ANATOMY OF DECEIT
Copyright© 1997 by Jerry Blaskovich. Electronic edition by Studia Croatica, by permission of the author
Chapter 3: The
Road to Vocin
When the Soviet Union failed to protest the fall of the Berlin Wall or the mass exodus from East Germany, which had been the bastion of communism, other captive nations including Croatia and Slovenia suddenly realized the impotence of Russia's monolithic power. Because these nations no longer feared the threat of Russian intervention, they stopped suppressing long-held desires for self-determination. Although European communism wasn't quite dead, it was in its last agonies. Slovene, Croatian, and other Eastern European sentiments seemed to echo Richard Nixon's proclamation that "someday historians will look back on the defeat of communism in the Cold War and recognize it for what it was, one of the most magnificent achievements of free people in the history of civilizations."
In 70 short
years, communism had damaged more lives than any other philosophical force in
history.
But as
practiced in Yugoslavia, Marxism was more along the lines of 50% Karl and 50% Groucho. Its leaders performed a never-ending comedy of
corruption and mismanagement, indulging themselves in decadent extravagances
financed by the West. The Western media called Yugoslavia the
"America" of communist countries and treated it as their darling.
Meanwhile, the Yugoslav government brutally policed its own citizens, showed no
mercy to dissidents, and held more political prisoners than all the Eastern
states of the Soviet Bloc combined. Helsinki Watch and other human rights
organizations branded Yugoslavia one of the worst human rights violators in the
world.
Despite
Yugoslavia’s abominable human rights record, the United States was enamored by
Tito’s regime. No less an expert than America’s last ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Warren Zimmermann, said that this one sided love
affair persuaded the U.S. to look the other way on human rights violations.
The seminal
event that precipitated the conflict in former Yugoslavia occurred when the
Slovene Communist Party delegation walked out of the Yugoslav Communist Party
Congress in January, 1990.
Apparently
their sudden exit caught everyone off guard. Doctor Slobodan Lang, one of the
Croatian delegates, approached the head of the Croatian delegation, Ivica Racan, grabbed him by the
arm and said, "If you don't get up and leave, I'll leave on my own."
So the entire Croatian delegation walked out as well.
The Communist
Party was the supposed glue that bound Yugoslavia together. But instead of
having the strength of Krazy Glue, the party was as
weak as water-soluble paste. So the concept of Yugoslavia essentially died
after the Party Congress. As a result, the first multi-party elections were
held in Slovenia and Croatia.
Monitored by
international bodies experienced in election protocol, Croatia and Slovenia's
populace voted into office parties that represented their own national
interests rather than those of Belgrade. The results of the early 1990 Croatian
and Slovene elections were more triumphs over Serbian hegemony than victories
over communism.
The democratic
movement in Yugoslavia started in Slovenia. During the early 1980s, the Yugoslav
federal government steadily came to look upon Slovenia's involvement with
movements such as feminism, environmentalism, anti-nuclear protests, and (that
horror-of-horrors for communism) pacifism as violations of Yugoslav communist
dogma. The movements coalesced in early 1988 after journalists from Mladina, a youth magazine, were arrested for printing
documents stating that the federal military establishment had organized forces
to suppress Slovenia's nationalist movement. As a direct consequence of their
arrests, a call arose among Slovenes for free elections and the formation of
multiple political parties, both illegal according to the Yugoslav
constitution.
Nevertheless,
the Slovenes voted into office essentially the same cast of characters who had
ruled from the old Communist Party. But now these politicians had clearly
switched allegiances. The dogmatic Communist Party itself won only 38 seats out
of the 240.
Although the
Croatian elections also resulted in a seemingly decisive victory over Communist
Party rule, the electorate voted in mostly ex-Communists who had been purged
from the party in the aftermath of the so-called Croatian Spring, Croatia's
self-determination attempt of the 1970s. I should emphasize that most of the
dissidents of that era came from within the Communist Party and that the
average Croatian citizen didn't participate in the attempt.
In the 1970s,
Croats in the Yugoslav Communist Party hierarchy had thought the time was ripe
for Croatia to gain some degree of autonomy because the main enforcer of
Serbian aspirations, secret police head Aleksandar Rankovic, had fallen from grace in 1967. But the Croatian
Communist Party had misread Rankovic's purging.
Belgrade's hard-liners still held control. As a result, the majority of Croatian
dissenters, which included present Croatian President Franjo
Tudjman, went to prison. The Croatian Spring turned into the Croatian Silence.
For the next two decades, organized Croatian opposition collapsed, and Serbian
power in Croatia became even more rampant.
The dossiers
and the true numbers of dissidents who went to prison in the aftermath of the
Croatian Spring are still buried deep in the archives of the secret police.
