THE DECLARATION OF CROATIAN
INDEPENDENCE IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
- - -
Journal
of Croatian Studies, XXVIII-XXIX, 1987-88, Annual Review of the Croatian Academy of
America, Inc. New York, N.Y., Electronic edition by Studia Croatica, by
permission. All rights reserved by the Croatian Academy of America.
- - -
In their struggle for independence and separation from the Yugoslav State established after the First World War, the Croats found themselves divided into two factions; on the one hand a law abiding majority, under the leadership of Dr. Vladko Maček, President of the Croatian Peasant Party, and on the other a revolutionary minority, styled "Ustaša" ("Insurgents"), whose visible head, Dr. Ante Pavelić, lived in exile in Italy.
Initially the Ustaša had received a limited amount of support from Hungary and Italy, but as Yugoslavia began to distance itself from its traditional allies (Great Britain and, more especially; France), and to move closer to Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, the Ustaša found themselves without any supporters at all.
When Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite
Pact on March 25t, 1941, it seemed that the Croatian revolutionary movement had
been dealt a mortal blow. Nevertheless, scarcely two days later, on March 27th,
a group of Yugoslav army officers, all of them Serbs, incited by the British
secret service, staged a coup, sparking off violent anti-German riots in
Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia and Serbia.
Although the new Yugoslav
Government tried to avoid a war with Germany and Italy, Hitler decided that the
Balkan situation should be clarified and full control established over the
whole region before embarking on the campaign he had planned against the Soviet
Union. He also felt slighted by the Serbs and decided to punish them by
launching an attack against Yugoslavia. This attack began on April 6th, 1941.
Although at that time most of the
prominent members of the Croatian Revolutionary Movement were in Yugoslav
prisons and their leader, Dr. Ante Pavelić, in exile, the Revolutionary
Movement seized the opportunity to launch a struggle for the liberation of
Croatia. One Ustaša group incited the troops to rebellion, capturing the town
of Bjelovar and proclaiming the independence of Croatia on April 8th, 1941, a
mere two days after the German attack, while the German troops were still far
away. News of this event failed to travel far, however, for lack of an adequate
mass communication media.
Meanwhile, in an attempt to
destabilize Yugoslavia, the Germans had already sent two envoys to the Croatian
capital, Zagreb where they contacted Maček. Unable to reach an agreement
with him, they met with Pavelić's representative, the former
Austro-Hungarian colonel Slavko Kvaternik, who subsequently, on April 10th
1941, was to proclaim, in the name of Ante Pavelić, the Independent State
of Croatia.
While the April 8th proclamation
had had little repercussion, this new announcement, divulged through Radio
Zagreb, had an explosive effect, sparking off uprisings throughout Croatia,
where followers of both Croatian movements, led by Maćek and Pavelić
respectively, jointly incited the Yugoslav troops to lay down their arms and
set up local Croatian revolutionary authorities.
Unfortunately, in 1945, the Croats were again to lose their freedom, and at present their history is being written by their enemies. The official Yugoslav version is that the Independent State of Croatia was created by Hitler and Mussolini rather than by the efforts of Croatian freedom-fighters.
This essay endeavours to assert
the historical truth of the matter. It centers its attention on the revolutionary
act of proclaiming the Independent State of Croatia and tries to explain what
caused the change in Hitler's attitude. (Hitler did not start out with the
concept of a free Croatia in mind but finally accepted the revolutionary
changes brought about by the Croats). It also analyzes the attitude adopted by
Italy and Hungary. The analysis is based on historical treatises published
mostly by historians who support the current Yugoslav system and are hostile to
the Independent State of Croatia, but also draws on an extensive selection of
secret documents from various countries, currently available to students of
history.*
To establish who was the creator
of the Independent State of Croatia is not merely the necessary matter of
setting history straight, but also has political implications. In order to
evaluate this facet of the Second World War objectively it is essential to
ascertain the true details of the creation of the Independent State of Croatia.
Was it the result of a struggle by the Croats themselves, who were to fight
tooth and nail for the following four years to defend it against all and
sundry, even to the extent of turning a blind eye to their own misgivings
concerning the system of government and its shortcomings? Or, far from being a
Croatian National State, was it imposed on the Croats, who rejected it and
fought not only against the Croatian government but also against the Croatian
State as such, in the pursuit of a new and better Yugoslavia, Tito's
Yugoslavia?
In order to evaluate objectively
whether or not the State o Croatia was artificially contrived by Germany and
Italy, it may be useful to analyze how and under what conditions a typical
German contrived state came into being. We shall take as our example Serbia,
established in 1941 and corresponding to the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia
before the Balkan wars.
The main characteristics of this
state are:
(a) It was masterminded
exclusively by Hitler, that is, by Germany.
(b) There had been no previous
Serbian political group fighting even for separation from the rest of
Yugoslavia, let alone for Serbia to come under German control.
(c) No-one, then or now, has suggested
that there might be even one Serb prepared to accept such a solution.
The Independent State of Croatia
on the contrary (established on April 10th, 1941) was not proclaimed
unexpectedly, nor did it come as a surprise to anyone. I shall cite below documents
which demonstrate that the Croats' aims and desires were known in major
political centers all round the world.
It was no secret that the
situation in Yugoslavia was explosive. However, in November 1928, five months
after an attempt on the life of the Croatian leader Stjepan Radić while
the Yugoslav parliament was in session, three months after his death and two
months before the proclamation of the personal dictatorship of King Alexander
of Yugoslavia, (the prime purpose of which was to crush Croatian resistance),
the King visited Paris where on November 15th he informed the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand:
"The Croats are pacifists and
therefore innocuous ... There is no danger of the Croats proclaiming their
independence ... The state administration is functioning normally as are the
courts of justice, the people are paying their taxes without grumbling and are
complying with their military service. This means that the situation in the
country is normal and the status quo is not threatened, so that, although there
is discontent, particularly in Croatia, the crisis is not serious and there is
no reason for concern. The opposition coalition and the people will, without
concrete results, eventually get tired of verbal fighting".[1]
However, barely two years later,
an English journalist and politician, Wickham Steed, who during the First World
War was a propagandist in English political circles for the creation of
Yugoslavia and, after the creation of Yugoslavia, became one of her most ardent
champions in Western political circles, warned Serbian politician Voja
Marinković: "What are you people doing? Don't you realize that King
Alexander's life is at stake and Yugoslavia will collapse?"[2]
Four years later King Alexander was indeed killed in Marseille by a Macedonian,
a member of a Croatian revolutionary group founded with the purpose of
eliminating the king, while the second part of this prediction was to be proved
true eleven years later.
By 1930 the Croats were already
actively looking for support for their political plans in various European
countries.
After the murder of Stjepan Radić, Vladko Maček succeeded him as President of the Croatian Peasant Party and leader of the Croatian people. While abroad Maček had met Juraj Krnjević and August Košutić, general secretary and vice-president respectively of the same party, who, as exiles, were politically active outside their country. He had also met Ante Pavelić, yet another exiled Croatian politician, who had formerly been vice-president of the Croatian Rights Party and a member of parliament for that party. After his meeting with Maček, who had just returned to Croatia, Ante Trumbić, another prominent Croatian politician, in this case president and member of parliament for the Croatian Federalist Party, made the following entry in his diary:
"Actions: Pavelić will
make contacts amongst the Italians, Košutić will work with the Italians
and the English, Krnjević with the English, and Kežman will have to work
within the law and contact the French".[3]
It is hardly surprising therefore
that all relevant political circles were familiar with the Croats' aspirations
and knew what they were struggling for. Thus we read in a report sent by the
German consul in Zagreb to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs in mid-February 1935
that "according to Maček the Croats would not fight to defend
Yugoslavia as it was. He noted with satisfaction Italy's stance in the dispute
between Yugoslavia and Hungary with regard to the assassination in Marseille,
as well as Italy's decision not to extradite Pavelić and Kvaternik".[4]
In July of 1936 Mussolini had
granted an audience to the exiled Croatian politician August Kožutić. On
being asked about the Croatian Peasant Party's political program, Kožutić
answered the in the first place they wanted a sovereign state of Croatia.
Should this not prove feasible they would accept Croatia as part of a
federation of Danubian states, (i.e. Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, and Austria).
If this too were impossible, and Croatia had to remain inside Yugoslavia, his
party would fight for Croatian autonomy. When Mussolini enquired what should be
done with Pavelić' followers, the so called "Ustaša", whose
extradition from Italy was being pressed for by Yugoslavia, Kožutić
replied that "under no circumstances should they be handed over to
Belgrade, as this would amount to treachery"[5]
on the part of Italy who had previously granted them asylum and assistance.
That same year Yugoslavia received
a visit from a certain M W. Been, a member of a London-based institute
specializing in the study of problems related to foreign affairs for subsequent
use by the British government. He also visited Maček, who was known to be
a friend of the English and a staunch democrat. Asked about the Croatian
attitude in the event of an armed conflict between Yugoslavia and Germany,
Maček answered that "the Croats would take advantage of the opportunity
to get rid of the Serbs"[6]
that is they would cut loose from Yugoslavia and would proclaim their own
sovereign state.
