THE
DECLARATION OF CROATIAN INDEPENDENCE IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
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Journal
of Croatian Studies, XXVIII-XXIX, 1987-88 ? Annual Review of the Croatian Academy of
America, Inc. New York, N.Y., Electronic edition by Studia Croatica, by
permission. All rights reserved by the Croatian Academy of America.
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In their struggle for independence and
separation from the Yugoslav State established after the First World War, the
Croats found themselves divided into two factions; on the one hand a law abiding
majority, under the leadership of Dr. Vladko Maček, President of the
Croatian Peasant Party, and on the other a revolutionary minority, styled
"Usta?a" ("Insurgents"), whose visible head, Dr. Ante
Pavelić, lived in exile in Italy.
Initially
the Usta?a had received a limited amount of support from Hungary and Italy, but
as Yugoslavia began to distance itself from its traditional allies, (Great
Britain and, more especially; France), and to move closer to Hitler's Germany
and Mussolini's Italy, the Usta?a found themselves without any supporters at
all.
When
Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact on March 25t, 1941, it seemed that the
Croatian revolutionary movement had been dealt a mortal blow. Nevertheless,
scarcely two days later, on March 27th, a group of Yugoslav army officers, all
of them Serbs, incited by the British secret service, staged a coup, sparking
off violent anti-German riots in Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia and
Serbia.
Although
the new Yugoslav Government tried to avoid a war with Germany and Italy, Hitler
decided that the Balkan situation should be clarified and full control
established over the whole region before embarking on the campaign he had
planned against the Soviet Union. He also felt slighted by the Serbs and
decided to punish them by launching an attack against Yugoslavia. This attack
began on April 6th, 1941.
Although
at that time most of the prominent members of the Croatian Revolutionary
Movement were in Yugoslav prisons and their leader, Dr. Ante Pavelić, in
exile, the Revolutionary Movement seized the opportunity to launch a struggle
for the liberation of Croatia. One Usta?a group incited the troops to
rebellion, capturing the town of Bjelovar and proclaiming the independence of
Croatia on April 8th, 1941, a mere two days after the German attack, while the
German troops were still far away. News of this event failed to travel far,
however, for lack of an adequate mass communication media.
Meanwhile,.
in an attempt to destabilize Yugoslavia, the Germans had already sent two envoys
to the Croatian capital, Zagreb where they contacted Maček. Unable to
reach an agreement wits him, they met with Pavelić's representative, the
former Austro-Hungarian colonel Slavko Kvaternik, who subsequently, on April
10th 1941, was to proclaim, in the name of Ante Pavelič, the Independent
State of Croatia.
While
the April 8th proclamation had had little repercussion, this new announcement,
divulged through Radio Zagreb, had an explosive effect, sparking off uprisings throughout
Croatia, where followers of both Croatian movements, led by Maćek and
Pavelić respectively, jointly incited the Yugoslav troops to lay down
their arms and set up local Croatian revolutionary authorities.
Unfortunately, in 1945, the Croats were again
to lose their freedom, and at present their history is being written by their
enemies. The official Yugoslav version is that the Independent State of Croatia
was created by Hitler and Mussolini rather than by the efforts of Croatian
freedom-fighters.
This
essay endeavours to assert the historical truth of the matter. It centers its
attention on the revolutionary act of proclaiming the Independent State of
Croatia and tries to explain what caused the change in Hitler's attitude.
(Hitler did not start out with the concept of a free Croatia in mind but
finally accepted the revolutionary changes brought about by the Croats). It
also analyzes the attitude adopted by Italy and Hungary. The analysis is based
on historical treatises published mostly by historians who support the current
Yugoslav system and are hostile to the Independent State of Croatia, but also
draws on an extensive selection of secret documents from various countries,
currently available to students of history.*
*
To
establish who was the creator of the Independent State of Croatia is not merely
the necessary matter of setting history straight, but also has political
implications. In order to evaluate this facet of the Second World War objectively
it is essential to ascertain the true details of the creation of the
Independent State of Croatia. Was it the result of a struggle by the Croats
themselves, who were to fight tooth and nail for the following four years to
defend it against all and sundry, even to the extent of turning a blind eye to
their own misgivings concerning the system of government and its shortcomings?
Or, far from being a Croatian National State, was it imposed on the Croats, who
rejected it and fought not only against the Croatian government but also
against the Croatian State as such, in the pursuit of a new and better
Yugoslavia, Tito's Yugoslavia?
In
order to evaluate objectively whether or not the State o Croatia was
artificially contrived by Germany and Italy, it may be useful to analyze how
and under what conditions a typical German contrived state came into being. We
shall take as our example Serbia, established in 1941 and corresponding to the
territory of the Kingdom of Serbia before the Balkan wars.
The
main characteristics of this state are:
(a)
It was masterminded exclusively by Hitler, that is by Germany.
(b)
There had been no previous Serbian political group fighting even for separation
from the rest of Yugoslavia, let alone for Serbia to come under German control.
(c)
No-one, then or now, has suggested that there might be even one Serb prepared
to accept such a solution.
The
Independent State of Croatia on the contrary (established on April 10th, 1941)
was not proclaimed unexpectedly, nor did it come as a surprise to anyone. I
shall cite below documents which demonstrate that the Croats' aims and desires
were known in major political centers all round the world.
It
was no secret that the situation in Yugoslavia was explosive. However, in
November 1928, five months after an attempt on the life of the Croatian leader
Stjepan Radić while the Yugoslav parliament was in session, three months
after his death and two months before the proclamation of the personal
dictatorship of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, (the prime purpose of which was
to crush Croatian resistance), the King visited Paris where on November 15th he
informed the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand:
"The
Croats are pacifists and therefore innocuous ... There is no danger of the
Croats proclaiming their independence ... The state administration is
functioning normally as are the courts of justice, the people are paying their
taxes without grumbling and are complying with their military service. This
means that the situation in the country is normal and the status quo is not
threatened, so that, although there is discontent, particularly in Croatia, the
crisis is not serious and there is no reason for concern. The opposition
coalition and the people will, without concrete results, eventually get tired
of verbal fighting".[1][1]
However,
barely two years later, an English journalist and politician, Wickham Steed,
who during the First World War was a propagandist in English political circles
for the creation of Yugoslavia and, after the creation of Yugoslavia, became
one of her most ardent champions in Western political circles, warned Serbian
politician Voja Marinković: "What are you people doing? Don't you
realize that King Alexander's life is at stake and Yugoslavia will collapse??[2][2] Four years later King Alexander was
indeed killed in Marseille by a Macedonian, a member of a Croatian
revolutionary group founded with the purpose of eliminating the king, while the
second part of this prediction was to be proved true eleven years later.
By
1930 the Croats were already actively looking for support for their political
plans in various European countries.
