ROGER
BOSCOVICH'S THEORIA PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS AND THE RISE OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY*
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Journal
of Croatian Studies, XXVIII-XXIX, 1987-88 – Annual Review of the Croatian Academy of
America, Inc. New York, N.Y., Electronic edition by Studia Croatica, by
permission. All rights reserved by the Croatian Academy of America.
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In order to ascertain the
spiritual affinities between an 18th century scientist and the beginnings of
modern philosophy in the 19th century, the meaning of the title of Boscovich's
magnum opus must first be deciphered. The title is unusual — theory of a philosophy.
What does it mean? From today's point of view, such a theory could mean one of
the two things: 1) something above the experiments; a theory that puts the
findings reached by experiments into a system, or 2) it could simply be another
name for philosophy. In other words "philosophy" of natural
philosophy, the latter in Boscovich's time still being considered, following
Aristotle, physics. By way of an explanatory intermission, let me relate that
for centuries "pure" philosophy meant only some of the most
idealistic aspects of Plato's thought. Aristotle, interpreting Plato,
classified under "pure" philosophy metaphysics, ethics and politics.
In the Middle Ages, the aforementioned disciplines were renamed and termed
"moral philosophy." Natural philosophy, on the other hand, included,
what we today consider, sciences. In contemporary usage, we would call
Boscovich's book the "philosophy of science." However philosophy of
science as conceived today, is the domain of the philosophers, not the
scientists. And Boscovich was in the first place a scientist and then, of
course, a theologian. In his case, and in connection with this work, he was a
scientist who reflected, or philosophized, over his experiments; he was
conceptualizing his scientific discoveries into a higher sphere, i.e., he was
adding logic and his mind's visions to experimental data. Consequently, the
proper way to understand Boscovich the scientist is through his philosophy of
science. The former dean of Croatian philosophers, now deceased, Professor
Vladimir Filipović refers to Boscovich's book as "philosophical
reflection" upon the latter's experiments; Boscovich thus created a work
which went beyond his "physical theory" (356). Marković in his
two-volume biography and study of Boscovich cites a number of distinguished
scientists and philosophers who have been intrigued with Boscovich's opus
(471-477).
Why did Boscovich force us into
this theoretical labyrinth? Why did he not simply call his book philosophie
naturalis — natural philosophy? In his age there was a surfeit of
hypothetical doctrines in and about natural philosophy, not necessitating
another theoretical appendage, in this instance — theoria. Or perhaps Boscovich
wanted us to understand the universe on the basis of both his philosophy and
his experimental sciences. In a number of instances throughout the book
Boscovich tells us that he has come to his conclusions by means of both his
experiments and his thinking (per reflexionem) or by legitimate reasoning (legitima
ratiocinatione). The very title of his work gives an indication that theory
comes first and natural philosophy second. Consequently, his is a theory which
explains and defines the sciences: it is a comprehensive reflection on the
nature of sciences. By itself Boscovich's natural philosophy (basically
physics) would be a torso.
To utilize today's definitions, we
assume that sciences have done their work when they have reached the intended
results. Why, for what reason, or of what value are these results is secondary
to a scientist (not to everyone). Philosophy, specifically the so-called
philosophy of science, does not stop at describing the procedures alone; it
wants to give logical explanations to scientific processes. It wants to make
clear to the general mind the nature of scientific work, to clarify the methods
and concepts involved in the experiments, and, per reflection, to suggest
further modes of investigation. In this respect Boscovich must have believed
that the theoretical mind itself can open new avenues leading to the discovery
of factual phenomena. As we know, in many instances, subsequent experiments
only confirm the hypotheses reached by pure reasoning. Philosophy's task is,
and this might have been Boscovich's intention, to put pure reason at the
service of experimental sciences. Let us not then be surprised that a Catholic
theologian wanted to see his discoveries confirmed by the perennial principles
of philosophy.
Newton, the forerunner of
Boscovich, and the latter's great idol, refuted the value of purely
philosophical thinking in the study of nature. For Newton, philosophy is either
philosophia experimentalis (experimental philosophy) or no philosophy at all.
Boscovich thought differently.
