STUDIA CROATICA

 

Croatian Journal of Political and Cultural Studies

 

Year I, Buenos Aires, July-September 1960, No. 1

 

Studia Croatica 2

Croatian National Anthem 7

Song to Freedom 7

The Croatian National Anthem 8

The Stepinac Affair 10

The Trial of Cardinal Stepinac 22

Pastor, Hero, and Martyr 27

Documents 39

Words of Pope Pius XII on Cardinal Stepinac 39

Pope John XXIII on Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac 39

Statements of Stepinac before the People's Court of Zagreb on October 3, 1946 41

Testimony of the President of the American Jewish Association 45

Testimony of Ivan Mestrovic 45

Cardinal Stepinac's Last Letter: Letter to the District Court 49 from Osijek

52 Croatia in the "Blavian Geography"

65 American Epiphany of a Distinguished Croatian Humanist

68 New Class and Nationalism

83 Score of the Croatian National Anthem

84 Croatia – Geographical, Economic and Historical Data

89 Chronicles and Commentaries

 


STUDIA CROATICA

 

This publication is intended for the public in Ibero-American countries, particularly those whose vocation or role gives them an interest in studying the current situation in Central and Southern Europe, regions currently under communist pressure. This publication is a genuine expression of Croatian exiles, among whom are many intellectuals, victims of communist persecution. The founders are driven by the desire to inform the free world about the historical and cultural heritage of their former homeland, about its suffering, the events, and the struggle it endures for freedom and independence. They are also motivated by gratitude toward the American republics, in which they found a new and welcoming homeland, which they reciprocate by sharing their experiences with communism, which today constitutes the common enemy throughout the free world. Successful resistance in the defense of individual and national freedoms and human dignity against communist oppression is only possible with a thorough understanding of its tactics and aims. The fundamental cause of so many failures of Western democracies after the Second World War lies in the ignorance of the true nature of Bolshevism.

Croatia is a small European country that suffered the tragic fate of losing its national freedom, and therefore does not even appear on political maps as a nation, although it was one for over a thousand years and currently possesses all the conditions to participate on an equal footing in the community of free nations.

Until 1918, Croatia, as an associated kingdom with its own state attributes, was part of the Danubian community of peoples of our Western culture under the Habsburg dynasty. After the First World War, Croatia was deprived of its democratic right to self-determination and, between the two world wars, was incorporated into Yugoslavia, ruled by the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty. The dictatorial King Alexander I officially denied even the attributes of Croatian nationality, outlawing Croatian patriots, political parties, and national institutions. In 1941, monarchical Yugoslavia disintegrated, and the Independent State of Croatia was founded. This state was forcibly suppressed in 1945 by the communists, who reintegrated Croatia into the second, supposedly communist and federal Yugoslavia. In this new Yugoslavia, Croatia, with its territory considerably reduced, constitutes one of six people's republics, all governed centrally from Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Thus, Croatia finds itself in a double enslavement: stripped of its national freedom and a victim of communist terror.

Although it is a distant and subjugated European country, such are the relations in the world today that even the South American nations - which represent not only a moral and material reserve of our Western world, but also demonstrate real strength and exert increasing influence in the community of free nations - cannot ignore the experiences of the captive peoples in the wide strip that runs from the Adriatic to the Baltic, that is, from Croatia in the south to Finland in the north.

In these defensive positions on the eastern border of the Western world, Croatia occupies one of the key posts. For over a millennium, it has legitimately possessed most of the eastern Adriatic coast, stretching between the Alps, the Danube, and the Balkans. Located at this crucial point, it was for centuries the border guardian, the defender of Western values ​​against the onslaughts of Byzantium, the Mongols, and the Ottomans in a highly sensitive area, as a neighbor to the Apennine and Alpine regions, seats of the papacy and empire—institutions that throughout the centuries have been the faithful expression of Western unity.

For this reason, the Renaissance Pope Leo X had just cause when he described Croatia as "the most salient shield and bulwark of Christendom."

In modern times, Croatia, whose language belongs to the Slavic language group, is exposed to the onslaught of Russian imperialism, first Tsarist, then Soviet. The tenacious and self-sacrificing resistance offered by the captive countries to communist oppression takes on the character of a defense of Western culture against the onslaught of Bolshevism, a specific Russian form of Marxism inextricably linked to the autocratic and Caesaropapist tradition of Eastern European culture and civilization, whose principal exponent was once the Byzantine Empire and in modern times the Russian Empire.

As soon as the communists occupied Croatia, they began an extermination campaign against all deeply rooted traditions and all spiritual ties with the Western world, imposing not only new institutions, opposed to the Croatian spirit, but also a new mentality. This pressure was able to materialize violently due to the sinister circumstances that forced the Croats, by virtue of the 1919 peace treaties, to live in the multinational Yugoslav state, heterogeneous and antagonistic in terms of culture, politics, and religious creed, under the hegemony of Balkan Serbia, a country where Byzantine and Russian traditions and influences still predominate today. In this sense, Yugoslavia, in which Serbia exercises domination over the non-Serbian majority, is analogous to Russia, which not only dominates so many peoples of the Soviet Union, but also numerous satellite states, including former nations that are an integral part of the Western world. Thus, Yugoslavia appears as the Soviet Union "in miniature," even after the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow, when the term "national communism" was coined.

There are also other reasons that make this publication timely within the context of the Spanish language. There are ancient and vibrant ties between Croatia and the Hispanic world, which must be maintained and strengthened even further.

Even at the beginning of the 16th century, at a critical moment in European and Croatian history, Croatia played an active role in the political landscape dominated by Spain. At that time, the military power of the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom was destroyed, along with the last resistance to Ottoman expansion, whose goal was to conquer Rome and reach the Rhine. Western countries forged extensive cooperation for defensive purposes, very similar to that which exists today. A strong defensive alliance was established among the Danubian countries under the aegis of the House of Austria and with the support of the Spanish Empire. In 1527, the Croatians elected Ferdinand I, brother of Charles V, "on whose empire the sun never set," as their king, thus becoming one of the first founders of the community that was aptly named "Little Europe." The Croats remained loyal to that community for four centuries, until the end of the First World War, when the "Balkanization" of the Danube basin took place, giving rise to the National Socialist adventure and later to Soviet domination.

Furthermore, there are other, more expressive and intimate relationships between Croatia and the Hispanic world. The Croats are genuinely a maritime people, having participated in naval battles against the Saracens as early as the Middle Ages; they also took part in the feat of the discovery of the New World and especially in its development. As early as the 16th century, we find groups of Croats on American soil, arriving not as conquerors but as settlers. As a country with a population exceeding seven million, Croatians have made a relatively significant contribution to the development of the Americas, totaling approximately two million immigrants. Several hundred thousand of these settled in South American republics, primarily as farmers and skilled sailors, who, among other things, founded the Argentine merchant fleet (the Mihanovic brothers). Due to their Western civilization and Catholic faith, Croatians integrate and assimilate easily with the population of Latin America. Until recently, they constituted the main immigrant group to the territory of present-day Yugoslavia. Although they arrived with Austrian or Yugoslavian passports and their documents did not indicate Croatian nationality, they were nonetheless of Croatian descent. Regarding trade between Yugoslavia and the South American republics, Croatian products occupy a leading position.

Following the end of World War II, the tragic mass migration from European countries, fallen under communist rule, began. The wave of Croatian refugees was particularly high. This forced expatriation continues, though fraught with danger. Croatians were among the first postwar refugees and endured extremely difficult times until the countries of the New World, in a magnanimous gesture, opened their doors to them, first and foremost Argentina, Venezuela, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Chile. These are thousands of refugees, seasoned fighters forged in the anti-communist struggle, who therefore appreciate the value of the institutions of the free world and their efforts toward progress, human dignity, and national rights.

Therefore, the editors and contributors of "Studia Croatica," whose first issue coincides with the Year of the Refugee and the sesquicentennial of the May Revolution in Argentina, embrace with equal love their old and new homelands and intend to inform and enlighten the Hispanic public with truthfulness and scientific rigor about the prevailing situation on the volatile eastern border of our Western society, in that volatile land where, in 1914 in Sarajevo, capital of the Croatian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first shot of the First World War was fired by Serbian terrorists who attempted to assassinate the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and gave immediate cause to the fratricidal war (1914-18), which cannot yet be considered over until true peace reigns, when all peoples and all individuals are assured of life in freedom, dignity, and justice.

As soon as the communists occupied Croatia, they began a campaign to exterminate all deeply rooted traditions and all spiritual ties to the Western world, imposing not only new institutions, contrary to the Croatian spirit, but also a new mentality. This pressure was able to manifest itself violently due to the sinister circumstances that forced the Croats, by virtue of the 1919 peace treaties, to live in the multinational Yugoslav state, heterogeneous and antagonistic in terms of culture, politics, and religious creed, under the hegemony of Balkan Serbia, a country where Byzantine and Russian traditions and influences still predominate today. In this sense, Yugoslavia, in which Serbia exercises domination over the non-Serbian majority, is analogous to Russia, which not only dominates so many peoples of the Soviet Union but also numerous satellite states, including former nations that are an integral part of the Western world. Thus, Yugoslavia appears as a "miniature" Soviet Union, even after the conflict between Belgrade and Moscow, when the term "national communism" was coined.

There are also other reasons why this publication is timely within the context of the Spanish language. There are long-standing and vibrant ties between Croatia and the Hispanic world, which must be maintained and further strengthened.

Even at the beginning of the 16th century, at a critical moment in European and Croatian history, Croatia played an active role in the political landscape dominated by Spain. At that time, the military power of the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom was destroyed, along with the last resistance to Ottoman expansion, whose goal was to conquer Rome and reach the Rhine. Western countries forged extensive cooperation for defensive purposes, very similar to that which exists today. A strong defensive alliance was established among the Danubian countries under the aegis of the House of Austria and with the support of the Spanish Empire. In 1527, the Croatians elected Ferdinand I, brother of Charles V, "on whose empire the sun never set," as their king, thus becoming one of the first founders of the community that was aptly named "Little Europe." The Croats remained loyal to that community for four centuries, until the end of the First World War, when the "Balkanization" of the Danube basin took place, giving rise to the National Socialist adventure and later to Soviet domination.

Furthermore, there are other, more expressive and intimate relationships between Croatia and the Hispanic world. The Croats are genuinely a maritime people, having participated in naval battles against the Saracens as early as the Middle Ages; they also took part in the feat of the discovery of the New World and especially in its development. As early as the 16th century, we find groups of Croats on American soil, arriving not as conquerors but as settlers. As a country with a population exceeding seven million, Croatians have made a relatively significant contribution to the development of the Americas, totaling approximately two million immigrants. Several hundred thousand of these settled in South American republics, primarily as farmers and skilled sailors, who, among other things, founded the Argentine merchant fleet (the Mihanovic brothers). Due to their Western civilization and Catholic faith, Croatians integrate and assimilate easily with the populations of Latin America. Until recently, they constituted the main immigrant group to the territory of present-day Yugoslavia. Although they arrived with Austrian or Yugoslavian passports and their documents did not indicate Croatian nationality, they were nonetheless of Croatian descent. Regarding trade between Yugoslavia and the South American republics, Croatian products hold a leading position.

Following the end of World War II, a tragic mass migration from European countries, fallen under communist rule, took place. The wave of Croatian refugees was particularly high. Forced expatriation continues, though fraught with dangers. Croatians were among the first postwar refugees and endured extremely difficult times until the countries of the New World, in a magnanimous gesture, opened their doors to them, first and foremost Argentina, Venezuela, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Chile. These are thousands of refugees, seasoned fighters forged in the anti-communist struggle, who therefore appreciate the value of the institutions of the free world and their efforts toward progress, human dignity, and national rights.

Therefore, the editors and contributors of "Studia Croatica," whose first issue coincides with the Year of the Refugee and the sesquicentennial of the May Revolution in Argentina, embrace with equal love their old and new homeland and propose to inform and enlighten the Hispanic public with truthfulness and scientific rigor about the prevailing situation on the effervescent eastern border of our Western society, in that hot land where in 1914 in Sarajevo, capital of the Croatian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first shot of the First World War was fired by Serbian terrorists who attempted to assassinate the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and gave immediate cause to the fratricidal war (1914-18), which cannot yet be considered over until true peace reigns, when all peoples and all men have assured life in freedom, dignity, and justice.

 

CROATIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM

ANTUN MIHANOVIC (1796-1861)

 

Oh beautiful homeland of ours,

Heroic beloved land,

Sun of ancient glory,

 

May you be forever blessed!

 

We love you for your glories,

We love you, unique one,

 

Beloved for your plains

Beloved for your mountains.

 

Drava, Sava, Drina, flow,

Danube, do not lose your spirit,

 

Oh blue sea, tell the world,

 

That the Croatian loves his homeland,

 

While the sun shines upon its furrows,

 

And the wind stirs the oaks,

 

While the tombs guard its dead

 

While his heart beats!

 

 

ODE TO FREEDOM

IVAN GUNDULIC (1589 - 1638)

 

Beautiful, sweet, and beloved Freedom,

Gift of God, supreme good of life,

True cause of pure glory,

Only adornment of the flowery plain.

 

With lives, with gold, and with fine silver,

Your crystalline beauty cannot be repaid.

 

Translation: Vinko Nikolic


THE CROATIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM

VINKO NIKOLIC

 

To know a country, one must know its poets, and by analogy, to understand a people, one must know their national anthem, since it often summarizes their defining characteristics. Even if the author is known, each anthem becomes the spiritual heritage of the respective nation, the authentic expression of the popular soul. Peoples are synthesized in their anthems and perpetuated from generation to generation through this sacred song.

Therefore, the most genuine manifestation of the Croatian national identity is precisely its anthem, a faithful reflection of its past, its ideals and concerns, a compendium of its philosophy and ethics, its idiosyncrasies and civic religion, a mirror of its landscapes and an image of the Croatian people in both their human and divine nature.

From the Spanish version of the first and last stanzas of the Croatian national anthem—that is, the two stanzas sung on solemn occasions—one can appreciate the deep love Croatians have for their land of dazzling beauty, so rich in heroes and martyrs. The Croatian landscapes are a true hymn to majestic natural beauty. The poet evokes with intimate affection the blue waves of the Adriatic, the swift and refreshing rivers, the mountains and valleys, with their meadows and wheat fields.

The remaining stanzas describe in detail the Croatian land and its inhabitants, its natural beauty, and the various agricultural tasks. Songs, verses, and dances complete the idyll of rural life, while joyful melodies resonate through mountains and valleys. From this peaceful and bucolic symphony, a strident, heart-rending tone erupts: it is the cry and groan that comes from Bosnia, the martyred Croatian province, then subjected to the Ottomans, where brothers invoke death to free themselves from slavery. The poet, in response, raises a war cry, inviting the Croatian people to unfurl the banners of battle, take up arms, and liberate Bosnia, where the glory of victory or an honorable death awaits them.

Once this storm has passed, the darkness disappears, the anguish subsides, and the new dawn breaks, a joyful harbinger of the oppressor's defeat. Then, the poet addresses the Motherland, urging her not to weep, but to rejoice, for her sons have fallen like heroes, sacrificing their lives for freedom and national unification. As the final flourish of this majestic symphonic poem, the solemn oath of loyalty to the Motherland is raised. The poet calls upon the Croatian rivers and sea as witnesses, for they are eternal. Men and customs pass away, but natural phenomena endure by the will of the Creator to bear witness to the eternal love of the Croatians for their country, which they love and will continue to love until golden rays kiss its wheat fields, the wind stirs its oak groves, the dead rest in their graves, and heroic hearts beat. Love, sublime love, ready for the greatest sacrifices, even the supreme one, sets the tone of the Croatian national anthem.

The Croatian national anthem is a lasting testament to the ethical sense of the Croatian people. While celebrating the heroic deeds of their ancestors, it does not glorify their conquests, as they rarely fought beyond their borders when enlisted in the Austrian armies. Their armies, mobilized by the Croatian Diet and under the command of their Ban, did not wage wars of conquest; they defended only their homeland, the national community, and their cultural values.

The anthem's author, Antonio (Antun) Mihanovic (1796-1861), was born in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, where he completed his secondary and university studies. He served, among other positions, as Consul General of the Austrian Empire in Belgrade, Thessaloniki, Izmir, Constantinople, and Bucharest. At that time, Serbia was, in effect, a protectorate of Austria, so Serbian laws required the approval of the Austrian Consul. He was particularly interested in literary and linguistic topics and amassed a very important collection of valuable documents and manuscripts, later called the Collectio Mihanoviciana.

In 1843, he discovered the so-called Zoograph Gospel, written in Cyrillic script, on the holy mountain of Athos. In Italy, he found a handwritten copy of the epic poem Osman, by the illustrious Croatian poet Ivan Gundulic (1589-1638), who occupies the same place in Croatian literature as Cervantes does in Spanish literature. Mihanovic also published a pamphlet in Vienna in 1815 advocating for the introduction of the Croatian language into public life and the sciences, replacing Latin. His dissertation on the relationship between Sanskrit and the Slavic languages ​​is also well-known. Besides the anthem, first published under the title Croatian Homeland in 1835 in the newspaper Danica, published in Gaj, he composed a dozen poems of a love and reflective nature. Mihanovic wrote the text of what would later become the Croatian national anthem in Rijeka (Fiume), upon his return from the United States, having traveled through all of Croatia in a poetic flight. He died in Novi Dvori, near Zagreb.

Inspired by the lyrical beauty, the measured rhythm, and the ethical and patriotic content of this poetry, the young officer and musician Joseph (Josip) Runjanin (1821-1878) composed the music in 1846, based on a Croatian folk melody.

From that year onward, many choirs sang it at concerts and patriotic events, though it did not yet hold the status of a national anthem. From its first performance, the people felt it as an intrinsic expression of their soul and listened to it with open heads.

Meanwhile, experts were searching for a national anthem. On the occasion of the grand agricultural and forestry exhibition inaugurated in Zagreb, a vocal festival was organized on September 8, 1891, featuring 60 choirs. The repertoire included several songs, among them the "Croatian Anthem" by Badalic-Zajc, written and composed with the intention of becoming the national anthem, as its title indicated. The audience of nearly 6,000 people was not initially enthusiastic. However, when 700 singers performed Mihanovic-Runjanin's composition, the entire auditorium, electrified and filled with patriotic fervor, rose to their feet and spontaneously sang along. Thus it happened that the Croatian national anthem was not decreed or promulgated by the rulers, but chosen by the people, since the 6,000 listeners came from all the Croatian provinces and felt in this poem, simple yet solemn, the heartbeat of the national soul, the authentic poetic-musical expression of the Croatian land and people, so intimately united.

After undergoing various harmonizations, the arrangement of the anthem by the prominent contemporary composer Jakov Gotovac was established as definitive.

The poet Antun Mihanovic and the composer Josef Runjanin gave the Croatian people their anthem, this sacred song which, together with the tricolor flag and the checkered coat of arms, constitutes the national symbols that evoke in every Croatian the glorious past, the struggles for freedom, and the captivating landscapes of their homeland. For Croatians who, for various reasons, had to leave their native soil, their anthem, ever new, ever beautiful, reminds them of their beloved homeland. Wherever they may be, they sing their anthem like a fervent prayer for their unforgettable Croatia.

 

Buenos Aires


THE STEPINAC AFFAIR

ERNEST PEZET

 

It is a great honor for Studia Croatica to publish in its first issue the Spanish version of the insightful essay (whose original French title is: Stepinac-Tito, Contexts and Insights into the Affair) by the renowned politician and writer Ernest Pezet, until recently Vice-President of the French Senate. Ernest Pezet is the author of, among other works, valuable and distinguished pieces on political issues.

This text is somewhat abridged due to the limited space of our journal, while rigorously respecting the author's thoughts and conclusions, without removing or adding a single word to the transcribed paragraphs. The complete text in its original French was published in Paris in 1959 by Nouvelles Editions Latines.

In France, some sixty-five years ago, a scandal erupted like thunder: an officer was accused of treason. He was, however, innocent. Sacrificed to the spirit of the military caste and to the reason of state. That scandal has a name in history: the Dreyfus Affair. It was simply called the Affair.

For about fourteen years now, there has also been an Affair in Yugoslavia; its interest and scope transcend the country's borders: the Stepinac Affair. Both have this in common: at their core, a miscarriage of justice; not an involuntary error, but a deliberate, premeditated, organized one, for reasons of state.

 

GENESIS OF A FORBIDDEN BOOK

 

For eight years, from 1932 to 1940, I was the permanent rapporteur in Parliament on the problems of Central and Eastern Europe in the Foreign Affairs Committee; even before the war, I was vice-chairman of that Committee; I returned to that position in 1945, holding it until 1958.

I have published numerous studies on the problems of Central and Eastern Europe; in 1933, a work appeared that caused quite a stir. At that time, here as in Belgrade, Yugoslavia was in danger. I was the principal author of that work. As soon as it was published, it was banned in Yugoslavia by royal decree for... offending the truth. What it caused fear, alas, in its various passages, came to pass in Marseille a year later.

It is hardly possible to retract a single word of the judgment expressed in 1933. Despite the revolutionary change of regime, the situation has remained, fundamentally, the same. This assertion still needs to be justified. To that end, I ask for the reader's patience. For a precise understanding of what follows, I am obliged to take it back quite far in time.

 

HISTORICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXTS

 

At the end of the 6th century, Slavic tribes crossed the Danubian and Hungarian plains; some headed towards the eastern Italian-Austrian Alps, others towards an area between the Adriatic Sea, the Drava and Sava rivers, west of a rather small river, the Drina, which would separate the two peoples. The former were the Slovenes; the latter, the Croats.

Other Slavic tribes settled in the mountainous part of the Balkans, between the Tisa River in the north and the border of Greece in the south: these were the Serbs.

The Slovenes and Croats, west of the Drina, came under Roman and Catholic influence; the Serbs, to the east, fell under Byzantine and Orthodox influence. From both a religious and cultural standpoint, by consequence, the former were to be dependent on Rome; the latter, on Constantinople.

According to the official 1952 census, Yugoslavia had 16,990,000 inhabitants, distributed among Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. (These are the federal republics of present-day Yugoslavia.) I should add here two regions dependent on Serbia: Vojvodina, north of Belgrade, where many Hungarians still reside, and Kosovo to the south, where numerous Albanians reside. Only Serbs live in Serbia, and they are dispersed across several regions. They make up 14% of the population in Croatia, 44% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 50% in Vojvodina (along with 25% Hungarians), and 23% in Kosovo (compared to 65% Albanians).

But there are even more diasporas in Yugoslavia: Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina represent 24% of the population; Muslims, without declared nationality but pro-Croat and always considered as such, reach a proportion of 30%. In total, in this republic: 44% Serbs and 54% Croats.

I extracted these figures from the almost official Documentation Française, issue of December 17, 1958: one could not find more reliable figures reproduced with greater accuracy by a quality publication.

If we total the various Yugoslav populations, we obtain the following figures:

16,990,000 inhabitants, of whom 6,984,000 are Serbs, compared to 6,700,000 Croats, Catholics, and pro-Croatian Muslims, and 1,900,000 Slovenes. I am not giving figures for Hungarians, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, or even Turks; note, moreover, the presence of 72,000 Italians on the Adriatic coast.

Here is the complex Yugoslav demography, and suddenly the complexity of the Yugoslav problem emerges.

But religious problems peculiarly exacerbate this complexity. Here, again, it is essential to resort to the figures. This time I can cite only the official censuses of 1921 and 1931, and the situation, in that respect, appears almost unchanged; let's admit that there isn't a maximum variation of 1 or 2% on either side; that doesn't change the overall picture at all:

 

Orthodox, 42%; Catholic, 38%; Muslim, 11%; various (Protestants, etc.), 9%.

 

So, from a racial, cultural, spiritual, and national point of view, there is no natural unity from the Alps to the Balkans, from Bacha to Istria.

I have clearly stated "from a national point of view": indeed, the State should not be confused with the Nation here. Even we in France do not conceive of this distinction. For a long time in our country, State and Nation have been confused, while in most Central and Eastern European countries, formed by disparate and differentiated elements, what is not understood is the close French symbiosis of State and Nation.

No natural unity. A mosaic, geographically established from West to East, from West to East (both terms must be taken in their intrinsic sense), with all its psychological, customary, and political consequences. The breaking point is the Drina River. That is Yugoslavia.

Between the two world wars, French opinion—not the only one—that of the street, the press, and parliament, ignored—some pretended to ignore—this complexity and its demands. It was only known—or people wanted to know—that Yugoslavia had Belgrade as its capital, the capital of Serbia, the heroic Serbia of 1914, on whose territory the first major enemy assault was launched; The sacrificed and venerated Serbia, whose glorious leader remained by his soldiers' side to continue fighting; the Serbia, finally, that we in France always hasten to honor and love. By extension, Yugoslavia was naively imagined as a natural expansion of Serbia, through a kind of annexation, after the conquest of the provinces seized from defeated Austria-Hungary.

But a greater Serbia was not a true Yugoslavia. Is it even known today how many inhabitants Serbia would have had solely within its former territorial borders? Here they are: if it were merely the most numerous Yugoslav nation, within a true federation, discounting the population of Vojvodina and Kosovo, autonomous regions, traditional Serbia would number only 4,461,000 inhabitants out of a total Yugoslav population of 16,990,000.

 

THE DEVIATION AND ALTERATION OF A GREAT IDEA AND THE CONSEQUENCES

 

There is a strange and almost universally ignored paradox: there was little or nothing "Serbian" in the concept and morphology of Yugoslavia. The origin of the word, like that of the thing itself, was essentially "Croatian" and somewhat "Slovenian."

Thus, the true initiators of Yugoslavism—that is, of Yugoslav unity, of the South Slavs in the 19th century, then during the war of 1914–1918, and finally during the peace negotiations—were the Slovenes and, above all, the Catholic Croats, with their Latin spirit and Western culture. Ultimately, they were victims of the falsification and misuse of the Yugoslav idea.

From 1958 onward, this deviation, this alteration of the Yugoslav idea, became obvious. I judged them thus:

"Little by little, the Yugoslav idea gave way to nothing but a Serbian conception that would provoke perpetual unrest in the new state. In 1919, Catholics had enthusiastically acclaimed the union of all South Slavs; in 1919, they were condemned to unification by force; Yugoslavia was nothing more than a deceptive name intended to disguise, in the eyes of foreigners, an imperialist and domineering pan-Serbia, to the greater detriment of the national ideal, the patriotic ideal, unity, and the true strength of the state."

Tragic disappointment and unjust misfortune. But it wasn't only the Croats and Slovenes who suffered the consequences: King Alexander in 1984, and the Serbian state and dynasty in 1941, were also victims.

At this point in the exposition, it is appropriate to establish the cause-and-effect and effect-and-cause relationships. New, the concatenation of events and their consequences. Nineteen years of Servism, from 1920 to 1939, engendered a virulent anti-Croatian sentiment and anti-Catholicism (I use the word without fear; Cardinal Stepinac himself will soon justify it).

The ruin of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes followed—1941, already dislocated even before its defeat; then came German and Italian domination; at that moment, anti-Croatian sentiment gave rise to the anti-Servian and anti-Orthodox reaction of Ante Pavelić and his Croatian state, so-called independent, whose errors and even crimes committed for reasons of state were attributed to Cardinal Stepinac, who was completely uninvolved in all of it.

Do you find the truth and severity of my judgment strange? Perhaps. However, I stand by them. I must, therefore, justify them.

 

TRUTH AND TRUTHS - OFFICIAL DATA

 

Dominant Serbianism, anti-Croatian sentiment between the two world wars; French public opinion was completely unaware of this reality. And how much astonishment my book provoked at the time, and how much scandal in certain circles, in Belgrade and even in Paris! My revenge—a sad revenge—is that, afterwards, the Marseille tragedy was soon considered an act of courage in the service of truth.

The truth? It will be revealed through simple official Serbian statistics from 1932. Despite the near-equal demographics between Serbs on one side, Croats and Slovenes on the other, here are the astonishing inequalities:

Military Academy Cadets: 1,300 Serbs, or 85%; 140 Croats; 50 Slovenes. Court officials: 30 Serbs out of 31, 94%

Decorations Chancellery: 9 Serbs out of 9, 100%

Office of the President of the Council officials: 13 out of 13

Ministry of the Interior: 113 out of 127

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 180 out of 218

Ministry of Public Instruction: 150 out of 156

Ministry of Justice: 116 out of 137

Generals: 115 out of 116

 

In summary: in all these administrative departments, between 80% and 95% to 99% are Serbs. This reflects Serbian dominance and anti-Croatian sentiment within the administration.

The statistics on religious matters continue (and don't forget the percentages: 38% Catholic and 42% Orthodox):

Budget for religious services in 1920: for Orthodox worship, 17 million dinars, 73%; for Catholic worship, 6 million dinars, 27%.

 

Bishops' stipends: Orthodox: 40,000 dinars; Catholic: 15,000 to 20,000 dinars.

 

Protestant parish in Belgrade: 900 parishioners, 116,000 dinars; Catholic parish in Belgrade: 10,000 parishioners (ten times more): 66,000 dinars, almost half less.

Obstacles to education: these multiplied; Catholic teachers were systematically assigned to Orthodox regions and vice versa. The obligation to provide free education was going to be imposed on Catholic schools: this would have meant their closure; King Alexander finally understood the complaints of the Croatian bishops; the obligation was dropped.

Catholic school textbooks were subjected to severe censorship, and official textbooks were imposed; however, one of these textbooks denied the divinity of Christ and denounced Catholicism as an obstacle to national unity. On my first stay in Slovenia, I was surprised to discover an Orthodox cathedral in Ljubljana. Our consul was with me; I asked him: "How many Orthodox parishioners are there in Ljubljana that such a cathedral had to be built for them?" "There aren't any, properly speaking," he replied. "To tell the truth, there are only Serbian Orthodox officials, all imported into Slovenia."

But the Orthodox Church refused, on principle and tradition, to truly become "Yugoslav." It remained purely Serbian in name and spirit. Having greatly contributed to shaping Serbian national consciousness, it became and remained, even for agnostics without religious faith, the Church of the Serbian State. This explains why, under Alexander, a true Byzantine clericalism prevailed, a virulent, deliberately provocative proselytism: provocation was the construction of Orthodox churches in predominantly Catholic, or nearly so, cities; provocation was those forced conversions to the Orthodox religion—an irony of circumstances: among the false accusations leveled against Cardinal Stepinac was that of forced conversions to Catholicism during Pavelić's reign.