After the murder of Stjepan Radić, Vladko
Maček succeeded him as President of the Croatian Peasant Party and leader
of the Croatian people. While abroad Maček had met Juraj Krnjević and
August Ko?utić, general secretary and vice-president respectively of the
same party, who, as exiles, were politically active outside their country. He
had also met Ante Pavelić, yet another exiled Croatian politician, who had
formerly been vice-president of the Croatian Rights Party and a member of
parliament for that party. After his meeting with Maček, who had just
returned to Croatia, Ante Trumbić, another prominent Croatian politician,
in this case president and member of parliament for the Croatian Federalist
Party, made the following entry in his diary:
"Actions:
Pavelić will make contacts amongst the Italians, Ko?utić will work
with the Italians and the English, Krnjević with the English, and Ke?man
will have to work within the law and contact the French".[3][3]
It
is hardly surprising therefore that all relevant political circles were
familiar with the Croats' aspirations and knew what they were struggling for.
Thus we read in a report sent by the German consul in Zagreb to his Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in mid-February 1935 that "according to Maček the
Croats would not fight to defend Yugoslavia as it was. He noted with
satisfaction Italy's stance in the dispute between Yugoslavia and Hungary with
regard to the assassination in Marseille, as well as Italy's decision not to
extradite Pavelić and Kvaternik".[4][4]
In
July of 1936 Mussolini had granted an audience to the exiled Croatian
politician August Ko?utić. On being asked about the Croatian Peasant
Party's political program, Ko?utić answered the in the first place they
wanted a sovereign state of Croatia. Should this not prove feasible they would
accept Croatia as part of a federation of Danubian states, (i.e. Slovenia,
Croatia, Hungary, and Austria). If this too were impossible, and Croatia had to
remain inside Yugoslavia, his party would fight for Croatian autonomy. When
Mussolini enquired what should be done with Pavelić' followers, the so
called "Usta?a", whose extradition from Italy was being pressed for
by Yugoslavia, Ko?utić replied that "under no circumstances should
they be handed over to Belgrade, as this would amount to treachery"[5][5] on the part of Italy who had previously
granted them asylum and assistance.
That
same year Yugoslavia received a visit from a certain M W. Been, a member of a
London-based institute specializing in the study of problems related to foreign
affairs for subsequent use by the British government. He also visited
Maček, who was known to be a friend of the English and a staunch democrat.
Asked about the Croatian attitude in the event of an armed conflict between
Yugoslavia and Germany, Maček answered that "the Croats would take
advantage of the opportunity to get rid of the Serbs?,[6][6] that is they would cut loose from
Yugoslavia and would proclaim their own sovereign state.
In
July 1937, Krnjević visited London where he told the Duchess of Atholl
that "relations between the Croats and the Serb were so strained that, if
there should be a war and the government were to order a mobilization, civil
war would ensue".[7][7]
In
December of the same year, the Czechoslovak Embassy in Belgrade sent the
following report regarding official conversation with Ko?utić and
Maček:
"When
Ko?utić was asked what the Croatian soldier would do in the case of an
armed conflict (between any power and Yugoslavia - Author's note), he said: Let
us suppose that a mobilization is called in Croatia. Bills will be posted
calling the people to join the army and to shed their blood fighting against
the enemy, to defend their state and their nation. Do you really believe that
anyone in Croatia would heed such a call? Some have had their ribs crushed in
prison, others mourn their murdered fathers, and so on. Can these people be
expected to go to war? After the first attack it will all be over".[8][8]
Maček's
answer to the same question was: "Try and send the Croats to the front.
Actually the question should be whether it is possible to effect a mobilization
at all. I think it is not possible. And, if we are forced to take up arms we
will cross over to the enemy, whoever he be. We would even join the Germans, despite
our dislike of them. We did once think highly of the Germans and were on good
terms with the Italians, purely because they were at that time against
Belgrade. At present they have moved closer to Belgrade and so we are against
them. You may find our attitude ideologically unsound, but this is a fact that
must be borne in mind ... The people follow me, but there are limits to my
authority. The peasants are indignant; they come to see me, asking when we will
give them arms to attack Belgrade. I was asked by the government to do my best
to ensure that the current army maneuvers proceed in a peaceful and orderly
manner and that Croatian soldiers should also participate in them. I managed to
convince them, but when I relayed Belgrade's request for food and draught
animals for the army the peasants were adamant. Our people asked me whether
they could commemorate December 1st [anniversary of the foundation of
Yugoslavia - Author's note] by organizing protests, burning Yugoslav flags and
hoisting Croatian flags in their place. As you will appreciate, the mood of the
people is one of rebellion".[9][9]
When
Krnjević remarked in Paris in April 1938, to a prominent member of the
radical-socialist party, that in the event of a war the Croats "would
start a revolution," the latter hurried off to communicate Krnjević's
assertion to the French General Staff, only to be told that "there was
nothing new about this, and that the Yugoslav army was neither technically nor
morally prepared for war, particularly on account of the Croatian
problem".[10][10]
One
year later, in early April 1939, Hugh Seton-Watson, son of R.W. Seton-Watson,
wrote in his report to the British Foreign Office after visiting Belgrade:
"During
his visit to Belgrade the leader of the Croatian Peasant party, Vladko
Maček, made a speech on August 14th 1938 in the presence of some 80,000
Serbs from Belgrade and ?umadija (central region of Serbia) about injustices
committed in Croatia. He mentioned an island in Dalmatia where police terror
was rampant and unrestricted, and asked the crowd: 'Are these Croats from
Dalmatia likely in the case of war to take up arms to defend thi State?' To
which the Serbian crowd replied 'No, and neither would we [if we were in their
place - Author's note]".[11][11] This testimony from Hugh Seton-Watson is
particularly significant as both he and his father were prominent English
journalists and historians (and very probably high-ranking agents of the
British Secret Service) moreover both were interested in protecting the status
quo in Yugoslavia.
To
summarize this section, the world was well aware of the situation in Yugoslavia
and even the Serbs, as ruling nation understood that the Croats could not fight
in defence of a state that was their oppressor.
Nazi
Germany's friendly attitude towards Yugoslavia is well known, and is
corroborated here by the following facts:
After
the annexation of Austria by Germany on March 12t1 1938, (an event known as
Anschluss), "Maček sent an emissary to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in Berlin. This messenger was received by an official of the Ministry,
and asked whether the German government would be prepared to support the
movement for the independence of Croatia, whereupon the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs immediately informed the Yugoslav government of this approach".[12][12] And to make things worse, "Prince
Paul transmitted this information confidentially to Campbell, the British
ambassador in Belgrade"[13][13] who, in turn, informed Lord Halifax
British Minister of Foreign Affairs.
In
brief, the Germans denounced the Croats to the Yugoslav authorities and Prince
Paul, the Regent ruling in the name of King Peter II who was still a minor,
denounced them to the English.
