The reality that was known to all but admitted by few was that Serbia's Yugoslav People's Army, supplied by Russia, was in full control in Bosnia and occupied Croatia. All field action in Bosnia and Croatia was controlled by the JNA general staff in Belgrade. Wounded "rebels" were flown to Yugoslav hospitals. The "Bosnian Serb" army was staffed by regular JNA officers who were rotated on a regular basis among Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. The last commander of the "Bosnian Serb" army was previously the commander of the "Croatian Serb" army. Despite this, the myth was maintained that Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic had sealed his borders with Bosnia and Croatia and had no control over "rebel forces." In reality the JNA never ceased shipping tons of Russian and Yugoslav arms. Milosevic had full control over his "Bosnian" puppets. Any question of that fact evaporated when "Bosnian Serb rebels" captured several hundred UN peacekeepers and chained them to military targets. It was Milosevic who slowly released them as he gained more and more concessions from the UN

The myth of the "Bosnian Serbs" and "Croatian Serbs" was allowed to go on because the UN, the US and NATO saw Milosevic as the only man who could negotiate a cease-fire. To attack targets in Serbia, the source of the aggression, it was felt, would lead to a wider Balkan war and court a world war. In the meantime, the UN was reduced to begging Milosevic to recognize the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. But "Slobo" used his advantage over the UN and NATO for all it was worth, and it was worth a great deal.

Croatia Strikes Back

For four years Croatia watched as the UN's so-called peacekeepers did nothing to restore Croatian civilian control over the occupied territories as called for in their mandate. Upon the change of command of the Russian UN peacekeeping force, the Serbs gave Russian Colonel Viktor Loginov, the outgoing commander, a white Mercedes-Benz limousine and a farewell party that was boycotted by British, French and Canadian forces. His replacement, Major General Alexander Perelyakin, was fired in April 1995 for his open collaboration with the Serbian occupation forces.

The UN mandate in Croatia expired on March 31, 1995, and the UN force was reduced in size from 12,000 to 5,000. At the same time, UN plans for Bosnia-Hercegovina changed almost weekly. Most plans represented little more than a repeat of Munich in 1938, where the socalled "Great Powers" handed over Czechoslovakia to Hitler a piece at a time. The final plan divided Bosnia-Hercegovina giving 49% of the country to the Serbs who constituted only 31 % of the pre-war population, rewarding Serbian aggression and punishing the victims. But even this plan was rejected by the Serbs who wanted 70% of Bosnia and access to the Adriatic Sea for the first time in history. Since the world refused to take any real action, against Serbia, the division of Bosnia became inevitable. The destruction, the barbarity, and the death brought on by the war assured that Orthodox, Muslim, and Catholic peoples could never again live together as "Bosnians".

Just as it appeared that Serbian aggression could not be contained, the Croatian Army (HV) proved that Serbia was not invincible despite numerical and hardware superiority. The Serbian army's basic tactic was to lob tons of ordinance on defenseless cities, towns and villages. But in actual combat, the Serb forces were demoralized, disorganized, and usually drunk.

In early May 1995, the government of Croatia moved against the Serbs by launching an offensive to reopen a vital highway and rail link that joined eastern Croatia (Slavonia) with the rest of the country. That link was broken on April 24th when Serb terrorists blocked the Dragalic-Novska section of the highway in violation of a standing cease-fire agreement of December 2, 1994, and a number of UN resolutions.