In July 1937, Krnjević
visited London where he told the Duchess of Atholl that "relations between
the Croats and the Serb were so strained that, if there should be a war and the
government were to order a mobilization, civil war would ensue"[7]
In December of the same year, the
Czechoslovak Embassy in Belgrade sent the following report regarding official
conversation with Kožutić and Maček:
"When Kožutić was asked
what the Croatian soldier would do in the case of an armed conflict (between
any power and Yugoslavia - Author's note), he said: Let us suppose that a
mobilization is called in Croatia. Bills will be posted calling the people to
join the army and to shed their blood fighting against the enemy, to defend
their state and their nation. Do you really believe that anyone in Croatia
would heed such a call? Some have had their ribs crushed in prison, others
mourn their murdered fathers, and so on. Can these people be expected to go to
war? After the first attack it will all be over".[8]
Maček's answer to the same
question was: "Try and send the Croats to the front. Actually the question
should be whether it is possible to effect a mobilization at all. I think it is
not possible. And, if we are forced to take up arms we will cross over to the
enemy, whoever he be. We would even join the Germans, despite our dislike of
them. We did once think highly of the Germans and were on good terms with the
Italians, purely because they were at that time against Belgrade. At present
they have moved closer to Belgrade and so we are against them. You may find our
attitude ideologically unsound, but this is a fact that must be borne in mind
... The people follow me, but there are limits to my authority. The peasants are
indignant; they come to see me, asking when we will give them arms to attack
Belgrade. I was asked by the government to do my best to ensure that the
current army maneuvers proceed in a peaceful and orderly manner and that
Croatian soldiers should also participate in them. I managed to convince them,
but when I relayed Belgrade's request for food and draught animals for the army
the peasants were adamant. Our people asked me whether they could commemorate
December 1st [anniversary of the foundation of Yugoslavia - Author's note] by
organizing protests, burning Yugoslav flags and hoisting Croatian flags in
their place. As you will appreciate, the mood of the people is one of
rebellion".[9]
When Krnjević remarked in
Paris in April 1938, to a prominent member of the radical-socialist party, that
in the event of a war the Croats "would start a revolution", the
latter hurried off to communicate Krnjević's assertion to the French
General Staff, only to be told that "there was nothing new about this, and
that the Yugoslav army was neither technically nor morally prepared for war,
particularly on account of the Croatian problem".[10]
One year later, in early April
1939, Hugh Seton-Watson, son of R.W. Seton-Watson, wrote in his report to the
British Foreign Office after visiting Belgrade:
"During his visit to Belgrade
the leader of the Croatian Peasant party, Vladko Maček, made a speech on
August 14th, 1938 in the presence of some 80,000 Serbs from Belgrade
and Šumadija (central region of Serbia) about injustices committed in Croatia.
He mentioned an island in Dalmatia where police terror was rampant and
unrestricted, and asked the crowd: 'Are these Croats from Dalmatia likely in
the case of war to take up arms to defend the State?' To which the Serbian
crowd replied 'No, and neither would we [if we were in their place - Author's
note]"[11] This
testimony from Hugh Seton-Watson is particularly significant as both he and his
father were prominent English journalists and historians (and very probably
high-ranking agents of the British Secret Service) moreover both were
interested in protecting the status quo in Yugoslavia.
To summarize this section, the
world was well aware of the situation in Yugoslavia and even the Serbs, as
ruling nation understood that the Croats could not fight in defence of a state
that was their oppressor.
Nazi Germany's friendly attitude
towards Yugoslavia is well known, and is corroborated here by the following
facts:
After the annexation of Austria by
Germany on March 12th,1938, (an event known as Anschluss),
"Maček sent an emissary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin.
This messenger was received by an official of the Ministry, and asked whether
the German government would be prepared to support the movement for the
independence of Croatia, whereupon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately
informed the Yugoslav government of this approach".[12]
And to make things worse, "Prince Paul transmitted this information
confidentially to Campbell, the British ambassador in Belgrade"[13]
who, in turn, informed Lord Halifax, British Minister of Foreign Affairs.
In brief, the Germans denounced
the Croats to the Yugoslav authorities and Prince Paul, the Regent ruling in
the name of King Peter II who was still a minor, denounced them to the English.
On March 23rd 1938, immediately
after the Anschluss, the consul general of Germany in Zagreb, Freundt, informed
his Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Maček had had an interview with the
Hungarian consul (who was about to depart for Budapest in order to submit a
verbal report). Maček told the Hungarian consul that "he wished to
insert the Croatian policy into the Berlin-Rome Axis Perhaps the Hungarian government
could ascertain whether this might be feasible? Only if the Berlin-Rome Axis
should abandon the Croats completely would he adopt the Franco-Czechoslovak
line, and negotiations with Belgrade would be a last recourse".[14]
Von Heeren, German ambassador in
Belgrade, wrote in the margin of this report: "It is convenient for
Germany that Yugoslavia achieve internal consolidation, that is that Maček
be compelled to undertake negotiations that would lead to the signing of a
political agreement with Belgrade".[15]
As a result of this report, on May
11th 1938 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany sent the following
instructions to the German consul general in Zagreb and to the German
ambassador in Belgrade: "There is no change in our policy of
non-interference in the Croatian problem after the Anschluss. Quite the
contrary, it is now even more convenient for us that Yugoslavia not suffer
either internal or external weakening as a result of the secession of a more or
less independent Croatia. In fact we would prefer a strong and friendly
Yugoslavia as our neighbour on the new frontiers of the Reich".[16]
The downfall of
Stojadinovič's pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist government on February 4th 1939
saw no change in the pro-Yugoslav attitude of Hitler's Germany. For example a
letter sent on February 22nd 1939 by German Secretary of State Ernst von
Weizsacker to the German ambassador in Belgrade, von Heeren, reads in part:
"Pessimistic comments about the internal strength of Yugoslavia keep arriving
here through different channels. It seems that the Croats in particular are
urging us to side with them. Needless to say every time I hear something of
this nature I exclaim 'That is the last thing I would want to do'".[17]
Moreover, Germany was endeavouring
to convince Italy not to attack Yugoslavia. Early in October 1940, scarcely six
months before the conflict with Yugoslavia, von Heeren told the chargé d'affaires
of the Slovak embassy in Belgrade that "Italy had territorial claims
against Yugoslavia, but Germany was appeasing Italy in an attempt to maintain
peace in that part of Europe ... Although it appears paradoxical, he states,
nevertheless it is a fact that Germany is acting as protector of the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia ... When the chargé d'affaires asked what
the German attitude was with regard to the problem of establishing an
independent Croatia, von Heeren replied that Germany considered that it was
more convenient to negotiate with an integral than with a dismembered
Yugoslavia. It was not therefore Germany's wish to exert any pressure or give
any help to the radically oriented Croatian movement whose clear and stated
objective was an independent Croatian State".[18]
Unlike Germany which, excepting a
part of Slovenia, had no territorial claims against Yugoslavia, Italy
continually wanted to conquer Dalmatia and rule the Adriatic. At the same time,
Italy was living in constant fear of Germany and was obsessed by the fear that
Germany might get a foothold on the Adriatic coast. Thus, whereas on the one
hand Italy had an interest in wresting Dalmatia away from Yugoslavia, on the
other it wanted Yugoslavia to be strong enough for the two of them to pool
their strength and thus prevent Germany from obtaining a passage to the
Adriatic. As a result of these two conflicting attitudes Italian foreign policy
embraced two conflicting lines, alternating according to the given
circumstances; a friendly attitude towards Yugoslavia or a confrontational one.
Italy's attitude towards Pavelić and his followers (Ustaša) living in
Italy, indeed her attitude to the Croats in general, depended on which of these
two lines might be deemed expedient at any given moment.
We can see at least three different attitudes adopted by Italy towards the Ustaša in particular and Croats in general. One attitude consisted of helping the Croatian struggle which was supposed to lead to a revolutionary uprising against Yugoslavia; second attitude used this struggle as a factor of pressure that was supposed to induce Yugoslavia to draw closer to Italy, and a third combined a friendship pact with Yugoslavia and a simultaneous persecution of Pavelić and his followers. This last policy was accompanied by pro-Serbian posturing, culminating in a secret conversations between Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano and Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinović, according to which, in the case of an armed conflict, Yugoslavia would allow Italy to occupy practically all of Dalmatia (from Sušak to a line somewhat to the south of Split), as well as the zone of Gorski Kotar, all of them Croatian territories, whilst Italy would, in return, help to create a Great Serbia that would annex the Greek port of Salonika and part of Albania, thus giving Serbia an outlet onto the Aegean Sea, an old dream of Serbian expansionists.