On
March 23rd 1938, immediately after the Anschluss, the consul general of Germany
in Zagreb, Freundt, informed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Maček
had had an interview with the Hungarian consul, (who was about to depart for
Budapest in order to submit a verbal report). Maček told the Hungarian
consul that "he wished to insert the Croatian policy into the Berlin-Rome
Axis Perhaps the Hungarian government could ascertain whether this might be
feasible? Only if the Berlin-Rome Axis should abandon the Croats completely
would he adopt the Franco-Czechoslovak line, and negotiations with Belgrade
would be a last recourse".[14][14]
Von
Heeren, German ambassador in Belgrade, wrote in the margin of this report:
"It is convenient for Germany that Yugoslavia achieve internal
consolidation, that is that Maček be compelled to undertake negotiations
that would lead to the signing of a political agreement with Belgrade".[15][15]
As
a result of this report, on May 11th 1938 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Germany sent the following instructions to the German consul general in Zagreb
and to the German ambassador in Belgrade: "There is no change in our
policy of non-interference in the Croatian problem after the Anschluss. Quite
the contrary, it is now even more convenient for us that Yugoslavia not suffer
either internal or external weakening as a result of the secession of a more or
less independent Croatia. In fact we would prefer a strong and friendly
Yugoslavia as our neighbour on the new frontiers of the Reich".[16][16]
The
downfall of Stojadinovič's pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist government on February
4th 1939 saw no change in the pro-Yugoslav attitude of Hitler's Germany. For
example a letter sent on February 22nd 1939 by German Secretary of State Ernst
von Weizsacker to the German ambassador in Belgrade, von Heeren, reads in part:
"Pessimistic comments about the internal strength of Yugoslavia keep
arriving here through different channels. It seems that the Croats in
particular are urging us to side with them. Needless to say every time I hear
something of this nature I exclaim 'That is the last thing I would want to
do'".[17][17]
Moreover,
Germany was endeavouring to convince Italy not to attack Yugoslavia. Early in
October 1940, scarcely six months before the conflict with Yugoslavia, von
Heeren told the charg頤'affaires of the Slovak embassy in Belgrade that
"Italy had territorial claims against Yugoslavia, but Germany was
appeasing Italy in an attempt to maintain peace in that part of Europe ...
Although it appears paradoxical, he states, nevertheless it is a fact that
Germany is acting as protector of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia ...
When the charg頤'affaires asked what the German attitude was with regard
to the problem of establishing an independent Croatia, von Heeren replied that
Germany considered that it was more convenient to negotiate with an integral
than with a dismembered Yugoslavia. It was not therefore Germany's wish to
exert any pressure or give any help to the radically oriented Croatian movement
whose clear and stated objective was an independent Croatian State".[18][18]
Unlike
Germany which, excepting a part of Slovenia, had no territorial claims against
Yugoslavia, Italy continually wanted to conquer Dalmatia and rule the Adriatic.
At the same time, Italy was living in constant fear of Germany and was obsessed
by the fear that Germany might get a foothold on the Adriatic coast. Thus,
whereas on the one hand Italy had an interest in wresting Dalmatia away from
Yugoslavia, on the other it wanted Yugoslavia to be strong enough for the two
of them to pool their strength and thus prevent Germany from obtaining a
passage to the Adriatic. As a result of these two conflicting attitudes Italian
foreign policy embraced two conflicting lines, alternating according to the
given circumstances; a friendly attitude towards Yugoslavia or a
confrontational one. Italy's attitude towards Pavelić and his followers
(Usta?a) living in Italy, indeed her attitude to the Croats in general,
depended on which of these two lines might be deemed expedient at any given
moment.
We can see at least three different attitudes
adopted by Italy towards the Usta?a in particular and Croats in general. One
attitude consisted of helping the Croatian struggle which was supposed to lead
to a revolutionary uprising against Yugoslavia; second attitude used this
struggle as a factor of pressure that was supposed to induce Yugoslavia to draw
closer to Italy, and a third combined a friendship pact with Yugoslavia and a
simultaneous persecution of Pavelić and his followers. This last policy
was accompanied by pro-Serbian posturing, culminating in a secret conversations
between Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano and Yugoslav Prime Minister
Stojadinović, according to which, in the case of an armed conflict,
Yugoslavia would allow Italy to occupy practically all of Dalmatia (from Su?ak
to a line somewhat to the south of Split), as well as the zone of Gorski Kotar,
all of them Croatian territories, whilst Italy would, in return, help to create
a Great Serbia that would annex the Greek port of Salonika and part of Albania,
thus giving Serbia an outlet onto the Aegean Sea, an old dream of Serbian
expansionists.
Several
sources reveal the existence of these secret conversations. Vladko Maček
and Ivan Me?trović, among others, mention them in their memoirs.
Me?trović, a friend of Prince-Regent Paul Karadordević, had heard of
the conversations as early as 1940 from Prince Paul himself who told him that
he had requested Stojadinović's resignation from his post as Prime
Minister of Yugoslavia specifically because of a secret understanding between
him and Ciano. The German diplomat von Hassel, later to become one of the
principal conspirators in an attempt on Hitler's life, also mentions it in his
memoirs. Referring to a conversation with Prince Paul in early November of
1940, he mentions that Paul had told him "he had been obliged to get rid
of Stojadinović on account of his attitude toward the Croats ...
Stojadinović was over-intimate with Ciano and Prince Paul considered that,
essentially, he had put the fate of Croatia into the hands of Italy".[19][19]
The
best proof of the Axis' pro-Serbian leanings is the fact of Yugoslavia's
accession to the Tripartite Pact; for once Yugoslavia had signed this pact,
Germany and Italy, in return, guaranteed respect for Yugoslav sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and, in a secret clause, access to the Aegean sea,
specifically "the extension of Yugoslav sovereignty over the city and port
of Salonika".[20][20]
Bearing
in mind that both Salonika and an Aegean outlet were old Serbian dreams, and
moreover that the importance of the Croatian coast and ports would be
diminished by their acquisition, the Tripartite pact can be seen as a gain for
the Serbs and a loss for the Croats. Assurances of Yugoslav territorial
integrity were tantamount to guaranteeing the submission of the Croatian
people, which would make a split of the Croats away from Yugoslavia more
difficult. By acceding to the pact, Yugoslavia promoted Serbian imperialism and
consolidated Serbian power inside the country. I am tempted to believe that
this is the true reason for Hitler's attack of hysteria on learning of the Serb
coup only two days after the pact was signed. This coup was
"inspired" by money from the British Secret Service, and news of the
Serbian masses that poured into the streets of Belgrade in violent anti-German
riots, chanting "better a war than a pact", can not have improved his
temper. Hitler's manic reaction resulted in an attack on Yugoslavia, and gave
the Croats a chance to realize their objective, namely the independence of
Croatia. History is as often as not the result of fortuitous events.
Oppressed
nations are seldom presented with the opportunity to become free, and so they
must grab any chance that presents itself. Did not the nations of South America
make the most of the opportunities history offered them to put their dreams of
sovereignty and liberty into practice, when the power ruling and exploiting
them, Spain, was conveniently tied up in fending off an attack by Napoleon? And
did the British settlers in North America fighting to shake off the shackles of
colonialism not benefit enormously from the war between France and England?
According to the New Cambridge Modern History:[21][21]
"From an early stage in the struggle,
Congressional leaders had realised that the foreign aid they deemed essential
could be obtained only from the maritime powers of France and Spain. Towards
both these countries, and particularly towards France, Americans had
traditional antipathies, and it was a measure of their necessity that they
decided to approach the Bourbons for aid. This they did even before
independence was declared".[22][22]
The
similarity between the problems of the American and Croatian revolutions is
surprising. Like the Americans, the Croats were obliged to ask and receive help
from powers for whom traditionally they had no liking. But the similarity does
not end there, because:
"France
had entered the war not so much to achieve American independence as to weaken
Great Britain.