Professor Zenko, in one of his
articles, notes the differences in the thinking processes between Newton and
Boscovich (2). Zenko does not think, however, that these differences were any
impediment to Boscovich in his pursuit of Newton's ideas. Zenko definitely
considers Boscovich a philosopher but thinks that Boscovich's was a unique
experimentum philosophicum (philosophical experiment). It was an experiment
because Boscovich tried to understand the very nature of the sciences and the
newly emerging technology by the constructs of rational thought, or in plain
words, by logical reasoning (ibid.). Boscovich must have thought, as later
Schopenhauer did too, that thinking itself is part of the functioning of the
universe and that by studying its own (mental) operations, our mind also
studies some aspects of the universe. Along this line of reasoning, Boscovich
argued that "new physics," in studying nature, also studies living
bodies with, of course, their psychological components. This is more than
self-evident in his Appendix to the Theoria, labeled De anima et deo or
The Mind (soul) and God. Together with his contemporaries, however, Boscovich
soon realized that soul cannot be just another sort of mat-ter, since soul
cannot obey the laws of mechanics. Soul's moving forces are a sense of purpose
and responsibility, the latter two can-not be reconciled with the laws of
mechanical regularities. Together with Spinoza, Leibnitz, Berkeley, and Hume,
Boscovich also reflected in his Theoria upon the relationship of the body to
the mind (No. 537). His conclusion, as we shall see later, was that soul and
God are not subject to the laws of nature. Indeed, they regulate them.
Along with the theoretical, we
must also pay attention to the experimental nature of Boscovich's scientific
pursuits. He used tools, gadgets, followed special techniques. He was, after
all, a physicist. In his theoria he even conceptualizes technical skills. In
this respect, for Boscovich technology itself is a type of science, subject to
its own "natural" laws to be discovered and explained.
Zenko gives us the final
definition of Boscovich's theory as follows: 1) The theory (Theoria) is not a
hypothesis which must be experimentally proved; 2) it is not simply natural
philosophy because Boscovich goes beyond the sciences; 3) Boscovich' theory is
a new and radical philosophical conceptualization of the essence of reality
reached by means of experimental sciences (15).
As an "experimental
science" Boscovich's theory should be further discussed by natural
scientists as to the validity of its results, or by philosophers of science as
to the clarity and logic of its concepts and methods. I am pursuing neither of
these two lines of investigation. This year's published monograph on Boscovich
by Professor Zarko Dadić, popularly written but sound in scholarship,
gives us a logical, clear and succinct explanation of Boscovich's scientific
accomplishments.
My concern here is with
Boscovich's philosophical ideas, detached from experiments, which pursue the
goals normally ascribed to metaphysics and ethics, the two traditional philosophical
disciplines.
Boscovich added an appendix to his
theory labeled De anima et deo or The Mind and God. The latter is
the key to the understanding of Boscovich's purely philosophical mind.
My purpose in this study is to
find in Boscovich's thought the aspects of, following in his wake, 19th century
philosophy, the latter extending into our own times. We are entitled to look
into this matter by the fact that Boscovich was a theologian and as such was
well versed in classical and medieval philosophies. He "argued" with
his immediate predecessors Descartes and Leibnitz, he worked in Paris from 1773
to 1783 in the heydays of the French enciclopaedists, and was honored by
membership in the Royal Society of England at the time of Hume, barely missing
during his lifetime the bishop and philosopher Berkeley.
Boscovich was not a pure
philosopher and we cannot expect his philosophical thought to stretch into 19th
and 20th century philosophy as separate from his scientific thought. However,
Boscovich felt philosophical currents flowing from the 18th into the 19th
century and expressed them in his own jargon. The latter could easily be
translated into the language of our age.
His greatest opponent in modem
philosophy, but also confrere, was Schopenhauer. Schopenahuer was born only one
year after Boscovich died. Like Boscovich, Schopenhauer (although a
philosopher, and not a scientist) was passionately and irrevocably committed to
the discovery of the final and irrefutable laws which govern our universe. Let
us keep in mind that Schopenhauer, although a German, was thoroughly imbued
with the Anglo-Saxon spirit of empirical modes of thinking.
