ANATOMY OF DECEIT
Copyright©
1997 by Jerry Blaskovich. Electronic edition by Studia
Croatica, by permission of the author
Chapter 12:
Croatia’s growing pains
After U.N.
special envoys Carrington and Vance brokered over 50 separate peace agreements
in Croatia that the Serbs quickly rescinded, Serbian leader Milosevic tenuously
agreed to one more proposal. The media made Milosevic's consent appear as a
magnanimous gesture. But Milosevic, ever the fox, knew that because his forces
weren't strong enough to capture more Croatian territory and couldn't
consolidate the gains they had already made; this last agreement would allow
the U.N. forces to consolidate the gains for him.
By the time Milosevic
had accepted Vance's plan for 14,000 U.N. peacekeepers to maintain the status
quo, Croatia had begun to develop a more structured army and acquire some
weapons despite the arms embargo.
The United
Nations Protective Forces (UNPROFOR) presence helped consolidate the territory
the Serbs had conquered. But for the Croats, UNPROFOR bought time to train
Croatia's fledgling army and amass more weapons, which proved so effective in
the August 1995 counter-offensive. The backbone of the Croatian tank corps were
tanks reconstructed from cannibalized parts taken from damaged JNA tanks.
After three
years of inertia, UNPROFOR failed to implement even one major provision of the
Vance plan, which had called for the return of displaced persons to their
homes, the disarming of the Serbian paramilitary, and the return of Croatia's
sovereignty over its territory.
When Milosevic
agreed to the terms of Vance's plan, the JNA redeployed its heavy weapons and
tanks to Bosnia-Herzegovina to block Bosnia's self-determination efforts and to
further the goal of a Greater Serbia.
The same cast
of characters--General Ratko Mladic,
Vojislav Seselj, and Zeljko
"Arkan" Raznjatovic--all
of whom had terrorized innocent civilians and wrecked havoc in Croatia, found
no shortage of victims in Bosnia.
The JNA, had UNPROFOR to patrol the borders along one-third of
Croatia that the Serbs occupied.
When
hostilities broke out in Bosnia, the media focused all its attention there and
all but ignored the fact that the supposed peace in Croatia was being
punctuated by death and daily Serbian shelling of Croatian towns and cities.
Serbian ethnic cleansing in Croatia continued unabated under the watchful eyes
of UNPROFOR.
Although the
Serbs had committed grotesque atrocities in Croatia, nobody had anticipated the
horrors they would commit in Bosnia. The Bush administration was unmoved by the
human suffering. Democratic presidential candidate Clinton exploited the issue
and made it a major point in his presidential campaign.
Despite the Bush’s
administration seemingly resolute inactivity, the Croatians and Muslims
expected the United States to reassert its world leadership role and come up
with a solution.
President
Bush, however, was firmly committed to maintaining the status quo and letting
the crises play itself out. Whatever could be said about Bush’s policy, at
least it was consistent and never disillusioned the victims.
After the
election, once Clinton took over the reigns of
government his schizophrenic policy became an emotional roller coaster for the
non-Serbs. In addition to increasing death and destruction, the Serbian
psychological warfare experts couldn't have better orchestrated the results
caused by Clinton's vacillating. If his "policy"
was, indeed, a conscious effort and not due to ineptness, then Clinton is in a
moral equivalent with the Serbs.
He sent
Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Europe in May, 1993, to unsuccessfully
argue for the "lift and strike" option. Only after U.S. government
archives are opened to future historians will we know whether Clinton ordered
Christopher to deliberately present an unenthusiastic case or whether
Christopher did so on his own initiative.
Christopher's efforts failed, and thereafter the administration claimed that it
wished to act in Bosnia but was prevented from doing so by the stubbornness of
its European allies.
The Clinton
administration, like the Bush administration before it, has engaged in its own
transparent brand of revisionism. Patrick Glynn of the American Enterprise
Institute has said that Secretary of State Warren Christopher's clumsy efforts
to distribute blame for the war equally ("There are atrocities on all
sides.") lacked the subtlety shown by his predecessor, Eagleburger, yet
was equally inaccurate. Christopher's Balkan policy even provoked an angry memo
from a State Department analyst. The memo, which was leaked to The New York
Times, pointed out the blatant inaccuracy of the secretary's assessment.