...
If France was indifferent to American interests, Spain was openly hostile.
Though Spain entered the war against Britain in June 1779, she did so as the
ally not of the United States but of France. In Madrid the birth of the
American republic was from the first viewed as a threat to Spanish imperial
interests".[23][23]
And
lastly: "The peace negotiations revealed deep fissures in the
Franco-American alliance.[24][24]
All
this proves that we are forced by historical circumstances to accept as our
allies whoever is willing to help us, even if they are not our true friends,
and that common interests, although circumstantial, prevail over our likes and
dislikes.
Let
us now, after this digression, return to the signing of the Tripartite Pact.
There are additional proofs that the signing of the Tripartite Pact helped to
strengthen Serbian rule and to consolidate the Croatian prison, Yugoslavia.
On
November 29th 1940, Hitler held a secret meeting in Berghof with the Yugoslav
Minister of Foreign affairs, Aleksandar Cincar-Marković. During this
meeting Hitler bent over backwards in his attempts to convince the Yugoslav
minister to sign the pact. He "expounded his plans for the consolidation
of Europe, and the formation of a world coalition stretching from Yokohama to
Spain. Hitler said that the moment had come for every European State to take
its place in the overall plan. A short time ago, in Vienna, he had had the opportunity
to converse in detail with Count Ciano ... about the consolidation of the
Balkans ... Hitler stated that in his opinion Yugoslavia's existence was
important for Germany, and that there were no political discrepancies between
Yugoslavia and the Reich ... In order to maintain the balance of power in the
Balkans, Germany needed a strong Yugoslavia. After expounding extensively on
the negative consequences of an armed clash between Italy and Greece, Hitler
said that perhaps in view of the military situation Germany should intervene
... Anyway he recommended that Yugoslavia 'hasten to make use of the existing
situation before it was too late'. He emphasized that if the consolidation were
carried out right away, with the approval of his Italian ally, it would not be
possible to effect subsequent changes in the future. `The help he was giving
Italy gave him the right to demand that'. At present he was in a position to
persuade Italy to accept the attitude he had consistently maintained regarding
Yugoslavia, although he had been unsuccessful in the past in obtaining Italian
acceptance. However, in the light of recent military events in Greece that
possibility has now materialized, and if Yugoslavia were to receive German
guarantees of its independence it would have nothing to worry about ... The
agreed Italo-German attitude regarding Yugoslavia 'could not be changed if in
the future Italy were to find it inconvenient' ... If it were feasible at this
moment to convince his ally [Italy] to guarantee the consolidation of
Yugoslavia, this would be valid for ever".[25][25]
In
other words, Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact and the written
undertaking on the parts of Italy and Germany to "always respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia?[26][26] were instrumental in shielding
Yugoslavia from present and future Italian pretensions. The bondage of the
Croatians was to last forever.
At
present the Serbs and the supporters of Yugoslavia are trying to justify the
signing of the Tripartite Pact by explaining it as a temporary measure with the
sole aim of avoiding Yugoslav entanglement in a war against Germany and Italy,
and claiming that the intention was, as soon as the military situation
permitted, that Yugoslavia would switch allegiance to the Allies. However, if
this were the only purpose, that is, if it were only a temporary measure, and
if the secret intention was to switch over to the other side, what was the
point of the secret clause promising Yugoslavia the city and port of Salonika?
It is obvious that Yugoslavia could only keep these territories if the powers
of the Axis won the war rather that the Allies. In other words, the fact that
Yugoslavia demander Salonika as part of the booty, in exchange for signing the
Tripartite Pact, proves that the Yugoslav government not only believes in
victory for the Axis, but that (at least at the moment of signing the
Tripartite Pact) it even wanted a final victory for Italy and Germany.
We
have seen the signing of the Tripartite Pact to have been beneficial for
Yugoslavia and for the Serbians, but that it most certainly was not convenient
for the Croats. So how are we to explain the fact that only two days after the
signing of the pact, the Serbian armed forces staged a coup which received the
ample sup port of the Serbian masses?
We
would be failing in our objectivity if we did not recognize the importance of
the anti-German (rather than anti-Nazi) sentiment of the Serbian masses. These
people reacted according to the way they felt, and deserve our respect for
that. But it should also be borne in mind that the masses were unaware of just
what had been signed on March 25th, particularly the secret clauses, and they
were therefore not in a position to judge how beneficial the signing of the
pact was for the Serbs.
It
is interesting to trace who was manipulating these masses who was pulling the
strings of the Putsch-makers; who was inciting these people. It is also useful
to learn the personal motivations of those who were in command of the
situation.
Doubtless
some of them acted in accordance with their political convictions. The facts
show, however, that actions of others went not solely inspired by political or
ideological motivations. Let us turn to some documents and witnesses reports,
and a selection of Serbian, English and Italian writers, to see what they have
to say.
?The
first testimony comes from Sir Cecil Parrott, tutor of King Peter II,
subsequently British ambassador and Professor of History at the University of
Lancaster. On January 12th 1977 he gave a lecture on BBC3 entitled Decline of a
Dynasty, the dynasty in question being that of the
Karađorđevićs. Referring to the Putsch of March 27th, Sir Cecil
said: 'Late in March 19411 visited my old university of Cambridge. There, in
the company of my old teacher: and their colleagues, we had a conversation
about the Putsch in Belgrade. Some of the teachers who were present said 'It
was not the Yugoslavs but us who staged the Putsch'. 'Who are us?' I asked them.
The answer was 'We, the SOE (Special Operation Executive)', that is the British
Secret Service pertaining to the Ministry of Psychological Warfare'".[27][27]
"According
to the statement of the British publicist and historian Robert William Seton Watson,
'the British spent half a million pounds to finance the Serbian revolt.' "
[28][28]
"In
a document from the official British archives (F.O. 371-224892) there is a note
mentioning that towards the end of 1940, actions against the Axis to be carried
out in the south-eastern part of Europe were analysed at a meeting between the
representatives of the Foreign Office and the SOE. These actions included a
system of large-scale bribes both in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Globally, the sum
of ? 5,000 per month was allotted as aid for the Serbian Agrarian Party, which
sum the latter had been receiving during the previous six months. Another
decision was to subsidize the Independent Democratic Party, to an unspecified
amount. The organization Narodna Odbrana (Defence of the People) had also been
earmarked for subsidies out of the same fund".[29][29]
"During
1940 Section D (later S.O.E.) was particularly active in Belgrade, cultivating
politicians and leaders of patriotic organizations and handing out subsidies to
the Serb Peasant Party, the Independent Democratic Party and the Narodna
Odbrana. They were also in contact with the exiled Bulgarian left-wing
Agrarians".[30][30]
"The
Belgrade authorities tried to explain to the people that the government had no
choice but to sign the Tripartite Pact, as Yugoslavia was militarily unprepared
and, for several months to come, Great Britain would not be in a position to
send supplies to Yugoslavia ... British Ambassador Campbell asked his
government to refute these arguments by means of BBC Serbo-Croatian broadcasts,
which would emphasize past and present British aid to Greece, and would state
that Yugoslavia was to receive both British and North American aid, and that
moreover booty obtained from Albania would come in very handy. Intelligence
Service agents gave efficient backing to this propaganda, flooding Yugoslavia
with anti-German leaflets and tracts, thus enhancing the climate for
revolution. They too gave financial aid to certain Serbian opposition groups,
centring their efforts on the people who were to carry out the Putsch".[31][31]
"On
21 March the crucial meeting of the Crown Council was held. Three members of
the government resigned rather than agree to signing the pact - Branko
Čubrilović, of the Serb Peasant Party, Srdjan Budisavljević, of
the Independent Democratic Party (both parties were subsidised by S.O.E., who
were in close touch with both men) and Mihajlo Konstantinović, an
independent nominee of Prince Paul's, over whom Budisavljević and
Tupanjanin (of the Serb Peasant Party, also in constant touch with S.O.E.) had
acquired considerable influence".[32][32]
About
the middle of May 1941 most of the exiled Yugoslav Government was in Palestine.