Schopenhauer maintained that
everything in nature — man, animals and plants — are propelled into existence, for
a while maintained there, and finally crushed by a invisible, impalpable,
illogical, but still fully sensed force which he labeled Universal Will. This
force is beyond our ability to manipulate it. Even our mind, hereto glorified
by many philosophers as the essence of Being, is itself subject to the will. At
best the mind can "justify" (ironically speaking) the deeds of the
will. However, these explanations are always tied to the interests of the will.
Due to the fact that our mind is dependent on an obviously irrational will, we
can never know the truth about ourselves. Before Schopenhauer, classical
philosophers and Christian theologians have placed the ultimate nature of man
and the universe in human mind. It was a God given gift.
The second of Schopenahuer's
theses is that there are not two worlds, one world we, or our mind which
thinks, and the other world, the world of nature in which we are placed. When
we observe the external world we are in contact only with our senses, not with
the real objects. The outer world exists only because we as human beings can
see it, feel it, touch it, hear it, or taste it. Without us, without our
senses, that outer world would not even exist. Consequently, we and the
material world are one and the same thing. The so-called natural laws are our
own products, and since they are reached by a secondary organ, the human mind,
they are unreliable. After all, how can something that we have created explain
to us in retrospect what we are; the created thing its creator? To go to the
natural sciences for the explanation of life means to outdistance ourselves
from the very sources of knowledge — which are within us. The crucial question
is — what or who determines our actions? Something, says Schopenhauer, that
will forever re-main foreign to us — Universal Will.
Boscovich is diametrically
opposite to Schopenhauer on the questions of mind vs. will, matter vs. spirit,
and, needless to say, Boscovich firmly believed that it was possible to
discover the laws of nature via experiments and logical reasoning. This Jesuit
father was far less of a metaphysician than the Weymar playboy, the latter in
reference to Schopenhauer.
Boscovich's eulogy of the human
mind and our mind's ability to know and manage the material world, advancing
thus our soul closer to God's final designs, are all a world apart from
Schopenhauer, and equally so from the early romantic metaphysicians of the 19th
century and the materialistically oriented mid-nineteenth century thinkers.
Boscovich downgrades the value of
matter at the expense of the mind. The very first sentence of his The Mind
and God states: "What relates to the distinction between the mind and
matter ... it is clear how great distinction there is between the body and mind
... corporeal matter and spiritual substance" (No. 525-526). He goes
directly against Schopenhauer's thesis that our senses are everything by
alleging that there is a "twofold class of operations: one of which we
call sensations and the other thought and will" (No. 527). He even further
refutes Schopenhauer's theses by maintaining that in our mind there is "a
certain force" which gives knowledge of non-local, non-material strictly
mental operations, spiritual contents that exist within ourselves and do not
come from outside (ibid.). Not quite, I would say, but very close to Kant's
"pure reason."
Contrary to Schopenhauer, matter
in Boscovich is devoid of feeling, thinking and willing (No. 529). And finally
Boscovich attacks the core of Schopenahuer's teaching by maintaining that
"The whole of our power of free action consists of the excitation of acts
of the will and by means of these of ideas of the mind also; once these have
been excited by a free and intrinsic motion of the mind" (No. 532). Mind,
not will, directs living creatures.
Boscovich thinks that mind has
free power of choosing, even against "our natural inclinations" (No.
534), which in Schopenhauer would be unthinkable. In a rather theological or
medieval manner, Boscovich searches for the seat of mind in the human body, a
matter that would be of no interest to any modern philosopher (ibid.) He, of
course, could not pinpoint the location. However, like a natural scientist,
Boscovich argues that matter as matter must have "a single point in space
and a single instant of time" (No. 537). Mind on the contrary can exist
throughout the whole body and at all points at the same time. God is mind
supreme due to "His own infinite Immensity, (and) is present in an
infinite number of points of space" (ibid.) In Boscovich spirit rules supreme
over the matter.
