
STUDIA CROATICA
Croatian Journal of Political and Cultural
Studies
Year I, Buenos Aires, July-September 1960, No.
1
Studia Croatica 2
Croatian National Anthem 7
Song to Freedom 7
The Croatian National Anthem 8
The Stepinac Affair 10
The Trial of Cardinal Stepinac 22
Pastor, Hero, and Martyr 27
Documents 39
Words of Pope Pius XII on Cardinal Stepinac 39
Pope John XXIII on Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac
39
Statements of Stepinac before the People's
Court of Zagreb on October 3, 1946 41
Testimony of the President of the American
Jewish Association 45
Testimony of Ivan Mestrovic 45
Cardinal Stepinac's Last Letter: Letter to the
District Court 49 from Osijek
52 Croatia in the "Blavian
Geography"
65 American Epiphany of a Distinguished
Croatian Humanist
68 New Class and Nationalism
83 Score of the Croatian National Anthem
84 Croatia – Geographical, Economic and
Historical Data
89 Chronicles and Commentaries
In these defensive positions on the eastern border of the Western world,
Croatia occupies one of the key posts. For over a millennium, it has
legitimately possessed most of the eastern Adriatic coast, stretching between
the Alps, the Danube, and the Balkans. Located at this crucial point, it was
for centuries the border guardian, the defender of Western values
against the onslaughts of Byzantium, the Mongols, and the
Ottomans in a highly sensitive area, as a neighbor to the Apennine and Alpine
regions, seats of the papacy and empire—institutions that throughout the
centuries have been the faithful expression of Western unity.
For this reason, the Renaissance Pope Leo X had just cause when he
described Croatia as "the most salient shield and bulwark of
Christendom."
In modern times, Croatia, whose language belongs to the Slavic language
group, is exposed to the onslaught of Russian imperialism, first Tsarist, then
Soviet. The tenacious and self-sacrificing resistance offered by the captive
countries to communist oppression takes on the character of a defense of Western
culture against the onslaught of Bolshevism, a specific Russian form of Marxism
inextricably linked to the autocratic and Caesaropapist tradition of Eastern
European culture and civilization, whose principal exponent was once the
Byzantine Empire and in modern times the Russian Empire.
As soon as the communists occupied Croatia, they began an extermination
campaign against all deeply rooted traditions and all spiritual ties with the
Western world, imposing not only new institutions, opposed to the Croatian
spirit, but also a new mentality. This pressure was able to materialize
violently due to the sinister circumstances that forced the Croats, by virtue
of the 1919 peace treaties, to live in the multinational Yugoslav state,
heterogeneous and antagonistic in terms of culture, politics, and religious
creed, under the hegemony of Balkan Serbia, a country where Byzantine and
Russian traditions and influences still predominate today. In this sense,
Yugoslavia, in which Serbia exercises domination over the non-Serbian majority,
is analogous to Russia, which not only dominates so many peoples of the Soviet
Union, but also numerous satellite states, including former nations that are an
integral part of the Western world. Thus, Yugoslavia appears as the Soviet Union
"in miniature," even after the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow,
when the term "national communism" was coined.
There are also other reasons that make this publication timely within
the context of the Spanish language. There are ancient and vibrant ties between
Croatia and the Hispanic world, which must be maintained and strengthened even
further.
Even at the beginning of the 16th century, at a critical moment in
European and Croatian history, Croatia played an active role in the political
landscape dominated by Spain. At that time, the military power of the
Hungarian-Croatian kingdom was destroyed, along with the last resistance to
Ottoman expansion, whose goal was to conquer Rome and reach the Rhine. Western
countries forged extensive cooperation for defensive purposes, very similar to
that which exists today. A strong defensive alliance was established among the
Danubian countries under the aegis of the House of Austria and with the support
of the Spanish Empire. In 1527, the Croatians elected Ferdinand I, brother of
Charles V, "on whose empire the sun never set," as their king, thus
becoming one of the first founders of the community that was aptly named
"Little Europe." The Croats remained loyal to that community for four
centuries, until the end of the First World War, when the
"Balkanization" of the Danube basin took place, giving rise to the
National Socialist adventure and later to Soviet domination.
Furthermore, there are other, more expressive and intimate relationships
between Croatia and the Hispanic world. The Croats are genuinely a maritime
people, having participated in naval battles against the Saracens as early as
the Middle Ages; they also took part in the feat of the discovery of the New
World and especially in its development. As early as the 16th century, we find
groups of Croats on American soil, arriving not as conquerors but as settlers.
As a country with a population exceeding seven million, Croatians have made a
relatively significant contribution to the development of the Americas,
totaling approximately two million immigrants. Several hundred thousand of
these settled in South American republics, primarily as farmers and skilled
sailors, who, among other things, founded the Argentine merchant fleet (the
Mihanovic brothers). Due to their Western civilization and Catholic faith,
Croatians integrate and assimilate easily with the population of Latin America.
Until recently, they constituted the main immigrant group to the territory of
present-day Yugoslavia. Although they arrived with Austrian or Yugoslavian
passports and their documents did not indicate Croatian nationality, they were
nonetheless of Croatian descent. Regarding trade between Yugoslavia and the
South American republics, Croatian products occupy a leading position.
Following the end of World War II, the tragic mass migration from
European countries, fallen under communist rule, began. The wave of Croatian
refugees was particularly high. This forced expatriation continues, though
fraught with danger. Croatians were among the first postwar refugees and
endured extremely difficult times until the countries of the New World, in a
magnanimous gesture, opened their doors to them, first and foremost Argentina,
Venezuela, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Chile. These are thousands of
refugees, seasoned fighters forged in the anti-communist struggle, who
therefore appreciate the value of the institutions of the free world and their
efforts toward progress, human dignity, and national rights.
Therefore, the editors and contributors of "Studia Croatica,"
whose first issue coincides with the Year of the Refugee and the
sesquicentennial of the May Revolution in Argentina, embrace with equal love
their old and new homelands and intend to inform and enlighten the Hispanic
public with truthfulness and scientific rigor about the prevailing situation on
the volatile eastern border of our Western society, in that volatile land
where, in 1914 in Sarajevo, capital of the Croatian provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the first shot of the First World War was fired by Serbian
terrorists who attempted to assassinate the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne
and gave immediate cause to the fratricidal war (1914-18), which cannot yet be
considered over until true peace reigns, when all peoples and all individuals
are assured of life in freedom, dignity, and justice.
As soon as the communists occupied Croatia, they began a campaign to
exterminate all deeply rooted traditions and all spiritual ties to the Western
world, imposing not only new institutions, contrary to the Croatian spirit, but
also a new mentality. This pressure was able to manifest itself violently due
to the sinister circumstances that forced the Croats, by virtue of the 1919
peace treaties, to live in the multinational Yugoslav state, heterogeneous and
antagonistic in terms of culture, politics, and religious creed, under the
hegemony of Balkan Serbia, a country where Byzantine and Russian traditions and
influences still predominate today. In this sense, Yugoslavia, in which Serbia exercises
domination over the non-Serbian majority, is analogous to Russia, which not
only dominates so many peoples of the Soviet Union but also numerous satellite
states, including former nations that are an integral part of the Western
world. Thus, Yugoslavia appears as a "miniature" Soviet Union, even
after the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow, when the term "national
communism" was coined.
There are also other reasons why this publication is timely within the
context of the Spanish language. There are long-standing
and vibrant ties between Croatia and the Hispanic world, which must be
maintained and further strengthened.
Even at the beginning of the 16th century, at a critical moment in
European and Croatian history, Croatia played an active role in the political
landscape dominated by Spain. At that time, the military power of the
Hungarian-Croatian kingdom was destroyed, along with the last resistance to
Ottoman expansion, whose goal was to conquer Rome and reach the Rhine. Western
countries forged extensive cooperation for defensive purposes, very similar to
that which exists today. A strong defensive alliance was established among the
Danubian countries under the aegis of the House of Austria and with the support
of the Spanish Empire. In 1527, the Croatians elected Ferdinand I, brother of
Charles V, "on whose empire the sun never set," as their king, thus
becoming one of the first founders of the community that was aptly named
"Little Europe." The Croats remained loyal to that community for four
centuries, until the end of the First World War, when the
"Balkanization" of the Danube basin took place, giving rise to the
National Socialist adventure and later to Soviet domination.
Furthermore, there are other, more expressive and intimate relationships
between Croatia and the Hispanic world. The Croats are genuinely a maritime
people, having participated in naval battles against the Saracens as early as
the Middle Ages; they also took part in the feat of the discovery of the New
World and especially in its development. As early as the 16th century, we find
groups of Croats on American soil, arriving not as conquerors but as settlers.
As a country with a population exceeding seven million, Croatians have made a
relatively significant contribution to the development of the Americas,
totaling approximately two million immigrants. Several hundred thousand of
these settled in South American republics, primarily as farmers and skilled
sailors, who, among other things, founded the Argentine merchant fleet (the Mihanovic
brothers). Due to their Western civilization and Catholic faith, Croatians
integrate and assimilate easily with the populations of Latin America. Until
recently, they constituted the main immigrant group to the territory of
present-day Yugoslavia. Although they arrived with Austrian or Yugoslavian
passports and their documents did not indicate Croatian nationality, they were
nonetheless of Croatian descent. Regarding trade between Yugoslavia and the
South American republics, Croatian products hold a leading position.
Following the end of World War II, a tragic mass migration from European
countries, fallen under communist rule, took place. The wave of Croatian
refugees was particularly high. Forced expatriation continues, though fraught
with dangers. Croatians were among the first postwar refugees and endured
extremely difficult times until the countries of the New World, in a
magnanimous gesture, opened their doors to them, first and foremost Argentina,
Venezuela, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Chile. These are thousands of
refugees, seasoned fighters forged in the anti-communist struggle, who
therefore appreciate the value of the institutions of the free world and their
efforts toward progress, human dignity, and national rights.
Therefore, the editors and contributors of "Studia Croatica,"
whose first issue coincides with the Year of the Refugee and the
sesquicentennial of the May Revolution in Argentina, embrace with equal love
their old and new homeland and propose to inform and enlighten the Hispanic
public with truthfulness and scientific rigor about the prevailing situation on
the effervescent eastern border of our Western society, in that hot land where
in 1914 in Sarajevo, capital of the Croatian provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the first shot of the First World War was fired by Serbian
terrorists who attempted to assassinate the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne
and gave immediate cause to the fratricidal war (1914-18), which cannot yet be
considered over until true peace reigns, when all peoples and all men have
assured life in freedom, dignity, and justice.
CROATIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM
ANTUN MIHANOVIC (1796-1861)
Oh beautiful homeland of ours,
Heroic beloved land,
Sun of ancient glory,
May you be forever blessed!
We love you for your glories,
We love you, unique one,
Beloved for your plains
Beloved for your mountains.
Drava, Sava, Drina, flow,
Danube, do not lose your spirit,
Oh blue sea, tell the world,
That the Croatian loves his homeland,
While the sun shines upon its furrows,
And the wind stirs the oaks,
While the tombs guard its dead
While his heart beats!
ODE TO FREEDOM
IVAN GUNDULIC (1589 - 1638)
Beautiful, sweet, and beloved Freedom,
Gift of God, supreme good of life,
True cause of pure glory,
Only adornment of the flowery plain.
With lives, with gold, and with fine silver,
Your crystalline beauty cannot be repaid.
Translation: Vinko Nikolic
The Croatian national anthem is a lasting testament to the ethical sense
of the Croatian people. While celebrating the heroic deeds of their ancestors,
it does not glorify their conquests, as they rarely fought beyond their borders
when enlisted in the Austrian armies. Their armies, mobilized by the Croatian
Diet and under the command of their Ban, did not wage wars of conquest; they
defended only their homeland, the national community, and their cultural
values.
The anthem's author, Antonio (Antun) Mihanovic (1796-1861), was born in
Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, where he completed his secondary and university
studies. He served, among other positions, as Consul General of the Austrian
Empire in Belgrade, Thessaloniki, Izmir, Constantinople, and Bucharest. At that
time, Serbia was, in effect, a protectorate of Austria, so Serbian laws
required the approval of the Austrian Consul. He was particularly interested in
literary and linguistic topics and amassed a very important collection of
valuable documents and manuscripts, later called the Collectio Mihanoviciana.
In 1843, he discovered the so-called Zoograph Gospel, written in
Cyrillic script, on the holy mountain of Athos. In Italy, he found a handwritten
copy of the epic poem Osman, by the illustrious Croatian poet Ivan Gundulic
(1589-1638), who occupies the same place in Croatian literature as Cervantes
does in Spanish literature. Mihanovic also published a pamphlet in Vienna in
1815 advocating for the introduction of the Croatian language into public life
and the sciences, replacing Latin. His dissertation on the relationship between
Sanskrit and the Slavic languages is also well-known. Besides the
anthem, first published under the title Croatian Homeland in 1835 in the
newspaper Danica, published in Gaj, he composed a dozen poems of a love and
reflective nature. Mihanovic wrote the text of what would later become the
Croatian national anthem in Rijeka (Fiume), upon his return from the United
States, having traveled through all of Croatia in a poetic flight. He died in
Novi Dvori, near Zagreb.
Inspired by the lyrical beauty, the measured rhythm, and the ethical and
patriotic content of this poetry, the young officer and musician Joseph (Josip)
Runjanin (1821-1878) composed the music in 1846, based on a Croatian folk
melody.
From that year onward, many choirs sang it at concerts and patriotic
events, though it did not yet hold the status of a national anthem. From its
first performance, the people felt it as an intrinsic expression of their soul
and listened to it with open heads.
HISTORICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND DEMOGRAPHIC
CONTEXTS
At the end of the 6th century, Slavic tribes
crossed the Danubian and Hungarian plains; some headed towards the eastern
Italian-Austrian Alps, others towards an area between the Adriatic Sea, the
Drava and Sava rivers, west of a rather small river, the Drina, which would
separate the two peoples. The former were the Slovenes; the latter, the Croats.
Other Slavic tribes settled in the mountainous
part of the Balkans, between the Tisa River in the north and the border of
Greece in the south: these were the Serbs.
The Slovenes and Croats, west of the Drina,
came under Roman and Catholic influence; the Serbs, to the east, fell under
Byzantine and Orthodox influence. From both a religious and cultural
standpoint, by consequence, the former were to be dependent on Rome; the
latter, on Constantinople.
According to the official 1952 census,
Yugoslavia had 16,990,000 inhabitants, distributed among Serbia, Croatia,
Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. (These are the
federal republics of present-day Yugoslavia.) I should add here two regions
dependent on Serbia: Vojvodina, north of Belgrade, where many Hungarians still
reside, and Kosovo to the south, where numerous Albanians reside. Only Serbs
live in Serbia, and they are dispersed across several regions. They make up 14%
of the population in Croatia, 44% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 50% in Vojvodina
(along with 25% Hungarians), and 23% in Kosovo (compared to 65% Albanians).
But there are even more diasporas in Yugoslavia:
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina represent 24% of the population; Muslims, without
declared nationality but pro-Croat and always considered as such, reach a
proportion of 30%. In total, in this republic: 44% Serbs and 54% Croats.
I extracted these figures from the almost
official Documentation Française, issue of December 17, 1958: one could not
find more reliable figures reproduced with greater accuracy by a quality
publication.
If we total the various Yugoslav populations, we obtain the following
figures:
16,990,000 inhabitants, of whom 6,984,000 are Serbs, compared to
6,700,000 Croats, Catholics, and pro-Croatian Muslims, and 1,900,000 Slovenes.
I am not giving figures for Hungarians, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians,
or even Turks; note, moreover, the presence of 72,000 Italians on the Adriatic
coast.
Here is the complex Yugoslav demography, and suddenly the complexity of
the Yugoslav problem emerges.
But religious problems peculiarly exacerbate this complexity. Here,
again, it is essential to resort to the figures. This time I can cite only the
official censuses of 1921 and 1931, and the situation, in that respect, appears
almost unchanged; let's admit that there isn't a maximum variation of 1 or 2%
on either side; that doesn't change the overall picture at all:
Orthodox, 42%; Catholic, 38%; Muslim, 11%; various (Protestants, etc.),
9%.
So, from a racial, cultural, spiritual, and national point of view,
there is no natural unity from the Alps to the Balkans, from Bacha to Istria.
I have clearly stated "from a national point of view": indeed,
the State should not be confused with the Nation here. Even we in France do not
conceive of this distinction. For a long time in our country, State and Nation
have been confused, while in most Central and Eastern European countries,
formed by disparate and differentiated elements, what is not understood is the
close French symbiosis of State and Nation.
No natural unity. A mosaic, geographically established from West to
East, from West to East (both terms must be taken in their intrinsic sense),
with all its psychological, customary, and political consequences. The breaking
point is the Drina River. That is Yugoslavia.
Between the two world wars, French opinion—not the only one—that of the
street, the press, and parliament, ignored—some pretended to ignore—this
complexity and its demands. It was only known—or people wanted to know—that
Yugoslavia had Belgrade as its capital, the capital of Serbia, the heroic
Serbia of 1914, on whose territory the first major enemy assault was launched;
The sacrificed and venerated Serbia, whose glorious leader remained by his
soldiers' side to continue fighting; the Serbia, finally, that we in France
always hasten to honor and love. By extension, Yugoslavia was naively imagined
as a natural expansion of Serbia, through a kind of annexation, after the
conquest of the provinces seized from defeated Austria-Hungary.
But a greater Serbia was not a true Yugoslavia. Is it even known today
how many inhabitants Serbia would have had solely within its former territorial
borders? Here they are: if it were merely the most numerous Yugoslav nation,
within a true federation, discounting the population of Vojvodina and Kosovo,
autonomous regions, traditional Serbia would number only 4,461,000 inhabitants
out of a total Yugoslav population of 16,990,000.
THE DEVIATION AND ALTERATION OF A GREAT IDEA AND THE CONSEQUENCES
There is a strange and almost universally ignored paradox: there was
little or nothing "Serbian" in the concept and morphology of Yugoslavia.
The origin of the word, like that of the thing itself, was essentially
"Croatian" and somewhat "Slovenian."
Thus, the true initiators of Yugoslavism—that is, of Yugoslav unity, of
the South Slavs in the 19th century, then during the war of 1914–1918, and
finally during the peace negotiations—were the Slovenes and, above all, the
Catholic Croats, with their Latin spirit and Western culture. Ultimately, they
were victims of the falsification and misuse of the Yugoslav idea.
From 1958 onward, this deviation, this alteration of the Yugoslav idea,
became obvious. I judged them thus:
"Little by little, the Yugoslav idea gave way to nothing but a
Serbian conception that would provoke perpetual unrest in the new state. In
1919, Catholics had enthusiastically acclaimed the union of all South Slavs; in
1919, they were condemned to unification by force; Yugoslavia was nothing more
than a deceptive name intended to disguise, in the eyes of foreigners, an
imperialist and domineering pan-Serbia, to the greater detriment of the
national ideal, the patriotic ideal, unity, and the true strength of the
state."
Tragic disappointment and unjust misfortune. But it wasn't only the
Croats and Slovenes who suffered the consequences: King Alexander in 1984, and
the Serbian state and dynasty in 1941, were also victims.
At this point in the exposition, it is appropriate to establish the
cause-and-effect and effect-and-cause relationships. New, the concatenation of
events and their consequences. Nineteen years of Servism, from 1920 to 1939,
engendered a virulent anti-Croatian sentiment and anti-Catholicism (I use the
word without fear; Cardinal Stepinac himself will soon justify it).
The ruin of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes followed—1941,
already dislocated even before its defeat; then came German and Italian
domination; at that moment, anti-Croatian sentiment gave rise to the
anti-Servian and anti-Orthodox reaction of Ante Pavelić and his Croatian
state, so-called independent, whose errors and even crimes committed for
reasons of state were attributed to Cardinal Stepinac, who was completely
uninvolved in all of it.
Do you find the truth and severity of my judgment strange? Perhaps.
However, I stand by them. I must, therefore,
justify them.
TRUTH AND TRUTHS - OFFICIAL DATA
Dominant Serbianism, anti-Croatian sentiment between the two world wars;
French public opinion was completely unaware of this reality. And how much
astonishment my book provoked at the time, and how much scandal in certain
circles, in Belgrade and even in Paris! My revenge—a sad revenge—is that,
afterwards, the Marseille tragedy was soon considered an act of courage in the
service of truth.
The truth? It will be revealed through simple official Serbian
statistics from 1932. Despite the near-equal demographics between Serbs on one
side, Croats and Slovenes on the other, here are the astonishing inequalities:
Military Academy Cadets: 1,300 Serbs, or 85%; 140 Croats; 50 Slovenes.
Court officials: 30 Serbs out of 31, 94%
Decorations Chancellery: 9 Serbs out of 9, 100%
Office of the President of the Council officials: 13 out of 13
Ministry of the Interior: 113 out of 127
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 180 out of 218
Ministry of Public Instruction: 150 out of 156
Ministry of Justice: 116 out of 137
Generals: 115 out of 116
In summary: in all these administrative departments, between 80% and 95%
to 99% are Serbs. This reflects Serbian dominance and anti-Croatian sentiment
within the administration.
The statistics on religious matters continue (and don't forget the
percentages: 38% Catholic and 42% Orthodox):
Budget for religious services in 1920: for Orthodox worship, 17 million
dinars, 73%; for Catholic worship, 6 million dinars, 27%.
Bishops' stipends: Orthodox: 40,000 dinars; Catholic: 15,000 to 20,000 dinars.
Protestant parish in Belgrade: 900 parishioners, 116,000 dinars;
Catholic parish in Belgrade: 10,000 parishioners (ten times more): 66,000
dinars, almost half less.
Obstacles to education: these multiplied; Catholic teachers were
systematically assigned to Orthodox regions and vice versa. The obligation to
provide free education was going to be imposed on Catholic schools: this would
have meant their closure; King Alexander finally understood the complaints of
the Croatian bishops; the obligation was dropped.
Catholic school textbooks were subjected to severe censorship, and
official textbooks were imposed; however, one of these textbooks denied the
divinity of Christ and denounced Catholicism as an obstacle to national unity.
On my first stay in Slovenia, I was surprised to discover an Orthodox cathedral
in Ljubljana. Our consul was with me; I asked him: "How many Orthodox
parishioners are there in Ljubljana that such a cathedral had to be built for
them?" "There aren't any, properly speaking," he replied.
"To tell the truth, there are only Serbian Orthodox officials, all
imported into Slovenia."
But the Orthodox Church refused, on principle and tradition, to truly
become "Yugoslav." It remained purely Serbian in name and spirit.
Having greatly contributed to shaping Serbian national consciousness, it became
and remained, even for agnostics without religious faith, the Church of the
Serbian State. This explains why, under Alexander, a true Byzantine clericalism
prevailed, a virulent, deliberately provocative proselytism: provocation was
the construction of Orthodox churches in predominantly Catholic, or nearly so,
cities; provocation was those forced conversions to the Orthodox religion—an
irony of circumstances: among the false accusations leveled against Cardinal
Stepinac was that of forced conversions to Catholicism during Pavelić's
reign.
The courageous bishop, however, had nothing to do with it; he condemned
them even expressly and publicly: they were the work either of priests acting
on their own initiative, as passionate supporters, or of civilians driven by
political motives, most often by the inspiration of party leaders. This violent
anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox backlash was absolutely condemnable in principle
and highly immoral; however, in reality, it was foreseeable and almost
inevitable in Croatia, driven by the recent, ever-present memories of the
Serbian regime's atrocities, especially under the dictatorship of the sinister
sovereign. Such were the deadly, poisoned fruits of Serbian and Orthodox
chauvinism, the domineering spirit, and violence in the last quarter of a
century.
MONSIGNOR STEPINAC HAS THE FLOOR
At this point in my presentation, as I have indicated, I will give the
floor to Monsignor Stepinac himself. He is the one who will describe the
strange manifestations of Pan-Servism and anti-Croatian sentiment between the
two world wars; these same manifestations, as a counter-coup, were bound to
provoke, after the fall of the monarchy and the state, this sort of
Pan-Croatian, anti-Servian, and anti-Orthodox madness of the Ustaše.
In October 1935, he granted me a lengthy audience, then invited me to
lunch with him privately. He shared some unsettling confidences and revelations
with me. Returning late to my hotel, I feverishly jotted down, in telegraphic
style, the essential points of our passionate and alarming interview.
I searched for these notes, written haphazardly, at the whim of memory,
barely three-quarters of an hour after the conversation, and found them in my
files. I will quote them verbatim, in no particular order, if I dare to express
myself thus, and without comment.
"The Monsignor shows me a whip in his office, which he calls his
'Museum of Horrors'; this whip is made of braided iron wires and a
bolt..."
"Less blood was shed, he tells me, in one hundred years of
Austro-Hungarian rule than in five years of purported Yugoslavism by the
Serbian gendarmes..."
"...The slightest pretext is plausible for unleashing fury; during
one of my last pastoral visits, two people died in a brawl provoked by the
gendarmerie..."
"...After Monsignor Bauer's memorandum to the Prince Regent,
numerous threats were directed at both me and the Catholic priests. There were
four deaths in Taborsko; the violence and acts of oppression are countless..."
"No priest feels safe in his life; not a day goes by without one of
them coming to seek refuge." "My protection..."
"The Croatian flag—do they reproach us for it? But neither the
bishops nor the priests demand it: it is the Croatian people who want it. In
it, they see the symbol of their oppressed freedoms. Yet Austria-Hungary
tolerated it..."
"Under Austria-Hungary, 700 gendarmes were enough to maintain order
in Croatia; now there are 6,000 to 7,000! They argue about the influence and
actions of communism: this is 'impossible in Croatia today...'"
"...My pastoral visits are considered political agitation. But what
can I do? The Diocese of Zagreb is immense; it has 1,700,000 inhabitants. If
the governor pretends to see political action there, then again: what can I
do?"
" "We live in a regime of suspicion. Denunciation lurks
everywhere. It's a Turkish system perpetuated through the Serbian regime. The
police, the gendarmerie: a state within a state..."
"A sergeant tried to bribe a woman to deliver a package. What
package? A bomb. And where to take it? To the bishop's palace. 'You'll be
rich,' the sergeant said, 'if you carry it.' The official record of this matter
was incorporated after the statements and confrontation of the actors in this
drama, which fortunately failed..."
"Monsignor Stepinac gave me a moving photograph. I resisted
believing in the authenticity of the photographed document. Then he placed the
original in my hands: a receipt issued by a Serbian tax agent on duty in a
border town; a receipt in good and proper form, with the required signature and
seal, for a sum paid by a family for five bullets for the execution of the
father."
" His crime? He had violated the regulations concerning the toll
imposed on peasants whose lands bordered the frontier. The man was on bad paper
and considered a dangerous Croatian militant; he was arrested, convicted, and
shot. The cost to the family: thirteen dinars, fifteen cents...
I interrupt my quotations here.
STEPINAC, FACING TYRANNY, SUPPORTER OF PRINCIPLES, DEFENDER OF THE
SERBS, ORTHODOX, AND JEWS
Now we must speak of Monsignor Stepinac himself. First, the conditions
of his defense. The Monsignor has refused to defend himself and has not chosen
his lawyers.
Who appointed them, then? The Supreme People's Court of the State; it
had initially rejected the lawyers who had spontaneously offered to defend the
Cardinal. The prosecution, therefore, chose the defenders, since it was the
Supreme People's Court that appointed them. And which defenders?
First, Dr. Politeo: defense attorney for Tito under the king's
dictatorship; then, Dr. Katicic; in his defense speech, he did not hesitate to
state that he was speaking as the official lawyer.
Now, both men, in that communist regime called federal and national, but
in fact and necessarily almost dictatorial (like all communist regimes, both
Moscow's and those of the people's democracies), irrefutably and, moreover,
unchallengedly demonstrated the innocence of the accused. Moreover, both, and
especially Politeo, in turn made accusations. It took courage.
Whom did they accuse? The Court itself for refusing to admit the
evidence. On the bench, Politeo declared:
"I submitted a significant amount of documentation and indicated
impartial witnesses. They were rejected. They are making Monsignor Stepinac a
scapegoat for all the crimes committed, not only by members of the clergy or by
Catholics, but even for all the crimes committed by the Independent State of
Croatia." This is expressly point number 1 of the indictment.
The truth, then, is quite the opposite. The Cardinal's writings reveal
genuine challenges hurled at the victorious fascism and Nazism. And in what
terms! Let's see:
"Even if they have all the weapons at their disposal ('they' refers
to the Nazis and fascists entrenched in Zagreb near the Curia), even if they
possess all the material means, even if they control the press, radio, and
cinema of the entire world, they will perish."
