POLITICS AND
NATIONALISM WITHIN THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY[1]
DRAGO
(CHARLES) ŠPORER
- - - -
Journal
of Croatian Studies, XX, 1979, – Annual Review of the
Croatian Academy of America, Inc.
New York, N.Y., Electronic edition by Studia Croatica, by permission. All rights reserved by the
Croatian Academy of America.
- - - -
The role of
the military is of crucial importance for maintaining power of the dictatorial
and totalitarian regimes of both right and left. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy
and the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and other "socialist"
countries, Yugoslavia included, offer excellent examples for the case. It
should be noted, that the approach and methods differ considerably. The German
and Italian governments under Hitler and Mussolini gave more importance to
military competence and less to politics in their armies; the Soviets and other
Communist armies gave priority to "political awareness" of their
military cadres. Consequently, in all Communist armies both the soldiers and
officers are continuously subjected to "political education". This
consists of indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism in a prescribed, selective
manner, supplemented by the "teachings" of the Communist leaders ruling
a particular country. In Yugoslavia, of course, these are Titoist
teachings which have gone through several metamorphoses.
Soviet System
of Commissars Served as a Model
By introducing
political commissars in their units the Yugoslav partisans followed the example
of the Soviet Army. This had been done when the Soviet Army was seriously
tested in the World War II battles.
At the
outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941, only seven percent of the Soviet
officers had higher military training, while thirty-seven percent lacked basic
training altogether.[2]
It is
generally believed that the reason for such a low percentage of qualified
officers was al direct result of the Great Purge of 1937-38. This deficiency in
the professional ranks of the Red Army greatly helped both the influx and
influence of political commissars. Commissars — many of them poorly educated,
but loyal to the Communist Party — were assigned to military units. Their duty
was to supervise the activities of the military commander.[3] Marshal Semyon
K. Timoshenko was the only exception to this rule, as he held both posts of
commissar and commander simultaneously. The Soviet commissars were nominally in
charge of educational activities, but they also had close ties with the
intelligence officers and their word had special weight in all matters they
choose to intervene. They became the most hated men in the Army. Stalin
realized that if he continued to send the "beloved" commissars to the
front-line, he might lose them all, so he ordered their withdrawal in 1942.
Yugoslav
Communists set up a commissars' system at the very beginning of the partisan
struggle. There was very little difference between Yugoslav and Russian
commissars, except that the former treated the partisan fighters in a more
humane manner, having taken into account that they were all volunteers.
However, with the war turning in their favor, the Yugoslav commissar became
just as obnoxious and rude as his Russian counterpart.
The constant
interference of the commissar with the commander's decisions led to continuous
friction and anarchy. To solve the problem the system had been modified to the
effect that the commissar's rank was always below that of the commanding
officer's. This, however, did not diminish the commissar's ambitions and
affected little of their actual power. Finally, their military rank was taken
away from them, but their function was never abolished. Today their role is
entrusted to a special officer under the title "Officer for Political and
Legal Affairs," generally referred to as the PPP (from "officer for političko-pravne poslove").
In the Armijska oblast, which is
comparable to the Army Area in the United States, this duty is assigned to a
major-general.
The Yugoslav
"People's Army" continues to emphasize political and ideological
education of the military and for that purpose. The High Political School was
opened in Belgrade in 1972. The school is in the same level as the Command and
General Staff schools. It accepts officers in the rank of captain and major who
must be graduates from accredited military academies. The class of 1974 was the
first class of graduates of the new school. Each graduate is exempt from taking
the exam for the next higher rank.[4]
It is obvious that these officers will be less skillful in military matters.
In general,
students of Yugoslav military academies spend considerable time on
"political education." An article in the Narodna
armija of September 14, 1972 pointed out that
someone was reprimanded because he referred to the "old times" when a
student could dedicate much more time to military subjects and less in
philosophizing theories which could never be applied in practice.
The members of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) constitute the principal nerve
system of political control and education in the army. The LCY has a secretary
in each army unit from the largest to the smallest. The secretary in an Army
Area is usually a major-general or colonel with the title "Secretary of
the Committee of the League of Communists Conference". His superior is the
Assistant to the Federal Secretary for National Defense. Currently he is
Colonel General Džemal Šarac,
a Moslem. His deputy is Major-General Milan Krdžić,
a Serb. In order to exert political control more efficiently, for a number of
years, up to 1958, the membership in the Communist Party was kept secret. Only
the members of the same cell in an army unit and their closest friends knew
each other.