The courageous bishop, however, had nothing to do with it; he condemned them even expressly and publicly: they were the work either of priests acting on their own initiative, as passionate supporters, or of civilians driven by political motives, most often by the inspiration of party leaders. This violent anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox backlash was absolutely condemnable in principle and highly immoral; however, in reality, it was foreseeable and almost inevitable in Croatia, driven by the recent, ever-present memories of the Serbian regime's atrocities, especially under the dictatorship of the sinister sovereign. Such were the deadly, poisoned fruits of Serbian and Orthodox chauvinism, the domineering spirit, and violence in the last quarter of a century.

 

MONSIGNOR STEPINAC HAS THE FLOOR

 

At this point in my presentation, as I have indicated, I will give the floor to Monsignor Stepinac himself. He is the one who will describe the strange manifestations of Pan-Servism and anti-Croatian sentiment between the two world wars; these same manifestations, as a counter-coup, were bound to provoke, after the fall of the monarchy and the state, this sort of Pan-Croatian, anti-Servian, and anti-Orthodox madness of the Ustaše.

In October 1935, he granted me a lengthy audience, then invited me to lunch with him privately. He shared some unsettling confidences and revelations with me. Returning late to my hotel, I feverishly jotted down, in telegraphic style, the essential points of our passionate and alarming interview.

I searched for these notes, written haphazardly, at the whim of memory, barely three-quarters of an hour after the conversation, and found them in my files. I will quote them verbatim, in no particular order, if I dare to express myself thus, and without comment.

"The Monsignor shows me a whip in his office, which he calls his 'Museum of Horrors'; this whip is made of braided iron wires and a bolt..."

"Less blood was shed, he tells me, in one hundred years of Austro-Hungarian rule than in five years of purported Yugoslavism by the Serbian gendarmes..."

"...The slightest pretext is plausible for unleashing fury; during one of my last pastoral visits, two people died in a brawl provoked by the gendarmerie..."

"...After Monsignor Bauer's memorandum to the Prince Regent, numerous threats were directed at both me and the Catholic priests. There were four deaths in Taborsko; the violence and acts of oppression are countless..."

"No priest feels safe in his life; not a day goes by without one of them coming to seek refuge." "My protection..."

"The Croatian flag—do they reproach us for it? But neither the bishops nor the priests demand it: it is the Croatian people who want it. In it, they see the symbol of their oppressed freedoms. Yet Austria-Hungary tolerated it..."

"Under Austria-Hungary, 700 gendarmes were enough to maintain order in Croatia; now there are 6,000 to 7,000! They argue about the influence and actions of communism: this is 'impossible in Croatia today...'"

"...My pastoral visits are considered political agitation. But what can I do? The Diocese of Zagreb is immense; it has 1,700,000 inhabitants. If the governor pretends to see political action there, then again: what can I do?"

" "We live in a regime of suspicion. Denunciation lurks everywhere. It's a Turkish system perpetuated through the Serbian regime. The police, the gendarmerie: a state within a state..."

"A sergeant tried to bribe a woman to deliver a package. What package? A bomb. And where to take it? To the bishop's palace. 'You'll be rich,' the sergeant said, 'if you carry it.' The official record of this matter was incorporated after the statements and confrontation of the actors in this drama, which fortunately failed..."

"Monsignor Stepinac gave me a moving photograph. I resisted believing in the authenticity of the photographed document. Then he placed the original in my hands: a receipt issued by a Serbian tax agent on duty in a border town; a receipt in good and proper form, with the required signature and seal, for a sum paid by a family for five bullets for the execution of the father."

" His crime? He had violated the regulations concerning the toll imposed on peasants whose lands bordered the frontier. The man was on bad paper and considered a dangerous Croatian militant; he was arrested, convicted, and shot. The cost to the family: thirteen dinars, fifteen cents...

I interrupt my quotations here.

 

STEPINAC, FACING TYRANNY, SUPPORTER OF PRINCIPLES, DEFENDER OF THE SERBS, ORTHODOX, AND JEWS

 

Now we must speak of Monsignor Stepinac himself. First, the conditions of his defense. The Monsignor has refused to defend himself and has not chosen his lawyers.

Who appointed them, then? The Supreme People's Court of the State; it had initially rejected the lawyers who had spontaneously offered to defend the Cardinal. The prosecution, therefore, chose the defenders, since it was the Supreme People's Court that appointed them. And which defenders?

First, Dr. Politeo: defense attorney for Tito under the king's dictatorship; then, Dr. Katicic; in his defense speech, he did not hesitate to state that he was speaking as the official lawyer.

Now, both men, in that communist regime called federal and national, but in fact and necessarily almost dictatorial (like all communist regimes, both Moscow's and those of the people's democracies), irrefutably and, moreover, unchallengedly demonstrated the innocence of the accused. Moreover, both, and especially Politeo, in turn made accusations. It took courage.

Whom did they accuse? The Court itself for refusing to admit the evidence. On the bench, Politeo declared:

"I submitted a significant amount of documentation and indicated impartial witnesses. They were rejected. They are making Monsignor Stepinac a scapegoat for all the crimes committed, not only by members of the clergy or by Catholics, but even for all the crimes committed by the Independent State of Croatia." This is expressly point number 1 of the indictment.

The truth, then, is quite the opposite. The Cardinal's writings reveal genuine challenges hurled at the victorious fascism and Nazism. And in what terms! Let's see:

"Even if they have all the weapons at their disposal ('they' refers to the Nazis and fascists entrenched in Zagreb near the Curia), even if they possess all the material means, even if they control the press, radio, and cinema of the entire world, they will perish."

The Archbishop thus publicly condemns them; He issued this further challenge to the fascist and Nazi authorities:

"Since this is foreign interference in the affairs of our country, I have no fear, even if this protest of mine falls into the hands of this foreign power: the Catholic Church, which I represent, fears no earthly power, as long as it is a matter of defending the fundamental rights of man."

The Archbishop was a constant, courageous, even audacious defender and protector of the Jews. This earned him, consequently, the homage of the president of the Jewish community of Zagreb and numerous foreign Jewish figures, especially from America. To the Minister of the Interior, Artukovic, he wrote on May 23, 1941:

"Even prostitutes and their accomplices are not branded with the yellow star, affixed to their bodies. This is done to avoid provoking public contempt for those who deserve it, but dishonors those whose only fault is belonging to another race."

Such courage can be measured by comparing it to the deliberate, obstinate silence of the hierarchy at the same time, in other places.

One month after the advent of the Croatian State (May 14, 1941), Pavelić ordered the execution of a group of Serbian rebels. Stepinac immediately protested and wrote to Pavelic:

"In my capacity as Archbishop, I protest against this violence: Catholic morality does not permit such acts. I beg you to take all necessary measures immediately to ensure that not one more Serb is killed unless they have committed a proven act deserving of the death penalty..."

Shortly afterward, upon learning that the Serbian hostages were in danger of being shot, he telephoned Pavelic:

"Do not do that. Catholic morality forbids killing hostages for the sins of others. It is pagan behavior that incurs the wrath of God."

On June 29, 1942, from the pulpit of the cathedral, he declared:

"If we have not managed to save them (the Serbian hostages), it is not the fault of the Church; it is the fault of those who violated divine and human laws to unleash their vengeance upon the innocent."

But then we ask ourselves, why, if all of this is true; if it is known, proven, and undeniable, how is it? Why the arrest, the trial, the imprisonment, the confinement of Archbishop Stepinac? They should have honored him; yet, they condemn him.

However—a fact that must be emphasized—not immediately: sixteen months will pass after the "liberation" of the country before they bother him. They prefer to take advantage of the time, perhaps to use the influence of their future victim over the Croatian people, in the belief that it will facilitate the installation of the system and its men.

The day arrives when the trial must be attempted. Tito then offers to facilitate his departure from Croatia by plane. If the Archbishop, this political criminal, accepts this pardon, by fleeing, facilitated by his accuser, he would appear to confess his guilt: then the trial is no longer necessary; the objection of civil justice will be avoided. Moreover, the accuser will be praised for his magnanimity!

The Archbishop does not fall into the trap: he is innocent of all charges. "Let them condemn him!" But he is an innocent man who will be condemned. The world will eventually know. True justice will one day vindicate the truth. Whatever happens, he will not flee, he will not abandon his flock or his office. From that moment, the die is cast. The trial takes place. The Archbishop is condemned.

At that time, Tito granted an interview to the correspondent of the "New York Times," Mr. Sulzberger, which surprised everyone and caused quite a stir. Tito felt compelled to comment on it!

"Because of this interview," Tito explained, "and the interpretation given to it—that Stepinac would be released if he went abroad—the Orthodox population has expressed its discontent."

Note carefully that he doesn't simply say "the population," meaning the entire nation. No; he says "the Orthodox population."

And Tito continued: "They—the Orthodox population—consider him a war criminal: and there's no room for change. We must take into account the feelings of the Orthodox population."

 

REASON OF STATE

 

This time, the true word has been spoken. The "why" of the Archbishop's persecution is not the proven crimes. No. These are accusations considered true by the Orthodox population: the will of that segment of the population takes precedence over Truth and Justice.

Tito already hints at this. But he will do so more explicitly: it is for reasons of confessional state that the atheist leader of an agnostic and even irreligious regime is harassing Bishop Stepinac, head of the Catholics in Croatia.

To tell the truth, the two reasons—reason of state and confessional reason—are indistinguishable: the only traditionally national Church, even for the new communist Yugoslavia, is the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Catholic Church, also traditionally national, is nothing but a foreign body.

As early as 1930, a prominent, almost official, figure, the president of the Masonic Lodge of Belgrade, thought and spoke in the same way: The religious organization is nothing more than an instrument of the State; the government should therefore not leave that instrument in the hands of a foreigner. Which foreigner? The Pope.

How can we not compare this statement with the words Tito addressed in December 1949 to the organization of the People's Priests of Slovene Cyril and Methodius, urging them to join the path of dissent from Rome, when he told them: "We Yugoslavs have separated from Moscow. Why don't you separate from Rome?"

Thus, the "Orthodox population" rises up against the Croatian Catholic Archbishop, accusing him of war crimes. The truth is, they have a problem with Rome, just as Tito did, since Rome represents supranational Catholicism, and therefore cosmopolitanism: in conflict with the national Orthodox Church, it represents the foreign world.

Pan-Serbian patriotism demands that it be denounced and combated in the person of its leader himself. The von Rom, as Bismarck said. "There have been cases in the world where, in the interest of the State, the innocent remained in prison and were even executed." But who expresses himself in this way? Tito himself, in an interview with the New York Times. In other words: "Why be surprised that I imprison the innocent Stepinac?" Even so, distanced from Moscow, and even at great discord with the Kremlin at the time, Tito continued to embrace the Constantinian-Latin disputes—in other words, the ecclesiastical disputes of Moscow—which explain and perpetuate the Serbian-Croatian antagonism.

It follows, then, that the Stepinac Affair is not a purely personal matter; it is symbolic; it is evidence of a fundamental malaise in Tito's Yugoslavia, as in Alexander's.

We have another involuntary, and how important, acknowledgment from Stepinac's persecutor: we find it in his interview with US Senator Boli-Moody, on August 16, 1950:

"Yes," he said, "yes, Stepinac is firmly supported by Yugoslav Catholics: but he is also strongly criticized by Serbian Orthodox Christians, who are in the majority."

Thus, from the very admission of the communist successor of the monarchs and Serbs, it is clear that the Yugoslav country, today as yesterday, is divided against itself, from both a religious and even a national perspective. The national church, even for the leaders of Yugoslav communism, is the Serbian Orthodox Church, national and statist. Consequently, Tito, an atheist, must nevertheless loyally carry out its will; he has to serve the aims and interests of a religious majority faction, with 42%, against a strongly minority faction, with 38%.

Thus, in a multinational and multiconfessional country, whose unity can only be achieved on a federal level—but in a truly federalist spirit and through genuinely federalist structures—only one "nation" counts, just as only one religion counts: Orthodoxy, whose primacy is maintained by a secular, atheist, and communist state, which should be secular and neutral, through an act of pure clericalism. Frankly, the paradox is rather stark! In a certain respect, however, it is understandable: this primacy of one confession helps to ensure the supremacy of one of the Yugoslav nations over the others.

The essential problem of relations between Serbs and Croats is therefore not resolved. Nor was it resolved by the new state, federated more in theory than in spirit and reality: it failed to do so; just as the Serbian monarch Karageorgevic, founder of the centralist Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, also failed to do so.

It has been said and written, without any denial, that exiled monarchists and Serbian communists have shared the same assessment of the Stepinac case. This fact is not so surprising: for the Grand Servism of both sides, there is no conceivable national equality between the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The religious struggle in that country constitutes another aspect of the national struggle; the latter even derives its premises and its true cause from religious contrasts.

Serbs and Croats, two different and, until now, antagonistic religious communities: the Orthodox and the Catholic.

Here is a painful story: we recount it reluctantly; but it is too illuminating and explanatory to pass over in silence in this writing, which seeks to shed light on the painful Tito-Stepinac conflict. The year is 1945-46. The Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Archbishop Gavrilo, is living in exile in London. He had followed the young King Peter there. Very zealous in the defense of old Serbia and his dynasty, he missed no opportunity to hurl condemnations and anathemas against those "bandits"—he used that term—who had usurped power in Belgrade and installed communism.

Does Tito react? Yes. But not to return blow for blow. Yes. But not to return blow for blow. He wants to be the successor of the Karageorgevic dynasty: at least for a time, and despite his militant atheism, he must rely on the Serbian national Church.

Knowing this, he will try to lure Monsignor Gavrilo, head of the Orthodox faithful, to Belgrade. What a success his return would be! He sends his emissaries; they negotiate with those of the Patriarch. The negotiation ended according to Tito's aims and desires! The Patriarch abandons the exiled King and returns to Belgrade.

He immediately plays the role Tito expects of him. He publicly censures the already imprisoned Catholic Archbishop and publicly praises Tito, whom he himself had previously called a bandit.

National cause for Monsignor Gavrilo, his Church being national and statist; The confessional reason of state for Tito was so imperative that even the fundamental principle of true Yugoslav unity could not prevail!

Despite the proclamations, despite an organization that was formally, but not truly, federal in spirit and structure, the problem of state unity remains unresolved in communist Yugoslavia, just as it was not under the monarchy before and the king's dictatorship after 1929.

The Serbian-Croatian conflict persists: it is psychological, historical, sociological, and spiritual in nature. Perhaps it also has an "organic" explanation in the Eastern and Balkan type of governmental practices of its monarchs, which are at the origin of its formation up to the modern state.

And so, with regard to this conflict, the Yugoslav communist regime follows the tradition of the Serbian monarchy.

Monsignor Stepinac should have been honored as a spiritual "resistance fighter"—but we see him imprisoned for crimes of collaboration, for war crimes!

For this very reason, we see that it became the highest illustration—not the only one, it's true—of the internal torment of Yugoslavia. Not the only one, nor the first: how many exiled victims of the Serbian dictatorship I knew, welcomed, and assisted between 1929 and 1940... Some were even very close to Tito and still are.

The Stepinac conflict reveals that a Great Servism survives within the communist regime, the one that established theoretically egalitarian states. The Cardinal is certainly more the sacrifice of raison d'état than the victim of a judicial error committed during the investigation and the course of the trial. Listen to him:

"The Prime Minister, Bakaric, has declared that there is no proof that I worked against the regime... I see that there is no difference between you and the Gestapo; but I do not ask for clemency; my conscience is clear and untarnished: I am condemned despite being innocent; the future will judge."

Thus spoke Archbishop Stepinac before the Supreme People's Court. Thus spoke the Apostles before their judges.

Yes, indeed, he is a victim of raison d'état, even more so than of a deliberate judicial error: this error has been committed for confessional reasons of state.

 

ELOQUENCE AND THE SENSE OF SILENCE...

 

To attest to his high esteem for Catholic Croatia, Pope Leo X conferred upon him this honorary title: Christianitatis antemurale, Bulwark of Christendom.

Upon the wall, no "soldier-bishop" stands, as in times past, armor upon his body and sword in his hand. But there is always a spiritual leader: Cardinal Stepinac. Imprisoned, confined, silent, he always stands firm in spirit; the eyes of the faithful turn toward him. Apparently defeated, he is, for that very reason, spiritually invincible. Persecution has matured him in an eloquent silence; it has not broken him.

Stronger than persecution is his upright conscience. Stronger still is his religious faith, the support it contains and the protest it embodies.

He meditates on the motto of his Croatian ancestors; rather, he lives it. Here it is: For the glory of the Cross and for the love of freedom.

 

Paris.


THE TRIAL OF CARDINAL STEPINAC

MARTIN ABERG COBO

 

I wish to add my voice to those raised in homage to the martyr of Faith and Liberty, victim of detestable political-religious persecution, Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, that prince with whom the Church is honored, embodiment of the indomitable spirit of a people and an example of dignity and fortitude, to whom, in addition to God, justice will one day be done by men themselves, and who is already a source of noble inspiration for those who know, in one way or another, his virtues and impeccable conduct.

A persecution had been unleashed against this virtuous prelate that, even considering the malice of communism, cannot be fully understood without some historical context.

From the end of the 7th century, the Slovenes and Croats, two peoples belonging to the South Slavic group, fell under Roman and Catholic religious and cultural influence, while their eastern neighbors, the Serbs, remained within the Byzantine and Orthodox sphere. Hence their separation and the profound error in the union process established at Versailles, when the allied statesmen created, despite concessions of mere terminology, a veritable Greater Serbia to which they subordinated the Croats and Slovenes, with the inevitable subjection of the Western Roman spirit and the Catholic religion to the Byzantine mentality and, ultimately, to the Eastern Balkan Orthodox religion.

Heroic Croatia, the true vanguard of Catholicism in the Balkan Peninsula, which Pope Leo X thus dubbed Christianitatis scudum (shield of Christendom), saw its purely political dependence, as it had been under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, transformed into a spiritual despotism, the remote origin of the trial of Cardinal Stepinac.

Indeed, the Orthodox Christians of the monarchical era in Yugoslavia identified the Vatican with Italy, which they did not perceive as friendly to the Slavs. For this reason, they considered Catholicism a stateless, if not anti-national, element, and resolved to achieve, by all means at their disposal, the separation of the Catholics from the authority of Rome.

This gave rise to all kinds of passions, both military and bureaucratic, educational and economic; Even ordinary life became difficult for Catholics, and provocations and attacks of all kinds by Serbs and officials of that ethnicity were frequent. In 1928, Croatian deputies were assassinated in Parliament by the extremist Serbian deputy Racic, under the pretext of avenging an insult uttered by another minority legislator.

King Alexander I assumed dictatorial power shortly thereafter. So-called religious conversations and terrible episodes of abuse of power continued, such as the incident recounted by the Frenchman Pezet, in which a tax agent collected payment and issued an official stamped receipt to a family for the cost of the bullets used to execute the father, a humble peasant accused of violating regulations applicable to those whose land extended beyond the borders.

The monarch was assassinated in the French city of Marseille (1934). Peter II assumed the throne, under the regency of Prince Paul, but the moderating efforts of the high authorities were undermined by the predominantly Serbian army and police, whose commands were largely composed of Serbs, and whose numbers were ten times greater than their Austro-Hungarian predecessors.

Following the Munich Agreement, Prince Paul, eager to preserve internal peace at all costs in the face of the threat of war, actively participated in an agreement that created an autonomous Croatian state, called Banovina Hrvatska (Banate of Croatia), which would have comprised the historical provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This agreement was not well received by the Serbs.

However, the global conflict prevented the realization of what might have saved Yugoslavia from war.

The government of Cvetkovic, neutralist in nature but gradually yielding to Axis pressure due to his country's complete isolation, was overthrown on March 27, 1941, by a decidedly pro-Serbian military coup, despite its attempts to reassure the Croatians. The new authorities were considered anti-German in Berlin, and therefore, barely ten days after their installation, Stuka dive bombers arrived. Palm Sunday witnessed the invasion of several borders and the beginning of the capitulation and occupation.

The victors proceeded to divide Yugoslavia into eight sectors. On April 10, Croatian nationalists proclaimed the so-called Independent State of Croatia, entrusting its government to Dr. Ante Pavelić, in his capacity as organizer of the Ustaše, that is, Croatian shock troops against the former Serbian domination.

Both Archbishop Stepinac and the other ecclesiastical authorities of Croatia logically recognized the new de facto civil authorities of their homeland, but this does not mean that they ever identified with them. The Archbishop vehemently repudiated all the abuses, defying the Axis armies by refusing to annul mixed Christian-Jewish marriages and assuming the role of protector of Jews and Serbs through direct protests and public condemnations from the pulpit of his cathedral church.

The struggles between Croatian and Serbian nationalists, the influence of the victorious USSR, and the shortsightedness of Anglo-American statesmen were the causes of the establishment of the new Yugoslavia, this time communist.

II

The situation of Catholics under the new regime became even more distressing than before for the simple reason that the religious struggle was no longer to be waged against an adversary who, although employing ignoble weapons, was at least Christian, but against a secular, atheist, and communist state nonetheless dedicated to carrying out a kind of pro-orthodox clerical policy, designed to flatter the passions of some of its subjects at the expense of others it considered less pliable.

That is why Pezet could say that the Stepinac affair is not a purely personal matter; it is a symbol; it is the result of a fundamental malaise in Tito's Yugoslavia, just as it was in Alexander's Yugoslavia.

And proof of this lies in the dictator's own confession during a conference with a US senator: Stepinac is strongly supported by Yugoslav Catholics, but is criticized with equal force by Serbian Orthodox Christians, who are the majority. However, even from a purely numerical standpoint, the dictator refrains from revealing the proportion, which is no more than 42% to 38%.

Nevertheless, the tyrant did not dare to act immediately; he waited sixteen months after the so-called liberation, and only after his victim heroically rejected an offer of exile did he unleash the iniquitous trial, which, more than targeting the Archbishop, is actually targeting the persecutor himself.

History has often been ashamed of the way humanity has judged its fellow human beings, if not its own God, but rarely with more justification than in this instance.

Monsignor Stepinac refused to defend himself and did not appoint lawyers, who were instead designated by the State Court after the lawyers who spontaneously offered to represent the Cardinal declined.

The principal jurist who earned this distinguished honor was Dr. Ivo Politeo, former defender of Marshal Tito himself during the dictatorship, who was later joined by Dr. Natko Katicic, although other professionals also collaborated to a lesser extent.

These defenders were immediately confronted with the following situation, the gravity of which will not escape even the most forewarned: the Archbishop had been arrested in the early morning of September 18, 1946. The indictment, dated the 23rd, reached them on the 24th, and the trial was held on the 30th of the same month and year. In other words, the defense had exactly six days to learn about the accusation, prepare the rebuttal, and examine the evidence offered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, who, on the other hand, enjoyed more than a year to prepare such pieces, as evidenced by the prolonged journalistic campaign carried out in advance against the Archbishop and the aggressions and tumults to which he was subjected in some of his public appearances.

But there is more. From the moment of his arrest until his conviction on October 11, the defendant was allowed only one meeting with his legal counsel, and for just one hour. Every possible obstacle was placed in the way of his lawyers. The Archbishop was denied the opportunity to consult with others, offer witnesses, and generally prepare his side of the case. Many of his associates were subjected to restrictions and harassment that made it impossible for them to contribute to the prelate's defense. Laws concerning crimes against the People and the State, passed in August 1945 and amended in July 1946, were invoked against him—that is, long after the accused had allegedly committed the crimes, which, even if they had occurred, were not yet criminalized at the time they were supposedly committed. The defendant was repeatedly and persistently questioned by all members of the Court that he sometimes did not have enough time to answer the questions. The audience was nothing more than a crowd organized and orchestrated by the secret police, mirroring the violent language used by the Public Prosecutor's Office.

The court sessions lasted twelve hours a day, with only a short break, leaving the defense no time to examine its position or properly analyze the opposing testimony. There are very serious discrepancies between the original statements and their subsequent publication, to the point that there is no doubt the original versions were carefully reviewed and corrected, as happened, for example, with the removal of a prosecution witness's statement that Stepinac was not a persona grata of the regime in power during the war.

The Public Prosecutor's Office was allowed to call an unlimited number of witnesses, while the defense was only permitted twenty, fourteen of whom were disqualified by the court, while the opposing witnesses were accepted without any restrictions and could not be cross-examined.

Most of the written evidence offered by Dr. Politeo was rejected, and only a small portion was allowed in the hearing or in the official records. The time limits granted to the parties varied according to this evident bias, to the point that on one occasion Dr. Politeo was accused of delaying the trial, to which he replied that up to that point, while the prosecution had spoken for a total of 48 hours, the defense had only had twenty minutes.

Furthermore, the Archbishop was tried along with several other defendants, accused of open participation in acts of terrorism, with which he was thus tacitly linked, even though he was completely uninvolved. This meant that, in a way, the Cardinal was grafted onto a process already underway without his participation, further complicating, if possible, the task of his defense.

The Archbishop was not allowed to be interviewed by His Excellency, the Most Reverend José Hurley, representative of the Holy See, who attended the trial and, upon entering and leaving the courtroom daily, genuflected before the accused as the supreme homage to the persecuted virtue.

On October 3, the accused was allowed to speak before the Tribunal, which he did for half an hour, being constrained to adhere strictly to the specific aspects of the accusation.

On the 7th of the same month, the few defense witnesses were authorized, while the others were dismissed as clearly biased.

And so we arrive at the condemnation of the 11th, which provoked outrage throughout the civilized world and the collective excommunication of those involved in the outrage, made public three days later.

Monsignor Stepinac was sentenced to sixteen years of hard labor, with the corresponding loss of his civil rights and confiscation of his property. His defenders were later harassed and even arrested for the "crime" of having fulfilled a sacred professional duty, repeating the scandal that had occurred with the lawyers of Louis XVI, as if the hatred that inspires sectarians could not bear the memory of the eloquence of a defender, who seemed to embody the reproach of his own conscience.

The illustrious condemned man had to endure long years in prison, and although his fate was somewhat alleviated by his confinement in his hometown of Krasic, it cannot be denied that he was deprived of his liberty and of the most essential care for his delicate state of health.

It is unnecessary to address each of the accusation's fabrications, which do not withstand even a cursory analysis. But at the risk of being tedious, I have deemed it appropriate to point out the manner in which the Cardinal was tried, in open contradiction with the supposed judicial and procedural guarantees established by Articles 116 and 118 of the Constitution of Yugoslavia, because evidently no one could give any credence to a conclusion derived from such premises.

Monsignor Stepinac was yet another victim of the passions unleashed by war and of the intrinsic evil of communism and everything associated with it.

He was not, however, tried only as a man, but primarily as a symbol.

It was the Catholic Church and its beloved daughter, Christian Croatia, that they sought to bring before the Tribunal in the person of the Metropolitan Archbishop of Croatia. Added to this was the hatred professed by atheistic materialism for everything beyond the hereafter, the age-old hostility of the Orthodox and Eastern Christians toward the Catholic and Western Christians; Tito, a contemporary communist, was seen as a continuation of outdated monarchical oppressions.

Monsignor Stepinac has thus been condemned for reasons of state, Machiavelli's sinister creation and the basis of totalitarian political philosophy. But though seemingly defeated, imprisoned, and silently confined, he has not been vanquished; rather, he has triumphed.

Above the injustices and persecutions stand the dignity of his conduct, the steadfastness of his faith, and the tranquility of his conscience.

Standing between his executioners, he is a symbol of an indomitable Croatia, an honor for the Sacred College, a true successor of the Apostles, a legitimate recipient of evangelical blessedness for those who hunger and thirst for justice.

 

Buenos Aires

 


PASTOR, HERO, AND MARTYR

CARDINAL ALOYSIUS STEPINAC, METROPOLITAN ARCHBISHOP OF CROATIA

Ivo Bogdan

 

The extraordinary interest in the struggle and suffering of the recently deceased Cardinal Stepinac, captive leader of the Catholic Church in Croatia, his homeland also under captivity; the countless expressions of admiration, solidarity, and veneration not only from the Catholic world, but also from all who appreciate moral fortitude, faithful fulfillment of duties, patriotism, and unwavering defense of human dignity and freedom; all these factors have made Cardinal Stepinac one of the most representative figures of our time. Pope Pius XII considered him one of the greatest men of our time, while John XXIII, deeply familiar with the problems of southeastern Europe, bestowed upon Stepinac extraordinary funeral honors, praising him as a faithful reflection of the Good Shepherd and invoking his protection over the universal Church in St. Peter's Basilica. Dignitaries and Catholic faithful on all five continents spontaneously joined in this tribute from His Holiness.

Such expressions of universal admiration and veneration (John XXIII) are undoubtedly directed toward the first and, to date, only member of the Sacred College elevated to the cardinalate while imprisoned for alleged crimes, and the only cardinal to die in communist captivity, never once able to wear the purple vestments, a symbol of the blood of martyrs, which Stepinac so richly deserved.

His figure emerges with perfect clarity when one considers, apart from his exceptional theological and cardinal virtues, the transcendent nature of his role as head of an illustrious archdiocese at a crucial point, during turbulent times. Stepinac, without a doubt, was equal to his historical role. But here we see a case where historical circumstances and a high office converge to elevate chosen individuals to the heights of greatness.

I

DEFENDER OF THE CHURCH AND THE CITY

 

Cardinal Stepinac was an exemplary pastor of one of the largest and most important archdioceses in the Catholic world, said Cardinal Montini, Archbishop of Milan, who, as Secretary of State to Pope Pius XII during the most vehement persecutions of the Church in Croatia, was able to fully appreciate the tragedy, whose protagonist was the Metropolitan Archbishop of Croatia and, in fact, head of the Catholic Church throughout Yugoslavia.

The Archdiocese of Zagreb (22,795 km², more than 2 million parishioners, the main focus of Catholic activity in Croatia) played a vital role in national life and, at certain periods, in the history of Christianity.

We find ourselves in Central Europe, where, since the dawn of our Western society, Church leaders have earned the title of defenders of the city, taking an active part in the historical events of their countries. In Croatia, bishops, along with the nobility and representatives of the municipalities, comprised the Croatian Diet (Sabor) for centuries, the repository of national sovereignty. Even after the revolutionary year of 1848, bishops in Croatia and Hungary were ex officio members of their respective parliaments until 1918, when the new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was created, later renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. Furthermore, the head of the Zagrabian diocese was considered primus bano regni and, as such, during periods of sede vacante (prorex), automatically assumed the office of the ban, becoming head of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia. This constitutional arrangement remained in place until the end of the First World War.

The Church's participation in political affairs was in keeping with the circumstances and times in which it was the main promoter of cultural activities, and it is thanks to this that, even in the early Middle Ages, Croatia was among the civilized peoples of the Christian West.