The lack of
principle in the State Department has moved a number of career officers to
resign. Marshall Harris was the desk officer for Bosnia at the State
Department. After serving for eight years, he became particularly disillusioned
over Christopher's disastrous European fiasco. In fact, more State Department
officials have resigned over Bush and Clinton's policies in former Yugoslavia
than resigned over the Vietnam War under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon combined.
As late as
November, 1994, the West was pressuring the Bosnian government to surrender,
while ignoring Serbian crimes against humanity. The West produced a variety of
peace plans that, in essence, legitimized Serbian rebel gains. In August, 1992,
and January, 1993, after the Croats dared to take back some of their territory,
the West threatened Croatia with sanctions if it didn't withdraw to its prior
positions.
Croatian
President Tudjman was faced with tremendous pressure from the members of his
own constituency who opposed continuing the status quo. During the UNPROFOR
mandate, the Croatian casualty and body count continued to mount. But Tudjman's
greatest pressures came from the increasingly vocal hawks in his own government
who were angered by U.N. Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali's early 1995 admission to the Security
Council that UNPROFOR wasn't in a position to discharge its responsibility in
Croatia and that its continued presence contributed to the stalemate. Croatia's
economy was in a shambles. Because of the arms embargo, Croatia had to buy
weapons on the black market and pay two to three times the going rate.
Aside from the
financial drain of caring for its own enormous displaced population, Croatia
had to bear the cost of supporting a flood of Bosnian refugees.
After Croatia
announced that it wouldn't renew the UNPROFOR mandate on January 12, 1995,
Secretary of State Christopher directed more criticism at Croatia than he'd
directed at the Serbs during their four years of rampage. In the words of that
great American philosopher Yogi Berra, it was "deja
vu all over again."
Christopher
was reviving his predecessor's technique of blaming the victims. He couldn't
quite pull it off, though, because he lacked Eagleburger's deviousness.
Christopher, who'd previously labeled the grossest Serbian genocidal acts
"naughty," sharply rebuked Tudjman and warned him that he'd be sorry.
The State
Department orchestrated media frenzy regarding Croatia's refusal to renew the
mandate failed to bring to light the fact that UNPROFOR's seminal mission in
Croatia was to implement the Vance peace plan--a mission it had failed to
accomplish. Additionally, Croatia had already renewed UNPROFOR's mandate eight
times, and eight times the West had miserably failed to fulfill its end of the
bargain. The media shrilly castigated Croatia for upsetting the peace. Just
whose peace they were talking about was unclear. Certainly the peace didn't
belong to the Croats, who were subjected to almost daily shelling from Serbian
artillery. Zagreb, Croatia's capital, lay a mere 30
miles from the front lines.
The only ones
enjoying peace were the Serbian separatists who occupied one-third of Croatian
territory.
Prior to the
Croatian offensive in July, 1995, the Serbs in Croatia hadn't been part of the
war's statistics. Rather than printing stories about Croatian victims who
desired to return to homes that the Serbs had confiscated, the media lamented
how the Serbs would be inconvenienced if the Croats attempted to take back
their territory.
Until the 1995
Croatian offensive, the Serbs in Croatia were crossing the borders of Bosnia
with impunity to fight in Bihac. The Bosnian Serbs
were especially interested in taking Bihac because
with the city under their control they realized their ambition to join a
Greater Serbia. Contrary to Strobe Talbott's
statement that the United States wouldn't accept the concept of Greater Serbia,
the United Nations Contact Group (which included the U. S.) had already de
facto recognized Greater Serbia as a fait accompli.
Despite
objecting to UNPROFOR's continuing presence in Croatia, Tudjman bowed to
American pressure less then 24 hours before the
deadline was to take effect and rescinded his order not to renew the mandate.
Having studied the State Department's psychological profile of Tudjman, Vice
President Al Gore and Secretary Christopher knew exactly which buttons to push
to change his mind.
Tudjman agreed
to extend the U.N. mandate on the condition that UNPROFOR would patrol
Croatia's borders between Bosnia and Serbia. But the condition was nebulous
because its implementation was predicated upon the goodwill of the Serbs to
allow it. By forcing him to change his mind, the United States had placed
Tudjman in a precarious position. He had to justify his waffling to a
parliament that wasn't noted for agreeing about anything--except, of course,
his original decision not to renew the mandate.