The Archbishop thus publicly condemns them; He issued this further
challenge to the fascist and Nazi authorities:
"Since this is foreign interference in the affairs of our country,
I have no fear, even if this protest of mine falls into the hands of this
foreign power: the Catholic Church, which I represent, fears no earthly power,
as long as it is a matter of defending the fundamental rights of man."
The Archbishop was a constant, courageous, even audacious defender and
protector of the Jews. This earned him, consequently, the homage of the
president of the Jewish community of Zagreb and numerous foreign Jewish
figures, especially from America. To the Minister of the Interior, Artukovic,
he wrote on May 23, 1941:
"Even prostitutes and their accomplices are not branded with the
yellow star, affixed to their bodies. This is done to avoid provoking public
contempt for those who deserve it, but dishonors those whose only fault is
belonging to another race."
Such courage can be measured by comparing it to the deliberate,
obstinate silence of the hierarchy at the same time, in other places.
One month after the advent of the Croatian State (May 14, 1941),
Pavelić ordered the execution of a group of Serbian rebels. Stepinac
immediately protested and wrote to Pavelic:
"In my capacity as Archbishop, I protest against this violence:
Catholic morality does not permit such acts. I beg you to take all necessary
measures immediately to ensure that not one more Serb is killed unless they
have committed a proven act deserving of the death penalty..."
Shortly afterward, upon learning that the Serbian hostages were in
danger of being shot, he telephoned Pavelic:
"Do not do that. Catholic morality forbids killing hostages for the
sins of others. It is pagan behavior that incurs the wrath of God."
On June 29, 1942, from the pulpit of the cathedral, he declared:
"If we have not managed to save them (the Serbian hostages), it is
not the fault of the Church; it is the fault of those who violated divine and
human laws to unleash their vengeance upon the innocent."
But then we ask ourselves, why, if all of this is true; if it is known,
proven, and undeniable, how is it? Why the arrest, the trial, the imprisonment,
the confinement of Archbishop Stepinac? They should have honored him; yet, they
condemn him.
However—a fact that must be emphasized—not immediately: sixteen months
will pass after the "liberation" of the country before they bother
him. They prefer to take advantage of the time, perhaps to use the influence of
their future victim over the Croatian people, in the belief that it will
facilitate the installation of the system and its men.
The day arrives when the trial must be attempted. Tito then offers to
facilitate his departure from Croatia by plane. If the Archbishop, this
political criminal, accepts this pardon, by fleeing, facilitated by his
accuser, he would appear to confess his guilt: then the trial is no longer
necessary; the objection of civil justice will be avoided. Moreover, the
accuser will be praised for his magnanimity!
The Archbishop does not fall into the trap: he is innocent of all
charges. "Let them condemn him!" But he is an innocent man who will
be condemned. The world will eventually know. True justice will one day
vindicate the truth. Whatever happens, he will not flee, he will not abandon
his flock or his office. From that moment, the die is cast. The trial takes
place. The Archbishop is condemned.
At that time, Tito granted an interview to the correspondent of the
"New York Times," Mr. Sulzberger, which surprised everyone and caused
quite a stir. Tito felt compelled to comment on it!
"Because of this interview," Tito explained, "and the
interpretation given to it—that Stepinac would be released if he went
abroad—the Orthodox population has expressed its discontent."
Note carefully that he doesn't simply say "the population,"
meaning the entire nation. No; he says "the Orthodox population."
And Tito continued: "They—the Orthodox population—consider him a
war criminal: and there's no room for change. We must take into account the
feelings of the Orthodox population."
REASON OF STATE
This time, the true word has been spoken. The "why" of the
Archbishop's persecution is not the proven crimes. No. These are accusations
considered true by the Orthodox population: the will of that segment of the
population takes precedence over Truth and Justice.
Tito already hints at this. But he will do so more explicitly: it is for
reasons of confessional state that the atheist leader of an agnostic and even
irreligious regime is harassing Bishop Stepinac, head of the Catholics in
Croatia.
To tell the truth, the two reasons—reason of state and confessional
reason—are indistinguishable: the only traditionally national Church, even for
the new communist Yugoslavia, is the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Catholic
Church, also traditionally national, is nothing but a foreign body.
As early as 1930, a prominent, almost official, figure, the president of
the Masonic Lodge of Belgrade, thought and spoke in the same way: The religious
organization is nothing more than an instrument of the State; the government
should therefore not leave that instrument in the hands of a foreigner. Which
foreigner? The Pope.
How can we not compare this statement with the words Tito addressed in
December 1949 to the organization of the People's Priests of Slovene Cyril and
Methodius, urging them to join the path of dissent from Rome, when he told
them: "We Yugoslavs have separated from Moscow. Why don't you separate
from Rome?"
Thus, the "Orthodox population" rises up against the Croatian
Catholic Archbishop, accusing him of war crimes. The truth is, they have a
problem with Rome, just as Tito did, since Rome represents supranational
Catholicism, and therefore cosmopolitanism: in conflict with the national
Orthodox Church, it represents the foreign world.
Pan-Serbian patriotism demands that it be denounced and combated in the
person of its leader himself. The von Rom, as Bismarck said. "There have
been cases in the world where, in the interest of the State, the innocent
remained in prison and were even executed." But who expresses himself in
this way? Tito himself, in an interview with the New York Times. In other
words: "Why be surprised that I imprison the innocent Stepinac?" Even
so, distanced from Moscow, and even at great discord with the Kremlin at the
time, Tito continued to embrace the Constantinian-Latin disputes—in other
words, the ecclesiastical disputes of Moscow—which explain and perpetuate the
Serbian-Croatian antagonism.
It follows, then, that the Stepinac Affair is not a purely personal
matter; it is symbolic; it is evidence of a fundamental malaise in Tito's
Yugoslavia, as in Alexander's.
We have another involuntary, and how important, acknowledgment from
Stepinac's persecutor: we find it in his interview with US Senator Boli-Moody,
on August 16, 1950:
"Yes," he said, "yes, Stepinac is firmly supported by
Yugoslav Catholics: but he is also strongly criticized by Serbian Orthodox
Christians, who are in the majority."
Thus, from the very admission of the communist successor of the monarchs
and Serbs, it is clear that the Yugoslav country, today as yesterday, is
divided against itself, from both a religious and even a national perspective.
The national church, even for the leaders of Yugoslav communism, is the Serbian
Orthodox Church, national and statist. Consequently, Tito, an atheist, must nevertheless
loyally carry out its will; he has to serve the aims and interests of a
religious majority faction, with 42%, against a strongly minority faction, with
38%.
Thus, in a multinational and multiconfessional country, whose unity can
only be achieved on a federal level—but in a truly federalist spirit and
through genuinely federalist structures—only one "nation" counts,
just as only one religion counts: Orthodoxy, whose primacy is maintained by a
secular, atheist, and communist state, which should be secular and neutral,
through an act of pure clericalism. Frankly, the paradox is rather stark! In a
certain respect, however, it is understandable: this primacy of one confession
helps to ensure the supremacy of one of the Yugoslav nations over the others.
The essential problem of relations between Serbs and Croats is therefore
not resolved. Nor was it resolved by the new state, federated more in theory
than in spirit and reality: it failed to do so; just as the Serbian monarch
Karageorgevic, founder of the centralist Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes, also failed to do so.
It has been said and written, without any denial, that exiled
monarchists and Serbian communists have shared the same assessment of the
Stepinac case. This fact is not so surprising: for the Grand Servism of both
sides, there is no conceivable national equality between the Catholic Church
and the Serbian Orthodox Church.
The religious struggle in that country constitutes another aspect of the
national struggle; the latter even derives its premises and its true cause from
religious contrasts.
Serbs and Croats, two different and, until now, antagonistic religious
communities: the Orthodox and the Catholic.
Here is a painful story: we recount it reluctantly; but it is too
illuminating and explanatory to pass over in silence in this writing, which
seeks to shed light on the painful Tito-Stepinac conflict. The year is 1945-46.
The Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Archbishop Gavrilo, is living in
exile in London. He had followed the young King Peter there. Very zealous in
the defense of old Serbia and his dynasty, he missed no opportunity to hurl
condemnations and anathemas against those "bandits"—he used that
term—who had usurped power in Belgrade and installed communism.
Does Tito react? Yes. But not to return blow for blow. Yes. But not to
return blow for blow. He wants to be the successor of the Karageorgevic
dynasty: at least for a time, and despite his militant atheism, he must rely on
the Serbian national Church.
Knowing this, he will try to lure Monsignor Gavrilo, head of the
Orthodox faithful, to Belgrade. What a success his return would be! He sends
his emissaries; they negotiate with those of the Patriarch. The negotiation
ended according to Tito's aims and desires! The Patriarch abandons the exiled
King and returns to Belgrade.
He immediately plays the role Tito expects of him. He publicly censures
the already imprisoned Catholic Archbishop and publicly praises Tito, whom he
himself had previously called a bandit.
National cause for Monsignor Gavrilo, his Church being national and
statist; The confessional reason of state for Tito was so imperative that even
the fundamental principle of true Yugoslav unity could not prevail!
Despite the proclamations, despite an organization that was formally,
but not truly, federal in spirit and structure, the problem of state unity
remains unresolved in communist Yugoslavia, just as it was not under the
monarchy before and the king's dictatorship after 1929.
The Serbian-Croatian conflict persists: it is psychological, historical,
sociological, and spiritual in nature. Perhaps it also has an
"organic" explanation in the Eastern and Balkan type of governmental
practices of its monarchs, which are at the origin of its formation up to the
modern state.
And so, with regard to this conflict, the Yugoslav communist regime
follows the tradition of the Serbian monarchy.
Monsignor Stepinac should have been honored as a spiritual
"resistance fighter"—but we see him imprisoned for crimes of
collaboration, for war crimes!
For this very reason, we see that it became the highest illustration—not
the only one, it's true—of the internal torment of Yugoslavia. Not the only
one, nor the first: how many exiled victims of the Serbian dictatorship I knew,
welcomed, and assisted between 1929 and 1940... Some were even very close to
Tito and still are.
The Stepinac conflict reveals that a Great Servism survives within the
communist regime, the one that established theoretically egalitarian states.
The Cardinal is certainly more the sacrifice of raison d'état than the victim
of a judicial error committed during the investigation and the course of the
trial. Listen to him:
"The Prime Minister, Bakaric, has declared that there is no proof
that I worked against the regime... I see that there is no difference between
you and the Gestapo; but I do not ask for clemency; my conscience is clear and
untarnished: I am condemned despite being innocent; the future will
judge."
Thus spoke Archbishop Stepinac before the Supreme People's Court. Thus
spoke the Apostles before their judges.
Yes, indeed, he is a victim of raison d'état, even more so than of a
deliberate judicial error: this error has been committed for confessional
reasons of state.
ELOQUENCE AND THE SENSE OF SILENCE...
To attest to his high esteem for Catholic Croatia, Pope Leo X conferred
upon him this honorary title: Christianitatis antemurale, Bulwark of
Christendom.
Upon the wall, no "soldier-bishop" stands, as in times past,
armor upon his body and sword in his hand. But there is always a spiritual
leader: Cardinal Stepinac. Imprisoned, confined, silent, he always stands firm
in spirit; the eyes of the faithful turn toward him. Apparently defeated, he
is, for that very reason, spiritually invincible. Persecution has matured him
in an eloquent silence; it has not broken him.
Stronger than persecution is his upright conscience. Stronger still is
his religious faith, the support it contains and the protest it embodies.
He meditates on the motto of his Croatian ancestors; rather, he lives
it. Here it is: For the glory of the Cross and for the love of freedom.
Paris.
The monarch was assassinated in the French city of Marseille (1934).
Peter II assumed the throne, under the regency of Prince Paul, but the
moderating efforts of the high authorities were undermined by the predominantly
Serbian army and police, whose commands were largely composed of Serbs, and
whose numbers were ten times greater than their Austro-Hungarian predecessors.
Following the Munich Agreement, Prince Paul, eager to preserve internal
peace at all costs in the face of the threat of war, actively participated in
an agreement that created an autonomous Croatian state, called Banovina
Hrvatska (Banate of Croatia), which would have comprised the historical
provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This
agreement was not well received by the Serbs.
However, the global conflict prevented the realization of what might
have saved Yugoslavia from war.
The government of Cvetkovic, neutralist in nature but gradually yielding
to Axis pressure due to his country's complete isolation, was overthrown on
March 27, 1941, by a decidedly pro-Serbian military coup, despite its attempts
to reassure the Croatians. The new authorities were considered anti-German in
Berlin, and therefore, barely ten days after their installation, Stuka dive
bombers arrived. Palm Sunday witnessed the invasion of several borders and the
beginning of the capitulation and occupation.
The victors proceeded to divide Yugoslavia into eight sectors. On April
10, Croatian nationalists proclaimed the so-called Independent State of
Croatia, entrusting its government to Dr. Ante Pavelić, in his capacity as
organizer of the Ustaše, that is, Croatian shock troops against the former
Serbian domination.
Both Archbishop Stepinac and the other ecclesiastical authorities of
Croatia logically recognized the new de facto civil authorities of their
homeland, but this does not mean that they ever identified with them. The
Archbishop vehemently repudiated all the abuses, defying the Axis armies by
refusing to annul mixed Christian-Jewish marriages and assuming the role of
protector of Jews and Serbs through direct protests and public condemnations
from the pulpit of his cathedral church.
The struggles between Croatian and Serbian nationalists, the influence
of the victorious USSR, and the shortsightedness of Anglo-American statesmen
were the causes of the establishment of the new Yugoslavia, this time
communist.
II
The situation of Catholics under the new regime became even more
distressing than before for the simple reason that the religious struggle was
no longer to be waged against an adversary who, although employing ignoble
weapons, was at least Christian, but against a secular, atheist, and communist
state nonetheless dedicated to carrying out a kind of pro-orthodox clerical
policy, designed to flatter the passions of some of its subjects at the expense
of others it considered less pliable.
That is why Pezet could say that the Stepinac affair is not a purely
personal matter; it is a symbol; it is the result of a fundamental malaise in
Tito's Yugoslavia, just as it was in Alexander's Yugoslavia.
And proof of this lies in the dictator's own confession during a
conference with a US senator: Stepinac is strongly supported by Yugoslav
Catholics, but is criticized with equal force by Serbian Orthodox Christians,
who are the majority. However, even from a purely numerical standpoint, the
dictator refrains from revealing the proportion, which is no more than 42% to
38%.
Nevertheless, the tyrant did not dare to act immediately; he waited
sixteen months after the so-called liberation, and only after his victim
heroically rejected an offer of exile did he unleash the iniquitous trial,
which, more than targeting the Archbishop, is actually targeting the persecutor
himself.
History has often been ashamed of the way humanity has judged its fellow
human beings, if not its own God, but rarely with more justification than in
this instance.
Monsignor Stepinac refused to defend himself and did not appoint
lawyers, who were instead designated by the State Court after the lawyers who
spontaneously offered to represent the Cardinal declined.
The principal jurist who earned this distinguished honor was Dr. Ivo
Politeo, former defender of Marshal Tito himself during the dictatorship, who was
later joined by Dr. Natko Katicic, although other professionals also
collaborated to a lesser extent.
These defenders were immediately confronted with the following
situation, the gravity of which will not escape even the most forewarned: the
Archbishop had been arrested in the early morning of September 18, 1946. The
indictment, dated the 23rd, reached them on the 24th, and the trial was held on
the 30th of the same month and year. In other words, the defense had exactly
six days to learn about the accusation, prepare the rebuttal, and examine the
evidence offered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, who, on the other hand,
enjoyed more than a year to prepare such pieces, as evidenced by the prolonged
journalistic campaign carried out in advance against the Archbishop and the
aggressions and tumults to which he was subjected in some of his public
appearances.
But there is more. From the moment of his arrest until his conviction on
October 11, the defendant was allowed only one meeting with his legal counsel,
and for just one hour. Every possible obstacle was placed in the way of his
lawyers. The Archbishop was denied the opportunity to consult with others,
offer witnesses, and generally prepare his side of the case. Many of his
associates were subjected to restrictions and harassment that made it
impossible for them to contribute to the prelate's defense. Laws concerning
crimes against the People and the State, passed in August 1945 and amended in
July 1946, were invoked against him—that is, long after the accused had
allegedly committed the crimes, which, even if they had occurred, were not yet
criminalized at the time they were supposedly committed. The defendant was
repeatedly and persistently questioned by all members of the Court that he
sometimes did not have enough time to answer the questions. The audience was
nothing more than a crowd organized and orchestrated by the secret police,
mirroring the violent language used by the Public Prosecutor's Office.
The court sessions lasted twelve hours a day, with only a short break,
leaving the defense no time to examine its position or properly analyze the
opposing testimony. There are very serious discrepancies between the original
statements and their subsequent publication, to the point that there is no doubt
the original versions were carefully reviewed and corrected, as happened, for
example, with the removal of a prosecution witness's statement that Stepinac
was not a persona grata of the regime in power during the war.
The Public Prosecutor's Office was allowed to call an unlimited number
of witnesses, while the defense was only permitted twenty, fourteen of whom
were disqualified by the court, while the opposing witnesses were accepted
without any restrictions and could not be cross-examined.
Most of the written evidence offered by Dr. Politeo was rejected, and
only a small portion was allowed in the hearing or in the official records. The
time limits granted to the parties varied according to this evident bias, to
the point that on one occasion Dr. Politeo was accused of delaying the trial,
to which he replied that up to that point, while the prosecution had spoken for
a total of 48 hours, the defense had only had twenty minutes.
Furthermore, the Archbishop was tried along with several other
defendants, accused of open participation in acts of terrorism, with which he
was thus tacitly linked, even though he was completely uninvolved. This meant
that, in a way, the Cardinal was grafted onto a process already underway
without his participation, further complicating, if possible, the task of his
defense.
The Archbishop was not allowed to be interviewed by His Excellency, the
Most Reverend José Hurley, representative of the Holy See, who attended the
trial and, upon entering and leaving the courtroom daily, genuflected before
the accused as the supreme homage to the persecuted virtue.
On October 3, the accused was allowed to speak before the Tribunal,
which he did for half an hour, being constrained to adhere strictly to the
specific aspects of the accusation.
On the 7th of the same month, the few defense witnesses were authorized,
while the others were dismissed as clearly biased.
And so we arrive at the condemnation of the 11th, which provoked outrage
throughout the civilized world and the collective excommunication of those
involved in the outrage, made public three days later.
Monsignor Stepinac was sentenced to sixteen years of hard labor, with
the corresponding loss of his civil rights and confiscation of his property.
His defenders were later harassed and even arrested for the "crime"
of having fulfilled a sacred professional duty, repeating the scandal that had
occurred with the lawyers of Louis XVI, as if the hatred that inspires
sectarians could not bear the memory of the eloquence of a defender, who seemed
to embody the reproach of his own conscience.
The illustrious condemned man had to endure long years in prison, and
although his fate was somewhat alleviated by his confinement in his hometown of
Krasic, it cannot be denied that he was deprived of his liberty and of the most
essential care for his delicate state of health.
It is unnecessary to address each of the accusation's fabrications,
which do not withstand even a cursory analysis. But at the risk of being
tedious, I have deemed it appropriate to point out the manner in which the
Cardinal was tried, in open contradiction with the supposed judicial and
procedural guarantees established by Articles 116 and 118 of the Constitution
of Yugoslavia, because evidently no one could give any credence to a conclusion
derived from such premises.
Monsignor Stepinac was yet another victim of the passions unleashed by
war and of the intrinsic evil of communism and everything associated with it.
He was not, however, tried only as a man, but primarily as a symbol.
It was the Catholic Church and its beloved daughter, Christian Croatia,
that they sought to bring before the Tribunal in the person of the Metropolitan
Archbishop of Croatia. Added to this was the hatred professed by atheistic
materialism for everything beyond the hereafter, the age-old hostility of the
Orthodox and Eastern Christians toward the Catholic and Western Christians;
Tito, a contemporary communist, was seen as a continuation of outdated
monarchical oppressions.
Monsignor Stepinac has thus been condemned for reasons of state,
Machiavelli's sinister creation and the basis of totalitarian political
philosophy. But though seemingly defeated, imprisoned, and silently confined,
he has not been vanquished; rather, he has triumphed.
Above the injustices and persecutions stand the dignity of his conduct,
the steadfastness of his faith, and the tranquility of his conscience.
Standing between his executioners, he is a symbol of an indomitable
Croatia, an honor for the Sacred College, a true successor of the Apostles, a
legitimate recipient of evangelical blessedness for those who hunger and thirst
for justice.
Buenos Aires
We find ourselves in Central Europe, where,
since the dawn of our Western society, Church leaders have earned the title of
defenders of the city, taking an active part in the historical events of their
countries. In Croatia, bishops, along with the nobility and representatives of
the municipalities, comprised the Croatian Diet (Sabor) for centuries, the
repository of national sovereignty. Even after the revolutionary year of 1848,
bishops in Croatia and Hungary were ex officio members of their respective
parliaments until 1918, when the new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes, was created, later renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. Furthermore, the head
of the Zagrabian diocese was considered primus bano regni and, as such, during
periods of sede vacante (prorex), automatically assumed the office of the ban,
becoming head of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia. This
constitutional arrangement remained in place until the end of the First World
War.
The Church's participation in political
affairs was in keeping with the circumstances and times in which it was the
main promoter of cultural activities, and it is thanks to this that, even in
the early Middle Ages, Croatia was among the civilized peoples of the Christian
West.
After the great Eastern Schism and the
shattering of Christian unity, Croatia, oriented towards the Rome of the Popes,
helped to halt Byzantine expansion at the very gates of Italy. Later, during
the Mongol invasions and Ottoman conquests, with Italy and Central Europe in
danger, Croatia constituted one of the irreplaceable and impregnable defensive
bulwarks for three centuries, so that Croatian national life in the Modern Age
was characterized by the spirit of the crusades of the Central European peoples
against the relentless onslaughts of the Ottoman Empire. The Church and the
papacy were then the main support of the centuries-long resistance of the
Catholic Croats, helping to ensure that, despite the tremendous bloodshed and
successive territorial amputations, the political individuality and cultural
identity of Croatia were preserved.
Church dignitaries in those heroic times not only provided powerful
moral support but, taking up swords and leading the defenders, fell on the
battlefields or in besieged fortresses and cities. Zagreb and the episcopal
residence itself were invincible bastions for centuries, and the Croats are
proud that Ottoman horses never trod the streets of their capital, not even
when the power of the sultans extended beyond Budin, the Hungarian capital, and
their Janissaries pounded on the gates of imperial Vienna.
Nor in those dark times, amidst the din of arms, was Croatian cultural
activity interrupted. A whole host of illustrious humanists, poets, painters,
sculptors, illuminators, architects, musicians, theologians, philosophers, and
scientists participated in the endeavors of the Renaissance and Baroque
periods.
In the not-so-distant era of national revivals, clergymen topped the
list of leading figures and promoters of national culture, founding the new
university, the Academy of Language, Science and Fine Arts, the Art Gallery,
and national libraries, among other things, while simultaneously fostering
economic activities such as agricultural cooperatives and credit institutions.
Monsignor Stepinac governed the Church in different times, and his
influence on national life manifested itself distinctly from that of his
predecessors, according to the new circumstances. The role of the Metropolitan
Archbishop of Croatia was reduced to religious and cultural activities, but
these were of paramount importance in the climate of serious struggles and
tensions.
The new Yugoslav state, dominated by the Serbian Orthodox minority with
its Caesaropapist mentality and traditions, was determined to exclude the
influence of the Catholic Church, which it considered an anti-national and
foreign institution. Even the Church's specific activities—fostering spiritual
life, consolidating its internal organization, promoting religious education
and Catholic Action associations, and, above all, maintaining ties with the
Holy See (considered by all Yugoslav regimes to be the hereditary enemy of the
Slavic peoples)—were criticized and labeled an unacceptable, anti-national, and
treasonous political stance. In this sense, the Catholic Church was accused not
only after the last war but also when the monarchical dictatorship had dissolved
all Croatian political parties, including the Christian Democratic People's
Party, so that there was no objection to the clergy and Catholic organizations
participating in partisan politics.
Due to the special circumstances that dictated the suspension of
partisan contests among Croats, it was Stepinac who insisted on the
inappropriateness of a political party with a Christian-social program, even
though a certain degree of freedom, albeit very restricted, was possible for
political parties in Croatia. Following the directives of the Holy See,
according to which the clergy and religious institutions should stay away from
partisan struggles, Stepinac even forbade the clergy from participating in the
Croatian parliament of 1942.
Therefore, the accusations that Monsignor Stepinac had involved the
Church in partisan disputes are untenable. What might have bothered the
Pan-Serbian dictatorship before, and the communist one after, was that he
courageously defended Christian principles, which at the same time meant
defending freedoms and human and civil rights in Croatia.
II
FACING DICTATORS
Stepinac, then, had to act in extremely difficult times, when his
homeland was humiliated and going through the most dramatic trials of its
thousand-year history, engaged in a relentless struggle, inevitable, moreover,
in this region of clashes and conflicts between different civilizations. In a
short period, he had to confront several dictatorial regimes: the dictatorship
of the Serbian monarchy; then, during the war, the pressures of the then
omnipotent fascism and National Socialism; and finally, the communist tyranny
of the postwar period.
Stepinac was appointed Archbishop of Zagreb in 1934, during the most
oppressive phase of King Alexander's dictatorship. Alexander had been educated
at the Russian imperial court in the autocratic and Caesaropapist tradition.
Such a ruler might have been suitable for Serbia in the period before the
Balkan Wars, but not for the new state, formed in 1918, in which Serbs and
their national church were a minority, incapable of coexisting democratically
with the Catholic Croats and Slovenes, who until then had been incorporated
into the Austro-Hungarian Empire and were accustomed to an incorruptible legal
and administrative order, as well as Western cultural and political forms. King
Alexander reigned for a time under a pseudo-democratic constitution, before
establishing a purely autocratic regime in 1929. His dictatorship was preceded
by the assassination of Croatian political leaders in the Parliament building
in Belgrade.
Instead of addressing the legitimate demands of the Croats, who sought
national and individual freedom, Alexander decreed laws that effectively
dissolved Croatia as a nation, persecuting any expression of Croatian patriotism
as treason. His oppressive policies were supported by the exclusively Serbian
military leadership and the Serbian National Church; moreover, he could count
on the submission of the Serbian masses, accustomed to the autocratic system of
government. He also benefited from the benevolence of certain Western powers,
who, failing to foresee the disastrous consequences, chose to support the
dictatorial rule of a culturally and nationally heterogeneous state,
sacrificing their own democratic principles. However, this supposed political
realism proved counterproductive, as successive dictatorial governments in
Belgrade increasingly aligned themselves with the Axis powers, failed to oppose
the Anschluss, and practically dismantled the Little Entente and the entire
system of political-military alliances, whose purpose was to thwart the designs
of both the Axis and the Kremlin regarding Central and Eastern Europe. Hopes
placed in the fighting spirit of the Yugoslav army were completely dashed when
it capitulated within days and without a fight.
Thus, when Stepinac assumed his high office, Croatia found itself in a
state of political vacuum, its political institutions suppressed, its political
leaders assassinated, imprisoned, or exiled abroad. The Church itself was under
intense pressure from the dictatorship, considered by the Serbs to be a foreign
institution and the main focus of Croat spiritual resistance, and persecuted as
anti-national and subversive. Despite all the abuses, the Church did not yield,
and the people found support and encouragement in its institutions—then as now.
Popular discontent and reaction against the anti-Croatian dictatorship were
also spontaneously expressed in religious demonstrations. With the country left
without its legitimate leaders, the Archbishop of Zagreb became virtually the
visible head of the nation. This unanimous popular sentiment was expressed in a
memorandum presented to Stepinac by representatives of the Croatian University,
reminding him of the historical role of the Archbishop of Zagreb as lieutenant
of the Croatian ban.
The Church did not seek to replace political parties, but rather to
protect the persecuted and aid the needy. For this reason, the Zagreb Curia had
organized free soup kitchens for thousands of unemployed people during the
great economic crisis, without distinction of religion or nationality. The
Committee for Aid to Jews who had escaped from Germany, Austria, and Bohemia
was headquartered in the Archbishop's residence. From 1939 onward, this aid was
also extended to Polish exiles.