Today close to
ninety percent of the officers are members of the LCY; among graduating cadets
the percentage is as high as ninety-eight to one hundred percent! The situation
is similar among those having or aspiring to managerial positions in civil
service. Marshal Tito acknowledged this in 1972, when he said that the
Communists are in almost all key positions.[5]
To be a member
of the LCY means to accept onerous obligations as one has not only to attend
numerous meetings but as a rule must take part in discussion. It is
unsatisfactory to be present and remain silent. Everyone is expected to quote
something from some Communist teachings. To prepare oneself
for such debates is often time-consuming. It is also a "moral
obligation" of a Communist to check on the political attitude of his
friends and colleagues. Informants are highly regarded.
As with every
army, the Yugoslav "People's Army" has its security service, which is
organized in a different way than equivalent services in the armies of
democratic countries. General Ivan Gošnjak, who was
then the Secretary of the National Defense, said in a statement made in 1966
that the security service was led and controlled by political commissars.[6] This does not agree with known facts. The
security service had its own chain of command and was completely independent of
the commissars. Each unit from the regiment upwards had two or three officers
from the secret police units of "People's Defense", known as OZNA. In
a regiment the chief OZNA officer was usually a captain.
It is obvious
that life in the Yugoslav Army is not particularly easy, nor interesting. It
was even more difficult in the past. Denunciation was the order of the day. The
officers who at the end of the war requested to be discharged in order to
continue their studies or to enter civil service were immediately reprimanded
and told that service in the army was their first duty. There was also another
kind of army officer, one who had bad "characteristics" (i.e.
references) as compiled by the commissars. These officers were the army
"undesirables", and as such were simply dismissed. At dismissals they
received a sealed envelope containing their "characteristics", which
they would have to present to personnel managers when applying for jobs. As all
firms were nationalized with no private enterprise, bad
"characteristics" from the army meant closed doors for any good job.
Many of these former career officers were forced to do manual work. They had to
work on such jobs for at least one year and only when they got better
references could they apply for clerical jobs.
Nationality
Problem
In addition to
ideo-political problems, the Yugoslav Army is also
beset with the nationality problem which it tries to conceal by keeping the
nationality of the generals and officers a secret. In the United States, for
instance, the practice is that the biography of persons in key positions includes
information on whether he is Irish, Jewish, Italian, Puerto
Rican, etc. In Yugoslavia the only reference made indicates if the particular
person is a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists.
Between 1968 and 1971, when a more liberalized atmosphere prevailed, the
references to the nationality of prominent personalities of Croatia were made
public in Zagreb, but this is no longer practiced.
The reason why
the nationality of army officers and generals is kept secret is explained by
the fact that there are far more Serbs than their proportion of the population
of the country would justify. For this reason, only the Serbian "aparatchiki" shun statistics disclosing the ratio of
nationalities. Overwhelming Serbian representation is in a way a continuation
of past practices. Before the German attack in 1941, Yugoslavia had 180 active
generals. There were ten or eleven Croatians, three Slovenes and the rest were
Serbs.[7]
The
insufficient number of Croatians in the Yugoslav Army in 1971 was confirmed by Miko Tripalo, at that time a
member of the Executive Bureau of the LCY's Central Committee. He stated that
we could not be satisfied with the nationality structure of leading organs in
the Department of the Internal Affairs (meaning the secret police) and in
national defense, which overall is unsatisfactory for the Croatians.[8] This means that even after twenty-seven
years of Communist rule the nationality problem was not resolved to the
satisfaction of Croatians and other non-Serbian nationalities.
***
Professor
Dennison I. Rusinow, Associate of the American
University Field Staff, is considered in the United States an expert on
Yugoslav affairs. Analyzing his reports one has the impression that he was
relying heavily on data supplied by Serbian unitarists.