After the dissidents had served their sentences, the "rehabilitated" ex-prisoners
were forbidden to write, to take part in public activities, and in most cases
even to work. Twenty years later, these same Croats became the main force
behind a more successful self-determination movement. For example, General Janko Bobetko, Croatia's present
Army Chief of Staff, had been a career military
officer in the Yugoslav Army. But as punishment for his role in the Croatian
Spring movement, the authorities denied Bobetko all
civil rights and stripped him of his position and rank.
The Slovene
and Croatian election results of early 1990 weren't well received in other
parts of Yugoslavia because they carried undertones of self-determination. The
Slovene Assembly's passage of a constitutional amendment transferring its
defense forces from federal to local control especially aggravated those
opposed to self-determination. Non-commissioned conscripts, who came from all
the republics, made up the bulk of the infantry in the Yugoslav Army.
Slovenia's announcement that it would no longer permit its citizens to serve
outside the boundaries of its republic and would ally itself with Yugoslavia's
defense only with Slovenia's unilateral consent directly challenged
Yugoslavia's federal rule.
For all
practical purposes, only one federal institution, the Yugoslav Army, remained
intact after the elections. Tito had left the constitution of 1974 as his
legacy to guide the transition from his personal rule and to maintain
Yugoslavia's unity. But its precepts were a nightmare to implement. More than
any other factor, the constitution directly accelerated Yugoslavia's demise.
The constitution established a collective presidency with a president to be
appointed yearly and rotated among each of the member republics and provincial
states.
Obviously,
under this system no strong leader could emerge, nor could one have the time to
nurture a power base. Additionally, the yearly rotation weakened the
president's ability to run the country effectively. But it offered each
republic, even the weaker ones, the opportunity to
fill the position. This provoked animosity from Serbia, Yugoslavia's strongest
state, despite the fact that the presidential seat remained in Belgrade.
In December,
1990, several months after the Slovene and Croatian elections, the renamed
Communist Party captured four out of five seats in the Serbian Parliament, a
victory that heightened the already rampant fear of Serbian aggression among
the non-Serbs.
Most
importantly, the 1990 Slovene and Croatian elections gave the republics the
means to openly address their fundamental grievance with the Yugoslav
federation, economics. Slovenia, with a population of two million and 10% of
Yugoslavia's work force, produced one-third of all Yugoslav exports and 20% of
the country's gross national product. But the Slovenes paid four-and-a-half
times more in federal taxes than they received in federal benefits.
The disparity
was no better in Croatia. In 1971, Croatia contributed 51% of Yugoslavia's
hard-currency earnings while Serbia earned 18%. Over the next 20 years, the
Croatian economy grew steadily, but Croats perceived Serbia as reaping most of
the federal financial benefits. Croatia's leaders, and to a lesser extent
Slovenia's, thought that the most equitable solution was to reorganize
Yugoslavia into a confederation.
Before a
Croatian referendum on confederation with Yugoslavia was voted upon in late
1990, the Serbs orchestrated a series of staged provocations against the
Croats. Serbian political leaders in Croatia refused to participate in the new
political system. Instead, they set about establishing an illegal Serbian
autonomous area that comprised 2.4% of Croatia's population and 8.8% of its
territory. The Serbs committed their first overt act on August 17, 1990, in the
Knin area when separatists blocked the main roads and
the only rail line that connected the coast, particularly Split, the second
largest city in Croatia, from the Croatian heartland. By cutting off the flow
of goods and people, the rebel Serbs threatened the very survival of the Croatian
state.
The Serbs then
began a nine-month siege of an isolated town north of Split. Violence broke out
on May 2, 1991, when nine Croatian policemen were ambushed and killed in a
village predominantly inhabited by Serbs. The Serbian rebels launched a
three-pronged attack in widely separated locations. Between March and June of
1991, the Serbs ambushed and killed 12 Croatian policemen at Pakrac, Plitvice National Park,
and Borovo Selo near Vukovar. Each time the JNA intervened, but instead of
backing the legitimate government, it openly allied itself with the Serbian
rebels.
Belgrade
ordered the JNA to prevent the referendum on confederation from taking place.
Both Belgrade and the rebel Serbs preferred a centralized, Communist
Party-controlled Yugoslavia that would continue to be financed largely from the
wealth generated by Croatia and Slovenia. Serbian leaders and the army feared
that confederation would cut their budgets and bankrupt both entities because
the new union would have meant full economic sovereignty for the individual
republics.
Shortly after
the referendum votes and the collapse of negotiations by Slovenia and Croatia
with Serbia, Serbian activities intensified. Using the pretext of protecting
its "endangered" minority, Serbia tried to reestablish control over
Croatia's infrastructure and natural resources. From the onset, the
confederation idea had been doomed to failure. Croatia was the only republic
that seriously considered it. From April, 1990, to the very eve of the conflict
in June, 1991, Croatia, ever naive, expected a resolution. Slovenia, ever
realistic, placed little credence in negotiating. Serbia, ever pragmatic, was
totally unyielding.