After the great Eastern Schism and the shattering of Christian unity, Croatia, oriented towards the Rome of the Popes, helped to halt Byzantine expansion at the very gates of Italy. Later, during the Mongol invasions and Ottoman conquests, with Italy and Central Europe in danger, Croatia constituted one of the irreplaceable and impregnable defensive bulwarks for three centuries, so that Croatian national life in the Modern Age was characterized by the spirit of the crusades of the Central European peoples against the relentless onslaughts of the Ottoman Empire. The Church and the papacy were then the main support of the centuries-long resistance of the Catholic Croats, helping to ensure that, despite the tremendous bloodshed and successive territorial amputations, the political individuality and cultural identity of Croatia were preserved.

Church dignitaries in those heroic times not only provided powerful moral support but, taking up swords and leading the defenders, fell on the battlefields or in besieged fortresses and cities. Zagreb and the episcopal residence itself were invincible bastions for centuries, and the Croats are proud that Ottoman horses never trod the streets of their capital, not even when the power of the sultans extended beyond Budin, the Hungarian capital, and their Janissaries pounded on the gates of imperial Vienna.

Nor in those dark times, amidst the din of arms, was Croatian cultural activity interrupted. A whole host of illustrious humanists, poets, painters, sculptors, illuminators, architects, musicians, theologians, philosophers, and scientists participated in the endeavors of the Renaissance and Baroque periods.

In the not-so-distant era of national revivals, clergymen topped the list of leading figures and promoters of national culture, founding the new university, the Academy of Language, Science and Fine Arts, the Art Gallery, and national libraries, among other things, while simultaneously fostering economic activities such as agricultural cooperatives and credit institutions.

Monsignor Stepinac governed the Church in different times, and his influence on national life manifested itself distinctly from that of his predecessors, according to the new circumstances. The role of the Metropolitan Archbishop of Croatia was reduced to religious and cultural activities, but these were of paramount importance in the climate of serious struggles and tensions.

The new Yugoslav state, dominated by the Serbian Orthodox minority with its Caesaropapist mentality and traditions, was determined to exclude the influence of the Catholic Church, which it considered an anti-national and foreign institution. Even the Church's specific activities—fostering spiritual life, consolidating its internal organization, promoting religious education and Catholic Action associations, and, above all, maintaining ties with the Holy See (considered by all Yugoslav regimes to be the hereditary enemy of the Slavic peoples)—were criticized and labeled an unacceptable, anti-national, and treasonous political stance. In this sense, the Catholic Church was accused not only after the last war but also when the monarchical dictatorship had dissolved all Croatian political parties, including the Christian Democratic People's Party, so that there was no objection to the clergy and Catholic organizations participating in partisan politics.

Due to the special circumstances that dictated the suspension of partisan contests among Croats, it was Stepinac who insisted on the inappropriateness of a political party with a Christian-social program, even though a certain degree of freedom, albeit very restricted, was possible for political parties in Croatia. Following the directives of the Holy See, according to which the clergy and religious institutions should stay away from partisan struggles, Stepinac even forbade the clergy from participating in the Croatian parliament of 1942.

Therefore, the accusations that Monsignor Stepinac had involved the Church in partisan disputes are untenable. What might have bothered the Pan-Serbian dictatorship before, and the communist one after, was that he courageously defended Christian principles, which at the same time meant defending freedoms and human and civil rights in Croatia.

 

II

 

FACING DICTATORS

 

Stepinac, then, had to act in extremely difficult times, when his homeland was humiliated and going through the most dramatic trials of its thousand-year history, engaged in a relentless struggle, inevitable, moreover, in this region of clashes and conflicts between different civilizations. In a short period, he had to confront several dictatorial regimes: the dictatorship of the Serbian monarchy; then, during the war, the pressures of the then omnipotent fascism and National Socialism; and finally, the communist tyranny of the postwar period.

Stepinac was appointed Archbishop of Zagreb in 1934, during the most oppressive phase of King Alexander's dictatorship. Alexander had been educated at the Russian imperial court in the autocratic and Caesaropapist tradition. Such a ruler might have been suitable for Serbia in the period before the Balkan Wars, but not for the new state, formed in 1918, in which Serbs and their national church were a minority, incapable of coexisting democratically with the Catholic Croats and Slovenes, who until then had been incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire and were accustomed to an incorruptible legal and administrative order, as well as Western cultural and political forms. King Alexander reigned for a time under a pseudo-democratic constitution, before establishing a purely autocratic regime in 1929. His dictatorship was preceded by the assassination of Croatian political leaders in the Parliament building in Belgrade.

Instead of addressing the legitimate demands of the Croats, who sought national and individual freedom, Alexander decreed laws that effectively dissolved Croatia as a nation, persecuting any expression of Croatian patriotism as treason. His oppressive policies were supported by the exclusively Serbian military leadership and the Serbian National Church; moreover, he could count on the submission of the Serbian masses, accustomed to the autocratic system of government. He also benefited from the benevolence of certain Western powers, who, failing to foresee the disastrous consequences, chose to support the dictatorial rule of a culturally and nationally heterogeneous state, sacrificing their own democratic principles. However, this supposed political realism proved counterproductive, as successive dictatorial governments in Belgrade increasingly aligned themselves with the Axis powers, failed to oppose the Anschluss, and practically dismantled the Little Entente and the entire system of political-military alliances, whose purpose was to thwart the designs of both the Axis and the Kremlin regarding Central and Eastern Europe. Hopes placed in the fighting spirit of the Yugoslav army were completely dashed when it capitulated within days and without a fight.

Thus, when Stepinac assumed his high office, Croatia found itself in a state of political vacuum, its political institutions suppressed, its political leaders assassinated, imprisoned, or exiled abroad. The Church itself was under intense pressure from the dictatorship, considered by the Serbs to be a foreign institution and the main focus of Croat spiritual resistance, and persecuted as anti-national and subversive. Despite all the abuses, the Church did not yield, and the people found support and encouragement in its institutions—then as now. Popular discontent and reaction against the anti-Croatian dictatorship were also spontaneously expressed in religious demonstrations. With the country left without its legitimate leaders, the Archbishop of Zagreb became virtually the visible head of the nation. This unanimous popular sentiment was expressed in a memorandum presented to Stepinac by representatives of the Croatian University, reminding him of the historical role of the Archbishop of Zagreb as lieutenant of the Croatian ban.

The Church did not seek to replace political parties, but rather to protect the persecuted and aid the needy. For this reason, the Zagreb Curia had organized free soup kitchens for thousands of unemployed people during the great economic crisis, without distinction of religion or nationality. The Committee for Aid to Jews who had escaped from Germany, Austria, and Bohemia was headquartered in the Archbishop's residence. From 1939 onward, this aid was also extended to Polish exiles.

With the dismemberment of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Croatian state was restored, and its government, lacking any other alternative, had to operate under the powerful pressure of the Axis powers, which at that time militarily dominated almost all of continental Europe. In these turbulent times, when the law was subject to brutal force, Stepinac sheltered Jews and all the persecuted. He frequently protested forcefully and publicly against racial and national discrimination, and protected the Serbian minority in Croatia, which faced reprisals for supporting two guerrilla movements: the extremist Serbian nationalists of Draza Mihailovic and Tito's partisans, the latter having emerged in the wake of the German-Russian conflict. Stepinac saved the lives of several thousand Jews and sheltered more than 7,000 Serbian orphans. He never ceased admonishing the authorities that excesses could not be tolerated, even in legitimate self-defense, and that revenge for past Serbian violence and persecution contradicted Christian morality and deeply rooted Croatian traditions, which respected ethics and the law.

However; Despite the proven fact that Stepinac spared no effort in his aid and support for the Serbian minority, the hostile and obstinate attitude of the Serbian anti-communists who had sought asylum in Western countries and of the Serbian ecclesiastical authorities, who consistently favored the communist campaign against the late Cardinal Stepinac, is surprising and incomprehensible to a foreign observer unfamiliar with the internal tensions within Yugoslavia and their underlying causes. This attitude of the representatives of Serbian national tradition and sentiment illustrates better than anything else the incompatibility between Serbs and Croats. Given that Stepinac demonstrated his affection and sympathy for the Serbian people even before being appointed archbishop, by enlisting as a volunteer on the Salonika front during the First World War for the liberation of Serbia, the behavior of the Serbian nationalists becomes even more revealing. Many Serbian ultra-patriots who follow former King Peter Karageorgevic and label Stepinac an enemy of the Serbian people were safe and well-paid while he was fighting in the trenches of the Salonika front.

Furthermore, the biased accusations made by both communists and Serbian nationalists regarding the supposed religious nature of the repressive acts against the Serbian minority in Croatia during the last war are unfounded, as if they stemmed from alleged Catholic fanaticism. The bloody struggles between Serbs and Croats were the product of the clash between two nationalisms. Protestants and Muslims, a significant minority (13% Muslim), loyal to the Croatian state, enjoyed absolute religious freedom at that time.

There is one more point on which communists and Serbian nationalists agree regarding Stepinac and the Catholic Church in Croatia. They cannot forgive Stepinac for his Croatian patriotism and his support for the restoration of the Croatian state, labeling him a collaborator for this reason. The Catholic hierarchy always distinguished between the state and the regime, between the nation and its government. Stepinac acted in the same way. He championed the Croatian state and repudiated all the errors of its government, courageously confronting the interference of the powerful Third Reich. He acted in the same manner as the German and Italian clergymen who refused to renounce national independence in the face of totalitarian regimes, which were necessarily temporary.

Stepinac's patriotic stance was accurately interpreted by a widely circulated Belgian weekly:

"The Archbishop of Zagreb has not hidden the fact that, like almost the entire Croatian people, he viewed the collapse of the Yugoslav state in 1941 with satisfaction. When a state frustrates the national aspirations of one of its peoples, it must blame itself if that people applauds its fall.

Let us suppose that in the Netherlands in 1829 an international conflict had led the French, English, or Prussian armies to sweep away the forces of King William: the Belgian people would certainly have leapt for joy, seeing themselves freed from the Dutch yoke. Could the Archbishop of Mechelen have failed to show solidarity with his people?"

The Yugoslav government knows what to expect on this point, especially since the feelings of the Croatian people have not changed with the new dictatorship:

Who can reproach the Poles, subjugated by the Russians, for having enthusiastically welcomed Napoleon's grenadiers?

Nor could Stepinac be required to renounce his Croatian patriotism, and even less so could the Serbian nationalists, who identified with Alexander's dictatorial regime and are even today grateful to the communists for having re-established the heterogeneous conglomerate that is Yugoslavia, considered by them an enlarged Serbia, where practically no form of government other than dictatorship is possible.

Yugoslavia can only be maintained against the will of the anti-Serbian majority of its unfortunate subjects. Forcing such a community implies the denial of all national and civic rights of the vast majority of its members. It is obvious that the Church cannot, in principle, side with those who, driven by a thirst for personal or collective power, prioritize state power over freedoms and human rights. Stepinac's merit lies in having fought, faithful to this principle, against all abuses of power, both during the monarchical and communist dictatorships, which persecuted Catholics and Croats, and in the last war, when he protected Serbs and Jews.

III

IN THE ZONE OF ENCOUNTERS AND CONFLICTS OF CIVILIZATIONS

 

Regarding the aforementioned attitude of Serbian nationalist and ecclesiastical representatives, incomprehensible to Westerners, we wish to clarify in good faith that this is not an inherent evil of the Serbian people. It is a phenomenon that, by its very nature, transcends the Croatian-Serbian conflict, which can only be understood through the comparative study of civilizations. From the perspective of cultural studies, the Croatian-Serbian antagonism is not so much an expression of national and religious differences per se, but rather one of the consequences arising from encounters and conflicts between two peoples belonging to distinct civilizations: Western and Eastern European.

Although Croats and Serbs, like Poles and Russians, derive from the same Slavic linguistic group, their cultural traditions and, consequently, their politics place them in distinct and quite antagonistic civilizations. President Roosevelt was therefore correct when, in 1943, deliberating with Sir Anthony Eden on the future of Europe, he expressed his repeated opinion that Croats and Serbs have nothing in common, making it ridiculous to insist that such antagonistic peoples live under the same government. Russia and Serbia, due to their traditional political systems, are "eternal tyrannies of the East," to use Ortega y Gasset's expression.

In this world, a different conception of the relationship between individual, group, and state prevails than the Western one. Western conceptions, according to which the Church should be independent of the state, as should cultural life, and where religion should not be confused with nationality, seem strange and incomprehensible to them. Instead of appreciating the Western Church's efforts to act independently of dictatorial governments, the representatives of the Eastern Orthodox Church criticize it for this, considering the submission of the Church to the state a Christian obligation. The official spokesperson for the Serbian National Church said the following:

"The Roman Catholic Church threatens the authority of our State, therefore necessarily provoking self-defense... Satan offered Christ earthly power, but he rejected it. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, accepted this power. Papal authority, as the supreme spiritual power, challenges the honor and autonomy of the State. It imposes itself as a State within a State, or perhaps as a State over another State; it is a foreign power. That is why the Catholic Church and Catholicism must be combated with Balkan brutality."

These are the same concepts used by Yugoslav communists to justify breaking off diplomatic relations with the Holy See.

The Pope is a "hereditary enemy" of Yugoslavia "not only because he is neither fascist nor socialist and democratic, but simply because he is Yugoslavia. The government of Yugoslavia and the people of Yugoslavia would have to submit to the absolute sovereignty of the Vatican on this matter of bishops and priests, even if they acted exclusively in the interests of a foreign authority, thus harming their own state and their own people. When Stepinac tells foreign journalists, 'I have only one person who commands me and to him alone I submit, and that is the Holy Father' (understood to be in relation to his ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Editor's note), he establishes his principles and his position, and that of the Vatican. What other state and what other people in the world would allow and tolerate the imposition of a bishop of such a nature?"

From this principled stance, it follows that all Catholics in Yugoslavia would always be undesirable, even if the following occurred: The religious resistance and national opposition of Croatian Catholics did not coincide, a fact deliberately conflated to justify religious persecution as if it were merely a political struggle.

There are other facts that are alien to the Western mindset. While the Yugoslav communists tolerated and even favored the Serbian Church, they ruthlessly persecuted Catholicism. While the Serbian Patriarch visited Moscow as an honored guest and the Russian Patriarch paid homage to Marshal Tito in Belgrade, Cardinal Stepinac and other Croatian prelates were imprisoned, interned, and held incommunicado. This contrast is only explicable if one considers that the communist governments—mere Byzantine-Russian versions of Marxism—and the Orthodox Church were acting within autocratic and Caesaropapist traditions. They represent two aspects of the same world. The Serbian Church was integrated into that world, while the Western Christian communities, Catholic and Protestant, were considered foreign bodies and forces. disintegrants.

On the other hand, religious differences are not the cause of the antagonism between Poles and Russians, Croats and Serbs. The Byzantine schism did not determine European cultural dualism—the main cause of these antagonisms—but rather was its consequence. Byzantium insisted on Caesaropapist conceptions against the papacy, even in the late Middle Ages, when the new and burgeoning society of Western Europe was already formed, a powerful support for the popes in the long and tenacious struggle against the Caesaropapist ambitions of the Byzantine emperors. The Church has not been the cause but rather the victim of the political conflicts that destroyed Christian unity.

The universal Church always aspires to restore the union of the Churches: Sharing this noble desire, certain Croatian Catholic prelates believed in 1918 that the newly created Yugoslav state would offer promising opportunities for achieving this goal. They hoped that the shared life of Eastern and Western Christians would lead to mutual understanding and a rapprochement between the separated Christian brethren.

However, the opposite occurred. Serbia, given its autocratic tradition, was unable to create a free community of peoples with equal rights, but instead imposed a hegemonic and anti-democratic government, provoking new conflicts, hatred, and resentment. The privileged Serbian Church, in accordance with Caesaropapist concepts, sought, with the backing of state power, to expand its sphere of influence through proselytizing methods. Those who believed that a common state could foster the union of the Churches had to face the reality that as long as Catholics remain in a subordinate political position, in a state with Byzantine traditions, they inevitably regress.

IV

PASTOR QUI ANIMAM SUAM DAT PRO OVIBUS SUIS

 

It is not our purpose to give a complete biography of Bishop Stepinac, but rather to highlight those exceptional virtues that stem from both his personal qualities and his formation, which is not exactly common among priests who have followed the usual ecclesiastical path.

He was born on May 8, 1898, in the village of Krasic, the eleventh child of a modest farming family. After completing his secondary studies at a national school in Zagreb, he was mobilized during the First World War by the Austrian army and assigned as a second lieutenant to the Italian front. There, fighting on the front lines, he was buried by a grenade and captured by the Italians.

From there, he volunteered for the Salonika front to fight for the liberation of Serbia, which was under Austro-Bulgarian occupation. After the war, he enrolled in the Faculty of Agriculture in Zagreb, combining his studies with the arduous work on his father's farm. He was nearly 27 when he became convinced that his true calling was the priesthood. In Rome, he studied at the Gregorian University as a student of the Collegium Germanicum. On October 26, 1929, he was ordained and received a doctorate in philosophy and theology.

Stepinac was a profound scholar of Sacred Scripture and the social doctrine of the Church, having been deeply interested in the Catholic social movement since his youth. Upon his return to Croatia, he was appointed to the Archbishop's household, primarily dedicated to the Caritas organization. His tireless charitable work brought him into direct contact with the poor, a connection he maintained even after his appointment as Archbishop.

In 1934, the Holy See appointed him Coadjutor Archbishop cum iure successionis, when he was only 36 years old. His appointment to such a high position was unexpected, as it was known that the elderly Archbishop Bauer, a highly prestigious prelate, deeply rooted in the traditions and splendor of his office, and a dignitary with a brilliant public career—a member of parliament in Zagreb and Budapest, former rector of the national university, and Protector of the Academy of Sciences and Fine Arts—had proposed several prominent canons, theologians, and even bishops to the Holy See as his successors.

The Belgrade government, however, objected to all the proposed candidates, citing their alleged activities against the state. In reality, the dictatorial government in Belgrade resorted to obstructionist tactics with the aim of seizing the substantial funds and assets of the Archdiocese of Zagreb should the see become vacant. Finally, Belgrade consented to Stepinac's appointment, based on his having been one of the volunteers on the Thessaloniki front—a privileged status at the time—and because they did not properly understand the meaning of the expression "cum iure successionis," meaning "with right of succession."

They did not oppose his appointment because they had overlooked the fact that Stepinac had renounced his Serbian officer rank and returned all his decorations in protest against Serbian dominance and pressure in Croatia. Croatian public opinion was surprised by the unexpected rise to such an important archiepiscopal see of a young, recently ordained priest unknown in public life.

In 1937, upon the death of Archbishop Bauer, Stepinac succeeded him as Archbishop of Zagreb, Metropolitan of Croatia, and Permanent President of the Conference of Bishops of Yugoslavia.

The newly appointed Archbishop infused new energy and inaugurated new methods. Catholic Action organizations, charitable institutions, and the Catholic press were reorganized and promoted. Impressive religious events—pilgrimages and Eucharistic Congresses—were organized, and new parishes and convents were established. In his Sunday sermons, delivered before large audiences, he raised his courageous voice in defense of natural law and morality.

Accompanied by tens of thousands of parishioners, he made a pilgrimage each year to the Croatian national shrine of Our Lady of Bistrica, sharing with the pilgrims the hardships of the three-day walk. The archbishop's palace, once a stately residence, became the headquarters of numerous Catholic institutions, while the Archbishop and his family lived a monastic life. Its former splendor was displayed only once a year, on the day of the papal coronation.

Unconditional loyalty to the Holy See and strict adherence to papal directives were the defining characteristics of Stepinac, who frequently traveled to the Eternal City, maintaining close contact with the central institutions of the Church. He acted in the same manner during the war. Therefore, when the smear campaign of world communism was unleashed, which even confused certain democratic circles, the Vatican did not hesitate for a moment to emphasize to the world the integrity and impeccable conduct of the head of the Catholic Church in Croatia. L'Osservatore Romano published in-depth articles, protests, commentaries, and front-page news stories daily in the wake of the "most sorrowful trial" (Pius XII).

Stepinac's lived religiosity, apostolic zeal, upright application of doctrine, social conscience, and patriotism were wonderfully combined with his innate modesty, as well as his moral fortitude and capacity for suffering, even physical. Fearlessness was truly necessary for a soldier of Christ, who had to face extremely difficult situations, endure personal attacks, and bear a long prison sentence with its accompanying hardships.

In early May 1945, the communists seized power in Croatia. Sixteen months passed before Stepinac's trial began for alleged war crimes, during which time the same communist radio station quoted and praised his protests against violations of freedoms and human rights. Stepinac, defenseless, had to witness the Church and the people of Croatia being outlawed.

A wave of terror plunged Croatia into a silent and bloody suffering that, unfortunately, found no echo in the free world at the time. The massacre of tens of thousands of civilians and unarmed soldiers, a true genocide perpetrated after the war had ended in Bleiburg and other locations, marks the path taken by the communists. Prominent Catholics and patriots were murdered without trial. The communists' aim was to eliminate all possible opposition in Croatia by fire and sword, to make it a territory completely subjugated to communism. For the first time in its thousand-year history, Croatia was incorporated in its entirety into an Eastern empire, and its proponents set out to destroy all forms of Western culture.

In such a dark atmosphere, the figure of Bishop Stepinac rose up, "a man sent from God... as a witness to testify concerning the light... and this light shines in the darkness, and out of the darkness they have not received it" (John 1:5-7). Croatia was once again suffering and bleeding, yet it would not yield to the enemy. The main struggle was, and continues to be, waged in the spiritual realm. Communism was not content with occupying Croatian lands; it wants to change the soul of the people, as stated in a paragraph of the Five-Year Plan. Therefore, it was necessary to break Stepinac or force him to leave the country. They resorted to a two-pronged tactic: pressure and blackmail. From the outset, they unleashed an infamous smear campaign against him, offering no possibility of rebuttal, and orchestrated physical attacks. They forbade him from leaving his residence and from having any contact with the faithful. At the same time, a compromise was suggested: to renounce the Holy See and found a national church.

All that pressure did not make the Archbishop waver. The Catholic episcopate, gathered under his presidency, published a lengthy and well-documented pastoral letter, detailing all the abuses and violence of the communist regime. In the first and only interview held with the Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito, he told him plainly and simply that without religious freedom and without respect for Croatian national rights, the country would not be pacified.

At that time, Stepinac still had justifiable hopes, based on the promises of Allied diplomats, with whom he had direct contact during his visits to Rome during the war, that the Allies would not allow a communist regime to be established on the Adriatic coast, at the gates of Italy and Austria. Consequently, he expected the Yalta agreements, which guaranteed the people of Yugoslavia the democratic right to elect their government, to be upheld.

Convinced that it was impossible to break Stepinac's loyalty to the Holy See, the communist rulers orchestrated the infamous trial, condemning him to 16 years in prison and the loss of his civil and political rights for an additional 5 years. This sentence, accompanied by rampant propaganda, was used as a final warning to an unyielding Croatia that the communist regime, backed by Moscow, was omnipotent and ruthless in its extermination of all Western influence.

It is well known that, during the trial, Stepinac refused to answer questions from the prosecutor and the communist judges, and that he did not appoint any defense attorneys. This was not a defiant or insolent gesture, as the communists asserted, but rather a reasoned stance from someone who knew it was impossible to argue with the communist party, with its legal and moral conceptions opposed to the Western and Christian mindset, and who, moreover, knew that the verdict had already been decided beforehand.

The defense attorneys, appointed by the court, acted with civic courage and professional competence, but their arguments had to adhere to communist legality, according to which loyalty to the Church and the Croatian people was considered a crime. The prosecutor himself objected to them, this time correctly, that "they were defending the accused Aloysius Stepinac against charges that he did not deny but rather praised as meritorious."

Therefore, even certain well-intentioned comments published in the free press were not entirely accurate in attempting, under the influence of persistent communist accusations, to interpret Stepinac's attitude as contrary to the restoration and defense of the Croatian state in wartime. However, when his speech before the tribunal, addressed not so much to the communist judges as to the Croatian people and world public opinion, became known, the matter was clarified.

It has been repeatedly emphasized that the courageous behavior of Bishop Stepinac differed greatly from the conduct of other defendants, such as that of the Serbian general Draza Mihailovic, so highly praised by Serbian nationalist propaganda. Mihailovic, the protagonist of a lost and unjust cause—that of Serbian supremacy over the other peoples of Yugoslavia—grown in humiliation before the judges, begging for mercy and arguing that many of his aims were, in reality, identical to theirs. Meanwhile, Stepinac, a champion of divine and human law, cleared his conscience of all accusations, unyielding to the well-known methods of psychological manipulation. He remained a true gentleman, without blemish or fear, refusing to yield in the slightest and without pleading for mercy.

It is worth noting another outstanding trait of Stepinac's personality: his vocation for martyrdom, which matured within him under the tremendous weight of responsibility in such crucial times. Tito himself had declared, after the aforementioned interview, that "this Stepinac aspired to martyrdom, but that the opportunity would not be given to him." The author of these lines particularly recalls the audience that Stepinac granted in 1938 to the Secretary General of Pax Romana, Abbé Gremaud, and M. Vershave, director of "L'Ecole de journalisme" in Lille, France.

Referring to the threats looming over Europe and Croatia, Stepinac, usually calm and composed, rose nervously and, looking out of the window of his library, located in the fortified section of the former episcopal palace, declared in a decisive tone: "I know that the Church in Croatia is in danger from the North (National Socialism) and from the East (Bolshevism). The Archbishop of Zagreb, encouraged by the example of his predecessors, who once fought and fell within these walls, is prepared to confront the enemy and bear witness with his blood for Christ."

His demeanor was anything but theatrical. His figure reflected the simplicity and sincerity of a young ascetic, marching with serenity and courage toward the martyrdom he had already foreseen. Above all, his faith was unwavering and steadfast. "In Te Domine speravi" (I have hoped in the Lord), was his motto. And when long years of trials arrived, he never wavered.

Remembering the psalmist's words, "Put your trust in God, act courageously, and your heart will be strengthened," he persevered until death (February 10, 1960), even though he could have left the country and avoided all the suffering he endured during 14 years of imprisonment and confinement, afflicted by illnesses that, with proper medical attention, could have been cured. He renounced the freedom offered to him, accepting the prolongation of his afflictions. We have official documents to attest to this.

Thus, L'Osservatore Romano, in its June 9-10, 1951 edition, published the contents of the Yugoslav government's note offering the Vatican Stepinac's release on the condition that he leave the country immediately, and the Holy See's response stating that the Archbishop preferred to remain with his flock. It is known for certain that at least three more proposals to this effect were categorically rejected by the heroic soldier of Christ. The good shepherd lays down his life for his flock (John 10:11).

The witness given by this worthy and irreproachable champion of the faith and of the homeland represents an exemplary moral victory over his oppressors. Faced with the outrage aroused in the free world by Stepinac's condemnation, the boastful Yugoslav dictator sought to downplay its significance: "For some time there will still be noise about Stepinac, but soon they will tire of him and forget him." Meanwhile, as time went on, she proved to be a typical illusion of dictators who tend to underestimate moral values. Stepinac was not only not forgotten, but his stature grew in the eyes of the people and the entire world.

He forced the communists to capitulate after his death. They had to reverse their initial decision to bury him in the parish church of Krasic until his sentence expired and accept the burial of his remains, with all the honors due to a prince of the Church, in their cathedral. They even sent official invitations to the consular corps and delegated their representatives to the funeral of a "criminal," a "traitor to the fatherland."

Martyred Croatia found its most genuine expression in him. Today, this hero and martyr, defender of the city, rests in the crypt of Zagreb Cathedral, alongside other Croatian heroes who gave their lives for their country: Count Peter of Zrin, Prince Francis Christopher Frankopan, and Eugene Kvaternik. His tomb is already a place of pilgrimage.

In the struggle between tyranny and freedom, martyrs are always stronger.

 

Buenos Aires

 


DOCUMENTS

 

WORDS OF POPE PIUS XII ON CARDINAL STEPINAC

 

"And now, Venerable Brothers, amidst the joy that fills Us at seeing you here before Us, We cannot prevent Our spirits from turning with sadness to Our Venerable Brother the Archbishop of Zagreb, who, due to his circumstances, was unable to reach Rome and visit the Common Father, with the free option of return. Although absent, We embrace him with paternal love and earnestly desire that the whole world know that in deciding to honor him with the majesty of the Roman purple, Our sole purpose is to worthily reward his eminent merits, as well as to bear witness to his entire nation of Our great benevolence. And in a special way, We wished to offer Our praise and consolation to Our beloved Sons and Daughters, who in such difficult times profess their Catholic faith with resolute courage."

"...Our conscience could not authorize us to recognize and admit the basis of the accusations made against the Archbishop of Zagreb, accusations which, as you know, led to his condemnation to a very severe punishment. Furthermore, we could not disappoint the hopes and expectations of Catholics throughout the world and of a good number of non-Catholics, who learned with great satisfaction of the elevation to the Roman cardinal's red hat of a pastor who is an example of apostolic zeal and Christian fortitude."

(From the Address in the Secret Consistory, January 12, 1953.)

 

POPE JOHN XXIII ON CARDINAL ALOYSIUS STEPINAC

 

-Your Eminences Cardinals; Venerable Brothers and beloved sons! Reasons of extraordinary respect and religious affection have compelled Our hearts to perform this funeral rite for the blessed soul of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb—a rite, unusual here in St. Peter's Basilica, for a Cardinal not belonging to the Curia. This simple yet distinguished figure of father and shepherd of the Church of God was too dear to Our spirit: his prolonged tribulation during fifteen years of exile in his own homeland, and his serene dignity and confidence in his continued suffering, have earned him universal admiration and veneration.

The circumstances of his passing, drawing the attention of his closest spiritual children to the great example of unwavering patience he gave to all during so many years of imprisonment, despite the short distance between his dwelling and theirs, have resonated like the tolling of bells in sorrow and weeping, recalling the notes of the Holy Saturday liturgy at the tomb of Jesus the Savior: "Recessit pastor noster, fons aquae vivae, ad cuius transitum sol obscuratus est." As he passed on to the eternal realms, even the sun was indeed obscured on the horizon, rainy and somber, of these winter days.

Oh! Truly, Cardinal Stepinac is a faithful reflection of the Good Shepherd, faithful and edifying. He dedicated 26 years of episcopate to his illustrious archdiocese, first through tenacious and fervent apostolic activity, and then, in his final years of painful and all-too-long imprisonment, he accumulated such a wealth of merit that the Heavenly Father has surely bestowed upon all the families and faithful of that fervent and devout Croatia as grace and blessing.

In these last weeks, the humble successor of Saint Peter as Bishop of Rome found great consolation in the Diocesan Synod, in which the sacred intimacy of the Shepherd and his flock—clergy and people—was maintained in frequent and gentle familiarity with the sweet splendor of Jesus, contemplating him as the Divine Shepherd who animates his own flock (I°, 10, 11).