With the dismemberment of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Croatian state was
restored, and its government, lacking any other alternative, had to operate
under the powerful pressure of the Axis powers, which at that time militarily
dominated almost all of continental Europe. In these turbulent times, when the
law was subject to brutal force, Stepinac sheltered Jews and all the
persecuted. He frequently protested forcefully and publicly against racial and
national discrimination, and protected the Serbian minority in Croatia, which
faced reprisals for supporting two guerrilla movements: the extremist Serbian
nationalists of Draza Mihailovic and Tito's partisans, the latter having
emerged in the wake of the German-Russian conflict. Stepinac saved the lives of
several thousand Jews and sheltered more than 7,000 Serbian orphans. He never
ceased admonishing the authorities that excesses could not be tolerated, even
in legitimate self-defense, and that revenge for past Serbian violence and
persecution contradicted Christian morality and deeply rooted Croatian
traditions, which respected ethics and the law.
However; Despite the proven fact that Stepinac spared no effort in his
aid and support for the Serbian minority, the hostile and obstinate attitude of
the Serbian anti-communists who had sought asylum in Western countries and of
the Serbian ecclesiastical authorities, who consistently favored the communist
campaign against the late Cardinal Stepinac, is surprising and incomprehensible
to a foreign observer unfamiliar with the internal tensions within Yugoslavia
and their underlying causes. This attitude of the representatives of Serbian
national tradition and sentiment illustrates better than anything else the
incompatibility between Serbs and Croats. Given that Stepinac demonstrated his
affection and sympathy for the Serbian people even before being appointed
archbishop, by enlisting as a volunteer on the Salonika front during the First
World War for the liberation of Serbia, the behavior of the Serbian
nationalists becomes even more revealing. Many Serbian
ultra-patriots who follow former King Peter Karageorgevic and label Stepinac an
enemy of the Serbian people were safe and well-paid while he was fighting in
the trenches of the Salonika front.
Furthermore, the biased accusations made by both communists and Serbian
nationalists regarding the supposed religious nature of the repressive acts
against the Serbian minority in Croatia during the last war are unfounded, as
if they stemmed from alleged Catholic fanaticism. The bloody struggles between
Serbs and Croats were the product of the clash between two nationalisms.
Protestants and Muslims, a significant minority (13% Muslim), loyal to the
Croatian state, enjoyed absolute religious freedom at that time.
There is one more point on which communists and Serbian nationalists
agree regarding Stepinac and the Catholic Church in Croatia. They cannot
forgive Stepinac for his Croatian patriotism and his support for the
restoration of the Croatian state, labeling him a collaborator for this reason.
The Catholic hierarchy always distinguished between the state and the regime,
between the nation and its government. Stepinac acted in the same way. He
championed the Croatian state and repudiated all the errors of its government,
courageously confronting the interference of the powerful Third Reich. He acted
in the same manner as the German and Italian clergymen who refused to renounce
national independence in the face of totalitarian regimes, which were
necessarily temporary.
Stepinac's patriotic stance was accurately interpreted by a widely
circulated Belgian weekly:
"The Archbishop of Zagreb has not hidden the fact that, like almost
the entire Croatian people, he viewed the collapse of the Yugoslav state in
1941 with satisfaction. When a state frustrates the national aspirations of one
of its peoples, it must blame itself if that people applauds its fall.
Let us suppose that in the Netherlands in 1829 an international conflict
had led the French, English, or Prussian armies to sweep away the forces of
King William: the Belgian people would certainly have leapt for joy, seeing
themselves freed from the Dutch yoke. Could the Archbishop of Mechelen have
failed to show solidarity with his people?"
The Yugoslav government knows what to expect on this point, especially
since the feelings of the Croatian people have not changed with the new
dictatorship:
Who can reproach the Poles, subjugated by the Russians, for having
enthusiastically welcomed Napoleon's grenadiers?
Nor could Stepinac be required to renounce his Croatian patriotism, and
even less so could the Serbian nationalists, who identified with Alexander's
dictatorial regime and are even today grateful to the communists for having
re-established the heterogeneous conglomerate that is Yugoslavia, considered by
them an enlarged Serbia, where practically no form of government other than
dictatorship is possible.
Yugoslavia can only be maintained against the will of the anti-Serbian
majority of its unfortunate subjects. Forcing such a community implies the
denial of all national and civic rights of the vast majority of its members. It
is obvious that the Church cannot, in principle, side with those who, driven by
a thirst for personal or collective power, prioritize state power over freedoms
and human rights. Stepinac's merit lies in having fought, faithful to this
principle, against all abuses of power, both during the monarchical and
communist dictatorships, which persecuted Catholics and Croats, and in the last
war, when he protected Serbs and Jews.
III
IN THE ZONE OF ENCOUNTERS AND CONFLICTS OF CIVILIZATIONS
Regarding the aforementioned attitude of Serbian nationalist and
ecclesiastical representatives, incomprehensible to Westerners, we wish to
clarify in good faith that this is not an inherent evil of the Serbian people.
It is a phenomenon that, by its very nature, transcends the Croatian-Serbian
conflict, which can only be understood through the comparative study of
civilizations. From the perspective of cultural studies, the Croatian-Serbian
antagonism is not so much an expression of national and religious differences
per se, but rather one of the consequences arising from encounters and
conflicts between two peoples belonging to distinct civilizations: Western and
Eastern European.
Although Croats and Serbs, like Poles and Russians, derive from the same
Slavic linguistic group, their cultural traditions and, consequently, their
politics place them in distinct and quite antagonistic civilizations. President
Roosevelt was therefore correct when, in 1943, deliberating with Sir Anthony
Eden on the future of Europe, he expressed his repeated opinion that Croats and
Serbs have nothing in common, making it ridiculous to insist that such
antagonistic peoples live under the same government. Russia and Serbia, due to
their traditional political systems, are "eternal tyrannies of the
East," to use Ortega y Gasset's expression.
In this world, a different conception of the relationship between
individual, group, and state prevails than the Western one. Western
conceptions, according to which the Church should be independent of the state,
as should cultural life, and where religion should not be confused with
nationality, seem strange and incomprehensible to them. Instead of appreciating
the Western Church's efforts to act independently of dictatorial governments,
the representatives of the Eastern Orthodox Church criticize it for this,
considering the submission of the Church to the state a Christian obligation.
The official spokesperson for the Serbian National Church said the following:
"The Roman Catholic Church threatens the authority of our State,
therefore necessarily provoking self-defense... Satan offered Christ earthly
power, but he rejected it. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand,
accepted this power. Papal authority, as the supreme spiritual power,
challenges the honor and autonomy of the State. It imposes itself as a State
within a State, or perhaps as a State over another State; it is a foreign
power. That is why the Catholic Church and Catholicism must be combated with
Balkan brutality."
These are the same concepts used by Yugoslav communists to justify
breaking off diplomatic relations with the Holy See.
The Pope is a "hereditary enemy" of Yugoslavia "not only
because he is neither fascist nor socialist and democratic, but simply because
he is Yugoslavia. The government of Yugoslavia and the people of Yugoslavia
would have to submit to the absolute sovereignty of the Vatican on this matter
of bishops and priests, even if they acted exclusively in the interests of a
foreign authority, thus harming their own state and their own people. When
Stepinac tells foreign journalists, 'I have only one person who commands me and
to him alone I submit, and that is the Holy Father' (understood to be in
relation to his ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Editor's note), he establishes his
principles and his position, and that of the Vatican. What other state and what
other people in the world would allow and tolerate the imposition of a bishop
of such a nature?"
From this principled stance, it follows that all Catholics in Yugoslavia
would always be undesirable, even if the following occurred: The religious
resistance and national opposition of Croatian Catholics did not coincide, a
fact deliberately conflated to justify religious persecution as if it were
merely a political struggle.
There are other facts that are alien to the Western mindset. While the
Yugoslav communists tolerated and even favored the Serbian Church, they
ruthlessly persecuted Catholicism. While the Serbian Patriarch visited Moscow
as an honored guest and the Russian Patriarch paid homage to Marshal Tito in
Belgrade, Cardinal Stepinac and other Croatian prelates were imprisoned,
interned, and held incommunicado. This contrast is only explicable if one
considers that the communist governments—mere Byzantine-Russian versions of
Marxism—and the Orthodox Church were acting within autocratic and Caesaropapist
traditions. They represent two aspects of the same world. The Serbian Church
was integrated into that world, while the Western Christian communities,
Catholic and Protestant, were considered foreign bodies and forces.
disintegrants.
On the other hand, religious differences are not the cause of the
antagonism between Poles and Russians, Croats and Serbs. The Byzantine schism
did not determine European cultural dualism—the main cause of these
antagonisms—but rather was its consequence. Byzantium insisted on Caesaropapist
conceptions against the papacy, even in the late Middle Ages, when the new and
burgeoning society of Western Europe was already formed, a powerful support for
the popes in the long and tenacious struggle against the Caesaropapist
ambitions of the Byzantine emperors. The Church has not been the cause but
rather the victim of the political conflicts that destroyed Christian unity.
The universal Church always aspires to restore the union of the
Churches: Sharing this noble desire, certain Croatian Catholic prelates
believed in 1918 that the newly created Yugoslav state would offer promising
opportunities for achieving this goal. They hoped that the shared life of
Eastern and Western Christians would lead to mutual understanding and a
rapprochement between the separated Christian brethren.
However, the opposite occurred. Serbia, given its autocratic tradition,
was unable to create a free community of peoples with equal rights, but instead
imposed a hegemonic and anti-democratic government, provoking new conflicts,
hatred, and resentment. The privileged Serbian Church, in accordance with
Caesaropapist concepts, sought, with the backing of state power, to expand its
sphere of influence through proselytizing methods. Those who believed that a
common state could foster the union of the Churches had to face the reality that
as long as Catholics remain in a subordinate political position, in a state
with Byzantine traditions, they inevitably regress.
IV
PASTOR QUI ANIMAM SUAM DAT PRO OVIBUS SUIS
It is not our purpose to give a complete biography of Bishop Stepinac,
but rather to highlight those exceptional virtues that stem from both his
personal qualities and his formation, which is not exactly common among priests
who have followed the usual ecclesiastical path.
He was born on May 8, 1898, in the village of Krasic, the eleventh child
of a modest farming family. After completing his secondary studies at a
national school in Zagreb, he was mobilized during the First World War by the
Austrian army and assigned as a second lieutenant to the Italian front. There,
fighting on the front lines, he was buried by a grenade and captured by the
Italians.
From there, he volunteered for the Salonika front to fight for the
liberation of Serbia, which was under Austro-Bulgarian occupation. After the
war, he enrolled in the Faculty of Agriculture in Zagreb, combining his studies
with the arduous work on his father's farm. He was nearly 27 when he became
convinced that his true calling was the priesthood. In Rome, he studied at the
Gregorian University as a student of the Collegium Germanicum. On October 26,
1929, he was ordained and received a doctorate in philosophy and theology.
Stepinac was a profound scholar of Sacred Scripture and the social
doctrine of the Church, having been deeply interested in the Catholic social
movement since his youth. Upon his return to Croatia, he was appointed to the
Archbishop's household, primarily dedicated to the Caritas organization. His
tireless charitable work brought him into direct contact with the poor, a
connection he maintained even after his appointment as Archbishop.
In 1934, the Holy See appointed him Coadjutor Archbishop cum iure
successionis, when he was only 36 years old. His appointment to such a high
position was unexpected, as it was known that the elderly Archbishop Bauer, a
highly prestigious prelate, deeply rooted in the traditions and splendor of his
office, and a dignitary with a brilliant public career—a member of parliament
in Zagreb and Budapest, former rector of the national university, and Protector
of the Academy of Sciences and Fine Arts—had proposed several prominent canons,
theologians, and even bishops to the Holy See as his successors.
The Belgrade government, however, objected to all the proposed
candidates, citing their alleged activities against the state. In reality, the
dictatorial government in Belgrade resorted to obstructionist tactics with the
aim of seizing the substantial funds and assets of the Archdiocese of Zagreb
should the see become vacant. Finally, Belgrade consented to Stepinac's
appointment, based on his having been one of the volunteers on the Thessaloniki
front—a privileged status at the time—and because they did not properly
understand the meaning of the expression "cum iure successionis,"
meaning "with right of succession."
They did not oppose his appointment because they had overlooked the fact
that Stepinac had renounced his Serbian officer rank and returned all his
decorations in protest against Serbian dominance and pressure in Croatia.
Croatian public opinion was surprised by the unexpected rise to such an
important archiepiscopal see of a young, recently ordained priest unknown in
public life.
In 1937, upon the death of Archbishop Bauer, Stepinac succeeded him as
Archbishop of Zagreb, Metropolitan of Croatia, and Permanent President of the
Conference of Bishops of Yugoslavia.
The newly appointed Archbishop infused new energy and inaugurated new
methods. Catholic Action organizations, charitable institutions, and the
Catholic press were reorganized and promoted. Impressive religious
events—pilgrimages and Eucharistic Congresses—were organized, and new parishes
and convents were established. In his Sunday sermons, delivered before large
audiences, he raised his courageous voice in defense of natural law and
morality.
Accompanied by tens of thousands of parishioners, he made a pilgrimage
each year to the Croatian national shrine of Our Lady of Bistrica, sharing with
the pilgrims the hardships of the three-day walk. The archbishop's palace, once
a stately residence, became the headquarters of numerous Catholic institutions,
while the Archbishop and his family lived a monastic life. Its former splendor
was displayed only once a year, on the day of the papal coronation.
Unconditional loyalty to the Holy See and strict adherence to papal
directives were the defining characteristics of Stepinac, who frequently
traveled to the Eternal City, maintaining close contact with the central
institutions of the Church. He acted in the same manner during the war.
Therefore, when the smear campaign of world communism was unleashed, which even
confused certain democratic circles, the Vatican did not hesitate for a moment
to emphasize to the world the integrity and impeccable conduct of the head of
the Catholic Church in Croatia. L'Osservatore Romano published in-depth articles,
protests, commentaries, and front-page news stories daily in the wake of the
"most sorrowful trial" (Pius XII).
Stepinac's lived religiosity, apostolic zeal, upright application of
doctrine, social conscience, and patriotism were wonderfully combined with his
innate modesty, as well as his moral fortitude and capacity for suffering, even
physical. Fearlessness was truly necessary for a soldier of Christ, who had to
face extremely difficult situations, endure personal attacks, and bear a long
prison sentence with its accompanying hardships.
In early May 1945, the communists seized power in Croatia. Sixteen
months passed before Stepinac's trial began for alleged war crimes, during
which time the same communist radio station quoted and praised his protests against
violations of freedoms and human rights. Stepinac, defenseless, had to witness
the Church and the people of Croatia being outlawed.
A wave of terror plunged Croatia into a silent and bloody suffering
that, unfortunately, found no echo in the free world at the time. The massacre
of tens of thousands of civilians and unarmed soldiers, a true genocide
perpetrated after the war had ended in Bleiburg and other locations, marks the
path taken by the communists. Prominent Catholics and patriots were murdered
without trial. The communists' aim was to eliminate all possible opposition in
Croatia by fire and sword, to make it a territory completely subjugated to
communism. For the first time in its thousand-year history, Croatia was
incorporated in its entirety into an Eastern empire, and its proponents set out
to destroy all forms of Western culture.
In such a dark atmosphere, the figure of Bishop Stepinac rose up,
"a man sent from God... as a witness to testify concerning the light...
and this light shines in the darkness, and out of the darkness they have not
received it" (John 1:5-7). Croatia was once again suffering and bleeding,
yet it would not yield to the enemy. The main struggle was, and continues to
be, waged in the spiritual realm. Communism was not content with occupying
Croatian lands; it wants to change the soul of the people, as stated in a
paragraph of the Five-Year Plan. Therefore, it was necessary to break Stepinac
or force him to leave the country. They resorted to a two-pronged tactic: pressure
and blackmail. From the outset, they unleashed an infamous smear campaign
against him, offering no possibility of rebuttal, and orchestrated physical
attacks. They forbade him from leaving his residence and from having any
contact with the faithful. At the same time, a compromise was suggested: to
renounce the Holy See and found a national church.
All that pressure did not make the Archbishop waver. The Catholic
episcopate, gathered under his presidency, published a lengthy and
well-documented pastoral letter, detailing all the abuses and violence of the
communist regime. In the first and only interview held with the Yugoslav
dictator Josip Broz Tito, he told him plainly and simply that without religious
freedom and without respect for Croatian national rights, the country would not
be pacified.
At that time,
Stepinac still had justifiable hopes, based on the promises of Allied
diplomats, with whom he had direct contact during his visits to Rome during the
war, that the Allies would not allow a communist regime to be established on
the Adriatic coast, at the gates of Italy and Austria. Consequently, he
expected the Yalta agreements, which guaranteed the people of Yugoslavia the
democratic right to elect their government, to be upheld.
Convinced that it was
impossible to break Stepinac's loyalty to the Holy See, the communist rulers
orchestrated the infamous trial, condemning him to 16 years in prison and the
loss of his civil and political rights for an additional 5 years. This
sentence, accompanied by rampant propaganda, was used as a final warning to an
unyielding Croatia that the communist regime, backed by Moscow, was omnipotent
and ruthless in its extermination of all Western influence.
It is well known
that, during the trial, Stepinac refused to answer questions from the
prosecutor and the communist judges, and that he did not appoint any defense
attorneys. This was not a defiant or insolent gesture, as the communists
asserted, but rather a reasoned stance from someone who knew it was impossible
to argue with the communist party, with its legal and moral conceptions opposed
to the Western and Christian mindset, and who, moreover, knew that the verdict
had already been decided beforehand.
The defense
attorneys, appointed by the court, acted with civic courage and professional
competence, but their arguments had to adhere to communist legality, according
to which loyalty to the Church and the Croatian people was considered a crime.
The prosecutor himself objected to them, this time correctly, that "they
were defending the accused Aloysius Stepinac against charges that he did not
deny but rather praised as meritorious."
Therefore, even
certain well-intentioned comments published in the free press were not entirely
accurate in attempting, under the influence of persistent communist
accusations, to interpret Stepinac's attitude as contrary to the restoration
and defense of the Croatian state in wartime. However, when his speech before
the tribunal, addressed not so much to the communist judges as to the Croatian
people and world public opinion, became known, the matter was clarified.
It has been
repeatedly emphasized that the courageous behavior of Bishop Stepinac differed
greatly from the conduct of other defendants, such as that of the Serbian
general Draza Mihailovic, so highly praised by Serbian nationalist propaganda.
Mihailovic, the protagonist of a lost and unjust cause—that of Serbian
supremacy over the other peoples of Yugoslavia—grown in humiliation before the
judges, begging for mercy and arguing that many of his aims were, in reality,
identical to theirs. Meanwhile, Stepinac, a champion of divine and human law,
cleared his conscience of all accusations, unyielding to the well-known methods
of psychological manipulation. He remained a true gentleman, without blemish or
fear, refusing to yield in the slightest and without pleading for mercy.
It is worth noting
another outstanding trait of Stepinac's personality: his vocation for
martyrdom, which matured within him under the tremendous weight of
responsibility in such crucial times. Tito himself had declared, after the
aforementioned interview, that "this Stepinac aspired to martyrdom, but
that the opportunity would not be given to him." The author of these lines
particularly recalls the audience that Stepinac granted in 1938 to the
Secretary General of Pax Romana, Abbé Gremaud, and M. Vershave, director of
"L'Ecole de journalisme" in Lille, France.
Referring to the
threats looming over Europe and Croatia, Stepinac, usually calm and composed,
rose nervously and, looking out of the window of his library, located in the
fortified section of the former episcopal palace, declared in a decisive tone:
"I know that the Church in Croatia is in danger from the North (National
Socialism) and from the East (Bolshevism). The Archbishop of Zagreb, encouraged
by the example of his predecessors, who once fought and fell within these
walls, is prepared to confront the enemy and bear witness with his blood for
Christ."
His demeanor was anything but theatrical. His figure reflected the
simplicity and sincerity of a young ascetic, marching with serenity and courage
toward the martyrdom he had already foreseen. Above all, his faith was
unwavering and steadfast. "In Te Domine speravi" (I have hoped in the
Lord), was his motto. And when long years of trials arrived, he never wavered.
Remembering the psalmist's words, "Put your trust in God, act
courageously, and your heart will be strengthened," he persevered until
death (February 10, 1960), even though he could have left the country and
avoided all the suffering he endured during 14 years of imprisonment and
confinement, afflicted by illnesses that, with proper medical attention, could
have been cured. He renounced the freedom offered to him, accepting the
prolongation of his afflictions. We have official documents to attest to this.
Thus, L'Osservatore Romano, in its June 9-10, 1951 edition, published
the contents of the Yugoslav government's note offering the Vatican Stepinac's
release on the condition that he leave the country immediately, and the Holy
See's response stating that the Archbishop preferred to remain with his flock.
It is known for certain that at least three more proposals to this effect were
categorically rejected by the heroic soldier of Christ. The good shepherd lays
down his life for his flock (John 10:11).
The witness given by this worthy and irreproachable champion of the
faith and of the homeland represents an exemplary moral victory over his
oppressors. Faced with the outrage aroused in the free world by Stepinac's
condemnation, the boastful Yugoslav dictator sought to downplay its
significance: "For some time there will still be noise about Stepinac, but
soon they will tire of him and forget him." Meanwhile, as time went on,
she proved to be a typical illusion of dictators who tend to underestimate
moral values. Stepinac was not only not forgotten, but his stature grew in the
eyes of the people and the entire world.
He forced the communists to capitulate after his death. They had to
reverse their initial decision to bury him in the parish church of Krasic until
his sentence expired and accept the burial of his remains, with all the honors
due to a prince of the Church, in their cathedral. They even sent official
invitations to the consular corps and delegated their representatives to the
funeral of a "criminal," a "traitor to the fatherland."
Martyred Croatia found its most genuine expression in him. Today, this
hero and martyr, defender of the city, rests in the crypt of Zagreb Cathedral,
alongside other Croatian heroes who gave their lives for their country: Count
Peter of Zrin, Prince Francis Christopher Frankopan, and Eugene Kvaternik. His
tomb is already a place of pilgrimage.
In the struggle between tyranny and freedom, martyrs are always
stronger.
Buenos Aires
And behold, in his passing into heaven, the soul of Cardinal Archbishop
Aloysius Stepinac repeats to us once more this great teaching and this divine
example from Chapter X of the Gospel of Saint John. We pray for the blessed
glorification of his chosen spirit: he will answer us from on high with the
seal of our renewed pastoral fervor, of our readiness to strive and sacrifice.
Beloved Brothers and children! We must not forget the serious
exhortation in his testament to the constant practice of forgiveness and peace.
How tender, how moving is his request for forgiveness from all those whom in
his life—even with the best of intentions and charity—he may have offended in
the slightest; How sublime is that repetition of the dying Christ's last words
to all those who made him suffer so unjustly: "Father, forgive them, for
they do not know what they are doing" (Luke 28:24). This is a powerful
statement: "they do not know what they are doing," an immense
compassion that illuminates with tragic brilliance the mystery of human
perversion regarding the meaning of individual and collective life, of which we
are witnesses.
In this great affliction, we find comfort in noticing here and there
glimpses of human compassion. Around the dead and crucified Christ, all four
Evangelists recount Pilate's gesture of handing over the condemned man's
lifeless body to the compassion of Joseph of Arimathea, who requested the
mortal remains, and of Nicodemus, who brought a copious mixture of myrrh and
aloes for the burial. In the immense sorrow that continues to tear at our
hearts, the gesture of the higher authorities, following the example of the
ancient Roman governor, allowed for a manifestation of popular piety to emerge
around the blessed sacrifice of the shepherd and illustrious father. This piety
will remain in humble homes for a whole generation as a sacred memory and an
eternal example of spiritual elevation and human and Christian tenderness.
Oh! Why, now that the sacrifice of the great priest and pontiff has been
accomplished, should all upright and good souls not be allowed to greet, at
least from afar, the return of a civic and religious peace that, respecting
noble and robust traditions, will reassure the renewed ascent of all toward the
highest ideals that are sublimated in the spirit of Christ, united in loyal and
harmonious collaboration in the pursuit and enjoyment of true prosperity that
makes human coexistence less sorrowful and more pleasant.
May the liturgical prayer that rises from our lips and hearts through
the sacred wisps of incense once more implore heavenly peace and glory for the
mourned departed Cardinal Stepinac. In this prayer, we feel intimately united
with all the venerable members of the Sacred College of Cardinals present here
and with those who, from every corner of the earth, have wished to share the
sorrow of our Common Father with expressions of moving fraternity, thus
conveying the condolences of the Universal Church. Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac
was never able to wear the glorious and well-deserved purple vestments outside
the place of his birth and his forced confinement. Nevertheless, we piously
wish to believe and hope that, in the grace and light of the Lord, he will now
extend his protection over the entire Sacred College, of which he remains a
shining example, over the whole Holy Church, and over all of Yugoslavia.
(From the Address in St. Peter's Basilica, 17/2/1960.)
STATEMENTS OF STEPINAC BEFORE THE PEOPLE'S COURT OF ZAGREB ON OCTOBER 3,
1946
To all the charges brought against me here, I reply that my conscience
is clear in every sense (even though the public may mock this statement) and I
do not seek to defend myself or appeal the verdict. Because of my convictions,
I am prepared to endure not only ridicule, contempt, and humiliation, but also,
with a clear conscience, I am ready to die at any moment. Hundreds of times I
have been called here "the accused Stepinac."
But no one is so naive as not to understand that with "the accused
Stepinac" sits here in the dock the Archbishop of Zagreb, the Metropolitan
of Croatia, and the head of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. And you
yourselves have come before the accused priests present here so that they may
acknowledge that only Stepinac can be blamed for everything they, priests and
people, have done. But not just any Stepinac would have had such influence;
only Archbishop Stepinac did.
For seventeen months, a campaign has been waged against me, publicly and
in the press, and furthermore, for twelve months, I have been effectively
confined to my archbishop's palace.
THE ORTHODOX
I am accused of rebaptizing Serbs. The term is incorrect, because
someone who has been baptized once does not need to be baptized again. But the
issue concerns the conversion of religions, and I will not speak of this in
detail except to declare that my conscience is clear of this charge and that
the judgment of history will be favorable to me.
It is a fact that I had to transfer several parish priests because they
were in danger of death among the Orthodox: the Serbs wanted to kill them
because they were delaying conversions to Catholicism. It is a fact that during
the war the Church had to face difficulties and overcome obstacles, precisely
for the good of the Serbian people and in order to help them to the best of its
ability.
The honorable judge has presented a document according to which I
claimed an abandoned Orthodox monastery in Orahovica (which had previously
belonged to our Pauline Fathers) to give it to the Trappist monks, expelled
from Reichenburg by the Germans. I consider it my sacred duty to help my
Slovenian brothers, expelled by the Hitlerites, and find them temporary refuge.
MILITARY VICAR
I am being charged with a grave crime because I was a military vicar.
The honorable judge asked me if I did not consider myself a traitor to
Yugoslavia for having sought an understanding with the Independent State of
Croatia in this matter. I was also a military vicar in the former Yugoslavia.
For eight or nine years I tried to resolve the issue of the military vicariate,
without reaching a definitive and mutually agreeable solution. Finally, this
matter was settled in Yugoslavia after many difficulties, through a Concordat
which, after its solemn ratification in Parliament, was rendered useless by
street riots.
As the end of the war between Yugoslavia and Germany approached, I was
obliged to extend spiritual assistance to the Catholic soldiers of the former
Yugoslav army and to those of the army of the newly created Independent State
of Croatia. Even though the state had collapsed, the soldiers remained, and we
had an obligation to take this situation into account.
THE RIGHTS OF THE CROATIAN PEOPLE
I was not "persona grata" to either the Germans or the Ustaše;
I was not a Ustaše, nor did I swear an oath, as many of your officials present
here did. The entire Croatian nation had declared itself in favour of a
Croatian state through a plebiscite, and I would have been infamous had I not
felt the pulse of the Croatian people, who were enslaved in the former
Yugoslavia. I have said that Croats could not advance in the military or enter
the diplomatic corps unless they changed their religion or married an Orthodox
woman. This was, therefore, a problem I had to address in my pastoral letters
and sermons.
Everything I have said concerning the right of the Croatian people to
their freedom and independence is in complete accordance with the basic
principles set forth by the Allies at Yalta and in the Atlantic Charter. If, in
accordance with these principles, every nation has the right to its independence,
then why is it denied to the Croatian nation? The Holy See has repeatedly
emphasized that both small nations and minorities have the right to freedom.
Can a Catholic bishop or metropolitan not even mention this principle? If we
must fall, let us fall for having fulfilled our duty.
If you believe this process pleases the Croatian people, give them the
opportunity to speak. For my part, I will accept their verdict. I have
respected and will always respect the will of my people.