At the end of their treatises,
both Schopenhauer and Boscovich put limitations to their respective theories:
Schopenhauer states that his philosophy cannot understand a world in which will
would be denied or overwhelmed. This would mean the very denial of life. If
will were ever successfully denied, we would then usher into the world of
"beyond," of which only mystics can speak. With that world, says
Schopenhauer, his philosophy cannot deal.
Boscovich too maintains that his
natural philosophy, or in today's terminology science, can never explain Him
(God) who has shown "infinite Power, Wisdom and Foresight" in
founding this universe (No. 539). In physical terms, the weak human mind can
never behold His Perfection. Ergo we must turn for information or enlightenment
to — Revelation.
Although not a determinist or a
pessimist like Schopenhauer, Boscovich, nevertheless, rejects Leibnitz's
pre-established harmony (No. 525). He attacked the followers of Leibnitz who
were the upholders of perennial optimism and for whom this universe was the
most perfect one in existence. If this were true or possible, God would not be
called upon to make the selection between the good and the bad, Boscovich
argues. In consequence, He would automatically loose His absolute power since
everything would be perfect from the very inception of life. God would also
cease to be a creator. What for? Ultimately, God would have nothing to do;
logically, he would be nobody. Consequently, Boscovich had decided to involve God
in an imperfect universe and thus indirectly to defend his own scientific
pursuits: to discover God's laws which govern the universe (No. 555).
Further studies would be necessary
to relate Boscovich's ideas on body, mind, instincts, etc., to the theories of
our age, notably behaviorism. Boscovich was a physicist and he finally always
reverts to this discipline for factual evidence.
Boscovich found a great admirer in
the most unlikely philosopher of the 19th century — Nietzsche. Both Boscovich
and Nietzsche directed the scalpel of their analyses to the everlasting dilemna
agitating man — what forces, spiritual, and/or physical, are responsible for
the functioning of the universe? And what type of activities of the human mind
can make these forces clear to us (the theories of the acquisition of
knowledge). And, finally, when these forces are found and defined, what role
does a human being play in this thus fully revealed universe?
Boscovich investigated as a
mathematician, physicist, and a theologian. Nietzsche thought as a philosopher,
poet, and — an atheist.
According to Boscovich, the energy
or the mass of which this universe, and concommitantly our existence, is made,
is infinite. It consists of "the arrangement of the points of matter (punctorum
materiae) in a space that extends in length, breadth, and depth" (No.
541). Following this arrangement, "the number derived from the possible
changes in all these things is infinite" (ibid.). Or in other words
"the combinations necessary for the formation of the Universe ... are
infinite" (No. 542). Boscovich considers as false the argument based on
the chance theory which purports that "the combination of a finite number
of terms are finite in number" (No. 540). Some things are called by us fortuitous,
and as such finite, simply because we are ignorant of the causes which
determine their existence, Boscovich argues (No. 540).
Continuing this argument on the
combinations of terms as stretching into infinity (combinationes numero
infinitae) Boscovich goes into the details which have more to do with
physics than philosophy. At the end of his scientific arguments, Boscovich
reverts finally to God. According to him, due only to the existence of an
outside Being the number of combinations is infinite. This Being, God,
possesses an "infinite determinative and elective force" (No. 550).
The theologian had no other choice. But the scientist spoke out loud and clear.
Nietzsche on his part uses the
same frame of reference and occasionally even the same terminology as Boscovich,
but gives a different interpretation to the operations of the universe.
Relevant to the issue of the
combination of forces as finite or infinite is Nietzsche's famous doctrine of
"the eternal recurrence," the perpetual coming back of everything in
existence. The doctrine, as stated in his book The Will to Power runs as
follows: "If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of
force and as a certain definite number of centers of force (in Boscovich points
of matter or punctorum virium) ... it follows that, in the great dice game of
existence, (Boscovich rejects the dice game theory) it must pass through a
calculable number of combinations in (Boscovich numerum combinationum).