Slovenia opted
for independence on June 25, 1991, after it became clear that confederation was
a dead issue. Not to be outdone by Slovenia, Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia
earlier that same day. Two days later, after Slovenia took control of the
border and custom posts with Italy and Austria, the JNA launched an attack on
Slovenia. The federal army derived substantial funds from custom fees.
When the JNA
tanks crossed Croatia into Slovenia without hindrance, Tudjman reneged on
Croatia’s mutual defense pact it had with Slovenia. Tudjman’s decision, which
overrode his chief general, Martin Spegelj who wanted
to honor the pact, produced a near rift at Croatia’s command level. J.P. Mackley, an ever astute political analyst, said Tudjman’s
decision was based on his clinging hope for confederation. Even at that late
date and after his constituency had overwhelming rejected it confederation was
still in his mind.
But it was the
U.S. who really opened the door for the JNA’s attack. Apparently the JNA heeded
Secretary of State James Baker statement that Yugoslavia must be held together
at all costs.
From the very
onset, Belgrade’s effort to subjugate Slovenia was doomed to failure. Slovenia
had no indigenous Serbian population to assist the JNA and the Slovenian Alps’
terrain was not conducive for mechanized warfare. The conscripts in JNA once
came from all the republics that comprised Yugoslavia. But once
self-determination had a chance of being realized, some republics refused to
supply conscripts.
Consequently,
the JNA had no infantry to support an effective mechanized force. Given these
factors, the JNA withdrew. To pacify Serb chauvinists they said Slovenia wasn't
in the plan for creating a Greater Serbia.
Slovenia’s
self-determination effort cost them nine lives, whereas the JNA lost
thirty-seven.
Following the
Slovene campaign, the JNA hierarchy instituted an ideological cleansing of its
officer cadre. Although the Yugoslav armed forces had always been
overwhelmingly Serbian, the purge effectively turned the military into an
ethnically pure entity of Serbs.
The Slovene
campaign may have been an effort to intimidate Croatia without resorting to a
Serb-Croat war. But Croatia's self-determination efforts continued, and the JNA
attacked. Regardless of how Belgrade justified its assault on Croatia, the
invasion led to the deaths of over 12,000 people, most of them Croatian
civilians.
When the
Yugoslav Army confronted Croatian forces, they found nothing more than a bunch
of auxiliary policemen. But the Croats, all volunteers indigenous to the area,
exhibited remarkable resilience against a trained, technologically superior,
and larger army. They were motivated by that most one of basic of human
needs--to protect their families and homes. They would rather die than allow the
same horrors perpetrated by Serbian extremists on their brethren in neighboring
villages to be visited upon their loved ones.
Although
Zagreb's government was willing to offer plenty of political advice, at the
time of the first attacks it wasn't in a position to help anyone, let alone
provide meaningful military help. The high command in Zagreb was exactly what
the term implied, a high command only, with neither lower echelons nor an army
to command. Zagreb’s government had little influence outside the buildings they
were sitting in.
The concept
that Croatia had a viable central government was a figment of the imagination
rather than a reality. Mayors of cities like Zadar or
Sibenik often thumbed their noses at Zagreb’s
authority. General Raseta had 20,000 JNA soldiers in
Zagreb walking around with fixed bayonets, one kilometer away from where the
Croatian Sabor (parliament) were putting the
finishing touches on the Croatian constitution.
The Zagreb
government should burn candles in thanksgiving that Washington didn’t have
anyone on the ground in Croatia to provide hard intelligence. Washington
instead relied on the hard intelligence reports that U.S. Ambassador Warren
Zimmermann gathered at Belgrade’s cocktail parties, where Croatia was
projected, because of its “super-nationalism,” as having a well armed
disciplined army and a cohesive government. If the pro-Serbian cabal in the
State Department knew just how vulnerable Croatia really was, I’m certain
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and company would have taken
measures to tilt that precarious balance.
The Croatian
defenders, mostly armed with weapons no larger than hunting rifles, were
loosely controlled by commanders whose communication with Zagreb was
non-existent. This lack of chain of command made the defenders more effective.
Their knowledge of the tactical situation enabled them to mount defenses
without Zagreb's political interference, which often seemed self-serving and
counterproductive. But the lack of communication also severely hindered
Croatia's ability to logistically coordinate its sparse military ordnance to
where it was most needed.
The
overwhelming Serbian aggression wasn't simply a military operation. The Serbs
systematically set about destroying Croatian communities, historical monuments,
churches, and birth, death and property registers.
Destroying the
registers would effectively confuse property ownership issues and give the
Serbs legitimacy when arguing about demographics at international tribunals.
The conquerors tried to remove any trace of Croatian presence and culture in
the Serbian occupied areas. Furthermore, the Serbs intimidated and coerced
remaining Croats to leave. After noting the destroyed churches, hospitals, and
graveyards that the Serbs had left in their path, human rights advocate Dr.
Slobodan Lang aptly described the Serbian army actions as "The War Against Three Crosses."