Several sources reveal the
existence of these secret conversations. Vladko Maček and Ivan Meštrović,
among others, mention them in their memoirs. Meštrović, a friend of
Prince-Regent Paul Karadordević, had heard of the conversations as early
as 1940 from Prince Paul himself who told him that he had requested
Stojadinović's resignation from his post as Prime Minister of Yugoslavia
specifically because of a secret understanding between him and Ciano. The
German diplomat von Hassel, later to become one of the principal conspirators
in an attempt on Hitler's life, also mentions it in his memoirs. Referring to a
conversation with Prince Paul in early November of 1940, he mentions that Paul
had told him "he had been obliged to get rid of Stojadinović on
account of his attitude toward the Croats ... Stojadinović was
over-intimate with Ciano and Prince Paul considered that, essentially, he had
put the fate of Croatia into the hands of Italy".[19]
The best proof of the Axis'
pro-Serbian leanings is the fact of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite
Pact; for once Yugoslavia had signed this pact, Germany and Italy, in return,
guaranteed respect for Yugoslav sovereignty and territorial integrity, and, in
a secret clause, access to the Aegean sea, specifically "the extension of
Yugoslav sovereignty over the city and port of Salonika".[20]
Bearing in mind that both Salonika
and an Aegean outlet were old Serbian dreams, and moreover that the importance
of the Croatian coast and ports would be diminished by their acquisition, the
Tripartite pact can be seen as a gain for the Serbs and a loss for the Croats.
Assurances of Yugoslav territorial integrity were tantamount to guaranteeing
the submission of the Croatian people, which would make a split of the Croats
away from Yugoslavia more difficult. By acceding to the pact, Yugoslavia
promoted Serbian imperialism and consolidated Serbian power inside the country.
I am tempted to believe that this is the true reason for Hitler's attack of
hysteria on learning of the Serb coup only two days after the pact was signed.
This coup was "inspired" by money from the British Secret Service,
and news of the Serbian masses that poured into the streets of Belgrade in
violent anti-German riots, chanting "better a war than a pact", can
not have improved his temper. Hitler's manic reaction resulted in an attack on
Yugoslavia, and gave the Croats a chance to realize their objective, namely the
independence of Croatia. History is as often as not the result of fortuitous
events.
Oppressed nations are seldom
presented with the opportunity to become free, and so they must grab any chance
that presents itself. Did not the nations of South America make the most of the
opportunities history offered them to put their dreams of sovereignty and
liberty into practice, when the power ruling and exploiting them, Spain, was
conveniently tied up in fending off an attack by Napoleon? And did the British
settlers in North America fighting to shake off the shackles of colonialism not
benefit enormously from the war between France and England? According to the New
Cambridge Modern History:[21]
"From an early stage in the struggle, Congressional leaders had realised that the foreign aid they deemed essential could be obtained only from the maritime powers of France and Spain. Towards both these countries, and particularly towards France, Americans had traditional antipathies, and it was a measure of their necessity that they decided to approach the Bourbons for aid. This they did even before independence was declared".[22]
The similarity between the
problems of the American and Croatian revolutions is surprising. Like the
Americans, the Croats were obliged to ask and receive help from powers for whom
traditionally they had no liking. But the similarity does not end there,
because:
"France had entered the war
not so much to achieve American independence as to weaken Great Britain.
... If France was indifferent to
American interests, Spain was openly hostile. Though Spain entered the war
against Britain in June 1779, she did so as the ally not of the United States
but of France. In Madrid the birth of the American republic was from the first
viewed as a threat to Spanish imperial interests".[23]
And lastly: "The peace
negotiations revealed deep fissures in the Franco-American alliance.[24]
All this proves that we are forced
by historical circumstances to accept as our allies whoever is willing to help
us, even if they are not our true friends, and that common interests, although
circumstantial, prevail over our likes and dislikes.
Let us now, after this digression,
return to the signing of the Tripartite Pact. There are additional proofs that
the signing of the Tripartite Pact helped to strengthen Serbian rule and to
consolidate the Croatian prison, Yugoslavia.
On November 29th 1940, Hitler held
a secret meeting in Berghof with the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign affairs,
Aleksandar Cincar-Marković. During this meeting Hitler bent over backwards
in his attempts to convince the Yugoslav minister to sign the pact. He
"expounded his plans for the consolidation of Europe, and the formation of
a world coalition stretching from Yokohama to Spain. Hitler said that the
moment had come for every European State to take its place in the overall plan.
A short time ago, in Vienna, he had had the opportunity to converse in detail
with Count Ciano ... about the consolidation of the Balkans ... Hitler stated
that in his opinion Yugoslavia's existence was important for Germany, and that
there were no political discrepancies between Yugoslavia and the Reich ... In
order to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans, Germany needed a strong
Yugoslavia. After expounding extensively on the negative consequences of an
armed clash between Italy and Greece, Hitler said that perhaps in view of the
military situation Germany should intervene ... Anyway he recommended that
Yugoslavia 'hasten to make use of the existing situation before it was too
late'. He emphasized that if the consolidation were carried out right away,
with the approval of his Italian ally, it would not be possible to effect
subsequent changes in the future. 'The help he was giving Italy gave him the
right to demand that'. At present he was in a position to persuade Italy to
accept the attitude he had consistently maintained regarding Yugoslavia,
although he had been unsuccessful in the past in obtaining Italian acceptance.
However, in the light of recent military events in Greece that possibility has
now materialized, and if Yugoslavia were to receive German guarantees of its
independence it would have nothing to worry about ... The agreed Italo-German
attitude regarding Yugoslavia 'could not be changed if in the future Italy were
to find it inconvenient' ... If it were feasible at this moment to convince his
ally [Italy] to guarantee the consolidation of Yugoslavia, this would be valid
for ever".[25]
In other words, Yugoslavia's
accession to the Tripartite Pact and the written undertaking on the parts of
Italy and Germany to "always respect the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia"[26]
were instrumental in shielding Yugoslavia from present and future Italian
pretensions. The bondage of the Croatians was to last forever.
At present the Serbs and the
supporters of Yugoslavia are trying to justify the signing of the Tripartite
Pact by explaining it as a temporary measure with the sole aim of avoiding
Yugoslav entanglement in a war against Germany and Italy, and claiming that the
intention was, as soon as the military situation permitted, that Yugoslavia
would switch allegiance to the Allies. However, if this were the only purpose,
that is, if it were only a temporary measure, and if the secret intention was to
switch over to the other side, what was the point of the secret clause
promising Yugoslavia the city and port of Salonika? It is obvious that
Yugoslavia could only keep these territories if the powers of the Axis won the
war rather that the Allies. In other words, the fact that Yugoslavia demanded
Salonika as part of the booty, in exchange for signing the Tripartite Pact,
proves that the Yugoslav government not only believes in victory for the Axis,
but that (at least at the moment of signing the Tripartite Pact) it even wanted
a final victory for Italy and Germany.
We have seen the signing of the
Tripartite Pact to have been beneficial for Yugoslavia and for the Serbians,
but that it most certainly was not convenient for the Croats. So how are we to
explain the fact that only two days after the signing of the pact, the Serbian
armed forces staged a coup which received the ample support of the Serbian
masses?
We would be failing in our
objectivity if we did not recognize the importance of the anti-German (rather
than anti-Nazi) sentiment of the Serbian masses. These people reacted according
to the way they felt, and deserve our respect for that. But it should also be
borne in mind that the masses were unaware of just what had been signed on
March 25th, particularly the secret clauses, and they were therefore not in a
position to judge how beneficial the signing of the pact was for the Serbs.
It is interesting to trace who was
manipulating these masses who was pulling the strings of the Putsch-makers; who
was inciting these people. It is also useful to learn the personal motivations
of those who were in command of the situation.
Doubtless some of them acted in
accordance with their political convictions. The facts show, however, that
actions of others went not solely inspired by political or ideological
motivations. Let us turn to some documents and witnesses reports, and a
selection of Serbian, English and Italian writers, to see what they have to
say.