And behold, in his passing into heaven, the soul of Cardinal Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac repeats to us once more this great teaching and this divine example from Chapter X of the Gospel of Saint John. We pray for the blessed glorification of his chosen spirit: he will answer us from on high with the seal of our renewed pastoral fervor, of our readiness to strive and sacrifice.

Beloved Brothers and children! We must not forget the serious exhortation in his testament to the constant practice of forgiveness and peace. How tender, how moving is his request for forgiveness from all those whom in his life—even with the best of intentions and charity—he may have offended in the slightest; How sublime is that repetition of the dying Christ's last words to all those who made him suffer so unjustly: "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing" (Luke 28:24). This is a powerful statement: "they do not know what they are doing," an immense compassion that illuminates with tragic brilliance the mystery of human perversion regarding the meaning of individual and collective life, of which we are witnesses.

In this great affliction, we find comfort in noticing here and there glimpses of human compassion. Around the dead and crucified Christ, all four Evangelists recount Pilate's gesture of handing over the condemned man's lifeless body to the compassion of Joseph of Arimathea, who requested the mortal remains, and of Nicodemus, who brought a copious mixture of myrrh and aloes for the burial. In the immense sorrow that continues to tear at our hearts, the gesture of the higher authorities, following the example of the ancient Roman governor, allowed for a manifestation of popular piety to emerge around the blessed sacrifice of the shepherd and illustrious father. This piety will remain in humble homes for a whole generation as a sacred memory and an eternal example of spiritual elevation and human and Christian tenderness.

Oh! Why, now that the sacrifice of the great priest and pontiff has been accomplished, should all upright and good souls not be allowed to greet, at least from afar, the return of a civic and religious peace that, respecting noble and robust traditions, will reassure the renewed ascent of all toward the highest ideals that are sublimated in the spirit of Christ, united in loyal and harmonious collaboration in the pursuit and enjoyment of true prosperity that makes human coexistence less sorrowful and more pleasant.

May the liturgical prayer that rises from our lips and hearts through the sacred wisps of incense once more implore heavenly peace and glory for the mourned departed Cardinal Stepinac. In this prayer, we feel intimately united with all the venerable members of the Sacred College of Cardinals present here and with those who, from every corner of the earth, have wished to share the sorrow of our Common Father with expressions of moving fraternity, thus conveying the condolences of the Universal Church. Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac was never able to wear the glorious and well-deserved purple vestments outside the place of his birth and his forced confinement. Nevertheless, we piously wish to believe and hope that, in the grace and light of the Lord, he will now extend his protection over the entire Sacred College, of which he remains a shining example, over the whole Holy Church, and over all of Yugoslavia.

(From the Address in St. Peter's Basilica, 17/2/1960.)

 

STATEMENTS OF STEPINAC BEFORE THE PEOPLE'S COURT OF ZAGREB ON OCTOBER 3, 1946

 

To all the charges brought against me here, I reply that my conscience is clear in every sense (even though the public may mock this statement) and I do not seek to defend myself or appeal the verdict. Because of my convictions, I am prepared to endure not only ridicule, contempt, and humiliation, but also, with a clear conscience, I am ready to die at any moment. Hundreds of times I have been called here "the accused Stepinac."

But no one is so naive as not to understand that with "the accused Stepinac" sits here in the dock the Archbishop of Zagreb, the Metropolitan of Croatia, and the head of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. And you yourselves have come before the accused priests present here so that they may acknowledge that only Stepinac can be blamed for everything they, priests and people, have done. But not just any Stepinac would have had such influence; only Archbishop Stepinac did.

For seventeen months, a campaign has been waged against me, publicly and in the press, and furthermore, for twelve months, I have been effectively confined to my archbishop's palace.

 

THE ORTHODOX

 

I am accused of rebaptizing Serbs. The term is incorrect, because someone who has been baptized once does not need to be baptized again. But the issue concerns the conversion of religions, and I will not speak of this in detail except to declare that my conscience is clear of this charge and that the judgment of history will be favorable to me.

It is a fact that I had to transfer several parish priests because they were in danger of death among the Orthodox: the Serbs wanted to kill them because they were delaying conversions to Catholicism. It is a fact that during the war the Church had to face difficulties and overcome obstacles, precisely for the good of the Serbian people and in order to help them to the best of its ability.

The honorable judge has presented a document according to which I claimed an abandoned Orthodox monastery in Orahovica (which had previously belonged to our Pauline Fathers) to give it to the Trappist monks, expelled from Reichenburg by the Germans. I consider it my sacred duty to help my Slovenian brothers, expelled by the Hitlerites, and find them temporary refuge.

 

MILITARY VICAR

 

I am being charged with a grave crime because I was a military vicar. The honorable judge asked me if I did not consider myself a traitor to Yugoslavia for having sought an understanding with the Independent State of Croatia in this matter. I was also a military vicar in the former Yugoslavia. For eight or nine years I tried to resolve the issue of the military vicariate, without reaching a definitive and mutually agreeable solution. Finally, this matter was settled in Yugoslavia after many difficulties, through a Concordat which, after its solemn ratification in Parliament, was rendered useless by street riots.

As the end of the war between Yugoslavia and Germany approached, I was obliged to extend spiritual assistance to the Catholic soldiers of the former Yugoslav army and to those of the army of the newly created Independent State of Croatia. Even though the state had collapsed, the soldiers remained, and we had an obligation to take this situation into account.

 

THE RIGHTS OF THE CROATIAN PEOPLE

 

I was not "persona grata" to either the Germans or the Ustaše; I was not a Ustaše, nor did I swear an oath, as many of your officials present here did. The entire Croatian nation had declared itself in favour of a Croatian state through a plebiscite, and I would have been infamous had I not felt the pulse of the Croatian people, who were enslaved in the former Yugoslavia. I have said that Croats could not advance in the military or enter the diplomatic corps unless they changed their religion or married an Orthodox woman. This was, therefore, a problem I had to address in my pastoral letters and sermons.

Everything I have said concerning the right of the Croatian people to their freedom and independence is in complete accordance with the basic principles set forth by the Allies at Yalta and in the Atlantic Charter. If, in accordance with these principles, every nation has the right to its independence, then why is it denied to the Croatian nation? The Holy See has repeatedly emphasized that both small nations and minorities have the right to freedom. Can a Catholic bishop or metropolitan not even mention this principle? If we must fall, let us fall for having fulfilled our duty.

If you believe this process pleases the Croatian people, give them the opportunity to speak. For my part, I will accept their verdict. I have respected and will always respect the will of my people.

You accuse me of being an enemy of the State and of the national authorities. Today I recognize your authority, but who held that authority before? I repeat: for me, you have represented authority since May 8, 1945, but not before. What place in the world is there where one can obey two authorities at once: you in the forests, and others in Zagreb? Whom should I obey: the authority of the coup leader Simovic, or the traitorous government—as you call it—in London, or the one in Cairo, or yours in the forests, or the government in Zagreb? Is it even possible to serve two masters? According to Catholic morality, international law, and human law in general, this is impossible. We could not ignore the established authorities here, even if they were Ustaše. They were here. You would only have the right to hold me accountable from May 8, 1945, onward.

As for my terrorist acts, you have no proof whatsoever: no one believes you. If Lisak, Lela Sofijanec, and others approached me under false names, if I received a letter I never read, if, in short, it is a crime for men to approach me, then I will accept the verdict calmly. My conscience is not troubled by having issued Father Maric a certificate of free passage, because I did not do so with the intention of violating the established order; for such a transgression, I could go to the next world with a clear conscience. It doesn't matter whether you believe me or not. The accused, the Archbishop of Zagreb, will not only suffer, but also die for his convictions. Prime Minister Bakaric himself told Father Milanovic: "We are convinced that the Archbishop is behind these actions, but we have no proof." That is enough for me, which is already quite a confession.

 

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

 

Now then, what is the nature of the conflict, where do the difficulties arise from, and why has the situation not returned to normal? The prosecutor has repeatedly asserted that nowhere else is there the freedom of conscience that reigns in this state. I would like to point out some facts that prove otherwise.

First and foremost, I reiterate that between 260 and 270 priests have been murdered by the National Liberation Movement. Nowhere else in the civilized world would such a large number of priests be punished, nor in such a manner, for the crimes with which they were charged. Thus, for example, Father Bürger, parish priest of Slatina, as a member of the Kulturbund, could have been sentenced, say, to about eight years in prison; but he was not sentenced to death, and you killed him because, in fulfillment of his sacred duties as dean, he had transported the liturgical objects from the neighboring church of Vocin. I affirm again: in no other civilized state would such a punishment have been imposed. Father Povoljnjak was murdered like a dog in the street, without even a trial, and the same fate has befallen some accused nuns. In no other civilized state would death ever have replaced a mere prison sentence. You have committed a fatal error in murdering the priests. The people will never forgive you. Such is your freedom.

Our Catholic schools, built at the price of enormous sacrifices, have been taken from us. The work of our seminaries is rendered impossible. If we had not received seven train cars loaded with food from North America, we would not have been able to continue this year. Yet these are the children of our poor farmers. You forcibly seized all their property from the seminaries. You have done no less than the Gestapo when it seized the property of the Mokrice Seminary. We are not opposed to agrarian reform. The Holy See has promulgated many encyclicals on social reforms, but these actions should have been carried out with the prior agreement of the Vatican.

Our orphanages have been rendered useless; our printing presses have been destroyed, and I know of none currently operating. Our press, so attacked here, no longer exists.

 

Is it not, then, a scandal to assert that nowhere else does the Church enjoy the freedom it has here? The Dominicans had a religious book printed that I translated from French, and they spent 75,000 dinars on the edition. Once the printing was finished, they tried to withdraw the copies, but they failed. Is that freedom of the press?

The San Jerónimo publishing house ceased to exist. It is a grave offense against the people to proceed in this way with their oldest and most important cultural institutions. You have criticized me for the work of "Caritas." I emphasize here that Caritas has provided enormous charitable services to our people and to your children as well.

Furthermore, there is the question of religious instruction in schools. You have established the rule: in the upper grades of secondary school, it is completely prohibited; in the lower grades, it is optional. But how can you grant children the right to choose for themselves when some have not even developed properly, and adults with the right to vote are denied the freedom to choose in this matter?

Our Catholic convent hospitals, how many difficulties do they encounter?

Against the will of the vast majority of the people, you have introduced civil marriage. Why have you not implemented this freedom in accordance with the mentality of our people? In the United States, where a wise republic prevails, the citizen is free to choose civil or religious marriage, whichever is more sensible. We do not deny you some control over marriage. But it is a grave offense to our people to be forced to enter into civil marriage before religious marriage. Had you consulted us on this matter, we would have given you pertinent suggestions.

The buildings of some religious communities in Bachka were confiscated; some churches in Split (I don't know if this situation still exists) were converted into warehouses. And ecclesiastical property was expropriated without any agreement with the Holy See. You have already seen that the people, despite your land reform, refuse to take these lands.

But material concerns are the least of our problems. The painful point is this: neither by night nor by day does any priest or bishop have a safe life. Bishop Srebrenic was attacked in Susak by youths, incited by certain individuals. For three hours they mistreated and assaulted him in a room before the indifferent gaze of your police and militia.

I myself suffered a similar attack in Zapresic, pelted with stones and shot at. Bishop Lach had gone to the other side of the Drava River for Confirmation, and although his arrival was known, he was sent to the other bank and spent the entire night detained in the Koprivnica prison. Some of your supporters have come to see me and declared that such treatment was unacceptable and that they would protest to the authorities. Mobs stoned the windows of the house where Bishop Buric was staying during his Confirmation visit. Bishop Pusic, I hear, was recently attacked by a mob, who threw rotten apples and eggs at him.

We consider such freedom illusory and do not want to be slaves without any rights; we will fight by all lawful means for our rights in this State.

 

THE PERSECUTORS AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

 

So that you may understand why we fight, I will cite three or four more examples of your supposed freedom. It is taught in classrooms, officially and in defiance of all the testimony of history, that Jesus Christ never existed. Know that Jesus Christ is God. For Him we are ready to die. Today you teach that He never lived; if a teacher dares to assert otherwise, he can safely expect to be dismissed.

I tell you, Mr. Prosecutor, that under such conditions the Church is deprived of its freedom and will soon be silenced. Christ is the foundation of Christianity. You protect the Orthodox Serbs. But I ask you: How can you conceive of orthodoxy without Christ? How can you conceive of the Catholic Church without Christ? It is absurd. In school textbooks, it is said that the Mother of God is a prostitute. Do you not know that for both Catholics and Orthodox Christians, the Mother of God is the most sacred and venerated of all concepts? You have ordered that it be disseminated, as official state doctrine, that man descended from the ape. Perhaps some harbor such ambitions. But why impose as official a theory that no renowned scholar dares to defend today?

According to your criteria, materialism is the only worthy system, even though it amounts to the denial of God and the annihilation of Christianity. If there is nothing but matter, I thank you for your freedom.

One of your own, a prominent figure, has said: "There is not a single man in this State whom we cannot bring to trial and condemn." Faced with the constant accusations that place me among murderers and accomplices of terrorists, I reply that not all crimes in the Independent State of Croatia were the work of the Domobrani or Ustaše.

These were perilous times for the Church, which had to overcome numerous difficulties. Let no one think that I desire war. Let the current authorities enter into dialogue with the Holy See. The Church does not recognize dictatorship, but it is not opposed to an honest understanding with whomever. The bishops will know what to expect in the fulfillment of their duties, and there will no longer be a need to seek out priests to point the finger of accusation against the bishops, as has been done here.

Finally, I want to say a few words to the Communist Party, which is, in truth, my accuser. If you believe that I have adopted my present stance for material reasons, you are mistaken, since we have remained steadfast in our defense even after becoming impoverished.

We are not against workers seeking recognition of their rights in factories, because this is the spirit of papal encyclicals. Nor are we against agrarian reform.

But let the leaders of communism understand that if there is to be freedom to spread materialism, then we also have the right to profess and propagate our principles. Many Catholics have died and will die defending that right.

In conclusion, if there is goodwill, an understanding can be reached, and the initiative lies with the current authorities. Neither I nor the other members of the episcopate are the ones who should enter into these fundamental negotiations. This is a matter between the State and the Holy See.

As for me, and as for the verdict, I ask for no clemency. My conscience is clear.

 

TESTIMONY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH ASSOCIATION

Luis S. Breier, president of the American Jewish Association, declared, two days after Stepinac's conviction, at the National Conference of Christians and Jews, at the Bronx Round Table, on October 13, 1946:

"This great man of the Church has been accused of being a Nazi collaborator. We Jews protest against this slander. Knowing his past well, we can say that from 1934 and in the following years he was always a true friend of the Jews, which he did not hide even during the times of the harshest persecution under the regime of Hitler and his satellites.

He was one of the very few in Europe who stood up against Nazi tyranny, even when it was most difficult and dangerous. This man, now the victim of a scandalous conviction, spoke out openly, courageously, and tirelessly under the Nazi regime against the appalling Nuremberg Laws, and his opposition to Nazi terrorism never wavered." It diminished. He also raised his voice openly against the Yellow Star system, emphasizing that it was an affront to human dignity. It is to his credit that this system was abolished. Alongside His Holiness Pius XII, Archbishop Stepinac was the greatest defender of persecuted Jews in Europe.”

 

TESTIMONY OF IVAN MESTROVIC

 

Original Croatian published in “Hrvatska Revija”, Buenos Aires.

 

The death of Cardinal Stepinac deeply moved all Croatians, those living in their homeland and those scattered throughout the world. It also affected me profoundly, both because of my long friendship with the Cardinal and because of his heroic conduct and his suffering in defense of his people and his religious creed. This defender did not use the sword or dubious alliances, but rather the truth and his noble soul, his heroic heart and his faith in God.

His conviction is one of the government's nefarious deeds, with sinister omens for the future. It is ignominious because a just man was condemned, a man whose integrity, both religious and national, was never questioned by any Croat, not even by those who handed down the sentence. He was "judged" for his unwavering faith in the doctrine of Christ and in the right of the Croatian people to live free and independent. The rest is crude fabrication. Milovan Djilas, one of the leaders of the Communist Party and at that time Tito's lieutenant, expressed his solidarity with the above in a conversation with the author of these lines in New York a few years ago. When asked for his opinion on Stepinac and his conviction, he replied:

"To tell the truth, I believe, and I'm not alone in believing this, that Stepinac is a man of integrity, of strong character, impossible to sway. He was, in fact, unjustly condemned, but how many times in history have just men been condemned for political expediency?"

"Is it truly necessary, for political expediency, to clash with the will and feelings of the Croatian people and with the great Christian Church and, consequently, with all religions that profess the existence of God?" I asked Djilas.

"We had nothing to object to regarding his Croatian nationalism, but I could not tolerate his allegiance to the Pope in Rome."

"In your opinion, who has more supporters in Croatia, Tito or Stepinac?"

" "It's a difficult question, but I'll answer it frankly. In Croatia, we don't number more than 3%, and 5% in all of Yugoslavia. However, that doesn't matter to us at all, since Christians also started with a small number of followers."

"But Christians didn't spread their faith by imprisoning and murdering those who didn't follow them; rather, they fought for their faith, facing martyrdom and suffering.

They did so later, when they had the power. Furthermore, the methods of our doctrine are completely opposed to those of Christianity in its beginnings. We annihilate and eliminate everything that obstructs our path; the end justifies the means." They say that's the motto of the Jesuits.

"They say that's the motto of the Jesuits." Communism adopts any slogan it deems appropriate to reach its goal. Poor Djilas; he had to experience this firsthand as soon as a human touch was perceived in his Marxist interpretation.

Another of the communist leaders told me, while discussing the Stepinac case, the same thing as Djilas:

"He is, indeed, a strong and irreproachable man, firm in his convictions. If he had yielded on just one thing, he would be free today and would have spared us the temptation." His Croatian nationalism wouldn't have bothered us, and had he proclaimed the Croatian Church, we would have lifted him to the heavens."

"That, sir or comrade, he couldn't do against his convictions and those of his flock; it's very likely he fully understood what 'lifting him to the heavens' would mean, since nothing would remain of him or his followers after the ensuing fall."

Regarding Stepinac's alleged involvement in the forced conversion of Jews and Orthodox Christians to Catholicism, the following case suffices to refute such a calumny:

The priest (still alive) of the largest Catholic parish in Zagreb showed me Archbishop Stepinac's circular, which, among other things, stated: "If people of the Orthodox or Jewish faith, whose lives are in danger, come to you and wish to be saved by accepting the Catholic faith, welcome them in order to save human lives." Do not demand a special religious doctrine from them, since the Orthodox are Christians like us, and Christianity originates from Judaism. The duty and obligation of a Christian consists, first and foremost, in saving humanity. Once this madness and savagery have ended, those who accepted our religion out of conviction will remain in it; the others, once the danger has passed, will return to their Church.”

Days after the verdict against Stepinac was handed down, I arrived in New York and met with Cardinal Spellman, who showed great interest in the Metropolitan of Croatia. After I informed him at length about Stepinac, both as a priest and as a man, he said to me, deeply moved:

“I will soon be leaving for Rome and will propose to the Holy Father that he appoint him a cardinal and summon him to Rome.” "I believe that way the regime won't oppose his departure from the country." I replied, "From what I know of Stepinac, he won't agree to be separated from his flock."

Spellman looked at me in astonishment and said,

"Do you think he would prefer to spend 16 years in prison rather than be free in the cardinal's purple?"

I replied that I believed Stepinac would choose the former.

A short time later, Spellman called me and informed me that he had been in Rome and had spoken with Pope Pius XII, proposing that Stepinac be named a cardinal. He said the Pope had replied that he had already found a way to propose it, but Stepinac had responded that he could not accept, as he could in no way separate himself from his people.

In a letter he wrote to me, Stepinac repeated the same words regarding his medical treatment, emphasizing that he could in no way leave Croatia, not even if he knew that he would die in a few days. He consoled himself by saying that he could easily endure his imprisonment, arguing that the other priests were in a worse situation and that it was his duty to suffer with them.

When I returned to my homeland last year, my main desire was to see Stepinac, which I managed to do, and he was the first person I visited. I made no secret of this intention and asked no one for permission, although I knew that they did not allow anyone, not even priests, to visit him. I went to Krasic and straight to the rectory. No one stopped or questioned me, and the militiaman guarding the entrance turned his back on me, taking a few steps back. At the entrance to the rectory, I met a man who looked surprised and pleased. At first, I thought he might be the gardener, since he wasn't wearing a cassock and was surely working in the garden. He introduced himself as the parish priest of Krasic and led me inside, where the Archbishop came out to meet me. We were both deeply moved; we embraced and kissed, our eyes filled with tears. The Cardinal was in good spirits, and after a few cheerful words, he led me to a modest room.

"This is the parish office and now the Cardinal's office, living room, and dining room." We soon sat down for lunch, which the nuns had hastily prepared. Since it was Friday, we ate fish, some cheese, bread baked by the nuns, and drank Krasic wine. The nuns were three natives of Bosnia; they cultivated the vegetable garden and managed the modest parish finances. We spent four hours after lunch discussing national problems. The cardinal was cheerful, and throughout our conversation, he didn't show a single word that betrayed any bitterness or hatred toward his adversaries.

"Patience," he said, "we live in a time of unpleasant historical events; there have been similar ones throughout the history of poor humanity. It seems to me that it is written in the Vedas that stupidity and folly are the cause of all misfortunes and evils. Christ taught us that we should forgive as he forgave, and indeed, forgiveness is an integral part of the love he preached. Every day I pray for those who hate me and also for those who love me. How could it be otherwise? They are also blood of our blood, men and brothers, even though our points of view may differ."

Stepinac looked well physically, except for an excessive flush, undoubtedly due to his illness. Spiritually, he was remarkably serene and seemed stronger in spirit than ever. All I could observe was that he was suffering from pain in his operated foot, which he kept elevated under the table. At one point, we got up and went to the window overlooking the fields of Stepinac's village and the peasants working. I noticed that he was enjoying this view and told him that those of us born in the countryside liked the peasants and their hard work with the land, and that I thought he, too, could bear his confinement in the village, in this small house, more easily than if he were confined in his vast archbishop's palace in Zagreb.

"You speak the truth; it's true. Our country folk, despite their continuous and arduous struggle, are closer to the earth and to heaven than those who live in the cities can ever be."

We said goodbye, but I had no feeling that this would be our last meeting, nor did I foresee how much longer his confinement would last. Neither he nor I said a single word about his "pardon" and his return to the archbishopric of Zagreb. I was convinced that Stepinac awaited only God's grace: to persevere in his mission to the end, as had been given to him. His people were dignified by his suffering and death. He did not return to the archbishopric of Zagreb, but to the tomb behind the high altar of his cathedral, from where he will defend, with an even more powerful voice, the freedom of Christ's doctrine and the freedom of his Croatian people.

Stepinac lies in the somber tomb, his face luminous, as the symbol of Croatian inflexibility that will never yield to anyone. Therefore, glory to the great son of Croatia, Aloysius Stepinac!

 

IVAN MESTROVIC. University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA

 

CARDINAL STEPINAC'S LAST LETTER: LETTER TO THE OSIJEK DISTRICT COURT

 

The trial of nine professors and theology students from the Djakovo Seminary in Croatia was held before the Osijek District Court. The trial began on January 28 and concluded on February 8, with the following verdict: the spiritual director and professor of the theology faculty, Cirilo Kos, was sentenced to 7 years; theology graduate Ivan Gaso to 6 years; and theology students Ivan Mrso to 4 years, Ante Bajic to 2.5 years, Zvonko Petrovic to 4 years, Bosko Radilovic to 3 years, and Petar Sokcevic to 2.5 years of strict imprisonment. The communists accused them of spreading chauvinism and inciting open struggle against the existing state order.

In connection with this trial, the court had summoned Cardinal Stepinac as a witness. He addressed a significant letter to the court, dated December 4, 1959, just 68 days before his death. In this letter, the martyred cardinal gives a moving testimony of his suffering and demonstrates once again his strength and indomitable greatness of soul.

The European press gave extensive publicity to this letter, which we translate from the English text published in the London weekly "The Tablet" on March 5 of this year. "I received the summons from the district court regarding questioning in the trial against 'Cyril Kos and others'... I have the honor to reply that I cannot comply with said summons, although in 1953 I responded to a summons issued by the same organ of state power for the purpose of questioning me about the content from an envelope sent to me directly from the Vatican. I write this so that it cannot be alleged that I am causing conflict or committing contempt. The reasons why I cannot appear are as follows:

1. According to information I have had for some time, the UDBA (the Yugoslav secret police) has discovered many of my letters in different parts of the country; for example, those found during a raid on the seminary in Djakovo, where Cyril Kos was spiritual director. In those letters, I replied to priests who sent me greetings and expressed their good wishes. If it could be proven that any of those letters was written by me (and therefore is not forged), I would not deny it, since I would have written it in my capacity as legitimate Superior to a priest of my diocese or another ecclesiastic or friend to comfort and encourage him. If I am to die for this, I am prepared to do so, since I do not consider myself guilty of the slightest infraction regarding these letters.

2. The second reason why I cannot respond to the summons is this: The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of Croatia sentenced me on October 11, 1946, to 16 years of hard labor, first in Lepoglava Prison and then in my current confinement in Krasic. That this sentence was a legal crime against an innocent man is the interpretation of the entire civilized world. Even certain leaders of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia admitted this in a conversation with Professor Mestrovic (the well-known sculptor Ivan Mestrovic, currently a refugee in the United States and a professor at the University of Notre Dame. - Editorial Staff) in the United States. Professor Mestrovic himself told me all this when he came to visit me in Krasic this year. He knows their names.

The consequence of the sentence that scandalized the entire world is that my physical life during the thirteen years of imprisonment and confinement has been on the brink of death. Doctors in our country and abroad have done everything possible to prolong my life, but they have not been able to restore my health to this day. They have taken thirty-four liters of blood, and that is still not enough. They had to operate on both legs to save me from imminent death by thrombosis.

Because of those operations, I am practically an invalid who drags his feet around the house, leaning on a cane. In addition, for the last five years I have suffered from prostatitis, and despite all the medication, there are rare moments when I feel completely pain-free. I will not mention the near-fatal illness that afflicted me two years ago when journalists announced that I was in danger of dying. Nor do I want to recall other ailments that plague me, such as bronchial catarrh. I suffered from that for years. When Dr. Sercer requested that I be allowed to go to the seaside, his request was denied.

The serious state of my health is best known to the parish priest of Krasic and the nuns who frequently spent entire days at my bedside. I was often unable to celebrate Holy Mass, even on Sundays, because of the pain. Every day I spend many hours on the sofa with my swollen feet, raised off the floor to improve blood circulation.

I know you will say: Don't our guards see him walking in the courtyard, going to church, talking to the children, etc.? Yes, I go to church when I can (but often I can't) to fulfill my duty in this way, at least, to offer words of instruction and encouragement to the people, and to help the parish priest of Krasic. No priest can come from the neighboring towns to help him, as they used to do for many years. I also walk in the courtyard, or, to be more precise, I drag myself along, leaning on my cane as best I can, to get some fresh air, as the doctors recommended, and to exercise as much as possible. I told the doctors that it was impossible for me to walk (I didn't for a year), not because I was expressly forbidden to do so, but because of the attitude of the guards who follow me everywhere.

If I fight against the Party's ideology, convinced of its complete falsehood, does this mean that I fight against the State? If the Yugoslav Communist Party is legally permitted to persecute the Catholic Church with fire and sword for the past fifteen years, separating people from the Church, preventing the baptism of children, prohibiting Christian instruction for young people and the celebration of religious marriages; if the law allows the Yugoslav Communist Party to destroy Catholic institutions and schools, printing presses, newspapers and their property, and to commit countless acts of repression, how can anyone dare accuse me of being a criminal if I raise my voice in defense of the sacred things of Catholicism? Have I violated the United Nations Charter of Human Rights, or was it others who violated it?

Because, after bloody injustices and many suppressions, some now want to torture me with lengthy interrogations about things for which I will never admit guilt? Is it not enough for you to know that some of your leaders have openly confessed to Professor Mestrovic that they have no evidence to prosecute me, and that, despite this, the trial was instituted with consequences that have brought me to the brink of death, as I described above?

Therefore, I tell you that I am a man with both feet on the grave, that I am already descending into it. Because I am gravely ill, I cannot comply with your summons. If an attempt is then made to torture me by force with interrogations in my sickbed or during my painful walks in the courtyard, I already refuse to answer anything. Furthermore, I decline all responsibility for the public scandal that would result from such action and that would find publicity in the world press when the slightest attack committed against a half-dead man becomes known. If the organs of government consider that I am dying too slowly, let them then order my physical liquidation as they ordered my legal liquidation fourteen years ago.

Saint Cyprian gave 25 gold coins to the executioner who had to behead him. I have no gold; I can only pray for the person who will eventually execute me, asking the Lord to forgive him in eternity and to allow me to die in peace. If you have provoked me to speak of your inhuman treatment during these long years, do not take it amiss, for the Romans said: Sunt certi denique fines (Everything has its limit). My jailers can continue to stand guard according to your instructions and make my life impossible, but I know what my duty is. With the grace of the Lord, I will fulfill it to the end, to the very end without the slightest hatred or vengeance toward anyone, but at the same time without fear of anyone.

 

Krasic, December 4, 1959.

Alojzije kard. Stepinac

Nadbiskup zagrebacki

 

 


CROATIA IN "BLAVIAN GEOGRAPHY"

PEDRO VUKOTA

Croatia, a nation jealously guarding its traditions, with its own millennia-old state identity, and proud of its unconditional loyalty to the world and to the values ​​of Western civilization, finds itself deprived of all its rights today, while the process of emancipation reaches, without discrimination, peoples with limited education and those in so-called colonial territories. Despite its evolution, identical to that of other European nations, it is not only excluded from the community of nations as a subject of public international law, but it does not even appear on many geographical maps as a national entity. Those who have thoroughly studied the Croatian problem and understand that the names Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia and Istria refer to the regions inhabited by Croats are few and far between.

The complex political events of the last century, determined by the decline and withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from southeastern Europe, which in turn disrupted the balance of power in post-Napoleonic Europe, have been essentially the main cause of Croatia's adverse national reality. The phenomenon of the Turkish retreat reactivated, with full force but with new actors and in new forms, the age-old process founded on the differences and classic antagonisms between the world of Western civilization and that of Byzantine civilization. Imperial Russia, with its dream of a Third Rome, considered itself not only the most faithful interpreter of the traditions of Byzantine civilization, but also claimed the right to inherit the regions recently liberated from the Turks. It practically set the limit of its interests as far as the power of the Patriarchs of Constantinople once extended. Hence the Russian interference in the lives of the young, Orthodox, and mostly Slavic nations of the Balkans. The Western powers opposed this attitude, interpreting it, quite rightly, as a direct threat to a vast and vital geopolitical sector.