Through its minister at the British Court, the Yugoslav government expressed
its wish to move as soot as possible to London.
The British Information Ministry set about
preparing a list of all Yugoslavs exiled in Palestine, with brief biographical
data. On that list, beside each name, remarks were recorded by Foreign Office
staff ... Beside the name of Milo? Tupanjanin was written 'On the payroll of
the British Intelligence Service, SOE 2' (F.O 3 71-30282)". [33][33]
?The
best hope lay with the Air Force, and with the younger army officers: the
General Staff, whatever bribes S.O.E. may have lavished, were too cautious and
fearful to take action ... On 26 March Macdonald reported that Simović was
head of an organization in tending to carry out a coup d'etat, and had said
that 'we should not have to wait more than a few days.. In reality, Simović
was the figure-head and Mirković the moving spirit, who brought forward
the date of the coup to 27 March.
In
the following year, when Mirković was in the Middle East he was reported
to have said that he had been an `agent of the British' before the coup. On
this Campbell (by this time Minister in Washington) commented that 'if he was
indeed an [agent] I did not know of it. I knew he was in confidential contact
with the Air Attach頡nd told him that a coup d'etat was being planned,
but he never furnished any details or dates, and I should doubt that he
received pay from any of our intelligence or other services'".[34][34]
The
Germans held the Yugoslav army in high esteem. The day before the attack
against Yugoslavia, on April 5th 1941, "Hitler wrote to Mussolini that he
was aware that he would have to fight against an exceptionally courageous and
tenacious enemy who will moreover be favoured by the mountainous configuration
of the land".[35][35] A short time before that, on March 30th
1941, Field Marshall Walter von Brauchitsch, chief of the High Command of the
Army (OKW), also considered that the Yugoslav troops would probably put up a
very brave defence and that they would fight stubbornly in the field as long as
their ammunition and food lasted".[36][36]
The
Germans however were proved entirely wrong. The Yugoslav southern front, where
the troops were mostly Serbian soldiers, gave way some three days after the
first German attack. (Skoplje, the most important town in that area, fell after
only one and a half days), so that the war was virtually all over. "In
accordance with the German OKW report of April 9th, once the German armed
forces had penetrated the Skoplje plain and crossed the river Vardar, 'the Yugoslav
troops (were) cut off from the Greek and English troops', prompting the German
military specialists to consider that the war in Yugoslavia was really over
(Der Feldzug auf dem Balkan, pp. 43-45)"[37][37]
At
9 a.m. of April 14th, that is barely eight days after the beginning of
hostilities, General Du?an Simović, Yugoslav Prime Minister, gave General
Kalafatović written orders to apply for "a truce", which
actually turned out to be an unconditional surrender. But the capitulation
could not be signed until April 17th at 21 hrs, on account of the chaotic state
of what was left of the Serbian army. (After April 10th, 1941, it is no longer
fitting to continue speaking of the Yugoslav Army, rather we should talk of the
remnants of the former Yugoslav Army, or the remnants of the Serbian troops
belonging to that army. However, Germany had waged war against Yugoslavia
rather than Serbia, which at that time did not exist, and, presumably for
normal reasons, the Germans insisted that the unconditional surrender be signed
in the name of the Yugoslav Army, although actually and legally it no longer
existed).
What
really happened is unimportant, but it is unquestionable that Hitler was
convinced that the war against Yugoslavia would take some time if certain
measures were not taken. But Hitler wanted a lightning-fast war against
Yugoslavia, convinced as he was that "Germany would thus be able to
intimidate Turkey sufficiently, an achievement which would eventually, in the
campaign against Greece, have favourable consequences.?[38][38] Likewise it "was important to end
the war in the Balkans as soon as possible, in order to launch the attack
against the Soviet Union which was scheduled to begin early in June 1941. Moreover,
the German OKW wanted to prevent the Yugoslavs, Greeks and the British joining
forces any forming a new 'Salonika Front,' which could hamper the German
advance and their penetration of the Mediterranean basin".[39][39]
Everything
Hitler did in those days was subordinated to his decision to put an end as soon
as possible to hostilities wit] Yugoslavia. During these days he showed little
interest in political issues, his main objectives being of a military nature.
We can see for example that, in order to convince the Hungarians to attack
Yugoslavia he had rashly promised them the rich province of Banat. However,
when the Yugoslav conflict was over, Hitler was unable to keep his promise on
account of Romanian opposition and that of the 140,000 Germans who lived there.
With
his mind set on a quick victory over Yugoslavia, on March 27th, before meeting
with his chief ally Mussolini, to whom h had as early as 1936 relinquished
Mediterranean supremacy including Adriatic supremacy in the form of the
Yugoslav coast Hitler summoned to an early morning meeting the "ambassador
of Hungary Dome Szt and the ambassador of Bulgaria Pervai Draganov in
order to announce his preparations for a lightning attack against Yugoslavia,
which would enable their countries to carry out territorial conquests, provided
they took part in the war".[40][40] At that time Hitler did not have an
independent Croatian State in mind because he was of the opinion that Croatia
should belong to Hungary and be granted only a limited degree of autonomy.
According to the Yugoslav historian Dr Fikreta Jelić Butić
"guided by strategic reasons Hitler favoured as a solution the Croatian
'self-government' within Hungary or at least under the influence of Hungary. He
probably hoped that this solution would eventually help to counteract the
Italian expansion".[41][41]
The
same day, between 13 and 14 hours, there was a meeting of the German War
Council. In the course of this meeting Hitler declared that it was
"necessary to bear in mind that, during the attack on Yugoslavia, the
Croats would side with the Germans. They should be given appropriate political
treatment (later on, self-government)"[42][42] Obviously Hitler did not foresee at that
time an independent Croatia, but merely considered that during the conflict, and
to reap maximum advantage of the Croatian anti-Yugoslav sentiments, they should
be given "appropriate political treatment" which would result
eventually in "self-government" (probably inside Hungary), always
provided that the Croats backed the German forces during the armed conflict.