You accuse me of being an enemy of the State and of the national
authorities. Today I recognize your authority, but who held that authority
before? I repeat: for me, you have represented authority since May 8, 1945, but
not before. What place in the world is there where one can obey two authorities
at once: you in the forests, and others in Zagreb? Whom should I obey: the
authority of the coup leader Simovic, or the traitorous government—as you call
it—in London, or the one in Cairo, or yours in the forests, or the government
in Zagreb? Is it even possible to serve two masters? According to Catholic
morality, international law, and human law in general, this is impossible. We
could not ignore the established authorities here, even if they were Ustaše.
They were here. You would only have the right to hold me accountable from May
8, 1945, onward.
As for my terrorist acts, you have no proof whatsoever: no one believes
you. If Lisak, Lela Sofijanec, and others approached me under false names, if I
received a letter I never read, if, in short, it is a crime for men to approach
me, then I will accept the verdict calmly. My conscience is not troubled by
having issued Father Maric a certificate of free passage, because I did not do
so with the intention of violating the established order; for such a
transgression, I could go to the next world with a clear conscience. It doesn't
matter whether you believe me or not. The accused, the Archbishop of Zagreb,
will not only suffer, but also die for his convictions. Prime Minister Bakaric
himself told Father Milanovic: "We are convinced that the Archbishop is
behind these actions, but we have no proof." That is enough for me, which
is already quite a confession.
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
Now then, what is the nature of the conflict, where do the difficulties arise
from, and why has the situation not returned to normal? The prosecutor has
repeatedly asserted that nowhere else is there the freedom of conscience that
reigns in this state. I would like to point out some facts that prove
otherwise.
First and foremost, I reiterate that between 260 and 270 priests have
been murdered by the National Liberation Movement. Nowhere else in the
civilized world would such a large number of priests be punished, nor in such a
manner, for the crimes with which they were charged. Thus, for example, Father
Bürger, parish priest of Slatina, as a member of the Kulturbund, could have
been sentenced, say, to about eight years in prison; but he was not sentenced
to death, and you killed him because, in fulfillment of his sacred duties as
dean, he had transported the liturgical objects from the neighboring church of
Vocin. I affirm again: in no other civilized state would such a punishment have
been imposed. Father Povoljnjak was murdered like a dog in the street, without
even a trial, and the same fate has befallen some accused nuns. In no other
civilized state would death ever have replaced a mere prison sentence. You have
committed a fatal error in murdering the priests. The people will never forgive
you. Such is your freedom.
Our Catholic schools, built at the price of enormous sacrifices, have
been taken from us. The work of our seminaries is rendered impossible. If we
had not received seven train cars loaded with food from North America, we would
not have been able to continue this year. Yet these are the children of our
poor farmers. You forcibly seized all their property from the seminaries. You
have done no less than the Gestapo when it seized the property of the Mokrice
Seminary. We are not opposed to agrarian reform. The Holy See has promulgated
many encyclicals on social reforms, but these actions should have been carried
out with the prior agreement of the Vatican.
Our orphanages have been rendered useless; our printing presses have
been destroyed, and I know of none currently operating. Our press, so attacked
here, no longer exists.
Is it not, then, a scandal to assert that nowhere else does the Church
enjoy the freedom it has here? The Dominicans had a religious book printed that
I translated from French, and they spent 75,000 dinars on the edition. Once the
printing was finished, they tried to withdraw the copies, but they failed. Is
that freedom of the press?
The San Jerónimo publishing house ceased to exist. It is a grave offense
against the people to proceed in this way with their oldest and most important
cultural institutions. You have criticized me for the work of
"Caritas." I emphasize here that Caritas has provided enormous
charitable services to our people and to your children as well.
Furthermore, there is the question of religious instruction in schools.
You have established the rule: in the upper grades of secondary school, it is
completely prohibited; in the lower grades, it is optional. But how can you
grant children the right to choose for themselves when some have not even
developed properly, and adults with the right to vote are denied the freedom to
choose in this matter?
Our Catholic convent hospitals, how many difficulties do they encounter?
Against the will of the vast majority of the people, you have introduced
civil marriage. Why have you not implemented this freedom in accordance with
the mentality of our people? In the United States, where a wise republic
prevails, the citizen is free to choose civil or religious marriage, whichever
is more sensible. We do not deny you some control over marriage. But it is a
grave offense to our people to be forced to enter into civil marriage before
religious marriage. Had you consulted us on this matter, we would have given
you pertinent suggestions.
The buildings of some religious communities in Bachka were confiscated;
some churches in Split (I don't know if this situation still exists) were
converted into warehouses. And ecclesiastical property was expropriated without
any agreement with the Holy See. You have already seen that the people, despite
your land reform, refuse to take these lands.
But material concerns are the least of our problems. The painful point
is this: neither by night nor by day does any priest or bishop have a safe
life. Bishop Srebrenic was attacked in Susak by youths, incited by certain
individuals. For three hours they mistreated and assaulted him in a room before
the indifferent gaze of your police and militia.
I myself suffered a similar attack in Zapresic, pelted with stones and
shot at. Bishop Lach had gone to the other side of the Drava River for
Confirmation, and although his arrival was known, he was sent to the other bank
and spent the entire night detained in the Koprivnica prison. Some of your
supporters have come to see me and declared that such treatment was
unacceptable and that they would protest to the authorities. Mobs stoned the
windows of the house where Bishop Buric was staying during his Confirmation
visit. Bishop Pusic, I hear, was recently attacked by a mob, who threw rotten apples
and eggs at him.
We consider such freedom illusory and do not want to be slaves without
any rights; we will fight by all lawful means for our rights in this State.
THE PERSECUTORS AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
So that you may understand why we fight, I will cite three or four more
examples of your supposed freedom. It is taught in classrooms, officially and
in defiance of all the testimony of history, that Jesus Christ never existed.
Know that Jesus Christ is God. For Him we are ready to die. Today you teach
that He never lived; if a teacher dares to assert otherwise, he can safely
expect to be dismissed.
I tell you, Mr. Prosecutor, that under such conditions the Church is
deprived of its freedom and will soon be silenced. Christ is the foundation of
Christianity. You protect the Orthodox Serbs. But I ask you: How can you
conceive of orthodoxy without Christ? How can you conceive of the Catholic
Church without Christ? It is absurd. In school textbooks, it is said that the
Mother of God is a prostitute. Do you not know that for both Catholics and
Orthodox Christians, the Mother of God is the most sacred and venerated of all
concepts? You have ordered that it be disseminated, as official state doctrine,
that man descended from the ape. Perhaps some harbor such ambitions. But why
impose as official a theory that no renowned scholar dares to defend today?
According to your criteria, materialism is the only worthy system, even
though it amounts to the denial of God and the annihilation of Christianity. If
there is nothing but matter, I thank you for your freedom.
One of your own, a prominent figure, has said: "There is not a
single man in this State whom we cannot bring to trial and condemn." Faced
with the constant accusations that place me among murderers and accomplices of
terrorists, I reply that not all crimes in the Independent State of Croatia
were the work of the Domobrani or Ustaše.
These were perilous times for the Church, which had to overcome numerous
difficulties. Let no one think that I desire war. Let the current authorities
enter into dialogue with the Holy See. The Church does not recognize
dictatorship, but it is not opposed to an honest understanding with whomever.
The bishops will know what to expect in the fulfillment of their duties, and
there will no longer be a need to seek out priests to point the finger of
accusation against the bishops, as has been done here.
Finally, I want to say a few words to the Communist Party, which is, in
truth, my accuser. If you believe that I have adopted my present stance for
material reasons, you are mistaken, since we have remained steadfast in our
defense even after becoming impoverished.
We are not against workers seeking recognition of their rights in
factories, because this is the spirit of papal encyclicals. Nor are we against
agrarian reform.
But let the leaders of communism understand that if there is to be
freedom to spread materialism, then we also have the right to profess and
propagate our principles. Many Catholics have died and will die defending that
right.
In conclusion, if there is goodwill, an understanding can be reached,
and the initiative lies with the current authorities. Neither I nor the other
members of the episcopate are the ones who should enter into these fundamental
negotiations. This is a matter between the State and the Holy See.
As for me, and as for the verdict, I ask for no clemency. My conscience
is clear.
TESTIMONY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH ASSOCIATION
Luis S. Breier, president of the American Jewish Association, declared,
two days after Stepinac's conviction, at the National Conference of Christians
and Jews, at the Bronx Round Table, on October 13, 1946:
"This great man of the Church has been accused of being a Nazi
collaborator. We Jews protest against this slander. Knowing his past well, we
can say that from 1934 and in the following years he was always a true friend
of the Jews, which he did not hide even during the times of the harshest
persecution under the regime of Hitler and his satellites.
He was one of the very few in Europe who stood up against Nazi tyranny,
even when it was most difficult and dangerous. This man, now the victim of a
scandalous conviction, spoke out openly, courageously, and tirelessly under the
Nazi regime against the appalling Nuremberg Laws, and his opposition to Nazi
terrorism never wavered." It diminished. He also raised his voice openly
against the Yellow Star system, emphasizing that it was an affront to human
dignity. It is to his credit that this system was abolished. Alongside His
Holiness Pius XII, Archbishop Stepinac was the greatest defender of persecuted
Jews in Europe.”
TESTIMONY OF IVAN MESTROVIC
Original Croatian published in “Hrvatska Revija”, Buenos Aires.
The death of Cardinal Stepinac deeply moved all Croatians, those living
in their homeland and those scattered throughout the world. It also affected me
profoundly, both because of my long friendship with the Cardinal and because of
his heroic conduct and his suffering in defense of his people and his religious
creed. This defender did not use the sword or dubious alliances, but rather the
truth and his noble soul, his heroic heart and his faith in God.
His conviction is one of the government's nefarious deeds, with sinister
omens for the future. It is ignominious because a just man was condemned, a man
whose integrity, both religious and national, was never questioned by any
Croat, not even by those who handed down the sentence. He was
"judged" for his unwavering faith in the doctrine of Christ and in
the right of the Croatian people to live free and independent. The rest is
crude fabrication. Milovan Djilas, one of the leaders of the Communist Party
and at that time Tito's lieutenant, expressed his solidarity with the above in
a conversation with the author of these lines in New York a few years ago. When
asked for his opinion on Stepinac and his conviction, he replied:
"To tell the truth, I believe, and I'm not alone in believing this,
that Stepinac is a man of integrity, of strong character, impossible to sway.
He was, in fact, unjustly condemned, but how many times in history have just
men been condemned for political expediency?"
"Is it truly necessary, for political expediency, to clash with the
will and feelings of the Croatian people and with the great Christian Church
and, consequently, with all religions that profess the existence of God?"
I asked Djilas.
"We had nothing to object to regarding his Croatian nationalism,
but I could not tolerate his allegiance to the Pope in Rome."
"In your opinion, who has more supporters in Croatia, Tito or
Stepinac?"
" "It's a difficult question, but I'll answer it frankly. In
Croatia, we don't number more than 3%, and 5% in all of Yugoslavia. However,
that doesn't matter to us at all, since Christians also started with a small
number of followers."
"But Christians didn't spread their faith by imprisoning and
murdering those who didn't follow them; rather, they fought for their faith,
facing martyrdom and suffering.
They did so later, when they had the power. Furthermore, the methods of
our doctrine are completely opposed to those of Christianity in its beginnings.
We annihilate and eliminate everything that obstructs our path; the end
justifies the means." They say that's the motto of the Jesuits.
"They say that's the motto of the Jesuits." Communism adopts
any slogan it deems appropriate to reach its goal. Poor Djilas; he had to
experience this firsthand as soon as a human touch was perceived in his Marxist
interpretation.
Another of the communist leaders told me, while discussing the Stepinac
case, the same thing as Djilas:
"He is, indeed, a strong and irreproachable man, firm in his
convictions. If he had yielded on just one thing, he would be free today and
would have spared us the temptation." His Croatian nationalism wouldn't have
bothered us, and had he proclaimed the Croatian Church, we would have lifted
him to the heavens."
"That, sir or comrade, he couldn't do against his convictions and
those of his flock; it's very likely he fully understood what 'lifting him to
the heavens' would mean, since nothing would remain of him or his followers
after the ensuing fall."
Regarding Stepinac's alleged involvement in the forced conversion of
Jews and Orthodox Christians to Catholicism, the following case suffices to
refute such a calumny:
The priest (still alive) of the largest Catholic parish in Zagreb showed
me Archbishop Stepinac's circular, which, among other things, stated: "If
people of the Orthodox or Jewish faith, whose lives are in danger, come to you
and wish to be saved by accepting the Catholic faith, welcome them in order to
save human lives." Do not demand a special religious doctrine from them,
since the Orthodox are Christians like us, and Christianity originates from
Judaism. The duty and obligation of a Christian consists, first and foremost,
in saving humanity. Once this madness and savagery have ended, those who
accepted our religion out of conviction will remain in it; the others, once the
danger has passed, will return to their Church.”
Days after the verdict against Stepinac was handed down, I arrived in
New York and met with Cardinal Spellman, who showed great interest in the
Metropolitan of Croatia. After I informed him at length about Stepinac, both as
a priest and as a man, he said to me, deeply moved:
“I will soon be leaving for Rome and will propose to the Holy Father
that he appoint him a cardinal and summon him to Rome.” "I believe that
way the regime won't oppose his departure from the country." I replied,
"From what I know of Stepinac, he won't agree to be separated from his
flock."
Spellman looked at me in astonishment and said,
"Do you think he would prefer to spend 16 years in prison rather
than be free in the cardinal's purple?"
I replied that I believed Stepinac would choose the former.
A short time later, Spellman called me and informed me that he had been
in Rome and had spoken with Pope Pius XII, proposing that Stepinac be named a
cardinal. He said the Pope had replied that he had already found a way to
propose it, but Stepinac had responded that he could not accept, as he could in
no way separate himself from his people.
In a letter he wrote to me, Stepinac repeated the same words regarding
his medical treatment, emphasizing that he could in no way leave Croatia, not
even if he knew that he would die in a few days. He consoled himself by saying
that he could easily endure his imprisonment, arguing that the other priests
were in a worse situation and that it was his duty to suffer with them.
When I returned to my homeland last year, my main desire was to see
Stepinac, which I managed to do, and he was the first person I visited. I made
no secret of this intention and asked no one for permission, although I knew
that they did not allow anyone, not even priests, to visit him. I went to
Krasic and straight to the rectory. No one stopped or questioned me, and the
militiaman guarding the entrance turned his back on me, taking a few steps
back. At the entrance to the rectory, I met a man who looked surprised and
pleased. At first, I thought he might be the gardener, since he wasn't wearing
a cassock and was surely working in the garden. He introduced himself as the
parish priest of Krasic and led me inside, where the Archbishop came out to
meet me. We were both deeply moved; we embraced and kissed, our eyes filled with
tears. The Cardinal was in good spirits, and after a few cheerful words, he led
me to a modest room.
"This is the parish office and now the Cardinal's office, living
room, and dining room." We soon sat down for lunch, which the nuns had
hastily prepared. Since it was Friday, we ate fish, some cheese, bread baked by
the nuns, and drank Krasic wine. The nuns were three natives of Bosnia; they
cultivated the vegetable garden and managed the modest parish finances. We
spent four hours after lunch discussing national problems. The cardinal was
cheerful, and throughout our conversation, he didn't show a single word that
betrayed any bitterness or hatred toward his adversaries.
"Patience," he said, "we live in a time of unpleasant
historical events; there have been similar ones throughout the history of poor
humanity. It seems to me that it is written in the Vedas that stupidity and
folly are the cause of all misfortunes and evils. Christ taught us that we
should forgive as he forgave, and indeed, forgiveness is an integral part of
the love he preached. Every day I pray for those who hate me and also for those
who love me. How could it be otherwise? They are also blood of our blood, men
and brothers, even though our points of view may differ."
Stepinac looked well physically, except for an excessive flush,
undoubtedly due to his illness. Spiritually, he was remarkably serene and
seemed stronger in spirit than ever. All I could observe was that he was
suffering from pain in his operated foot, which he kept elevated under the
table. At one point, we got up and went to the window overlooking the fields of
Stepinac's village and the peasants working. I noticed that he was enjoying
this view and told him that those of us born in the countryside liked the
peasants and their hard work with the land, and that I thought he, too, could
bear his confinement in the village, in this small house, more easily than if
he were confined in his vast archbishop's palace in Zagreb.
"You speak the truth; it's true. Our country folk, despite their
continuous and arduous struggle, are closer to the earth and to heaven than
those who live in the cities can ever be."
We said goodbye, but I had no feeling that this would be our last
meeting, nor did I foresee how much longer his confinement would last. Neither
he nor I said a single word about his "pardon" and his return to the
archbishopric of Zagreb. I was convinced that Stepinac awaited only God's
grace: to persevere in his mission to the end, as had been given to him. His
people were dignified by his suffering and death. He did not return to the
archbishopric of Zagreb, but to the tomb behind the high altar of his
cathedral, from where he will defend, with an even more powerful voice, the
freedom of Christ's doctrine and the freedom of his Croatian people.
Stepinac lies in the somber tomb, his face luminous, as the symbol of
Croatian inflexibility that will never yield to anyone. Therefore, glory to the
great son of Croatia, Aloysius Stepinac!
IVAN MESTROVIC. University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA
CARDINAL STEPINAC'S LAST LETTER: LETTER TO THE OSIJEK DISTRICT COURT
The trial of nine professors and theology students from the Djakovo
Seminary in Croatia was held before the Osijek District Court. The trial began
on January 28 and concluded on February 8, with the following verdict: the
spiritual director and professor of the theology faculty, Cirilo Kos, was
sentenced to 7 years; theology graduate Ivan Gaso to 6 years; and theology
students Ivan Mrso to 4 years, Ante Bajic to 2.5 years, Zvonko Petrovic to 4
years, Bosko Radilovic to 3 years, and Petar Sokcevic to 2.5 years of strict
imprisonment. The communists accused them of spreading chauvinism and inciting
open struggle against the existing state order.
In connection with this trial, the court had summoned Cardinal Stepinac
as a witness. He addressed a significant letter to the court, dated December 4,
1959, just 68 days before his death. In this letter, the martyred cardinal
gives a moving testimony of his suffering and demonstrates once again his
strength and indomitable greatness of soul.
The European press gave extensive publicity to this letter, which we
translate from the English text published in the London weekly "The
Tablet" on March 5 of this year. "I received the summons from the district
court regarding questioning in the trial against 'Cyril Kos and others'... I
have the honor to reply that I cannot comply with said summons, although in
1953 I responded to a summons issued by the same organ of state power for the
purpose of questioning me about the content from an envelope sent to me
directly from the Vatican. I write this so that it cannot be alleged that I am
causing conflict or committing contempt. The reasons why I cannot appear are as
follows:
1. According to information I have had for some time, the UDBA (the
Yugoslav secret police) has discovered many of my letters in different parts of
the country; for example, those found during a raid on the seminary in Djakovo,
where Cyril Kos was spiritual director. In those letters, I replied to priests
who sent me greetings and expressed their good wishes. If it could be proven
that any of those letters was written by me (and therefore is not forged), I
would not deny it, since I would have written it in my capacity as legitimate
Superior to a priest of my diocese or another ecclesiastic or friend to comfort
and encourage him. If I am to die for this, I am prepared to do so, since I do
not consider myself guilty of the slightest infraction regarding these letters.
2. The second reason why I cannot respond to the summons is this: The
Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of Croatia sentenced me on
October 11, 1946, to 16 years of hard labor, first in Lepoglava Prison and then
in my current confinement in Krasic. That this sentence was a legal crime
against an innocent man is the interpretation of the entire civilized world.
Even certain leaders of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia admitted
this in a conversation with Professor Mestrovic (the well-known sculptor Ivan
Mestrovic, currently a refugee in the United States and a professor at the
University of Notre Dame. - Editorial Staff) in the United States. Professor
Mestrovic himself told me all this when he came to visit me in Krasic this
year. He knows their names.
The consequence of the sentence that scandalized the entire world is
that my physical life during the thirteen years of imprisonment and confinement
has been on the brink of death. Doctors in our country and abroad have done
everything possible to prolong my life, but they have not been able to restore
my health to this day. They have taken thirty-four liters of blood, and that is
still not enough. They had to operate on both legs to save me from imminent
death by thrombosis.
Because of those operations, I am practically an invalid who drags his
feet around the house, leaning on a cane. In addition, for the last five years
I have suffered from prostatitis, and despite all the medication, there are
rare moments when I feel completely pain-free. I will not mention the
near-fatal illness that afflicted me two years ago when journalists announced
that I was in danger of dying. Nor do I want to recall other ailments that
plague me, such as bronchial catarrh. I suffered from that for years. When Dr.
Sercer requested that I be allowed to go to the seaside, his request was
denied.
The serious state of my health is best known to the parish priest of
Krasic and the nuns who frequently spent entire days at my bedside. I was often
unable to celebrate Holy Mass, even on Sundays, because of the pain. Every day
I spend many hours on the sofa with my swollen feet, raised off the floor to
improve blood circulation.
I know you will say: Don't our guards see him walking in the courtyard,
going to church, talking to the children, etc.? Yes, I go to church when I can
(but often I can't) to fulfill my duty in this way, at least, to offer words of
instruction and encouragement to the people, and to help the parish priest of
Krasic. No priest can come from the neighboring towns to help him, as they used
to do for many years. I also walk in the courtyard, or, to be more precise, I
drag myself along, leaning on my cane as best I can, to get some fresh air, as
the doctors recommended, and to exercise as much as possible. I told the
doctors that it was impossible for me to walk (I didn't for a year), not
because I was expressly forbidden to do so, but because of the attitude of the
guards who follow me everywhere.
If I fight against the Party's ideology, convinced of its complete
falsehood, does this mean that I fight against the State? If the Yugoslav
Communist Party is legally permitted to persecute the Catholic Church with fire
and sword for the past fifteen years, separating people from the Church,
preventing the baptism of children, prohibiting Christian instruction for young
people and the celebration of religious marriages; if the law allows the
Yugoslav Communist Party to destroy Catholic institutions and schools, printing
presses, newspapers and their property, and to commit countless acts of
repression, how can anyone dare accuse me of being a criminal if I raise my
voice in defense of the sacred things of Catholicism? Have I violated the
United Nations Charter of Human Rights, or was it others who violated it?
Because, after bloody injustices and many suppressions, some now want to
torture me with lengthy interrogations about things for which I will never
admit guilt? Is it not enough for you to know that some of your leaders have
openly confessed to Professor Mestrovic that they have no evidence to prosecute
me, and that, despite this, the trial was instituted with consequences that
have brought me to the brink of death, as I described above?
Therefore, I tell you that I am a man with both feet on the grave, that
I am already descending into it. Because I am gravely ill, I cannot comply with
your summons. If an attempt is then made to torture me by force with
interrogations in my sickbed or during my painful walks in the courtyard, I
already refuse to answer anything. Furthermore, I decline all responsibility
for the public scandal that would result from such action and that would find
publicity in the world press when the slightest attack committed against a
half-dead man becomes known. If the organs of government consider that I am dying
too slowly, let them then order my physical liquidation as they ordered my
legal liquidation fourteen years ago.
Saint Cyprian gave 25 gold coins to the executioner who had to behead
him. I have no gold; I can only pray for the person who will eventually execute
me, asking the Lord to forgive him in eternity and to allow me to die in peace.
If you have provoked me to speak of your inhuman treatment during these long
years, do not take it amiss, for the Romans said: Sunt certi denique fines
(Everything has its limit). My jailers can continue to stand guard according to
your instructions and make my life impossible, but I know what my duty is. With
the grace of the Lord, I will fulfill it to the end, to the very end without
the slightest hatred or vengeance toward anyone, but at the same time without
fear of anyone.
Krasic, December 4, 1959.
Alojzije kard. Stepinac
Nadbiskup zagrebacki
Croatia, a nation jealously guarding its
traditions, with its own millennia-old state identity, and proud of its
unconditional loyalty to the world and to the values of Western
civilization, finds itself deprived of all its rights today, while the process
of emancipation reaches, without discrimination, peoples with limited education
and those in so-called colonial territories. Despite its evolution, identical
to that of other European nations, it is not only excluded from the community
of nations as a subject of public international law, but it does not even
appear on many geographical maps as a national entity. Those who have
thoroughly studied the Croatian problem and understand that the names Croatia,
Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia and Istria refer to the regions
inhabited by Croats are few and far between.
The complex political events of the last
century, determined by the decline and withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from
southeastern Europe, which in turn disrupted the balance of power in
post-Napoleonic Europe, have been essentially the main cause of Croatia's adverse
national reality. The phenomenon of the Turkish retreat reactivated, with full
force but with new actors and in new forms, the age-old process founded on the
differences and classic antagonisms between the world of Western civilization
and that of Byzantine civilization. Imperial Russia, with its dream of a Third
Rome, considered itself not only the most faithful interpreter of the
traditions of Byzantine civilization, but also claimed the right to inherit the
regions recently liberated from the Turks. It practically set the limit of its
interests as far as the power of the Patriarchs of Constantinople once
extended. Hence the Russian interference in the lives of the young, Orthodox,
and mostly Slavic nations of the Balkans. The Western powers opposed this
attitude, interpreting it, quite rightly, as a direct threat to a vast and
vital geopolitical sector.
The Eastern Question, as this acute
international problem came to be called, which ultimately caused such great
confusion, had dramatic consequences for the large central and southeastern
part of Europe and remained fully relevant throughout the 19th century. The
world conflict of 1914-18 was the culmination of that long crisis, and the
current situation in the aforementioned European region is a logical projection
derived from the Eastern Question.
This long process was arduous for Croatia,
resulting in its inability to take control of its own destiny, although, thanks
to great efforts and in a highly adverse climate, it achieved its economic and
social restructuring and appropriate cultural expansion. On the other hand, so
many conflicting interests converged on Croatian territory that, subjecting
everything, in a Byzantine style, to political ambitions, they introduced
genuine confusion into scholarly literature and public documents directly or
indirectly related to the Croatian question. Croatian reality and history were
mythologized, even in encyclopedic works, with unparalleled disregard.
This situation threatens to distort even the
very notion of what it means to be Croatian and the role this nation played in
history and continues to play today in a region where diverse factors
influenced the definition of a uniquely sensitive geopolitical identity. In
contrast to their geographically neighboring peoples, the Croats, despite
having suffered a considerable portion of their national territory under
Turkish rule, maintained their political and cultural identity intact.

CROATIA IN JEAN BLAEU'S "ATLAS MAYOR"
In contrast to certain contemporary publications, we are offered an
extraordinary and truly valuable example: a map of Croatia published in the
17th century. It comes from perhaps the most difficult period, when the Croats
felt the full weight of Turkish pressure on the heart of Europe and when the
Croatian state was reduced to the relics of the former Kingdoms of Croatia,
Dalmatia, and Slavonia.
Johannes Blaeu published his Atlas Mayor in Amsterdam in 1669, in twelve
volumes, dedicating a map and extensively documented description to Croatia in
the volume on Italy. All of this is remarkably accurate, considering the
limited cartographic resources available at the time. Furthermore, all Croatian
regions are listed with admirable precision in the descriptive table, and the
country's political situation is analyzed in an encyclopedic manner. Nor was
the heraldic aspect neglected, although its purpose was primarily decorative,
and no detail was omitted from the coats of arms of the main regions. Finally,
the dedication further enhances the historical value of the entire document,
since, in addressing it to the Ban (Viceroy) of Croatia, Count Peter Zrinski, a
figure of great prominence and no less prestige in European life at that time,
the full diplomatic title of the Kingdom of Croatia is mentioned.


The map under consideration belongs to the renowned Flemish school,
which made an invaluable contribution to science. The geographers and
cartographers Mercator and Ortelius inaugurated a long series of modern
atlases. Among the great figures of the golden age of Dutch cartography,
William Jansoon Blaeu, father, and his son, Joan Wz. Blaeu, stand out. Blaeu
the father was a scholar of mathematics and astronomy, founder of a famous
cartographic establishment in Amsterdam, and publisher of maps, atlases, wall
maps, and terrestrial globes. William remained in his position only briefly,
and in 1638, he was succeeded by his son, who gained renown with a general map
in two hemispheres using stereographic projections, in commemoration of the
Peace of Westphalia. Joan Blaeu published a large world map, considered the
pinnacle of Dutch cartography.

The Blaeu family's works have been highly praised for their exceptional
technical and artistic quality. Their maps are covered with compass roses, ship
types, scenes of exotic life, navigational instruments, coats of arms, and
more, all meticulously and exquisitely drawn, with the designers giving free
rein to their imaginations. Because of their content, these maps were virtually
encyclopedias of contemporary geography and justly and deservedly crown the
century of Dutch supremacy in cartographic art.