The Eastern Question, as this acute international problem came to be called, which ultimately caused such great confusion, had dramatic consequences for the large central and southeastern part of Europe and remained fully relevant throughout the 19th century. The world conflict of 1914-18 was the culmination of that long crisis, and the current situation in the aforementioned European region is a logical projection derived from the Eastern Question.

This long process was arduous for Croatia, resulting in its inability to take control of its own destiny, although, thanks to great efforts and in a highly adverse climate, it achieved its economic and social restructuring and appropriate cultural expansion. On the other hand, so many conflicting interests converged on Croatian territory that, subjecting everything, in a Byzantine style, to political ambitions, they introduced genuine confusion into scholarly literature and public documents directly or indirectly related to the Croatian question. Croatian reality and history were mythologized, even in encyclopedic works, with unparalleled disregard.

This situation threatens to distort even the very notion of what it means to be Croatian and the role this nation played in history and continues to play today in a region where diverse factors influenced the definition of a uniquely sensitive geopolitical identity. In contrast to their geographically neighboring peoples, the Croats, despite having suffered a considerable portion of their national territory under Turkish rule, maintained their political and cultural identity intact.

 

 

CROATIA IN JEAN BLAEU'S "ATLAS MAYOR"

 

In contrast to certain contemporary publications, we are offered an extraordinary and truly valuable example: a map of Croatia published in the 17th century. It comes from perhaps the most difficult period, when the Croats felt the full weight of Turkish pressure on the heart of Europe and when the Croatian state was reduced to the relics of the former Kingdoms of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia.

Johannes Blaeu published his Atlas Mayor in Amsterdam in 1669, in twelve volumes, dedicating a map and extensively documented description to Croatia in the volume on Italy. All of this is remarkably accurate, considering the limited cartographic resources available at the time. Furthermore, all Croatian regions are listed with admirable precision in the descriptive table, and the country's political situation is analyzed in an encyclopedic manner. Nor was the heraldic aspect neglected, although its purpose was primarily decorative, and no detail was omitted from the coats of arms of the main regions. Finally, the dedication further enhances the historical value of the entire document, since, in addressing it to the Ban (Viceroy) of Croatia, Count Peter Zrinski, a figure of great prominence and no less prestige in European life at that time, the full diplomatic title of the Kingdom of Croatia is mentioned.

 

 

 

The map under consideration belongs to the renowned Flemish school, which made an invaluable contribution to science. The geographers and cartographers Mercator and Ortelius inaugurated a long series of modern atlases. Among the great figures of the golden age of Dutch cartography, William Jansoon Blaeu, father, and his son, Joan Wz. Blaeu, stand out. Blaeu the father was a scholar of mathematics and astronomy, founder of a famous cartographic establishment in Amsterdam, and publisher of maps, atlases, wall maps, and terrestrial globes. William remained in his position only briefly, and in 1638, he was succeeded by his son, who gained renown with a general map in two hemispheres using stereographic projections, in commemoration of the Peace of Westphalia. Joan Blaeu published a large world map, considered the pinnacle of Dutch cartography.

 

The Blaeu family's works have been highly praised for their exceptional technical and artistic quality. Their maps are covered with compass roses, ship types, scenes of exotic life, navigational instruments, coats of arms, and more, all meticulously and exquisitely drawn, with the designers giving free rein to their imaginations. Because of their content, these maps were virtually encyclopedias of contemporary geography and justly and deservedly crown the century of Dutch supremacy in cartographic art.

Among the works of Blaeu the Younger, the Atlas Mayor or Geografía Blaviana, published in 1669, stands out. It is the result of an enormous amount of human effort, thought, and research. This work includes a description and map of Croatia as part of a book covering Italian topics. The Spanish edition is titled PARTE DEL ATLAS MAYOR O GEOGRAFIA BLAVIANA, que contenido las cartas y descripcións de Italia. It follows a spherical design held by angels with the inscription INNEFESSVS AGENDO. The cover ends with the indication: In Amsterdam and the office of Juan Blaeu - MDCLXIX.

 

 

The atlas is dedicated to His Serene Highness - His Majesty Don Juan of Austria, son of King Philip IV... I submit to Your Highness the Geographical Description, with historical narratives, enriched with new information and illustrations; and arranged in a concise style... Amsterdam, December 1, 1669. Juan Blaeu.

 

DESCRIPTION OF THE CROATIAN PROVINCES

 

In his description of Croatia, Blaeu first uses the classical name Illyricum and then Slavonia, due to the Slavic character of the Croatian language. The Illyrian attribute for the Croatians is mainly due to the desire and custom of humanists to call European countries by their classical names. The republication of Ptolemy's Geography greatly influenced the use of classical names. Thus, the great humanist Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II (1458-64), in his work *De Europa*, referred to the Croatian lands by the name of the ancient Illyrians. Furthermore, the theory of the Illyrian origin of the Croats gained some traction, because the modern Croatian people are indeed the result of a diverse ethnic background and can be considered partly descended from the ancient Illyrians.

In a way, these classical concepts undoubtedly influenced Napoleon's creation of the Kingdom of the Illyrian Provinces. Illyria is comprised of Dalmatia and the following regions: Croatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia...

The apostolic brief Slavorum gentium, of Pope Leo XIII, when discussing the dioceses with rights over the ancient Illyrian College in Rome, states:

"Nicholas V, our predecessor, acceding to the requests of Jerome of Potomlje, of the diocese of Ragusa, and of other pious men of Dalmatia and Slavonia, with the bull Piis fidelium votis, issued on April 21, 1453, established a hospice in Rome, which was named after Saint Jerome of the Slavs, and later also of the Illyrians, according to the ancient geographical designation, for the purpose of receiving and sheltering the poor faithful who would arrive here from Dalmatia, Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina..."

 

The generalized name Slavic, used as an equivalent for the ethnic name of the Croats, comes from a custom in the Mediterranean world, primarily Italian, of referring to Croats by the common name for peoples of the Slavic linguistic group, Slavi, or, according to the Venetian dialect, Schiavoni.

In modern times, the name Illyrian or Slavic has been given biased interpretations, but the synonym Slavic or Illyrian was used only when referring to the Croats, because they were practically the only Slavic-speaking peoples who had direct contact with the Renaissance centers of Italy. Furthermore, they were the only Slavic people with a navy, and as skilled navigators, particularly the Ragusans, they maintained relationships with maritime nations. The other peoples of the Slavic linguistic group were called by their own names, for example: Bulgarians, Serbs, Poles, etc.

Juan Blaeu, who had a well-formed understanding of Croatia—for in 1666 his workshop printed *De Regno Croatiae et Dalmatiae - Libri Sex* by Ioannes Lucius, the father of modern Croatian historiography—begins his description, transcribed here in fragments, as follows:

"Although this province, also called Illyris, Illiria, and Illirias, is situated outside the borders of Italy, and its description has been placed among the Eastern European provinces, because it fell under Venetian rule in many cities and several islands, it can rightfully be placed among the regions that obeyed that vast dominion."

 

BOUNDARIES. The ancients established the Illyrian border, between the Hungarians and the Adriatic Sea, with the Romans extending its boundaries so far that they included many lands on the other side of the Danube; but with the decline of their empire, these boundaries became much more restricted. Pliny, Ptolemy, Pomponius Mela, Dionysius, Alexandrinus, and Suetonius, in the Life of Tiberius, describe its boundaries variously; which the Moderns have delineated, pointing to the East, Serbia or Rascia; to the North, Urgria, separated from it by the Danube and Dravo rivers; to the West, Styria, Carniola by the Windisch March, and Istria; and to the South, the aforementioned Gulf or Sea of ​​Venice, embracing only the Provinces of Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia, and the latter being commonly called the whole of Illyricum: where Lucas de Linda notes that Croatia and Dalmatia make up the ancient Liburnia, this Region not being different.

 

TERRITORIES AND MAIN RIVERS. Illyricum, for the most part, is a rugged and mountainous country, with many lakes and rivers that fertilize it. From the bordering mountain ranges of Germany flow the Dravo and Savo rivers: the former separates Slavonia from Hungary; the latter crosses that province; and both, joined by other less well-known rivers, merge with the Danube.

"The other rivers that fertilize Illyricum will be mentioned in their own sections. That territory abounds in cattle and sheep, and the breeding of spirited horses. The fruits it yields most abundantly are wines, figs, and similar products. Nor are there any shortages of gold, iron, and mercury. The natives are tall, robust, rugged, docile, and suitable for any occupation."

The author, in listing the provinces, begins with Slavonia, Bosnia, Croatia, and ends with Dalmatia. Referring to Slavonia, he says:

 

SLAVONIA. The province properly called Slavonia is contained within the Drava and Sava rivers; its boundaries being Serbia or Rascia to the east; Hungary to the north; Styria and Carniola to the west; Croatia and Bosnia to the south; with a length of fifty German miles and a latitude between the aforementioned rivers of twelve miles, formerly being part of Upper Hungary. Its metropolis and capital is the city of Zagabria, which alone resisted Ottoman power, its empire remaining free and not recognizing that of any other prince. It is a diocesan see and counted together.

When referring to Bosnia, a vassal kingdom of medieval Croatia and the second Croatian state formation, the author uses the Croatian term Bosna and not the Latinized name Bosnia:

 

BOSNA. "Bosna, which many considered ancient Dardania, is named, according to some, after the Bosna River, which nourishes it and joins the Sava River after having flowed almost entirely through it. Its borders are, to the East, the Province of Serbia; to the North, Slavonia, along the Sava River; to the West, Croatia and part of Dalmatia, which also marks its southern boundary. Its length is forty German miles, and its width fifteen. It was formerly divided into Upper and Lower Bosna: the former was called Ducal, the latter Royal, due to the rule of the Princes who possessed them. Today, both are subject to the Ottoman Empire, along with most of Croatia and Dalmatia; which has divided its government into seven Prefectures or Sanzacatos: Bosna, Poxega, Cernik, Bihek, Likam with Cesbava, Clisoa, and Herzegovina, with the latter being superior to all." Bassa of Bosna, who acknowledges subordination to the Vizier of Buda.

Then, echoing the widespread misconception in Europe at the time, the author treats the Bosnians as if they were barbarians.

In his description of the province properly called Croatia, he refers only to a strip of land between the Adriatic Sea and the Sava River, corresponding to the regions now known as the Croatian Littoral, Western Bosnia, Lika, Gorski Kotar, Pokupje, and partly Posavina.

CROATIA. Croatia, which the Germans call Krabaten, a famous part of Liburnia, faces east towards Bosnia; north towards Slavonia; west towards Carniola, via the Windisch March; and south towards Dalmatia, which also lies to the east. Almost all of it is under Muslim rule, and some portion under Austrian rule. That which is subject to the Turks is governed by ministers subject to the Bassa of Bosnia, as mentioned; and that which recognizes Austrian authority has its own governor. There are many lords of vassals there who treat them with such cruelty that they would rather be lords of the Turks. The metropolis of Croatia was formerly Fluminio, commonly known as Fiume, on the banks of the Flum River, which the Germans call Pflaum. Today its capital is Bigihon... Its territory is fertile with wheat, wine, and various fruits, with some olive groves... The customs of the Croats are very similar to those of the Hungarians, Slavs, and Germans of those borders, so much so that it is said of the nobles of this region: "They surpass the Germans in temperance; the Hungarians in pride and cunning; and the Slavs in ferocity."

The note on Dalmatia is extensive and detailed.

 

DALMATIA. Dalmatia, a famous region of Illyricum or Slavonia, whose description is more appropriate for this volume due to the strongholds held there by the Venetians, borders Alvania to the east, and part of Serbia or Rascia; To the north, Bosnia and Croatia; to the west, Windisch March and Istria; and to the south, the Adriatic Sea with its adjacent islands. The name Dalmatia originated from the city of Dalmium or Delminium, which, during the reign of Gentius in Illyricum, rose up as a free republic. Subjugating the neighboring peoples, including those within the rivers Narenta (or Norin) and Kerka (formerly called Tityus), it extended its dominion over all that territory, later expanding to the aforementioned limits. It was also called Liburnium because this province encompassed Dalmatia and Croatia, as mentioned.

The Dalmatians are fair-skinned and red-faced, well-disposed, agile, brave, and resourceful, peaceful, loyal, constant, spirited, and prudent; the women are courageous and agreeable.

The dominion of Dalmatia is divided among four princes: the part extending from Obroaz or Obrovacio, through the Morlaca mountain range and its borders, as far as Albona, on the Istrian border, with that maritime coast, belongs to the Austrian lineage. The cities of Zara, Nona or Enona, Sebenico, Trau, Spalatro, and Cataro, with their jurisdictions, are under Venetian rule; to which are added the adjacent islands of Cherso, Ossero, Vellia, Arbo, Lesina, Corzola, and other smaller ones. The Republic of Ragusa administers a good part of Dalmatia, the islands, and the mainland. Finally, the Turks hold some important positions in this province, which will be mentioned below.

The land of Morlaca, formerly called Albius or Albio, extends along the Dalmatian coast to the west; it contains three main towns: Segna, Baccari, and Fiume or Rio di San Vito; which, as noted, belong to the Archduke of Austria.

The Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik, in Croatian), which was the third Croatian political formation as a true and sovereign state and which intervened in international politics as a factor of European importance, has been analyzed separately and occupies a separate chapter, recording the smallest details of interest:

 

RAGUSA. The Republic of Ragusa encompasses a large part of Dalmatia, its jurisdiction currently severely restricted by the powerful Turkish presence. Not many years ago, it extended one hundred and twenty miles in length and twelve in width. It borders Alvania to the east; the Duchy of Herzegovina to the north; the part of Bosnia and the remainder of Dalmatia to the west; and the Adriatic Sea to the south. The cities of Ragusa, Stagno, Tribigna, and Sabioncelo, as well as other fortresses and small towns, belong to the Republic. The most significant islands are Agosta (or Longosta), Meleda, São Andre, Mezo, Lupana, and São Pietro.

It is a small city, but very strong and well-governed. Capital of an illustrious Republic, which has endured for so many years against the Ottoman power, administered by a Rector, whose term lasts only one month, a Senate, and other Magistrates. It is a trading center and stopover for goods coming down from Turkey and Eastern countries, destined for Western countries. It is defended by strong walls, high towers, and thick bastions, dominated by a distinguished fortress called São Lorenço. It has a secure harbor, closed with a chain. It suffered a lamentable upheaval caused by a terrible earthquake and a furious storm last year, 1667, the damage being so extensive that it cannot be fully repaired so quickly.

 

THE MAP OF CROATIA

 

The map is presented on a sheet measuring 62 by 54 cm. In the upper left corner are the coats of arms of Bosnia and Dalmatia, and in the upper right corner, the coat of arms of Slavonia and Croatia, the latter checkered in silver and gules, now the national coat of arms. In the lower left corner is the table with the map's title and its contents, in Latin, and its translation into English reads:

Illyrian present-day, which writers commonly call Sclavonia and Italians usually call Schiavonza, is divided into Sclavonia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia. The greater part, occupied by the Turks, is divided into prefectures which they call sanjaks; the rest is held by the Venetians, Hungarians, and Ragusans. The sanjaks are Bosnia, residence of the pasha, Pozega, Cernik, Bihac, Lika and Krbava, Klis, and Herzegovina.

The map's delineation and overall design are meticulously crafted, demonstrating a clear effort to include a large number of geographical features and names. It is worth noting that, despite the inherent errors of the techniques and knowledge of the time, the accuracy of the general outlines is striking, both in the depiction of river courses, mountains, the location of cities and towns, and in the representation of islands and other geographical features, especially regarding borders.

This accuracy holds immense value for modern historiography. The map does not merely define the borders between well-established sovereign states, but rather establishes the limits of a nation at a time when its territory was governed by various powers at war with one another. Even more remarkable is the scientific precision with which the borders were determined and drawn, even within the Ottoman Empire itself, particularly those separating Croatian lands from Serbia, following the course of the Drina River. The same border was recognized at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when the occupation and subsequent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary was authorized, remaining unchanged until 1918. Afterwards, it was maintained as the regional border in Yugoslavia and is currently the border between the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, respectively. During the period 1941-45, it was the border between the Independent State of Croatia and Serbia, then under German and Bulgarian occupation. The only omissions are with regard to present-day Montenegro, which was then called Zeta and, being largely under Venetian protectorate, was considered part of Albania Veneto, with its coastline considered part of southern Dalmatia.

In summary, the borders, both to the East, North, Northwest and East in Istria, as well as to the Southwest and South encompassing the eastern part of the Adriatic Sea, run along the limits of the regions inhabited by the Croatian people, without distinction of the political power in force at that time.

 

 

DEDICATION TO THE BAN OR VICEROY OF CROATIA

 

Unlike other maps in the same book, which refer to the states and principalities of Italy, the author, with his own signature, printed a dedication on this map to the Ban or Viceroy of Croatia, Count Peter of Zrin, a prominent figure. The dedication, in Latin, lists all the titles and honors that Count Zrinski held at that time, which is of particular importance because, for the first time in this work, the full title of the Croatian kingdom is mentioned in accordance with medieval diplomatic practice: Regnum Dalmatiae, Croatiae ac Slavoniae.

Blaeu, in referring to the Croatian territory free from the Turks and not part of the Venetian Lordship, called by historians "Reliquiae reliquiarum," did not clearly define its political organization. As mentioned, there is no reference to the Kingdom of Croatia, but there is to Hungary and the Austrian princes or Empire. The discrimination is made, but without analysis, when it is stated that Croatia "has its own Governor" (ban) and that Slavonia—which at that time politically formed a whole with Croatia proper—"has its own free Empire without recognizing that of another Prince." By mentioning the ban or viceroy, the main function of Count Zrinski, and the title Regnor. Dalmatiae, Croatiae Slavoniae, the explanatory encyclopedic mission was completed.

It should be noted, in view of the mentions of Hungary and the House of Austria, that Croatia, with the Pacta Conventa of 1102, entered into a personal union with the Hungarian crown, with both states retaining their sovereignty. The common king was represented by the ban or viceroy, generally a Croatian nobleman. In 1527, the Croatian Diet (Sabor) elected Ferdinand of Habsburg as King of Croatia, an example later followed by the Hungarians. It was noted that they elected him freely, as they had done when uniting with the Hungarian crown... libero arbitrio se coadiunximus circa sacram coronam Hungariae, et post hoc, nunc erga maiestatem vestram.

In this way, Croatia preserved its own state organization, governed by the ban or viceroy, and the Diet, composed of nobles and estates.

The institution of ban is native to Croatia, as is the word itself, which some believe to be of Iranian origin. It refers to the sovereign's most important advisor. The ban of Croatia was the king's lieutenant, and is often called prorex in Latin documents. His specific functions were to convene and preside over the Diet, he was commander-in-chief of the army, and he commanded the naval force. He was head of the judiciary and head of the executive branch of the kingdom. He was also a member of the sovereign's secret council and, at coronation ceremonies, occupied a place of honor and held the royal apple.

 

THE PERSONALITY OF COUNT PETER ZRINSKI

 

Count Peter of Zrin (in Croatian, Petar Subic Zrinski) was a descendant of a very old family named Subic, who adopted the surname Zrinski after settling in Zrin Castle in Northern Croatia. His most illustrious ancestor was Prince Paul Subic of Bribir, who was the hereditary Ban of Croatia and "Lord of Bosnia." He brought the kings of the Angevin family to the thrones of Croatia and Hungary (in 1301), rulers of the Kingdom of Naples and later also of Poland and Lithuania. Another distinguished Subic Zrinski was Peter's grandfather, Nicholas, Ban of Croatia, who fell heroically defending the strategic fortress of Sigeth, located in southern Hungary, halting the advance of the powerful Turkish army, led by Suleiman II, the Magnificent, on its march towards Vienna (1565). He sacrificed his life by rejecting the crown of Croatia, offered by the Turks. For this, and for his gesture of leading a handful of his soldiers against the Turks upon seeing his fortress destroyed, he was called the Leonidas of Christendom. Although he did not achieve victory, he at least neutralized the potential of Suleiman, who died during the siege. The event has been compared to the Battle of Lepanto. Many historians, such as N. Jorga and P. Herre, consider this date the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

The heroism of the defenders of Sigeth has been the subject of numerous works and poems, both by Croatian and foreign poets. The brother of the dedicatee, Count Nicholas of Zrin, Ban of Croatia (1647-64), in a heroic epic written in Hungarian and published in Vienna (1651), commemorated his grandfather's deeds. Because he wrote it in Hungarian, despite his Croatian origins and position as ban (governor), Hungarian Romanticism considered him Hungarian, although he himself left no doubt as to his nationality. In a letter to the prefect (zupan) of Zagreb, he stated: "I am Croatian and I know Zriniam is." Peter Zrin translated his brother's poem into Croatian, first under the title "Carmen heroicum Croaticum," and then under the title "Adranskoga mora sirena" (Siren of the Adriatic Sea), which he published in Venice in 1660. Peter Zrinski's participation in the struggles against the Turks earned him recognition and praise from the public of the time. He was a wise politician, respected at the imperial court, and also connected with other courts, such as those of Rome and the King of France. He distinguished himself in his firm opposition to the absolutist and centralist tendencies of the Emperor, King of Croatia and Hungary. When it seemed that, due to internal struggles, the Emperor himself was forgetting his commitments to defend Croatia in the fight against the Turks, he attempted to negotiate directly with the Sultan of Constantinople. It was then that he was tricked into coming to court, where he and his brother-in-law, Prince Frankopan, were accused of plotting high treason. On April 30, 1671, Peter of Zrin and Francis Christopher Frankopan were beheaded in Wienerneustadt.

The day of their death is celebrated as a national holiday in honor of the defense of Croatian political and state rights. Their remains are kept in the Zagreb Cathedral, where they were transferred in 1919.

 

Buenos Aires.

 


AN AMERICAN EPIPHANY OF AN ILLUSTRIOUS CROATIAN HUMANIST

PEDRO P. BARNOLA, S.J.

 

For our young American nations, it is always beneficial and undoubtedly of interest to look a little further into the centuries-old culture of the veteran European nations. But perhaps we find greater satisfaction in focusing our attention not so much on some of the so-called great nations of that continent, such as France or Germany, with their preponderant influence on world culture, but rather on some of those other many nations, smaller in size and political power, but no less rich in a rich and varied tradition of cultural life.

The scant, and sometimes almost nonexistent, knowledge we may have previously had here means that when we later encounter, almost by chance, figures and works from these smaller nations, we experience the admiration and satisfaction that always arise in the presence of remarkable things whose existence we were unaware of.

These observations have a very clear and concrete application in the field of the humanities. A practical case that proves this without reservation is one that occurred recently in the Venezuelan cultural sphere.

In 1957, the University of Los Andes (Mérida, Venezuela) published, printed in its own printing presses, a work that, given its characteristics and presentation, should perhaps be considered the first of its kind published to date in this republic. Here is the bibliographic entry:

"M. Marvli davidiadis", Libri XIV. E Codice Tavrinensi in lucem protvlit Miroslavvs Marcovich. Cum viginti fascimilibus. Emeritae. Typis Universitatis. MCMLVII. Publications of the Directorate of Culture of the University of Los Andes, Mérida, Venezuela, No. 62, pp. 278."

We believe it can be stated that until the publication of this excellent volume, very few Venezuelans had any accurate knowledge of the personality of the illustrious Croatian humanist and great Christian Renaissance figure, Marco Marulo (in Croatian: Marko Marulic), a Dalmatian patriot born in the ancient city of Spalato (Split), who lived between 1450 and 1524. We have had the opportunity to review the magnificent volume of studies about Marulo published in Zagreb, Croatia, in 1950, commemorating the fifth centenary of his birth, and we could not help but understand that he is a figure of extraordinary importance in the European humanist movement at the dawn of the Renaissance. His bibliography is extensive; it comprises nearly three hundred titles, of which more than one hundred are various and interesting editions of almost all his works, some of which achieved extraordinary dissemination throughout Europe, which proves the high esteem in which they were held by scholars.

Marulus wrote no fewer than fifteen important works in Latin prose, on historical, scriptural, moral, and other subjects, as well as a treatise on psychology. The quality of these writings is well evidenced by the statement of one of his biographers, who categorically affirms that Marulus wrote nothing that is not worthy of being remembered. He was called the Christian Virgil for his many excellent Latin poems, among which stand out the heroic poem in which he sings of "The Peace of Italy," and the beginning of the Latin translation of the Divine Comedy, of which only the first one hundred and forty hexameters are known. Furthermore, Marulus has the glory of being called the Father of Croatian Literature, for having composed, in impeccable verse in that language, the poem in six cantos that is a version of the biblical story of Judith. Another contemporary poet, a friend and fellow countryman of Marulus, stated unequivocally that this poem, Judith, which the experts in Croatian language nihil gratius nihilque acceptius legere queant.

This figure, therefore, so relevant to Central European Renaissance culture, has suddenly and extraordinarily reappeared in Venezuelan cultural circles thanks to the splendid critical edition of the poem "La Daviadiada," an unpublished work whose bibliographic reference we provided above. The manuscript of this important yet unknown poem was discovered by the distinguished Professor Dr. Miroslav Marcovich in 1953 in the National Library of Turin, while he was conducting research on Cicero. Dr. Marcovich, a graduate in Classical Philology and Greek Philosophy from the University of Belgrade—his hometown—after teaching at that same university, went on to hold the chair of Sanskrit at the Visva Bharati University of Rabindranath Tagore in Santiniketan, India, in 1954-1955. After completing that course, he came to Venezuela and has since held the chairs of Latin and Greek at the University of Los Andes, Mérida, where he has also carried out extensive cultural work, publishing books and articles for various journals. His most recent work is the book Bhagavad Gita (The Song of the Lord), a direct translation from Sanskrit with a rational interpretation. This is a philosophical-religious poem, considered the most popular work of classical Hindu thought, which is included within the great poem "Mahabharata."

As soon as Dr. Marcovich discovered the manuscript of "The Davidiad," he made a microfilm copy of the 157 pages that contained both the text of the poem itself and a final topology, or "allegorical commentary," written in Latin prose by the poet Marulus himself. The poem is divided into fourteen books or cantos, with a total of 6,765 hexameters.

It is a truly remarkable achievement of the editor, Dr. Marcovich, to have managed to read and fully interpret every page and every verse of a manuscript that was in a very lamentable state. During a fire that occurred at the beginning of the century in the Taurinese Library, the water used to extinguish the flames seriously damaged several works, including Marulo's poem. Dr. Marcovich's edition is illustrated with numerous photocopied pages that vividly show the reader the condition in which the manuscript was left. Undoubtedly, those who had previously held it considered it lost. But Dr. Marcovich, far from being daunted by the serious work that a correct transcription would entail, dedicated himself wholeheartedly and with absolute success to preparing the edition we now possess, clearly printed, worthy of inclusion in all good libraries, and deserving of the warmest applause, both for the dedicated restorer and editor and for the Alma Mater of Mérida that sponsored such an extraordinary edition.

It was not for nothing that the aforementioned professor worked with undeniable competence for four years. With Benedictine patience and the affection of a great humanist, only someone with such a solid Latin culture as he could finally deliver the complete copy, down to its smallest details, which was then sent to the printers. Marulo's poem is entirely preserved, and with critical rigor, the very few, but highly appropriate, interpolations that were necessary to reconstruct some passages completely lost in the original are noted.

Works of this nature can be presented with great honor at any important university of classical studies. And the University of Mérida in Venezuela has had the enviable good fortune to benefit from the prestigious work carried out by this great classical humanist, Miroslav Marcovich.

 

Caracas, Andrés Bello Catholic University.

 


NEW CLASS AND NATIONALISM

D.A. Tomasic

 

The system of government developed in current communist countries has caused sharp social differentiation and class stratification. Furthermore, in communist-led countries composed of two or more different nationalities, the hegemony of one nationality over the others has been established.

It is a well-known fact that in the Soviet Union, members of the Greater Russian nationality, comprising less than 50% of the total population, constitute the overwhelming majority in the supreme party bodies (Presidium, Secretariat, Central Committee). They also dominate the highest governmental, military, administrative, and intellectual hierarchies of the country. Moreover, as a result of this hegemonic position of the Greater Russians, non-Russian party members must be sufficiently Russified to be allowed by Russian leaders to occupy positions of power and trust.

The same practice is also applied to positions of power at the local levels of Soviet society. In Ukraine, for example, in 1927, out of 29 million Ukrainians, there were 2,677,000 Great Russians, or 9% of the population. But the Ukrainian Communist Party, according to official statistics from 1927, was then composed of 51.96% Ukrainians and 46.15% Russians. It was precisely the Russian members of the party, along with the Russified Ukrainians, who dominated the party and dictated its policies. A similar situation existed in communist Czechoslovakia. There, the ruling class was predominantly made up of members of Czech nationality. The ranks of this New Class were opened to Slovaks only to the extent that they had been "Chekized."

 

 

The same situation exists in communist Yugoslavia, where members of Serbian nationality and Orthodox faith have managed to establish their hegemony over the other nationalities in the country, as we will demonstrate in the following pages.

The Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, elected at the Sixth Party Congress (1952), comprised approximately 58.5% members of Orthodox origin. Members of Croat-Catholic and Slovene-Catholic descent made up approximately 35% of this supreme body, while Muslim participation was only 5%. The new Central Committee, elected at the Seventh Party Congress in April 1959, exhibits a similar composition. Of the 135 members, 44 (32.6%) are Serbs, 16 (11%) Montenegrins, and 13 (9.6%) Macedonians; that is, there are 73 members, or 54.1%, of Orthodox background. Five members (3.7%) declared themselves Yugoslavs and should be added to the Orthodox group. Of those five, three are Muslims, one is Croat, and one is Serb. The Orthodox group, together with the Yugoslavs, totals 78 members, or 57.8%. The remainder consists of 30 (22.2%) Croats, 23 (17.1%) Slovenes, and 4 (2.9%) from national minorities (2 Albanians, 1 Bulgarian, and 1 Hungarian). Now then; According to statistics from before the Second World War, Orthodox Christians represented 46% of the total population, while the percentage of Catholics reached 39% and that of Muslims 11%. These ratios have not fundamentally changed since the war.

 

 

The national and religious composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia does not fully reflect the dominance of one nationality over the others. The Party's Central Committee is supposed to be a representative body. It is composed of party representatives from the six constituent republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) and, therefore, tends to present a picture representative of various nationalities and religions, at least in appearance.