"The first testimony comes
from Sir Cecil Parrott, tutor of King Peter II, subsequently British ambassador
and Professor of History at the University of Lancaster. On January 12th 1977
he gave a lecture on BBC3 entitled Decline of a Dynasty, the dynasty in
question being that of the Karađorđevićs. Referring to the
Putsch of March 27th, Sir Cecil said: 'Late in March 1941 I visited my old
university of Cambridge. There, in the company of my old teacher: and their
colleagues, we had a conversation about the Putsch in Belgrade. Some of the
teachers who were present said 'It was not the Yugoslavs but us who staged the
Putsch'. 'Who are us?' I asked them. The answer was 'We, the SOE (Special
Operation Executive)', that is the British Secret Service pertaining to the
Ministry of Psychological Warfare'".[27]
"According to the statement
of the British publicist and historian Robert William Seton Watson, 'the
British spent half a million pounds to finance the Serbian revolt". [28]
"In a document from the
official British archives (F.O. 371-224892) there is a note mentioning that
towards the end of 1940, actions against the Axis to be carried out in the
south-eastern part of Europe were analysed at a meeting between the
representatives of the Foreign Office and the SOE. These actions included a
system of large-scale bribes both in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Globally, the sum
of Ł 5,000 per month was allotted as aid for the Serbian Agrarian Party, which
sum the latter had been receiving during the previous six months. Another
decision was to subsidize the Independent Democratic Party, to an unspecified
amount. The organization Narodna Odbrana (Defence of the People) had also been
earmarked for subsidies out of the same fund".[29]
"During 1940 Section D (later
S.O.E.) was particularly active in Belgrade, cultivating politicians and
leaders of patriotic organizations and handing out subsidies to the Serb
Peasant Party, the Independent Democratic Party and the Narodna Odbrana. They
were also in contact with the exiled Bulgarian left-wing Agrarians".[30]
"The Belgrade authorities
tried to explain to the people that the government had no choice but to sign
the Tripartite Pact, as Yugoslavia was militarily unprepared and, for several
months to come, Great Britain would not be in a position to send supplies to
Yugoslavia ... British Ambassador Campbell asked his government to refute these
arguments by means of BBC Serbo-Croatian broadcasts, which would emphasize past
and present British aid to Greece, and would state that Yugoslavia was to
receive both British and North American aid, and that moreover booty obtained
from Albania would come in very handy. Intelligence Service agents gave
efficient backing to this propaganda, flooding Yugoslavia with anti-German
leaflets and tracts, thus enhancing the climate for revolution. They too gave
financial aid to certain Serbian opposition groups, centring their efforts on
the people who were to carry out the Putsch".[31]
"On 21 March the crucial
meeting of the Crown Council was held. Three members of the government resigned
rather than agree to signing the pact - Branko Čubrilović, of the
Serb Peasant Party, Srdjan Budisavljević, of the Independent Democratic Party
(both parties were subsidised by S.O.E., who were in close touch with both men)
and Mihajlo Konstantinović, an independent nominee of Prince Paul's, over
whom Budisavljević and Tupanjanin (of the Serb Peasant Party, also in
constant touch with S.O.E.) had acquired considerable influence".[32]
About the middle of May 1941 most
of the exiled Yugoslav Government was in Palestine. Through its minister at the
British Court, the Yugoslav government expressed its wish to move as soon as
possible to London.
The British Information Ministry set about preparing a list of all Yugoslavs exiled in Palestine, with brief biographical data. On that list, beside each name, remarks were recorded by Foreign Office staff ... Beside the name of Miloš Tupanjanin was written 'On the payroll of the British Intelligence Service, SOE 2' (F.O 3 71-30282)". [33]
"The best hope lay with the Air
Force, and with the younger army officers: the General Staff, whatever bribes
S.O.E. may have lavished, were too cautious and fearful to take action ... On
26 March Macdonald reported that Simović was head of an organization in
tending to carry out a coup d'etat, and had said that 'we should not have to
wait more than a few days.. In reality, Simović was the figure-head and
Mirković the moving spirit, who brought forward the date of the coup to 27
March.
In the following year, when
Mirković was in the Middle East he was reported to have said that he had
been an 'agent of the British' before the coup. On this Campbell (by this time
Minister in Washington) commented that 'if he was indeed an [agent] I did not
know of it. I knew he was in confidential contact with the Air Attaché and told
him that a coup d'etat was being planned, but he never furnished any details or
dates, and I should doubt that he received pay from any of our intelligence or
other services'".[34]
The Germans held the Yugoslav army
in high esteem. The day before the attack against Yugoslavia, on April 5th
1941, "Hitler wrote to Mussolini that he was aware that he would have to
fight against an exceptionally courageous and tenacious enemy who will moreover
be favoured by the mountainous configuration of the land".[35]
A short time before that, on March 30th 1941, Field Marshall Walter von
Brauchitsch, chief of the High Command of the Army (OKW), also considered that
the Yugoslav troops would probably put up a very brave defence and that they
would fight stubbornly in the field as long as their ammunition and food
lasted".[36]
The Germans however were proved
entirely wrong. The Yugoslav southern front, where the troops were mostly
Serbian soldiers, gave way some three days after the first German attack.
(Skoplje, the most important town in that area, fell after only one and a half
days), so that the war was virtually all over. "In accordance with the
German OKW report of April 9th, once the German armed forces had penetrated the
Skoplje plain and crossed the river Vardar, 'the Yugoslav troops (were) cut off
from the Greek and English troops', prompting the German military specialists
to consider that the war in Yugoslavia was really over (Der Feldzug auf dem
Balkan, pp. 43-45)"[37]
At 9 a.m. of April 14th, that is
barely eight days after the beginning of hostilities, General Dušan
Simović, Yugoslav Prime Minister, gave General Kalafatović written
orders to apply for "a truce", which actually turned out to be an
unconditional surrender. But the capitulation could not be signed until April
17th at 21 hrs, on account of the chaotic state of what was left of the Serbian
army. (After April 10th, 1941, it is no longer fitting to continue speaking of
the Yugoslav Army, rather we should talk of the remnants of the former Yugoslav
Army, or the remnants of the Serbian troops belonging to that army. However,
Germany had waged war against Yugoslavia rather than Serbia, which at that time
did not exist, and, presumably for normal reasons, the Germans insisted that
the unconditional surrender be signed in the name of the Yugoslav Army,
although actually and legally it no longer existed).
What really happened is
unimportant, but it is unquestionable that Hitler was convinced that the war
against Yugoslavia would take some time if certain measures were not taken. But
Hitler wanted a lightning-fast war against Yugoslavia, convinced as he was that
"Germany would thus be able to intimidate Turkey sufficiently, an
achievement which would eventually, in the campaign against Greece, have
favourable consequences".[38]
Likewise it "was important to end the war in the Balkans as soon as
possible, in order to launch the attack against the Soviet Union which was
scheduled to begin early in June 1941. Moreover, the German OKW wanted to
prevent the Yugoslavs, Greeks and the British joining forces any forming a new
'Salonika Front,' which could hamper the German advance and their penetration
of the Mediterranean basin".[39]
Everything Hitler did in those
days was subordinated to his decision to put an end as soon as possible to
hostilities wit] Yugoslavia. During these days he showed little interest in
political issues, his main objectives being of a military nature. We can see
for example that, in order to convince the Hungarians to attack Yugoslavia he
had rashly promised them the rich province of Banat. However, when the Yugoslav
conflict was over, Hitler was unable to keep his promise on account of Romanian
opposition and that of the 140,000 Germans who lived there.
With his mind set on a quick
victory over Yugoslavia, on March 27th, before meeting with his chief ally
Mussolini, to whom he had as early as 1936 relinquished Mediterranean supremacy
including Adriatic supremacy in the form of the Yugoslav coast Hitler summoned
to an early morning meeting the "ambassador of Hungary Dome Sztójay and
the ambassador of Bulgaria Pervan Draganov in order to announce his
preparations for a lightning attack against Yugoslavia, which would enable
their countries to carry out territorial conquests, provided they took part in
the war".[40] At that
time Hitler did not have an independent Croatian State in mind because he was
of the opinion that Croatia should belong to Hungary and be granted only a
limited degree of autonomy. According to the Yugoslav historian Dr Fikreta
Jelić Butić "guided by strategic reasons Hitler favoured as a
solution the Croatian 'self-government' within Hungary or at least under the
influence of Hungary. He probably hoped that this solution would eventually
help to counteract the Italian expansion".[41]
The same day, between 13 and 14
hours, there was a meeting of the German War Council. In the course of this
meeting Hitler declared that it was "necessary to bear in mind that,
during the attack on Yugoslavia, the Croats would side with the Germans. They
should be given appropriate political treatment (later on,
self-government)"[42]
Obviously Hitler did not foresee at that time an independent Croatia, but
merely considered that during the conflict, and to reap maximum advantage of
the Croatian anti-Yugoslav sentiments, they should be given "appropriate
political treatment" which would result eventually in
"self-government" (probably inside Hungary), always provided that the
Croats backed the German forces during the armed conflict.
"As soon as the meeting of
the War Council was over, the OKW/WFSt prepared, along the lines of Hitler's
statements, the instructions for the military campaign against Yugoslavia.
These instructions (Weisungen) bore the reference number 25, and the attack
against Yugoslavia was accordingly known as 'Operation 25'".[43]
Amongst other things this plan of action states that "The political
tensions within Yugoslavia will have to be exacerbated by making promises to
the Croats.[44] Obviously,
the intention was to incite the Croats against Yugoslavia so as to weaken her defence,
but there was no plan regarding the proclamation of a sovereign Croatian State.