Among the works of Blaeu the Younger, the Atlas Mayor or Geografía
Blaviana, published in 1669, stands out. It is the result of an enormous amount
of human effort, thought, and research. This work includes a description and
map of Croatia as part of a book covering Italian topics. The Spanish edition is titled PARTE DEL ATLAS MAYOR O GEOGRAFIA BLAVIANA,
que contenido las cartas y descripcións de Italia. It follows a spherical design held by angels with the inscription
INNEFESSVS AGENDO. The cover ends with the indication: In Amsterdam and the
office of Juan Blaeu - MDCLXIX.

The atlas is dedicated to His Serene Highness - His Majesty Don Juan of
Austria, son of King Philip IV... I submit to Your Highness the Geographical
Description, with historical narratives, enriched with new information and
illustrations; and arranged in a concise style... Amsterdam, December 1, 1669.
Juan Blaeu.
DESCRIPTION OF THE CROATIAN PROVINCES
In his description of Croatia, Blaeu first uses the classical name
Illyricum and then Slavonia, due to the Slavic character of the Croatian
language. The Illyrian attribute for the Croatians is mainly due to the desire
and custom of humanists to call European countries by their classical names.
The republication of Ptolemy's Geography greatly influenced the use of
classical names. Thus, the great humanist Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, later
Pope Pius II (1458-64), in his work *De Europa*, referred to the Croatian lands
by the name of the ancient Illyrians. Furthermore, the theory of the Illyrian
origin of the Croats gained some traction, because the modern Croatian people
are indeed the result of a diverse ethnic background and can be considered
partly descended from the ancient Illyrians.
In a way, these classical concepts undoubtedly influenced Napoleon's
creation of the Kingdom of the Illyrian Provinces. Illyria is comprised of
Dalmatia and the following regions: Croatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia...
The apostolic brief Slavorum gentium, of Pope Leo XIII, when discussing
the dioceses with rights over the ancient Illyrian College in Rome, states:
"Nicholas V, our predecessor, acceding to the requests of Jerome of
Potomlje, of the diocese of Ragusa, and of other pious men of Dalmatia and
Slavonia, with the bull Piis fidelium votis, issued on April 21, 1453,
established a hospice in Rome, which was named after Saint Jerome of the Slavs,
and later also of the Illyrians, according to the ancient geographical designation,
for the purpose of receiving and sheltering the poor faithful who would arrive
here from Dalmatia, Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina..."

The generalized name Slavic, used as an equivalent for the ethnic name
of the Croats, comes from a custom in the Mediterranean world, primarily
Italian, of referring to Croats by the common name for peoples of the Slavic
linguistic group, Slavi, or, according to the Venetian dialect, Schiavoni.
In modern times, the name Illyrian or Slavic has been given biased
interpretations, but the synonym Slavic or Illyrian was used only when
referring to the Croats, because they were practically the only Slavic-speaking
peoples who had direct contact with the Renaissance centers of Italy.
Furthermore, they were the only Slavic people with a navy, and as skilled
navigators, particularly the Ragusans, they maintained relationships with
maritime nations. The other peoples of the Slavic linguistic group were called
by their own names, for example: Bulgarians, Serbs, Poles, etc.
Juan Blaeu, who had a well-formed understanding of Croatia—for in 1666
his workshop printed *De Regno Croatiae et Dalmatiae - Libri Sex* by Ioannes
Lucius, the father of modern Croatian historiography—begins his description,
transcribed here in fragments, as follows:
"Although this province, also called Illyris, Illiria, and
Illirias, is situated outside the borders of Italy, and its description has
been placed among the Eastern European provinces, because it fell under
Venetian rule in many cities and several islands, it can rightfully be placed
among the regions that obeyed that vast dominion."
BOUNDARIES. The ancients established the Illyrian border, between the
Hungarians and the Adriatic Sea, with the Romans extending its boundaries so
far that they included many lands on the other side of the Danube; but with the
decline of their empire, these boundaries became much more restricted. Pliny,
Ptolemy, Pomponius Mela, Dionysius, Alexandrinus, and Suetonius, in the Life of
Tiberius, describe its boundaries variously; which the Moderns have delineated,
pointing to the East, Serbia or Rascia; to the North, Urgria, separated from it
by the Danube and Dravo rivers; to the West, Styria, Carniola by the Windisch
March, and Istria; and to the South, the aforementioned Gulf or Sea of
Venice, embracing only the Provinces of Dalmatia, Croatia,
Bosnia, and Slavonia, and the latter being commonly called the whole of
Illyricum: where Lucas de Linda notes that Croatia and Dalmatia make up the ancient
Liburnia, this Region not being different.
TERRITORIES AND MAIN RIVERS. Illyricum, for the most part, is a rugged
and mountainous country, with many lakes and rivers that fertilize it. From the
bordering mountain ranges of Germany flow the Dravo and Savo rivers: the former
separates Slavonia from Hungary; the latter crosses that province; and both,
joined by other less well-known rivers, merge with the Danube.
"The other rivers that fertilize Illyricum will be mentioned in
their own sections. That territory abounds in cattle and sheep, and the
breeding of spirited horses. The fruits it yields most abundantly are wines,
figs, and similar products. Nor are there any shortages of gold, iron, and
mercury. The natives are tall, robust, rugged, docile, and suitable for any
occupation."
The author, in listing the provinces, begins with Slavonia, Bosnia,
Croatia, and ends with Dalmatia. Referring to Slavonia, he says:
SLAVONIA. The province properly called Slavonia is contained within the
Drava and Sava rivers; its boundaries being Serbia or Rascia to the east;
Hungary to the north; Styria and Carniola to the west; Croatia and Bosnia to
the south; with a length of fifty German miles and a latitude between the
aforementioned rivers of twelve miles, formerly being part of Upper Hungary.
Its metropolis and capital is the city of Zagabria, which alone resisted
Ottoman power, its empire remaining free and not recognizing that of any other
prince. It is a diocesan see and counted together.
When referring to Bosnia, a vassal kingdom of medieval Croatia and the
second Croatian state formation, the author uses the Croatian term Bosna and
not the Latinized name Bosnia:
BOSNA. "Bosna, which many considered ancient Dardania, is named,
according to some, after the Bosna River, which nourishes it and joins the Sava
River after having flowed almost entirely through it. Its borders are, to the
East, the Province of Serbia; to the North, Slavonia, along the Sava River; to
the West, Croatia and part of Dalmatia, which also marks its southern boundary.
Its length is forty German miles, and its width fifteen. It was formerly
divided into Upper and Lower Bosna: the former was called Ducal, the latter
Royal, due to the rule of the Princes who possessed them. Today, both are
subject to the Ottoman Empire, along with most of Croatia and Dalmatia; which
has divided its government into seven Prefectures or Sanzacatos: Bosna, Poxega,
Cernik, Bihek, Likam with Cesbava, Clisoa, and Herzegovina, with the latter
being superior to all." Bassa of Bosna, who acknowledges subordination to
the Vizier of Buda.
Then, echoing the widespread misconception in Europe at the time, the
author treats the Bosnians as if they were barbarians.
In his description of the province properly called Croatia, he refers
only to a strip of land between the Adriatic Sea and the Sava River,
corresponding to the regions now known as the Croatian Littoral, Western
Bosnia, Lika, Gorski Kotar, Pokupje, and partly Posavina.
CROATIA. Croatia, which the Germans call Krabaten, a famous part of Liburnia,
faces east towards Bosnia; north towards Slavonia; west towards Carniola, via
the Windisch March; and south towards Dalmatia, which also lies to the east.
Almost all of it is under Muslim rule, and some portion under Austrian rule.
That which is subject to the Turks is governed by ministers subject to the
Bassa of Bosnia, as mentioned; and that which recognizes Austrian authority has
its own governor. There are many lords of vassals there who treat them with
such cruelty that they would rather be lords of the Turks. The metropolis of
Croatia was formerly Fluminio, commonly known as Fiume, on the banks of the
Flum River, which the Germans call Pflaum. Today its capital is Bigihon... Its
territory is fertile with wheat, wine, and various fruits, with some olive
groves... The customs of the Croats are very similar to those of the
Hungarians, Slavs, and Germans of those borders, so much so that it is said of
the nobles of this region: "They surpass the Germans in temperance; the
Hungarians in pride and cunning; and the Slavs in ferocity."
The note on Dalmatia is extensive and detailed.
DALMATIA. Dalmatia, a famous region of Illyricum or Slavonia, whose
description is more appropriate for this volume due to the strongholds held
there by the Venetians, borders Alvania to the east, and part of Serbia or
Rascia; To the north, Bosnia and Croatia; to the west, Windisch March and
Istria; and to the south, the Adriatic Sea with its adjacent islands. The name
Dalmatia originated from the city of Dalmium or Delminium, which, during the
reign of Gentius in Illyricum, rose up as a free republic. Subjugating the
neighboring peoples, including those within the rivers Narenta (or Norin) and
Kerka (formerly called Tityus), it extended its dominion over all that territory,
later expanding to the aforementioned limits. It was also called Liburnium
because this province encompassed Dalmatia and Croatia, as mentioned.
The Dalmatians are fair-skinned and red-faced, well-disposed, agile,
brave, and resourceful, peaceful, loyal, constant, spirited, and prudent; the
women are courageous and agreeable.
The dominion of Dalmatia is divided among four princes: the part
extending from Obroaz or Obrovacio, through the Morlaca mountain range and its
borders, as far as Albona, on the Istrian border, with that maritime coast,
belongs to the Austrian lineage. The cities of Zara, Nona or Enona, Sebenico,
Trau, Spalatro, and Cataro, with their jurisdictions, are under Venetian rule;
to which are added the adjacent islands of Cherso, Ossero, Vellia, Arbo,
Lesina, Corzola, and other smaller ones. The Republic of Ragusa administers a
good part of Dalmatia, the islands, and the mainland. Finally, the Turks hold
some important positions in this province, which will be mentioned below.
The land of Morlaca, formerly called Albius or Albio, extends along the
Dalmatian coast to the west; it contains three main towns: Segna, Baccari, and
Fiume or Rio di San Vito; which, as noted, belong to the Archduke of Austria.
The Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik, in Croatian), which was the third
Croatian political formation as a true and sovereign state and which intervened
in international politics as a factor of European importance, has been analyzed
separately and occupies a separate chapter, recording the smallest details of
interest:
RAGUSA. The Republic of Ragusa encompasses a large part of Dalmatia, its
jurisdiction currently severely restricted by the powerful Turkish presence.
Not many years ago, it extended one hundred and twenty miles in length and
twelve in width. It borders Alvania to the east; the Duchy of Herzegovina to
the north; the part of Bosnia and the remainder of Dalmatia to the west; and
the Adriatic Sea to the south. The cities of Ragusa, Stagno, Tribigna, and
Sabioncelo, as well as other fortresses and small towns, belong to the
Republic. The most significant islands are Agosta (or Longosta), Meleda, São
Andre, Mezo, Lupana, and São Pietro.
It is a small city, but very strong and well-governed. Capital of an
illustrious Republic, which has endured for so many years against the Ottoman
power, administered by a Rector, whose term lasts only one month, a Senate, and
other Magistrates. It is a trading center and stopover for goods coming down
from Turkey and Eastern countries, destined for Western countries. It is
defended by strong walls, high towers, and thick bastions, dominated by a
distinguished fortress called São Lorenço. It has a secure harbor, closed with
a chain. It suffered a lamentable upheaval caused by a terrible earthquake and
a furious storm last year, 1667, the damage being so extensive that it cannot
be fully repaired so quickly.
THE MAP OF CROATIA
The map is presented on a sheet measuring 62 by 54 cm. In the upper left
corner are the coats of arms of Bosnia and Dalmatia, and in the upper right
corner, the coat of arms of Slavonia and Croatia, the latter checkered in
silver and gules, now the national coat of arms. In the lower left corner is
the table with the map's title and its contents, in Latin, and its translation
into English reads:
Illyrian present-day, which writers commonly call Sclavonia and Italians
usually call Schiavonza, is divided into Sclavonia, Croatia, Bosnia, and
Dalmatia. The greater part, occupied by the Turks, is divided into prefectures
which they call sanjaks; the rest is held by the Venetians, Hungarians, and
Ragusans. The sanjaks are Bosnia, residence of the pasha, Pozega, Cernik,
Bihac, Lika and Krbava, Klis, and Herzegovina.
The map's delineation and overall design are meticulously crafted,
demonstrating a clear effort to include a large number of geographical features
and names. It is worth noting that, despite the inherent errors of the
techniques and knowledge of the time, the accuracy of the general outlines is
striking, both in the depiction of river courses, mountains, the location of
cities and towns, and in the representation of islands and other geographical
features, especially regarding borders.
This accuracy holds immense value for modern historiography. The map
does not merely define the borders between well-established sovereign states,
but rather establishes the limits of a nation at a time when its territory was
governed by various powers at war with one another. Even more remarkable is the
scientific precision with which the borders were determined and drawn, even
within the Ottoman Empire itself, particularly those separating Croatian lands
from Serbia, following the course of the Drina River. The same border was
recognized at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when the occupation and
subsequent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary was
authorized, remaining unchanged until 1918. Afterwards, it was maintained as
the regional border in Yugoslavia and is currently the border between the
People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, respectively. During
the period 1941-45, it was the border between the Independent State of Croatia
and Serbia, then under German and Bulgarian occupation. The only omissions are
with regard to present-day Montenegro, which was then called Zeta and, being
largely under Venetian protectorate, was considered part of Albania Veneto,
with its coastline considered part of southern Dalmatia.
In summary, the borders, both to the East, North, Northwest and East in
Istria, as well as to the Southwest and South encompassing the eastern part of
the Adriatic Sea, run along the limits of the regions inhabited by the Croatian
people, without distinction of the political power in force at that time.

DEDICATION TO THE BAN OR VICEROY OF CROATIA
Unlike other maps in the same book, which refer to the states and
principalities of Italy, the author, with his own signature, printed a
dedication on this map to the Ban or Viceroy of Croatia, Count Peter of Zrin, a
prominent figure. The dedication, in Latin, lists all the titles and honors
that Count Zrinski held at that time, which is of particular importance
because, for the first time in this work, the full title of the Croatian
kingdom is mentioned in accordance with medieval diplomatic practice: Regnum
Dalmatiae, Croatiae ac Slavoniae.
Blaeu, in referring to the Croatian territory free from the Turks and
not part of the Venetian Lordship, called by historians "Reliquiae
reliquiarum," did not clearly define its political organization. As
mentioned, there is no reference to the Kingdom of Croatia, but there is to
Hungary and the Austrian princes or Empire. The discrimination is made, but
without analysis, when it is stated that Croatia "has its own
Governor" (ban) and that Slavonia—which at that time politically formed a
whole with Croatia proper—"has its own free Empire without recognizing
that of another Prince." By mentioning the ban or viceroy, the main
function of Count Zrinski, and the title Regnor. Dalmatiae, Croatiae Slavoniae,
the explanatory encyclopedic mission was completed.
It should be noted, in view of the mentions of Hungary and the House of
Austria, that Croatia, with the Pacta Conventa of 1102, entered into a personal
union with the Hungarian crown, with both states retaining their sovereignty.
The common king was represented by the ban or viceroy, generally a Croatian
nobleman. In 1527, the Croatian Diet (Sabor) elected Ferdinand of Habsburg as
King of Croatia, an example later followed by the Hungarians. It was noted that
they elected him freely, as they had done when uniting with the Hungarian
crown... libero arbitrio se coadiunximus circa sacram coronam Hungariae, et
post hoc, nunc erga maiestatem vestram.
In this way, Croatia preserved its own state organization, governed by
the ban or viceroy, and the Diet, composed of nobles and estates.
The institution of ban is native to Croatia, as is the word itself,
which some believe to be of Iranian origin. It refers to the sovereign's most
important advisor. The ban of Croatia was the king's lieutenant, and is often
called prorex in Latin documents. His specific functions were to convene and
preside over the Diet, he was commander-in-chief of the army, and he commanded
the naval force. He was head of the judiciary and head of the executive branch
of the kingdom. He was also a member of the sovereign's secret council and, at
coronation ceremonies, occupied a place of honor and held the royal apple.
THE PERSONALITY OF COUNT PETER ZRINSKI
Count Peter of Zrin (in Croatian, Petar Subic Zrinski) was a descendant
of a very old family named Subic, who adopted the surname Zrinski after
settling in Zrin Castle in Northern Croatia. His most illustrious ancestor was
Prince Paul Subic of Bribir, who was the hereditary Ban of Croatia and
"Lord of Bosnia." He brought the kings of the Angevin family to the
thrones of Croatia and Hungary (in 1301), rulers of the Kingdom of Naples and
later also of Poland and Lithuania. Another distinguished Subic Zrinski was
Peter's grandfather, Nicholas, Ban of Croatia, who fell heroically defending
the strategic fortress of Sigeth, located in southern Hungary, halting the
advance of the powerful Turkish army, led by Suleiman II, the Magnificent, on
its march towards Vienna (1565). He sacrificed his life by rejecting the crown
of Croatia, offered by the Turks. For this, and for his gesture of leading a
handful of his soldiers against the Turks upon seeing his fortress destroyed,
he was called the Leonidas of Christendom. Although he did not achieve victory,
he at least neutralized the potential of Suleiman, who died during the siege.
The event has been compared to the Battle of Lepanto. Many historians, such as
N. Jorga and P. Herre, consider this date the beginning of the decline of the
Ottoman Empire.
The heroism of the defenders of Sigeth has been the subject of numerous
works and poems, both by Croatian and foreign poets. The brother of the
dedicatee, Count Nicholas of Zrin, Ban of Croatia (1647-64), in a heroic epic
written in Hungarian and published in Vienna (1651), commemorated his grandfather's
deeds. Because he wrote it in Hungarian, despite his Croatian origins and
position as ban (governor), Hungarian Romanticism considered him Hungarian,
although he himself left no doubt as to his nationality. In a letter to the
prefect (zupan) of Zagreb, he stated: "I am Croatian and I know Zriniam
is." Peter Zrin translated his brother's poem into Croatian, first under
the title "Carmen heroicum Croaticum," and then under the title
"Adranskoga mora sirena" (Siren of the Adriatic Sea), which he published
in Venice in 1660. Peter Zrinski's participation in the struggles against the
Turks earned him recognition and praise from the public of the time. He was a
wise politician, respected at the imperial court, and also connected with other
courts, such as those of Rome and the King of France. He distinguished himself
in his firm opposition to the absolutist and centralist tendencies of the
Emperor, King of Croatia and Hungary. When it seemed that, due to internal
struggles, the Emperor himself was forgetting his commitments to defend Croatia
in the fight against the Turks, he attempted to negotiate directly with the
Sultan of Constantinople. It was then that he was tricked into coming to court,
where he and his brother-in-law, Prince Frankopan, were accused of plotting
high treason. On April 30, 1671, Peter of Zrin and Francis Christopher
Frankopan were beheaded in Wienerneustadt.
The day of their death is celebrated as a national holiday in honor of
the defense of Croatian political and state rights. Their remains are kept in
the Zagreb Cathedral, where they were transferred in 1919.
Buenos Aires.
This figure, therefore, so relevant to Central European Renaissance
culture, has suddenly and extraordinarily reappeared in Venezuelan cultural
circles thanks to the splendid critical edition of the poem "La
Daviadiada," an unpublished work whose bibliographic reference we provided
above. The manuscript of this important yet unknown poem was discovered by the
distinguished Professor Dr. Miroslav Marcovich in 1953 in the National Library
of Turin, while he was conducting research on Cicero. Dr. Marcovich, a graduate
in Classical Philology and Greek Philosophy from the University of Belgrade—his
hometown—after teaching at that same university, went on to hold the chair of
Sanskrit at the Visva Bharati University of Rabindranath Tagore in Santiniketan,
India, in 1954-1955. After completing that course, he came to Venezuela and has
since held the chairs of Latin and Greek at the University of Los Andes,
Mérida, where he has also carried out extensive cultural work, publishing books
and articles for various journals. His most recent work is the book Bhagavad
Gita (The Song of the Lord), a direct translation from Sanskrit with a rational
interpretation. This is a philosophical-religious poem, considered the most
popular work of classical Hindu thought, which is included within the great
poem "Mahabharata."
As soon as Dr. Marcovich discovered the manuscript of "The
Davidiad," he made a microfilm copy of the 157 pages that contained both
the text of the poem itself and a final topology, or "allegorical commentary,"
written in Latin prose by the poet Marulus himself. The poem is divided into
fourteen books or cantos, with a total of 6,765 hexameters.
It is a truly remarkable achievement of the editor, Dr. Marcovich, to
have managed to read and fully interpret every page and every verse of a
manuscript that was in a very lamentable state. During a fire that occurred at
the beginning of the century in the Taurinese Library, the water used to
extinguish the flames seriously damaged several works, including Marulo's poem.
Dr. Marcovich's edition is illustrated with numerous photocopied pages that
vividly show the reader the condition in which the manuscript was left.
Undoubtedly, those who had previously held it considered it lost. But Dr.
Marcovich, far from being daunted by the serious work that a correct
transcription would entail, dedicated himself wholeheartedly and with absolute
success to preparing the edition we now possess, clearly printed, worthy of
inclusion in all good libraries, and deserving of the warmest applause, both
for the dedicated restorer and editor and for the Alma Mater of Mérida that
sponsored such an extraordinary edition.
It was not for nothing that the aforementioned professor worked with
undeniable competence for four years. With Benedictine patience and the
affection of a great humanist, only someone with such a solid Latin culture as
he could finally deliver the complete copy, down to its smallest details, which
was then sent to the printers. Marulo's poem is entirely preserved, and with critical
rigor, the very few, but highly appropriate, interpolations that were necessary
to reconstruct some passages completely lost in the original are noted.
Works of this nature can be presented with great honor at any important
university of classical studies. And the University of Mérida in Venezuela has
had the enviable good fortune to benefit from the prestigious work carried out
by this great classical humanist, Miroslav Marcovich.
Caracas, Andrés Bello Catholic University.

The same situation exists in communist Yugoslavia, where members of
Serbian nationality and Orthodox faith have managed to establish their hegemony
over the other nationalities in the country, as we will demonstrate in the
following pages.
The Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, elected at
the Sixth Party Congress (1952), comprised approximately 58.5% members of
Orthodox origin. Members of Croat-Catholic and Slovene-Catholic descent made up
approximately 35% of this supreme body, while Muslim participation was only 5%.
The new Central Committee, elected at the Seventh Party Congress in April 1959,
exhibits a similar composition. Of the 135 members, 44 (32.6%) are Serbs, 16
(11%) Montenegrins, and 13 (9.6%) Macedonians; that is, there are 73 members,
or 54.1%, of Orthodox background. Five members (3.7%) declared themselves
Yugoslavs and should be added to the Orthodox group. Of those five, three are Muslims,
one is Croat, and one is Serb. The Orthodox group, together with the Yugoslavs,
totals 78 members, or 57.8%. The remainder consists of 30 (22.2%) Croats, 23
(17.1%) Slovenes, and 4 (2.9%) from national minorities (2 Albanians, 1
Bulgarian, and 1 Hungarian). Now then; According to statistics from before the
Second World War, Orthodox Christians represented 46% of the total population,
while the percentage of Catholics reached 39% and that of Muslims 11%. These ratios have not fundamentally changed since the war.

The national and religious composition of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia does not fully reflect the dominance of one
nationality over the others. The Party's Central Committee is supposed to be a
representative body. It is composed of party representatives from the six
constituent republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia, and Slovenia) and, therefore, tends to present a picture representative
of various nationalities and religions, at least in appearance.
In the military, government, and other hierarchies, this apparent
representation is not considered necessary. Thus, for example, statistics
regarding the highest military commanders in Yugoslavia indicate that this
important body is almost entirely in the hands of Serbian Orthodox officers. A
recent survey found that of the 146 highest-ranking generals, 110 (76%) were
Serbian Orthodox. Only 36 (24%) were of Roman Catholic background, and not a
single general of Muslim religious background appeared in that survey.
According to the statistics of January 1, 1958, there were 218 generals on
active duty in Yugoslavia at that time. Of these, 162 (74.31%) were of Serbian
Orthodox background, 29 (13.31%) Croats, 22 (10.00%) Slovenes, 4 (1.84%)
Macedonians, and 1 (0.46%) Jewish. There was not a single one of Muslim faith. [1][33].
The personal data of these generals reveal that a considerable number of
Serbian Orthodox Christians joined the partisan movement (Communist
guerrillas). during the Second World War for their nationalist opposition to
the Croatian authorities and their nationalist opposition to the German
occupation forces. Generals of Catholic faith, on the other hand, have been
affiliated with the Communist Party and promoted to the rank of general, not
only for their abilities, but also for their denationalization and
internationalist communist orientation.

Similarly, Serbian Orthodox dominance in government affairs is evident
in the composition of Yugoslavia's diplomatic missions abroad. According to the
International Yearbook for 1953, of the 33 heads of Yugoslav diplomatic
missions, 23 (70%) were Serbs. More recent statistics (January 1, 1958) show
that of the 46 heads of diplomatic missions, 29 (63%) were Serbian Orthodox. Of
the remainder, 7 were Croats, 7 Slovenes, 2 Muslims, and 1 Macedonian. Of the
24 Consulates General that Yugoslavia currently maintains abroad, 17 Consuls
General (70%) are drawn from the Serbian national pool. Of the remaining 2, 2
were Croats, 3 Slovenes, and 2 Macedonians.
Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia is even more evident in the official
statistics of the Party, government institutions, and the military in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. This constituent republic serves as a good test of the Party's
policy regarding nationalities, since the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is ethnically more mixed than any other Yugoslav region, and no single national
or religious group holds an absolute numerical majority.
According to official statistics (1948), Bosnia and Herzegovina has
approximately 2,700,000 inhabitants. Of these, 1,150,000 are Serbian Orthodox
(42%), 900,000 are Muslim (33%), and 700,000 are Catholic, according to
religious affiliation. Regarding their national orientation, 1,260,000 (47%)
declared themselves Serbs, 650,000 (24%) Croats, and 800,000 (30%)
"nationally undefined Muslims." [27]
The Central Committee of the Communist Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
had 48 members (1955). However, this highest governing body of the Republic was
composed of 35 Orthodox Serbs (73%), 10 Muslims (21%), 2 Catholics (4%), and 1
Jew. As for their national orientation, 30 members of this Committee declared
themselves Serbs, 17 "Yugoslavs," and only one Croat.
However, there is no such thing as a "Yugoslav" nationality.
The main nationalities of Yugoslavia were Croat, Macedonian, Serbian, and
Slovene. Montenegrins, however, identify with Serbian nationality. There are
also national minorities in Yugoslavia, namely Albanians, Hungarians, and
Romanians. Those who declared themselves "Yugoslavs" are, therefore,
either those who have become denatured or those who are oriented more
internationally than nationally, but who are willing to support the policies of
the dominant Serbian group in the Party and the government. This is why, in the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all 10
Muslims, 3 of the 35 Serbian Orthodox members, 1 of the 2 Catholics, and the
Jewish member declared themselves "Yugoslavs" [28]. This is further
confirmation of the political principle of the New Class, established above,
according to which those who wish to rise in the Party or government hierarchy
must belong to the dominant nationality or be assimilated into it.
Even the recruitment of ordinary members is governed by the same
political principle. Thus, for example, in 1950, the Communist Party in
Bosnia-Herzegovina had 54,150 members. Of these, 37,320 (70%) were Serbian
Orthodox by religious background, 8,714 were Muslim, 7,519 were Catholic, and
607 were Jewish.
However, 41,005 (81%) declared themselves Serbs, 5,117 Croats, 4,920
"Yugoslavs," 3,012 "nationally undefined Muslims," and 5
others [29]. Here we note that a relatively large number of Muslims, who
otherwise overwhelmingly declared themselves "nationally undefined,"
listed "Serbian" or "Yugoslav" nationality upon joining the
party. The same occurred with a number of Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who
otherwise identified almost exclusively as Croats.
The policy of favoring Serbian or Yugoslav national orientation at the
expense of Croatian national orientation is also evident in other institutions
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, the regular police (militia) of Bosnia
and Herzegovina has 11,700 officers. Of these, 7,832 (70%) are Serbian Orthodox,
2,100 are Muslim, and 1,718 are Catholic. But with regard to their national
orientation, 8,340 (79%) declared themselves Serbs, 2,510
"Yugoslavs," and only 380 Croats and 420 as "nationally
undefined Muslims" [30].