 

In the military, government, and other hierarchies, this apparent representation is not considered necessary. Thus, for example, statistics regarding the highest military commanders in Yugoslavia indicate that this important body is almost entirely in the hands of Serbian Orthodox officers. A recent survey found that of the 146 highest-ranking generals, 110 (76%) were Serbian Orthodox. Only 36 (24%) were of Roman Catholic background, and not a single general of Muslim religious background appeared in that survey. According to the statistics of January 1, 1958, there were 218 generals on active duty in Yugoslavia at that time. Of these, 162 (74.31%) were of Serbian Orthodox background, 29 (13.31%) Croats, 22 (10.00%) Slovenes, 4 (1.84%) Macedonians, and 1 (0.46%) Jewish. There was not a single one of Muslim faith. [1][33].

The personal data of these generals reveal that a considerable number of Serbian Orthodox Christians joined the partisan movement (Communist guerrillas). during the Second World War for their nationalist opposition to the Croatian authorities and their nationalist opposition to the German occupation forces. Generals of Catholic faith, on the other hand, have been affiliated with the Communist Party and promoted to the rank of general, not only for their abilities, but also for their denationalization and internationalist communist orientation.

 

 

Similarly, Serbian Orthodox dominance in government affairs is evident in the composition of Yugoslavia's diplomatic missions abroad. According to the International Yearbook for 1953, of the 33 heads of Yugoslav diplomatic missions, 23 (70%) were Serbs. More recent statistics (January 1, 1958) show that of the 46 heads of diplomatic missions, 29 (63%) were Serbian Orthodox. Of the remainder, 7 were Croats, 7 Slovenes, 2 Muslims, and 1 Macedonian. Of the 24 Consulates General that Yugoslavia currently maintains abroad, 17 Consuls General (70%) are drawn from the Serbian national pool. Of the remaining 2, 2 were Croats, 3 Slovenes, and 2 Macedonians.

Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia is even more evident in the official statistics of the Party, government institutions, and the military in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This constituent republic serves as a good test of the Party's policy regarding nationalities, since the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is ethnically more mixed than any other Yugoslav region, and no single national or religious group holds an absolute numerical majority.

According to official statistics (1948), Bosnia and Herzegovina has approximately 2,700,000 inhabitants. Of these, 1,150,000 are Serbian Orthodox (42%), 900,000 are Muslim (33%), and 700,000 are Catholic, according to religious affiliation. Regarding their national orientation, 1,260,000 (47%) declared themselves Serbs, 650,000 (24%) Croats, and 800,000 (30%) "nationally undefined Muslims." [27]

The Central Committee of the Communist Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina had 48 members (1955). However, this highest governing body of the Republic was composed of 35 Orthodox Serbs (73%), 10 Muslims (21%), 2 Catholics (4%), and 1 Jew. As for their national orientation, 30 members of this Committee declared themselves Serbs, 17 "Yugoslavs," and only one Croat.

However, there is no such thing as a "Yugoslav" nationality. The main nationalities of Yugoslavia were Croat, Macedonian, Serbian, and Slovene. Montenegrins, however, identify with Serbian nationality. There are also national minorities in Yugoslavia, namely Albanians, Hungarians, and Romanians. Those who declared themselves "Yugoslavs" are, therefore, either those who have become denatured or those who are oriented more internationally than nationally, but who are willing to support the policies of the dominant Serbian group in the Party and the government. This is why, in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all 10 Muslims, 3 of the 35 Serbian Orthodox members, 1 of the 2 Catholics, and the Jewish member declared themselves "Yugoslavs" [28]. This is further confirmation of the political principle of the New Class, established above, according to which those who wish to rise in the Party or government hierarchy must belong to the dominant nationality or be assimilated into it.

Even the recruitment of ordinary members is governed by the same political principle. Thus, for example, in 1950, the Communist Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina had 54,150 members. Of these, 37,320 (70%) were Serbian Orthodox by religious background, 8,714 were Muslim, 7,519 were Catholic, and 607 were Jewish.

However, 41,005 (81%) declared themselves Serbs, 5,117 Croats, 4,920 "Yugoslavs," 3,012 "nationally undefined Muslims," and 5 others [29]. Here we note that a relatively large number of Muslims, who otherwise overwhelmingly declared themselves "nationally undefined," listed "Serbian" or "Yugoslav" nationality upon joining the party. The same occurred with a number of Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who otherwise identified almost exclusively as Croats.

The policy of favoring Serbian or Yugoslav national orientation at the expense of Croatian national orientation is also evident in other institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, the regular police (militia) of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 11,700 officers. Of these, 7,832 (70%) are Serbian Orthodox, 2,100 are Muslim, and 1,718 are Catholic. But with regard to their national orientation, 8,340 (79%) declared themselves Serbs, 2,510 "Yugoslavs," and only 380 Croats and 420 as "nationally undefined Muslims" [30].

Among the militia officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same trend was even more pronounced. Of the 620 police officers, 411 were Orthodox, 130 Muslim, and 79 Catholic. Regarding their national orientation, 502 (81%) identified as Serbs, 102 as Yugoslavs, and only 14 as Croats and 2 as Muslims of undefined nationality. As expected, the same situation prevailed in other state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, of the 196 members of the Council of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the highest legislative and administrative body of the Republic, 144 (73.48%) declared themselves Serbs, only 38 (19.35%) Croats, 9 (4.59%) Yugoslavs, and 4 (2.05%) as "nationally undefined Muslims."

This dominance of Serbian and Serbian Orthodox elements in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is not a new phenomenon. It is rather traditional in the Yugoslav communist movement, which from its inception had Serbian Orthodoxy as its national and cultural foundation. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia took shape in April 1919, when, at the initiative of the Social Democratic Party of Serbia, a meeting of all the socialist parties of Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade. The purpose of this meeting was to create a communist party and join the International. The Communist Party, which had just been formed in Moscow under Lenin's leadership, boasted 69,000 members by the end of 1920, mostly Serbian Orthodox.

Elections held that same year for the Constituent Assembly also indicate that the vast majority of communist votes came from Orthodox regions such as Montenegro, Macedonia, and Serbia. Similarly, parliamentary representation and party leadership at that time were largely in the hands of Orthodox Christians due to their religious background. Of the total communist parliamentary representation, 82 percent were of Orthodox descent, even though Orthodox Christians then comprised only 46 percent of the total population. There were only 9 Catholics and 1 Muslim among the communist deputies, compared to 48 Orthodox Christians. Regarding their national affiliation, there were only 6 Slovenes, 3 Croats, and 1 [unclear - possibly "other" or "other"]. or 2 Macedonians. Forty-eight were Serbs (including 4 Montenegrins).

Like the top party leadership, the lower party cadres were also overwhelmingly Orthodox and Serbs. This is evident from the national and religious composition of the group of 502 candidates for the parliamentary elections, of whom 342 (almost 69%) were of Orthodox and Serbian descent, while 140 (28%) were Catholic and only 2.3 percent were Muslim. The percentage of Catholics in the total population of Yugoslavia at that time was 39 percent and that of Muslims 11 percent. [33].

Since the Serbian leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party at that time tended to impose its national ideology on the Party, an open conflict arose with the policy of the Communist International, led by Stalin. At that time, Stalin demanded that the Communist Party The Yugoslav leader sought to exploit internal national antagonism between Serbs and Croats, between Serbs and Macedonians, and between Serbs and Montenegrins. He wanted the Party to advocate for national separation in order to bring about the country's disintegration and thus create the conditions for the Communists to seize power. Such a policy, however, completely contradicted the ideas and feelings of the Serbian leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party. These people had identified with Serbian national ideals and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia under Serbian leadership. [35].

Precisely because of this conflict between the Serbian leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party and Stalin, in 1938, Josip Broz Tito, a Croat by birth, rose to the highest position in the Party as its General Secretary. Tito, however, in his work organizing and preparing the Party for the future revolution, increasingly relied on the Serbian element of the Party, particularly since the Party made a concerted effort to attract Serbians in much greater numbers than those of the other Yugoslav nationalities. In his "cadre policy," Tito paid special attention to young student and university groups. In this respect, a number of secondary schools in Montenegro, Bosnia, and Western Serbia, as well as the University of Belgrade, were of fundamental importance from the standpoint of the Party's future. It was precisely in these educational institutions, and especially among students of Serbian Orthodox origin, that Tito found his most enthusiastic and capable supporters.[36] The result was that Tito recruited and trained future party, military, and administrative leaders from among these young people. He himself admitted this when reviewing the Party's work regarding organization and propaganda. Tito said: "Much of the credit for this work must be given to the Party organization at the University of Belgrade. This university had long been known for its freedom of thought, especially between the two world wars. First of all, most of the students were the children of peasants and workers, generally from Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbian regions. Most of these students lived at home and came to Belgrade only to take exams; they were in constant contact with the people" [37].

Moreover, these were the same people who had formed the Yugoslav contingents in the Spanish Civil War.

These same brigades later became the nuclei of the partisan guerrilla struggle during World War II. In the course of these guerrilla activities, at the end of November 1942, the communist partisans felt bold enough to undertake the organization of a clandestine legislature, their first attempt to seize power in Yugoslavia. Of the 68 deputies present at the inaugural session of this body, 53 (78%) were Serbian Orthodox, 10 were Croat Catholics, 4 were Muslims, and 1 was a Serbian Jew.[38] The main struggle of the partisans, the organization of the first partisan government and then the organization of the revolutionary partisan government (November 1943), took place in Western Bosnia, in an area inhabited mainly by Serbian Orthodox.[39]

The reasons why Serbian Orthodox Christians were attracted to the Yugoslav Communist Party in comparatively much greater numbers than other nationalities and religions, even under the leadership of a man of Croatian and Catholic origin, are numerous.

For centuries, the Serbian Orthodox people felt a close affinity with the Russian Orthodox people based on their shared religion (Eastern Orthodox) and linguistic and cultural similarities. Slavophilism, which claims superior qualities for Slavs and their culture, and Pan-Slavism, which promotes the cultural and political unity of all Slavs under Russian leadership, took deep root among Russians and Bulgarians, as well as in Serbia and Montenegro. This was true both among the leaders and the people in the small Slavic Orthodox countries. Orthodox Russia was considered "Great Mother Russia." Russia had helped them in the past to achieve and consolidate their national independence. They also hoped that Russia would protect them in the future and help them strengthen and extend their national power.

It should be noted that for Eastern Orthodox peoples, religion and nationality are one and the same. For historical reasons, in Eastern Christendom, unlike Western Christendom, the Church has been identified with the State. Consequently, the Orthodox Church considered it its duty to promote the political interests of the State with which it was associated. Therefore, the Orthodox Church had adopted political and national objectives in addition to its religious functions. Consequently, several Orthodox churches promoted religious creeds alongside nationalism among their adherents. These national churches were named according to their national identities (Russian, Serbian Orthodox, etc.). Hence, nationalism among these people, due to its blending with religion, took such deep root.[40] Since Slavophile and Pan-Slavic ideology also implied Orthodox supremacy, it could be expected that such movements would find supporters especially among Orthodox Slavs.

At the same time, however, rivalries, conflicts, and wars erupted among various Slavic nations. Some expanded at the expense of others and established their hegemony, using the ideology of Pan-Slavic unity as justification. The Great Russians, for example, ruled over the Ukrainians and Belarusians, while the Czechs dominated the Slovaks.

Similarly, Serbia was able to impose its political hegemony over the vast areas inhabited by the Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Slovene peoples by the end of the First World War. Serbia capitalized on its position as an ally of the victorious powers in the war and justified its domination over the other South Slavic nations in the name of "Yugoslav (South Slavic) unity." In the Second World War, the Serbs managed to regain their former supremacy, this time taking the form of communism.

Serbs were increasingly drawn to the communist movement during the course of World War II, not so much by its internationalist communist ideology. They had violently resented becoming a national minority in the newly established Croatian and Catholic state. Furthermore, they were attracted to the Slavophile and Pan-Slavic content of Russian communism. For many of them, Bolshevism was acceptable as long as it was Russian and Slavic and offered the prospect of a restored Yugoslavia under Serbian Orthodox leadership [41].

Another important reason for the communist appeal to Serbian Orthodox Serbs lies in the psychology of communism. The communist movement, as conceived by Lenin, is a militant organization whose objective is to seize power by any and all means. In both its ideology and practice, this movement emphasizes conspiracy, violence, and cruelty in the pursuit of power and in the treatment of adversaries, all of whom are considered "enemies." The Leninist-type communist party, in its internal organization, follows the principles of authoritarianism, rigid military discipline, total dedication to the party, and selflessness for the cause of the revolution. Such a party, therefore, tends to seduce people of a particular psychological and ideological character. However, such a party must proceed with a selective approach in the affiliation and training of its members and "cadres" (party officials). For this reason, one of the fundamental aspects of the organization of the communist party consists of its "cadre policy," that is, the methodical and meticulously planned selection of its members, their training and indoctrination, their promotion based on rigorous tests of ability, performance, and loyalty, and their advancement to positions and functions based on special skills, talents, and trustworthiness.[42] One of the most decisive criteria in the promotion of cadres is the degree of "party loyalty," that is, the sense of dedication and selflessness for the cause, and of subordination to the supreme leadership.

Generally speaking, the party, in its pre-revolutionary and revolutionary phases, due to its psychological aspects, attracts and recruits into its ranks dynamic, aggressive, dedicated, fanatical, and conspiratorial types of militants. Furthermore, because of its psychological facets, its ideals of a classless society, its universal brotherhood, and its cultural and personal freedom, the party also draws upon, in this phase of its development, a number of idealists with a universal orientation and utopians of various stripes. Moreover, based on its supposed struggle against all forms of exploitation and oppression, the party vigorously addresses, in this phase of its development, numerous members of subjugated nations, exploited classes, and exiled minorities.

It was to be expected, therefore, that the Yugoslav Communist Party, in its revolutionary phases and due to its psychological and Pan-Slavic aspects, would exert a strong attraction among the Orthodox Serbs of the Dinaric Alps.

These mountain people from the regions of Montenegro, Western Bosnia, Western Serbia, and Central Croatia (Lika) are renowned for their traditional militancy and rebelliousness, their military qualities and resilience in the face of hardship, their lust for power and their ruthlessness, as well as for their sense of heroism, dedication, and self-sacrifice in the name of Orthodox Serbs.[43] Such traits were particularly emphasized during the Second World War, when the Orthodox Serbs of these regions found themselves under Catholic Croatian authorities. The party, therefore, paid special attention to these people both before and during the war. As a result of all these circumstances, the majority of the highest-ranking military commanders in contemporary Yugoslavia came from the Dinaric region (Map I) [44]. Their ideological orientation was shaped by the influence of Belgrade, the seat of Serbian Orthodoxy and Serbian nationalism (Map II). [45]

 

III

 

According to Leninist teachings, when communists seize power in a country, they must establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat," consolidate it, and develop it as the basis for expanding communism to other countries, pursuing their goal of world revolution. This is the third phase of the world revolution. Therefore, the party that has come to power in a country continues to recruit militant, dedicated, fanatical, ruthless, and power-hungry individuals. This becomes imperative for the promotion of revolutionary ideology; even more so, for the self-perpetuation in power of a small group of professional and dedicated conspirators who have established a totalitarian government in opposition to the vast majority of the population.

These circumstances, however, led to the formation of a ruling caste—the New Class—which seized control of the entire government apparatus and completely monopolizes the social, economic, and educational life of the country. Occupying such a position, the party must also rely on highly skilled and educated individuals, specialists in all spheres of political, economic, and military activity. To govern efficiently, the party depends on the knowledge of these experts. And to secure their loyalty, the party rewards them with relatively high salaries, comforts, and special privileges. The party also depends on the knowledge and expertise of scholars and teachers, novelists and artists, publicists and journalists. The result is that all that "intelligentsia"—administrative, technological, and humanistic—promotes vested interests in its statutes and holdings and therefore tends to identify with the New Class.

It would seem logical, then, that the communist party in a multinational state should direct its personnel policy to avoid antagonisms among the various national and ethnic groups in the country. Apparently, the consolidation of party power would be greatly facilitated if harmonious and friendly relations existed among the various national and ethnic groups in the country, rather than hostile ones. To achieve this objective, one might expect the party to systematically try to introduce a more or less proportional representation of the various national and ethnic groups in the highest party ranks and in the highest institutions of the country, whether administrative and legislative, judicial and military, economic and educational. This does not happen, however. All contemporary communist regimes in multinational countries have thus far exhibited a strong tendency toward a monopolistic concentration of political, economic, and social power in the hands of a relatively small group of people belonging to the dominant group or who are entirely assimilated into it.

The party is well aware that such a tendency represents one of the weakest points of its government. This is demonstrated by the fact that the party promotes laws and decrees, statutes and regulations that make all national discrimination and national antagonism punishable by law. Top party leaders and officials frequently make statements to this effect. But this is pure ideology, while in practice we see that such rules and regulations are applied only to subjugated nationalities and not to the dominant nationality. Thus, we often hear of prosecutions and trials against "nationalist bourgeois" in Ukraine and in the Asian and Baltic republics of the Soviet Union. Such trials were frequently mounted against Slovaks and Croats, as well as against Jewish intellectuals, but rarely, if ever, against Russians, Czechs, or Serbs.

The reasons for this seemingly illogical policy stem from the necessity and desirability of a monolithic Party and State structure in a communist-controlled society. When Lenin conceived the organization of the communist party at the beginning of the 20th century, his primary objective was to develop the most effective instrument for combating the Russian Tsarist police; an instrument that could systematically undermine the Tsarist regime and, if necessary, allow the party to seize power. Lenin believed that to achieve these aims, the communist party should be limited to a relatively small number of professional conspirators, well-trained, disciplined, and completely devoted to the cause of the revolution. This group should be tightly integrated around its top leadership, which, in turn, would be composed of "a dozen talented people working in perfect harmony."

Lenin also conceived of the communist party as a militant and combative organization, permanently engaged in clandestine or open warfare with its enemies until their defeat and destruction. However, in order to achieve maximum combat efficiency, the party, according to the Leninist conception, had to maintain "absolute unity of will and action," and a strict, subordinate military discipline from the ranks and cadres below the supreme leadership. Such a high degree of monolithism can only be achieved if the party leaders and cadres think and act alike; that is, if they possess similar or identical training, experience, and personality, and can work in unison, without friction. Those who cannot achieve such a degree of uniformity must be systematically purged.

Such a party organization proved highly efficient in action and almost impenetrable and immune to infiltration by its enemies, particularly by enemy secret services. It was precisely this party organization that enabled Lenin and his Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia in 1917. Lenin, consequently, concluded that such a party should be organized internationally and thus become the General Staff of the world proletariat in its revolution against the bourgeoisie of the entire world. Hence, the model of the Russian party, through the institution of the Communist International, was imposed on communist parties worldwide. In certain cases, this system of party organization served its purpose as well and as efficiently as in Russia, with regard to seizing power and establishing the party dictatorship. The most salient examples of this are the cases of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party.

Once in power, and in order to perpetuate themselves as the ruling class, the Bolsheviks declared that the internal "enemy" had not been defeated. In reality, they maintained that the enemy was now more active and threatening than before they had seized power. And in order to eliminate any opposition to their rule, Lenin and his followers deemed it essential, for the purpose of total control of society, to apply the conspiratorial system of government to the administration of the state as well. In this way, Russia also became the model of state organization applied in the formation of all states under communist control.

Now, to maintain "absolute unity of will and action," both in the party and in the state, the functioning of party forums and legislative bodies in a society under communist rule cannot resemble the functioning of political parties and representative institutions in Western-style governments. In Western political systems, there is almost complete interplay of various social forces, both within political parties and in representative institutions. Inter-party factions, as well as coalitions, alliances, and blocs between parties and multi-party groups, tend to form and dissolve freely, depending on circumstantial pressures and the variable and often conflicting political and social objectives of the represented groups.

But in the Leninist system of political monolithism, factionalism and other groupings formed to achieve different political objectives, or the same objectives by different means, are prohibited as sacrilege and punished with purges (expulsion or execution). Instead of the free play of social forces and decisions made by majority vote, in the Communist Party system, the group that manages to dominate the Central Committee imposes unanimity of votes from above within the party and legislative bodies. Through party directives, "unity of will and action" is also achieved in all governmental, economic, educational, and military institutions.

Such a high degree of regimentation and conformity within the Party and the State is achieved through a system of "conspiratorial manipulation." In this organizational structure, every party forum and every level of leadership in all public institutions is divided into several small groups, varying according to their nature and degree of authority. The smallest, but also the most significant of these groups at the local, regional, or national level, is the impermeable, highly compact core of decision-makers. This "Sanctum" of the party or governmental body puts its decisions into practice through a small group of capable and loyal advisors and executors (the "inner circle"). They also secure the support of "front men," chosen for their prestige within the party ranks (the "party mass"), their ability to influence broad segments of the population, and their willingness to follow the directives of the party's internal leadership without question. In such a structure, each and every decision of the party's supreme leadership is immediately communicated to the party nucleus at each level of the party and from there to the leadership nucleus at each corresponding level of the state organization ("transmission belt").

In each party body and at each level of the party organization, the decision-making nucleus is generally organized as a "secretariat." The monolithic unity of will and action throughout the party is achieved through the "Axis of Secretariats," which runs uninterruptedly from the top to the bottom of the party pyramid (see the Charter). Political unity (the "party line") within the Secretariat Axis is maintained according to the principle of "inverse representation." This approach involves having one or more key figures in each party body and at each level of the party organization. These individuals are members of the higher party body and thus represent it and its policies in the lower party units, not vice versa. In this way, an unbreakable link is established between the highest party body—the Secretariat of the Central Committee or the Politburo (Presidium, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee)—and the lowest party unit, that is, the basic party unit or cell.

This top-down control system is reinforced by the principle of "democratic centralism," according to which decisions made by a higher party body must be implemented by lower party bodies "unquestionably, promptly, and correctly." In theory, "democratic centralism" also implies free discussion based on majority votes within the ranks. In practice, however, lower party bodies are limited to discussing how to carry out the directives of a higher body. This top-down control system is further reinforced by another mechanism: the principle of "vertical communication," according to which party bodies at the same organizational level cannot communicate with each other directly, but only through their common superordinate body. This helps prevent the formation of organized opposition within the party ranks against directives from above. Similarly, the principle of direct top-down control empowers the top leadership of the Party to interfere directly in the affairs of party forums at any level of the party organization, through a system of "instructors." These are advisors and inspectors who serve as envoys and watchdogs of the supreme party leadership at the lower levels of the party organization. They verify whether party directives have been executed promptly and correctly. For this entire organizational system to function smoothly, the main Secretariat at the top of the party pyramid decides on the promotion of each person to the decision-making core and the inner circle at every level of the party organization. Such promotions are based on merit and ability, as well as loyalty to the supreme party leader.

Elections for the Party Congress, which represents the party's supreme legislative body, are not direct, but indirect. This allows the party leadership to manipulate the Party Congress elections in such a way as to ensure the election of loyal, yes-men. Thus, this entire system of monolithic and conspiratorial organization allows the top party leadership and its Secretarial Axis to perpetuate themselves in power and establish their permanent control over the party and its policies. Only when the supreme leader of the party is removed through "palace revolutions" do more radical personal changes usually occur, both in the highest party bodies and throughout the entire Secretarial Axis.

 

The party core, or ruling caste, maintains its total control of society by monopolizing and concentrating all property and all sources of production and income in its hands. Furthermore, the ruling caste reinforces each individual's sense of total dependence on the party and the state for their life and subsistence through the systematic control of thought and feelings. This form of psychological manipulation is achieved through the monopolization and concentration in the hands of the party of all means of communication among members. However, since the communist-led economy is an economy of scarcity, the only way to ensure the loyalty of the necessary experts in state administration and economic management—in research and technology, education, and propaganda—is to reward them at the expense of the peasants, industrial workers, and the lower bureaucracy (employees, clerks, and technicians).

IV

 

The fundamental problem for the party, therefore, lies in preserving and perpetuating in its hands the administration of such a complex and delicate system of total control. One way to solve this problem could be the "open door" policy. That is, by admitting all skilled people into the party, without regard to their national, social, or religious background. Such a policy, however, would tend to weaken the party in its ideological and disciplinary aspects. It could easily lead to the disintegration of the monolithic party system and cause the transfer of power and state control from the party to the bureaucracy. Therefore, in order to avoid such a fate, the party had to resort to other means to concentrate all control in its own hands.

In the legislative, administrative, and judicial spheres, the party achieved such a high degree of control through the system of "interlocking governing boards." In other words, in every governmental body, in every state institution, and at every level of state organization (municipality, district, republic, nation), the core of oversight is composed of the same people who form the core of the party at that same level of organization. Furthermore, the party, mindful of the danger of spurning loyalty, must rigorously enforce the principle of "primacy of loyalty to the party." Any party official who demonstrates adherence to a non-party function in a way that could compromise their primary loyalty to the party must be ruthlessly purged, regardless of their professional expertise or previous party merits. Such a system of control attaches particular importance to the armed forces, including the police forces, since these are the only organized institutions that possess weapons and could therefore challenge the supremacy of the Party and overthrow its government through armed rebellion.

The principle of "interlocking governing boards," as a Party-State organizational system, nevertheless entails serious drawbacks. The need for ideological identity and similarity in the personal background of the party leadership and party officials almost inevitably leads to the recruitment of the party's leadership apparatus and state officials from among people of the same ethnic background. Due to cultural identity and similar experiences, people from the same social and cultural sphere tend to have similar mindsets, understand each other better, and have similar or identical orientations, aspirations, and goals.

They are more likely to trust each other than people from different linguistic, social, and religious backgrounds.

Consequently, those with similar or identical roots prefer to attract a contemporary to the party, support each other in the rise through the party and state hierarchies, and develop common vested interests in consolidating, strengthening, and perpetuating their positions within the party and the state. This forms a closed communist ruling caste—the New Class.

In a multinational state, such circumstances almost inevitably lead to the recruitment of party cadres, especially from the party's core leadership and, consequently, from the New Class, primarily from a national group. Then, once established in power, this New Class, when its vested interests are at stake, pushes party policy in the direction of "national communism."

The objectives of "national communism" are the protection of the New Class against the intrusion of ruling classes from other communist countries, and particularly from the New Class within the Soviet Union. For internal use, the New Class, both in the Soviet Union and in certain communist-led countries such as China, Yugoslavia, and Poland, efficiently exploits nationalist sentiments to boost morale and galvanize the psychological climate. This was necessary to combat the lack of enthusiasm, indifference, and apathy prevalent among broad segments of the population, who feel mistreated and exploited by the new rulers. In multinational countries under communist rule, communist leaders failed in their attempt to cultivate a "Soviet," "Yugoslav," or "Czechoslovak" patriotism or nationalism. Consequently, the only nationalism and patriotism they could draw upon for encouragement and moral support was that of the dominant nationality. They observed that many members of the dominant nationality, even if opposed to communism, would support the party as long as it promoted the national interests of their group. This course of events, in turn, reinforced the tendency to incorporate members of the dominant nationality into the New Class.

However, such a development provokes violent reactions among subjugated nationalities and other ethnic groups, depending on their level of national or ethnic consciousness. These nationalities and other ethnic groups eventually perceive that they are enslaved not only by the party dictatorship but also by the hegemony of a foreign nationality, and that they are being used to promote the interests of the dominant nationality. In such circumstances, the subjugated groups often blame the dominant nationality for all the ills caused by the dictatorship and the party's policies.

Lacking legal means of opposition, the oppressed nationalities often resort to spontaneous and unorganized mass resistance, reflected in political passivity and disinterest in state affairs. Such demoralization tends to reinforce existing apathy and decline productivity among the most exploited segments of the population, particularly industrial workers, peasants, and the lower bureaucracy, regardless of their national origin. This demoralization often manifests itself later in phenomena such as alcoholism, hooliganism, sexual promiscuity, and criminality.

The regime's countermeasures, limiting individual and group freedoms to control these simmering national resentments, do not restrain, but rather promote, the progressive development of group consciousness. These measures only intensify group hostility among people who consider themselves nationally and socially exploited. Therefore, instead of solving the national question, which was one of communism's greatest claims, they accentuated this source of internal conflict.

Moreover, the New Class in the Soviet Union, due to its military and economic supremacy, was prone to extract economic and political advantage from other communist states. This policy provoked tensions and open clashes between the Soviet Union and other communist-controlled countries, forcing the Soviet Union to revise its methods with respect to other nations. Nevertheless, it insisted on its leading role as an imperative condition for preserving unity and increasing the fighting efficiency of the communist world.

Therefore, every contemporary communist state, founded on the Leninist principles of party-state organization, has developed a ruling class that, in defense of its vested interests, became nationalist, not only with respect to subjugated nationalities but also in relation to other communist and non-communist countries. At the same time, however, all these ruling classes of various communist states have deemed it necessary to maintain unity and solidarity among themselves. This policy of unity is essential as a means of consolidating and perpetuating their power in relation to internal opposition and to the non-communist world.

Each multinational state, governed by communists, and the entire "communist camp" thus faces three basic "contradictions": the clash of interests between the New Class and the vast oppressed masses of the population; the clash of interests between the dominant nationality and the subjugated nationalities or ethnic minorities; and, finally, the clash of vested interests among the ruling classes of various communist states, while at the same time being obliged to maintain international solidarity with one another.

Speaking of the national imperialism of his time, Lenin highlighted three important "contradictions": the conflict between the workers and the owners of the means of production, particularly the monopolistic trusts; the conflict between various imperialist nations over territorial possessions, markets, and raw materials; and the conflict between national imperialism and its colonial and dependent peoples. Lenin declared that, due to its internal contradictions, the days of national imperialism were numbered, that imperialism was in its final stage of development. He envisioned a party of revolutionaries and professional conspirators, whose objective was to overthrow the "moribund" system of imperialism and build upon its ashes a new and better order—a communist order.

But it seems that the New Class—which evolved from the foundations of Lenin's political monolithism and calls itself communist—has developed its own system of economic exploitation and national imperialism. The question now is: Will the New Class be able to resolve its own contradictions before it disintegrates as a result of internal and external pressures?

 

Bloomington, Indiana University.

 


 

SCORE OF THE CROATIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM

 

 

 


CROATIA – GEOGRAPHICAL, ECONOMIC, AND HISTORICAL DATA

 

GEOGRAPHY Geographical Location: between 42°30' and 46°30' North latitude and 14°30' and 20°30' East longitude.

 

Area: The historical Croatian provinces – Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina – cover a total area of ​​115,000 km².

Borders: To the South, the Adriatic Sea, opposite Italy; to the West, Slovenia; to the North, Hungary; and to the East, Serbia and Montenegro. The Croatian coastline, one of the most rugged in the world, stretches for 1,560 km, or 600 km as the crow flies.

Topography: In the northeast, it is characterized by the Danubian Plain and the foothills of the Alps, while the western and southern parts belong to the Dinaric Alps, a karst mountain range. The highest point is 2,228 m.