In infinite time, Nietzsche continues, "every possible combination would
at some time or another be realized; more, it would be realized an infinite
number of times" (WP 1066). Here two points are of utmost interest: the
very "material" of which everything in nature is made is finite;
there exists only so much of it. However, the life-span of that material, its
durability, is infinite. Consequently, Nietzsche argues, the identical shapes
of this material will be repeated, will come back, will eternally recur. The
material does not expand itself, only transforms itself. The whole process has
no goal, and no end. Nietzsche does not explain how this quanta of energy
undergoes ceaseless transformations. In somber tones he only says: "All
things recur eternally, and we ourselves too; and that we have already existed an
eternal number of times, and all things with us" ("The
Convalescent," in So Spoke Zarathustra). For a while Nietzsche
insisted that his theory had a solid scientific basis. He read extensively in
the works of renowned scientists, as for example, Helmholtz, Mundt, Rieman, and
Richter. He even planned to undertake a study of the sciences in Vienna. He
soon forgot his intentions.
In Boscovich the energy or mass
forming this universe is infinite. It has its definite laws, laws discovered by
human mind but long before foreshadowed by God. They are in nature only to
reveal God's ultimate designs. In Nietzsche everything is finite but moves in a
perpetuum mobile, without a goal, unless, as he alleges, power itself is a
goal.
Where is the place of ethics in
these two differently defined operations of the universe? Neither Boscovich nor
Nietzsche had forgotten this important dimension of human existence.
From the point of view of ethics,
Boscovich speaks of "regular" and "irregular" combinations.
"Regular" combinations are those which carry God's message. As such
they are the carriers of wisdom, piety and knowledge (No. 550). They advance
the cause of the sciences and bring us closer to God. The "irregular"
series are arbitrary. They elicit blind chaos, fatalism, necessities, the
pro-ducts of dark forces of the devil. The Supreme Being, the only one who
controls the series and is from the inception aware of their moral import,
selects the right series and brings them to the attention of human mind. After
that, it is up to human beings to make the right choices by their God given
free will. Only "regular" series give certainty to life (ibid.)
Nietzsche too imbues his eternal
recurrence with moralistic overtones. In order not to repeat the mediocre,
stupid, disastrous, below the dignity of man existence, man must also choose
between the "series," using Boscovich's terminology. However, these
"series" in Nietzsche are defined by a new code of ethics, a code
"beyond good and evil." The carrier of this amoral code is Nietzsche's
Superman. He is the one who must, all alone, without God's or anybody's help,
live his moment on this earth to the fullest degree of his abilities and
capacities. He must live so that when his deeds are repeated, they will give
light, grandeur, and meaning to human existence. God takes care of moral values
in Boscovich; Superman in Nietzsche. For God, one must have faith; for
Superman, an unbounded confidence in oneself.
Nietzsche, quite surprisingly,
read Boscovich. He held him in high esteem, as the quotation from his Beyond
Good and Evil makes this clear. Nietzsche states: "Thanks chiefly to
the Dalmatian Boscovich ... materialistic atomism ... is one of the best
refuted theories ... in Europe" (No. 12). (Boscovich "defined atoms
as centers of energy, and not as particles of matter," according to the
historian of science Gillespie, 455.). Then Nietzsche continues: "He
(Boscovich) and the Pole Copernicus have been the greatest and most successful
opponents of visual evidence so far. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to
believe, contrary to all senses, that the earth does not stand fast, Boscovich
has taught us to abjure the belief in the last part of the earth that 'stood
fast' — belief in 'substance', in 'matter,' in the earth-residuum and particle-atom:
it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has been gained on earth so
far" (ibid.) What Nietzsche found in Boscovich was that the latter
had successfully proved that our senses misinform us about the phenomena of
nature. And this all from Nietzsche who based his entire philosophy on the
value of the senses as the sole source of knowledge and the only directing
force in human existence. As a scientist Boscovich argued over and over that
objective reality cannot be grasped through our senses. His very Theoria is
shaped, as he told us, "per reflexionem", by means of
reflection. Needless to add, per reflection which follows in the wake of
scientific experiments, the latter again not tied to the senses. It was
Boscovich's philosophical frame of mind, not his experiments, which conjured a
new image of reality.