When the
West's provision proved impossible to implement, even the most naive diplomat
realized that Tudjman wouldn't allow the U.N. another chance to extend the
mandate. So the West came up with the so-called Z-4 Plan. The plan's
signatories, the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United
Nations, hailed it as the ultimate compromise for restoring peace in Croatia.
But a cursory examination of the document revealed that, in effect, it set up a
state within a state. The plan rewarded the perpetrators of genocide and
abusers of human rights with the right to institute their own judiciary,
currency, taxation, police force, and to control natural resources and tourism in
Serbian-held Croatia. The Z-4 Plan not only envisioned setting up a Little
Serbia in Croatia, it also demanded that Croatia amend its constitution and
laws to adhere to the Z-4 proposal. The plan hypocritically demanded Serbian
autonomy in Croatia, but ignored ethnic Albanian demands for the return of
their lost autonomy in Serbian-controlled Kosovo, despite the fact that
Albanians comprise over 90% of that region's population.
During the time the Contact Group was urging Croatia to accept the Z-4 proposal, the Serbs had intensified their siege on all the designated safe areas within Bosnia. The attacks on the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa came to their predictable bloody conclusions. Despite U.N. protection, Bihac's population of 135,000 was quickly starving to death. With each passing hour it looked as if the city would meet the same fate as Srebrenica and Zepa. The U.N. openly tolerated a massive rebel Serbian military build up and allowed Serbian forces to stage attacks on Bosnian and Croatian towns from areas under U.N. control. Milosevic sent a huge contingency of Serbian officers, including Yugoslavia's top general, Mile Mrksic, and troops to assist in the attacks. Mrksic had commanded a JNA brigade during the destruction of Vukovar; in April, 1994, he was active in the assault on Gorazde, a Bosnian Muslim enclave. Western intelligence sources confirm that over 300 officers in Serbian units operating in the Western Slavonian region of Croatia were being paid directly by Belgrade. When the Croatian forces liberated Okucani in Western Slavonia in 1995, they found records of the names, units, and payroll records of at least 6 colonels, 7 lieutenant colonels, 8 majors, 13 captains, 9 lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers of the Yugoslav Army that directly linked them to the Belgrade government. Despite irrefutable evidence, including reports from U.N. observers that Serbia had sent over 5,000 soldiers, 25 tanks, and 10 PACs to the Serbian occupied territories of Croatia in clear violation of Resolution 988, the U.N. took no action. The U.N. ignored intelligence reports and objective evidence, as well as letters sent to Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Yasushi Akashi from a number of Croatian officials. They gave Milosevic the benefit of the doubt when he maintained that no JNA forces were stationed outside Serbia.
The Western
powers even ignored statements by Milan Martic, the
former president of the so-called Serbian Republic of Krajina,
who publicly acknowledged Belgrade's involvement and influence in Serb-held
Croatia. "...FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) paid all the officers (including
General Mile Mrksic) that it sent to Krajina...No one in Krajina
undertook any moves, even of the smallest nature, without informing or
consulting Milosevic...I ordered the withdrawal of civilians into the depth of Krajina," Martic confessed.
These revelations (although they were widely known by anyone with a scintilla
of background about the situation) came at a time when the Clinton
administration was in the process of whitewashing Milosevic and talking about
easing sanctions on Serbia.
In late July,
1995, a host of Western leaders stated that the Serbs had won, implying that
the Bosnian government, which the West had recognized as a legitimate and
sovereign state, had no choice but to take whatever peace proposal was offered.
Defense Secretary William Perry said, "Serbs have occupied 70% (of
Bosnia). There is no prospect, as I see it, of the Muslims winning it
back." A few weeks earlier, British Under
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Douglas Hogg urged the Bosnians to
"acknowledge military defeat when it stares them
in the face." The West's failure to support Bosnia's sovereignty tacitly
reminded the Croatian leadership of its own precarious situation.
If the
neighboring Bosnian city of Bihac had fallen to the
Serbs, Croatia's security and territorial integrity would've been seriously
jeopardized. Serbs from the Krajina area in Croatia
had been pouring into Bosnia and joining their Bosnian-Serb counterparts in
attacking Bihac. Recognizing that the Z-4 Plan would
have only aided Serbian goals, Tudjman took matters into his own hands. In a
lightning-like move, Croatian armed forces liberated Croatian territory (except
for a small portion that abuts Serbia on its western border with Croatia) that
had been under Serbian control since 1990.