Eventually, he made some progress and admitted that prior to December 1971 the
Croatian leadership's request for changes and subsequent attack on Belgrade
policies was not without partial historic justification, as Serbian politicians
are primitive by education, hard fisted by training and necessity, and
centralist by interest and tradition.[9]
Also, Croatia's aspiration is for a fairer deal in the Yugoslav federation,
where Croatians had felt exploited and oppressed by a centralist system in
which more numerous but poorer ethnic rivals, the Serbs, have enjoyed a
preponderant influence.[10]
This
revelation by Mr. Rusinow was quite surprising since
he was quoted in Time magazine (June 5, 1972) labeling Croatians as
"having a case" of permanent national paranoia. He further emphasized
this "label" pointing out that paranoia is familiar to a historian of
national problems of Central Europe.[11]
At this juncture one could ask such historians why such labels are justified
only for Central Europe and not for the Irish, French Canadians and others for
example.
It is
significant that when some other nationalities of Yugoslavia have to be
satisfied, something is always taken away from the Croatians' "ethnic
key" (ključ) and not from the Serbs. Thus,
for instance, in the new LCY's Central Committee (CC) there are 14.6% Croatians
against a Croatian population of 22.1%, while there are 40% Serbs and
Montenegrins in the CC against the whole Serbian and Montenegrin population of
42%.[12]
In the CC Presidium and Executive Committee (which are two of the most powerful
political organs) there are 17.8% Croats, and 31.1% Serbs, or 42.2% Serbs and
Montenegrins combined.[13]
In 1971 Lt.
Colonel-General Janko Bobetko,
a Croatian, took pains to improve the situation in the
armed forces. He was, at that time, Chief of Staff, or G-III, of the Army Area
of Zagreb while the commander was Djoko Jovanić, a Serb, who thereafter became Under Secretary
for National Defense in Belgrade. General Bobetko
agreed that a committee be formed enabling society to have an inside look into
the armed forces structure and policies.[14] He was also in favor of ethnic head
counting (prebrojavanje) in all other
government services except the armed forces, because of over-representation of
Serbs. It was for this reason that Marshal Tito first removed Bobetko from his position, and later expelled him from both
the Army and the LCY. At the same time, General Vladko
Mutak was expelled from the Army and sentenced to a
prison term together with a half dozen higher army officers, all Croatians. All
of them were sentenced for "nationalism" which is considered
"counter-revolutionary".
One of the
reasons for Croatian under-representation is that many young Croatians and
Slovenes are not inclined to enter the military schools to become career
officers because of the rather primitive level of Yugoslav military academies.
Furthermore, the Yugoslav Army, which developed from the former Serbian Royal
Army when the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes was established in
1918, preserved all the characteristics and methods of the Serbian Army and
still applies the Serbian rules and regulations[15] despite the fact that it is the army of
a new, multinational state. Until 1973, the army was served popara
(bread-mash) for breakfast a pure Serbian specialty not familiar to other
nationalities[16].
Furthermore, addressing is still done in the ways of old Serbia. Every officer
of lower rank is addressed in the second person singular instead of plural,
using ti instead of vi
as is customary of the other languages used in Yugoslavia. This is, for the Croatians
and the Slovenes, very offensive. The Serbian language and terminology is used
in a way that the armed forces has become a sort of "melting pot" to
make all soldiers Serbs, if not by birth, then by language and mentality.
Characteristically, a group of Serbian journalists publishing an interview with
General Viktor Bubanj, who at that time was Chief of
the General Staff, objected strongly that he was not using the Serbian language
but rather a mixture of "two variants" [Serbian and Croatian].[17] The Serbian journalists' arrogance in
questioning the language usage of the Chief of the General Staff is
particularly significant in the view that Serbs, more than anyone else, insist
that "Serbo-Croatian" is one language and that anyone can use either
one or both of its two "variants".
It is
interesting to note that during the Partisan War, each of the Republics used
their own language. Thus the Slovenes used their language in their territory
without adversely affecting the morale of their detachments.
During the
session of the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslavia on November 30, 1943, a
decision was made that all official communications were to be published in the
Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, and Macedonian languages. A Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian language was not mentioned. Retired general
and partisan hero, Jaka Avšič,
stated that Marshal Tito in the session mentioned above promised the Slovene
delegation that each republic would have its own army and language beginning
from the highest command downward.[18]
After the war
the armed forces were re-organized by the Chief of the General Staff, Arso Jovanović, and a close
group of officials in Belgrade without the consent and agreement of the
nationalities of Yugoslavia. In 1948, General Jovanović
attempted to flee to Russia and was shot to death at the Yugoslav-Romanian
border.[19]
No one in Yugoslavia had the courage to ask publicly in whose authority he acted
to reorganize the armed forces. Those orders, when carried out, imposed the
Serbian language on all concerned.