Civilians made
up 84% of the causalities in Croatia. But the Western response to attacks on
mostly unarmed civilians was negligible. Following the slaughter that took
place in Croatian cities like Vukovar and in the
siege of Dubrovnik, the Western media finally came to question Serbian
justifications for the war. Reporting became more objective. But prior to those
awakening, Serbian propagandists had convinced the international media that the
casualties and the destruction of churches, historically meaningful structures,
and villages were appropriate responses to the Croatians' alleged propensity
for violence.
When the Serbs
first attacked Croatia, the defenders had to create an army from scratch.
Weapons and ammunition had been almost non-existent. Despite the paucity of
weapons, the Croats held their own once the shock of the initial JNA attacks
wore off.
President
George Bush inherited the final chapter of the fall of communism from President
Reagan.
Unfortunately,
Bush didn't know how to react. Although some political pundits applauded Bush's
foreign policy, he wasn't any better at foreign policy than he was at the
domestic policy that cost him the election. A major objective of foreign policy
is to prevent war, an objective Bush failed to achieve in both Iraq and
Yugoslavia.
A remarkable
parallel exists between the Iraqi and Yugoslav conflicts. A week before Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie
assured Hussein that "the U.S. has no opinion on the conflict regarding
[Iraq's] border disagreement with Kuwait." Likewise, in June, 1990,
Secretary of State Baker made a pivotal speech in Belgrade concerning
Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. He stated that Yugoslavs should use
"all means possible to preserve the stability of the country." Thus
Baker gave the Belgrade regime carte blanche to proceed with a five year
pattern of genocide.
Although
Yugoslavia didn't have enough oil to interest the United States, the country's
geo-strategic position was vitally important to the U.S. during the Cold War.
After Yugoslavia's split with Russia in 1947, the U.S. based its Balkan policy
on Tito's supposed resistance to Moscow. When the Russian military threat
disappeared in 1989, the integrity of Yugoslavia was no longer strategically
significant to U.S. national interests.
The fall of
the Berlin Wall foreshadowed the collapse of European Communism and transformed
fear of the Russian monolith into bravado. One-party rule broke down throughout
Eastern Europe as long-suppressed desires for self-determination began to
energize nationalistic forces. Caught up in the euphoria, Croatia and Slovenia opted
to secede from Yugoslavia. Remaining tied to Serbia would've meant remaining
chained to the
anachronism of an ineffective Communist past because the Communist Party was
reasserting itself in Serbia.
But a
Croatian-proposed loose confederation of former Yugoslav republics was flatly
rejected by Serbian President Milosevic. Instead, Serbia advocated a strong
central government with majority control of a renewed federation.
Milosevic
rekindled Serbian nationalism by whipping up myths that inflamed a pathological
and hysterical hatred of the Croats. This hatred was a direct result of an
effective brainwashing campaign.
Disinformation
convinced the Serbian population that Croatia had built concentration camps
where the Croats were slaughtering thousands of their Serbian minority. The
Serbs claimed to have uncovered a Vatican plot against Orthodoxy and an
Austrian-German-Croatian conspiracy to form a Fourth Reich. The Serbs also
claimed that the Croatian government was a reincarnation of the Ustashe. By stirring up anxiety and paranoia among
Balkan ethnic
groups Milosevic had begun to implement the tenets of the SANU Memorandum.
In 1987,
Milosevic denounced the leadership in the autonomous region of Kosovo and
subsequently installed a Serb-led police state there. Milosevic's Kosovo speech
brought him out of relative obscurity and into the limelight of Yugoslav
politics. The speech also laid the groundwork for the spread of nationalistic
chauvinism and the campaign to create a Greater Serbia.
During 1988
and 1989, Milosevic organized numerous nationally televised Serbian
demonstrations to protest supposed Croatian fascism. The demonstrations
panicked Serbs into believing that they were victims of discrimination.
Conversely, the demonstrations were shrewdly designed to intimidate non-Serbs
throughout Yugoslavia. Milosevic proclaimed Serbia the undisputed master of
post-Tito Yugoslavia, while he and his cronies used Balkan Stalinism,
deception, corruption, blackmail, demagoguery, and violence, to fulfill the
slogan "All Serbs in one state."
Milosevic
sabotaged the economic reforms of Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic. Markovic, a non-elected
party apparatchik in whom the Bush administration had placed a great deal of
trust, resigned on December 20, 1991, after rejecting a newly proposed federal
budget that earmarked 75% for the Yugoslav National Army.
His
resignation was a blow for those Americans who had based their approach to
Yugoslav policy on Markovic. Although Markovic had neither real power base nor a constituency,
Zimmermann presupposed this quintessential apparatchik to be the savior of
Yugoslavia. As Markovic was no longer on the scene
Milosevic misappropriated billions of dollars from the individual republics'
foreign reserves held in Belgrade banks, which he used to further his political
ambitions.
In May 1991,
after Milosevic blocked the scheduled rotation process of the presidency,
Yugoslavia became a country without a legitimate president. The Serbian
pretense that Yugoslavia was still a federation collapsed in October, 1990,
when Serbia imposed import duties on goods from Croatia and Slovenia.