This can be seen more clearly on
analysis of the guidelines used for drawing up the propaganda against
Yugoslavia. These guidelines were issued on March 28th by Field Marshall
Wilhelm Keitel, head of the OKW. Point (c) reads: "It is necessary to
reveal that the German army is not coming to the Croatian, Bosnian or
Macedonian territories as an enemy. On the contrary it comes to prevent the
Serbian chauvinists sending these people to the front where they would lose
their lives in vain, to the sole benefit of the British. But if, under the
influence of the Anglo-Serbian propaganda, the non-Serbian population too was
to put up a resistance, they would be crushed by the German army, regardless of
who they were and where the resistance might be encountered."[45]
It is clear that the purpose of
the German propaganda was to dissuade the non-Serbian population from taking
part in the conflict. The dual purpose was to appeal to the interests of the
people and at the same time to intimidate them. This way they would understand
that they had nothing to gain from fighting but, should they decide to do so,
they should know before hand of the dire consequences. If anything this proves
that at that time the German had no intention whatsoever of helping the Croats
to become independent; if they had, would it not have been more coherent an
expedient to use this as an argument in their propaganda?
It can be seen with even greater
clarity that nobody was giving the remotest thought to the possibility of an
independent Croatian State in point (b) of the same instructions, which reads:
"In different parts of occupied Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia, the
publication of newspapers will be permitted under German censorship".[46][
This implies that under German
plans Croatia was to be occupied rather than independent, but given a milder
treatment inasmuch as the publication of newspapers was to be allowed
"particularly in Croatia", albeit subject to German (rather than
Croatian) censorship. These guidelines coincide perfectly with the instructions
Hitler had given the day before in the course of his meeting with the War
Council, in the sense that during the hostilities the Croats should be given
"appropriate political treatment" and "later on
self-government".
That same night Hitler sent a
letter to Mussolini, informing him of his decision to attack Yugoslavia and of
his suggestions to the ambassadors of Hungary and Bulgaria that their countries
might participate in the attack. "Because, Duce, without the help of
Hungary and Bulgaria we will not be able to act with the speed the events might
demand".[47]
Mussolini answered immediately,
one paragraph of his letter being particularly interesting. It reads:
"Besides Bulgarian, and especially Hungarian cooperation, the separatist
tendencies of the Croats, those represented by Dr. Pavelić, should be
borne in mind".[48]
In other words it was Mussolini who first pointed out to Hitler the importance
of the Croats. However Mussolini does no mention the independence of Croatia;
he limits himself to underscoring the importance of Croatian involvement apart
from that of Hungary and Bulgaria if the war against Yugoslavia is to be
terminated as soon as possible.
The following day (March 28th) the
Hungarian ambassador Sztójay, after Hitler had again offered him Croatia,
"replied that Hungary had no claims on Croatia and did not wish to
incorporate that country into its boundaries",[49]
whereupon Hitler insisted that "a possible solution might be, for example,
Croatia receiving friendly and economic support from Hungary".[50]
On March 31st, that is four days
after Hitler had taken the decision to attack Yugoslavia, Mussolini had pointed
out the importance of the Croats to him, and after the Hungarians had rejected
the idea of Croatia becoming part of Hungary, as an autonomous territory,
"for the first time a pattern of German opinion regarding the idea of an
'independent Croatia' began to emerge with some clarity".[51] That same day Minister of Foreign Affairs
Joachim von Ribbentrop sent a telegram to the German consul in Zagreb
instructing him to inform Maček that if Yugoslavia were to collapse
Germany would contemplate an independent Croatia.[52]
But what was to be understood by
the term "independence"? Even Hitler seems to have been unclear. Six
days later, on April 6th, he issued instructions for the subsequent
organization of Yugoslav territory. Here one can read "Croatia shall be an
independent state, probably under Hungarian influence".[53]
"The coast in the north-western part of Yugoslavia, Dalmatia and
Montenegro shall belong to Italy".[54]
More than two days after the
Croats had proclaimed their independent state (in the afternoon of April 10th)
we eventually find in article 6 of the "Provisional instructions regarding
the breakup of Yugoslavia" which was put together between the evening of
April 12th and the morning of April 13th, that "within its ethnic boundaries,
Croatia shall become an independent state", and that "Germany shall
not interfere in the internal political affairs of Croatia".[55]
However, article 7 of these instructions states that Bosnia (and implicitly
Dalmatia) do not belong to Croatia, and that their future political status
shall be decided by Italy.[56]
It is therefore obvious that when Hitler speaks about Croatia he refers only to
"the historical Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, formerly a constituent
part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy".[57]
It is of extreme importance to
determine as accurately as possible the date on which these "Provisional
instructions" were conceived. If they were put together after the
proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia they would prove that this was
established thanks to the Croatian struggle and that Hitler came into the
picture late in the day. However, if the "Provisional instructions"
preceded the proclamation of the independence of Croatia then evidence of this
could be used by enemies of the Croatian cause to give credibility to their
theory that the Independent State of Croatia was a German creation.
Not only the Croats are aware of
this, but also all those who put their pens to the service of Croatian
oppressors. It is useful to see just how far some official Yugoslav historians
are prepare to go.
For instance Ferdo
Čulinović, renowned historian and university professor in Yugoslavia,
writes in his book Yugoslavia Between Two Wars, published in Yugoslavia
in 1961, that Hitler issued his Provisional instructions "before attacking
Yugoslavia",[58]
that is before April 6th 1941. And in order that so gross a lie not be detected
by readers the author refrains from mentioning the date of these instructions,
April 12th 1941, or six days after the German attack.
What seems to particularly bother
Čulinović about these instructions is the statement that Germany will
not interfere in the internal political affairs of the Croatian State, and this
would seen to be why he qualifies them as an example of the "hypocrisy of
the leaders of the Third Reich".[59]
But Čulinović knows perfectly well that these instructions, far from
being intended for the Croats or the general public were actually issued to the
highest levels of command of the German army and classified "Top
Secret". He also knows that they were prepared and signed by the Chief of
the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), General Keitel along the
lines of Hitler's instructions, which surely implies that this is not a
statement made for purposes of propaganda but a case of a high-ranking officer
giving official instructions.
Another Yugoslav historian,
General Velimir Terzić, was much more blunt. General Terzić does not
enter into subtle disquisition: and musings about "hypocrisy."
Instead, on page 549 of the second tome of his bulky work Collapse of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941 we can find the "complete" text of
the "Provisional instructions", from which he has omitted completely
the instructions relating to non-interference in the internal political matters
of the Croatian State. This omission patently constitutes an academic and
historical forgery.
It is interesting to analyse
Čulinović's and Terzič's motives in playing down and concealing
respectively this instruction. It would be ridiculous to affirm or attempt to
demonstrate by means of this instruction that the Germans really did not meddle
in the internal affairs of the Independent State of Croatia. But this
instruction does show clearly what Hitler and the Germans were thinking at a
given moment, the moment at which the Independent State of Croatia was
proclaimed, and also what kind of state they were prepared to recognize. It is
obvious they were thinking in terms of a fully sovereign state, and that at
that moment they had no intention of interfering in its internal problems. It
is not the purpose of this essay to analyse the subsequent events which were in
many respects a far cry from what was voiced in the "Provisional
instructions". Here we simply wish to highlight the changes that occurred
in Hitler's plans. On March 27th 1941 Hitler conceived Croatia as an autonomous
country inside Hungary, and on April 6th 1941, the day Yugoslavia was attacked,
he already considered that Croatia should be an independent state but
"under Hungarian influence", only to change again abruptly on April
12th 1941, upholding the idea of Croatia as an "independent state" in
whose internal affairs Germany should not interfere. It is obvious that the chain
of events that commenced on April 6th, that is to say the momentum of the
Croatian revolution which culminated in the proclamation of the independence of
Croatia on April 10th 1941, was instrumental in forging Hitler's (and
Germany's) opinion.
Let us however return to General
Terzić. It seems that the adulteration of one document relating to the
proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia was not enough for the
appetite of a "good" Yugoslav historian. If we turn to pages 722/3 of
the same volume of his book we can read: "The Independent State of Croatia
was created by the decision of the German High Command, that is, by the
decision of the German army whose duty it was to put this decision into
practice. This is also confirmed by the commander of the German Second Army, Field
Marshall Weichs, who on April 4th issued the following order to his troops:
'The Führer has given the order to establish the new state of Croatia which
will maintain friendly relations with Germany'". It is to Terzić's
eternal misfortune that he had completely forgotten that in the same volume of
his book, on pages 58-60, he had published the entire text of the said orders
of the commander of the Second Army, issued on April 4th, in which the
quotation from it on pages 722/3 does not appear. This "Order related to
the Operations", as indicated by its title, is of a purely military
nature, with the exception of article 1 which reads: "On account of
changes in the political situation in the Balkans resulting from the coup
staged by the army in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia must also be considered our enemy,
in spite of its declaration of loyalty. The Führer and Supreme Commander has
decided that Yugoslavia must be defeated as soon as possible. This operation
will bear the code name 'Operation 25' ". As we can see, there is no
question here of "setting up the new state of Croatia", as
Terzić said, but of overpowering (that is defeating or annihilating) the
Yugoslav army militarily, and as quickly as possible. But then again, how many
readers will remember, when they get to page 722, what they read on page 58?