Rivers: The Danube forms the northeastern border, with its main tributaries, the Drava and Sava, and its tributaries the Drina, Bosna, Vrbas, Una, and Kupa, totaling 5,578.9 km in length. Other rivers, 487 km long in total, flow into the Adriatic: the Rasa, Zrmanja, Krka, Cetina, and Neretva. Therefore, Croatia is both a Danubian and a Mediterranean country.

Climate: Mediterranean along the coast, gradually becoming continental towards the north and east. The average annual temperature is 10-17°C. Rainfall varies between 600 and 3,000 mm.

Population: In 1931, the historical Croatian provinces had 6,300,000 inhabitants, and currently have approximately 7,200,000. Population density (1931): 55 per km², rural population; in 1960, 60%. Certain Croatian communities live in neighboring countries: Montenegro, Serbia, Hungary, Austria, and Italy. Approximately 2 million Croatians reside outside Croatia, mostly in transatlantic countries, especially in the Americas.

Administrative Division: Each of the historical provinces has an absolute majority of Croatian population. Catholics and Muslims are Croats, while Orthodox Christians are politically influenced by the Serbian National Church, which also has jurisdiction in Croatia.

Religion: Catholics 68.1%, Eastern Christians (Orthodox) 17%, Muslims 13%, Protestants, Jews, and others 0.9%.

Administrative Division: Currently, Croatia is part of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and is divided into two: 1) the People's Republic of Croatia, which includes Slavonia (excluding the eastern part of Sriem, annexed to Serbia), Dalmatia (excluding Boka Kotorska, annexed to Montenegro), Croatia, and Istria; and 2) the People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, separated from the other Croatian provinces by virtue of the official theory that Croats of Muslim faith are not nationally defined, thus giving rise to the marked predominance of the Serbian minority.

 

Cities: The capital of Croatia is Zagreb (500,000 inhabitants), currently the seat of government of the People's Republic of Croatia; Sarajevo, 130,000 inhabitants, is the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other important cities are: Rijeka (Fiume), 80,000 inhabitants; Split, 75,000 inhabitants; Osijek, 80,000 inhabitants; Banjaluka, 40,000 inhabitants; and approximately 30,000 inhabitants each for Mostar, Dubrovnik, Tuzla, Karlovac, Pula, and Zenica.

National Emblems: Flag: tricolor, three horizontal stripes of equal shape and size; top stripe red, middle stripe white, and bottom stripe blue. Coat of Arms: checkered, divided into five squares, gules and argent (red and white). National Anthem: "Lijepa nasa domovina" (Our beautiful homeland).

Comparative Data: Croatia, due to its size and population, surpasses the following European countries: Albania, Denmark, Slovakia, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Serbia, and Switzerland; its area is larger than that of Belgium, Bulgaria, Bohemia, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Portugal, and it has more inhabitants than Finland, Greece, Norway, and Sweden.

 

ECONOMY

 

Agricultural and Livestock Production: Of the cereals, wheat and corn are the main crops, in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the population. Industrial crops include tobacco, flax, hemp, oilseeds, sugar beets, hops, pyrethrum, and medicinal and aromatic plants. Wine and olive harvests are significant. The most abundant fruit trees are plum, apple, cherry, walnut, and fig. Cattle, pigs, sheep, horses, and poultry are raised and exported. Various species of fish are found in the sea and rivers.

Forestry industry: After Finland, Croatia is the most forested country in Europe (40% of its total area). Slavonian oak is world-renowned.

Mining: There is a surplus of coal, iron, salt, and cement for domestic consumption. Croatia is one of the world's leading producers of bauxite. Recently, considerable oil fields, perhaps the richest in Europe, have been discovered and are currently being partially exploited.

Industry: The manufacturing of agricultural and livestock products is advanced, and the timber industry is developed, while in recent decades the metallurgy and shipbuilding industries have been progressing (500,000 tons annually).

Industry has sufficient energy resources, primarily electricity, generated by hydroelectric power plants. In this respect, the possibilities are inexhaustible.

Communications: A relatively dense rail and road network extends across northern Croatia, also connecting it to river (Danube-Sava) and seaports. Important international routes pass through Croatia: from Western Europe towards the Near East and from Central Europe towards the seaports. Croatians are skilled seafarers with a centuries-old maritime tradition and have excellent natural harbors: Pola, Rijeka, Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Ploče, Dubrovnik, and Boka Kotorska. The Yugoslav merchant fleet (approximately one million tons) is comprised of and managed almost exclusively by Croats.

Foreign trade: Most of Yugoslavia's exports originate in Croatia, including timber, bauxite, cement, chemicals (tannin, Solvay soda, cyanamide), machinery, ships, tobacco, catfish, meat, poultry, fruit, wine, maraschino liqueur, and slivovica. The main importing and exporting countries are those of Western Europe, especially Germany, Italy, and Austria, while Croatia's maritime location facilitates continuous trade with numerous countries in Europe, the Near East, and the Americas.

Tourism: The Croatian coast—a land of a thousand islands—with its beaches, bays, capes, and inlets, and picturesque towns steeped in history, is among the European countries that offer the best conditions for international tourism. Currently, Croatia is also the main tourist resorts and a significant source of foreign exchange.

 

CULTURE AND HISTORY

 

Origins: In the 7th century, several Croatian tribes, Slavic-speaking and apparently of Iranian origin, migrated from the territory of present-day Poland to the Roman provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia Inferior. They arrived as foederati (allies) of the Roman Empire, then based in Byzantium—like the Goths, Franks, and Lombards—gradually becoming independent. In their new homeland, they encountered and assimilated significant groups of the already Romanized Illyrian-Celtic population, as well as groups of Slavs, Goths, and Avars who had arrived during the first phase of the great migrations of peoples, and also Roman and Greek colonists in the Dalmatian cities. In modern times, small groups of Germans and Slovenes have settled, primarily in the cities. From all these ethnic elements, the Croatian people today were formed, a racial mixture like all Western peoples. In Croatia, the following racial types predominate: Dinaric (Adriatic), Alpine, Nordic, and Mediterranean. The percentage of each type is very similar to that of Slovenia and northern Italy. During the Turkish invasions, significant groups of the Balkan population infiltrated the region. This population was very resistant to assimilation due to the strong influence exerted upon them by the Serbian national church, hence the pan-Serbian claims to certain Croatian regions.

Culture: Upon their arrival in Dalmatia, the Croats found an established ecclesiastical organization, received baptism and the Christian doctrine of Rome, and thus became part of the developing Western society. They participated in almost all the common endeavors of the Western world, distinguishing themselves as dedicated defenders of their eastern borders. Their contribution to the progress of the arts and sciences has been significant. In Croatia, alongside classical Roman monuments, one finds valuable works of art and buildings in the Romantic, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, and Modern styles. Works by Croatian artists adorn major European centers, particularly in Italy, with notable examples including Laurana, Juan Dalmata, Giulio Clovio, Medulic, Mestrovic, and others. Croatians are among the most distinguished humanists.

During the Turkish invasions, a number of Croats in Bosnia converted to Islam, assimilating elements of Persian Islamic culture, which is reflected in the architecture, clothing, music, and way of life of this religious community.

Croatian letters, written in the native alphabet called Glagolitsa, date back to the Early Middle Ages. Since then, in some dioceses along the Croatian coast, services have been celebrated in the national language and with the Latin rite, a unique privilege granted by the Catholic Church.

In both Croatia and Western Europe, Latin was for centuries the language of politics and culture. Until 1848, Latin was used in the Croatian Diet (Sabor), the high magistracy, and in relations with associated kingdoms, an irreplaceable language in a multinational community like the Danubian Monarchy. With the triumph of democratic and national thought, Croatian became the official language, while Croatian literature flourished from the Renaissance onward.

From the 18th century onward, cultural and educational institutions ran parallel to those of Central Europe. The remarkable current development of the visual arts and lyric poetry is noteworthy. Croatia boasts an exceptional wealth of folklore in its various manifestations: folk poetry, music, dances, costumes, customs, and crafts.

 

State Organization:

 

Upon arriving in their new homeland, the Croats inherited the political organization of the Roman province of Dalmatia, recognizing the supreme authority of the Byzantine Empire, and later that of Charlemagne. By the 9th century, Croatia was already an independent kingdom and, shortly thereafter, one of the most powerful European countries. With the extinction of the local Trpimirovic dynasty, the Croats, by virtue of the Pacta Conventa of 1102, entered into a personal union with the kingdom of Hungary, in order to resist together, more effectively, the claims of Byzantium and Venice. The common kings come from the following dynasties: Arpad (1102-1301), Angevin of Naples (1301-1886), Luxembourg (1387-1458), then, successively, Habsburgs, Hunyadi and Jagiello until 1527, when, to defend Western Europe from the Ottomans, the Croats, as well as Czechs and Hungarians, chose as their king: Ferdinand I, Archduke of Austria, brother of Charles V, thus creating the Danubian Community that lasted until 1918, when Croatia was illegally incorporated against the will of its people into the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes", called Yugoslavia in 1929.

For a time (1377-1463), Bosnia was a vassal kingdom of Croatia and Hungary, until the Turkish invasion, enjoying a privileged status within the Ottoman Empire. By decision of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, it was occupied by Austria-Hungary. Dubrovnik, the third Croatian state, was for centuries an independent city-state, one of the most illustrious maritime republics of the Mediterranean. In the Napoleonic Wars, it lost its independence and, by resolution of the Congress of Vienna, was incorporated into the province of Dalmatia.

Occupying a territory of paramount strategic importance, the Croats not only faced invasions by the Huns, Mongols, and Ottomans, but, as a maritime people, participated in battles against the Saracens, in the Crusades, in the battles of Lepanto and Algiers, and were even present in the Spanish Armada and in the discovery and colonization of the Americas. In Mediterranean maritime trade, Dubrovnik held a leading position, sometimes surpassing even the Venetian fleet. Throughout its historical vicissitudes, Croatia managed to retain the attributes of a sovereign kingdom until its virtual annexation by Serbia in 1918. Except for the period between 1941 and 1945, Croatian efforts from 1918 to the present day have tended toward emancipation from the pan-Serbian label, which has had communist overtones in the last 15 years. The Croats, faithful to their deep-rooted traditions of centuries-long coexistence with Western countries, refuse to be treated as a Serbian and Russian appendage and aspire to the restoration of the thousand-year-old Croatian state and integration into the community of free European nations as a sovereign entity.

 


CHRONICLES AND COMMENTARIES

 

DR. ANTE PAVELIC - BACKGROUND AND CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING HIS DEATH

 

On December 28th of last year, the Croatian politician Dr. Ante Pavelic passed away in Madrid at the age of 70. Born on July 14, 1889, in Herzegovina, Pavelic graduated with a law degree from the University of Zagreb. In the first phase of his political career, he joined the leadership of the Croatian State Law Party (Hrvatska Stranka Prava), was elected city councilor, and later a national deputy for the Croatian capital. Following the assassination of Esteban Radic and other Croatian democratic leaders in the Belgrade parliament and the establishment of the dictatorship in 1929, Pavelic, like other Croatian politicians, sought asylum abroad. While the exiled representatives of the Croatian Agrarian Party (Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka), the majority party in successive elections, sought support from the democratic countries, victors of the First World War and upholders of the Treaty of Versailles, Pavelić sought support from the revisionist nations, first Bulgaria, then Hungary and Italy. His collaboration with the Macedonian revolutionary organization VMRO earned him a death sentence, handed down in 1929 by the Yugoslav Special Court for the Defense of the State.

From this moment on, Pavelić's political activity took a new turn. Convinced that Serbian hegemony, dictatorship, and imperialism could not be fought against, and that Croatian independence could not be achieved through legal political means, which were nonexistent in a despotic state, he founded the clandestine, revolutionary Croatian Liberation Movement, the Ustaša. This movement gained notoriety following the 1934 assassination attempt in Marseille against King-Dictator Alexander I of the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty, carried out in collaboration with the Macedonian revolutionary organization. On this occasion, Pavelić was sentenced to death in absentia for the second time, this time by a French court. Shortly thereafter, with the political rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia, the center of activity for Croatian revolutionary nationalists shifted from abroad to the country. During this period, Pavelić and most of the Croatian political refugees were interned in Italy, only being released in 1941 when war broke out between the Axis powers and Yugoslavia. The Croatian nationalists seized this opportunity to proclaim national independence on April 10, 1941, and to establish their own government in Zagreb, with Pavelić assuming leadership a few days later. He established a personal dictatorship, which lasted until May 1945, amidst bloody fighting with guerrillas, both Chetniks and communists, serious difficulties stemming from the ambiguous policies of his allies Mussolini and Hitler, as well as disagreements with internal democratic forces. Subsequently, Croatia was invaded by Tito's forces, who, supported by the Red Army, incorporated Croatian national territory into Yugoslavia.

Pavelic went into exile again, where he tried to gather his supporters. In 1948, he immigrated to Argentina, and eight years later he was seriously wounded by gunfire near Buenos Aires from unknown assailants. The Yugoslav communist government repeatedly requested his extradition from the Argentine government, which was denied because his whereabouts were unknown. This time, Pavelic's address was located, but he managed to disappear, and his residence only became known after his death in Madrid.

 

It is obvious that the governments of the countries where Pavelic resided as a refugee—whatever their opinion of his actions—did not consider it appropriate or honorable to hand over an anti-communist politician to be condemned by a communist tribunal.

 

***

 

(Editor's Note) - As the fundamental purpose of our magazine is to address Croatian political and cultural issues, we will refer objectively, "sine ira et studio," to the personality and work of this much-debated Croatian revolutionary and politician on another occasion. For now, we must point out, without being his supporters, that the information and commentaries appearing in the world press on the occasion of his death have been largely based on information provided by the intelligence services of the two Yugoslav dictatorships: the monarchist and the communist. Pavelić's unpopularity in democratic countries served as a pretext for them to label the Croatian people's struggle for their national and political freedom as separatism, treason in the service of the fascist and national-socialist regimes.

It is an irrefutable fact, however, that Croats, regardless of party affiliation, have been fighting for 40 years against Serbian hegemony, inherent to the nationally and culturally heterogeneous Yugoslav state, aspiring to restore their ancient national sovereignty, which is not recognized in Yugoslavia. This struggle could only be labeled separatism if a Yugoslav nationality existed in the ethnic-historical sense, or if the multinational Yugoslav conglomerate were a community of nations, freely constituted and governed. On the contrary, no such Yugoslav people exists; there are the Serbian and Croatian peoples, defined ethnically and politically as separate historical nations until 1918. Croatian sovereignty dates back to the early Middle Ages, and its continuity was maintained and respected until the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. With the forced and illegal union with the Kingdom of Serbia in 1918, Croatia lost all its attributes as a sovereign nation and became subject to Balkan-style political oppression, national and religious discrimination, and economic exploitation. Therefore, the Croatian people have ample reason to fight for the restoration of their national sovereignty, the only guarantee of their freedoms and rights, both national and human.

Croatian nationalist extremism, by prioritizing, like other similar movements, real or perceived national interests over democratic institutions, was far more a product of the unhealthy conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia under oppressive and despotic Serbian rule than a reflection of European nationalist currents. In his choice of methods, Pavelić followed the model of Serbian nationalists and revolutionaries much more closely than the tactics practiced by fascists and National Socialists. Furthermore, as a prototypical activist and conspirator, he was not particularly concerned with the ideological foundations of the Ustaša movement, which he led.

Croatia was unfamiliar with terrorist methods in its political struggles; however, these methods were a defining characteristic of the Serbian fight for emancipation from Turkish rule, where a veritable cult of bandits (haiduks) still exists today. Political terrorism was introduced to Croatia by Serbian agitators, and their most famous crime was the Sarajevo assassination of 1914, a tragic prelude to the First World War. In Yugoslavia, the official cult of the assassins of the ill-fated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was and continues to be fostered. A commemorative plaque stands at the site of the assassination, but not to the victim, rather to his perpetrators, while Serbian patriotic institutions honor themselves by taking the names of the Sarajevo assassins. It is a telling coincidence that these men were both fanatical Serbian nationalists and members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the nucleus of the later organized Yugoslav Communist Party.

The Marseille assassination attempt against the king-dictator was a joint effort by Macedonian and Croatian nationalist activists, in retaliation for the murder of Croatian leader E. Radic and so many other abuses and acts of violence perpetrated by a ruthless dictatorship, particularly vicious against Croats and Macedonians. While the attacks may have been carried out with the tacit approval of certain governments, reluctant to embrace Serbian expansionism, it is obvious that the perpetrators were not "international terrorists" in the pay of the official Yugoslav narrative, but rather opponents of the tyranny of King Alexander, hated both within the country and repudiated by democratic opinion worldwide. Indeed, the Aix-en-Provence tribunal, considering the motives of the accused, commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, justifying its ruling on the grounds that they had acted out of patriotic, honorable, and idealistic motives.

Following the resounding and abrupt collapse of the Yugoslav army in 1941, unexpected only by those who refused to acknowledge the reality of Yugoslavia, the Independent State of Croatia was established. However, its future was uncertain, as the ongoing war prevented the Allies from recognizing the new government. Despite these circumstances, which partly determined the form of government, insinuations that this was a Quisling-style act are untenable.

The Croatian revolutionaries did not rebel for ideological reasons or out of a lust for power against their own democratic government, siding with the invaders. Quite the contrary. Croatia had been under foreign domination for over two decades, in the grip of the Serbian military clique that, just days before the outbreak of war, had staged a coup, overthrowing the Belgrade government for granting Croatia limited autonomy. It is absolutely certain that the majority of Croats who participated in the re-establishment of the Croatian state would have preferred to have Western democratic governments as allies. Croatian youth fought courageously, sacrificing themselves to maintain Croatian independence against the Serbian nationalist guerrillas (Chetniks) and later against the communists, certain that they were contributing their blood to the defense of the enduring interests of the Western community, momentarily divided. The Croats had no alternative but to fight against the communists, who supported Soviet and Serbian domination of Croatia, or to join their ranks.

The struggle of the Croats for their national independence is therefore not anti-democratic, as the heroism of Cardinal Stepinac proves. Serbia, despite appearances and the tired clichés, found itself in both world wars on the side of the Western victors, solely as Russia's traditional ally and as a Balkan exponent of Tsarist and Soviet expansionism, respectively.

 

EXCEPTIONAL TREATMENT FOR YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS

 

The Western powers have sought to gain political advantage from the schism that has arisen between Belgrade and the Kremlin—in reality, it is not a matter of ideological differences, but primarily of preventing Moscow from arbitrarily dismissing Belgrade's rulers, as it usually does in occupied satellite states—and for this reason, they are giving exceptional treatment to Yugoslav communists to win their favor (that this favorable treatment can be excessive is evidenced by the survey conducted by the influential and independent London weekly "The Spectator" regarding the interference of Yugoslav communists in British Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts intended for Yugoslavia).

The Spectator's survey prompted a parliamentary inquiry and the corresponding explanations from the British government. Dissatisfied with the official response, The Spectator published an editorial and a report on the same topic on March 13 of this year. Extensive Memorandum on the "Yugoslav section" of the official radio station. What the London weekly demands is a disinterested news service, one that does not favor the democratic opposition in Yugoslavia.

"The success of the broadcasts for Yugoslavia," argues The Spectator, "should not be judged by the amount of propaganda material favorable to the West or satisfactory to Tito and his supporters. Its evaluation should be based on the degree to which it reflects the true picture of English life, including, and this is of primary importance, English public opinion about Yugoslavia."

The BBC, however, proceeds in such a way that "its news service appears to benefit Titoism and is designed so that the broadcasts for Yugoslavia reflect, not what the English think, but what the Yugoslav regime would like to prove to its subjects that we think." To this effect, The Spectator cites a series of precedents, which we will now summarize:

Since Five years ago, Desmond Clarke's commentaries, very popular among Yugoslav radio listeners but censored by the communist press, were suppressed. The BBC, in its broadcasts, made no mention of instances where Yugoslav and Soviet representatives defended the same cause at the United Nations, especially in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution. Nor did it report on the trials in Yugoslavia against pro-Western elements.

Objective commentaries on communist Yugoslavia, broadcast to other communist countries, were omitted from Yugoslav broadcasts. Even in citing foreign sources, the BBC allowed itself to be subservient to the Yugoslav regime. Regarding Djilas's book "The New Class," some favorable reviews from the British press were broadcast, but far more attention was given to the unfavorable comments, which were very few. For example, the criticism by Labour MP Barbara Castle, published in the New Statesman, in favor of Tito, was quoted in full. But when, two months later, the author retracted her hasty and optimistic claims in the same magazine, the BBC didn't even mention it. Fragments of "The New Class" are broadcast to other satellites, except for Yugoslavia. Nor was Djilas's trial and conviction reported or commented on.

Con todo, los radioescuchas yugoeslavos de las emisiones podían en parte enterarse de lo que piensa el público inglés acerca de la actualidad yugoeslava a través de la reseña mensual de la prensa británica, suprimida, sin embargo, a partir de este año. Al referirse al año de los refugiados, la BBC omitió indicar que el mayor porcentaje de los refugiados, después de Alemania Oriental, procedía de Yugoeslavia.

The BBC persists in its thesis that Yugoslavia occupies a special place among communist countries and, therefore, its communism should not be censored. Yugoslav communist officials have the opportunity to express their opinions, while the same is not true for the Yugoslav democratic opposition or, more precisely, for anyone who might criticize the communist regime. Visiting Yugoslav officials can speak on the BBC, which they often use to launch attacks against the United States and to argue that the social system in communist Yugoslavia is superior to the English one, "because there are no strikes in Yugoslavia." Not a single prominent English political commentator appears on these broadcasts.

With the aim of establishing "the best relations" with the Yugoslav regime, a system was introduced in 1954 of bringing staff from Yugoslavia to work on the broadcasts for five-year periods, and vice versa. For six years, eight Yugoslav broadcasters worked for the BBC, and only one BBC broadcaster, Mr. Valentine, was assigned to the Zagreb radio station. However, as soon as he arrived, the police made him certain propositions, which he, of course, refused. He was then subjected to pressure—so much so that he had to leave the country a few days after his arrival. The BBC gave him sick leave, and the incident was hushed up. The "exchange" continues, unilaterally.

The consequence is that a communist cell is hidden within the BBC, informing the Yugoslav government about what is happening at the station. The Spectator cites three notorious communists prominent at the BBC: I. Zivkovic, from Zagreb; B. Bozovic and Miss S. Zivkovic, from Belgrade. "Despite the BBC's denials, it is clear that these people influence even the daily programs." Among other examples, The Spectator cites a characteristic case that occurred on the occasion of the death of Cardinal Stepinac. The Serbian communist broadcaster, S. Zivkovic, misrepresented the text. Where it said "Stepinac was tried for his alleged collaboration with the Nazis," she wrote "he was convicted of collaboration with the Nazis, which was proven at trial."

"The Yugoslav communist authorities," The Spectator continued, "not only prevent BBC representatives from being sent to Yugoslavia, but also dictate who can work at Bush House" (BBC headquarters). Thus, in early 1957, M. Gregoric arrived at the BBC from Belgrade. He received orders from a secret agent at the Yugoslav embassy in London to spy on BBC employees and, among other things, send him a copy of the British broadcaster's internal newsletter, which sometimes contains the addresses and letters of its Yugoslav listeners, information of interest to the communist police. Gregoric reported this request to the heads of the "BBC's Yugoslav service," but they advised him to comply with the embassy's wishes.

The Yugoslav secret police soon found out about all this, and Gregoric's family was detained in Belgrade. The BBC was asked to immediately dismiss Gregoric "in the interest of friendly relations," which they did, and, to top it all off, they advised Gregoric to return to Yugoslavia, as he could not obtain political asylum in England.

The Spectator concludes its Memorandum by asserting that representatives of the Yugoslav "new class" are very pleased with the BBC, but the people of Yugoslavia are listening less and less to its broadcasts, which are considered a kind of official Yugoslav propaganda. People prefer Croatian broadcasts from Radio Madrid. In this regard, The Spectator quotes the Swiss broadcasting newspaper, Schweizer Radiozeitung, which, under the headline "Radio War over Yugoslavia," wrote that "for some time now, Croatian broadcasts from Radio Madrid have been very popular in Yugoslavia. It seems that these broadcasts are listened to extensively, even in Serbia. Listeners denounce the London broadcasts as 'proto-toist.' Other Swiss newspapers, as well as the Christian Science Monitor of Boston, reported that in Zagreb, during Croatian broadcasts from Radio Madrid, cafes and confectioneries are emptied because the patrons go to listen to them."

Following its survey, The Spectator published many letters, including one from Dr. Juraj (George) Krnjevic, general secretary of the Croatian Agrarian Party (Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka), who has lived in exile in London for twenty years.

"It seems to me," the letter says, "that the discussion in The Spectator about BBC broadcasts for Yugoslavia is framed narrowly. The conspiracy of silence regarding the atrocities of the Yugoslav communist regime is not limited to the BBC. Even the most prominent English newspapers adopt the same stance in their reports and commentaries on postwar Yugoslavia. In The Times, one can only read very cautious reports written with the intention of not upsetting the current rulers. It is significant that The Voice of America and the New York Times correspondents in Belgrade take the same attitude, as does the American National Committee for a Free Europe, which deals with refugees. When the representative body of European exiles—European Captive Nations—was established in the United States, it was advised that asylum seekers from Yugoslavia not be included so as not to offend the sensibilities of Yugoslavia." "Post-war."

The BBC's attitude, in the opinion of this veteran Croatian democratic politician, "is a consequence of the general policies of Great Britain and the United States, demoralizing for peoples subjected to communist dictatorships and detrimental to the cause of democracy and freedom."

It should be added that certain United Nations agencies practice discrimination against refugees from Yugoslavia, with truly tragic cases involving returned refugees. Furthermore, Croatians are unhappy with the Voice of America broadcasts transmitted solely in Serbian, completely ignoring Croatian.

 

BLACKMAIL TO REACH A "MODUS VIVENDI" WITH THE HOLY SEE

 

Even before the death of Cardinal Stepinac, the Yugoslav communist government sought to create the impression that it wished to normalize the situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. However, due to their Caesaropapist mentality, the communists in Belgrade cannot conceive that a "modus vivendi" is achieved through concessions and compromises, not through measures of persecution and oppression, which amount to mere blackmail. Such treatment of the Catholic Church has the opposite effect, leaving those who, in good faith, had suggested certain arrangements with the communist government, considering them the lesser evil, in an awkward position.

In their blackmailing policy, the communists have also resorted, among other means, to a series of fabricated trials against the Catholic clergy. Since these trials have not been properly reported and interpreted in the Western press, we deem it appropriate to summarize them:

I. On March 17 and 18 of this year, the trial of the Catholic Bishop of Skopje, Smiljan Cekada, the bursar of the Zagreb Theological Seminary, Rodolfo Pukljak, and a group of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim laypeople was held in Skopje, the capital of the People's Republic of Macedonia, where Catholics constitute an insignificant minority amidst the Orthodox and Islamic population. They were accused of the clandestine sale of foreign currency and various items they received from abroad as aid, from their relatives, and from Catholic organizations, primarily American ones. Although the sentences were not severe, the trial was given considerable publicity with the aim of damaging a Catholic diocese in the diaspora, located in the heart of the Balkans, and the most important seminary in Croatia, located in Zagreb. They are particularly vicious against Bishop Cekada because of his great renown and authority among the Macedonians and Albanians, who, like the Croats, oppose Serbian dominance. The Macedonians aspire to have their own autocephalous Church and not depend on the Serbian national Church, an instrument of Serbian chauvinism, something that has never been granted to them, nor is it now. Hence their strong sympathies for the Croats and even for the Catholic Church.

II. The background of the trial in Osijek is published on page 46. This trial aimed to obstruct the activities of the seminary in the important Diocese of Djakovo. It was preceded by countless raids, interrogations, arrests, and direct threats against seminarians, forcing them to become informers. The communists are striving to close all seminaries in Croatia. They employed the same tactic to close the old seminary in Split, where priests for Dalmatia were trained. The main evidence of subversive activities was words written in pencil in a book: "I am a Croat." The communists boast of having achieved national equality, but this example proves otherwise. It is inconceivable that a Serbian cleric should be tried for declaring his nationality, while a Croat is branded a chauvinist, a subversive, and a criminal for the same reason.

 

III. At the same time, arrests and raids were carried out in the Archdiocese of Sarajevo, though the details are still unknown. It is known that priests not affiliated with the Catholic clergy union, sponsored by the communist government but disapproved of by the Holy See, were arrested.

 

IV. The communist propaganda machine gave extensive publicity to the trial of fifteen young people for illegal association and subversive activity, held in Zagreb between January 13 and 29 of this year. The main defendant was the Franciscan friar Rodolfo Jerak, sentenced to 15 years of hard labor, identified as the instigator. Other defendants were sentenced to severe terms of one to fourteen years in prison. It is known that numerous arrests were made on this occasion, but the whereabouts of those detained are unknown. This group was accused of maintaining relations with exiled "fascist" circles, without a single piece of conclusive evidence being presented. For the communists, all exiles without exception are fascists, criminals, and Nazis, supported by Adenauer. The purpose of this trial has been twofold: to defame all political exiles as Nazi-fascists and to demonstrate that they are not persecuting the Catholic Church as a religious institution, but only because of the illegal and subversive activity of a segment of the clergy. Communist propaganda had some success, as news agencies broadcast without comment the communist accusations that these were pro-fascist activities.

In short, the Yugoslav communists are attempting to reach a modus vivendi with the Catholic Church through blackmail, driven by its political prestige in democratic countries. With such tactics, they demonstrate their complete ignorance of the Western mindset and, consequently, misinterpret the cautious and reserved attitude of ecclesiastical circles, which are willing to make certain concessions for the replacement of some church officials, but never to make principled concessions.

 

SUCCESSOR TO CARDINAL STEPINAC

 

Shortly after Cardinal Stepinac's death, the Holy See appointed Monsignor Francis Seper as his successor. Since 1954, he had served as Apostolic Administrator of the Zagreb diocese. Born in Osijek in 1905, he pursued university studies in Zagreb, interrupting them to dedicate himself to the priesthood. In Rome, a colleague and friend of Stepinac, he studied at the Gregorian University and was ordained in 1930. He then served as Stepinac's secretary, rector of the Zagreb theological seminary, and later as a parish priest in the Croatian capital. In 1954, he was appointed titular and now residential archbishop.

In 1958, he was able to go to Rome for his ad limina mission, though he was not permitted to visit Stepinac even once. The new head of the Catholic Church in Croatia is renowned as a cultured, prudent, and energetic prelate, and as a proven patriot. The Holy See appointed the new residential archbishop of Zagreb, Metropolitan of Croatia, without consulting the Yugoslav government, which had to accept the fait accompli.