Prior to the
Croatian and Slovene declarations of independence in June, 1991, the Serbian
media devoted a disproportionate amount of its coverage to criticizing the
secessionist republics. The Serbian press also stressed that the Serbs would be
defenseless against the genocidal urges of the Croats. The Serbian government
accused the leading political party in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica: HDZ), of planning to revive Ustashe
terror.
The assertion
that the conflict has its roots in ancient ethnic hatreds is a historical
inaccuracy. Certainly the area had witnessed numerous battles as the fault line
between Christian Europe and the Islamic Ottoman Empire. But contrary to media
and Western politicians' allegations, prior to 1918 there had been a remarkable
symbiosis between Serbs and Croats. In the Summer 1991
issue of Foreign Affairs, V.P. Gagon wrote:
"From a historical perspective, this area experienced little ethnic
violence prior to the twentieth century and never witnessed the vicious
religious wars as seen in Western Europe."
Many of the
myths carefully propagated by governments with a stake in the conflict break
down when history is studied. The 1990-1995 fighting wasn't caused by
inherently violent ethnic traits that manifest themselves every second or third
generation. Rather, forces beyond the control and borders of everyday Croatian
and Serbian citizens have fueled the violence. World Wars I and II can't be
blamed on Balkan genetics.
Diplomats and
British and American pundits added to the public's confusion by using Rebecca
West's 1941 novel, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, as their primary reference for
understanding the causes of the conflict. The problem with West's book was that
her extraordinary literary style overshadowed the historical facts. West's
contemporary, John Gunther, said at the time of the
book's publication: "[It's] not so much a book about Yugoslavia as a book
about Rebecca West." The book was a purely subjective travelogue that
romanticized the Serbs as racially superior beings.
West hated the
Croats as much as she admired the Serbs. She considered the Croats pretentious
for wanting to be associated with Western and not Slavic ideals. And she
negated Croatian and Bosnian self-determination efforts because she felt that
the Croats and Bosnians should've accepted their lot, including the murders or
imprisonment of dissidents, in gratitude for having been saved from the Turks.
West's pre-World War II era ideas continue to be spewed by the pundits of the
1990s. Although the book never professed to be historical, it nevertheless
influenced the thinking of several generations of readers about Yugoslavia. The
State Department made the book its bible for the region. Diplomats assigned to
the former Yugoslavia who had been prejudiced by West's "history"
severely handicapped the non-Serbian positions. Warren Zimmermann, one of the
highest ranking American diplomats, acknowledged West’s influence when he
mentioned her a number of times in his 1996 book,
Origins of a Catastrophe.
The republics
of Croatia and Slovenia countered Serbia's chauvinism with nationalistic
agendas of their own. After their first free elections the republics refused to
recognize Serbia's self-proclaimed seniority status within Yugoslavia. A few
days before Croatia and Slovenia formally voted for independence, Yugoslav
Prime Minister Markovic, forever the naive optimist
and Zimmermann’s great hope, said, "The federal government will counter
unilateral secession with all available means."
In the
meantime, Chetnik and Belgrade-sponsored groups had
infiltrated Serbian communities within Croatia and began supplying them with
weapons. Violence rose exponentially in Croatian regions heavily populated by
ethnic Serbs following Croatian and Slovene independence. Serbian provocations
escalated into a cold and calculated ethnic cleansing program. But contrary to
media reports, there were very few substantiated incidents of Serbs having fled
Croatia because of terrorism.
In many
instances Serbian antagonists used stratagems reminiscent of Mao Tse Tung to promote fear among the Serbs of Croatia against
the legitimate government. After Serbian rebels seized the police station in Pakrac (a village in Slavonia) in Spring
1991, the Croatian government sent in reinforcements. When the Croatian police
arrived, the Serbian rebels fled and found refuge in the local JNA base.
Serbian provocateurs then went house to house warning the indigenous Serbs that
the Croats were coming to kill them. Panicked, thousands of
Serbs fled by any means available. The media then depicted those fleeing
as victims and prime examples of Croatian terrorism despite the fact that none
of these so-called refugees ever saw any Croat lift a finger against them.
Banner headlines lamented the "Bloodbath at Dawn" and "Massacre
of Innocents". Yugoslav Army tanks were called in to keep the peace.
The situation
in Croatia exploded in July and August of 1991, when Serbian irregulars, aided
by the JNA, initiated a series of incidents. Thousands of innocent civilians
died, and entire cities and villages were wantonly destroyed. The war in Bosnia
would follow a similar pattern, though on a much grander scale.
The Serbs
instituted and organized a systematic policy meant to destroy the non-Serbian
population, cultures, traditions, and religions. In Croatia, violence was
primarily aimed at Roman Catholic churches, hospitals, and historical
structures. Twenty eight of the latter were designated by UNESCO as cultural
monuments. Although of no military value, medieval Dubrovnik was under siege
for months.