As far as the inner driving force
of the universe is concerned, there are great similarities in the thinking of
Boscovich, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Boscovich's theory has been described
by Zenko as one of "absolute dynamism" (2), or by Copleston as
"dynamic atomism" (70). For Boscovich, force not matter was a
fundamental feature of the universe. Matter itself is a field of forces, the
extended atoms, girating but not colliding with each other, in constant motion,
a self-generating energy. Boscovich viewed even God as force, according to
Zenko's interpretation (16). (Remember "Force" as the ruling
phenomenon of life in the movie Star War). This force in Zenko's view is
"organogena," i.e,. the force of the technique, technique itself, or
skill, being also a component part of nature.
Schopenhauer zeroes in on the same
phenomenon but calls it Universal Will. The latter too runs our existence, is
in perpetual motion and is outside of the human sphere of control. Nietzsche,
in the same line of thinking, introduces the concept of the Will-to-Power (in
the book of the same name) as the essence of life. Behind all phenomena of
life, even the most benevolent ones, is the will to overpower something or
somebody. As Nietzsche says in the conclusion of his last book, "This
world is the will to power — and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also
this will to power — and nothing besides" (WP 1067). All three of our
thinkers clearly zeroed in on the notion of a unified force, dark or light,
creative or destructive, depending on one's ethical point of view, which
propels the universe into existence. And that force or power or dynamism is
with us today and is more menacing than ever before.
The Jesuit Father Copleston, who
wrote the best and the most voluminous history of philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon
world, wrote two separate books on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. What prompted
this Jesuit to devote so much time to these two confirmed atheists? This may be
beyond the goals of this study, but it is worth mentioning that Copleston also
greatly valued Boscovich's theories. Although Boscovich was primarily a
scientist, Copleston gave him three pages in his history of world philosophy.
Professor Zenko notes some
similarities between Boscovich, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger (26). This is
possible, but in order to prove this point research of an intricate nature
would be required. One author who could be compared with Boscovich, more as to
his personality and the character of his efforts than to his specialty, was
Father Teilhard de Chardin, also a Jesuit. The latter, too, was a scientist (an
anthropologist), a philosopher, and a visionary. Like Boscovich he too tried to
outline a total vision of man's spiritual and material world. The church was
hesitant to support either of them.
Conclusion. It would be foolish to
deny the title of philosopher to Boscovich. He thought and reflected on life,
nature, and God independently of his scientific experiments. Like Descartes and
Leibnitz, he had a comprehensive vision of man's place in the universe and of
the forces which shape our existence, — be they material or spiritual in
nature. Had he had a home (he was a perennial vagrant), a circle of trusted
friends, and a more flexible church, he might have philosophized more and
become eventually another Aristotle — an all comprehensive scientist and
philosopher. As we know him today, he remains basically a scientist, but one
with a full awareness that the sciences do not offer a total picture of man and
his universe.
REFERENCES
1) Roger Joseph Boscovich, S.J. Theoria
philosophiae naturalis (A Theory of Natural Philosophy) (Chicago &
London: Open Court Publishing Company, 1922). Dual text in Latin and English.
Translated by J.M. Child.
2) Frederick Copleston, S.J., A
History of Philosophy (New York: Image Books, 1960). Vol. 6.
3) Žarko Dadić, Rudjer Bošković (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1987). Parallel texts in English and Croatian. Translated by Janko Paravić.
4) Vladimir Filipović,
"Pogovor," in Rudjer Bošković Teorija prirodne filozofije
(Zagreb: Liber, 1974).
5) C.C. Gillispie, The Edge of
Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1960).
6) Željko Marković, Rudje
Bošković (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti,
1968). Two volumes. This is the most comprehensive study of the life and
scholarly activities of Bošković.
7) Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: A Vintage Giant, 1968). Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale.
8) Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond
Good and Evil, (New York: Vintage books, 1966). Edited and Translated by
Walter Kaufmann.
9) Arthur Schopenhauer, The Will to Live (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1967). Edited by Richard Taylor.
10) Franjo Zenko,
"Fundamentalno-filozofijski horizont Boškovićeve teorije"
(Fundamental-Philosophical Horizon of Boscovich's Theory'). International
Symposium on Boscovich, December 11-13, 1986, Zagreb.
*
This paper was presented at the 19th National Convention of the American
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies held in Boston, November 5-8,
1987.