Since then,
the language in the Yugoslav armed forces is officially called Serbo-Croatian
with the Štokavian dialect and Ekavian
pronunciation.[20]
In practice, this means a pure Serbian language. All military textbook editions
and biographies as well as the newspapers Front and Narodna
armija are printed in this language. The latter
appears in all languages of Yugoslavia with the exception of Croatian. In this
way the Croatians are served with a real Serbian language under the guise of
Serbo-Croatian. When General Branko Borojević, a Serb from Croatia, was the Secretary of
the Committee of the Conference of the LCY, he insisted that language
discussions cease. He said that strict measures should be applied against those
who rebel.[21]
According to
the Constitution, the language of the respective republic can be used only in the
territorial defense units. But even this is different in practice. In 1971,
when the Commander of the Youth Brigade of the Republic of Croatia signed
documents using the Croatian term of his rank zapovjednik
instead of the Serbian word komandant, he was
reprimanded for "chauvinism". Yet, the Jugoslavenski
list which appeared in Sarajevo from 1918 to 1941 used this Croatian term.[22]
In 1967 the
Federal Secretary for National Defense issued the Military Dictionary (Vojni rečnik).
Purportedly published in the "Serbo-Croatian" language, the
dictionary was corrected and interpreted by Professor Dragoljub
Pavlović who utilized grammar and idiomatic
expressions only from the Serbian language: Consequently, many words and sentences
could not be understood by the Croatians.
A high-ranking
Croatian Communist official attested of how fair efforts to eliminate the
Croatian language have gone. Pero Pirker,
the Secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia,
visiting Vinkovci in March 1971, where there are
76,3% Croatians and 17,1% Serbs, declared that until recently it was dangerous
to call the language of the Croatians by its name.[23] Perceiving the assimilatory potential of
the Serbian language, Croatians are undertaking measures to preserve their own
distinctiveness.[24]
Language is
not the only problem and Croatians are not the only ones who are discontent.
The Slovenes are disturbed by the continuous shifts from one place to another
and particularly by the fact that they must serve outside their own republic or
state. General Ivan Dolničar, who is Secretary
of the Council for National Defense, said in May 1973 that career officers will
no longer serve outside of their own republic. He also said that Slovenes will
perform the major part of their service in Slovenia.[25] It was reported that at no time would a
Slovene general persuade his son to enter the military academy. Therefore, the
cadets are mostly recruited from the poorer classes.[26]
National
Composition of High-Ranking Officers
In 1970, there
were 16.5% Montenegrin and 4.7% Serbian generals more than would correspond to
their respective populations. At the same time there were 3.8% less Croatians
and 2.2% less Slovenes in proportion.[27]
According to J. C. Campbell, the army was 'mainly Serb'[28], and conservative estimates place 70% of
Yugoslav army officers as Serbs.[29]
We realize it is not always possible to satisfy the proportion of lower-ranked
officers, however, population percentages should be taken into account for
colonels and generals.
It is an
interesting fact that Croatians in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire had more
generals than there were in the Royal Yugoslav Army.[30] At that time, Croatians also used the
Croatian language in their units.[31]
In the
Yugoslav People's Army, the highest rank is General of the Army. This rank is a
title only and not a command position. The next rank is Colonel-General
followed by Lt. Colonel-General and finally Major-General.
The list of
generals promoted each year is published in the Yugoslav press on Army's Day,
i.e., December 22nd. (The year 1969 was an exception because
it was published on December 21st). In 1964 there were no promotions.
According to the census of 1971, there were in Yugoslavia 39.7% Serbs, 22.1%
Croatians, 8.3% Slovenes, 2.5% Montenegrins, etc. As
it was already indicated, it is rather difficult to find a breakdown of
officers by nationality. An exception was Who's Who published in 1957.
In all other editions no nationality was indicated. However, it is possible
with some certainty to determine the nationality either by the name of the
person, or by the name of his father. Strangely enough, for generals, their
fathers' names have been omitted since 1969 in order to make it more difficult
to ascertain their nationality. We are not discussing the case of admirals.