The Serbs made
a cardinal mistake when they besieged Dubrovnik in the beginning of October,
1991.
The Yugoslav
conflict might have remained a backwater civil disorder in the eyes of the
media if the Dubrovnik attack and siege hadn't drawn international attention.
For the first time the media became skeptical of Serbian justifications for
their war.
Unfortunately,
this change in perception didn't include the Western governments. Alone among
the its allies, only Germany was outraged that an army
was attacking a purely civilian target and condemned the Serbian actions. With
each passing day, the siege of Dubrovnik became increasingly desperate. The
city's population began to panic, especially when they saw how the civilized
world ignored their plight.
For many of
the inhabitants of Dubrovnik, the bombardment was their second experience
living under siege. Approximately 55,000 refugees thought they had found a safe
haven Dubrovnik after escaping from Serbian onslaughts in other parts of
Croatia. Expensive hotels, once playgrounds for the rich and famous, where many
of the refugees were housed, were within Serbian mortar range. In his pathetic
attempt at shuttle diplomacy, Lord Carrington urged the citizens of Dubrovnik
to surrender.
As the siege
intensified press headlines read: "Shell shocked Croat soldiers abandon
the last hilltop fort protecting the ancient city." The victims of the
siege were in such dire straights that French
Minister for Humanitarian Relief Dr. Bernard Kouchner
called for surrender. Dr. Kouchner, the founder of Medecins sans Frontěeres and Medecins du Monde, which is a Non Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) that sends doctors to catastrophes throughout the world,
was aware of what the Serbs were capable of doing because he had seen the
aftermath of Vukovar. Kouchner
naively tried to broker a unilateral cease-fire with the Serbian forces.
Without Croatian consent, he offered to demilitarize Dubrovnik. The Croatian
forces would surrender what arms they had and leave by sea; the EC or U.N.
would monitor and guarantee the peace.
The last stage
of any siege is when the defenders consider evacuating the women and children.
This situation was fast approaching in Dubrovnik. The Croats knew they couldn't
defend the city against a well armed, well trained army with only a few
shotguns, hunting rifles, and two 1942 vintage 76 millimeter artillery pieces.
After the Serbs cut off the water supply, the reservoirs emptied, and the
situation appeared desperate.
Miraculously,
though, it rained. Not only did the rain water replenish the bodily needs of
the besieged, the rain also gave the city's defenders a tremendous
psychological boost. Even one particularly terrible six hour period on Saint
Nicholas Day, December 6, 1991, when 600 Serbian artillery shells exploded in
the old historic district, couldn't deter the steadfast resolve of Dubrovnik's
citizens.
The West
assumed Dubrovnik's fall was imminent. The Serbs allowed humanitarian
organizations to send three ships to evacuate 1,700 women with their children.
Once accomplished, the next step would've been for the Serbs to take the city.
Instead, the women refused to leave their sons, husbands, and fathers. The
women of Dubrovnik evoked what Lang called the Masada strategy. The citizens of
Dubrovnik felt that the only way to confront the Serbian strategy of generating
refugees as tools of genocide was for every member of society to refuse
surrender. The Dubrovnik crisis dissipated after the Croat forces mounted a
counter-offensive, and the Serb forces retreated from the high ground.
In a January
14, 1992 full-page ad in the New York Times, as the mayhem increased in
Croatia, 104 Nobel Prize winners spurred by Linus
Pauling called upon world governments to stop the wanton destruction by the
Yugoslav Army and save the Croatian people from extinction. Never before had so
many awardees concurred on a common cause. But even this gesture didn't affect
the Western governments' policy of appeasing the Serbs.
The Serbs were
undeviating in their military campaigns. Prior to any offensive maneuver they
forewarned the indigenous Serbian population. Once those people not having a
death wish were safely removed, incessant, coordinated tank and artillery
bombardment followed. Most of the terrified non-Serbian population fled and in
marched the Serbian irregulars. Those remaining non-Serbs were beaten, murdered
and raped, only to wish they had fled with the first wave.
Before overt
hostilities erupted, the outside world found it difficult to see that a bloody
conflict was brewing. President Bush ignored highly credible CIA warnings in
1990 that Yugoslavia would break up spontaneously within 18 months, with a
strong likelihood that this process would be accompanied by acts of violence
and civil war. European diplomats were also unconvinced. During the Slovene war
the foreign ministers of the European Community supported diplomatic
negotiations that, in their view, had already sorted out the entire problem.
The West either didn't understand the nature of the conflict or it didn't care
to understand.