We shall now try to analyse just
when the "Provisional instructions," particularly article 6 relating
to Croatia, were drawn up. They contain an explicit statement that they are
based on Hitler's instructions of April 3rd 1941, prior to April 10th, the day
on which the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed. Consequently, one
part of the instructions is simply a new and more complete formulation of
Hitler's previous orders. If this were also the case of article 6, relating to
Croatia, then it would be quite irrelevant whether the date on which they were
drawn up were before or after the proclamation of Croatian independence.
However, in Hitler's previous instructions ("Instruction No. 26" of
April 3rd 1941), there is no mention at all of the future Croatian State, nor
for that matter any mention of anything relevant to Croatian problems. There is
indeed no mention at all of Croatia, and the only reference to Croatian
territories in article 5 is in the context of "the Italian Second Army
shall not be set into motion before the attack of the German Second Army and of
the XXXI Mobile Group of the Army Corps become manifest. To this end it might become
imperative that the attack be directed more to the south than the south-
east?".[60] We must
therefore conclude that as far as Croatia is concerned the "Provisional
instructions" of April 12th are entirely unrelated to the previous
instructions of April 3rd 1941, and that they do not derive from them.
In the light of official documents
currently available to the public, it is possible to establish not only the
date but even the hour when the "Provisional instructions" were drawn
up. To this end our study must be based on two of its articles, that is
articles 1 and 6.
According to article 1, "The Führer
of the Reich shall draw up a settlement in writing with the Duce ratifying the
cession of the territories that have already been occupied by Italian troops",[61]
and stating which territories will go to Germany. The territories in question
were part of Slovenia claimed by Germany, while the other part was claimed by
Italy. But these territories were occupied by the Italian troops on April 12th
1941 in the afternoon, since on that day "at 18.20 the Chief of Staff of
the (German) Second Army informed (over the telephone) the district chief
(Gauleiter) in Graz that the Italians had occupied part of the zone that was to
be annexed to Southern Carynthia",[62]
which shows that the "Provisional instructions" could not have been
drawn up before 18.20 hours on April 12th 1941.
On the basis of article 6 it is
possible to establish with even greater accuracy just when the
"Provisional instructions" were drafted. The crux of the matter is in
that part of article 6 in which instructions are given to the effect that
Germans should not interfere in the internal political affairs to the Croatian
State. The question then that ought to be raised is why this order was included
in the "Provisional instructions" issued for the benefit of
high-ranking German commanding officers, since it should have been sufficient
to include in article 6 the part reading that "within its ethnic limits
Croatia will be an independent state". But, if the instruction about
non-interference was added, (which at first sight appears to be redundant),
then there must have been a valid reason for its inclusion. And indeed there
was.
As can be seen from official
German documents, Slavko Kvaternik, the Croatian revolutionary who proclaimed
the Independent State of Croatia on April 10th in the name of Ante
Pavelić, approached the German government on April 12th requesting
diplomatic recognition of the new state.[63] The request for recognition was forwarded through
the Command of the German Second Army, which, in turn, channelled through the
High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) a request from the German
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for clarification as to who was the head of the
Croatian State, Pavelić or Kvaternik.[64] The enquiry was received at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs at 20.45 hours on April 12th 1941,[65]
but the Ministry had no brief which would enable them to answer. That same
night, at 22 hours,[66]
the Ministry of Foreign affairs received Hitler's answer relayed over the phone
by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces (OKW), General Alfred Jodl.
Hitler's answer was "There shall be no interference whatsoever in Croatian
internal matters. Let the Croats chose whomsoever they want as their head of
state."[67]
If the "Provisional
instructions", particularly the instruction regarding German
non-interference, had been drawn up previously it would not have been necessary
to wait until 22 hrs for the answer, which must mean that this particular
instruction was incorporated sometime between 20.45 and 22.00 hours on April
12t 1941, to match the enquiry of the Command of the German Second Army. This
would seem to be corroborated in the similarity between Hitler's reply and the
phrasing of article 6, as well as by the fact that both statements belonged to
the OKW sphere, and that both instructions had been issued for the benefit of
the higher officers of the German Command.
To sum up, the instruction
explaining what the Croatian Stat would be like, to wit that the Germans would
not interfere in it internal political affairs, was drawn up more than two
days, (between 53 and 54 hours to be precise), after the proclamation of the
Independent State of Croatia. Therefore the proclamation of Croatian
Independence was not the consequence but the cause of the spirit in which
article 6 of the "Provisional instructions" was drawn up.
As explained above, on March 27th
1941 Hitler was not planning to recognize the rights of the Croats to a
sovereign state. His plans were completely different. So, the question is, what
happened that persuaded him to recognize the Independent State of Croatia
proclaimed by the Croats.
There were several causes, but all
hinge around one truism: international politics is keyed exclusively to common
interests. The Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed and established as a
result of these struggle and efforts of the Croats, but it achieved recognition
from Germany and Italy because, at that moment, Croatian interests coincided
not only with those of Germany and Italy, but also with those of Hungary. No
analyst of these events however has attached sufficient importance to the
incidence of Hungarian interests which, to my thinking were fundamental.
As we have already seen, Hitler
was trying by all means possible to convince the Hungarians to attack
Yugoslavia, promising them territorial concessions in exchange for their
support. But barely four months previously, Yugoslavia and Hungary had signed a
pact of eternal friendship and a breach of this pact would be extremely
unpleasant for Hungary. Still, Hungary was interested in territorial expansion,
and was therefore looking around for a pretext to attack Yugoslavia. The
Hungarian Cabinet resolved in a meeting on April 1st 1941 to attack Yugoslavia,
the excuse being the probable secession of Croatia, arguing that as a result of
the conflict Yugoslavia would no longer exist and thus their pact would no
longer have any validity. But two days after this cabinet meeting, the then
President of the Hungarian government, Count Teleki, committed suicide,
apparently motivated by remorse for his failure to oppose more firmly the
decision to attack Yugoslavia, In fact Teleki had received a cable from London
advising him that a high ranking person in England had remarked that the good
name of Hungary would be besmirched were Hungary to become an accomplice of
Germany by attacking Yugoslavia. Faced with this Teleki shot himself, leaving a
letter addressed to Regent Horthy, in which he explained that he had decided to
take his life as "the course to which the Hungarian government was about
to commit itself was not consistent with his honour or his conscience".[68]
This tragic decision had
far-reaching repercussions, making it even more difficult for Hungary to attack
Yugoslavia. Therefore, immediately after the suicide, April 3rd 1941, Regent
Horthy sent "a letter to Hitler explaining what had happened, and the
difficult position Hungary now found herself in as a result. But from the
contents of this letter it is possible to deduce that the attitude of Croatia
during the armed conflict could make Hungary's position considerably easier"[69],
because at the meeting of the Hungarian cabinet everybody "shared the
opinion the once the German troops have entered Yugoslavia, Croatia would
probably sever its ties with the Yugoslav State, whereby facto cease to exist
(for Hungary) as cosignatory of the treaty".[70]
With their intimate knowledge of
the Croats, the Hungarians were well aware that the Croats would use the German
attack on Yugoslavia to rebel and proclaim their independent state. But they
also knew what Hitler thought, because seven day earlier he had explained his
ideas to the Hungarian ambassador Döme Sztójay.
Consequently they knew that Hitler
was not thinking in terms of Croatian independence. This is the reason why
Horthy's letter to Hitler was in fact a veiled suggestion that Germany should
recognise the future Croatian State once the Croats had proclaimed it, thus
enabling Hungary to justify her attack on Yugoslavia. The Hungarians continued
to push this idea and so, on the day, on the following day, the Hungarian
ambassador in Germany paid a visit to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
where he had an interview with Secretary of State von Weizssäcker "On that
occasion too Croatia was mentioned, with the Hungarian ambassador pointing out
that the proclamation of the independence of Croatia might provide a motive for
setting into motion the Hungarian attack against Yugoslavia".[71]
On April 9th, only one day before
the proclamation of the Independence of Croatia, and three days after Germany
had launched her attack on Yugoslavia, there was still no sign of an imminent
attack by Hungary. On the contrary, in a Hungarian communiqué we can read
"Hungary has no other intention than to see to it that the war be fought
as far as possible away from Hungarian soil".[72]
But only a few hours after the Croatian declaration of Independence, on April
10th, "at 21.00 hours the Hungarian liaison officer informed [the German
Second Army - Author's Note] that Hungary planned to send one brigade towards
the city of Osijek".[73]
That same night of April 10th, in a message to the Hungarian army and nation
Regent Horthy said: "With the creation of the Independent and Sovereign
Croatian State, Yugoslavia has ceased to exist, collapsing into its constituent
parts. This places us under an obligation to assume responsibility for the fate
of the territories that were taken away from Hungary in 1918 and also to ensure
the security of the Hungarians who live there".[74]
In fact, on the following day, "in the early hours of April 11th, units of
the Hungarian southern army, (the 4th and 5th Infantry Corps and the 1st
Motorized Cavalry Corps) commenced their advance..."[75]
But how could the Hungarian attack
be justified without the recognition of the Independent State of Croatia by
Germany? What attitude could Germany adopt in view of the immediate recognition
of the independence of Croatia by Regent Horthy in his message of April 10th?