Although more than 90% of the Adriatic Coast belongs to Republic of Croatia,
among officers and admirals there is a high proportion of Serbs.
Until 1970,
all commanders of each Army Area were colonel-generals. Later on lieutenant
colonel-generals were also appointed to such positions. We will examine closely
the national composition of these two ranks. From 1960 to 1973 a total of
sixty-one generals were promoted to the rank of colonel-general. Sixty-eight
percent were Serbs and Montenegrins despite the fact Serbs and Montenegrins
constituted 42% of the total population in Yugoslavia.[32] Simultaneously, 18% Croatians were
promoted to the same rank while making up 22.1% of the Yugoslav population.
During the same interval, there were 130 major-generals promoted to lieutenant
colonel-general, 65% of which were Serbs and Montenegrins.
Although there
are 14.2% Serbs in the Republic of Croatia as opposed to 79.4% Croatians, it
was recently revealed that many Serbs are generals, diplomats, and higher
federal functionaries from this single republic. Yet the actual percentage of
Serbian officials from Croatia and from Bosnia-Hercegovina
was not revealed. Until recently the Serbs were over-represented in government
and Party positions in the Republic of Croatia.[33] The Secretary of the League of
Communists of Croatia since 1973 has been a Serb, Dušan
Dragosavac. The Serbs could not believe that the
Croatians would accuse them of domination of the army, the police and the
diplomatic corps.[34]
A few words
should be said about the high command of the Yugoslav army. Looking only on the
surface, one may conclude that the Croatians are not neglected. The
Commander-in-Chief is Marshal Tito who is a Croatian by nationality. However,
it is known that a good pre-war Communist cannot have any nationalistic
feelings and he carefully avoids to identify himself
as a Croatian. He is most concerned with the interests of the Communist League
as well as with his personal position.
It has been
noted that Tito is often playing the Serbs against the Croatians. When he needs
the Serbs, he attacks the Croatians and, when he seeks Croatian support, he
censures the Serbian chauvinists. However, he has done nothing against the
Serbian chauvinists; only against the Serbian liberals. The only exception was Aleksandar Ranković, head of
the Secret Police, who was removed in 1966. He not only wire-tapped Tito, but
was preparing to take over his position.
After Tito,
one of the most important positions in the armed forces is that of the Federal
Secretary for National Defense. General Ivan Gošnjak,
also a Croatian, held this position until 1967. If these two Croatians in the
highest military positions had some Croatian feelings, they would not have
allowed the Serbian language to be introduced into the Yugoslav army and
neglected the promotion of officers in the Army. For this reason many people in
Croatia consider that these two are not Croatians at all but opportunists
trying not to antagonize the Serbs.
At this time,
the Secretary of National Defense is Nikola Ljubičić,
a Serb from Serbia. He is not reluctant to admit that he is a Serb and speaks
in a pure Serbian language, not in a Serbo-Croatian mixture used by Tito and Gošnjak.[35]
The position
of the Chief of the General Staff was alternately occupied by various
nationalities. Now that position is filled by a Slovene, Stane
Potočar. Prior to him was a Croatian, Viktor Bubanj, who died suddenly in Belgrade in 1972. His death
has not yet been explained. It was reported that he had been hinting to Serbian
politicians and generals that each republic should have its own army with its
own commanding staff.
In the Air
Force the proportion of nationalities was fairly equal because commanding
officers were periodically rotated. At present, the commander is a Moslem;
previously, it was a Croat, and prior to him a Serb and Slovene.
After these
positions, the most important one is that of the commander of the Army Area.
The Army Area of Zagreb controls the whole of Croatia, with the exception of
the Maritime Zone, which belongs to the Navy. Immediately after the war, the
first commander of Zagreb was Kosta Nadj. In Who's Who of 1957 he declared himself a Croatian,
but in 1974 he stated, "I always declare myself a Yugoslay".[36] He is now President of the Association
of Partisan Fighters of Yugoslavia (SUBNOR). Nadj
was succeeded by two Serbs and then for a short time by a Croatian, Ivan Rukavina. As Rukavina acted more
in Croatian interests, he was removed before his rotation period expired and
soon thereafter retired. Replacing Rukavina was Djoko Jovanić, a Serb from
Croatia. The commander at the present time is again a Serb, also from Croatia, Dušan Čorkić. Since
there are only 14.2% Serbs living in Croatia, many Croatians consider it a
provocation that more than half of the generals and higher army officers in the
Army Area of Zagreb are Serbs. This is also true for other garrisons of Croatia.