 

INACCURATE DATA IN W. M. JACKSON EDITIONS

 

Yugoslav diplomatic and propaganda services disseminated all kinds of falsehoods and misinterpretations regarding Croatian culture, history, and aspirations.

Therefore, we often find references to Croatia's past and present in encyclopedias, compendiums, and manuals that are deficient, if not entirely distorted, with a clear political bias. The editors and compilers of these encyclopedic publications were almost always taken in and their good faith and intention to propagate only the truth about each country were betrayed and deceived.

Today we will refer to the W. M. Jackson encyclopedic editions, published in Buenos Aires, which enjoy well-deserved prestige in the Spanish-speaking world and are widely consulted by professors.

 

I

 

Let us now examine, free from any polemical spirit, some information on Croatian and Serbian literature contained in W. M. Jackson's Practical Encyclopedia (Vol. IX, Buenos Aires, 1956). 1. The author of the note on Croatian literature, Professor Pablo Schostakowsky (a rather Russian-sounding surname), begins his review with a notable inaccuracy and evident contradiction:

"Literature in Croatia remained closely linked to that of Serbia throughout all periods of its development, despite the fact that the country's geographical position on the Adriatic coast predestined it to enter the orbit of Western culture. The Croats even accepted the Roman Catholic religion and the Latin alphabet. Their literature reached an extraordinary flowering in the 15th-18th centuries in the maritime city of Dubrovnik (Ragusa)."

Mr. Schostakovsky is clearly completely ignorant of the subject, for it is an incontrovertible fact, recognized by all scholars in the field, that the cultural, literary, and political development of Croatia was linked to that of Western Europe. In Croatian territory, and especially in Dubrovnik, mentioned by Schostakovsky, the cultural currents and movements of the West were faithfully reflected. In Croatian literature, the themes, style, spirit, and approach to problems generally coincide with those prevalent in Western countries. The same can be said of other cultural activities and even political forms. It is, therefore, precisely the opposite of what Schostakovsky maintains: the Croats entered the orbit of Western culture, and there was no connection whatsoever between Serbian and Croatian literatures until the mid-19th century. of the last century, because among the Serbs, dominated by the Turks, there was no climate conducive to the cultivation of literature and fine arts, and they were also under the influence of Russian ecclesiastical literature, so that the few books by their writers could not be understood by the Serbian people because they were written in a mixture of Old Slavic and Russo-Serbian.

2. The data and assessments of certain authors are entirely false. The great Croatian lyric poet Agustín Ujevic is included in Serbian literature and defined as a "singer of the Russian Revolution." The truth lies on the opposite side. The poet who was to Croatian literature what Mallarmé, Rimbaud, and Valéry were to French literature, is considered the greatest Croatian poet of the present century. For his patriotism and liberal spirit, he was accused by Tito's communists of being a bourgeois writer, tried, and publicly condemned. His disciples and admirers, the vast majority of young Croatian writers, were labeled reactionaries and decadent Westernizers, and some of them still cannot publish today.

3. Another historical falsehood in this review is the assertion that the leaders of Illyrianism adopted the Serbian literary language. The truth is that Illyrianism—a Croatian national movement of the last century—adopted, for the sake of national unity, the dialect of the Renaissance writers of Dubrovnik, with minor morphological and phonetic modifications and modernisms. It turns out that Croatian writers were using the current literary language several centuries before the emergence of modern Serbian literature. The Dubrovnik dialect (Stokavski) is not Serbian, as it is the dialect spoken by the majority of Croats. Therefore, Croats have not been able to adopt the Serbian literary language or "steal" it, as the Serbian chauvinists, whom Shostakovsky is imitating, maintain.

 

II

 

In The Picturesque World (Vol. IX, 1957, Buenos Aires), another magnificently presented and illustrated edition by W. M. Jackson, there is an article on The South Slavic Peoples - Among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. While Montenegro is lauded, we find few lines about Croatia and Slovenia, and even fewer. We learned that in Croatia, in general, "the regions adjacent to rivers are very unhealthy," which is not true. Montenegro, a region that occupies a modest place in terms of culture and tourist appeal, is discussed at length and with praise. Croatia, on the other hand, compared to other South Slavic regions, ranks first, yet it is overlooked and poorly represented. While Croatia and Slovenia, which are two different nations, are listed together, Dalmatia, an integral part of Croatia and the cradle of Croatian culture and state organization, is treated separately. Dalmatia is simply described as the most beautiful province in Yugoslavia, but *The Picturesque World* does not include a single photograph of it.

Upon reading the phrase "courtesy of the Legation of Yugoslavia in Buenos Aires" at the bottom of the relevant photographs, the aforementioned omissions take on their true meaning. That is to say, the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives, in their The majority of those involved are Serbs and Montenegrins, who supply the data and photographic material, largely paid for with Croatian money, deliberately concealing everything related to Croatia, the country from which almost exclusively more than 300,000 immigrants residing in South America originate.

Official Yugoslav policy, both under the monarchy and the current communist regime, is not a policy of equality for South Slavs but rather tends toward political and cultural integration, toward the balkanization of nations with Western culture, such as Croatia and Slovenia. Hence all sorts of falsifications and distortions of facts and circumstances by propagandists who exploit the good faith of foreign publishers.

 

Vinko Nikolic

 


BOOK REVIEW

 

Pablo Tijan: Crisis of Liberalism in Central Europe (The Masaryk Myth) - Madrid, 1958 - Editora Nacional, p. 460.

 

The eminent Croatian polymath and Slavist, Professor Pablo Tijan, published a remarkable essay, The Masaryk Myth, in 1951 in the Madrid-based journal Arbor, published by the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC). In it, he shed new light on the person and work of Tomáš G. Masaryk, Czech philosopher and statesman (1856-1937), who was the founder and first president of the Czechoslovak Republic from its establishment in 1918 until 1935. In a concise analysis, the author explained the causes of the crisis and collapse of this Central European state, which occurred on the eve of the Second World War and its subsequent submersion within the Soviet empire.

The book under review addresses the same topic, but in a more comprehensive and documented form, written with rigorous scientific methodology, offering the reader an insightful perspective on political evolution in Danubian Europe.

The material is divided into four parts and 36 chapters. The author tackles the crisis that gripped the centuries-old Danubian monarchy under the impact of modern currents of liberalism and nationalism, historically and ideologically correlated. His historical exposition is not limited to a critical analysis of Austro-Czech relations, but encompasses the salient points of the entire problem within the multinational Habsburg monarchy. Appropriately, and drawing on Croatian sources, he also considers Croatia's role in this evolution. The second part is dedicated to the study of Masaryk's personality and thought, while the final two parts analyze his work as a statesman and interpret his ultimate failure.

Professor Tijan adopts a critical stance towards the conceptions and prejudices of politicians who were determined to destroy the Danubian political community, which for centuries had fulfilled its irreplaceable European mission, convinced that in doing so they were enabling the application of the national principle, progress, and the affirmation of democracy.

Instead, national conflicts intensified. Instead of nation-states built upon the remnants of the old monarchy, new multinational states were actually formed, in which one nationality, sometimes a minority, imposed national discrimination, the origin of regimes that were not entirely democratic and progressive. The crisis, with the tragic outcome that engulfed Czechoslovakia, which was perhaps the most successful experiment in these multinational integrations, points precisely to the errors and mistakes of its creators and protectors. Even Masaryk had to confess: "Our Republic is merely a poor imitation of the old monarchy."

The consequences of such a state of affairs were fatal. The current communist domination stems from the crisis that the author meticulously studies. Although he does not propose solutions for the immediate future, it is obvious from his critical and dispassionate examination that past mistakes must not be repeated. Therefore, it is necessary to follow the activities of certain exiled politicians with reservations and caution, as they still maintain assumptions that determined the current unbearable situation. Hence, the author's revisionist position regarding official Yugoslav and Czechoslovak historiography is of paramount importance. In support of his thesis, the speaker reproduces valuable and little-known conclusions of the same Czech authors, who were Catholic in orientation.

The work "Crisis of Liberalism in Central Europe" has the merit, aside from containing numerous background materials that make important global problems more comprehensible to the Spanish-speaking reader, of having been approached from the perspective of the countries directly affected. German, French, Russian, and English authors who address these problems, even when striving for objectivity and good intentions, sometimes fail to accurately reflect all the aspirations and interests of these peoples. Professor Pablo Tijan, on the other hand, has an advantage because he comes from a Danubian country and possesses direct knowledge of the Czechoslovak problem, having studied it in Bohemia itself. He also had access to abundant literature, not only from the major Western countries, but also from the works and sources of Czech, Slovak, Russian, Croatian, and Serbian authors.

 

Buenos Aires

J. B. GHETALDI

 

 

D.A. TOMASIC: National Communism and Soviet Strategy - Public Affairs Press, Washington D.C., 1957, pp. VIII-222.

 

Most books on the problem of national communism in Yugoslavia, or so-called "Titoism," approach it from the perspective of its importance to international communism and the free world, without delving into a precise analysis of the factors of this communist variant. However, Professor D.A. Tomasic, in his book National Communism and Soviet Strategy, in addition to providing an interesting analysis of the problem, explains the evolution of communism in Yugoslavia in relation to the complex problems of the country, and primarily those of its nationalities. The book thus fills a gap in the literature on Yugoslav communism.

The author is a professor of sociology and a specialist in Eastern European studies at Indiana University, a prestigious university in the USA. Until 1941, he was a professor of sociology at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb. By that time, he had already published several books, among which the one dedicated to the political development of the Croats (Politicki razvitak Hrvata HKN, Zagreb, 1938) stands out. The book under discussion is the third he published in the United States. The first analyzes the role of personalities and culture in the politics of Eastern Europe (Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics, George W. Stewart, New York, 1948), while the second deals with the influence of Russian culture on Soviet communism (The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism, Free Press, Glencoe III, 1953).

Professor Tomasic's profound knowledge of both Soviet communism and the psychology, history, and culture of the peoples that made up Yugoslavia constituted the fortunate combination that allowed him, with the assistance of J. Strmecki, to master the complex issues surrounding the events in that country that led the communists to power and then to the conflict with Moscow, which erupted in 1948.

In the first chapter of the book under review, the author addresses the significance of "Titoism" for the communist world; he explains the dangers to which the international communist movement is exposed in the monolithic system on the one hand, and in the weakening of central control on the other. He then moves on to analyze the development of the communist movement in Yugoslavia, describing its tentative beginnings and the abrupt shift from supporting nationalities oppressed by Serbian hegemony to defending Yugoslavia during the Popular Front era.

The chapter describing the psychology of the inhabitants of the Dinaric Mountains and how the Serbs of that region came to assume a dominant role in the Yugoslav Communist Party during the last war is extremely interesting. Professor Tomasic attributes the friction with Moscow and Tito's effective resistance to Stalin's attack largely to the arrogance and complacency of these guerrillas, intoxicated by their victory.

For a moral assessment of the Yugoslav communists' rebellion against Moscow, it is essential to emphasize that they had gone further in the terror and implementation of communist plans than any of the "people's democracies," and that the break with Moscow was not desired by either Tito or his supporters. Unbridled ambition provoked the conflict. No dictator enjoys taking orders from another. This point is often forgotten because it does not align with the wishes of many observers and with the irrational need to attribute not only courage but also moral valor to anyone who confronts a more powerful adversary. The author shows us how, after the distancing from the source of international communism, this excess of security has turned into disorientation and demoralization.

The final chapters analyze the importance of "Titoism" for the Kremlin's world strategy and its relationship to the uprisings in satellite states. Instead of opposing any tendency toward "Titoism"—that is, toward the relative autonomy of communist governments outside the USSR—the Kremlin has used, since Stalin's death, the "Titoist" idea as a useful instrument to give the impression that a "socialist state" can function successfully even independently of Moscow; that there can be a "national" communism. This is a temporary adaptation between nationalism and communism, since it was impossible to continue with the monolithic Stalinist system in the expanding communist empire. And if this "Titoist" policy fails, Professor Tomasic believes that this could signify the beginning of the failure of communism as a unified world movement.

 

Buenos Aires,

BRANIMIR ANZULOVIC.

 

 

ERNEST PEZET: Stepinac-Tito - Contexts and Insights into "The Affair" -, Paris 1959, Nouvelles Editions Latines, pp. 32.

 

On the occasion of the publication of Father Teodoro Dragun's widely circulated book, Le Dossier du Cardinal Stepinac, Ernest Pezet gave a presentation in the Sainte Odile crypt, Paris, on December 21, 1958. The booklet in question contains his speech, stripped of oratorical flourishes and with a prologue by the author himself, in which he compares the case of Cardinal Stepinac to the Dreyfus Affair. Both his oral and printed presentations had an unprecedented impact in France. In this issue, we publish in full the reasoning and deductions of this prominent French parliamentarian and profound expert on the Yugoslav problem. The work also contains interesting personal recollections related to the Marseille assassination attempt of 1934.

"Le Monde Diplomatique," the official publication of diplomatic circles and major international organizations, in its December 1959 issue, refers to this work and assesses its informative value, stating that "the Vice-President of the Senate, who for some thirty years was one of the most active and influential members of the foreign affairs committees of both parliamentary assemblies, believes that Tito is making the same mistake about which he had warned Barthou himself before the Marseille assassination attempt. Indeed, in the author's opinion,

Tito founded the Yugoslav state on the predominance of the Serbian element. Also, according to him, the Yugoslav idea, which was of Croatian and Slovenian origin and implied the fraternal unity of all South Slavs, has been distorted to the benefit of the Serbs, who are treated as a nation superior to others, so that..." Behind the façade of communist federalism, the tradition of the Serbian monarchy persists. Pezet sees in this attitude the underlying reason for the measures against Bishop Stepinac, considering them extremely unjust.

 

BRANKO KADIC

 

 

Fr. THEODORE DRAGOUN: The Dossier of Cardinal Stepinac. Paris, 1958, Nouvelles Editions Latines, pp. 288.

 

As the figure of Cardinal Stepinac gained greater prominence internationally, standing as a symbol of truth and freedom against tyranny, studies and commentaries on the imprisoned Cardinal and the historical circumstances in which he lived and acted multiplied in Western countries. Of particular note is the book by Fiorello Cavalli, S.J., which contains a detailed analysis of "The Trial of the Archbishop of Zaragoza" (Rome, Ed. La Civiltà Cattolica, 1947), as well as the voluminous work by Richard Pattee, the renowned American historian, "The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac" (The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1953).

In this masterfully documented work, the author strives to illustrate the Stepinac case from a historical perspective and to meticulously and rigorously analyze the motives, legal elements, and course of the proceedings. The complex issues surrounding the internal relations of the peoples incorporated into the Yugoslav conglomerate, dominated by Serbs, sometimes hindered these authors from fully understanding the Yugoslav reality and its fundamental causes, whereas the author of the Prontuario del Cardinal Stepinac, Father Teodoro Dragoun, a Croatian Dominican and currently the national rector of the Croatian Catholic Mission in France, was in a better position to place Archbishop Stepinac within the historical context and to assess the contributing factors. His book is primarily intended for a French audience, exposed to the intense anti-Croatian campaigns unleashed by Serbian nationalists and communists, who exploit French sympathies toward Serbia, their ally in the First World War.

The prestigious French journal "Etudes" (December 1946) alluded to this mood, noting, in the wake of Stepinac's trial and conviction: "Slower than the Anglo-Saxon press, and not as well-informed, our press, as a whole and with a few meritorious exceptions, has hesitated to clarify this event and even more so to take sides. In this way, it has deprived French public opinion—which is most regrettable—of the opportunity to condemn an ​​injustice; as for Christians, they will be unable to venerate a martyr." To better guide the confused French reader,

T. Dragoun systematically presents the historical and geographical context of Yugoslavia and describes the religious situation during the monarchical and communist regimes. In support of his arguments, he reproduces a whole series of irrefutable documents, namely: Archbishop Bauer's memorandum of May 25, 1935; an essay on the struggle against Catholicism by E. Pezet and H. Simondet; several pastoral letters from Croatian bishops; Stepinac's speech before the court; arguments of the defense lawyers appointed by the court; transcripts from Etudes, Civiltà Cattolica, and Osservatore Romano; the Holy See's White Paper of December 15, 1952, and excerpts from Le communisme et L'Eglise Catholique (Ed. de Fleurus, pp. 409-414); and testimonies from prominent politicians, ecclesiastics, and other leading figures regarding Stepinac.

In the preface, the Auxiliary Bishop of Paris, Monsignor Jean Rupp, who visited Croatia in 1930, evokes his memories and highlights Croatia's exceptional and strategic importance, seeing it as an insertion point for prestigious values ​​within the West.

Dragoun's book was well-received not only in France but also in South America. The prestigious Buenos Aires newspaper "La Nación," in its literary supplement of January 29, 1959, published a laudatory review of "Le Dossier du Cardinal Stepinac," emphasizing that "this work is a historical affirmation of the figure of the persecuted Archbishop of Zagreb through circumstances and events of enormous global significance."

 

Buenos Aires

Branko Kadic

 

 

ANTE SMITH PAVELIC: Dr. Ante Trumbic - Problem of Croatian-Serbian Relations. Ed. "Hrvatska Revija", Munich 1959, pp. XVI-333.

 

With this work, dedicated to Dr. Antonio Trumbic, president of the Yugoslav Committee—around which anti-Austrian Croatian exiles rallied during the First World War—and first chancellor of the new "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," the author has filled a gap in Croatian political literature. Trumbic, who advocated for the national unity of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes, upon encountering the reality of a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs and governed by anti-democratic regimes, became one of the proponents of a Croatian nation-state.

It is illustrative of the relations between Serbs and Croats that the author of this insightful work is one of the few Croats accepted into the Yugoslav diplomatic service, as he is the son of Dr. Ante Pavelic, vice-president of the National Council, a revolutionary body established in Zagreb that, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, assumed power in Croatia and Slovenia. His father presided over the National Council delegation that, on December 1, 1918, agreed in Belgrade to the union of Croatia and Serbia.

Dr. Pavelic possesses all the necessary qualifications to understand and accurately interpret Trumbic's political line, since he himself underwent a similar political evolution and, from his youth, was in contact with Trumbic's closest collaborators. He was also able to consult unpublished documents bequeathed by his father. The book's prologue was written by the renowned sculptor Ivan Mestrovic, a collaborator of Trumbic on the Yugoslav Committee, who had experienced similar disappointments. Mestrovic asserts that Yugoslavia is essentially an enlarged Serbia, where Croats have endured martyrdom and disillusionment.

The author divides the topic into three parts. In the first, he summarizes the political situation in Croatia prior to the First World War, adopting a distinctly anti-Austrian stance, considered by many Croats today to be erroneous and anachronistic.

The second part contains an interesting and comprehensive account of the actions of the Yugoslav Committee, its struggle against the secret 1915 Treaty of London, which, as a reward to Italy for entering the war on the side of the Entente powers, granted it the right to annex the distinctly Croatian and Slovene regions of vital importance to those peoples, located in the eastern Adriatic. It also reviews the ongoing conflict between Croatian exiles and Serbian politicians, primarily with the Serbian Prime Minister, Nicolae Pašić, who supported the creation of Greater Serbia under the tutelage of the Russian Empire and to the detriment of Croatia.

The author analyzes and commends the efforts of the Croatian politician Frano Šupilo, one of the founders of the Yugoslav Committee, to counter the maneuvers of Serbia, Russia, and Italy, which were prepared to sacrifice the essential interests of Croatia and Slovenia. Smith Pavelic then presents, based on new documents, the events that took place in Zagreb during the collapse of the Habsburg Empire.

The third part describes Trumbic's struggle at the Peace Conference against the implementation of the London Pact. He had some influence from President Wilson, but little or no support from his own government, which sought to negotiate behind his back with Italy, to the detriment of vital Croatian and Slovenes' interests. The final chapters illustrate Trumbic's opposition activities and his evolution toward Croatian nationalism. This section is incomplete because the author did not always have access to reliable information, having lived abroad and lacking direct contact with internal events.

In the final chapter, the author summarizes his argument and offers the following concluding judgment: "From the beginning, Trumbic longed for the political equality of Serbs and Croats and respect for democratic freedoms, in accordance with Croatian political traditions...

"Instead of equality and democracy, the ideas and policies of Serb supremacy prevailed, for whom unification meant incorporating the other South Slavs into the Serbian state and their integration, even forced, into the Serbian national community. While this policy was practiced in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Yugoslav label, it was in reality nothing other than Serbian dictatorship, national and nationalist. The experience of recent decades demonstrates that both Serbs and Croats lack sufficient moral and physical strength to impose themselves on one another and that the Croats resolutely demand recognition of their national identity and sovereignty." Therefore, the question of "Croatian-Serbian relations remains unresolved and open." (pp. 314-15)

Smith Pavelic's work is written with scientific methodology, is well-documented, and meticulously edited. It contains extensive bibliographical data. This book represents a valuable contribution to political literature, essential for those who wish to understand the reality of Yugoslavia.

 

Buenos Aires.

Ivo Bogdan.

 

 

VJEROSLAV VRANCIC: Dr. Andrija Artukovic pred sjevernoamerickim sudom (Artukovic before American Justice), Buenos Aires, 1959. Ed. Hrvatska Misao, V, p. 112.

 

Thousands upon thousands of Croatians sought refuge in free countries at the end of World War II, when the communists seized power and Croatia was occupied by Tito's forces. A number of Croatian refugees settled in the United States, among them Dr. Andrija Artukovic, former Minister of the Interior of the Independent State of Croatia during the war.

In September 1951, the Yugoslav communist government initiated extradition proceedings against Dr. Artukovic in the Los Angeles District Court. These proceedings concluded in January 1959, with all three levels of the U.S. federal justice system involved. The initial indictment was based on general, unspecified accusations that the accused was a member of the criminal gangs that had terrorized much of Yugoslavia. He was accused of the deaths of more than one million Yugoslavs, allegedly murdered in the Independent State of Croatia.

Due to the vagueness of the accusations and the lack of sufficient evidence, the case did not proceed. The Yugoslav public prosecutor then filed a supplementary indictment, holding the accused responsible for a series of murders and participation in murders perpetrated between April 1941 and October 1942, during which time the defendant held the position of Minister of the Interior.

This time, the indictment and the extradition request were based on a mutual legal assistance treaty signed in 1902 between the former Kingdom of Serbia and North America.

Yugoslavia, as is well known, was created after the First World War without consulting the Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. Between the two world wars, successive Yugoslav governments, dominated by Serbs, behaved as if Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were conquered territories annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia. This policy was criticized at the time, even by the Communist Party, which, however, upon coming to power, maintained and even increased the predominance of the Serbs, even though they constitute only a relative minority within the multinational Yugoslav conglomerate.

In this regard, it is very revealing that the extradition request made to the US judicial system was based on a treaty signed in 1902 with the Kingdom of Serbia, that is, 16 years before the creation of Yugoslavia. Another significant fact is that this is the same Croatian politician, Dr. Artukovic, whose extradition was requested in 1934 by the Yugoslav dictatorial government following the Marseille bombing. On that occasion, French authorities handed over Dr. Artukovic, who, after a rigorous trial and multiple instances of torture, was declared innocent by the Yugoslav State Security Court and placed at the disposal of the French justice system, which released him.

Under the aforementioned Serbian-American treaty, the accused was subject to extradition if there was a plausible reason to believe him guilty of the murder or participation in the murder. This meant that the American court only had to verify whether there was justifiable suspicion of guilt, while it was up to the Yugoslav justice system to conclusively verify all the evidence and rule on the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The ruling was issued by the federal commissioner of the Los Angeles District Court, Theodore Hocke. It contains a chronological summary of the entire process, a summary of the arguments, an extensive analysis of the evidence produced during the trial, the motivation for the rejection of extradition, and the acquittal verdict.

Because this is the only ruling of its kind issued by the courts of an American republic regarding the extradition request of Croatian refugees by the communist and Yugoslav authorities, we believe it is worthwhile to transcribe paragraphs from its reasoning:

"Murder is a crime in both Yugoslavia and the U.S. The definition of murder is substantially the same in both states. Murder is the crime stipulated in the treaty as the basis for extradition."

"Not a single piece of evidence was presented to suggest that the accused committed the murder."

"All the witness statements presented by the plaintiff are written in narrative form. The witnesses signed the statements, but it is obvious that these were not their words."

"The same language is used repeatedly in the witness statements. The words 'the so-called Independent State of Croatia' appear in every statement. I highly doubt that this could be a coincidence."

"It is also clear that the statements were made with the intent to incite passion and prejudice. They constantly refer to infants, newborns, the elderly, cruel and inhuman treatment, etc."

"Considering all the evidence presented and the legal sources cited by both parties, I can only reach one conclusion. The plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficient, competent evidence that there is reasonable or probable cause to believe that the defendant is guilty of any of the alleged crimes. I hope I will not see the day when a person has to answer for a crime, either in the courts of California or the United States, based on evidence such as that presented by the plaintiff."

The commissioner then states that this could conclude the reasoning behind his ruling, but, in light of the defense's arguments, he adds that, even if the defendant had committed the alleged crimes, there would be no grounds for extradition, since said crimes would be political in nature. To that effect, he gives the following justification:

"The evidence presented, as well as the historical facts, which I can take judicial note of, demonstrate that the peoples of the Balkans have lived in discord for years. Without suffrage or the possibility of election for the Croats, after the First World War, Croatia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The government was controlled by the Serbs, who imposed tremendous burdens on the Croats. The Croats wanted an independent government or at least independent representation in Parliament. In the elections held in 1928, the Croats elected their deputies to the Belgrade parliament. Upon arriving at parliament, they were assassinated by a Serbian deputy. Civil war nearly broke out, and in 1929, King Alexander dissolved all political parties. The Croats never forgot their ideal of an independent state, and when the Germans and Italians invaded Yugoslavia during the Second World War, they had their first opportunity to establish their own." their own state.

On April 10, the Croatian leaders declared independence and began by establishing their own government. The Serbs opposed this, triggering civil war. Many lives were lost. Factions of Chetniks and "partisans" (communist guerrillas) did everything possible to disrupt the new government's plans.

The book we are reviewing is published in Croatian and contains a detailed exposition of the U.S. judicial system. It also includes the full text of the acquittal and the relevant considerations in English (pp. 85-105).

 

Buenos Aires.

A. Belic.

 

 

CHARLES JELAVICH: Tsarist Russia and Nationalism. (Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886). Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958. University of California Press, p. 304.

Liuben Karavelov, one of the most distinguished Bulgarian authors, wrote prophetic words in 1870: "If Russia comes to liberate us, it will be received with great sympathy; if, however, it comes to dominate us, it will find many enemies," thus expressing the feelings of the Balkan peoples toward Tsarist Russia. Jelavich undertook the arduous task of examining the extent to which Russian policy, promoting first and foremost its interests as a great European power, came into sharp conflict with Bulgarian nationalism, and how, conversely, it won the sympathies of the Serbs.

Throughout the 300 pages of his work, divided into 11 chapters, two of them dedicated exclusively to Serbia, the author meticulously recounts the events from the Congress of Berlin (1878)—when the combined pressure of the great powers forced Russia to relinquish its dominant position of exclusive influence in Serbia to Austria, in exchange for exclusive influence in Bulgaria, essential for the long-desired control of the Straits—to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Bulgaria (1886).

The reader encounters the Russian military and political representatives in Bulgaria, their dealings with Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and the Bulgarian political leaders, both conservative and liberal, as well as the vicissitudes surrounding the drafting and suspension of the constitution, the construction of the international railway lines, the organization of the armed forces, the union with Eastern Rumelia, the war with Serbia, the abdication of Prince Alexander, and so on. The direct influence and positions held by Russians in Bulgaria reveal the degree of Bulgaria's dependence, initially equivalent to occupation.

In summarizing the ideological underpinnings of Russo-Bulgarian relations in the prologue, the author emphasizes the similarity between the events of the period under study and those of the decade immediately following World War II. Previously, Russia invoked autocratic tradition, Orthodoxy, and Slavophilia; currently, it invokes the communist ideal and the ethnic kinship of the Slavs.

The work is based primarily on previously unpublished material from the dispatches of the British Foreign Office and Public Record Office, as well as from the Austrian archives (Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv), and the works of several historians. The author also had access to Giers's interesting correspondence with A. P. Davidov, A. G. Ionini, A. E. Vlangali, and I. A. Zinoviev.

The five pages of the selected bibliography, which do not include a single Croatian author, explain Jelavich's unilateral and equivocal references to Serbian aspirations to the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied by Austria under the Treaty of Berlin, as well as, with greater rights, to Macedonia, which Bulgaria also appropriated. Thus, for example, the author's arbitrary assertion that Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were assigned to Austria-Hungary at the Congress of Berlin, are "the Serbian national territories" (p. 165) is entirely devoid of historical value, as is his statement on pp. 174 and 178, when commenting on the policy of the Habsburg Empire in the Balkans: "Lacking 'natural ties' in the Balkan Peninsula, it was obliged to rely rather on force and diplomacy.

For this reason, in its relations with the Balkan regions, Austria advocated the direct annexation of the territory, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina..." (p. 2). A reader less familiar with the ethnic, geographical, historical, political, and national issues of southeastern Europe might mistakenly conclude that the provinces in question constitute Serbian national territory—an error the author could easily have avoided by consulting Croatian sources, such as L. V. Südland's masterful work, "Die Südslawische Frage und der Weltkrieg" (The South Slavic Question and the World War), Vienna, 1918; Zagreb, 1944, or Dr. Mladen Lorkovic's well-documented book, "Narod i Zemlja Hrvata" (People and Land of Croatia), Zagreb, 1940, as well as the work of the English historian R. W. Seton Watson, "Die Südslawische Frage im Habsburger Reich" (The South Slavic Question in the Habsburg Empire), Berlin, 1913.

The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, According to the latest official statistics from Belgrade, 44% of the population is Serbian. Historically, Bosnia was part of the Croatian kingdom and later the vassal kingdom of Croatia-Hungary. In terms of its economy, natural communication routes, and geographical importance, it forms an indivisible unit with other Croatian provinces.

Professor Charles Jelavich's book makes a valuable contribution to understanding Russian policy and its objectives in the Balkan Peninsula. The scientific method applied to the study of such a compelling subject, presented in an engaging and fluid style, are other characteristics of this work, which is published with meticulous attention to detail.

 

Buenos Aires

Milan Blazekovic

 

 



[1] Anon. [Adil Zulfikarpasic], "Generali Titove Komunisticke Armije", Hrvatski Dom (Frigurgo, Suiza), vol I, Nro. 98, enero-febrero 1959, p. 11. Zulfikarpasic era miembro del PCY. Durante la guerra era teniente coronel en el ejército comunista de Tito. Dejó las filas comunistas en 1947 y desde entonces vive exilado.