidates.
This is why the role
of true and authentic Muslim religious leaders becomes more difficult. In the
early years, moral or material support from the Islamic world could not be
expected, something that is now possible, given that Tito seeks to maintain
good relations with many Islamic countries and win them over to his policy of
"active and positive coexistence," so that he can present himself,
both domestically and internationally, as an important player in international
politics.
Even so, the communists
imprisoned the president of the Council of the Islamic Religious Community for
Montenegro, Husein ef. Redzepasic, a 75-year-old man. He was arrested on September
27, 1960, and accused of having slandered state and party authorities in a
report addressed to the Pakistani ambassador. He was also accused of having
delivered "an incendiary speech against the leaders and the
authorities," despite having merely recommended that the new imams be on
guard against the materialist doctrine of communism, contrary to the teachings
of the Quran (Bosanski Pogledi,
London, October 1960).
It is also worth
recalling the reprisals the communists took against the "Young
Muslims" organization, founded before the war as an expression of
solidarity with the pan-Islamic movement. In certain districts, it enjoyed the full
support of the Muslims. According to the Bosanski Pogledi—a well-informed Muslim publication—the communists
quickly dissolved the organization; its founders were killed, forced into
inactivity, or disappeared. However, it was already known in 1946 that the
organization was still operating clandestinely.
In 1947, it
restructured itself into cells of three, and in 1948, its organization crossed
the borders of Bosnia and published underground materials. Although its
activity was primarily religious in nature, the communists portrayed it as
instigating religious hatred and systematically persecuted its members. In
1947, several trials were held, and by 1949, the persecution intensified to
such an extent that the main organizers were arrested, sentenced to death, or
imprisoned. One of the main charges was that they were attempting to establish
contact with Islamic religious communities outside of Yugoslavia.
Religious education for young
people faced insurmountable obstacles. Of 200,000 Muslim schoolchildren, only
1,900 attended religious instruction, in mosques. The data presented by Ulema Medzilis to the Congress of
the Islamic Religious Community in 1960 is highly significant in this regard.
The third chapter of his report states that religious instruction was
prohibited in 10 districts, and in 14 localities, it could only be given in
mosques, for one hour every three months.
Textbooks were lacking, and the
official commission had not yet approved the proposed text. In some cities,
religious instruction is temporarily prohibited, under the pretext that mosques
lack heating and school supplies, but requests to provide religious instruction
in other buildings belonging to the religious community were rejected. Chapter
IV of the aforementioned report states: "In the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, there are still 239 closed mosques (and 102 schools), of which 112
are beyond the control of religious institutions, as these mosques are being
used as warehouses, cinemas, or gymnasiums."
A tremendous blow was
dealt to the Islamic religious community with the law nationalizing all
habitable buildings owned by the Muslim religious foundation (Vakuf). The income from these houses, donated for centuries
by Muslim faithful for religious purposes, maintained mosques and educational
institutions. The Islamic religious community was left without material
resources, and the administration of the foundations was dissolved.
The Ulema Medzilis, who inspected and
controlled the religious and cultural life of the community, were also
suppressed. Great indignation was provoked among both Muslims and Croat
Catholics by the nationalization of the Gazi Husrevbeg Institute in Sarajevo, which had already been
requisitioned in 1945 for the establishment of the Faculty of Philosophy and
Letters. This historic "medresa" was the
only Islamic secondary school in Yugoslavia. A group of 70 distinguished
Muslims from Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, sent a letter to the Yugoslav
dictator Tito requesting the return of the building. They were told to address
their concerns to the supreme religious leader, Reis el Ulema.
The action failed, and its initiators experienced the repressive measures of
the political police.
In connection with
this initiative, Bosanski Pogledi
(London, October 1960) published a very interesting document, smuggled out of
the country by an employee of the Religious Commission to the central
government in Belgrade. It was a confidential report on the intimidation of the
initiators of the aforementioned note, which had a wide-ranging impact, thus
making public reprisals inappropriate. The report on the situation of the
Islamic religious community, delivered to an Afghan delegation, was considered
a particularly negative development, as was the attempt to establish contact
with Muslims in Egypt.
A group of Muslim intellectuals
exiled from Bosnia is about to deliver some 20 documents, accompanied by
explanatory memoranda, to the United Nations, the governments of Islamic
countries, and major Islamic organizations. Among other allegations, they claim
that the president of the Religious Commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina is a
former officer of the sinister and feared political police, who must approve
every appointment of a hodza (Muslim priest).
He controls the pilgrims to
Mecca, and last year, out of 174 candidates, he only granted permission to 35.
Given that the Yugoslav communists strive to exert their influence in the
Islamic countries of Asia and Africa by granting them loans, sending
technicians, and giving lavish gifts (with money provided by Western
governments), this action by exiled Muslims could alleviate the situation of
their coreligionists in Yugoslavia and, at the same time, shed real light on
the Yugoslav communist leaders, who pretend to be champions of the freedom of
Islamic peoples against Western powers.