Bush abandoned
what had been the linchpin of U.S. policy, the destabilization of communism,
because of an inordinate devotion to geo-political stability. Bush ironically
first abandoned these tenets in Russia, the country that originated the need for
this policy in the first place. Enamored with Communist leaders Mikhail
Gorbachev in Russia and Ante Markovic in Yugoslavia,
Bush was unable to comprehend realpolitik and
continued supporting the status quo and survival of the Soviet Union. Bush
listened enthusiastically to Gorbachev's persistent warnings about an impending
catastrophe if the Soviet Union broke up. Gorbachev had a fear of new
leadership, and his distrust of emerging, freely elected parties apparently
influenced the American president. Instead of promoting democracy, free
elections, and respect for human rights, Bush chose to maintain the existing
state of affairs. The U.S. and Western European nations looked at Yugoslavia
through the prism of the Soviet Union. As armed conflicts commenced, support
was given to the political anachronism prevailing in Serbia for fear that an
outbreak of secessionist movements among constituent republics would provoke
similar outbreaks in the Soviet Union and have a destabilizing effect there
too.
The Western
right of self-determination seemed only to apply to the Eastern European
countries that wished to leave the Soviet bloc. In December 1991 Bush
reiterated his policy that states should neither be created nor destroyed.
Condemning "suicidal nationalism," he begged the Ukrainians to remain
in the Soviet Union and stick with reliable Gorbachev. Reinforced by the advice
of Ambassador Zimmermann, Secretary of State Baker notified Croatia and
Slovenia that they shouldn't expect U.S. recognition. The democratic aspirations
of Croatia and Slovenia were vilified in some Western political circles as the
real cause of the war.
Zimmermann
also actively spread disinformation about Croatia. In early 1991, in an
interview in the Serbian periodical NIN, Zimmermann stated that America was
concerned about dangers Serbs and Jews were facing in Croatia, despite a lack
of any verifiable instances of Jews or Serbs perceiving themselves in jeopardy.
By raising the
suspicion, he created an issue out of a non-issue and aided and abetted the
Serbian propagandists.
Zimmermann
influenced policy makers when he articulated the pro-Serbian cabal's agenda in
the State before the Yugoslav Economic Council meeting on September 19, 1991
Department in Washington D.C. He disingenuously characterized the events in
Yugoslavia as merely a conflict between two narrow-minded nationalisms. The
only difference between the Serbs and the Croats was that the Croats weren't
expansionistic.
Because the
Croats forced Serbs living in Croatia to take loyalty oaths, fired them en
masse from their jobs, and burned and looted their homes, he said the Serbs had
justifiable reasons to be angry with the Croats.
Furthermore,
although Serbs comprised a sizable percentage of the population in Croatia, the
Serbs didn't have the power that their numbers dictated. Zimmermann's
half-truths and lies might as well have been written by Serbian propagandists.
The Balkan
policies of the United States, Britain, and France were based on outmoded
balance-of-power politics. These self-appointed Western godfathers had an
almost pathological attachment to their hybrid, Yugoslavia, an entity they had
created after World War I. They looked upon their noble experiment, with its
imbedded Serbian ethnic and civic nationalism hegemony, as sacrosanct--but
never considered the non-Serbs’ civil rights. After the eruption of the
conflict, these countries tried to appease radical Serbian chauvinism because
they saw that policy as the best way to keep Yugoslavia intact. History has
shown that appeasing aggression only encourages a conflict to continue. So when
countless Western negotiated cease-fires were disregarded by the Serbs, the
only response the Western powers could come up with was to wring their hands
and make statements of protest.
After a number
of governments encouraged Croatia and Slovenia's self-determination
aspirations, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger did everything in his
power to sabotage those efforts. Old wounds reopened and continue to fester
amongst the allies. Following the reunification of Germany, European states
took sides on the Balkan issue exactly as they had in 1914. In a Los Angeles
Times editorial, the self-styled pundit Martin Walker presumptuously branded
the German reunification as the "Fourth Reich" and claimed that
Germany's breaking ranks over the Balkan issue "provoked the first
European war since it plunged us into the last one". Undaunted by
criticism, Germany decided to play a more forceful role in European affairs. But
the German Constitution forbids deployment of its military other than in
defense of German territory or outside of NATO's jurisdiction. So a military
response to the crisis in former Yugoslavia was precluded.
Germany
officially recognized Croatia and Slovenia in January 1991, despite almost
hysterical posturing by France and England, strong U.S. objections, and a
vigorous campaign by Eagleburger. U.N. peace negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord
Peter Carrington argued that recognition would only escalate the war. But diplomatic
recognition brought with it the first lasting cease-fire in Croatia, after 58
previous peace agreements had been broken by the Serbs. Germany's decision was
its first unilateral pronouncement since World War II.
Despite having
the world's third largest economy and being the second largest exporter,
Germany's external political voice has been muted by its competitors because of
Germany's role in World War II. But Germany's economic dominance in Central and
Eastern Europe has led to political influence in the region.
Germany's
moral stand on the conflict in former Yugoslavia didn't sit well with its NATO
allies, particularly the Bush administration. American officials forecast that
this "new German assertiveness" would be "difficult to
stomach" because it thrusts Germany back into a leadership role and
condemns the United States to secondary status in Europe. Germany bluntly
criticized the refugee policies of its Western neighbors who were far less
generous in offering asylum. As of August 1992, Germany had accepted 240,000
refugees from former Yugoslavia, while France and England together had taken
less then 2,000.