Among the militia officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same trend was
even more pronounced. Of the 620 police officers, 411 were Orthodox, 130
Muslim, and 79 Catholic. Regarding their national orientation, 502 (81%)
identified as Serbs, 102 as Yugoslavs, and only 14 as Croats and 2 as Muslims
of undefined nationality. As expected, the same situation prevailed in other
state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, of the 196 members
of the Council of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the highest
legislative and administrative body of the Republic, 144 (73.48%) declared
themselves Serbs, only 38 (19.35%) Croats, 9 (4.59%) Yugoslavs, and 4 (2.05%)
as "nationally undefined Muslims."
This dominance of Serbian and Serbian Orthodox elements in the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia is not a new phenomenon. It is rather traditional in the
Yugoslav communist movement, which from its inception had Serbian Orthodoxy as
its national and cultural foundation. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia took
shape in April 1919, when, at the initiative of the Social Democratic Party of
Serbia, a meeting of all the socialist parties of Yugoslavia was held in
Belgrade. The purpose of this meeting was to create a communist party and join
the International. The Communist Party, which had just been formed in Moscow
under Lenin's leadership, boasted 69,000 members by the end of 1920, mostly
Serbian Orthodox.
Elections held that same year for the Constituent Assembly also indicate
that the vast majority of communist votes came from Orthodox regions such as
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia. Similarly, parliamentary representation and
party leadership at that time were largely in the hands of Orthodox Christians
due to their religious background. Of the total communist parliamentary
representation, 82 percent were of Orthodox descent, even though Orthodox
Christians then comprised only 46 percent of the total population. There were
only 9 Catholics and 1 Muslim among the communist deputies, compared to 48
Orthodox Christians. Regarding their national affiliation, there were only 6
Slovenes, 3 Croats, and 1 [unclear - possibly "other" or
"other"]. or 2 Macedonians. Forty-eight were Serbs (including 4
Montenegrins).
Like the top party leadership, the lower party cadres were also
overwhelmingly Orthodox and Serbs. This is evident from the national and
religious composition of the group of 502 candidates for the parliamentary
elections, of whom 342 (almost 69%) were of Orthodox and Serbian descent, while
140 (28%) were Catholic and only 2.3 percent were Muslim. The percentage of
Catholics in the total population of Yugoslavia at that time was 39 percent and
that of Muslims 11 percent. [33].
Since the Serbian leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party at that
time tended to impose its national ideology on the Party, an open conflict
arose with the policy of the Communist International, led by Stalin. At that
time, Stalin demanded that the Communist Party The Yugoslav leader sought to
exploit internal national antagonism between Serbs and Croats, between Serbs
and Macedonians, and between Serbs and Montenegrins. He wanted the Party to
advocate for national separation in order to bring about the country's
disintegration and thus create the conditions for the Communists to seize
power. Such a policy, however, completely contradicted the ideas and feelings
of the Serbian leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party. These people had
identified with Serbian national ideals and wanted to preserve the territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia under Serbian leadership. [35].
Precisely because of this conflict between the Serbian leadership of the
Yugoslav Communist Party and Stalin, in 1938, Josip Broz Tito, a Croat by
birth, rose to the highest position in the Party as its General Secretary.
Tito, however, in his work organizing and preparing the Party for the future
revolution, increasingly relied on the Serbian element of the Party,
particularly since the Party made a concerted effort to attract Serbians in
much greater numbers than those of the other Yugoslav nationalities. In his
"cadre policy," Tito paid special attention to young student and
university groups. In this respect, a number of secondary schools in
Montenegro, Bosnia, and Western Serbia, as well as the University of Belgrade,
were of fundamental importance from the standpoint of the Party's future. It
was precisely in these educational institutions, and especially among students
of Serbian Orthodox origin, that Tito found his most enthusiastic and capable
supporters.[36] The result was that Tito recruited and trained future party, military,
and administrative leaders from among these young people. He himself admitted
this when reviewing the Party's work regarding organization and propaganda.
Tito said: "Much of the credit for this work must be given to the Party
organization at the University of Belgrade. This university had long been known
for its freedom of thought, especially between the two world wars. First of
all, most of the students were the children of peasants and workers, generally
from Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbian regions. Most of these students lived at
home and came to Belgrade only to take exams; they were in constant contact
with the people" [37].
Moreover, these were the same people who had formed the Yugoslav
contingents in the Spanish Civil War.
These same brigades later became the nuclei of the partisan guerrilla
struggle during World War II. In the course of these guerrilla activities, at
the end of November 1942, the communist partisans felt bold enough to undertake
the organization of a clandestine legislature, their first attempt to seize
power in Yugoslavia. Of the 68 deputies present at the inaugural session of
this body, 53 (78%) were Serbian Orthodox, 10 were Croat Catholics, 4 were
Muslims, and 1 was a Serbian Jew.[38] The main struggle of the partisans, the
organization of the first partisan government and then the organization of the
revolutionary partisan government (November 1943), took place in Western
Bosnia, in an area inhabited mainly by Serbian Orthodox.[39]
The reasons why Serbian Orthodox Christians were attracted to the
Yugoslav Communist Party in comparatively much greater numbers than other
nationalities and religions, even under the leadership of a man of Croatian and
Catholic origin, are numerous.
For centuries, the Serbian Orthodox people felt a close affinity with
the Russian Orthodox people based on their shared religion (Eastern Orthodox)
and linguistic and cultural similarities. Slavophilism, which claims superior
qualities for Slavs and their culture, and Pan-Slavism, which promotes the cultural
and political unity of all Slavs under Russian leadership, took deep root among
Russians and Bulgarians, as well as in Serbia and Montenegro. This was true
both among the leaders and the people in the small Slavic Orthodox countries.
Orthodox Russia was considered "Great Mother Russia." Russia had
helped them in the past to achieve and consolidate their national independence.
They also hoped that Russia would protect them in the future and help them
strengthen and extend their national power.
It should be noted that for Eastern Orthodox peoples, religion and
nationality are one and the same. For historical reasons, in Eastern
Christendom, unlike Western Christendom, the Church has been identified with
the State. Consequently, the Orthodox Church considered it its duty to promote
the political interests of the State with which it was associated. Therefore,
the Orthodox Church had adopted political and national objectives in addition
to its religious functions. Consequently, several Orthodox churches promoted
religious creeds alongside nationalism among their adherents. These national
churches were named according to their national identities (Russian, Serbian
Orthodox, etc.). Hence, nationalism among these people, due to its blending
with religion, took such deep root.[40] Since Slavophile and Pan-Slavic
ideology also implied Orthodox supremacy, it could be expected that such
movements would find supporters especially among Orthodox Slavs.
At the same time, however, rivalries, conflicts, and wars erupted among
various Slavic nations. Some expanded at the expense of others and established
their hegemony, using the ideology of Pan-Slavic unity as justification. The
Great Russians, for example, ruled over the Ukrainians and Belarusians, while
the Czechs dominated the Slovaks.
Similarly, Serbia was able to impose its political hegemony over the
vast areas inhabited by the Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Slovene
peoples by the end of the First World War. Serbia capitalized on its position
as an ally of the victorious powers in the war and justified its domination
over the other South Slavic nations in the name of "Yugoslav (South
Slavic) unity." In the Second World War, the Serbs managed to regain their
former supremacy, this time taking the form of communism.
Serbs were increasingly drawn to the communist movement during the
course of World War II, not so much by its internationalist communist ideology.
They had violently resented becoming a national minority in the newly
established Croatian and Catholic state. Furthermore, they were attracted to
the Slavophile and Pan-Slavic content of Russian communism. For many of them,
Bolshevism was acceptable as long as it was Russian and Slavic and offered the
prospect of a restored Yugoslavia under Serbian Orthodox leadership [41].
Another important reason for the communist appeal to Serbian Orthodox
Serbs lies in the psychology of communism. The communist movement, as conceived
by Lenin, is a militant organization whose objective is to seize power by any
and all means. In both its ideology and practice, this movement emphasizes
conspiracy, violence, and cruelty in the pursuit of power and in the treatment
of adversaries, all of whom are considered "enemies." The
Leninist-type communist party, in its internal organization, follows the
principles of authoritarianism, rigid military discipline, total dedication to
the party, and selflessness for the cause of the revolution. Such a party,
therefore, tends to seduce people of a particular psychological and ideological
character. However, such a party must proceed with a selective approach in the
affiliation and training of its members and "cadres" (party
officials). For this reason, one of the fundamental aspects of the organization
of the communist party consists of its "cadre policy," that is, the
methodical and meticulously planned selection of its members, their training
and indoctrination, their promotion based on rigorous tests of ability,
performance, and loyalty, and their advancement to positions and functions based
on special skills, talents, and trustworthiness.[42] One of the most decisive
criteria in the promotion of cadres is the degree of "party loyalty,"
that is, the sense of dedication and selflessness for the cause, and of
subordination to the supreme leadership.
Generally speaking, the party, in its pre-revolutionary and
revolutionary phases, due to its psychological aspects, attracts and recruits
into its ranks dynamic, aggressive, dedicated, fanatical, and conspiratorial
types of militants. Furthermore, because of its psychological facets, its
ideals of a classless society, its universal brotherhood, and its cultural and
personal freedom, the party also draws upon, in this phase of its development,
a number of idealists with a universal orientation and utopians of various
stripes. Moreover, based on its supposed struggle against all forms of
exploitation and oppression, the party vigorously addresses, in this phase of
its development, numerous members of subjugated nations, exploited classes, and
exiled minorities.
It was to be expected, therefore, that the Yugoslav Communist Party, in
its revolutionary phases and due to its psychological and Pan-Slavic aspects,
would exert a strong attraction among the Orthodox Serbs of the Dinaric Alps.
These mountain people from the regions of Montenegro, Western Bosnia,
Western Serbia, and Central Croatia (Lika) are renowned for their traditional
militancy and rebelliousness, their military qualities and resilience in the
face of hardship, their lust for power and their ruthlessness, as well as for
their sense of heroism, dedication, and self-sacrifice in the name of Orthodox
Serbs.[43] Such traits were particularly emphasized during the Second World
War, when the Orthodox Serbs of these regions found themselves under Catholic
Croatian authorities. The party, therefore, paid special attention to these
people both before and during the war. As a result of all these circumstances,
the majority of the highest-ranking military commanders in contemporary
Yugoslavia came from the Dinaric region (Map I) [44]. Their ideological
orientation was shaped by the influence of Belgrade, the seat of Serbian
Orthodoxy and Serbian nationalism (Map II). [45]
III
According to Leninist teachings, when communists seize power in a
country, they must establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat,"
consolidate it, and develop it as the basis for expanding communism to other
countries, pursuing their goal of world revolution. This is the third phase of
the world revolution. Therefore, the party that has come to power in a country
continues to recruit militant, dedicated, fanatical, ruthless, and power-hungry
individuals. This becomes imperative for the promotion of revolutionary
ideology; even more so, for the self-perpetuation in power of a small group of
professional and dedicated conspirators who have established a totalitarian
government in opposition to the vast majority of the population.
These circumstances, however, led to the formation of a ruling caste—the
New Class—which seized control of the entire government apparatus and
completely monopolizes the social, economic, and educational life of the
country. Occupying such a position, the party must also rely on highly skilled
and educated individuals, specialists in all spheres of political, economic,
and military activity. To govern efficiently, the party depends on the
knowledge of these experts. And to secure their loyalty, the party rewards them
with relatively high salaries, comforts, and special privileges. The party also
depends on the knowledge and expertise of scholars and teachers, novelists and
artists, publicists and journalists. The result is that all that
"intelligentsia"—administrative, technological, and
humanistic—promotes vested interests in its statutes and holdings and therefore
tends to identify with the New Class.
It would seem logical, then, that the communist party in a multinational
state should direct its personnel policy to avoid antagonisms among the various
national and ethnic groups in the country. Apparently, the consolidation of
party power would be greatly facilitated if harmonious and friendly relations
existed among the various national and ethnic groups in the country, rather
than hostile ones. To achieve this objective, one might expect the party to
systematically try to introduce a more or less proportional representation of
the various national and ethnic groups in the highest party ranks and in the
highest institutions of the country, whether administrative and legislative,
judicial and military, economic and educational. This does not happen, however.
All contemporary communist regimes in multinational countries have thus far
exhibited a strong tendency toward a monopolistic concentration of political,
economic, and social power in the hands of a relatively small group of people
belonging to the dominant group or who are entirely assimilated into it.
The party is well aware that such a tendency represents one of the
weakest points of its government. This is demonstrated by the fact that the
party promotes laws and decrees, statutes and regulations that make all
national discrimination and national antagonism punishable by law. Top party
leaders and officials frequently make statements to this effect. But this is
pure ideology, while in practice we see that such rules and regulations are
applied only to subjugated nationalities and not to the dominant nationality.
Thus, we often hear of prosecutions and trials against "nationalist
bourgeois" in Ukraine and in the Asian and Baltic republics of the Soviet
Union. Such trials were frequently mounted against Slovaks and Croats, as well
as against Jewish intellectuals, but rarely, if ever, against Russians, Czechs,
or Serbs.
The reasons for this seemingly illogical policy stem from the necessity
and desirability of a monolithic Party and State structure in a
communist-controlled society. When Lenin conceived the organization of the
communist party at the beginning of the 20th century, his primary objective was
to develop the most effective instrument for combating the Russian Tsarist
police; an instrument that could systematically undermine the Tsarist regime
and, if necessary, allow the party to seize power. Lenin believed that to
achieve these aims, the communist party should be limited to a relatively small
number of professional conspirators, well-trained, disciplined, and completely
devoted to the cause of the revolution. This group should be tightly integrated
around its top leadership, which, in turn, would be composed of "a dozen
talented people working in perfect harmony."
Lenin also conceived of the communist party as a militant and combative
organization, permanently engaged in clandestine or open warfare with its
enemies until their defeat and destruction. However, in order to achieve
maximum combat efficiency, the party, according to the Leninist conception, had
to maintain "absolute unity of will and action," and a strict,
subordinate military discipline from the ranks and cadres below the supreme
leadership. Such a high degree of monolithism can only be achieved if the party
leaders and cadres think and act alike; that is, if they possess similar or
identical training, experience, and personality, and can work in unison,
without friction. Those who cannot achieve such a degree of uniformity must be
systematically purged.
Such a party organization proved highly efficient in action and almost
impenetrable and immune to infiltration by its enemies, particularly by enemy
secret services. It was precisely this party organization that enabled Lenin
and his Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia in 1917. Lenin, consequently,
concluded that such a party should be organized internationally and thus become
the General Staff of the world proletariat in its revolution against the
bourgeoisie of the entire world. Hence, the model of the Russian party, through
the institution of the Communist International, was imposed on communist
parties worldwide. In certain cases, this system of party organization served
its purpose as well and as efficiently as in Russia, with regard to seizing
power and establishing the party dictatorship. The most salient examples of
this are the cases of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Chinese Communist
Party.
Once in power, and in order to perpetuate themselves as the ruling
class, the Bolsheviks declared that the internal "enemy" had not been
defeated. In reality, they maintained that the enemy was now more active and
threatening than before they had seized power. And in order to eliminate any
opposition to their rule, Lenin and his followers deemed it essential, for the
purpose of total control of society, to apply the conspiratorial system of
government to the administration of the state as well. In this way, Russia also became the model of state organization applied in
the formation of all states under communist control.
Now, to maintain "absolute unity of will and action," both in
the party and in the state, the functioning of party forums and legislative
bodies in a society under communist rule cannot resemble the functioning of
political parties and representative institutions in Western-style governments.
In Western political systems, there is almost complete interplay of various
social forces, both within political parties and in representative
institutions. Inter-party factions, as well as coalitions, alliances, and blocs
between parties and multi-party groups, tend to form and dissolve freely,
depending on circumstantial pressures and the variable and often conflicting
political and social objectives of the represented groups.
But in the Leninist system of political monolithism, factionalism and
other groupings formed to achieve different political objectives, or the same
objectives by different means, are prohibited as sacrilege and punished with
purges (expulsion or execution). Instead of the free play of social forces and
decisions made by majority vote, in the Communist Party system, the group that
manages to dominate the Central Committee imposes unanimity of votes from above
within the party and legislative bodies. Through party directives, "unity
of will and action" is also achieved in all governmental, economic,
educational, and military institutions.
Such a high degree of regimentation and conformity within the Party and
the State is achieved through a system of "conspiratorial manipulation."
In this organizational structure, every party forum and every level of
leadership in all public institutions is divided into several small groups,
varying according to their nature and degree of authority. The smallest, but
also the most significant of these groups at the local, regional, or national
level, is the impermeable, highly compact core of decision-makers. This
"Sanctum" of the party or governmental body puts its decisions into
practice through a small group of capable and loyal advisors and executors (the
"inner circle"). They also secure the support of "front
men," chosen for their prestige within the party ranks (the "party
mass"), their ability to influence broad segments of the population, and
their willingness to follow the directives of the party's internal leadership
without question. In such a structure, each and every decision of the party's
supreme leadership is immediately communicated to the party nucleus at each
level of the party and from there to the leadership nucleus at each corresponding
level of the state organization ("transmission belt").
In each party body and at each level of the party organization, the
decision-making nucleus is generally organized as a "secretariat."
The monolithic unity of will and action throughout the party is achieved
through the "Axis of Secretariats," which runs uninterruptedly from
the top to the bottom of the party pyramid (see the Charter). Political unity
(the "party line") within the Secretariat Axis is maintained according
to the principle of "inverse representation." This approach involves
having one or more key figures in each party body and at each level of the
party organization. These individuals are members of the higher party body and
thus represent it and its policies in the lower party units, not vice versa. In
this way, an unbreakable link is established between the highest party body—the
Secretariat of the Central Committee or the Politburo (Presidium, the Executive
Committee of the Central Committee)—and the lowest party unit, that is, the
basic party unit or cell.
This top-down control system is reinforced by the principle of
"democratic centralism," according to which decisions made by a
higher party body must be implemented by lower party bodies
"unquestionably, promptly, and correctly." In theory,
"democratic centralism" also implies free discussion based on
majority votes within the ranks. In practice, however, lower party bodies are
limited to discussing how to carry out the directives of a higher body. This top-down
control system is further reinforced by another mechanism: the principle of
"vertical communication," according to which party bodies at the same
organizational level cannot communicate with each other directly, but only
through their common superordinate body. This helps prevent the formation of
organized opposition within the party ranks against directives from above.
Similarly, the principle of direct top-down control empowers the top leadership
of the Party to interfere directly in the affairs of party forums at any level
of the party organization, through a system of "instructors." These
are advisors and inspectors who serve as envoys and watchdogs of the supreme
party leadership at the lower levels of the party organization. They verify
whether party directives have been executed promptly and correctly. For this
entire organizational system to function smoothly, the main Secretariat at the
top of the party pyramid decides on the promotion of each person to the
decision-making core and the inner circle at every level of the party
organization. Such promotions are based on merit and ability, as well as
loyalty to the supreme party leader.
Elections for the Party Congress, which represents the party's supreme
legislative body, are not direct, but indirect. This allows the party
leadership to manipulate the Party Congress elections in such a way as to
ensure the election of loyal, yes-men. Thus, this entire system of monolithic
and conspiratorial organization allows the top party leadership and its
Secretarial Axis to perpetuate themselves in power and establish their
permanent control over the party and its policies. Only when the supreme leader
of the party is removed through "palace revolutions" do more radical
personal changes usually occur, both in the highest party bodies and throughout
the entire Secretarial Axis.
The party core, or ruling caste, maintains its total control of society
by monopolizing and concentrating all property and all sources of production
and income in its hands. Furthermore, the ruling caste reinforces each
individual's sense of total dependence on the party and the state for their
life and subsistence through the systematic control of thought and feelings.
This form of psychological manipulation is achieved through the monopolization
and concentration in the hands of the party of all means of communication among
members. However, since the communist-led economy is an economy of scarcity,
the only way to ensure the loyalty of the necessary experts in state
administration and economic management—in research and technology, education,
and propaganda—is to reward them at the expense of the peasants, industrial
workers, and the lower bureaucracy (employees, clerks, and technicians).
IV
The fundamental problem for the party, therefore, lies in preserving and
perpetuating in its hands the administration of such a complex and delicate
system of total control. One way to solve this problem could be the "open
door" policy. That is, by admitting all skilled people into the party,
without regard to their national, social, or religious background. Such a
policy, however, would tend to weaken the party in its ideological and
disciplinary aspects. It could easily lead to the disintegration of the
monolithic party system and cause the transfer of power and state control from
the party to the bureaucracy. Therefore, in order to avoid such a fate, the
party had to resort to other means to concentrate all control in its own hands.
In the legislative, administrative, and judicial spheres, the party
achieved such a high degree of control through the system of "interlocking
governing boards." In other words, in every governmental body, in every
state institution, and at every level of state organization (municipality,
district, republic, nation), the core of oversight is composed of the same
people who form the core of the party at that same level of organization.
Furthermore, the party, mindful of the danger of spurning loyalty, must
rigorously enforce the principle of "primacy of loyalty to the
party." Any party official who demonstrates adherence to a non-party
function in a way that could compromise their primary loyalty to the party must
be ruthlessly purged, regardless of their professional expertise or previous
party merits. Such a system of control attaches particular importance to the
armed forces, including the police forces, since these are the only organized
institutions that possess weapons and could therefore challenge the supremacy
of the Party and overthrow its government through armed rebellion.
The principle of "interlocking governing boards," as a
Party-State organizational system, nevertheless entails serious drawbacks. The
need for ideological identity and similarity in the personal background of the
party leadership and party officials almost inevitably leads to the recruitment
of the party's leadership apparatus and state officials from among people of
the same ethnic background. Due to cultural identity and similar experiences,
people from the same social and cultural sphere tend to have similar mindsets,
understand each other better, and have similar or identical orientations,
aspirations, and goals.
They are more likely to trust each other than people from different
linguistic, social, and religious backgrounds.
Consequently, those with similar or identical roots prefer to attract a
contemporary to the party, support each other in the rise through the party and
state hierarchies, and develop common vested interests in consolidating,
strengthening, and perpetuating their positions within the party and the state.
This forms a closed communist ruling caste—the New Class.
In a multinational state, such circumstances almost inevitably lead to
the recruitment of party cadres, especially from the party's core leadership
and, consequently, from the New Class, primarily from a national group. Then,
once established in power, this New Class, when its vested interests are at
stake, pushes party policy in the direction of "national communism."
The objectives of "national communism" are the protection of
the New Class against the intrusion of ruling classes from other communist
countries, and particularly from the New Class within the Soviet Union. For
internal use, the New Class, both in the Soviet Union and in certain
communist-led countries such as China, Yugoslavia, and Poland, efficiently
exploits nationalist sentiments to boost morale and galvanize the psychological
climate. This was necessary to combat the lack of enthusiasm, indifference, and
apathy prevalent among broad segments of the population, who feel mistreated
and exploited by the new rulers. In multinational countries under communist
rule, communist leaders failed in their attempt to cultivate a
"Soviet," "Yugoslav," or "Czechoslovak"
patriotism or nationalism. Consequently, the only nationalism and patriotism
they could draw upon for encouragement and moral support was that of the
dominant nationality. They observed that many members of the dominant
nationality, even if opposed to communism, would support the party as long as
it promoted the national interests of their group. This course of events, in
turn, reinforced the tendency to incorporate members of the dominant
nationality into the New Class.
However, such a development provokes violent reactions among subjugated
nationalities and other ethnic groups, depending on their level of national or
ethnic consciousness. These nationalities and other ethnic groups eventually
perceive that they are enslaved not only by the party dictatorship but also by
the hegemony of a foreign nationality, and that they are being used to promote
the interests of the dominant nationality. In such circumstances, the
subjugated groups often blame the dominant nationality for all the ills caused
by the dictatorship and the party's policies.
Lacking legal means of opposition, the oppressed nationalities often
resort to spontaneous and unorganized mass resistance, reflected in political
passivity and disinterest in state affairs. Such demoralization tends to
reinforce existing apathy and decline productivity among the most exploited
segments of the population, particularly industrial workers, peasants, and the
lower bureaucracy, regardless of their national origin. This demoralization
often manifests itself later in phenomena such as alcoholism, hooliganism,
sexual promiscuity, and criminality.
The regime's countermeasures, limiting individual and group freedoms to
control these simmering national resentments, do not restrain, but rather
promote, the progressive development of group consciousness. These measures
only intensify group hostility among people who consider themselves nationally
and socially exploited. Therefore, instead of solving the national question,
which was one of communism's greatest claims, they accentuated this source of
internal conflict.
Moreover, the New Class in the Soviet Union, due to its military and
economic supremacy, was prone to extract economic and political advantage from
other communist states. This policy provoked tensions and open clashes between
the Soviet Union and other communist-controlled countries, forcing the Soviet
Union to revise its methods with respect to other nations. Nevertheless, it
insisted on its leading role as an imperative condition for preserving unity
and increasing the fighting efficiency of the communist world.
Therefore, every contemporary communist state, founded on the Leninist
principles of party-state organization, has developed a ruling class that, in
defense of its vested interests, became nationalist, not only with respect to
subjugated nationalities but also in relation to other communist and
non-communist countries. At the same time, however, all these ruling classes of
various communist states have deemed it necessary to maintain unity and
solidarity among themselves. This policy of unity is essential as a means of
consolidating and perpetuating their power in relation to internal opposition
and to the non-communist world.
Each multinational state, governed by communists, and the entire
"communist camp" thus faces three basic "contradictions":
the clash of interests between the New Class and the vast oppressed masses of
the population; the clash of interests between the dominant nationality and the
subjugated nationalities or ethnic minorities; and, finally, the clash of
vested interests among the ruling classes of various communist states, while at
the same time being obliged to maintain international solidarity with one
another.
Speaking of the national imperialism of his time, Lenin highlighted
three important "contradictions": the conflict between the workers and
the owners of the means of production, particularly the monopolistic trusts;
the conflict between various imperialist nations over territorial possessions,
markets, and raw materials; and the conflict between national imperialism and
its colonial and dependent peoples. Lenin declared that, due to its internal
contradictions, the days of national imperialism were numbered, that
imperialism was in its final stage of development. He envisioned a party of
revolutionaries and professional conspirators, whose objective was to overthrow
the "moribund" system of imperialism and build upon its ashes a new
and better order—a communist order.
But it seems that the New Class—which evolved from the foundations of
Lenin's political monolithism and calls itself communist—has developed its own
system of economic exploitation and national imperialism. The question now is:
Will the New Class be able to resolve its own contradictions before it
disintegrates as a result of internal and external pressures?
Bloomington, Indiana University.
SCORE OF THE CROATIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM


Cities: The capital of Croatia is Zagreb (500,000 inhabitants),
currently the seat of government of the People's Republic of Croatia; Sarajevo,
130,000 inhabitants, is the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other important
cities are: Rijeka (Fiume), 80,000 inhabitants; Split, 75,000 inhabitants;
Osijek, 80,000 inhabitants; Banjaluka, 40,000 inhabitants; and approximately
30,000 inhabitants each for Mostar, Dubrovnik, Tuzla, Karlovac, Pula, and
Zenica.
National Emblems: Flag: tricolor, three horizontal stripes of equal
shape and size; top stripe red, middle stripe white, and bottom stripe blue.
Coat of Arms: checkered, divided into five squares, gules and argent (red and
white). National Anthem: "Lijepa nasa domovina" (Our beautiful
homeland).
Comparative Data: Croatia, due to its size and population, surpasses the
following European countries: Albania, Denmark, Slovakia, Estonia, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Serbia, and Switzerland; its area is larger than that of Belgium,
Bulgaria, Bohemia, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Portugal, and it has more
inhabitants than Finland, Greece, Norway, and Sweden.
ECONOMY
Agricultural and Livestock Production: Of the cereals, wheat and corn
are the main crops, in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the
population. Industrial crops include tobacco, flax, hemp, oilseeds, sugar
beets, hops, pyrethrum, and medicinal and aromatic plants. Wine and olive
harvests are significant. The most abundant fruit trees are plum, apple,
cherry, walnut, and fig. Cattle, pigs, sheep, horses, and poultry are raised
and exported. Various species of fish are found in the sea and rivers.
Forestry industry: After Finland, Croatia is the most forested country
in Europe (40% of its total area). Slavonian oak is world-renowned.
Mining: There is a surplus of coal, iron, salt, and cement for domestic
consumption. Croatia is one of the world's leading producers of bauxite. Recently, considerable oil fields, perhaps the richest in Europe, have been
discovered and are currently being partially exploited.
Industry: The manufacturing of agricultural and livestock products is
advanced, and the timber industry is developed, while in recent decades the
metallurgy and shipbuilding industries have been progressing (500,000 tons
annually).
Industry has sufficient energy resources, primarily electricity,
generated by hydroelectric power plants. In this respect, the possibilities are
inexhaustible.
Communications: A relatively dense rail and road network extends across
northern Croatia, also connecting it to river (Danube-Sava) and seaports.