The weight of these arguments and
the important part they play in Germany's decision to recognize Croatian
independence, can be seen from the communication the German Minister of Foreign
Affairs von Ribbentrop sent to Mussolini on April 14th.
In it Ribbentrop explains that
Hitler and he were convinced that the moment had come to recognize the
independent state of Croatia and that this decision was based on two premises.
One was that "this recognition would persuade every Croatian soldier to
the last man not to use their weapons"[76]
against the German and Italian troops, and the other that the Hungarians had
used the declaration of Croatian Independence as an excuse to "justify
their penetration of Yugoslav territory, based on the assumption that the
Yugoslav State had ceased to exist as such".[77]
We shall now analyse how the
interests of Germany happened to coincide with those of Croatia, and why
Germany acceded to the Croatian point of view.
Let us begin by examining Hitler's
objectives when he attacked Yugoslavia. Knowing that Yugoslavia was actually a
small Serbian empire, and that the coup was the exclusive responsibility of the
Serbs, Hitler decided to punish them by crushing their little empire,
Yugoslavia. He furthermore wanted complete clarification of the Balkan situation
before launching his planned attack against the Soviet Union. And lastly, he
wanted a lightning strike against Yugoslavia to keep the conflict as brief as
possible.
He knew how to dismember
Yugoslavia and what to do with her territories; his only problem was Croatia.
As an Austrian he was prejudiced by his recollections of the internal structure
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This was why, in his opinion, the Croatian
territory did not exist as a unit but (as inside the Austro-Hungarian Empire) as
three separate territories: Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia-Slavonia.
The first two Croatian provinces he planned to hand over to Italy and the third
he wanted inside Hungary, perhaps in order to offset Italy's expansionist
tendencies, as suggested by Yugoslav historian Fikreta Jelić-Butić.
But when the Hungarians refused to
incorporate Croatia into their state and furthermore explained to Hitler that
the foundation of an independent Croatia would justify a Hungarian attack on
Yugoslavia; when additionally Hitler realized that the Yugoslav army, which he
as an Austrian with memories of the First World War not only respected but to
an extent feared, seemed to wilt under the impact of Croatian revolutionary
action; when he saw his troops enter Croatian territory almost without a shot
being fired; when he realized that wherever they went they found Croatian
authorities and a revolutionary government already in office; when. it became
clear to him that recognition of the Independent State of Croatia would result
in each and every Croatian soldier refraining from using his weapons against
the Germans; then Hitler accepted the Independent State of Croatia as a
solution.
But if it had not been for the
Croatian revolutionary process commencing on April 6th, the day the Germans
launched their Yugoslav offensive which was so soon to achieve success, with
the rebellion of the 108th Infantry regiment the following day and the capture
of the city of Bjelovar (where on the same afternoon the first declaration of the
independence of Croatia was made) on April 8th; if that revolutionary process
had not brought about, without the intervention of German troops, the practical
collapse of the Yugoslav northern front; if the proclamation of the Independent
State of Croatia made on April 10th in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, had not
caused an immediate reaction throughout Croatia; if the revolutionary spark had
not so quickly acquired the proportions of an inextinguishable revolutionary
fire that devoured both the state of Yugoslavia and her army; if things had
been otherwise, who knows whether Hitler would have recognized the Independent
State of Croatia, and whether Kvaternik's manifesto would have served no higher
purpose than to be used by the German High Command in their campaign to
undermine the morale of the Yugoslav troops.
Apart from all that, there was yet
another argument favouring recognition of the Independent State of Croatia; yet
another coincidence of German and Croatian interests. Hitler was preparing his
campaign against the Soviet Union, and consequently it was essential for him to
have the main body of his army at his disposal. He therefore wanted to have as
few troops as possible tied up in the territories of what had been Yugoslavia.
Serbia had to be kept under military occupation, but he preferred not to have
to do this in Croatia too, and consequently an independent Croatia was more
convenient than a Croatia under military occupation. If, in spite of that, he
was in the event obliged to maintain troops on Croatian soil, there was no one
to blame but the Italians. At a meeting in Vienna on April 21st and 22nd 1941
Ribbentrop informed Ciano that Germany intended to pull her troops out of
Croatia as soon as possible. However, when Ciano replied that if that were the
case then he would replace them with Italian troops, the Germans changed their
minds and on the following day Ribbentrop informed Ciano that Hitler had
decided that Germany would after all keep some troops in Croatia.[78]
The Italians too had their reasons
and interests for recognizing the Independent State of Croatia.
Italian policy was constantly
opposed to the Independent State of Croatia and this policy was the cause of
practically all the ensuing ills which befell Croatia, including Tito's
guerrillas who, without direct or indirect help from Italy, would never have
been able to subsist, and who always found refuge in territories occupied by
Italian troops when fleeing from German or Croatian military operations.
Italian interference in Croatian
internal matters is not the subject matter of this essay. Nevertheless it
should be pointed out that the Italian military authorities not only created
grave internal problems in those zones of Croatia under Italian occupation but that
they also furthered the growth of those problems until they became unmanageable
and finally resulted in the loss of Croatian independence.
The first and nearly fatal blow
inflicted by Italy on the newly formed Croatian State was the "Agreements
of Rome", a set of stipulations imposed by Italy on Croatia which, amongst
other things, implied the loss of Dalmatia and of virtually all the Adriatic
coast. Enemies of the Croats and of the Croatian Liberation Movement blamed the
Independent State of Croatia for this loss, accusing its government of high
treason for "trading off" Dalmatia. But at that time Italy could have
merely occupied Dalmatia without recognizing Croatian independence, since as
long ago as 1936 Hitler had relinquished primacy over the Mediterranean to
Italy, which implied that the Adriatic (and Dalmatia) came into the Italian
sphere of influence. On several occasions Hitler had confirmed to the Italians
that their hands were free as far as Dalmatia was concerned. We have already
seen that on March 27th 1941 he still believed Dalmatia should belong to Italy.
Furthermore, Italy had effected the military occupation of Dalmatia at a time
when the Croatian army was not yet in existence. So who or what could prevent
Italy annexing Dalmatia? And what difference did the recognition of the
Independent State of Croatia make, in view of the fact that Italy had already
secured Dalmatia as part of its spoils of war?
Truly, as regards Dalmatia, there
was no need for Italy to recognize the Independent State of Croatia and indeed
it would have been more convenient for Italy not to recognize it. But in that
case, to whom would the remaining Croatian territories have gone? The only
thing the Hungarians were interested in was an outlet to the Adriatic, (which
was precisely what the Italians were determined to deny them, or anyone else
for that matter). Hence, the only ones who would have been capable of occupying
these lands were the Germans, who would in any case never have allowed then to
fall into Italian hands as they were already, since the existence of
Yugoslavia, obtaining key raw materials from these territories Furthermore,
German communications, very important from a military standpoint, passed
through these lands, another reason to keep them out of Italian hands. We have
already seen that some historians argue that Hitler had offered the Croatian
lands to Hungary precisely to avoid them falling into the clutch of Italy.
As for the Italians, they lived in
a constant state of fear bordering on panic that the Germans might get a
foothold on the Adriatic coast or at least nearby, and they preferred the
devil, horns, tail and all, or even the Independent State of Croatia, to
Germany.
This then is the only reason that
Italy recognized Croatia, and later events show that Italy was Croatian's worst
enemy.
As we have seen, on the basis of
documents recently made public, the Independent State of Croatia was not the
result of the decision, the wish or the actions of Italian Fascists or German
Nazis, rather it was the result of the long struggle of the Croatian people, a
struggle everyone knew about but nobody was prepared to support. At a historic
moment, on Croatian soil, four separate interests, those of Croatia, Germany,
Hungary, and Italy, became intertwined; four dissimilar interests, coinciding
in one aspect; the convenience of recognizing the Croatian State because it
represented a mutually acceptable territorial solution. This is the only reason
that the Croatian State, established as the result of a long struggle by the
Croats, was recognized as an independent nation.
Translated by Vera Korsky-Poli
* Quotations from documents which were originally
written in English have been retranslated into English from other languages;
unfortunately it has not been always possible to quote verbatim from the
original sources.
[1] "Izvještaj od 29.X do 17.XI.1928" ("Report from October 29 to November 17,
1928"), written by Ante Trumbič after his return from abroad. A-JAZU,
Trumbić's collection, fascicle 60; quoted from Bogdan Krizman Ante
Pavelič i ustaše (Ante Pavelič and the ustaša), Zagreb: Globus
1978, p. 35.