Looking for a
convenient scapegoat for their inertia, the other Western governments chastised
Germany for prematurely recognizing Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet Britain
and France, who had been the loudest critics of Germany, voted in the
affirmative in the European Community’s (EC) unanimous decision to support
recognition. Germany, was the only Western country to
take a moral stand when they protested the barbaric atrocities, indiscriminate
shelling of non-combatant civilians in cities like Dubrovnik, and the leveling
of Vukovar. Ignoring Germany's position, the United
States continued to support an indivisible Yugoslavia, a policy that encouraged
and contributed to the aggressiveness of the Serbian-led JNA.
The schism
between the Western allies over the Balkan issue has been blamed for slowing
down European integration by some pundits. But the main rationale for
integration had been the threat of the Soviet Union's monolithic Communism. As
a result of its disintegration, European integration has slowed to a snail's
pace. Political lines have emerged based on economic spheres of influence.
Germany is the prevailing economic influence in most Eastern European
countries. Its economic power blocked France and Britain from competing in
those new markets. France and Britain's only partners in the old Eastern bloc
are Romania and Serbia.
Perhaps one of
the reasons for the delay until April 27, 1993, of economic sanctions on
Yugoslavia was that France and Britain didn't want to jeopardize their future
economic relationships with Serbia. And England's complicity with Yugoslavia
has recently started to pay off. A March 1996, article in the Greek weekly Ependitis, titled "The Secret Major-Milosevic
Agreement," claimed that British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind had entered into a gentlemen's agreement with
Milosevic to advance credits of five billion dollars for the purchase of
British weapons. In addition to a number of high ranking British officials,
several representatives of British companies and banks, including Midlands and
Barclays, participated in the negotiations. As a reward, British interests will
apparently control Yugoslavia's banking system and markets. The British
justified their deal with Milosevic as an effort to combat Germany's
ever-widening influence in the Balkans.
Another reason
for the British’ government’s obvious complicity with Serbia may have resulted
from successful influence peddling by the Serbs. According to the Guardian
(December 23, 1996), shortly before the 1992 general election in England, the
Tory Party, with John Majors full knowledge, received
an enormous amount of funds from Serbian sources. As witnessed by the Clinton
administration, apparently accepting campaign from foreign sources is common
practice among Western democracies. The only harm caused by Indonesia and China
funding Clinton was to its own people and opposition parties. But the harm
caused by the Serb funding the Tories added to the death and destruction of the
non-Serbs. The Labour Party questioned the ethics of
the Tory Party accepting funds from forces that had placed British subjects in harms way while serving in the armed forces in former
Yugoslavia.
After the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, European governments deluded themselves
into believing that their new trading bloc would be endowed with political
unity and power. The EC still reflects the objective economic and social
interests of its members. Yet the EC's decision-making procedure allows only
the lowest common denominator to work. Greece's implacable opposition to
Macedonian recognition has caused severe embarrassment to EC members. Greece's
intense lobbying on Serbia's behalf made a coherent EC approach to the Balkan
crisis very difficult.
President
François Mitterand of France made an unannounced
visit to Sarajevo on June 28, 1992, to show solidarity with the besieged city.
Although his trip was a minor gesture, it met with a great deal of criticism
from European leaders. His visit particularly piqued the British because the
French president had grabbed the limelight on the eve of the British takeover
of the EC presidency. Clearly the EC is composed of members with independent
agendas. Military involvement in the Balkans by EC members was highly unlikely
because a consensus on the make-up of the intervening force would be
politically contentious and ultimately an unsolvable issue.
The EC
erroneously embarked on a policy of localized solutions to the war that neither
stopped the violence nor resolved any of its underlying causes. Milosevic,
whose regime was responsible for supplying the Serbian insurgents with weapons
and other support, disappeared into the background during the seemingly endless
peace discussions that had taken place in such varied spots as London, Paris,
Geneva, and Greece.
The West
struggled to find a solution to the crisis in former Yugoslavia and was stymied
for many valid reasons. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War
absorbed considerable Western attention, so other hot-bed regions paled in
strategic significance. Because Serbia posed no military threat outside of
former Yugoslavia, the West found the Balkans uninteresting. But the West's assertion
that military involvement would've immersed its forces in a quagmire with no
discernible enemy was nothing more than a weak excuse.
Those who
feared that United States or NATO air-strikes against Serbian positions or
commitment of ground troops would result in a deeper Western involvement in the
war were wrong. After the conflict had already caused 250,000 deaths, NATO
finally employed air strikes. Although those first attacks were anemic, they
did get the Serbs' attention.
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– Traductor croata
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Joza Vrljicak
– Master in Economics
(Concordia U, Montreal)
(+54-11) 4811-8706 (+54-911) 6564-9585 (+54-911) 5112-0000