Important international routes pass through Croatia: from Western Europe
towards the Near East and from Central Europe towards the seaports. Croatians
are skilled seafarers with a centuries-old maritime tradition and have
excellent natural harbors: Pola, Rijeka, Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Ploče,
Dubrovnik, and Boka Kotorska. The Yugoslav merchant fleet (approximately one
million tons) is comprised of and managed almost exclusively by Croats.
Foreign trade: Most of Yugoslavia's exports originate in Croatia,
including timber, bauxite, cement, chemicals (tannin, Solvay soda, cyanamide),
machinery, ships, tobacco, catfish, meat, poultry, fruit, wine, maraschino
liqueur, and slivovica. The main importing and exporting countries are those of
Western Europe, especially Germany, Italy, and Austria, while Croatia's
maritime location facilitates continuous trade with numerous countries in
Europe, the Near East, and the Americas.
Tourism: The Croatian coast—a land of a thousand islands—with its
beaches, bays, capes, and inlets, and picturesque towns steeped in history, is
among the European countries that offer the best conditions for international
tourism. Currently, Croatia is also the main tourist resorts and a significant
source of foreign exchange.
CULTURE AND HISTORY
Origins: In the 7th century, several Croatian tribes, Slavic-speaking
and apparently of Iranian origin, migrated from the territory of present-day
Poland to the Roman provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia Inferior. They arrived
as foederati (allies) of the Roman Empire, then based in Byzantium—like the
Goths, Franks, and Lombards—gradually becoming independent. In their new
homeland, they encountered and assimilated significant groups of the already
Romanized Illyrian-Celtic population, as well as groups of Slavs, Goths, and
Avars who had arrived during the first phase of the great migrations of
peoples, and also Roman and Greek colonists in the Dalmatian cities. In modern
times, small groups of Germans and Slovenes have settled, primarily in the
cities. From all these ethnic elements, the Croatian people today were formed,
a racial mixture like all Western peoples. In Croatia, the following racial
types predominate: Dinaric (Adriatic), Alpine, Nordic, and Mediterranean. The
percentage of each type is very similar to that of Slovenia and northern Italy.
During the Turkish invasions, significant groups of the Balkan population
infiltrated the region. This population was very resistant to assimilation due
to the strong influence exerted upon them by the Serbian national church, hence
the pan-Serbian claims to certain Croatian regions.
Culture: Upon their arrival in Dalmatia, the Croats found an established
ecclesiastical organization, received baptism and the Christian doctrine of
Rome, and thus became part of the developing Western society. They participated
in almost all the common endeavors of the Western world, distinguishing
themselves as dedicated defenders of their eastern borders. Their contribution
to the progress of the arts and sciences has been significant. In Croatia,
alongside classical Roman monuments, one finds valuable works of art and
buildings in the Romantic, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, and Modern styles.
Works by Croatian artists adorn major European centers, particularly in Italy,
with notable examples including Laurana, Juan Dalmata, Giulio Clovio, Medulic,
Mestrovic, and others. Croatians are among the most
distinguished humanists.
During the Turkish invasions, a number of Croats in Bosnia converted to
Islam, assimilating elements of Persian Islamic culture, which is reflected in
the architecture, clothing, music, and way of life of this religious community.
Croatian letters, written in the native alphabet called Glagolitsa, date
back to the Early Middle Ages. Since then, in some dioceses along the Croatian
coast, services have been celebrated in the national language and with the
Latin rite, a unique privilege granted by the Catholic Church.
In both Croatia and Western Europe, Latin was for centuries the language
of politics and culture. Until 1848, Latin was used in the Croatian Diet
(Sabor), the high magistracy, and in relations with associated kingdoms, an
irreplaceable language in a multinational community like the Danubian Monarchy.
With the triumph of democratic and national thought, Croatian became the
official language, while Croatian literature flourished from the Renaissance
onward.
From the 18th century onward, cultural and educational institutions ran
parallel to those of Central Europe. The remarkable current development of the
visual arts and lyric poetry is noteworthy. Croatia boasts an exceptional
wealth of folklore in its various manifestations: folk poetry, music, dances,
costumes, customs, and crafts.
State Organization:
Upon arriving in their new homeland, the Croats inherited the political
organization of the Roman province of Dalmatia, recognizing the supreme
authority of the Byzantine Empire, and later that of Charlemagne. By the 9th
century, Croatia was already an independent kingdom and, shortly thereafter,
one of the most powerful European countries. With the extinction of the local
Trpimirovic dynasty, the Croats, by virtue of the Pacta Conventa of 1102,
entered into a personal union with the kingdom of Hungary, in order to resist
together, more effectively, the claims of Byzantium and Venice. The common
kings come from the following dynasties: Arpad (1102-1301), Angevin of Naples
(1301-1886), Luxembourg (1387-1458), then, successively, Habsburgs, Hunyadi and
Jagiello until 1527, when, to defend Western Europe from the Ottomans, the
Croats, as well as Czechs and Hungarians, chose as their king: Ferdinand I,
Archduke of Austria, brother of Charles V, thus creating the Danubian Community
that lasted until 1918, when Croatia was illegally incorporated against the
will of its people into the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes",
called Yugoslavia in 1929.
For a time (1377-1463), Bosnia was a vassal kingdom of Croatia and
Hungary, until the Turkish invasion, enjoying a privileged status within the
Ottoman Empire. By decision of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, it was occupied
by Austria-Hungary. Dubrovnik, the third Croatian state, was for centuries an
independent city-state, one of the most illustrious maritime republics of the
Mediterranean. In the Napoleonic Wars, it lost its independence and, by
resolution of the Congress of Vienna, was incorporated into the province of
Dalmatia.
Occupying a territory of paramount strategic importance, the Croats not
only faced invasions by the Huns, Mongols, and Ottomans, but, as a maritime people,
participated in battles against the Saracens, in the Crusades, in the battles
of Lepanto and Algiers, and were even present in the Spanish Armada and in the
discovery and colonization of the Americas. In Mediterranean maritime trade,
Dubrovnik held a leading position, sometimes surpassing even the Venetian
fleet. Throughout its historical vicissitudes, Croatia managed to retain the
attributes of a sovereign kingdom until its virtual annexation by Serbia in
1918. Except for the period between 1941 and 1945, Croatian efforts from 1918
to the present day have tended toward emancipation from the pan-Serbian label,
which has had communist overtones in the last 15 years. The Croats, faithful to
their deep-rooted traditions of centuries-long coexistence with Western
countries, refuse to be treated as a Serbian and Russian appendage and aspire
to the restoration of the thousand-year-old Croatian state and integration into
the community of free European nations as a sovereign entity.
Pavelic went into exile again, where he tried
to gather his supporters. In 1948, he immigrated to Argentina, and eight years
later he was seriously wounded by gunfire near Buenos Aires from unknown
assailants. The Yugoslav communist government repeatedly requested his
extradition from the Argentine government, which was denied because his
whereabouts were unknown. This time, Pavelic's address was located, but he
managed to disappear, and his residence only became known after his death in
Madrid.
It is obvious that the governments of the
countries where Pavelic resided as a refugee—whatever their opinion of his
actions—did not consider it appropriate or honorable to hand over an
anti-communist politician to be condemned by a communist tribunal.
***
(Editor's Note) - As the fundamental purpose
of our magazine is to address Croatian political and cultural issues, we will
refer objectively, "sine ira et studio," to the personality and work
of this much-debated Croatian revolutionary and politician on another occasion.
For now, we must point out, without being his supporters, that the information
and commentaries appearing in the world press on the occasion of his death have
been largely based on information provided by the intelligence services of the
two Yugoslav dictatorships: the monarchist and the communist. Pavelić's
unpopularity in democratic countries served as a pretext for them to label the
Croatian people's struggle for their national and political freedom as
separatism, treason in the service of the fascist and national-socialist
regimes.
It is an irrefutable fact, however, that
Croats, regardless of party affiliation, have been fighting for 40 years
against Serbian hegemony, inherent to the nationally and culturally
heterogeneous Yugoslav state, aspiring to restore their ancient national
sovereignty, which is not recognized in Yugoslavia. This struggle could only be
labeled separatism if a Yugoslav nationality existed in the ethnic-historical
sense, or if the multinational Yugoslav conglomerate were a community of
nations, freely constituted and governed. On the contrary, no such Yugoslav
people exists; there are the Serbian and Croatian peoples, defined ethnically
and politically as separate historical nations until 1918. Croatian sovereignty
dates back to the early Middle Ages, and its continuity was maintained and
respected until the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. With the forced and
illegal union with the Kingdom of Serbia in 1918, Croatia lost all its
attributes as a sovereign nation and became subject to Balkan-style political
oppression, national and religious discrimination, and economic exploitation.
Therefore, the Croatian people have ample reason to fight for the restoration
of their national sovereignty, the only guarantee of their freedoms and rights,
both national and human.
Croatian nationalist extremism, by prioritizing, like other similar
movements, real or perceived national interests over democratic institutions,
was far more a product of the unhealthy conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia
under oppressive and despotic Serbian rule than a reflection of European
nationalist currents. In his choice of methods, Pavelić followed the model
of Serbian nationalists and revolutionaries much more closely than the tactics
practiced by fascists and National Socialists. Furthermore, as a prototypical
activist and conspirator, he was not particularly concerned with the
ideological foundations of the Ustaša movement, which he led.
Croatia was unfamiliar with terrorist methods in its political
struggles; however, these methods were a defining characteristic of the Serbian
fight for emancipation from Turkish rule, where a veritable cult of bandits
(haiduks) still exists today. Political terrorism was introduced to Croatia by
Serbian agitators, and their most famous crime was the Sarajevo assassination
of 1914, a tragic prelude to the First World War. In Yugoslavia, the official
cult of the assassins of the ill-fated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was
and continues to be fostered. A commemorative plaque stands at the site of the
assassination, but not to the victim, rather to his perpetrators, while Serbian
patriotic institutions honor themselves by taking the names of the Sarajevo
assassins. It is a telling coincidence that these men were both fanatical
Serbian nationalists and members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the
nucleus of the later organized Yugoslav Communist Party.
The Marseille assassination attempt against the king-dictator was a
joint effort by Macedonian and Croatian nationalist activists, in retaliation
for the murder of Croatian leader E. Radic and so many other abuses and acts of
violence perpetrated by a ruthless dictatorship, particularly vicious against
Croats and Macedonians. While the attacks may have been carried out with the
tacit approval of certain governments, reluctant to embrace Serbian
expansionism, it is obvious that the perpetrators were not "international
terrorists" in the pay of the official Yugoslav narrative, but rather
opponents of the tyranny of King Alexander, hated both within the country and
repudiated by democratic opinion worldwide. Indeed, the Aix-en-Provence
tribunal, considering the motives of the accused, commuted the death sentence
to life imprisonment, justifying its ruling on the grounds that they had acted
out of patriotic, honorable, and idealistic motives.
Following the resounding and abrupt collapse of the Yugoslav army in
1941, unexpected only by those who refused to acknowledge the reality of
Yugoslavia, the Independent State of Croatia was established. However, its
future was uncertain, as the ongoing war prevented the Allies from recognizing
the new government. Despite these circumstances, which partly determined the
form of government, insinuations that this was a Quisling-style act are
untenable.
The Croatian revolutionaries did not rebel for ideological reasons or
out of a lust for power against their own democratic government, siding with
the invaders. Quite the contrary. Croatia had been under foreign domination for
over two decades, in the grip of the Serbian military clique that, just days
before the outbreak of war, had staged a coup, overthrowing the Belgrade
government for granting Croatia limited autonomy. It is absolutely certain that
the majority of Croats who participated in the re-establishment of the Croatian
state would have preferred to have Western democratic governments as allies.
Croatian youth fought courageously, sacrificing themselves to maintain Croatian
independence against the Serbian nationalist guerrillas (Chetniks) and later
against the communists, certain that they were contributing their blood to the
defense of the enduring interests of the Western community, momentarily divided.
The Croats had no alternative but to fight against the communists, who
supported Soviet and Serbian domination of Croatia, or to join their ranks.
The struggle of the Croats for their national independence is therefore
not anti-democratic, as the heroism of Cardinal Stepinac proves. Serbia,
despite appearances and the tired clichés, found itself in both world wars on
the side of the Western victors, solely as Russia's traditional ally and as a
Balkan exponent of Tsarist and Soviet expansionism, respectively.
EXCEPTIONAL TREATMENT FOR YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS
The Western powers have sought to gain political advantage from the
schism that has arisen between Belgrade and the Kremlin—in reality, it is not a
matter of ideological differences, but primarily of preventing Moscow from
arbitrarily dismissing Belgrade's rulers, as it usually does in occupied
satellite states—and for this reason, they are giving exceptional treatment to
Yugoslav communists to win their favor (that this favorable treatment can be
excessive is evidenced by the survey conducted by the influential and
independent London weekly "The Spectator" regarding the interference
of Yugoslav communists in British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts intended
for Yugoslavia).
The Spectator's survey prompted a parliamentary inquiry and the
corresponding explanations from the British government. Dissatisfied with the
official response, The Spectator published an editorial and a report on the
same topic on March 13 of this year. Extensive Memorandum on the "Yugoslav
section" of the official radio station. What the London weekly demands is
a disinterested news service, one that does not favor the democratic opposition
in Yugoslavia.
"The success of the broadcasts for Yugoslavia," argues The
Spectator, "should not be judged by the amount of propaganda material
favorable to the West or satisfactory to Tito and his supporters. Its
evaluation should be based on the degree to which it reflects the true picture
of English life, including, and this is of primary importance, English public
opinion about Yugoslavia."
The BBC, however, proceeds in such a way that "its news service
appears to benefit Titoism and is designed so that the broadcasts for
Yugoslavia reflect, not what the English think, but what the Yugoslav regime
would like to prove to its subjects that we think." To this effect, The
Spectator cites a series of precedents, which we will now summarize:
Since Five years ago, Desmond Clarke's commentaries, very popular among
Yugoslav radio listeners but censored by the communist press, were suppressed.
The BBC, in its broadcasts, made no mention of instances where Yugoslav and
Soviet representatives defended the same cause at the United Nations,
especially in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution. Nor did it report on the
trials in Yugoslavia against pro-Western elements.
Objective commentaries on communist Yugoslavia, broadcast to other
communist countries, were omitted from Yugoslav broadcasts. Even in citing
foreign sources, the BBC allowed itself to be subservient to the Yugoslav
regime. Regarding Djilas's book "The New Class," some favorable
reviews from the British press were broadcast, but far more attention was given
to the unfavorable comments, which were very few. For example, the criticism by
Labour MP Barbara Castle, published in the New Statesman, in favor of Tito, was
quoted in full. But when, two months later, the author retracted her hasty and
optimistic claims in the same magazine, the BBC didn't even mention it.
Fragments of "The New Class" are broadcast to other satellites,
except for Yugoslavia. Nor was Djilas's trial and conviction reported or
commented on.
Con todo, los radioescuchas yugoeslavos de las emisiones podían en parte
enterarse de lo que piensa el público inglés acerca de la actualidad yugoeslava
a través de la reseña mensual de la prensa británica, suprimida, sin embargo, a
partir de este año. Al referirse al año de los refugiados, la BBC omitió
indicar que el mayor porcentaje de los refugiados, después de Alemania
Oriental, procedía de Yugoeslavia.
The BBC persists in its thesis that Yugoslavia occupies a special place
among communist countries and, therefore, its communism should not be censored.
Yugoslav communist officials have the opportunity to express their opinions,
while the same is not true for the Yugoslav democratic opposition or, more
precisely, for anyone who might criticize the communist regime. Visiting
Yugoslav officials can speak on the BBC, which they often use to launch attacks
against the United States and to argue that the social system in communist
Yugoslavia is superior to the English one, "because there are no strikes
in Yugoslavia." Not a single prominent English political commentator
appears on these broadcasts.
With the aim of establishing "the best relations" with the
Yugoslav regime, a system was introduced in 1954 of bringing staff from
Yugoslavia to work on the broadcasts for five-year periods, and vice versa. For
six years, eight Yugoslav broadcasters worked for the BBC, and only one BBC
broadcaster, Mr. Valentine, was assigned to the Zagreb radio station. However,
as soon as he arrived, the police made him certain propositions, which he, of
course, refused. He was then subjected to pressure—so much so that he had to
leave the country a few days after his arrival. The BBC gave him sick leave,
and the incident was hushed up. The "exchange" continues,
unilaterally.
The consequence is that a communist cell is hidden within the BBC,
informing the Yugoslav government about what is happening at the station. The
Spectator cites three notorious communists prominent at the BBC: I. Zivkovic,
from Zagreb; B. Bozovic and Miss S. Zivkovic, from Belgrade. "Despite the
BBC's denials, it is clear that these people influence even the daily
programs." Among other examples, The Spectator cites a characteristic case
that occurred on the occasion of the death of Cardinal Stepinac. The Serbian
communist broadcaster, S. Zivkovic, misrepresented the text. Where it said
"Stepinac was tried for his alleged collaboration with the Nazis," she
wrote "he was convicted of collaboration with the Nazis, which was proven
at trial."
"The Yugoslav communist authorities," The Spectator continued,
"not only prevent BBC representatives from being sent to Yugoslavia, but
also dictate who can work at Bush House" (BBC headquarters). Thus, in
early 1957, M. Gregoric arrived at the BBC from Belgrade. He received orders
from a secret agent at the Yugoslav embassy in London to spy on BBC employees
and, among other things, send him a copy of the British broadcaster's internal
newsletter, which sometimes contains the addresses and letters of its Yugoslav
listeners, information of interest to the communist police. Gregoric reported
this request to the heads of the "BBC's Yugoslav service," but they
advised him to comply with the embassy's wishes.
The Yugoslav secret police soon found out about all this, and Gregoric's
family was detained in Belgrade. The BBC was asked to immediately dismiss
Gregoric "in the interest of friendly relations," which they did,
and, to top it all off, they advised Gregoric to return to Yugoslavia, as he
could not obtain political asylum in England.
The Spectator concludes its Memorandum by asserting that representatives
of the Yugoslav "new class" are very pleased with the BBC, but the people
of Yugoslavia are listening less and less to its broadcasts, which are
considered a kind of official Yugoslav propaganda. People prefer Croatian
broadcasts from Radio Madrid. In this regard, The Spectator quotes the Swiss
broadcasting newspaper, Schweizer Radiozeitung, which, under the headline
"Radio War over Yugoslavia," wrote that "for some time now,
Croatian broadcasts from Radio Madrid have been very popular in Yugoslavia. It
seems that these broadcasts are listened to extensively, even in Serbia.
Listeners denounce the London broadcasts as 'proto-toist.' Other Swiss
newspapers, as well as the Christian Science Monitor of Boston, reported that
in Zagreb, during Croatian broadcasts from Radio Madrid, cafes and
confectioneries are emptied because the patrons go to listen to them."
Following its survey, The Spectator published many letters, including
one from Dr. Juraj (George) Krnjevic, general secretary of the Croatian
Agrarian Party (Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka), who has lived in exile in London
for twenty years.
"It seems to me," the letter says, "that the discussion
in The Spectator about BBC broadcasts for Yugoslavia is framed narrowly. The
conspiracy of silence regarding the atrocities of the Yugoslav communist regime
is not limited to the BBC. Even the most prominent English newspapers adopt the
same stance in their reports and commentaries on postwar Yugoslavia. In The
Times, one can only read very cautious reports written with the intention of
not upsetting the current rulers. It is significant that The Voice of America
and the New York Times correspondents in Belgrade take the same attitude, as
does the American National Committee for a Free Europe, which deals with
refugees. When the representative body of European exiles—European Captive Nations—was
established in the United States, it was advised that asylum seekers from
Yugoslavia not be included so as not to offend the sensibilities of
Yugoslavia." "Post-war."
The BBC's attitude, in the opinion of this veteran Croatian democratic
politician, "is a consequence of the general policies of Great Britain and
the United States, demoralizing for peoples subjected to communist
dictatorships and detrimental to the cause of democracy and freedom."
It should be added that certain United Nations agencies practice
discrimination against refugees from Yugoslavia, with truly tragic cases
involving returned refugees. Furthermore, Croatians are unhappy with the Voice
of America broadcasts transmitted solely in Serbian, completely ignoring
Croatian.
BLACKMAIL TO REACH A "MODUS VIVENDI" WITH THE HOLY SEE
Even before the death of Cardinal Stepinac, the Yugoslav communist
government sought to create the impression that it wished to normalize the
situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. However, due to their
Caesaropapist mentality, the communists in Belgrade cannot conceive that a
"modus vivendi" is achieved through concessions and compromises, not
through measures of persecution and oppression, which amount to mere blackmail.
Such treatment of the Catholic Church has the opposite effect, leaving those
who, in good faith, had suggested certain arrangements with the communist
government, considering them the lesser evil, in an awkward position.
In their blackmailing policy, the communists have also resorted, among
other means, to a series of fabricated trials against the Catholic clergy.
Since these trials have not been properly reported and interpreted in the
Western press, we deem it appropriate to summarize them:
I. On March 17 and 18 of this year, the trial of the Catholic Bishop of
Skopje, Smiljan Cekada, the bursar of the Zagreb Theological Seminary, Rodolfo
Pukljak, and a group of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim laypeople was held in
Skopje, the capital of the People's Republic of Macedonia, where Catholics
constitute an insignificant minority amidst the Orthodox and Islamic
population. They were accused of the clandestine sale of foreign currency and
various items they received from abroad as aid, from their relatives, and from
Catholic organizations, primarily American ones. Although the sentences were
not severe, the trial was given considerable publicity with the aim of damaging
a Catholic diocese in the diaspora, located in the heart of the Balkans, and
the most important seminary in Croatia, located in Zagreb. They are
particularly vicious against Bishop Cekada because of his great renown and
authority among the Macedonians and Albanians, who, like the Croats, oppose
Serbian dominance. The Macedonians aspire to have their own autocephalous
Church and not depend on the Serbian national Church, an instrument of Serbian
chauvinism, something that has never been granted to them, nor is it now. Hence
their strong sympathies for the Croats and even for the Catholic Church.
II. The background of the trial in Osijek is published on page 46. This
trial aimed to obstruct the activities of the seminary in the important Diocese
of Djakovo. It was preceded by countless raids, interrogations, arrests, and
direct threats against seminarians, forcing them to become informers. The
communists are striving to close all seminaries in Croatia. They employed the
same tactic to close the old seminary in Split, where priests for Dalmatia were
trained. The main evidence of subversive activities was words written in pencil
in a book: "I am a Croat." The communists boast of having achieved
national equality, but this example proves otherwise. It is inconceivable that
a Serbian cleric should be tried for declaring his nationality, while a Croat
is branded a chauvinist, a subversive, and a criminal for the same reason.
III. At the same time, arrests and raids were carried out in the
Archdiocese of Sarajevo, though the details are still unknown. It is known that
priests not affiliated with the Catholic clergy union, sponsored by the communist
government but disapproved of by the Holy See, were arrested.
IV. The communist propaganda machine gave extensive publicity to the
trial of fifteen young people for illegal association and subversive activity,
held in Zagreb between January 13 and 29 of this year. The main defendant was
the Franciscan friar Rodolfo Jerak, sentenced to 15 years of hard labor,
identified as the instigator. Other defendants were sentenced to severe terms
of one to fourteen years in prison. It is known that numerous arrests were made
on this occasion, but the whereabouts of those detained are unknown. This group
was accused of maintaining relations with exiled "fascist" circles,
without a single piece of conclusive evidence being presented. For the
communists, all exiles without exception are fascists, criminals, and Nazis,
supported by Adenauer. The purpose of this trial has been twofold: to defame
all political exiles as Nazi-fascists and to demonstrate that they are not
persecuting the Catholic Church as a religious institution, but only because of
the illegal and subversive activity of a segment of the clergy. Communist
propaganda had some success, as news agencies broadcast without comment the
communist accusations that these were pro-fascist activities.
In short, the Yugoslav communists are attempting to reach a modus
vivendi with the Catholic Church through blackmail, driven by its political
prestige in democratic countries. With such tactics, they demonstrate their
complete ignorance of the Western mindset and, consequently, misinterpret the
cautious and reserved attitude of ecclesiastical circles, which are willing to
make certain concessions for the replacement of some church officials, but
never to make principled concessions.
SUCCESSOR TO CARDINAL STEPINAC
Shortly after Cardinal Stepinac's death, the Holy See appointed
Monsignor Francis Seper as his successor. Since 1954, he had served as
Apostolic Administrator of the Zagreb diocese. Born in Osijek in 1905, he
pursued university studies in Zagreb, interrupting them to dedicate himself to
the priesthood. In Rome, a colleague and friend of Stepinac, he studied at the
Gregorian University and was ordained in 1930. He then served as Stepinac's
secretary, rector of the Zagreb theological seminary, and later as a parish
priest in the Croatian capital. In 1954, he was appointed titular and now
residential archbishop.
In 1958, he was able to go to Rome for his ad limina mission, though he
was not permitted to visit Stepinac even once. The new head of the Catholic
Church in Croatia is renowned as a cultured, prudent, and energetic prelate,
and as a proven patriot. The Holy See appointed the new residential archbishop
of Zagreb, Metropolitan of Croatia, without consulting the Yugoslav government,
which had to accept the fait accompli.
INACCURATE DATA IN W. M. JACKSON EDITIONS
Yugoslav diplomatic and propaganda services disseminated all kinds of
falsehoods and misinterpretations regarding Croatian culture, history, and
aspirations.
Therefore, we often find references to Croatia's past and present in
encyclopedias, compendiums, and manuals that are deficient, if not entirely
distorted, with a clear political bias. The editors and compilers of these
encyclopedic publications were almost always taken in and their good faith and
intention to propagate only the truth about each country were betrayed and
deceived.
Today we will refer to the W. M. Jackson encyclopedic editions,
published in Buenos Aires, which enjoy well-deserved prestige in the
Spanish-speaking world and are widely consulted by professors.
I
Let us now examine, free from any polemical spirit, some information on
Croatian and Serbian literature contained in W. M. Jackson's Practical
Encyclopedia (Vol. IX, Buenos Aires, 1956). 1. The author of the note on
Croatian literature, Professor Pablo Schostakowsky (a rather Russian-sounding
surname), begins his review with a notable inaccuracy and evident
contradiction:
"Literature in Croatia remained closely linked to that of Serbia
throughout all periods of its development, despite the fact that the country's
geographical position on the Adriatic coast predestined it to enter the orbit
of Western culture. The Croats even accepted the Roman Catholic religion and
the Latin alphabet. Their literature reached an extraordinary flowering in the
15th-18th centuries in the maritime city of Dubrovnik (Ragusa)."
Mr. Schostakovsky is clearly completely ignorant of the subject, for it
is an incontrovertible fact, recognized by all scholars in the field, that the
cultural, literary, and political development of Croatia was linked to that of
Western Europe. In Croatian territory, and especially in Dubrovnik, mentioned
by Schostakovsky, the cultural currents and movements of the West were
faithfully reflected. In Croatian literature, the themes, style, spirit, and
approach to problems generally coincide with those prevalent in Western
countries. The same can be said of other cultural activities and even political
forms. It is, therefore, precisely the opposite of what Schostakovsky maintains:
the Croats entered the orbit of Western culture, and there was no connection
whatsoever between Serbian and Croatian literatures until the mid-19th century.
of the last century, because among the Serbs, dominated by the Turks, there was
no climate conducive to the cultivation of literature and fine arts, and they
were also under the influence of Russian ecclesiastical literature, so that the
few books by their writers could not be understood by the Serbian people
because they were written in a mixture of Old Slavic and Russo-Serbian.
2. The data and assessments of certain authors are entirely false. The
great Croatian lyric poet Agustín Ujevic is included in Serbian literature and
defined as a "singer of the Russian Revolution." The truth lies on
the opposite side. The poet who was to Croatian literature what Mallarmé,
Rimbaud, and Valéry were to French literature, is considered the greatest
Croatian poet of the present century. For his patriotism and liberal spirit, he
was accused by Tito's communists of being a bourgeois writer, tried, and
publicly condemned. His disciples and admirers, the vast majority of young
Croatian writers, were labeled reactionaries and decadent Westernizers, and
some of them still cannot publish today.
3. Another historical falsehood in this review is the assertion that the
leaders of Illyrianism adopted the Serbian literary language. The truth is that
Illyrianism—a Croatian national movement of the last century—adopted, for the
sake of national unity, the dialect of the Renaissance writers of Dubrovnik,
with minor morphological and phonetic modifications and modernisms. It turns
out that Croatian writers were using the current literary language several
centuries before the emergence of modern Serbian literature. The Dubrovnik dialect
(Stokavski) is not Serbian, as it is the dialect spoken by the majority of
Croats. Therefore, Croats have not been able to adopt the Serbian literary
language or "steal" it, as the Serbian chauvinists, whom Shostakovsky
is imitating, maintain.