Unexpectedly,
Croatia retook the Krajina with minimal resistance
and causalities. Prior to the Croatian army's move into the area, the
overwhelming majority of Serbs, both civilians and military, had evacuated. In
contrast to the Krajina campaign, fighting was
furious in the Petrinja and Glina,
areas where the Serbian military put up a great deal of resistance. But the
relative ease with which the "weekend warrior" Croats soundly routed
the professional Serbs in the Krajina must have
embarrassed the Western military experts who had championed Serbian fighting
prowess.
The Croatian
victory unequivocally changed the balance of power in the Balkan conflict. The
victory relieved the imminent siege of Bihac and
ultimately saved Western Bosnia. When Croatian troops joined efforts with
Bosnia's legitimate army, the combined forces were able to recover 20% of
Bosnia's territory from the Serbs.
Contrary to
the shrill insistence of Western leaders that Croatian forces never should've
crossed into Bosnia, the Croatian army's presence on Bosnian territory was
legitimate because the Croats came at the request of the sovereign Bosnian
government. Although the Croatia-Bosnia coalition had been brokered by Washington,
the Croatian military's unexpected successes in Bosnia weren't acceptable to
the British and French. As Croat-Muslim forces were taking back territory and
rapidly closing in on Banja Luka, fear apparently
rose among the British and French that the coalition forces might liberate
territory that they had already committed to the Serbs. Western leaders turned
a blind eye and probably encouraged the Bosnian-Serbs to use air power to
redress the military imbalance. In an obvious attempt to salvage as much
territory as they could for the Serbs, the British and French placed enormous
diplomatic pressure on Croatia to disengage. A Serbian defeat wasn't
acceptable. After all, why would they have allowed the Serbs to kill 250,000
souls only to have the conquerors' territory taken away?
The shift in
the balance of power was decisive. NATO and U.N. military commanders expressed
surprise at how rapidly Serbian defenses had collapsed. The Serbian defeat must
have shattered the commanders' belief in Serbian invincibility and their
notions that the Serbs somehow ranked as the greatest guerrilla fighters in
history. Whether the Western military experts had based their pre-Croatian
offensive assessments of Serbian fighting strength on faulty judgments or, had
instead deliberately bent the truth to feed their political masters has yet to
be determined. Why European and Pentagon officials, spearheaded by Colin
Powell, told the public that fighting the Serbs would take 500,000 NATO
soldiers is an important question to ask.
The myth of
Serbian military strength, largely created in the Western military experts
imaginations, has only prolonged the conflict. Most Western governments
(especially Great Britain) condemned the successful Croatian offensive and
expressed indignation because Croatia's success contradicted the mythology that
had become sacred to those who advocated non-intervention and preservation of
the arms embargo. In keeping with a British tradition of sabotaging any
positive Croatian effort, British intelligence officers provided information to
Croatian officials before their action in the Krajina
indicating that the Serbian rebels were stronger than previously thought. At
the same time, Canadian peacekeepers were providing information on Croatian
troop movements to the Serbian rebels in Knin.
The Croatian
success in the Krajina couldn't have come at a better
time for the Clinton administration. The President's vacillating policy over
Bosnia had angered Congress to such a degree that it overwhelmingly voted to
unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. The House vote of 244-178 clearly
transcended party lines: 117 yes votes came from Democrats. Clinton vetoed the
bill and then tried everything in his political repertoire to keep Congress
from overriding it. Fortunately for Clinton, the Croatian offensive dissipated
the showdown and alleviated Congress' political pressure.
While Congress
and the Clinton administration were wasting energy on their confrontation over
the arms embargo, the President had already given his secret blessing
authorizing covert arms smuggling operations to the region. He wasn't simply
ignoring arms shipments, as he would later claim when the information became
public in April 1996, because his administration inspected the shipments in
great detail, ostensibly looking for atomic, biological, or chemical weapons.
Most likely, the true purpose of these searches was to do an inventory.
While arms
were making their way toward Bosnia, Clinton's relationship to Congress
resembled that of a philanderer to a cuckold. And like a cuckold, Congress was
the last to know about an affair that seemingly involved half the world.