[2] Ljubo Boban: Maček i politika Hrvatske
Seljačke Stranke 1928-1941 (Maček and the policy of the Croatian
Peasant Party 1928-1941), Zagreb: Liber 1974, Vol. I., p. 63.
[3] Zbirka Trumbić (Trumbić's collection), note dated November 5, 1930, regarding his
conversation with Maček, not registered: according to Lj. Boban, op. cit.,
I, p. 53.
[4] Politischer Archiv des auswärtigen Amtes (Political Archives of the German Ministry of
Foreign Affairs), (henceforth PA), DK Zagreb VI A Bd. 13, February 12, 1935:
According to Lj. Boban, op. cit., I, p. 400.
[5] Zbirka Trumbić (Trumbić's collection), note dated April 26, 1935: according to
Lj. Boban, op. cit., I, p. 402.
[6] Ibidem,
note dated December 24, 1936, regarding his conversation with Maček, not
registered: according to Lj. Boban, op. cit., I, p. 239.
[7] Lj. Boban, op. cit., I, p. 419; quoted from
the Public Record Office, Archive of the Foreign Office, London (henceforth
F.O.), 371, f-21196 R 5201, letter from the Duchess of Atholl dated July 27,
1937.
[8] Embassy of the Republic of Czechoslovakia in
Belgrade, No. 1461/confidential 37: Regular political report, number 103,
Belgrade, December 10, 1937: according to Lj. Boban, op. cit., I, p.
309.
[9] Ibidem:
according to Lj. Boban, op. cit., I, pp. 314-315.
[10] Lj. Boban, op. cit., 1, p. 429, quoted from
the Trumbić's collection, note dated April 23, 1938, regarding his
conversation with Tomo Jančiković.
[11] Hugh Seton-Watson "Položaj u Jugoslaviji"
("Situation in Yugoslavia") F.O.-371, f-23875, R 2704, April 7, 1939:
according to Lj. Boban, op. cit., II, p. 102
[12] Lj. Boban, op. cit., I, p. 423.
[13] Ibidem,
II, p. 453, F.O. 371, f.22476, R 5193, Report from Campbell to Halifax, May 23,
1938.
[14] PA DK Zagreb Pd IV 60 Bd. 1, March 23, 1938: according
to Lj. Boban op. cit., I, p. 424.
[15] Ibidem.
[16] PA Pol. IV 60 Bd. 1, April 11, 1938: according to Lj. Boban,
op. cit., I, p. 424.
[17] Lj. Boban, op. cit., II, p. 81.
[18] Lj. Boban, op. cit., II, p. 420: quoted from Archiv
Ministerstva zahraničnych veci Slovenskej republiky, Zprávy politicke
(Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovakia,
Political Documents), Bratislava, Č. 3564/P. 141/40. Report by the chargé
d'affaires of the Slovak embassy in Belgrade of October 9, 1940.
[19] According to Lj. Boban, op. cit, I, p. 474.
[20] F.O. 371-37651: According to Staniša R.
Vlahović: Zbomik dokumenata iz Britanske arhive. Anglo-jugoslavenski
odnosi 1941-1948 (Collection of Documents from the British Archives: The
Anglo-Yugoslav relations 1941-1948), Birmigham 1985, p. 30.
[21] The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume
VIII, A. Goodwin, The American and French Revolutions 1763-93.
[22] Ibidem,
pp. 495 and 496.
[23] Ibidem,
pp. 500 and 501.
[24] Ibidem, p.
505.
[25] Velimir Terzić: Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije
1941 (Collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941), Second Edition,
Beograd, Ljubljana, Titograd: Partizanska knjiga, Narodna knjiga, Pobjeda,
1984, I, pp. 302-303.
[26] Ibidem, I,
p. 420 and p. 422.
[27] S.R. Vlahović, op. cit., p. 40.
[28] V. Terzić, op. cit., I, p. 453, note quoted from
Alfredo Breccia's book: Jugoslavia 1939-1941, Diplomazia della
neutralitá (Yugoslavia 1939-1941, Diplomacy of Neutrality), Milan: Giuffré
1978, p. 548.
[29] S.R. Vlahović, op. cit., p. 314.
[30] Elisabeth Barker: British Policy in Southeastern
Europe in the Second World War, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976, p. 85.
[31] V.
Terzić, op. cit., I, p. 406.
[32] E. Barker, op. cit., p. 90.
[33] S.R. Vlahović , op. cit., pp. 31 and 32.
[34] E. Barker, op. cit., p. 92.
[35] Vjekoslav Vrančić: Branili smo Državu (We
Defended the State), Barcelona-Munich: Knjižnica Hrvatske Revije, 1985,1. p.
235: Quoted from Akten zur deutschen auswäigen Politik 1918-1941 (Documents
Related to the German Foreign Policy 1918-1941), (henceforth ADAP), D, XII/1,
p. 383, No. 281.
[36] Zbornik dokumenata i podatka o
narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije (Collection of Documents and
Data Related to the Liberation War of the Peoples of Yugoslavia), II, 2, pp.
500-502: according to V. Terzić, op. cit., II, p. 48.
[37] Ferdo Čulinović:
Jugoslavija između dva rata (Yugoslavia Between Two Wars), Zagreb:
Jugoslovenska Akademija Znanosti i Umjetnosti, 1961, II, p. 240.
[38] B. Krizman, op. cit., p. 352.
[39] V. Terzić, op. cit., II, p. 277.
[40] V. Vrančić, op. cit, p. 219, quoted from
ADAP, D, XII/1, pp. 304-307, No. 215, 216.
[41] Fikreta Jelič-Butić: Ustaše i Nezavisna Država
Hrvatska 1941-1945 (The 'Ustaša' and the Independent State of Croatia,
1941-1945), Second Edition, Zagreb: Liber, 1978, p. 63.
[42] V. Vrančić, op. cit., I, p. 222, from the
notes of Major Christian, published in ADAP, D, XII/1, pp. 307-309, No. 217.
See also V. Terzić, op. cit., II, p. 31, Major Christian's records.
[43] V. Vrančić, op. cit., I, p. 222, quoted
from ADAP, D, XII/1, pp. 324-326, No. 223.
[44] Zbomik dokumenata NOR-a (Collection of documents of
the National Liberation War), II, 2, 427 et seq.: According to Dr. F.
Jelić-Butić, op. cit., p. 63.
[45] V. Terzić, op. cit., II, p. 43.
[46] Ibidem.
[47] B. Krizman, op. cit., p. 353, quoted from ADAP, D,
XII, 1. pp. 326-327.
[48] Ibidem, p. 354, quoted from ADAP, D, XII, 1, pp.
328-329.
[49] V. Vrančić, op. cit., I, p. 226; ADAP, D,
XII/1, pp. 331-333, No. 228.
[50] Ibidem.
[51] F. Jelić-Butić, op. cit., p. 64.
[52] V.
Vrančić, op. cit., I, p. 227, quoted from ADAP, D, XII/1, p. 350, No.
239.
[53] B. Krizman, op. cit., p. 377, quoted from PA, Büro Unterstaatssekretär
Jugoslawien, Band. 1.
[54] Ibidem.
[55] ADAP, D, XII/1, No. 334: according to V.
Vrančić, op. cit., I, p. 238.
[56] See V. Vrančić, op. cit., p. 238.
[57] Ibidem, p. 239.
[58] F.
Čulinović, op. cit., p. 210
[59] Ibidem.
[60] V. Terzić, op. cit., II, p. 64
[61] Ibidem, p. 549.
[62] Ibidem, p. 413.
[63] ADAP, D, MI/2, pp. 440-441, No. 324: according to V.
Vrančić, op. cit., p. 244 and B. Krizman, op. cit., p. 421.
[64] ADAP, D, X11/2, pp. 436-437, No. 319: according to V.
Vrančić, op. cit., 245
[65] See V. Vrančić, op. cit., p. 245.
[66] Ibidem.
[67] B. Krizman, op. cit., p. 420 and V.
Vrančić, op. cit., p. 245.
[68] E. Barker, op. cit., p. 79.
[69] V. Vrančić, op. cit., I, p. 233: quoted
from ADAP, D, XII/1, p. 369, No. 261
[70] Ibidem.
[71] Ibidem, p. 233. Quoted from ADAP, D, XII/1, p. 372, No. 264.
[72] Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog Instituta, NAV-N-T-312,
423/800 13) 3-1304; Archiv der Gegenwart 1941 (Archives of the Present Time,
1941), p. 4968. According to V. Terzić, op. cit., p. 358.
[73] V. Terzić, op. cit., II, p. 366.
[74] B. Krizman, op. cit., p. 431.
[75] Drugi svetski rat: Pregled operacija (The Second World
War - Review of Operations), I, p. 472. According to V. Terzić, op. cit.,
II, p. 389.
[76] B. Krizman, op. cit., p. 422-423
[77] Ibidem, p. 423.
[78] According to B. Krizman, op. cit., pp. 452-453, based
on ADAP, D, XII, 2; p. 515 and pp. 505-509.