"As
soon as the meeting of the War Council was over, the OKW/WFSt prepared, along
the lines of Hitler's statements, the instructions for the military campaign
against Yugoslavia. These instructions (Weisungen) bore the reference number
25, and the attack against Yugoslavia was accordingly known as 'Operation
25'".[43][43] Amongst other things this plan of action
states that "The political tensions within Yugoslavia will have to be
exacerbated by making promises to the Croats.[44][44] Obviously, the intention was to incite
the Croats against Yugoslavia so as to weaken her defence, but there was no
plan regarding the proclamation of a sovereign Croatian State.
This
can be seen more clearly on analysis of the guidelines used for drawing up the
propaganda against Yugoslavia. These guidelines were issued on March 28th by
Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, head of the OKW. Point (c) reads: "It is
necessary to reveal that the German army is not coming to the Croatian, Bosnian
or Macedonian territories as an enemy. On the contrary it comes to prevent the
Serbian chauvinists sending these people to the front where they would lose
their lives in vain, to the sole benefit of the British. But if, under the
influence of the Anglo-Serbian propaganda, the non-Serbian population too was
to put up a resistance, they would be crushed by the German army, regardless of
who they were and where the resistance might be encountered."[45][45]
It
is clear that the purpose of the German propaganda was to dissuade the
non-Serbian population from taking part in the conflict. The dual purpose was
to appeal to the interests of the people and at the same time to intimidate
them. This way they would understand that they had nothing to gain from
fighting but, should they decide to do so, they should know before hand of the
dire consequences. If anything this proves that at that time the German had no
intention whatsoever of helping the Croats to become independent; if they had,
would it not have been more coherent an expedient to use this as an argument in
their propaganda?
It
can be seen with even greater clarity that nobody was giving the remotest
thought to the possibility of an independent Croatian State in point (b) of the
same instructions, which reads: "In different parts of occupied
Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia, the publication of newspapers will be
permitted under German censorship?.[46][46]
This
implies that under German plans Croatia was to be occupied rather than
independent, but given a milder treatment inasmuch as the publication of
newspapers was to be allowed "particularly in Croatia", albeit
subject to German (rather than Croatian) censorship. These guidelines coincide
perfectly with the instructions Hitler had given the day before in the course
of his meeting with the War Council, in the sense that during the hostilities
the Croats should be given "appropriate political treatment" and
"later on self-government".
That
same night Hitler sent a letter to Mussolini, informing him of his decision to
attack Yugoslavia and of his suggestions to the ambassadors of Hungary and
Bulgaria that their countries might participate in the attack. "Because,
Duce, without the help of Hungary and Bulgaria we will not be able to act with
the speed the events might demand".[47][47]
Mussolini
answered immediately, one paragraph of his letter being particularly
interesting. It reads: "Besides Bulgarian, and especially Hungarian
cooperation, the separatist tendencies of the Croats, those represented by Dr.
Pavelić, should be borne in mind".[48][48] In other words it was Mussolini who
first pointed out to Hitler the importance of the Croats. However Mussolini
does no mention the independence of Croatia; he limits himself to underscoring
the importance of Croatian involvement apart from that of Hungary and Bulgaria
if the war against Yugoslavia is to be terminated as soon as possible.
The
following day (March 28th) the Hungarian ambassador Szt, after Hitler
had again offered him Croatia, "replied that Hungary had no claims on
Croatia and did not wish to incorporate that country into its boundaries",[49][49] whereupon Hitler insisted that "a
possible solution might be, for example, Croatia receiving friendly and
economic support from Hungary".[50][50]
On
March 31st, that is four days after Hitler had taken the decision to attack
Yugoslavia, Mussolini had pointed out the importance of the Croats to him, and
after the Hungarians had rejected the idea of Croatia becoming part of Hungary,
as an autonomous territory, "for the first time a pattern of German
opinion regarding the idea of an 'independent Croatia' began to emerge with
some clarity".[51][51] That same day Minister of Foreign
Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop sent a telegram to the German consul in Zagreb
instructing him to inform Maček that if Yugoslavia were to collapse
Germany would contemplate an independent Croatia.[52][52]
But
what was to be understood by the term "independence"? Even Hitler
seems to have been unclear. Six days later, on April 6th, he issued
instructions for the subsequent organization of Yugoslav territory. Here one
can read "Croatia shall be an independent state, probably under Hungarian
influence".[53][53] "The coast in the north-western
part of Yugoslavia, Dalmatia and Montenegro shall belong to Italy".[54][54]
More
than two days after the Croats had proclaimed their independent state (in the
afternoon of April 10th) we eventually find in article 6 of the
"Provisional instructions regarding the breakup of Yugoslavia" which
was put together between the evening of April 12th and the morning of April
13th, that "within its ethnic boundaries, Croatia shall become an
independent state", and that "Germany shall not interfere in the
internal political affairs of Croatia".[55][55] However, article 7 of these instructions
states that Bosnia (and implicitly Dalmatia) do not belong to Croatia, and that
their future political status shall be decided by Italy.[56][56] It is therefore obvious that when Hitler
speaks about Croatia he refers only to "the historical Kingdom of Croatia
and Slavonia, formerly a constituent part of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy".[57][57]
It
is of extreme importance to determine as accurately as possible the date on
which these "Provisional instructions" were conceived. If they were
put together after the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia they
would prove that this was established thanks to the Croatian struggle and that
Hitler came into the picture late in the day. However, if the "Provisional
instructions" preceded the proclamation of the independence of Croatia
then evidence of this could be used by enemies of the Croatian cause to give
credibility to their theory that the Independent State of Croatia was a German
creation.
Not
only the Croats are aware of this, but also all those who put their pens to the
service of Croatian oppressors. It is useful to see just how far some official
Yugoslav historians are prepare to go.
For
instance Ferdo Čulinović, renowned historian and university professor
in Yugoslavia, writes in his book Yugoslavia Between Two Wars, published
in Yugoslavia in 1961, that Hitler issued his Provisional instructions
"before attacking Yugoslavia",[58][58] that is before April 6th 1941. And in
order that so gross a lie not be detected by readers the author refrains from
mentioning the date of these instructions, April 12th 1941, or six days after
the German attack.
What
seems to particularly bother Čulinović about these instructions is
the statement that Germany will not interfere in the internal political affairs
of the Croatian State, and this would seen to be why he qualifies them as an
example of the "hypocrisy of the leaders of the Third Reich?.[59][59] But Čulinović knows perfectly
well that these instructions, far from being intended for the Croats or the
general public were actually issued to the highest levels of command of the
German army and classified "Top Secret". He also knows that they were
prepared and signed by the Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces
(OKW), General Keitel along the lines of Hitler's instructions, which surely
implies that this is not a statement made for purposes of propaganda but a case
of a high-ranking officer giving official instructions.
Another
Yugoslav historian, General Velimir Terzić, was much more blunt. General
Terzić does not enter into subtle disquisition: and musings about
"hypocrisy." Instead, on page 549 of the second tome of his bulky
work Collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941 we can find the
"complete" text of the "Provisional instructions", from which
he has omitted completely the instructions relating to non-interference in the
internal political matters of the Croatian State. This omission patently
constitutes an academic and historical forgery.