The commander of the artillery of the Army Area in Zagreb is a Serb, General Dragan Pajić. Before him the
commander was Branko Kresojević,
a Serb. His deputy was Colonel Antonije Pavlović, also a Serb. The latter died in an
"unfortunate accident" in the war games in July 1972. The same
circumstances surrounded the death of General Radoje Ljubičić in May 1972, also a Serb from Serbia,
who was commander of the Air Corps of the Army Area of Zagreb. Similarly
killed, in 1971, was a Serb colonel, commander of the tank units in Zagreb. It
is suspected that all of these cases were acts carried out by Croatian
individuals opposing Serbs.
In a way, the
leaders of the Croatian Republic are to be blamed that so many Serbs are in
commanding positions in Croatia. This is due to the lack of mutual agreement
among them and to their subservience to certain pressure groups. Such is not
the case in Slovenia where a Slovene is permanent commander of the Army Area.
Also, the majority of the generals are Slovenes. Presently, the commander is
Franc Tavčar, and before him it was Stane Potočar. Not only
that, but in Ljubljana there is a military high school in which only students
from the Republic of Slovenia can enroll.[37] All of the graduates are accepted for
military academies.
A similar
situation exists in Macedonia. In the city of Skopje, the Army Area commander
is Vasko Karangelski and
his deputy is Tihomir Sarevski.
Both are Macedonians as are the majority of the generals. In Montenegro, the
commander is Danilo Jauković
and his deputy is Radomir Šćepanović,
both Montenegrins.
In Bosnia and Hercegovina things are better now. Commanders of all three
nationalities succeed each other. At present, the commander is Rahmija Kadenić, a Moslem.
Another
important position in the Yugoslav army is the commander of the border guards,
which is always a colonel-general. These guards are the former KNOJ
(Command of the Defense of Yugoslavia) which after the war fought Chetniks and Ustashas. Of all
seven commanders who have held this position up to now only Rudolf Primorac was a Croatian. The commander is now Vlado Šćekić, and his
deputy Pero Lalović,
both Serbs.
The military
counter-intelligence service called KOS (Kontra
obavještajna služba)
should also be mentioned here. Its chief was Colonel-General Ivan Mišković, a Croatian. Until June 1973, he was also a
close personal adviser to President Tito. It is said that he spoke to him
daily. His sudden dismissal has remained a mystery. He was succeeded by Lt.
Colonel-General Stjepan Domankušić,
also a Croatian. There is enough proof available to show that Mišković prepared the removal of the entire Croatian
leadership at the end of 1971. He and his brother Milan allegedly tape-recorded
a discussion between the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mirko Tepavac, and his
Under-Secretary, Ante Drndić. Their object was
to prove that Croatia's leaders had connections with the "Ustasha emigration". This connection was later
officially denied and General Mišković was
removed.
It is also
necessary to say something of Tito's Guard. Their duty is to escort and protect
him on his trips. Up until 1966 over 90% of the soldiers and officers of the
guard had been, Serbs from Lika, a region of Croatia.
They were generally less monarchist than Serbian soldiers from other parts of
Yugoslavia and therefore more reliable. Their first commander, in 1944, was
Milan Žeželj, also from Lika.
In 1962, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel-general and
appointed the Chief of Staff of the Border Guard. Later he became President of
the Transportation Council.
General Žeželj was not replaced due to rotation or political
reasons, but rather because of his close acquaintance with Mrs. Jovanka Broz-Tito. Before Jovanka
was married to Marshal Tito, she was employed in the office of the President of
the Republic (at that time also the office of the Prime Minister) whose
secretary was Mitar Bakić,
a Montenegrin. General Žeželj often came to the
office to see Jovanka. After her marriage, General Žeželj was generally near her because of his official
duties. Since Tito could not tolerate this close relation-ship, Žeželj was removed.[38]
Finally, a
word about the morale of the Yugoslav army would be in order. We will cite from
the book of the late General Bubanj, Doctrine of
Victory, where he says, "... it is obvious that the morale of the
armed forces is basically the morale of the society".[39] Taking into account deep national
divisiveness and latent conflict between forces imposing the hegemony of one
nation over the other, and those opposing such a hegemony
it is obvious that the morale of the army is rather low. This has been
confirmed by officers and generals of the Yugoslav Army themselves. The polls
showed that 54% of them declared that "the main threat came from
nationalism and chauvinism rather than external aggression".[40] It would be interesting to know what
these officers and generals have done up till now to mitigate the acuteness of
these problems.