II
In The Picturesque World (Vol. IX, 1957, Buenos Aires), another
magnificently presented and illustrated edition by W. M. Jackson, there is an
article on The South Slavic Peoples - Among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
While Montenegro is lauded, we find few lines about Croatia and Slovenia, and
even fewer. We learned that in Croatia, in general, "the regions adjacent
to rivers are very unhealthy," which is not true. Montenegro, a region
that occupies a modest place in terms of culture and tourist appeal, is discussed
at length and with praise. Croatia, on the other hand, compared to other South
Slavic regions, ranks first, yet it is overlooked and poorly represented. While
Croatia and Slovenia, which are two different nations, are listed together,
Dalmatia, an integral part of Croatia and the cradle of Croatian culture and
state organization, is treated separately. Dalmatia is simply described as the
most beautiful province in Yugoslavia, but *The Picturesque World* does not
include a single photograph of it.
Upon reading the phrase "courtesy of the Legation of Yugoslavia in
Buenos Aires" at the bottom of the relevant photographs, the
aforementioned omissions take on their true meaning. That is to say, the
Yugoslav diplomatic representatives, in their The majority of those involved
are Serbs and Montenegrins, who supply the data and photographic material,
largely paid for with Croatian money, deliberately concealing everything
related to Croatia, the country from which almost exclusively more than 300,000
immigrants residing in South America originate.
Official Yugoslav policy, both under the monarchy and the current
communist regime, is not a policy of equality for South Slavs but rather tends
toward political and cultural integration, toward the balkanization of nations
with Western culture, such as Croatia and Slovenia. Hence all sorts of
falsifications and distortions of facts and circumstances by propagandists who
exploit the good faith of foreign publishers.
Vinko Nikolic
BOOK REVIEW
Pablo Tijan: Crisis of Liberalism in Central Europe (The Masaryk Myth) -
Madrid, 1958 - Editora Nacional, p. 460.
The eminent Croatian polymath and Slavist,
Professor Pablo Tijan, published a remarkable essay, The Masaryk Myth, in 1951
in the Madrid-based journal Arbor, published by the Spanish National Research
Council (CSIC). In it, he shed new light on the person and work of Tomáš G.
Masaryk, Czech philosopher and statesman (1856-1937), who was the founder and
first president of the Czechoslovak Republic from its establishment in 1918
until 1935. In a concise analysis, the author explained the causes of the
crisis and collapse of this Central European state, which occurred on the eve
of the Second World War and its subsequent submersion within the Soviet empire.
The book under review addresses the same
topic, but in a more comprehensive and documented form, written with rigorous
scientific methodology, offering the reader an insightful perspective on
political evolution in Danubian Europe.
The material is divided into four parts and 36
chapters. The author tackles the crisis that gripped the centuries-old Danubian
monarchy under the impact of modern currents of liberalism and nationalism,
historically and ideologically correlated. His historical exposition is not
limited to a critical analysis of Austro-Czech relations, but encompasses the
salient points of the entire problem within the multinational Habsburg
monarchy. Appropriately, and drawing on Croatian sources, he also considers
Croatia's role in this evolution. The second part is dedicated to the study of
Masaryk's personality and thought, while the final two parts analyze his work
as a statesman and interpret his ultimate failure.
Professor Tijan adopts a critical stance
towards the conceptions and prejudices of politicians who were determined to
destroy the Danubian political community, which for centuries had fulfilled its
irreplaceable European mission, convinced that in doing so they were enabling
the application of the national principle, progress, and the affirmation of
democracy.
Instead, national conflicts intensified.
Instead of nation-states built upon the remnants of the old monarchy, new
multinational states were actually formed, in which one nationality, sometimes
a minority, imposed national discrimination, the origin of regimes that were
not entirely democratic and progressive. The crisis, with the tragic outcome
that engulfed Czechoslovakia, which was perhaps the most successful experiment
in these multinational integrations, points precisely to the errors and
mistakes of its creators and protectors. Even Masaryk had to confess: "Our
Republic is merely a poor imitation of the old monarchy."
The consequences of such a state of affairs
were fatal. The current communist domination stems from the crisis that the
author meticulously studies. Although he does not propose solutions for the
immediate future, it is obvious from his critical and dispassionate examination
that past mistakes must not be repeated. Therefore, it is necessary to follow
the activities of certain exiled politicians with reservations and caution, as
they still maintain assumptions that determined the current unbearable
situation. Hence, the author's revisionist position regarding official Yugoslav
and Czechoslovak historiography is of paramount importance. In support of his
thesis, the speaker reproduces valuable and little-known conclusions of the
same Czech authors, who were Catholic in orientation.
The work "Crisis of Liberalism in Central
Europe" has the merit, aside from containing numerous background materials
that make important global problems more comprehensible to the Spanish-speaking
reader, of having been approached from the perspective of the countries
directly affected. German, French, Russian, and English authors who address
these problems, even when striving for objectivity and good intentions,
sometimes fail to accurately reflect all the aspirations and interests of these
peoples. Professor Pablo Tijan, on the other hand, has an advantage because he
comes from a Danubian country and possesses direct knowledge of the
Czechoslovak problem, having studied it in Bohemia itself. He also had access
to abundant literature, not only from the major Western countries, but also
from the works and sources of Czech, Slovak, Russian, Croatian, and Serbian
authors.
Buenos Aires
J. B. GHETALDI
D.A.
TOMASIC: National Communism and Soviet Strategy - Public Affairs Press,
Washington D.C., 1957, pp. VIII-222.
Most books
on the problem of national communism in Yugoslavia, or so-called
"Titoism," approach it from the perspective of its importance to
international communism and the free world, without delving into a precise
analysis of the factors of this communist variant. However, Professor D.A.
Tomasic, in his book National Communism and Soviet Strategy, in addition to
providing an interesting analysis of the problem, explains the evolution of
communism in Yugoslavia in relation to the complex problems of the country, and
primarily those of its nationalities. The book thus fills a gap in the literature
on Yugoslav communism.
The author
is a professor of sociology and a specialist in Eastern European studies at
Indiana University, a prestigious university in the USA. Until 1941, he was a
professor of sociology at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb. By
that time, he had already published several books, among which the one
dedicated to the political development of the Croats (Politicki razvitak Hrvata
HKN, Zagreb, 1938) stands out. The book under discussion is the third he
published in the United States. The first analyzes the role of personalities
and culture in the politics of Eastern Europe (Personality and Culture in
Eastern European Politics, George W. Stewart, New York, 1948), while the second
deals with the influence of Russian culture on Soviet communism (The Impact of
Russian Culture on Soviet Communism, Free Press, Glencoe III, 1953).
Professor
Tomasic's profound knowledge of both Soviet communism and the psychology,
history, and culture of the peoples that made up Yugoslavia constituted the
fortunate combination that allowed him, with the assistance of J. Strmecki, to
master the complex issues surrounding the events in that country that led the
communists to power and then to the conflict with Moscow, which erupted in
1948.
In the
first chapter of the book under review, the author addresses the significance
of "Titoism" for the communist world; he explains the dangers to
which the international communist movement is exposed in the monolithic system
on the one hand, and in the weakening of central control on the other. He then
moves on to analyze the development of the communist movement in Yugoslavia,
describing its tentative beginnings and the abrupt shift from supporting
nationalities oppressed by Serbian hegemony to defending Yugoslavia during the
Popular Front era.
The
chapter describing the psychology of the inhabitants of the Dinaric Mountains
and how the Serbs of that region came to assume a dominant role in the Yugoslav
Communist Party during the last war is extremely interesting. Professor Tomasic
attributes the friction with Moscow and Tito's effective resistance to Stalin's
attack largely to the arrogance and complacency of these guerrillas,
intoxicated by their victory.
For a
moral assessment of the Yugoslav communists' rebellion against Moscow, it is
essential to emphasize that they had gone further in the terror and
implementation of communist plans than any of the "people's
democracies," and that the break with Moscow was not desired by either
Tito or his supporters. Unbridled ambition provoked the conflict. No dictator
enjoys taking orders from another. This point is often forgotten because it
does not align with the wishes of many observers and with the irrational need
to attribute not only courage but also moral valor to anyone who confronts a
more powerful adversary. The author shows us how, after the distancing from the
source of international communism, this excess of security has turned into
disorientation and demoralization.
The final
chapters analyze the importance of "Titoism" for the Kremlin's world
strategy and its relationship to the uprisings in satellite states. Instead of
opposing any tendency toward "Titoism"—that is, toward the relative
autonomy of communist governments outside the USSR—the Kremlin has used, since
Stalin's death, the "Titoist" idea as a useful instrument to give the
impression that a "socialist state" can function successfully even
independently of Moscow; that there can be a "national" communism.
This is a temporary adaptation between nationalism and communism, since it was
impossible to continue with the monolithic Stalinist system in the expanding
communist empire. And if this "Titoist" policy fails, Professor
Tomasic believes that this could signify the beginning of the failure of
communism as a unified world movement.
Buenos
Aires,
BRANIMIR
ANZULOVIC.
ERNEST PEZET: Stepinac-Tito - Contexts and Insights into "The
Affair" -, Paris 1959, Nouvelles Editions Latines, pp. 32.
On the occasion of the publication of Father Teodoro Dragun's widely
circulated book, Le Dossier du Cardinal Stepinac, Ernest Pezet gave a
presentation in the Sainte Odile crypt, Paris, on December 21, 1958. The
booklet in question contains his speech, stripped of oratorical flourishes and
with a prologue by the author himself, in which he compares the case of
Cardinal Stepinac to the Dreyfus Affair. Both his oral and printed
presentations had an unprecedented impact in France. In this issue, we publish
in full the reasoning and deductions of this prominent French parliamentarian
and profound expert on the Yugoslav problem. The work also contains interesting
personal recollections related to the Marseille assassination attempt of 1934.
"Le Monde Diplomatique," the official publication of
diplomatic circles and major international organizations, in its December 1959
issue, refers to this work and assesses its informative value, stating that
"the Vice-President of the Senate, who for some thirty years was one of
the most active and influential members of the foreign affairs committees of
both parliamentary assemblies, believes that Tito is making the same mistake
about which he had warned Barthou himself before the Marseille assassination
attempt. Indeed, in the author's opinion,
Tito founded the Yugoslav state on the predominance of the Serbian
element. Also, according to him, the Yugoslav idea, which was of Croatian and
Slovenian origin and implied the fraternal unity of all South Slavs, has been
distorted to the benefit of the Serbs, who are treated as a nation superior to others,
so that..." Behind the façade of communist federalism, the tradition of
the Serbian monarchy persists. Pezet sees in this attitude the underlying
reason for the measures against Bishop Stepinac, considering them extremely
unjust.
BRANKO KADIC
Fr. THEODORE
DRAGOUN: The Dossier of Cardinal Stepinac. Paris, 1958, Nouvelles Editions
Latines, pp. 288.
As the
figure of Cardinal Stepinac gained greater prominence internationally, standing
as a symbol of truth and freedom against tyranny, studies and commentaries on
the imprisoned Cardinal and the historical circumstances in which he lived and
acted multiplied in Western countries. Of particular note is the book by
Fiorello Cavalli, S.J., which contains a detailed analysis of "The Trial
of the Archbishop of Zaragoza" (Rome, Ed. La Civiltà Cattolica, 1947), as
well as the voluminous work by Richard Pattee, the renowned American historian,
"The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac" (The Bruce Publishing
Company, Milwaukee, 1953).
In this
masterfully documented work, the author strives to illustrate the Stepinac case
from a historical perspective and to meticulously and rigorously analyze the
motives, legal elements, and course of the proceedings. The complex issues
surrounding the internal relations of the peoples incorporated into the
Yugoslav conglomerate, dominated by Serbs, sometimes hindered these authors
from fully understanding the Yugoslav reality and its fundamental causes,
whereas the author of the Prontuario del Cardinal Stepinac, Father Teodoro Dragoun,
a Croatian Dominican and currently the national rector of the Croatian Catholic
Mission in France, was in a better position to place Archbishop Stepinac within
the historical context and to assess the contributing factors. His book is
primarily intended for a French audience, exposed to the intense anti-Croatian
campaigns unleashed by Serbian nationalists and communists, who exploit French
sympathies toward Serbia, their ally in the First World War.
The
prestigious French journal "Etudes" (December 1946) alluded to this
mood, noting, in the wake of Stepinac's trial and conviction: "Slower than
the Anglo-Saxon press, and not as well-informed, our press, as a whole and with
a few meritorious exceptions, has hesitated to clarify this event and even more
so to take sides. In this way, it has deprived French public opinion—which is
most regrettable—of the opportunity to condemn an injustice; as
for Christians, they will be unable to venerate a martyr." To better guide
the confused French reader,
T. Dragoun
systematically presents the historical and geographical context of Yugoslavia
and describes the religious situation during the monarchical and communist
regimes. In support of his arguments, he reproduces a whole series of
irrefutable documents, namely: Archbishop Bauer's memorandum of May 25, 1935;
an essay on the struggle against Catholicism by E. Pezet and H. Simondet;
several pastoral letters from Croatian bishops; Stepinac's speech before the
court; arguments of the defense lawyers appointed by the court; transcripts
from Etudes, Civiltà Cattolica, and Osservatore Romano; the Holy See's White
Paper of December 15, 1952, and excerpts from Le communisme et L'Eglise
Catholique (Ed. de Fleurus, pp. 409-414); and testimonies from prominent
politicians, ecclesiastics, and other leading figures regarding Stepinac.
In the
preface, the Auxiliary Bishop of Paris, Monsignor Jean Rupp, who visited
Croatia in 1930, evokes his memories and highlights Croatia's exceptional and
strategic importance, seeing it as an insertion point for prestigious values
within the West.
Dragoun's
book was well-received not only in France but also in South America. The
prestigious Buenos Aires newspaper "La Nación," in its literary
supplement of January 29, 1959, published a laudatory review of "Le
Dossier du Cardinal Stepinac," emphasizing that "this work is a
historical affirmation of the figure of the persecuted Archbishop of Zagreb
through circumstances and events of enormous global significance."
Buenos
Aires
Branko
Kadic
ANTE SMITH PAVELIC: Dr. Ante Trumbic - Problem of Croatian-Serbian
Relations. Ed. "Hrvatska Revija", Munich 1959, pp. XVI-333.
With this work, dedicated to Dr. Antonio Trumbic, president of the
Yugoslav Committee—around which anti-Austrian Croatian exiles rallied during
the First World War—and first chancellor of the new "Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes," the author has filled a gap in Croatian political
literature. Trumbic, who advocated for the national unity of Croats, Serbs, and
Slovenes, upon encountering the reality of a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs and
governed by anti-democratic regimes, became one of the proponents of a Croatian
nation-state.
It is illustrative of the relations between Serbs and Croats that the
author of this insightful work is one of the few Croats accepted into the
Yugoslav diplomatic service, as he is the son of Dr. Ante Pavelic,
vice-president of the National Council, a revolutionary body established in
Zagreb that, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, assumed
power in Croatia and Slovenia. His father presided over the National Council
delegation that, on December 1, 1918, agreed in Belgrade to the union of
Croatia and Serbia.
Dr. Pavelic possesses all the necessary qualifications to understand and
accurately interpret Trumbic's political line, since he himself underwent a
similar political evolution and, from his youth, was in contact with Trumbic's
closest collaborators. He was also able to consult unpublished documents
bequeathed by his father. The book's prologue was written by the renowned
sculptor Ivan Mestrovic, a collaborator of Trumbic on the Yugoslav Committee,
who had experienced similar disappointments. Mestrovic asserts that Yugoslavia
is essentially an enlarged Serbia, where Croats have endured martyrdom and
disillusionment.
The author divides the topic into three parts. In the first, he
summarizes the political situation in Croatia prior to the First World War,
adopting a distinctly anti-Austrian stance, considered by many Croats today to
be erroneous and anachronistic.
The second part contains an interesting and comprehensive account of the
actions of the Yugoslav Committee, its struggle against the secret 1915 Treaty
of London, which, as a reward to Italy for entering the war on the side of the
Entente powers, granted it the right to annex the distinctly Croatian and
Slovene regions of vital importance to those peoples, located in the eastern
Adriatic. It also reviews the ongoing conflict between Croatian exiles and
Serbian politicians, primarily with the Serbian Prime Minister, Nicolae
Pašić, who supported the creation of Greater Serbia under the tutelage of
the Russian Empire and to the detriment of Croatia.
The author analyzes and commends the efforts of the Croatian politician
Frano Šupilo, one of the founders of the Yugoslav Committee, to counter the
maneuvers of Serbia, Russia, and Italy, which were prepared to sacrifice the
essential interests of Croatia and Slovenia. Smith Pavelic then presents, based
on new documents, the events that took place in Zagreb during the collapse of
the Habsburg Empire.
The third part describes Trumbic's struggle at the Peace Conference
against the implementation of the London Pact. He had some influence from
President Wilson, but little or no support from his own government, which
sought to negotiate behind his back with Italy, to the detriment of vital
Croatian and Slovenes' interests. The final chapters illustrate Trumbic's
opposition activities and his evolution toward Croatian nationalism. This
section is incomplete because the author did not always have access to reliable
information, having lived abroad and lacking direct contact with internal
events.
In the final chapter, the author summarizes his argument and offers the
following concluding judgment: "From the beginning, Trumbic longed for the
political equality of Serbs and Croats and respect for democratic freedoms, in
accordance with Croatian political traditions...
"Instead of equality and democracy, the ideas and policies of Serb
supremacy prevailed, for whom unification meant incorporating the other South
Slavs into the Serbian state and their integration, even forced, into the
Serbian national community. While this policy was practiced in the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Yugoslav label, it was in reality nothing
other than Serbian dictatorship, national and nationalist. The experience of
recent decades demonstrates that both Serbs and Croats lack sufficient moral
and physical strength to impose themselves on one another and that the Croats
resolutely demand recognition of their national identity and sovereignty."
Therefore, the question of "Croatian-Serbian relations remains unresolved
and open." (pp. 314-15)
Smith Pavelic's work is written with scientific methodology, is well-documented,
and meticulously edited. It contains extensive bibliographical data. This book
represents a valuable contribution to political literature, essential for those
who wish to understand the reality of Yugoslavia.
Buenos Aires.
Ivo Bogdan.
VJEROSLAV VRANCIC: Dr. Andrija Artukovic pred sjevernoamerickim sudom
(Artukovic before American Justice), Buenos Aires, 1959. Ed. Hrvatska Misao, V,
p. 112.
Thousands upon thousands of Croatians sought refuge in free countries at
the end of World War II, when the communists seized power and Croatia was
occupied by Tito's forces. A number of Croatian refugees settled in the United
States, among them Dr. Andrija Artukovic, former Minister of the Interior of
the Independent State of Croatia during the war.
In September 1951, the Yugoslav communist government initiated
extradition proceedings against Dr. Artukovic in the Los Angeles District
Court. These proceedings concluded in January 1959, with all three levels of
the U.S. federal justice system involved. The initial indictment was based on
general, unspecified accusations that the accused was a member of the criminal
gangs that had terrorized much of Yugoslavia. He was accused of the deaths of
more than one million Yugoslavs, allegedly murdered in the Independent State of
Croatia.
Due to the vagueness of the accusations and the lack of sufficient
evidence, the case did not proceed. The Yugoslav public prosecutor then filed a
supplementary indictment, holding the accused responsible for a series of
murders and participation in murders perpetrated between April 1941 and October
1942, during which time the defendant held the position of Minister of the
Interior.
This time, the indictment and the extradition request were based on a
mutual legal assistance treaty signed in 1902 between the former Kingdom of
Serbia and North America.
Yugoslavia, as is well known, was created after the First World War
without consulting the Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. Between
the two world wars, successive Yugoslav governments, dominated by Serbs,
behaved as if Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were conquered
territories annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia. This policy was criticized at the
time, even by the Communist Party, which, however, upon coming to power, maintained
and even increased the predominance of the Serbs, even though they constitute
only a relative minority within the multinational Yugoslav conglomerate.
In this regard, it is very revealing that the extradition request made
to the US judicial system was based on a treaty signed in 1902 with the Kingdom
of Serbia, that is, 16 years before the creation of Yugoslavia. Another
significant fact is that this is the same Croatian politician, Dr. Artukovic,
whose extradition was requested in 1934 by the Yugoslav dictatorial government
following the Marseille bombing. On that occasion, French authorities handed
over Dr. Artukovic, who, after a rigorous trial and multiple instances of
torture, was declared innocent by the Yugoslav State Security Court and placed
at the disposal of the French justice system, which released him.
Under the aforementioned Serbian-American treaty, the accused was
subject to extradition if there was a plausible reason to believe him guilty of
the murder or participation in the murder. This meant that the American court
only had to verify whether there was justifiable suspicion of guilt, while it
was up to the Yugoslav justice system to conclusively verify all the evidence
and rule on the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The ruling was issued by the federal commissioner of the Los Angeles
District Court, Theodore Hocke. It contains a chronological summary of the
entire process, a summary of the arguments, an extensive analysis of the
evidence produced during the trial, the motivation for the rejection of
extradition, and the acquittal verdict.
Because this is the only ruling of its kind issued by the courts of an
American republic regarding the extradition request of Croatian refugees by the
communist and Yugoslav authorities, we believe it is worthwhile to transcribe
paragraphs from its reasoning:
"Murder is a crime in both Yugoslavia and the U.S. The definition
of murder is substantially the same in both states. Murder is the crime
stipulated in the treaty as the basis for extradition."
"Not a single piece of evidence was presented to suggest that the
accused committed the murder."
"All the witness statements presented by the plaintiff are written
in narrative form. The witnesses signed the statements, but it is obvious that
these were not their words."
"The same language is used repeatedly in the witness statements.
The words 'the so-called Independent State of Croatia' appear in every
statement. I highly doubt that this could be a coincidence."
"It is also clear that the statements were made with the intent to
incite passion and prejudice. They constantly refer to infants, newborns, the
elderly, cruel and inhuman treatment, etc."
"Considering all the evidence presented and the legal sources cited
by both parties, I can only reach one conclusion. The plaintiff has not
demonstrated sufficient, competent evidence that there is reasonable or
probable cause to believe that the defendant is guilty of any of the alleged
crimes. I hope I will not see the day when a person has to answer for a crime,
either in the courts of California or the United States, based on evidence such
as that presented by the plaintiff."
The commissioner then states that this could conclude the reasoning
behind his ruling, but, in light of the defense's arguments, he adds that, even
if the defendant had committed the alleged crimes, there would be no grounds
for extradition, since said crimes would be political in nature. To that
effect, he gives the following justification:
"The evidence presented, as well as the historical facts, which I
can take judicial note of, demonstrate that the peoples of the Balkans have
lived in discord for years. Without suffrage or the possibility of election for
the Croats, after the First World War, Croatia was incorporated into the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The government was controlled by the Serbs, who
imposed tremendous burdens on the Croats. The Croats wanted an independent
government or at least independent representation in Parliament. In the
elections held in 1928, the Croats elected their deputies to the Belgrade
parliament. Upon arriving at parliament, they were assassinated by a Serbian
deputy. Civil war nearly broke out, and in 1929, King Alexander dissolved all
political parties. The Croats never forgot their ideal of an independent state,
and when the Germans and Italians invaded Yugoslavia during the Second World
War, they had their first opportunity to establish their own." their own
state.
On April 10, the Croatian leaders declared independence and began by
establishing their own government. The Serbs opposed this, triggering civil
war. Many lives were lost. Factions of Chetniks and "partisans"
(communist guerrillas) did everything possible to disrupt the new government's
plans.
The book we are reviewing is published in Croatian and contains a
detailed exposition of the U.S. judicial system. It also includes the full text
of the acquittal and the relevant considerations in English (pp. 85-105).
Buenos Aires.
A. Belic.
CHARLES
JELAVICH: Tsarist Russia and Nationalism. (Russian Influence in the Internal
Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886). Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958.
University of California Press, p. 304.
Liuben
Karavelov, one of the most distinguished Bulgarian authors, wrote prophetic
words in 1870: "If Russia comes to liberate us, it will be received with
great sympathy; if, however, it comes to dominate us, it will find many
enemies," thus expressing the feelings of the Balkan peoples toward
Tsarist Russia. Jelavich undertook the arduous task of examining the extent to
which Russian policy, promoting first and foremost its interests as a great
European power, came into sharp conflict with Bulgarian nationalism, and how,
conversely, it won the sympathies of the Serbs.
Throughout
the 300 pages of his work, divided into 11 chapters, two of them dedicated
exclusively to Serbia, the author meticulously recounts the events from the
Congress of Berlin (1878)—when the combined pressure of the great powers forced
Russia to relinquish its dominant position of exclusive influence in Serbia to
Austria, in exchange for exclusive influence in Bulgaria, essential for the
long-desired control of the Straits—to the rupture of diplomatic relations
between Russia and Bulgaria (1886).
The reader
encounters the Russian military and political representatives in Bulgaria,
their dealings with Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and the Bulgarian political
leaders, both conservative and liberal, as well as the vicissitudes surrounding
the drafting and suspension of the constitution, the construction of the
international railway lines, the organization of the armed forces, the union
with Eastern Rumelia, the war with Serbia, the abdication of Prince Alexander,
and so on. The direct influence and positions held by Russians in Bulgaria
reveal the degree of Bulgaria's dependence, initially equivalent to occupation.
In
summarizing the ideological underpinnings of Russo-Bulgarian relations in the
prologue, the author emphasizes the similarity between the events of the period
under study and those of the decade immediately following World War II.
Previously, Russia invoked autocratic tradition, Orthodoxy, and Slavophilia;
currently, it invokes the communist ideal and the ethnic kinship of the Slavs.
The work
is based primarily on previously unpublished material from the dispatches of
the British Foreign Office and Public Record Office, as well as from the
Austrian archives (Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv), and the works of several
historians. The author also had access to Giers's interesting correspondence
with A. P. Davidov, A. G. Ionini, A. E. Vlangali, and I. A. Zinoviev.
The five pages of the selected bibliography, which do not include a
single Croatian author, explain Jelavich's unilateral and equivocal references
to Serbian aspirations to the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied by
Austria under the Treaty of Berlin, as well as, with greater rights, to
Macedonia, which Bulgaria also appropriated. Thus, for example, the author's
arbitrary assertion that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were assigned to
Austria-Hungary at the Congress of Berlin, are "the Serbian national
territories" (p. 165) is entirely devoid of historical value, as is his
statement on pp. 174 and 178, when commenting on the policy of the Habsburg
Empire in the Balkans: "Lacking 'natural ties' in the Balkan Peninsula, it
was obliged to rely rather on force and diplomacy.
For this reason, in its relations with the Balkan regions, Austria
advocated the direct annexation of the territory, as in the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina..." (p. 2). A reader less familiar with the ethnic,
geographical, historical, political, and national issues of southeastern Europe
might mistakenly conclude that the provinces in question constitute Serbian
national territory—an error the author could easily have avoided by consulting
Croatian sources, such as L. V. Südland's masterful work, "Die
Südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg" (The South Slavic Question and the
World War), Vienna, 1918; Zagreb, 1944, or Dr. Mladen Lorkovic's
well-documented book, "Narod i Zemlja Hrvata" (People and Land of
Croatia), Zagreb, 1940, as well as the work of the English historian R. W.
Seton Watson, "Die Südslawische Frage im Habsburger Reich" (The South
Slavic Question in the Habsburg Empire), Berlin, 1913.
The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, According to the latest
official statistics from Belgrade, 44% of the population is Serbian.
Historically, Bosnia was part of the Croatian kingdom and later the vassal
kingdom of Croatia-Hungary. In terms of its economy, natural communication
routes, and geographical importance, it forms an indivisible unit with other
Croatian provinces.
Professor Charles Jelavich's book makes a valuable contribution to
understanding Russian policy and its objectives in the Balkan Peninsula. The
scientific method applied to the study of such a compelling subject, presented
in an engaging and fluid style, are other characteristics of this work, which
is published with meticulous attention to detail.
Buenos Aires
Milan Blazekovic
[1] Anon. [Adil
Zulfikarpasic], "Generali Titove Komunisticke Armije", Hrvatski Dom
(Frigurgo, Suiza), vol I, Nro. 98, enero-febrero 1959, p. 11. Zulfikarpasic era
miembro del PCY. Durante la guerra era teniente coronel en el ejército
comunista de Tito. Dejó las filas comunistas en 1947 y desde entonces vive
exilado.