It
is interesting to analyse Čulinović's and Terzič's motives in
playing down and concealing respectively this instruction. It would be
ridiculous to affirm or attempt to demonstrate by means of this instruction
that the Germans really did not meddle in the internal affairs of the
Independent State of Croatia. But this instruction does show clearly what
Hitler and the Germans were thinking at a given moment, the moment at which the
Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed, and also what kind of state they
were prepared to recognize. It is obvious they were thinking in terms of a
fully sovereign state, and that at that moment they had no intention of
interfering in its internal problems. It is not the purpose of this essay to
analyse the subsequent events which were in many respects a far cry from what was
voiced in the "Provisional instructions". Here we simply wish to
highlight the changes that occurred in Hitler's plans. On March 27th 1941
Hitler conceived Croatia as an autonomous country inside Hungary, and on April
6th 1941, the day Yugoslavia was attacked, he already considered that Croatia
should be an independent state but "under Hungarian influence", only
to change again abruptly on April 12th 1941, upholding the idea of Croatia as
an "independent state" in whose internal affairs Germany should not
interfere. It is obvious that the chain of events that commenced on April 6th,
that is to say the momentum of the Croatian revolution which culminated in the
proclamation of the independence of Croatia on April 10th 1941, was
instrumental in forging Hitler's (and Germany's) opinion.
Let
us however return to General Terzić. It seems that the adulteration of one
document relating to the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia was not
enough for the appetite of a "good" Yugoslav historian. If we turn to
pages 722/3 of the same volume of his book we can read: "The Independent
State of Croatia was created by the decision of the German High Command, that
is, by the decision of the German army whose duty it was to put this decision
into practice. This is also confirmed by the commander of the German Second
Army, Field Marshall Weichs, who on April 4th issued the following order to his
troops: 'The F?has given the order to establish the new state of Croatia which
will maintain friendly relations with Germany'". It is to Terzić's
eternal misfortune that he had completely forgotten that in the same volume of
his book, on pages 58-60, he had published the entire text of the said orders
of the commander of the Second Army, issued on April 4th, in which the
quotation from it on pages 722/3 does not appear. This "Order related to
the Operations," as indicated by its title, is of a purely military
nature, with the exception of article 1 which reads: "On account of
changes in the political situation in the Balkans resulting from the coup
staged by the army in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia must also be considered our enemy,
in spite of its declaration of loyalty. The F?and Supreme Commander has decided
that Yugoslavia must be defeated as soon as possible. This operation will bear
the code name 'Operation 25' ". As we can see, there is no question here
of "setting up the new state of Croatia", as Terzić said, but of
overpowering (that is defeating or annihilating) the Yugoslav army militarily,
and as quickly as possible. But then again, how many readers will remember,
when they get to page 722, what they read on page 58?
We
shall now try to analyse just when the "Provisional instructions,"
particularly article 6 relating to Croatia, were drawn up. They contain an
explicit statement that they are based on Hitler's instructions of April 3rd
1941, prior to April 10th, the day on which the Independent State of Croatia
was proclaimed. Consequently, one part of the instructions is simply a new and
more complete formulation of Hitler's previous orders. If this were also the
case of article 6, relating to Croatia, then it would be quite irrelevant
whether the date on which they were drawn up were before or after the
proclamation of Croatian independence. However, in Hitler's previous
instructions ("Instruction No. 26" of April 3rd 1941), there is no
mention at all of the future Croatian State, nor for that matter any mention of
anything relevant to Croatian problems. There is indeed no mention at all of
Croatia, and the only reference to Croatian territories in article 5 is in the
context of "the Italian Second Army shall not be set into motion before
the attack of the German Second Army and of the XXXI Mobile Group of the Army
Corps become manifest. To this end it might become imperative that the attack
be directed more to the south than the south- east?".[60][60] We must therefore conclude that as far
as Croatia is concerned the "Provisional instructions" of April 12th
are entirely unrelated to the previous instructions of April 3rd 1941, and that
they do not derive from them.
In
the light of official documents currently available to the public, it is
possible to establish not only the date but even the hour when the
"Provisional instructions" were drawn up. To this end our study must
be based on two of its articles, that is articles 1 and 6.
According
to article 1, "The F?of the Reich shall draw up a settlement in writing
with the Duce ratifying the cession of the territories that have already been
occupied by Italian troops",[61][61] and stating which territories will go to
Germany. The territories in question were part of Slovenia claimed by Germany,
while the other part was claimed by Italy. But these territories were occupied
by the Italian troops on April 12th 1941 in the afternoon, since on that day
"at 18.20 the Chief of Staff of the (German) Second Army informed (over
the telephone) the district chief (Gauleiter) in Graz that the Italians had
occupied part of the zone that was to be annexed to Southern Carynthia",[62][62] which shows that the "Provisional
instructions" could not have been drawn up before 18.20 hours on April
12th 1941.
On
the basis of article 6 it is possible to establish with even greater accuracy
just when the "Provisional instructions" were drafted. The crux of
the matter is in that part of article 6 in which instructions are given to the
effect that Germans should not interfere in the internal political affairs to
the Croatian State. The question then that ought to be raised is why this order
was included in the "Provisional instructions" issued for the benefit
of high-ranking German commanding officers, since it should have been
sufficient to include in article 6 the part reading that "within its
ethnic limits Croatia will be an independent state". But, if the
instruction about non-interference was added, (which at first sight appears to
be redundant), then there must have been a valid reason for its inclusion. And
indeed there was.
As
can be seen from official German documents, Slavko Kvaternik, the Croatian
revolutionary who proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia on April 10th in
the name of Ante Pavelić, approached the German government on April 12th
requesting diplomatic recognition of the new state.[63][63] The request for recognition was
forwarded through the Command of the German Second Army, which, in turn,
channelled through the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) a request
from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for clarification as to who was the
head of the Croatian State, Pavelić or Kvaternik.[64][64] The enquiry was received at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs at 20.45 hours on April 12th 1941,[65][65] but the Ministry had no brief which
would enable them to answer. That same night, at 22 hours,[66][66] the Ministry of Foreign affairs received
Hitler's answer relayed over the phone by the Chief of General Staff of the
Armed Forces (OKW), General Alfred Jodl. Hitler's answer was "There shall
be no interference whatsoever in Croatian internal matters. Let the Croats
chose whomsoever they want as their head of state."[67][67]
If
the "Provisional instructions", particularly the instruction
regarding German non-interference, had been drawn up previously it would not
have been necessary to wait until 22 hrs for the answer, which must mean that
this particular instruction was incorporated sometime between 20.45 and 22.00
hours on April 12t 1941, to match the enquiry of the Command of the German
Second Army. This would seem to be corroborated in the similarity between
Hitler's reply and the phrasing of article 6, as well as by the fact that both
statements belonged to the OKW sphere, and that both instructions had been
issued for the benefit of the higher officers of the German Command.
To
sum up, the instruction explaining what the Croatian Stat would be like, to wit
that the Germans would not interfere in it internal political affairs, was
drawn up more than two days, (between 53 and 54 hours to be precise), after the
proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia. Therefore the proclamation of
Croatian Independence was not the consequence but the cause of the spirit in
which article 6 of the "Provisional instructions" was drawn up.
As
explained above, on March 27th 1941 Hitler was not planning to recognize the
rights of the Croats to a sovereign state. His plans were completely different.