[1] This is slightly revised version
of the paper presented at the Seminar of the American Croatian Academic
Society, co-sponsored by the Case Western Reserve University, held in Cleveland
on November 29-30, 1974.
[2] Vjesnik, Zagreb, March 22,
1973. A daily newspaper.
[3] B.H. Liddell Hart, The Red Army, New York, Harcourt, Brace and
Co., 1956. p. 49.
[4] Narodna Armija, Belgrade, July 25, 1974. A weekly.
[5] Vjesnik, October 8, 1972.
[6] Komunist,
Belgrade, September 8, 1966. A weekly.
[7] N. Halasz, In the Shadow of Russia, New
York, 1959, p. 123 states that the army had 165 general officers, and all but
two were of Serb nationality. Ninety percent of the officers
corp consisted of Serbians. The proportion was
similar in all important positions.
According to Ekonomska politika,
Belgrade, September 2, 1968, from a total of 177 high federal functionaries
there were 43.5% Serbs, 16.9% Montenegrins, 10.7% Croats etc. As per Ekonomska politika of January 27. 1969, in Belgrade were
75.3% Serbs elected functionaries. 71,7% functionaries
of federal administration, and 71.5% federal judicial functionaries, all of
them Serbs.
[8] Naše teme, Zagreb, No. 10, 1971, and NIN, Belgrade, June 28, 1970.
[9] Dennison I. Rusinow
in American University Field Staff Reports, No. 5, September 1972.
[10] D.I. Rusinow in AUFS Reports, No. 4,
June 1972.
[11] D.I. Rusinow
in AUFS Reports, No. 7, September 1972.
[12] Politika,
Belgrade, May 31, 1974. We are updating Croatian population from 22.0% to 22.1%
because earlier Yugoslav statistics were rounded off from 4,526,782 to
4,520,000 in Politika, November 28, 1974.
There are now 8,143,246 Serbs and percentage remains the same, 39.7%.
[13] Slobodan Stankovic,
Bulletin of Radio New Europe, May 31, 1974.
[14] Vjesnik,
March 13, 1971.
[15] General Jaka Avšič in Teorija in praksa,
Ljubljana, vol. 7, No. 8/9, 1970.
[16] Vjesnik,
January 14, 1973.
[17] Ilustrovana politika, Belgrade, October 24, 1972. "Urednici su mu zamerili što često mesa dve jezičke varijante. Nasmejao se i rekao to su u pravu i
to sam vam Jugosloven, pomalo i Goranin i
Beogradjanin, i ijekavac i ekavac." — "The editors strongly objected to him for mixing two language
variants. He laughed and said that they were right, that in this he is a
Yugoslav, a little Goranin, [inhabitant of the region
Gorski Kotar in Croatia], a
little Belgradean, ijekavian,
and ekavian". In effect, he said that he
was a little of everything but Croatian. Nevertheless, he has been censured for
not having forgotten all Croatian expressions of the official "Croato-Serbian" or "Serbo-Croatian"
language!
In general, it seems that serious implications of
language problems are ignored in Serbia. This is evident from numerous
examples. When Jure Bilić, a Croatian Communist leader
and a member of the Executive Council of the LCY, granted an interview to the
Belgrade weekly Komunist, his statements published by
the paper contained such typical Serbian words as: konstituisanje,
obezbijediti, preduzećima,
afirmiše, organizovati,
etc. (Komunist, November 11, 1974) which Bilić did not use. Why could not his statements have
been published in original Croatian? And if not, why they did not fully
translated them into Serbian?
[18] Sodobnost, Ljubljana, No. 4, 1970 and Encyclopedia Moderna, Zagreb, No. 12,
1970. In Književne novine, Belgrade, April 10, 1971, appears an article by
Mihailo Stevanović
(Professor at the Faculty of Philology) describing agreement at Novi Sad (Dec.