Although Iran was singled out, such diverse countries as Hungary, Brunei,
Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Argentina were also supplying arms to
Bosnia through Turkey. The Clinton administration didn't object to the
shipments despite the fact that the transfers were in violation of the U.N.
arms embargo. Regardless of how the Bosnian weapons trade will affect Clinton's
future political position, the shipments ultimately benefited the non-Serbs.
The arms flow helped create conditions that relieved the Bihac
siege and accomplished what diplomats had previously failed to negotiate.
The spin
doctors in Clinton's administration worked overtime to exploit the Croatian
success. From the moment of the initial JNA attack on Slovenia to the very eve
of the Croatian liberation of the Krajina, both the
Bush and Clinton administrations had cast Croatia in the same light as Serbia.
Suddenly, like St. Paul's revelation on the road to Damascus, the Clinton
administration did a 180 degree about face. Although Defense Secretary William
Perry initially denied that the U.S. had given the Croats a green light for
their offensive, he later--when he saw political advantage in doing
so--suggested that the administration had at least given an
amber light. The Clinton administration also failed to discourage
unsubstantiated speculation that the American military played a major role in
helping liberate Croatian territory.
Before the
war, 120,000 Serbs and 102,000 Croats lived in the area called the Krajina. After Serbian ethnic cleansing, only 279 Croats
remained in the same area. These statistics were never mentioned by the media
when they complained about the Serbian retreat. Yet the Serbian exodus was
voluntary, orderly, and preceded the Croats entrance to the Krajina.
When the Serbs had deported Croats on a massive scale in 1991, the Croats had
no choice. They had to leave all their possessions behind. The lucky ones were
allowed to take only what could be bundled and carried. None were allowed to
take their cars or tractors. During the Serbian occupation of the Krajina, 94% of the region's 158 Roman Catholic churches
were destroyed or damaged. Out of the 122 Serbian Orthodox churches, 17 were
damaged, but only one was completely destroyed. According to a September, 1995,
communiqué from the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the U.N., most of the
damage to the Orthodox churches occurred prior to the Serbian retreat.
The Serbs who
left Krajina were neither victims of Croatian ethnic
cleansing, as the media purported, nor refugees. Rather, they left of their own
volition or under the direct orders and urging of the Serbian leadership. People
who move voluntarily aren't considered refugees under international law. The
organized manner of the exodus, which was conducted under the protection of
armed Serbian military forces and confirmed in documents and supporting
statements from top Serbian leadership in Belgrade press conferences, offers de
facto evidence that the Croats played no role in the migration. In late August,
1995, members of the Knin leadership published
documents in the Serbian daily Politka that revealed
orders by Milan Martic, quasi-president of the Krajina Serbs, to evacuate. Another document, signed by
General Mile Mrksic, called for the Serbs to leave
the area before the Croatian forces' arrival.
Many of the
Serbs had ample reasons to leave. Some had come from Serbia proper and moved
into Croatian homes whose previous owners had been killed or purged in 1991.
Another large number of indigenous Serbs fled because they had participated in
atrocities committed against their Croatian neighbors. As most of the
atrocities were committed in front of surviving Croats (a tactic used to scare
the remaining Croats into leaving and accelerate ethnic cleansing), the
witnesses were sure to return to their homeland and exact revenge. But the
majority of Serbs left because of coercion from fleeing neighbors.
In typical
fashion, the U.N. later wildly exaggerated the number of Krajina
evacuees and incidents of supposed Croatian brutality. The U.N. High Commission
for Refugees routinely inflates figures to receive increased funding. But in
this case, its numbers game only served to further erode U.N. credibility.
According to a
March, 1996, communiqué from the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the U.N., one
Geneva based international humanitarian organization has charged that the Krajina Serbs "continue to live in a hostile
environment where their physical safety remains precarious." The charges
were based on reports from December, 1995, to January, 1996, when the
organization "gathered a total of 67 individual allegations of incidents
against the integrity and safety of people ranging from looting, harassment and
threats of physical assaults and murder." This amounted to 34 incidents
per 10,000 persons. Imagine the reaction of those who chastised Croatia for
these horrendous statistics if they knew that the statistics for the same
crimes were 61 per 10,000 population in New York City, 92 in Washington, D.C.,
and 143 in Miami. Perhaps the humanitarian group wasn't aware that every
country has a natural rate of crime for which no government should be
condemned.
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