So, the question is, what happened that persuaded him to recognize the
Independent State of Croatia proclaimed by the Croats.
There
were several causes, but all hinge around one truism: international politics is
keyed exclusively to common interests. The Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed
and established as a result of these struggle and efforts of the Croats, but it
achieve recognition from Germany and Italy because, at that moment, Croatian
interests coincided not only with those of Germany and Italy, but also with
those of Hungary. No analyst of these events however has attached sufficient
importance to the incidence of Hungarian interests which, to my thinking were
fundamental.
As
we have already seen, Hitler was trying by all means possible to convince the
Hungarians to attack Yugoslavia, promising them territorial concessions in
exchange for their support. But barely four months previously, Yugoslavia and
Hungary had signed a pact of eternal friendship and a breach of this pact would
be extremely unpleasant for Hungary. Still, Hungary was interested in
territorial expansion, and was therefore looking around for a pretext to attack
Yugoslavia. The Hungarian Cabinet resolved in a meeting on April 1st 1941 to
attack Yugoslavia, the excuse being the probable secession of Croatia, arguing
that as a result of the conflict Yugoslavia would no longer exist and thus
their pact would no longer have any validity. But two days after this cabinet
meeting, the then President of the Hungarian government, Count Teleki,
committed suicide, apparently motivated by remorse for his failure to oppose
more firmly the decision to attack Yugoslavia, In fact Teleki had received a
cable from London advising him that a highranking person in England had
remarked that the good name of Hungary would be besmirched were Hungary to
become an accomplice of Germany by attacking Yugoslavia. Faced with this Teleki
shot himself, leaving a letter addressed to Regent Horthy, in which he
explained that he had decided to take his life as "the course to which the
Hungarian government was about to commit itself was not consistent with his
honour or his conscience".[68][68]
This
tragic decision had far-reaching repercussions, making it even more difficult
for Hungary to attack Yugoslavia. Therefore, immediately after the suicide,
April 3rd 1941, Regent Horthy sent "a letter to Hitler explaining what had
happened, and the difficult position Hungary now found herself in as a result.
But from the contents of this letter it is possible to deduce that the attitude
of Croatia during the armed conflict could make Hungary?s possition
considerably easier"[69][69], because at the meeting of the Hungarian
cabinet everybody "shared the opinion the once the German troops have
entered Yugoslavia, Croatia would probably sever its ties with the Yugoslav
State, whereby facto cease to exist (for Hungary) as cosignatory of the
treaty".[70][70]
With
their intimate knowledge of the Croats, the Hungarians were well aware that the
Croats would use the German attack on Yugoslavia to rebel and proclaim their
independent state. But they also knew what Hitler thought, because seven day
earlier he had explained his ideas to the Hungarian ambassador D?Szt.
Consequently
they knew that Hitler was not thinking in terms of Croatian independence. This
is the reason why Horthy'sletter to Hitler was in fact a veiled suggestion that
Germany should recognise the future Croatian State once the Croats had
proclaimet it, thus enabling Hungary to justify her attack on Yugoslavia. The
Hungarians continued to push this idea and so, on the day, on the following
day, the Hungarian ambassador in Germany paid a visit to the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, where he had an interview with Secretary of State von Weizs?
"On that occasion too Croatia was mentioned, with the Hungarian ambassador
pointing out that the proclamation of the independence of Croatia might provide
a motive for setting into motion the Hungarian attack against Yugoslavia".[71][71]
On
April 9th, only one day before the proclamation of the Independence of Croatia,
and three days after Germany had launched her attack on Yugoslavia, there was
still no sign of an imminent attack by Hungary. On the contrary, in a Hungarian
communiqu頷e can read "Hungary has no other intention than to see to
it that the war be fought as far as possible away from Hungarian soil".[72][72] But only a few hours after the Croatian
declaration of Independence, on April 10th, "at 21.00 hours the Hungarian
liaison officer informed [the German Second Army - Author's Note] that Hungary
planned to send one brigade towards the city of Osijek".[73][73] That same night of April 10th, in a
message to the Hungarian army and nation Regent Horthy said: "With the
creation of the Independent and Sovereign Croatian State, Yugoslavia has ceased
to exist, collapsing into its constituent parts. This places us under an
obligation to assume responsibility for the fate of the territories that were
taken away from Hungary in 1918 and also to ensure the security of the
Hungarians who live there".[74][74] In fact, on the following day, "in
the early hours of April 11th, units of the Hungarian southern army, (the 4th
and 5th Infantry Corps and the 1st Motorized Cavalry Corps) commenced their
advance..."[75][75]
But
how could the Hungarian attack be justified without the recognition of the
Independent State of Croatia by Germany? What attitude could Germany adopt in
view of the immediate recognition of the independence of Croatia by Regent
Horthy in his message of April 10th?
The
weight of these arguments and the important part they play in Germany's
decision to recognize Croatian independence, can be seen from the communication
the German Minister of Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop sent to Mussolini on
April 14th.
In
it Ribbentrop explains that Hitler and he were convinced that the moment had
come to recognize the independent state of Croatia and that this decision was
based on two premises. One was that "this recognition would persuade every
Croatian soldier to the last man not to use their weapons"[76][76] against the German and Italian troops,
and the other that the Hungarians had used the declaration of Croatian
Independence as an excuse to "justify their penetration of Yugoslav
territory, based on the assumption that the Yugoslav State had ceased to exist
as such".[77][77]
We
shall now analyse how the interests of Germany happened to coincide with those
of Croatia, and why Germany acceded to the Croatian point of view.
Let
us begin by examining Hitler's objectives when he attacked Yugoslavia. Knowing
that Yugoslavia was actually a small Serbian empire, and that the coup was the
exclusive responsibility of the Serbs, Hitler decided to punish them by
crushing their little empire, Yugoslavia. He furthermore wanted complete
clarification of the Balkan situation before launching his planned attack
against the Soviet Union. And lastly, he wanted a lightning strike against
Yugoslavia to keep the conflict as brief as possible.
He
knew how to dismember Yugoslavia and what to do with her territories; his only
problem was Croatia. As an Austrian he was prejudiced by his recollections of
the internal structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This was why, in his
opinion, the Croatian territory did not exist as a unit but (as inside the
Austro-Hungarian Empire) as three separate territories: Dalmatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia-Slavonia. The first two Croatian provinces he
planned to hand over to Italy and the third he wanted inside Hungary, perhaps
in order to offset Italy's expansionist tendencies, as suggested by Yugoslav
historian Fikreta Jelić-Butić.
But
when the Hungarians refused to incorporate Croatia into their state and
furthermore explained to Hitler that the foundation of an independent Croatia
would justify a Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia; when additionally Hitler
realized that the Yugoslav army, which he as an Austrian with memories of the
First World War not only respected but to an extent feared, seemed to wilt
under the impact of Croatian revolutionary action; when he saw his troops enter
Croatian territory almost without a shot being fired; when he realized that
wherever they went they found Croatian authorities and a revolutionary
government already in office; when. it became clear to him that recognition of
the Independent State of Croatia would result in each and every Croatian
soldier refraining from using his weapons against the Germans; then Hitler
accepted the Independent State of Croatia as a solution.