1954). He said that everything that the Croatian delegation had suggested was
accepted, except the requirement that in federal administration and in the
armed forces there should be a regulated use of both pronunciations, which
means Serbian and Croatian. The main purpose of the meeting was to achieve
equality between Serbian and Croatian pronunciation or variants (if not two
languages) in the multinational states and federal system. But the Serbs are
against equality in the languages, which is contrary to the new and old Federal
Constitution of Yugoslavia.
[19] Vjesnik u Srijedu, thereafter referred to as VUS,
March 3, 1971. A weekly.
[20] Borba, December 29, 1969,
and Vjesnik, May 28. 1970. In the new Constitution
of 1974, Article 243 states that in commands and drill exercises the language
of a particular nationality of Yugoslavia may be used.
The Federal Defense
Law (Narodna armija,
May 8, 1974). Article 13, provides the use of Serbo-Croatian, respectively Croato-Serbian. The same article states that in the armed
forces any one of the three languages may be used. It is puzzling then why only
the Serbian language is used and imposed on all nationalities in the service.
The article also says that individual units can use the language of their
Republic and this can be ordered by the Federal Secretary of National Defense.
But up to now this has not happened.
It is also
interesting that the law does not establish in which Republic, city or garrison
a draftee should perform his duty.
[21] Borba, May
30, 1969.
[22]
Lica, Sarajevo, No. 5-6. 1971.
[23] Vjesnik,
March 13, 1971.
[24] Gary K. Bertsch in Problems of Communism, Washington, D.C.,
Nov-Dec., 1973.
[25] VUS, Zagreb, May
2, 1973. Translation from Naša
Obramba, Ljubljana.
[26] Stjepan Bunta in Teorija in praksa, No. 5, 1970, p. 796 and NIN, Belgrade,
June 14, 1970. Also NIN, March 20, 1970.
[27] NIN, September
20, 1970.
[28] John C. Campbell in Foreign Affairs,
New York, July 1973, p. 786.
[29] Robin Alison Remington in ORBIS,
Philadelphia, Pa., No. 1, Spring 1973, p. 216, and p. 210, and NIN,
Belgrade, June 20, 1971.
[30] Osterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918 (Registerband), Vienna,
1938.
[31] Kritika,
Zagreb, No. 13, 1970.
[32] Most of the Montenegrins who
reside outside of Yugoslavia consider themselves first Serbs then Montenegrins.
Since the First World War they were dominated by Serbs who considered
Montenegro a Serbian state as much as Serbia proper. Taking into account this
sentiment "Serbs first, Montenegrins second," we classed them here
together with other Serbs.
[33] Paul Shoup,
Communism and Yugoslav National Questions, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1968, p. 121,
[34] Y. Blumenfeld
in Editorial Research Reports, Washington, D.C., No. 21, 1973, p. 430.
[35] Despite Declaration signed in
March 17, 1967 by eighteen cultural and linguistic organizations in Zagreb,
stating that Croatian and Serbian are two different languages, Marshal Tito in
his speech in Priština stated that there is no
difference in languages (Politika) April 2,
1967).
[36] NIN, Belgrade. January 13, 1974.
[37] Narodna armija, Dec. 27. 1973 and Vjesnik, Jan. 5. 1973.
[38] Since Milan Žeželj
achieved high rank in the army, his biography is contradictory. Vojna enciklopedija,
vol. 10, Belgrade, 1967, p. 832, stated that, amongst other positions, he was
commander of the Guard Division and then chief of staff of the Border Guard. Who's
Who of 1970 stated his education was at the pre-war School for non-commisioned officers. No other profession was shown before
World War II. In Who's Who of 1957 he was mentioned as a manual worker,
and there was no entry for the above school. Actually, before World War II he
was "žandar," i.e. state policeman, and
they were loyal to pre-war regimes and very rough with their opponents
especially Communists. He was proclaimed a national hero and promoted to
colonel-general. After him, the commander of Tito's Guard was General Ilija Radaković, also a Serb
from Lika. Croatia. Before the war he was a teacher.
[39] Viktor Bubanj, Doktrina pobjede, Belgrade. 1972, p. 83.
[40] ORBIS, No. 1, Spring 1973, p. 216 and NIN, June 20, 1971.